get along with everybody. we have to get along with everybody. i say wait a minute,. i'm a businessman i live in manhattan. it's all democrat. republicans don't even want people for the most part. if they do, they will get 5%. i have to get along with everybody. i think that will be a tremendous asset. right now, we have gridlock in washington. we have people that they don't talk. i have been a very political person, always. republicans and democrats, they liked each other, they got along. we would have different views on things, but, in the evenings, they would go out and have dinner together with their families. you don't see that anymore. there is total hatred and total gridlock. i will give you one point. countries leaving the united states. they are leaving for better

taxes, and a lot of things. pfizer. how big is pfizer? thousands of jobs will be lost. they are also leaving because we have $2.5 trillion -- at least that is out of drink and these companies cannot get back because of bureaucracy and horrible agreements, but because the taxes are too high. they actually take the company, and move the company to the money. the republicans and democrats totally agree that the money should come back. for three years, they cannot get a deal. there is no leadership. it is gridlock. this is an example of something -- all the people appear, they all agree. they are politicians. all talk, no action. it is not like something where .hey can't agree

this is something that everybody agrees, the money should pour into this country, we should use this money. they agree, and they cannot get it done because of gridlock and incompetent leadership. >> hillary clinton, is she a friend of israel? honestly, i don't think anybody can say. she says she is, but all of a sudden, she says maybe less so than you thought because she is going far to the other side. bernie sanders has brought her to positions that she did not want to be at p a you look at some of the things she is saying right now. i will tell you what, she does not have the strength or energy to help israel. she doesn't. [applause] mr. trump: take a look. she will come out and do an event, and then you do not see her for another 3-5 days. it's true. she does not have the strength or energy. israel needs more than just our

support, they need strength. they need real power. you look at the countries, as they fall over there, and israel has some difficulties. one thing, and i think you will all admit it, these people are fighting really dirty. they fight better than we used to think. 15 years ago, with my friends from israel -- i have a lot of friends from israel -- they used to smile and laugh. now, they are saying, they are dirty fighters. they are tough. they are not the jv. obama said they are the jv. they are not, folks. they are tough. we need general george patton, macarthur. i do not want my generals on television saying, isis is very tough. other dayy the saying, isis is very tough, i

don't know. general george patton, they did not like him because he was foul mouthed, a brilliant guy. he would have never made it. patton. we need a genius like macarthur. we have those people. i will find that person. crap out ofk the them. we are going to win. [applause] >> last question. as you see it, the greatest challenges facing the united states. russia, china, radical islam. mr. trump: radical islam -- [applause] you onep: i will tell thing i know it is not is global warming. that is the one thing i know isn't. [applause] we have a guy that just the other day said -- right they want to blow

our cities up, destroy our civilization, and he is worried about global warming, which a lot of people think is a hoax. by the way, i have one so many environmental awards. i want a air, crystal water, i want a lot of things. global warming -- you noticed a change the name. they go global warming, climate change. i hear a lot about extreme weather. how can you mess with extreme weather. it is a disgrace, what is going on. to have this man and verizon's embarrass us to say that global warming is our biggest threat, we have to get him out so fast. thank goodness we only have one year left. inc. you. [applause] thank you.

you, everybody. [applause] >> c-span takes you on the road to the white house. att access to the candidates town hall meetings, speeches, rallies, and meet and greets. we are taking a comments on facebook, twitter, and by phone. every campaign event we cover is available on her website, c-span.org. live coverage will continue here on c-span. in just a few minutes, we will have a panel discussion on the strategies of al qaeda and isis, the future of the jihadist

movement, and how the u.s. should respond in the current environment. the new america foundation is the host of this with a number of experts. in just underlife 10 minutes. right now, we will bring a discussion on the future of american warfare. this is from this morning's "washington journal." host: now joining us is a guest we have had on relatively frequently, linda robinson. she has covered a lot of military campaigns. of military campaigns. where were you last? guest: i think we are going to talk about isil today, so i have been out in the region this year. i have been to iraq and jordan and kuwait. in iraq, i visited all of the various units that were doing the advisory training work paid host: are you working -- training work. host: are you working with the pentagon? guest: rand is a nonprofit

nonpartisan research institution. the bulk of its work is for the u.s. government, and of the the biggest part is research. host: so when you are out in the field, do you get a sense of who is fighting to? -- who is fighting who? guest: it is very complex. in my view, we have had a number of iraqi units over the past year that the u.s. military has reengaged with and is starting to understand their exact state because there was a loss of civility of was leading these ofts, what -- visibility fit was leading these units i watched that unit grow up over my many visits, for my time as a reporter in 2003 through 2008.

they became the most efficient unit, and they still are. they have been in every battle. they have suffered a lot of losses. so that is the high-end. the low-end arguments that completely disintegrated. and then there are the kurdish forces, which is kind of a militia. they have a less formal organization. but they do also have special forces units that the u.s. military has been closely engaged with. 2003, heavily through that -2010 period. i think that that is really where the main hope rests right now, but because you need a whole force, as they say, you need enough mass of indigenous keeping the peace after a clearing operation for so it is very important to be working -- operation.

so it is very important to be working with the full force. obviously, they are trying to develop the sunni travel forces as a -- tribal forces as a hold force in conjunction with the iraqi government. and then syria is a whole different do of groups. -- whole different stew of groups. host: if you could explain, looking at this map, where u.s. forces might be. it shows the surrounding area as well. we will put it in your monitor over here, but you can see it right over here as well. guest: ok. good. u.s. advisory role -- and i should just maybe throughout a few facts here. there has been about 3500 u.s. military in iraq over the past year. and that includes special operations forces, conventional

military, and another couple thousand coalition partners also doing three things. train and equip on six sites. most of them are around baghdad, but also up in the kurdistan region in the north and out in the west. otherwise, they are clustered in bases around the greater baghdad area. then there is the advisory mission. this is where the special operations forces have been heavily devoted to matters with the units i mentioned, the kurdish and iraqi -- i shouldn't say that, the iraqi special operations forces is a very mixed unit. a lot of times people just assume that things are broken down into the various sects. this is the one unit in iraq that has the full complement of sunni, shia, and kurds. our special operations forces specialition

operations forces have been outed rising, but they have been very restricted -- have been out advising, but they have been very restricted in what they are able to do. and a lote has been -- of people in the field have been pushing -- to get the advisor to have been after lower levels. -- to get the advisory mission to happen at lower levels. in order to have that full effect on the unit. and they are doing things -- a lot of the debate in the u.s. has are involved -- unfortunately -- around the use of the guys on the ground that we put out there to colin airstrikes. -- call in airstrikes. it is very important that think for people to learn a little bit

more about the full spectrum of advisory roles. and that i think is where we are heading now, to expanding that. there is also the new use that is being -- authorized by the u.s. government to have the troops out in a combat role. i think it will just be the special operations expeditionary force that secretary carter talked about in his testimony host: just a few days ago to host: how quickly -- testimony just a few days ago. host: how quickly will those troops be added check of -- the added? guest: we don't know when they are actually going to get on the ground, but it will be soon. i think what you have heard consistently from both secretary carter and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is the need to accelerate and intensify. especially in the wake of paris.

now i think the world's attention is riveted on the isil problem. so i think you'll see them certainly within a matter of weeks. but i do think it is important while we are entering a new phase now to point out that the special operations forces have been there for a year. emblematic raid that people think of is the raid into syria, which special operations forces conducted. they did end up killing the leader and captured his wife, and a huge trove of intelligence information. and that is the key reason for these rates. they are going to yield a trove of intelligence, and hopefully capture isil members that can then be interrogated. and that will greatly expand the knowledge of who is doing what.

a scaley something on or rapidity of the essay done in thering the days -- of surge done and iraq -- in iraq. now, in iraq are going to do this in conjunction with the special operations forces i have mentioned. they are not doing unilateral raids in iraq. in syria, they will be doing unilateral. when it is a case of a u.s. hostage, they will hours reserve the right to do a unilateral mission to host: -- linda robinson -- -- unilateral mission. host: linda robinson is our guest. screen ifs are on the you want to participate in this conversation. sam in manassas, virginia, the republican line. caller: yes, good morning. let me say this.

first of all, we could get rid of isis in one day. they would drop an atomic weapon on that city a net would be it. haram, they keep kidnapping and raping all these people. when they run through the woods, napalm them. the reason we don't get rid of these people is because then who are we going to fight? we have a $700 billion military budget. we need to keep that up. if you didn't fight these people, we wouldn't need of them. host: i think we got the point, sam. were you able to hear that? guest: yes, i was. i think this is a very important point. obviously, the u.s. has a tremendous amount of power, and we have been conducting in air war -- an air war. what you achieve from the air is physical destruction.

and if you don't have the rules of engagement that have been applied, you can have mass civilian casualties. and those things can create their own problems. but there is also the central question of: then what? who is going to come along behind to guarantee the peace and into these areas don't become terrorist sanctuaries. and that is why this approach is being taken, to really work through indigenous forces in iraq and in syria so that you have an end game. and i think this is why there is a lot of disappointment about u.s. military activities over the past year. the endgame can take a while. it can take a generation. but i think there is a great deal of frustration in the wake of the various terrorist attacks that have occurred, paris being the most notable, but also we had the russian jet shot down in egypt. so i think there is it is our

right not to quickly finish the problem. useisil, or isis, and i do isil because that is the government's term, they are heavily dug in. they have fortified the city's that they have been holding -- cities that they have been holding now for well over a year. these are going to take a long time to recapture and, most importantly, hold with capable ground forces. host: charles, ohio, the independent line. caller: good morning, sir. i find it amazing that even the guest that you have on will not call what happened in santa barbara a terrorist attack. those people didn't do that on the spur of the moment. host: you know what, charles, i'm going to have to move on because we are done talking about what happened in san

bernardino and we have moved on. we are talking about the current u.s. policy toward syria and iraq. linda robinson, when you hear the term, "boots on the ground," what does that mean to you checkups we have to do -- what does that mean to you? we have 35 people already over there. -- 3500 people already over there. guest: it is a vague term that only creates confusion. it is very, very harmful to any public understanding and debate about what we are doing. these boots on the ground, of course, as you say, we have had that he 500 advisers over there. they are all u.s. military in uniform. i would say the majority of them are combat arms and infantrymen. if you were to deploy them in combat mode, they would be combat troops could but they are all qualified -- troops.

but they are all qualified to be troops. as i read all the congressional testimony, i believe the administration employed that term to mean it was not going to count it as an option of sending large combat formations over to fight in the front -- that they were not going to take the leading role in combat. now ie crossed the line think into combat. of course, there was the first combat death with the u.s. special operation forces participating with the kurdish special operations forces in the raid on a prison to free the captives there. and the delta soldier died in coming forward to help the kurds, who were parked down -- bogged down. we have crossed the line and we

are now in a combat market but what i believe the administration -- combat mode. but what i believe the administration intends is keeping the iraqis and -- keeping the iraqis in the lead. the more competent the ground force is, the syrian forces, the less the u.s. force is needed. the counterterrorism service, the iraqi special operations forces, they do have people able to direct airstrikes. they are not as proficient. the use of english language is very important good that is the language of air power. so you do need to have kind of a this stage.ort at but the emphasis is on growing that capability of these ira qis. host: republican, mike, go ahead. caller: yeah, the policies that

she is talking about -- i mean, it is more or less when everything is working well. [indiscernible] -- and i know you don't want to talk about the shootings, but it is related. when the united states sees that not much is doing done about isis -- i talked to the guy yesterday on c-span, and he voted that bill down to vet these people. statese the united citizen supposed to do? response for that caller? guest: i would say i think the paris attacks have a road to fear, and is a real fear that isil is moving into a phase of external attacks. my view of them as they will attack where it is expedient.

we have seen that in iraq over the past year. they didn't stand and fight, they melted away and began attacking elsewhere. so they are very agile and they are going to shift. the way i look at that policy option is to a three options. containment, which is standing off and using air power. there is the current approach, which is relying on an building partner forces on the ground. and then there is a large-scale u.s. direct military intervention that i believe there is very little support for among either party to go in and do that. but there is an agreement that you have to deal with the iraq-syria problem and the amount of territory there holding because that is really the central base from which all of this emanates. sean, florida, the independent line. more u.s. troops to the middle east. what do you think? caller: good morning.

let's be realistic about this. this entire discussion and our actions are predicated on a premise. that premise is that we originally went in to get the mass -- weapons of mass destruction. there were no such thing. all of the asked that have been created -- acts that have been created since then have been disastrous. on the death of so many of our citizens. and here we go again, stepping into a place where we have no business being. making mistakes that are going to lead to further mistakes down the road. what is necessary is for us to take a brave step and step out of there. protect and to help as much as we can. but we have no business being there. we are there because we made mistakes. and this is not going to and. -- end. and this discussion about how many troops we are going to send is again all predicated on a

premise. host: linda robinson? guest: certainly, those with long memories, as this caller certainly has, the original sin, if you will, of the invasion of iraq in 2003 was this premise that there were weapons of mass destruction, which turned out to be incorrect. , and we has passed now did fight a very large were there. ofl rose up out of the ashes al qaeda in iraq, and it now holds more territory with more guns and more capability than anything we have ever seen. i would say i think in reaction to the caller said, i think that there has been an effort, but probably not a sufficient effort, to ask the arab countries to do more. those surrounding countries have the greater interest. and you see, for example, saudi arabia has been very preoccupied

with its own military operation in yemen. aboutd, it is a concern what is going on there is some of this conversation in its entirety at c-span.org. we will go live now to a conversation on combating al qaeda and isis posted by the new america foundation. >> it provides an assessment of where we are currently, after attacks by the islamic state -- egypt -- asnce, and well as the framework for how we can understand the competition between the islamic state and al qaeda. while the jihadist movement was

dominated for over a decade by somewhat arguer, that it is less competitive than hadislamic state which has repercussions. discussing they paper. unfortunately, we are still waiting for our lead author, but .e will be able to join us daveedel includes peter bergen gartenstein-ross. onwill also receive comments the paper. [no audio]

>> her work consists of a number of things. she did her doctorate, focusing on the role of muslim intellectuals, and is also working on a project at the moment, tracking foreign fighters from arab countries. meantime, i guess we will

in the meantime, we will try the co-author, possible, and get a beginning description of the paper. >> good morning. my name is jason france. i'm one of the authors on this report. the report was done originally to take a look at these strategic competition between al qaeda and the islamic state. waysntent was to examine that al qaeda and isis are in

competition with each other. looked at the islamic state and al qaeda as revolutionary groups. it is not the only way to examine them. they are of course terrorist organizations, and in the case of the islamic state, because i state. toh organizations have tried fight against the world order, and particularly in the region. in this way, we have identified al qaeda as more of a traditional malice organization where they favor political preparation of areas that they intend to go into. they use violence, but it is not in support of political objectives. second.ence comes this has been seen in a number of the public writings from the

leaders. y feet off of thet experiences and writings of che guevara, on how they put dominance towards violence, and politics through violence. second.e for a further, we look at differences in their strategies within the construct, and how we examine it. we look at -- al qaeda has been going through a branding effort in the last two years where they have been trying to downplay their own role within their affiliate organizations across north africa and the middle east.

contrasting that with isis' declaration of being an actual state, and their use of violence. aveed isr aspect -- d here. don't gonstein-ross: away. ultimate d.c. action move is being linked to your own launch. my gartenstein-ross: apologies for this. it has been kind of a long week. i want to fundamentally give a shout out to jason, the team who worked on this. a phenomenal team. i want you to finish, and then i or two.y a thing

i apologize again for being late to my own launch event. particularly putting the focus on politics, with silence supporting politics. they are trying to present themselves to the muslim population of the world as a more reasonable alternative to the islamic state. that is really about it. one last sentence, and then i will hand it over to you. mr. gartenstein-ross: to pick up on that, one concept that comes up a lot in my work is what i refer to as consensus areas. areas where virtual consensus, those of us operating the public sphere, about what particular events being that -- mean that end up being wrong. spring ended up

being the exact opposite. we see something that resembles a consensus area in this. my prediction is that in 2-3 years, one of the things we will be talking about is the fact operateqaeda is able to much more openly than it ever could before. you already see this in syria where al qaeda made itself almost impossible to attack. the reason being that they are so thoroughly embedded with rebel groups, the syrian population, they have genuinely over large won portions of this population. these have all been important moves. you can see this coincide with a few disturbing trends -- the

increase in state support to al watar, saudi, arabia, are all helping it gain ground in syria. u.s. backed rebels are helping al qaeda take ground. this is openly acknowledge. .his is not nefarious the reason the u.s. doesn't is we acknowledge that moderate rebels are so marginal at this point that they need -- they cannot operate in areas is al qaeda wants to deny them the ability to do so. charities that we worked so hard to close down post 9/11 are back in business. the sanctions regime at the united nations is fundamentally collapsing. all of this is going to create a very complex situation is, as i believe, isis ends up -- it's

flame does not burn quite as bright in a few years. you have to understand, there .re different jihadist actors one has been playing off of this dramatic rise of isis. the way the isis has been able to capture our imaginations, and the imaginations of so many, backers.san bernardino they have been able to capture the excitement of jihadist, especially young jihadist. they have been able to capture e our imagination. not paying attention to how al qaeda is pivoting is something we will regret, and probably sooner, rather than later. >> with that, we will turn it over to start with some comments his view of the paper.

sure.livant: i've really enjoyed reading this paper, which clearly laid out the distinction between the two groups in some interesting ways. we are used to thinking of these two groups as different, but i think we do not think very hard about why that is so. we know this is the islamic state, and they are a little more violent. we know there is al qaeda, and we have hated them for so long. it is almost like we are ready for something new. we have not thought about the distinctions, and i think that is something that this report does very well. if i could lay it out even more simply than the report does, in very short hand -- of course was shorthand, you lose some nuance -- a shorthand way of thinking about this is is the islamic revolution, the caliphate, now

or later? for al qaeda, it is not yet time to bring about the full islamic revolution. the people are not ready. they still live in relative not truly islamic state, which means everything from malaysia to saudi arabia. they are not ready. there needs to be a period of education, teaching, and preparing not only the people, adre, for what is to come. in the meantime, there are these far enemies who need to be dealt with and taught a lesson. as september 11 demonstrated. that is their theory of the case -- it is not yet time. inks, it isstate

time. now is when we need to bring about this revolution, and we now see what they consider that to be. we see the islamic state, as they set it up in the territory they have captured in iraq and syria, and spreading throughout the world. both in the affiliates and the lone wolves -- whether in paris, san bernardino, or where have you. i appreciate this paper bringing it to the for and allowing me to think about it in that way. the second point that the paper really brings out is something that daveed emphasized at the end. i guess i will emphasize it a little more. the way they put it in the paper is that because of the existence of the islamic state, isil, or generall qaeda in jo support.o enjoy state

in syria, they explicitly get -- i do not think this is a matter -- this is well known in open, classified materials. they get money from turkey. if you ask them, they say, no, we are supporting the rebel groups, we are giving to the coalition, and the fact that there happens to be a big affiliate in the middle of it is a regrettable necessity. the combination of the syrian revolution, and the fact that ,ou have now isil metaphorically speaking, to al qaeda's right, as the new definer of what true evil is has now made it possible for people to talk about al qaeda, and deal with al qaeda in ways that would have been unthinkable in early parts of the last decade.

the day went prominent figures would publicly talk -- maybe we can reconcile with pieces of this al qaeda affiliate. you cannot imagine people saying that in 2003-2004. it would have been unthinkable. now we have this. an al qaeda group which may or may not still be a more significant long-term threat that is now able to get state support, which daveed points out. the sanctions regime is showing weakness. and, just in the public's sphere is talked about in a much different way, almost as an afterthought. oh, yeah, there is an al qaeda affiliate in the middle of them. again, unthinkable to think

about talking about an al qaeda affiliate in these terms. you have to ask the question, last i checked -- until a few days ago -- isil had not attacked the homeland of the united states. even now, we certainly regret it , butned in san bernardino it is qualitatively different event and what we happen a 9/11. when did a group that attacked our homeland somehow become moderate when compared to a evil, never really has, or not in the same sense. third, there was one thing i did not see indy report that i would like daveed to respond to. i did not see the report treat the distinction, in the way that two groups treat the arabs.

that is something that has always been qualitatively different about the two groups, starting with the founders. osama bin laden, in my understanding, at least, always had a soft spot for the shiite -- certainly viewed them as heretics,cause but never talked about exterminating them, subjugating them. they weren't issue, and sometimes they had regrettable political views, and had to be lectured. of course, they were with iran, , but theyas a problem were seen as a group of heretics. that needed to be killed, or at the very least, put in a very subordinate status. i think that has been reflected

in the approach by the two groups. i did not see that in the paper, and would be interested in daveed's thoughts on that. as the paper brings out, there are two responses that al qaeda could have to the rise of isil. do they try to mimic them and increase their visibility, their approach. do they essentially agreed that tobe we do need accelerate the revolution? or do they double down -- slow .nd steady wins the race we are the tortoise, not the hare. i think a lot of this depends on where is the islamic state in two years? al qaeda may be forced to mimic them more. where, on the other hand, if remove theire to

abilities to hold the territory, and there is no longer an islamic state existing in the north of iraq and east of syria, then al qaeda's longer-term strategy may look different. i guess i will stop there now. >> thank you for the report. i thought it was very generous to al qaeda, maybe too generous. for one thing, if you look at the fighters of isis and al qaeda, they go back and forth. a lot of influence with isis. in terms of ideology, the difference is practically none. to say things like al qaeda avoids frightening or alienating local populations -- for someone who grew up in the arab world, we do not have much more whorous political scientist

care about thes population. we do not have the kind of democracy that we want. we have terrorism springing and every part of the world. another thing is i would have liked the report to have discussed the brutality between the two groups. it is a huge problem that fighters go back and forth. they started executing whoever .hanges camps, basically there have been executions of hundreds and hundreds of fighters. it is documented. it is always documented. by al qaeda, as well as isis. paranoia,ting such but actually, at one point, isis of itsd four

premieres, and 100 people at one point. there is no shortage. but we talk about caring about the population, we really are not -- we have to make an enormous distinction between, in the west, what we think about, when we talk about caring for the populations, public support, and the arab world, which again, the bar is so low that maybe and ant can crawl under it, it is so low. we are talking about maybe the best case scenario -- may be the taliban. taliban andder the organization that cares about

the population? i wouldn't. --hink there is the violence is relevant.t what we talk about public support, we cannot take the leaders words. we are talking about night and day difference is. another thing is the organic -- i really have an issue with this. actually, syria -- everywhere in the arab world, the practices that al qaeda has cannot be called organic in saudire except for maybe arabia. othernot organic to any place. it is planted, supported. reallye thing -- this is available.

pretty much all of the leadership are saudis. some of them are professors at saudi universities. some of them are current or former officials. clause initute at a the army, where you can be paid, take a vacation, and go fight in syria. if you are killed in syria, you are a martyr. this is state-supported, state e direct it. it is not so much organic. this is very active. i will stop here. we will turn it back perhapsd to respond, starting with the question, are these two really distinct groups? or, they cannot truly have a

distinct strategy? mr. gartenstein-ross: they are definitely distinct groups. nadia supported that, by saying that the way that people defected from one group to another can be killed. the definitely see distinction. i agree with everything that nadia said. it is possible that we do not do enough in the report to brutality,l qaeda's but we start with the premise that al qaeda is an incredibly brutal organization, and unlike isis, keeps a chunk of its brutality off camera. i do not think there is a moral distinction between them that al qaeda is actually organic, or actually avoiding brutality. rather, it is a question of what they are trying to craft. i would rather talk about the organic question than the brutality question. i believe that language we use

is that al qaeda, unlike isis, likes to make itself appear that organic part of the population. i agree, it is not. you can look into two things. one is the writing of its ideologues. the second is the expansion of the actual practice. in tunisia and libya -- i think urer example p -- they used front groups. there would be this openness. they made a point. don't be too hard on the population. these dictators have made sure that they do not understand true islam. you have to lean them. to be clear, this is al qaeda talking. i'm not giving theological credence to them. : how do you explain the

killing of two politicians with this rhetoric? mr. gartenstein-ross: again, there are multiple ways that one can explain it. she's talking about the assassination of two tunisian populations that ended up to the disbanding of the organization. there are two possible ways. there is something that i've not been able to get at. was that organized from the top or out of local initiative? either way, i do not think it fundamentally changes things. number one, i think that does represent the true face of the group. even the fact that the assassination of the politicians, another thing they have been engaged in is violence to enforce religious norms, attacking hotel bars, christians, secularists. these were attacks that had .anctioned at top levels the use violence, but the same

time, they were making it seem organic. what they mean by lean yet is way different than what we mean by lean yet. they are lean yet if they kill a few hundred people. you think of all the other people they could have killed instead. what they are talking about is the way it will come across to the population. to them, isis goes beyond what we can consider leniency. al qaeda has a very quixotic view of what they mean to be lenient. in terms of practice, the front group that they put up did a lot of work. , neighborhoods that were normally under served by the state. people have the perception,

these are good guys. that is how they appear organic. other faces are carrying out different types of violence. to them, they are the average man on the street. caree average man does not about a couple of politicians being killed, to them, they have been lean yet and organic. with respect to brutality, i want to say a specific word about that. and looking at their actions, al qaeda versus isis, the way i described the two of them with respect to religious minorities -- we will get to the shiites in a moment -- is hard genocide versus off genocide. hard genocide is isis. men in mass and enslaved women. that is pretty straight out of any sort of genocide playbook. had atrast, al qaeda

program that was definitely genocidal. attempt tofined as destroy the group, in whole, or part. they had people sign of an invasion their faith, and put them in reorganization classes. themis not the -- round up, slaughter them, and slave them. instead, it is a softer genocide. it is still a genocidal policy. in some cases, there are documented cases, where they try , and werebrutality dissatisfied when it got caught on camera. one example is yemen, where they went into a hospital, and slaughter people, only to find it came up on the internet. they apologized for it, said it was a rogue commander. i think a more likely explanation is they were ok with it until it turned up on the internet. these are two different approaches to violence.

i would go back to the .orrespondent in 2005 busy predecessor was brutalizing the population. the leader wrote them a letter telling them not to do that. he made the point, couldn't you just shoot them rather than cut their heads off? to me, that is a lot about their strategy. beingda is ok with them dead, and keeping the reputation relatively high. i think that doug -- doug asked about shiism. it is a great point, and a great distinction. al qaeda's approach to shiites there is. -- varies. jihad, itdelines for

is talked about how you must avoid unnecessary conflict in order to not harm the reputation, but at the same time, in theaters where they have a bigger role, they have been extraordinarily anti-shiite . you look at yemen where you have houthis shiite backed by iran. awent back through trove of things posted online pseudonym.t i it is extraordinarily anti-shiite. it was surprising at the time because it resonated less with where al qaeda had taken himself. he described the shiites as the main enemy of the muslims. i do get with situational for

what they face fear they do not have a consistent approach, but in general, i think al qaeda's outlook is, do not cause unnecessary conflicts because it can hurt your reputation. where you can really benefit from it, like in yemen, they are anti-shiite. also, doug's point about time -- i agree with them entirely that now, alew is caliphate qaeda's view is the time is not right. population, ale qaeda has been concentrating on this progressive destabilization. they understand that destabilize areas play to their benefit. assuming isis does not usurp qaeda's plays to al benefit. even in places with a big al qaeda presence, including ,omalia, yemen, northern mali

syria -- areas where you have lack of state capacity, violence on the ground. i think part of the longer-term plan -- i think they believe that time is not on the side of the state. not only is the population restless, but there are factors that make it difficult change,n -- climate though bin laden did put up a message that focuses on climate change. all of these things are things that make it harder to govern as a state. the more destabilization there is, the harder it is for the u.s. and the west to do what they have done over time, which is the lack of strategy. backed islamic state popped up in mali. acked itch wh

down. to them, if you have enough destabilization, and they built the infrastructure, preparing places like yemen and were that strategy is that this will not back them down. panel, the paper draws out that the best islamic state does not have a tactical agreement with al qaeda. you said that the betrayal of ideology. i am wondering if your paper and the way you presented it appears to suggest that you think al qaeda has this engaged a new branding strategy, not actually using -- as we understood it