of these ballistic missiles has defined, will be in violation of the new agreement that is being implemented. it was in violation of 1929. we have done nothing about that which is unfortunate. but there is cute language that was utilized that we discussed while trying to understand what the agreement said. theytary kerry was adamant could not continue to test missiles even after this agreement was put in place. that is weird language this refers to, it says they are called upon. out of curiosity, after the implementation, if they launch these types of missiles, is it or is it not in violation of the agreement? mull: it is not. it is a violation of security council resolutions. sen. corker: so the called upon my was from your perspective it will continue

to be a violation. part it would violate the of the un security council resolution but that contains legal prohibitions on any international support for iran's nuclear weapons program. any exception to provide materials or other resources to iran's missile program is for written by you and security resolution -- un security council. the united states will veto any other things requested. sen. corker: i will reserve the rest of my time for interjections. senator menendez? menendez: thank you for your testimony. i would like to follow up with what the chairman, his line of questioning was. before i do so i want to echo senator cardin's comments about the chairman's process of

leaving the committee. i do appreciate probably the most bipartisan committee in the united senate -- united states senate. it needs to be as bipartisan as it can so i appreciate it. sen. corker: if i could, i was ranking when you are chair. you have no idea how much i appreciate the way that you dealt with me and your staff. the respect. just know that when someone like you is chair, it sets an example that really causes those who come behind you to want to do the same. sen. menendez: i hope to do so tha again. there had to be a point of divergence but in any event, i have a very clear sense. and i hope i'm wrong. that what we have here is a permissive environment.

circumstancesof where, regardless of what you issue, for the longest amount of time we have pushed to get a real sense of breadth and scope of how far iran. in the development of a nuclear weapon. for the longest amount of time, the government of the united states said we needed to know that. what we got was a process in the jcpoa that gave iran the easy out by simply answering questions they wanted. without fully coming clean. the result was that's closed. now the administration consistently came before this if wetee and said that move aside from the nuclear

portfolio, that we would aggressively pursue iran's violation of international orders, u.s.-led technology, weapons trafficking, human rights, and hegemonic interests in the region. what we have seen since is not one but two missile tests. an interdiction of armed shipments off of oman. expect thenk we can security council to do anything about it because of russia and china. , if thetion is administration ready to act and sod its own set of actions that iran understands the consequences for violating the international order and setting the tone so that when the full

implementation of the jcpoa takes place that we will have a very clear understanding by then that failure to comply fully will have consequences. i stress that we fully concur with you and the rest of this committee, that iran has violated these security council resolutions and its missile program at it does commit many things that are hostile to our interests. sen. menendez: what are we going to do? mull: iran is one of the most sanctioned countries on earth thanks to the partnership we have had in putting together and putting together a patchwork of sanctions that has exacted serious costs to the iranian economy. as weieve going forward

confirm these missile launches, we have been swift and condemning them as we did in the security council and measures that we will take in response to those confirmed missile launches. we are actively considering additional measures. me. menendez: if you say to they are the most sanctioned, it almost implies there's nothing else we can do. if that is the case we are in trouble. come offtions will assuming implementations of the and i have seen her shaking her head, as far as i understand, those sanctions will come off upon implementation. mull: those nuclear related sanctions. has will come off when iran rid itself of 98% of its enriched uranium stock. sen. menendez: if those sections no longer exist and if you are

saying they're are the most sanctioned country in the world, i assume you are referring to that they are non-nuclear sanctions so then what is left to do? to let it run violate without consequence? mull: i would underscore a very important part of the agreement we negotiated was the snapback provision that allows the reimposition of sanctions for any violation of the agreement. the united states is not bound. sen. menendez: but these are non-nuclear actions. let's put the nuclear portfolio aside. if iran continues to violate non-nuclear actions that are in violation of un security council resolutions and violation of what secretary kerry said before the committee, that we will aggressively pursue iran on violations that take place for missile technology and human

rights, for arms trafficking. then what is left? mull: we will use the considerable full authorities we have to take action and perhaps i could ask my colleague, assistant secretary countryman in pursuing our nonproliferation interests. sec. countryman: in regard to ballistic technology we rely on to related concepts, sanctions and strategic trade controls. it is correct we have sanctioned ritually every iranian entity that is connected with the ballistic missile program so they cannot do commerce with the u.s. or acquire u.s. technology legally or use the u.s. financial system. we have also used such sanctions and designations against commercial entities in other countries that have traded with the iranian ballistic missile program. those sanctions remain in effect

and we have retained the authority to impose those sanctions even after the nuclear related sanctions are lifted. we retain as the previous administration and the next administration, the determination to do so. strategic trade controls are different. they allow us through the missile technology control regime through the proliferation of security initiatives in support of the un security council resolutions to partner with dozens of nations around said,rld in order, as i to interrupt, delay, in peter, in every way possible the transfer of nuclear technology. we have not and cannot entirely stopped at trade but we believe our efforts which will continue after nuclear related sanctions are lifted, have made the iranian missile program less productive, less accurate, less of a threat to our friends in the region than it otherwise

would have been. sen. menendez: let me close by saying, number one, i will be looking forward to seeing what actions you take. so far, they have not been forthcoming. number two, you talk about snapback, you have to step back to something and the iran sanctions that my colleagues have all helped with expire in the senate this coming year and i will seek its real authorization because you have to step back to something. i have been following the run since my days in the house of rep sedatives for the better part of 20 years -- the house of representatives for the better part of 20 years. this is showing the hardliners have some strength by firing missile technology and testing it, i know that iran, over the last two decades has tested the will of the international community. that is why they've gotten to the point where they were on the the nuclearing

power that could be converted to nuclear weapons. basically, we said it is too big to roll back. if we end of the day allow it to continue to test us, they have a history and have tested us and the world. if we allow them to continue to test us without consequent is, believe me they will continue to expand. that is a risk and i hope that is what we can come together on not only in an understanding of , but in action. i'm getting the strong sense that the reason we are creating a permissive environment which is very problematic over the long-term, i think we are doing that because we are trying to effect the internal elections taking place this spring. that is just not in keeping with the integrity of this agreement and i can understand a desire by some to do that which is why

they are dismantling so quickly, so the sanctions will be relieved before the election. what i get the sense that you and others are complicit. affect their internal of elections. i am talking about the administration but with that, -- >> sorry, i just called you johnny. nne hello.tell diana let me echo what senator menendez and senator coker said. i appreciate what you've done but i want to share something with committee. the 43 surviving hostages from the american embassy in iran

learned this congress had passed compensation for them. thoseotional relief for 43 hostages is not expressible in terms of words but i want the chairman, ranking member, and regret and republican alike to know you did a great deal of , you have made the lives of those who were beaten and held, i want to thank the member of the -- the ranking member. >> all of them know it's because of your persistence and leadership that this is happening and we all get frustrated with the impact that we are able to have with 100 people but there is no question you have had an incredible impact on these 43 citizens and i thank you. sec. isaksen: it was a team effort and i thank you and it was the template of my comments to mr. mull.

when president carter obtain the release of the americans from the iranian hostage situation in the embassy, to get them released by the iranians he had to negotiate with their ability to be compensated for the ordeal. that was the way the iranians negotiated. we got a hold of sanctions money in the settlement which the department of justice had which is the money we are compensating those hostages from. the iranians never want to accept responsibility or culpability for a crime they have perpetrated against the american people. i worry as senator menendez said if we are very passive about the jcpoa enforcement and look the other way, they will look the other way and do whatever they want. by way of example, and i'm quoting, the iranian regime has considered any type of example a breach from that would release iran from any deal. as i understand and the president says the sanctions are then waved and take any action,

the snapback which is the enforcement measure. the iranians would call that a violation of the agreement and would be free to do what they want. it's like having it both ways. and i missing something? am i missing something? this is aelieve political commitment by all sides, the united states has been very firm those in the negotiations as well as publicly in explaining the deal since then. that any violation of the agreement will draw consequences. we have a wide range of consequences from complete we imposing of the sanctions to possibly we imposing some of them and walking away from the deal. a number of the factors at this deal are close to irreversible. if iran does forward as it says it will in the next few weeks,

to disable the reactor of the , in one swiftctor action that would remove iran's to produce weapons grade plutonium for the for seeable future. that is a huge win for our interests and friends in the region. if iran decides to go back, they will have an unprecedented inspection regime. there were the 132 150 iaea 24/7ctors given full-time access to all of the run specular facilities. we would be able to determine if they are in compliance or not and if not, there will be consequences. >> on that point it seems to me like what senator menendez and what he wanted to do is that if we region limitation day which i

assume we well, if the sanctions regimen goes away, should we have in place before that date comes what sanctions we would snap act to if there was a violation? mull: we have in place and will have in place on implementation day and far beyond a comprehensive network of sanctions authorities. both through the legislation that congress has passed as well as a complex of executive orders, which has the ability to impose sanctions on iran swiftly should that be required. we believe that we have the tools in order to do that. sec. isaksen: can i ask you a question please? the iranians are going to be sending 25,000 pounds of nuclear enriched materials to russia as part of the agreement. mull: yes. sec. isaksen: if my math is right that the number of tons

that -- that is a number of tons. do we know that will be monitored in russia and will we monitor how they take care of that material? mull: we work very closely with enhance,er decades to cooperatively, their security and safeguards of the nuclear sites. are many of the sites subject to the iaea safeguards in the same way that others are. and this one, the impression we get is this is a move the russians are taking very seriously and very professionally. they know how to move nuclear material, they know how to store nuclear material. they know how to account for it. sec. isaksen: the reason i asked and i think i am correct here, there was a significant breach in the integrity of some of that material in russia a number of years ago which brought about

the creation of the non-nuclear threat initiative and the inspections that took lace in the old soviet union, which let some of that stuff get loose and was never accounted for. we want to make sure we never revisit that chapter in history and getting that much to material going into russia now. mull: i couldn't agree more. let me add parenthetically the cooperative threat reduction measures taken immediately after the fall of the berlin wall and dissolution of the soviet union is one of the secular most important achievements in foreign policy that i have had an an opportunity to participate in. in those early days, we had talks about security and safety at nuclear facilities in russia both civil and nuclear. it is because of the work of and ars nunn and lugar bunch of patriotic americans who made countless trips there working with russian counterparts, that it is better

than before. there is work to be done in my opinion and the opinion of the nsa and doe. politicalcurrent circumstances, it has been very difficult to get the russians interested in pushing forward. but we will look for opportunities to do that. sec. isaksen: thanks to all of you for your service. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you to the witnesses. i strongly support this deal and continue to and i support tough enforcement of the deal. i was glad to join with sec -- senator corker. i am gratified the u.n. report about that test was so unequivocally clear that it was a violation of the security council resolution. the reason among many that i supported the deal was i think the u.s. has to try diplomacy first. in 2003 overwar nuclear program that did not exist.

we need to try diplomacy first. we need to keep the military option on the table and that option is strengthened legally and strategically in terms of coalition partners. it is even strengthened in terms of the intel if we go forward on this deal. we keep that option on the table that we need to -- but we need to try diplomacy first. a good thing and trying diplomacy is we are now in a hearing like this, keeping the focus on iranian behavior. that's where the focus should be. if we walked away, the focus would have been on american negotiating tactics. why would america take a deal in the international community? that would've been the focus. now it is on iranian behavior and we kept to keep the focus on their behavior and what the consequences should be. i was gratified. i think senator corker said we were expecting the iaea report to be a bit of a fudge factor.

but it was really clear, iran had a nuclear program. we were gratified with the clarity because it kept the focus on their behavior. i'm gratified by the human panel conclusion that has and reported on -- u.n. panel conclusion. it was a violation of un security council resolution. i expect we will have hearings and i have the focus is primarily on what is iranian behavior. as it lays a predicate for the actions that need to be laid lovely. -- laid globally. i think the question of what's going on in iran, we should be humble about psychologizing any situation. we are not monolithic and have divisions. a lot of what's going on in the run is a non-monolithic -- in iran is non-monolithic within their political society about the deal and broader issues of

whether they want to be reintegrated into a global economy or be an outlier. when you see the way this deal has been treated by the iranian legislature, and the degree to which hardliners hated and threatened to kill those involved in negotiating, you see some of the challenges that are underway there. is have theseo do hearings every time there is activity. we need to keep the spotlight on and we do need to demand of the administration, consequences but precision in the consequences. the use an example of something that has been done pretty well by this committee and the administration, we have had a broad set of sanctions that we could have used in venezuela. the extent of the sanctions that were used were sort of a smaller subset of what could have been. the reason for that precision was a concern i believe that if we want maximal in what we could

have done, that can have the event of -- effect of subverting political opposition. it prevents them from blaming their problems on the united states and that crushes political opposition. what we saw in venezuela was a stunning objection to the government where people rose up and said it's not the u.s., you mismanaged our country and they demanded significant political change. a harsh spotlight on any violation either of this deal or of any other un security council resolution is exactly what we ought to be doing and we have to be demanding like when senator menendez asked the question of what you are doing that we are thinking of doing stuff with a good enough answer and i recognize we are a few days out from the u.n. issuing the report about it. there have to be consequences but we have to be precise in the consequences we use. we don't want our actions to

undermine legitimate political opposition, legitimate desires of the iranian people for a different path than the regime has pursued. i am interested in this question -- i wasn't able to ask, asked samantha power the other day. the u.n. has set up a panel to analyze this for the activity in was a violation of the u.n. security resolution. we have reasons to believe russia and china will not go along with this. i hope, i hope our attitude on this isn't that russia and china will probably veto it so we probably shouldn't do anything. i hope any time there something like this that we get our colleagues to put a resolution on the table and put it in the light of day backed up by a clear security council report and we asked the u.n. to take action and make russia and china

before the whole world be an apologist for something that is clearly a violation of the security council. i hope we do that every time and that we also think of other steps we can take. any lever ate up our disposal to keep the spotlight on iranian misbehavior or violation of rules. with respect of this un security council situation about the october missile firing, we have a great report out of the u.n. that definitively establishes this was a violation. what is strategy right now about how we pursued that in the security council and let's make russia and china use their veto power and use it publicly. walk us through the steps that you are thinking about. i am proud to say our colleague, senator power, has been the leader on the security council in drawing the consuls attention to the issue first one they confirmed it in october and this week when the report came

back from the panel of experts. she was very forthright, urging the security council to take action and calling out those who would reject such action as being inconsistent with our common objectives to keep this very serious threat to international security under control. i mentioned in terms of responses to that action, we are now actively considering the appropriate consequences to that launch in october. ,n terms of moving forward, ambassador countryman? countryman: we have not hesitated previously to ask for resolutions, even when we knew they would be vetoed, even if it was valuable for making the point as you suggested it is. there is a broader dynamic at play in the un security council

and i cannot speak for ambassador power on what the next steps are but we will get that. >> let me tell you what i will hope you do and what many people appear would think. we ought to make the point every time we can and if we are sure they will veto we should make a point. when it comes to iranian behavior that is in violation of un security council resolution we should never say somebody else will veto it so why bother. we should make the point. here's another question i was confused about, senator menendez was asking questions about the ballistic missiles. the un security council andlution versus the jcpoa the ballistic missile. there's an article in the guardian from the 15th of december. experts report of ballistic missile tests violating the un security council resolution. it says under the july nuclear deal most sections on the run will be lifted when it is

recommended in exchange for curbs on the nuclear program. the experts noted that ballistic missile launches would be covered under the july resolution. the experts and concluding there was a firing that it was in security of the u.n. council resolution are saying it is covered under the july resolution which is of the same as saying it's covered under the jcpoa. they're saying it's covered by the july 20 resolution which was embracing the jcpoa. what is the status of this and maybe i will ask that for the record because i think we should have a clear understanding of that. you will besoon able to come back and i will probably ask this for the record. what are the steps we will pursue with respect of the clear questions a very good and i am happy to mention it. j -- jcp await does not

address the missile program. the purpose of that was to endorse and give the security aouncil blessing to the jcpo and address other elements about iran's policy, including continuing the embargo and conventional weapons sales to iran for the next five years, and preventing trade and otherwise support from the international community for the iran missile program for eight years. and otherut jcpoa issues as well. >> thank you, mr. chair. >> i would say that regardless -- of the the you and un security council taken action on which we know they are not, we do not have the ability of

implementing into lateral . senator isakson: what kind of inspections? will there be inspections anytime, anywhere as the word and phrase was used by the united states? >> thank you, senator. what iran is required to do under the jcpoa is reduce their downs of enriched uranium

to 300 kilograms or less of uranium that has been enriched. senator isakson: assuming they do that, will there be inspections of that? remind me of the jcpoa terms. iaeaey will still be inspections under the safeguards regime and additional protocol in iran. senator isaacson: but in russia. clarify that. >> we are in the midst of an negotiation and the removal of that material. it is in iran. i believe it's departure from iran is imminent, however, we are working closely with russia and the iaea to make sure that material flow be removed and stored wherever it ends up. what is thecson: inspection requirement once it is stored in russia? >> we are in the process of discussing that.

senator isaacson: and we don't have a plan of inspecting it in russia? >> we would not be comfortable in releasing that amount anywhere without safeguards. we are pursuing, -- sender: and with the committee? >> and russia. termsare negotiating the senator isakson: do we have a plan in place? >> today, we do not. senator isakson: so the answer is no. thank you. we have heard answers on the that we that we are -- have strongly condemned iran for the ballistic missile launches and swiftly condemned iran for the ballistic missile launch and raised concerns about the missile launch. to chairmanonse

corker, you stated in response to the ballistic missile test, one of the reasons we pursued this jcpoa is that iran has repeatedly violated security resolutions on that program. and then you stated, iran is going to develop the program regardless of continents. you stated that iran will violate the ballistic missile ,rovisions resolutions regardless of consequences. knowing that, what plan for sanctions to rehab in place upon the verification that they violated? >> of violating the missile provisions? >> yes. >> as i mentioned earlier, senator, we have substantial sanctions in place. tactically every entity involved in the program. senator: but what are we doing? if you knew that iran would develop the program regardless of consequences, do you believe it is appropriate that they have access to billions of dollars that they will have access to

once the implementation arrives and their economy is afraid of? the sanctions >> -- that the economy? >> just for the record -- senator: this is the unofficial playback you stated. iran will develop that program. >> iran has developed that. activeconsidering measures, active consequences for this latest launch and remote share those with the committee as soon as you make that decision. senator: in your testimony, you said we continue to used and a lateral authorities connected to iran's ballistic missile programs and procurement network . what unilateral authorities has the united states used after the last two ballistic missile tests? authorities we have to

include iran, north korea, and syrian nonproliferation act with orders 138 -- 133832 and, sorry, there was another one. it ist have it, but virtually every iranian entity collected to the missile -- connected to the missile program has been sentient and we are actively considering what steps to take in response to the october 10 test. i have to say that i do not understand the argument about a permissive environment. the obama administration is doing exactly the same thing that the bush administration did, which is to respond to every violation of listed missile resolutions of human rights, of terrorism, of hostage-taking with the legal authorities congress has given us in an aggressive manner to designate section and reach out to hurt those taking that action . at the same time, pursuing an

active diplomatic policy in the united nations and in other bodies. that is what we do. we do it aggressively and it has what we have been doing for 15 years. i have not heard an idea for doing something different and that perhaps goes beyond the legal authorities we have in the diplomatic capabilities. senator: one idea different is to prevent iran from a seat in the billions of dollars they will receive, which will then go into continual ballistic missile program that will continue, regardless of the consequences. >> and that violation by sf the jcpoa would be to the resumption of the nuclear program. somebody used and said that this permissive environment that we have created, we'd knowledge iran will continue the program of ballistic missiles, regardless of consequences, that

we have referred these five nations to a committee, we have talked about it, we have sternly reprimanded them, wagner finger ourit has done -- wagged finger and it has not the to protect the american people. this committee has done an incredible job of understanding the fact, but the fact is we do not have the response and the actions to back it up when iran has clearly violated this. we have not taken any steps necessary to keep them from growing their program, which they will and it has been admitted. my time has expired. the act takenr: clearly identifying this as a violation of the u.n. resolution has the cost and benefit to us in enabling us to fortify those partners around the world who are not actively with us in preventing the diversion of ballistic missile technology to iran. you for holding this

hearing and i would like to thank eyewitnesses. before i go on, let me briefly make sure anderson the point you are making, mr. countryman. isn't it correct the u.n. experts report on the ballistic vessel launch is a few days old? mr. countrymen: correct. >> and you said we will continue to call on the security council to address the matter. and increase the cost to iran of their behavior. i respect that you are actively considering action, but can you say, will you act? mr. countrymen: it is certainly my intent. the bureaucratic process is complicated. in part because you want to get the facts right and the right target. it is certainly the mandate of my bureau to push for such action, and i think we will continue to do so. >> thank you. i think the focus, as all of us

as members, have on this issue is important because at the time when our country and constituents are focused on other things, whether it is isis, terrorism, refugees, the economy, it is the challenge and job of this committee, in partnership with the you and the administration, to insist on a relentless implementation and enforcement of the jcp away -- of the jcpoa and enforcement of the sanctions of other unsolicited activities. whether it is human rights violations or their ballistic missile program. my willingness to support the jcpoa was rooted in a clear eyed commitment to holding this administration, and the next, accountable for acted enforcement of the jcpoa and rooted in a deep suspicion of iran's intentions, suspicions which i think have been amply confirmed by the iaea report and

the ballistic test. while i do commend the administration for its active outreach to congress and for ofent successful high season a weapon shipment from iran to support the rebels, i think we need to continue to work together because if we take our eye off the ball, or fail to win a mistaken force what we have got -- or fail to enforce what we have got inabilities to constrain iran's actions, they will take that as a clear signal that we have taken our eye off the ball and that they have carte blanche to continue their actions. could,first, if i because you are talking about what authorities you had unilaterally and multilaterally. in january, many members of congress will call for the swift mineral of their iran sanctions act which expires at the end of

2016. what is the administration's opinion of the renewal and do you believe iran would consider that the united states would be breaking our commitments under the nuclear deal if it is extended? happy, senator cruz, and as i and shouldn't -- and as i mentioned earlier, the administration is a result from work with this committee and other parts of the congress over the past decade the more. they have developed an incredibly powerful toolkit for imposing sanctions on behavior by iran that threatens our critical interest. the iran sanctions act has been an important part of that. it is in full force through the end of 2016. the administration looks forward to working with this committee and considering, as to get close to the expiration of that authority, whether it makes sense to continue. it is in place for the next

year. we have a good solid toolkit to use in protecting our interests with iran. >> do you believe iran would argue that we have somehow violated the jcpoa if we extended? getting the recent actions, i think we would have more reason the number to constrain their actions. >> it is difficult for me to predict how iran would respond. i do underscore that as we exercise our sanctions authority , we do so to protect our interests. not to anticipate or overcome any anticipated reactions. >> i think tireless work with partners, as well as extending our sanctions, is a key piece of this. ship loaded with weapons being sent in violations of international standards. ourink we have to increase

observation. thomas something about the ministrations plans to heighten the pace -- tell me something about the ministrations plant tighten and if you're successfully working with our regional partners to prepare for this. bothey can refer to critical technology for nuclear ballistic missile programs, it can also refer to the transfer , which irannal arms is heavily involved in and the number of other states and actors in the middle east region are involved in. interdiction depends crucially on intelligence. it also depends on building a framework of confidence with partners in the region. i think that we have successfully developed such a partnership with key countries in the region. i would not only be willing, but downright proud in a closed

session, to tell you some of the successes we have had working with friends in the region. in has been our business for over 20 years to make the iranian program more expensive, less successful, and we have done that. >> thank you. i would welcome that briefing as well. my concern, having been briefed in a classified session about the number of successful interdictions, my success is -- my concern is that other colleagues are not aware of it. the metaphor i have used before is when the chef conducts a successful drug bust, he put all the drugs and money on the table, so the rest of the community interested in commuting -- and committing illegal activity, recognizes there are costs. the me ask you one last question. been what i understand to the actions by china and russia in blocking the un security council from condemning the ballistic missile test, are you concerned that we do not have reliable partners in the snapback of sanctions, when or

if, there is credible evidence of iranian cheating on the jcp .way -- on the! -- on the jcpoa. we worked -- make worked very hard to sure they would be no structure on the ability of the united states to impose a fully use the sanctions at the disposal to ofpond to iranian violations un security council resolutions, challenges to our interest. in terms of broader international sanctions, we have also structured the process that when there is a credible report to the joint commission deal of as this violation, any member of the can bring suchn a complaint to the commission. if a limited number of members to the joint commission report

to the security council, the presumption is that those of sanctions will be sent back. it will be impossible for any member of the security council toveto the recommendation reimpose sanctions. of how thessumption security council will handle that. we believe that that protects our interest and equities are a will. i understand and i am hopeful that mechanism will work. i expect we will work relentlessly and on a bipartisan basis to make sure our allies understand the intent to continue to enforce sanctions against iran's bad going behavior. >> i think it would be helpful if something more certain could be given from the administration relative to this extension of the iran sanctions. i do think the senator is right. the efforts immediately after the first of the to extend those, if there are things you

need to share with us in a classified setting, that would be fine. i do not think the vague response -- and i am not criticizing you -- i know that is where the ministrations, battle think the vagueness of their thinking is helpful to us and there may be things you want to share that we are unaware of. to take theirappy request to my colleagues. senator perdue: i appreciate you guys and when you are trying to do. you have a tough job. i think we are very naive and what we are trying to do, and i look at history. i am not trying to predict the future. i just look at history to come to that conclusion. i have a couple of questions related to solar reports. the iaea released a report that basically said iran has lied about their pnd efforts. when the foreign minister of republic, "the islamic of iran has never sought nuclear

weapons nor will it seek them in the future." contradictionar of the iaea report, as i read it, of their activity prior to 2003 until 2009. given then is, missile violations that have already been asked about today, by 89 229 and resolution 2231, the resolution is about the 90 date certification that the secretary of state has given congress. i will quote in here, iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program." if they are firing missiles in violation of you and sanctions resolutions,tions they are thumbing their nose at us and i am not clear on how the secretary can make the certification that included covert activity that could significantly advance the

nuclear weapon program. when just last to come at the back fence -- when just last year, the defense [indiscernible] covert operations are either inadequate or often do not exist. sure how tot believe the facts here. the revelation that our own report in the december iaea report says they were doing this through 2009, but there was also a report that the u.s. national intelligence estimate back in 2007 that says iran's nuclear programs's weapon was halted in fall 2003. we now know -- and they went on to say, they had not restarted as a mid-2007. i know those are old reports, but i would like the general to address this. to what confident we have, given

our own intelligent communities as relation, to assure us in public and private about our ability to detect true covert activity? >> thank you, senator. my own sense having worked in and around the intelligence community for decades is that we had very good capabilities and that can be brought to bear. sometimes it takes time to figure out all the details and put the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together, but i would commend our colleagues in the intelligence committee to getting to that point. struck because i read a couple of times, three times to be exact, the iaea report came out earlier, just how detailed it was in terms of it playing out the very nature of iran's program and following up

on those issues which had not been resolved at the time they wrote the 2011 report. it is very clear and very candid about what the iranians have done, what they have denied doing, what we know that they have done, and what we need to pay attention to. the areas laid out in the pmd report that the ip a printout in terms of -- put out in terms of capabilities, the development of nonnuclear capabilities to open eyes a nuclear weapon, all find their way back to the jcpoa as the people who negotiated this structured that agreement and situated that we would place limits on those very things. our intelligence community and the iaea have identified as issues.

>> second question, ambassador, address this, if you will, the fourth item that was in the that thetion is suspension of sanctions is appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable and is vital to the national security interest of the united states. mi to read this to say that we bitalready certified a first 90 days that we are in support -- i would like you to clarify this in terms of appropriate and proportionate release of sanctions, suspension of sanctions. >> there has been some limited sanctioned relief up until now. that was negotiated as part of the joint program of action. it was a mechanism by which to build some good negotiating safe

to go forward and exchange for enrichment activities that was later certified and the united states did agree to allow the unfreezing and small percentage of iran's frozen assets. >> can you be a little more specific and qualify what that release entails? permissionamounts to to withdraw $700 million of its frozen assets in various institutions around the world. for your testimony. i appreciate your objectivity. i do take issue with one comment you made earlier that the administration has done everything it can to protect u.s. interests, and we did not mention of negotiation before.

we have for u.s. citizens being held by this regime, and we are not even addressing that. the real question i have, in the united nations, realistically, we have the security council veto in front of us, what can we expect to be the reaction of the united nations and what are we trying to get them to do related to the violations of the resolutions? >> to our, senator. -- thank you,oint senator. on the first point, i share your frustration that we cannot solve every problem at one. we were never able to settle human rights questions and questions of foreign intervention or a host of other issues. yes, those agreements were vital to national security, and i think, without making any kind of prediction about iran, laid the groundwork for eventual that was made in

eastern europe and eventually the soviet union. they were limited. they did not solve every issue at once. in the case of what we can expect from the security council , i take very well the senators point that we should force people to be on the record. further, i think it is important that we continue to support of our own expertise. it will have, i hope, a bigger role in identifying and publicizing the violations by and merchants outside of iran. that kind of publicity is what we rely upon when we go make the argument to exporting country or transshipment company. you have to do something to stop that shipment of activity. a unif there is not security council resolution, with the sanctions committee has

already done is valuable to our counter proliferation efforts. >> thank you. panel.nted to thank the you are working overtime to protect the world from a nuclear armed iran. i can think of no higher quality and i appreciate what you are doing. and thank you to the chairman. ,ould you stand, please ali? his brother's jason, jason, a washington post reporter is being held in iran and convicted. thank you so much. i went to give a message to the government if they are listening , and i would like to use this opportunity to echo my friends and so many of our pointed views about the need to come this

iranian government, to release jason. marked the 500th day of his detention. jason's family lives in california and they urine for his release. for hishey yearn release. [indiscernible] i make this humanitarian release to release jason and ease the extreme pain of his family. it has been so interesting and in some ways, you get to hear everybody and it is very important. it is kind of a narrative tapinging here that this an administration that is permissive. and i believean,

the facts belie this. you don't have to scream every day and pound the table to be strong and i know this president did not screen or pound the table or take a victory lap when he took up osama bin laden, he just did it. i just do not see the narrative at that point. they certainly back it up with a , butf passion and policies i just did not see it. i just read samantha powers comments and i wanted to asking rhetorically if you think this .s solid stuff she is are you and representative. she said, this past october, iran launched ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. security council prohibits this

kind of launch. after reviewing this incident, they concluded definitively that it was a violation, yet, instead of an effective and timely response, the security council has [indiscernible] working. to keep she is speaking for the administration. we intend to keep working to respond appropriately to this serious incident. she goes on and says, we do not camp out oners can these violations. to me, to say to the administration naive, soccer whatever you want to use, i do not see that permissiveness. and then there is a letter that was sent by the president to the -- heor, in which he says " signed the letter, president obama -- robust sanctions related to the nonnuclear

activities to iran will continue to be a critical element of our policy. i will maintain powerful u.s. sanctions under a host of domestic authorities countering ,ran's support for terrorism and human rights abuses, and the sale or transfer of iranian conventional weapons. i asked to put both the records -- but the documents in the records. we all know that we had sanctions to counter iran support for terrorism, human rights abuse, missile ofliferation, and transfer iranian weapons, and this sanctions have not been changed. they still will continue, so i narrative, like this because i think it sends a bad message to iran. i think our messages, we are united on this. we are not divided -- maybe we

were divided on giving them a chance, but we are not divided at all on standing together to enforce those kinds of sanctions. i will moved mary, on. is there anything in this that would prevent the united states from taking action it the iranians filing our agreement? >> no, ma'am. absolutely nothing. >> so everything is on the table? i think that is very important. questionsswitch to about the iaea because i think they are very important in this. i would ask lieutenant general, in your testimony, you mentioned the extensive coordination and cooperation of the iaea and the department of energy. with regards to the training, how would you describe the quality and capability of iaea personnel? lieutenant general: thank you

for the question. i rate the quality of professionalism and seriousness of iaea personnel, including those who work at the headquarters and the inspectors, to be very high. iaeapport the training of inspectors. in fact, every single iaea inspector takes a course on nuclear material management at los alamos national lab in new mexico. other inspectors and other members of the staff receive what you might call continuing professional education are graduate-level education on modern newtonian and other aspects of the fuel cycle and they are at other national laboratories in the united states. we also provide, at the request of the iaea, a number of people to support their safeguard staff. there are about 800 people in the safeguard staff at iaea and roughly 10% of those, 80, are american citizens. many of whom have come to the

national lab structures across united states. we also provide about 15 of what be called cost free experts to serve on the staff. the other thing that we do, besides training, and this might take more time on this, our national laboratories are also developing a lot of the processes and technologies which for themof the process carrying out their inspections and continuous monitoring. was at the laboratory last week and saw some of the work. other laboratories are developing the cameras, the monitors that the iaea uses or will use in iran, but also uses in the other countries that have agreed to a safeguard agreement or the additional protocol.

it is a professional organization, it ought to be. we have worked closely with them since the late 1950's. >> thank you. i think the iaea is so critical, whether we supported the agreement or not, and i would urge you, if you see anything you feel is changing your view of the iaea, we need to know because they are key to the whole agreement. thank you. that thisnt to say preventive nest issue is one that has been felt strongly on both sides of the aisle and a strong letter went from a large group of democrats in yesterday to the administration. i think the concern is that we have known of the violations. we have had multiple -- and i met directly with the u.n. council -- and we know that they will block. i think people will see this happening more likely at the end of january, all the sanctions

will be released. potentially, no pushback on the issue. >> mr. chairman, i would like to engage. i never said bipartisan. toaid there is been there have on both sides of the aisle. aisle.des of the there is a disagreement, and it is not part of that. i did not mean to suggest it and i never said it. i just disagree with it. you can write 100 letters 100 ways until sunday. read the president of the united states, samantha powers, so you can create any scenario. not that it hurts, but the point is, i do not agree with it and we could argue all day. >> [indiscernible] we never really got to vote on this agreement. >> if i may interject myself. the unanimousink

support in the united states senate for zero tolerance for violations by iran. work as 100% support to hard as we can to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power. we are committed to that. i think there is pride that the engagement of congress is giving us a better opportunity to achieve those objectives. >> i think that is what we are together and we continue to work together. >> thank you and two are for the testimony. i apologize if i am falling on the ground here, but with regard -- let me just say, i came out against the agreement, but i feel it was a close call. it is difficult to be on the other side of almost all of your allies, but my concern in the end and what tipped the balance for me is the concern that our

desire for iran to stick to the nuclear agreement might prevent us from punishing iran on their nonnuclear behavior. and the ballistic weapons playing is fuzzy. it is only used for nuclear payroll we are told and not part of the jcpoa agreement, but i am concerned. it seems as if we are just kind stepping off in the security council will not act on this and russia and china will veto, so that is it. what of the remedies do we have outside of that? i understand you can publish and try to work with others who might be participating or helping iran with this program, but what else are what of the

remedy to we have outside of the security council for this breach? countrymen: a couple of points, one, this should not be anen in any way as excusing iranian violation, but the missile launched on october 10 was the median range listed missile. do have a general concern about the proliferation of median range ballistic missiles, but a number of countries in the middle east, that is making the region more dangerous, but our number one concern and target for action is the iranian program. -- authorities that we have we have used aggressively and creatively and we will continue to do so, but they are authorities congress has given an order to designate specific iranian entities outside of iran.

to impose a genuine economic cost upon the entity and upon the program of development of ballistic missile technologies. sanctions and designations touch companies outside of iran, it is a matter of significant commercial harm to those companies and those countries that allow countries to participate in that kind of behavior. that is what we have the authority to do, and that is what we do aggressively. on the diplomatic side, i think ambassador powers are described what we can do. within the united nations, we have reached well beyond the united nations. last friday, i was in brussels for a meeting with all 28th of my counterparts in the european union states, where i emphasized, again, the necessity to stand strong on preventing shipment of technology and ballistic missiles to iran.

are the authorities we have, and i sincerely welcome ideas on how to use them more effectively. concern is that iran has already stated over and over that it will consider any to the back of .he books if iran were to take action side of the nuclear agreement that we thought to be egregious enough to justify implementing sanctions, in particular, let's say the ones that we can do on a unilateral basis or central-bank sanctions, where we hesitate to use that leverage of the need to? because that has been the difference. we have said, yes, we will and

iranians are saying, if you do and, it violates the jcpoa we are out of our obligations. what is your sense of our willingness to use the levers we have? thank you. the administration has been clear publicly and throughout the negotiating process that this deal is exclusively about the nuclear question, and we will not hesitate to use other authorities to address other threats to our interest outside of that nuclear deal. >> even if it is the same section we imposed on the nuclear side? in particular, the sanctions on the central bank. >> yes, but we have to walk authorities available to all of these threats to our interest, whether it is human rights, missile launches we talked about, iran's regional activities, support for terrorism, we have a wide variety of sanctions that target any number.

as i mentioned, i was prepared to vote against the agreement how we got to the vote. >> having said that, this is going forward. i hope it works. i hope this committee and the congress ensures that it does work. it is important, i think, that we not count, even from the beginning, the violations on the iranians inside. if we do, it is all gone. thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, mr. chairman. last spring, the committee held a hearing on the new u.s.-china cooperationr agreement. we discussed very credible allegations about china's inability, or as i suggested, unwillingness to enforce its commitments to prevent bad actors, like karl the, from selling ballistic technology, to

iran, north korea, and other countries. as has been discussed today, iran has conducted two ballistic missile tests in the last few weeks, a violation of un security council resolution 1929. which countries to you believe are dividing ballistic missile technology -- providing ballistic missiles technology to iran? >> my assessment is the same as the spring. and i believeurce the chinese government has stepped up its efforts to enforce its own laws and you and sanctions, however, i cannot say that they have reached a satisfactory port of enforcement. >> again, that continues to be my very serious concern. ofoncern about the approval the china nuclear agreement.

i cannot have the support on this committee when the senate conditions, but they would have imposed requirement with the save guards on others transferring ballistic missiles into iran, north korea, and other countries. we essentially have the equivalent of the nuclear materials, which i think are under close safeguards being the bullets. we are in a gun-control discussion here today, ballistic missiles, there like nuclear bullets to other countries in the world. manufacturer.un from my perspective, we missed a great opportunity to condition that agreement.

i think we should have. the sole discussion on ballistic missiles goes back to the china agreement since they are from, the mis-direction's perspective, the most likely source of the ballistic missile technology. we had a lot of leverage at that point. i argued we should condition at that time, but i think it was a great historic missed opportunity to draw line on nuclear proliferation issues, create ligatures so that we could be focusing on the bullet program, nuclear materials program, and the gun program. they will perceive whatever can come through clandestinely. as long as people can move around china with impunity, i think we will continue to have a serious problem, and we might as well and the hearing on that subject because that is the

ballistic missile discussion in iran. it is going to be other countries like china who believe that notwithstanding their public support for gun control that they find their own way around the relatively and poorly enforced restriction because we do not step up and use our leverage when the opportunity arrives. if anything was directly related to iran and the nuclear program, at thateing thought point but the discussion did not happen. going forward, having lost that opportunity, what else do we have is a tool to let china no help serious we are about this and how we do not intend on and that the

entire world ostensibly says they believe is the long-term global stability? in beijing i will be again. next month, i do not wish to have whatever i say dismissed as finger wagging because i think it will be a strong message. i also cannot predict and cannot forecast at this moment what additional actions we will take against chinese entities that are complicit input -- in providing ballistic missile technology. i will only say, as we said earlier, that under active consideration by now are additional affected measures in response to the october 10 test. >> i appreciate that. i think it is going to actually have the kind of weight force and it -- behind it conditioning of the china-civilian nuclear agreement

with cap, but it continues to raise the question of china's nuclear agreements on the very that it sends out to the rest of the world. i would hope that mr. chairman, next to it, we can take this up again, the 123 agreement of climate that we have created around the world, where we are suppliers ourselves and unfortunately turn a blind eye to other gun suppliers who are out there who do not believe there is going to be sufficiently well enforced international response when it is clear there are violations taking place and i don't think there is any question that carl lee is the ballistic missile dealer, one of them anyway. it is not sufficient.

i do not think it is a sufficient response from our countries perspective. i think we have to -- there is really no point in even trying to convince people that iran is sincere if they are engaging in an ongoing clandestine i'm ballistic report with supplies coming in from china. at least a clear impression that this is a temporary period before they attach the bullets to the top of these listed missiles. that is a cynical approach, which the chinese are taking, and i think we had an opportunity but we have to focus upon this next year. i think we need those hearings so we can go back to the china? again. >> thank you. thank you for your continued vigilance. were the both realized issues of stood in the united states senate as a whole, but i

thank you for your continued efforts in that regards. senator: thank you. i will not belabor this. you know where i am. the comments by senator boxer are not shared equally by members of this committee. you have -- the administration has apologist here, i get that. this is a joke and has been for months and years. i will answer her rhetorical question. she read the president and powers led her and said, do you think this is soft stuff? yes, i think it is. limit say what is not soft stuff, the iranians shaking their fists in our faced and saying, death to america and we will prove it. we have prohibitions against us developing ballistic missile systems, but we are going to continue to develop them and we will continue to test him, and we don't care what you do and you are right in your statement that it does not matter. they will continue to do it

regardless of consequences. -- only hope that we have senator kaine, who i have great respect for and generally agree with, talks about how we need to spotlight their violations. they love the spotlight in their violation. they would say, look at us. we are iran. we are filing this. you know what the united states of america can do about this? nothing and we will continue to do it. on theort of the u.n. ballistic missile firing, we have to to wait. no, we did not have to wait. everybody knew when they fired those ballistic missiles that that was a violation of the agreements. do i think this is soft stuffed? i think it is tremendously soft stuff. my prayer is 142 days from now, the inaugurated new leader will

convince iranians that we are going to do something about this, we are going to protect the american people, and we are going to stop them from testing ballistic missiles and doing what we all know they're going to continue to do with this agreement. thank you, mr. chairman. senator: thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate you being there today. i went to try to put a finer point on senator boxer's .omments i don't necessarily appreciate some of the name-calling. i support the agreement, not because i am an apologist, but i think it is the right thing for american national security. i think she and senator corker are right. i think there is broad agreement here that we need to take definitive steps to respond and we take ambassador countrymen at

his word, that this is not just loose talk about a consideration of options. this is a predicate to action and i think there is agreement that that is necessary for the -- that is a necessity. label ofr this broad the culture that may exist with respect to the action that iran is taking. frankly, the report that was iaea describes the culture of permissiveness that allows for the iranians, up 2003 and after 2003, to conduct a military scale nuclear weapons research program. there was a culture of permissiveness created by a lack of international consensus that in the years after 2003, allowed for the iranians to stockpile of tape thousand kilograms of

enriched materials and it would get up to 19,000 centrifuges. in many ways, this agreement nds the culture of permissiveness that has allowed the iranians to conduct a program that was unprecedented in scope. , and withn to 6000 respect to the ballistic missiles program, we are united in the idea that there should be a response. whether we like it or not, this is not new. the iranians have been engaged in a ballistic missile program since they were with iraq, and there have been regular tests and the democratic administrations. if you want to argue there has been a culture permissiveness relative to the ballistic missile program, you could make that argument. maybe i will ask this question

and you know the history of the program better than i, i think we have used strong words but i imagine we have used them in the past. this has been a long-standing commitment to building a ballistic missile program that we have clearly tried to build international consensus to stop but predates the iran nuclear agreement, and my right? >> you are absolutely correct that the ballistic missile program goes back to the iran-iraq war in the 1980's. it proceeded an active nuclear weapons program in iran, and i think it goes back a little bit to your question, mr. chairman, there are multiple reasons for iran to engage in this program, including the desire, ultimately, to have a nuclear theon, but also including

fact that there is a proliferation of such systems throughout the region and they have made it just about all of their neighbors. they are building a whole bunch of them, but it also includes an element of national pride as it has been in other countries and thegenously producing technology becomes a that both military and politicians boast about. as well as a number of other motives, so it is a long-standing program. >> i think the chairman's point is that our inability or refusal to act this time may have greater consequences because now we are in business with them at a different level than we were before, and i get that. scope of theg a full program is important. to specific questions on other points. i wanted to follow-up on a question that certain or gardner l,ked you, ambassador mul

about what happened to the material being sent to russia. i know he was not satisfied with the fact that there was not an agreement, but let me clarify, as a member of the iaea, russia has obligations to safeguard that material and the iaea has the ability, i assume, to assure they live up to those safeguards that exist separate and aside from an agreement that you may you negotiating today. and i would be happy to have you take that question. briefi could give a answer before the ambassador speaks. the way it works is for existing nonnuclear weapon states. a they are going to have safeguard agreement with the iaea, it has to be voluntary. it is the case for us, it is the case for russia. it will depend at the end of the day where this material actually

goes. as the ambassador says, that discussion is going on as to whether or not safeguards exist there. the negro back to a point i made earlier, the russians are been in this business for a long time -- let me go back to a point i made earlier, the russians have been in this business for a long time. very confident that this will be done in a professional manner. ambassador mull: thank you. i do not want to leave any doubt at all that when the material arrives in russia will not be subject to state rights. we are in the process of negotiating closely and discussing closely with the iaea and russia. there are 27 nuclear storage facilities in russia that are

subject to safeguards, iaea safeguards. this material will end up at a safeguard facility. >> one quick question. we are about to pass a reform of the visa waiver program that it a naming of iran so that individuals traveling to iran will be no longer alterable for the visa waiver program. it was a question because there is an element of the agreement that obligate us not to take steps that would stop economic relations between other countries and iran, that we could be in jeopardy of breaching the agreement. i think there are other things that troubled me about this visa waiver reform, including how it affects dual nationals. have europeans raise concerns or have others raised concerns for you that that provision is something we should be thinking

about in the wake of this pretty clear imminent passage? >> yes, sir. i have heard from their senior and the secretary has as well, from senior officials from european allies of ours that it could have a negative impact on the deal. it is something for the committee to consider. thank you. >> i think because of the way the omnibus came together there was concern about those technicalities being looked at. my sense is the road day will be. ranking member? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, senator markey. cornyn her,ator this is an issue we need to look at. great deal of congressional interest in that

visa waiver program and refugees since the paris attacks and the attacks on our country. including this in the omnibus was not the right venue. we should have had the opportunity to debate this issue and look at the consequences far beyond the immediate impact on individuals who wish to come to the united states. for thanked senator murphy raising that issue, and i hope we have an opportunity early next year in the committee to look at this on the point of senate foreign relations committee. iran agreement oversight is in our committee, and the connection senator murphy made with that issue was very much in our committee's jurisdiction. i understand the direct aim of the legislation may not be up hours, but our committee could

have weighed in, and we did not have the opportunity. senator murphree, i agree with you completely that a lot of the activities in iran are not new, that we should not expect that will change. as i said in my opening comments held,the americans being that this is an area we know we will have to be aggressive, and i appreciate the response from the administration, as they have said consistently throughout this, that the iranian activities with regard to human ballisticlations and missiles and support of terrorism, that our response has not been hampered by the iran agreement, each is focused on one issue, and that is true, stopping it from becoming a nuclear weapons state. i appreciate all those matters. let me take my first question to deal not with a direct issue. it has been talked about by most members of this committee, and that is the iranian violations

of the you and security council resolutions on missiles. my question is pretty specific. yes, the united states will respond, and that is clear, we will respond. but we have a mechanism under where anagreement individual country that is a participant can take direct action, unilaterally, but you are depending on the coalition with our european partners to have a day-to-day strict compliance with the iran agreement by iran. to meet this is the first test of the unity with our european partners. i hope and i will ask that question, that we are trying to coordinate in response with our european partners, but it seems to me they also understand the importance of that coalition to the successful implementation of the iran agreement. >> yes, sir, i completely agree.

one of our strongest suits, we have a powerful toolbox we can use unilaterally. to the extent we can get others to join us in the international community, that substantially increases the impact of these sorts of matters. that has been one of the great success stories in confronting threats from iran over the past several decades. we are talking with the compliance within the iran agreement. yes, we want to get international support to respond ran, but it is important we have the numbers that will be important in enforcing the iranian agreement. and about your missile launch, we have support of the security council in reporting this violation of the u.n. security resolution, from france, germany, who brought i

to our attention. tsenator cardin: we will be watching their resolution, because it is telling whether we will have zero tolerance for the compliance with the iran agreement. we could take unilateral action, but a lot of this depends on iran understanding we have the support of our coalition partners in europe. let me move on to a second issue that has the concerned, and let me get your response to it. theughout the iran review agreement itself, the estimate from all of the administration witnesses was that iran would most likely be eligible for sentient relief in the spring. that was the -- for sentient relief in the spring. that was the date. in many these estimates, it's a they would have so much to do it would take them at least until

spring. now we understand it is likely iran will be in compliance and entitled to section relief as early as january. is --s my point obviously, we want them to comply as quickly as possible. do not get me wrong. are we underestimating iran's participation in this agreement the affect other aspects here as well? and why do we miss judge so badly that date which was likely for compliance? i think the agreement was very clear that implementation day comes and the sanction relief comes only when iran has completed every single step that it must do in terms of reducing the capacity of its nuclear program for weaponization. senator cardin: i want to focus on this. based on intelligence

information, waste on technical information as to how long it would take to dismantle the centrifuges and ship the equipment, etc., there was a thought that it would be spring. now it is december -- january. is that a concern or not? mr. mull: i assume during the negotiations there were assumptions that members of our administration didn't speculate on how long it would take. what guided the answer to that was has done everything it could do. iran'spacing is in hands. we have been for in delivering a message that they have to do this right, they do not have to do it quickly. the guinea with adoption day, beginoved very swiftly to dismantling their centrifuge operations. we are not there yet. we are close working with the

iaealy to make sure they have full insight to verify everything that iraq has done. we will get to implementation they only when iran has completed those steps. i do not think anyone in the united states is able to predict when that will be. the responsibility lies with iran as verified by the iaea. senator cardin: the last question has to do do with the shipment of uranium outside your iran, to russia, kazakhstan. upquestion is to follow earlier, which is from a legal point of view, will we know whether enron, after the -- i ran, on the stock restrictions have elapsed, whether they will have a legal right to reclaim this material and have it shipped back to iraq? -- iran? mr. mull: iran even before the

agreement ends is eligible to receive in five kilogram increments those its of fuel for .ts tehran research reactor it can only receive those increments as the iaea verify that the preceding amount of fuel has been use. that will be under tight control. jcpo years of the from now in the future, there is iran'striction on enrichment activities, beyond their saying they will develop a program with peaceful purposes. that will be a constant focus of the u.s. government -- senator cardin: my question is, will we know whether the legal agreement entered into between

iran and russia and perhaps iran and context on -- kazakhstan today will give them the right to reclaim this material af ter the restrictions are eliminated? mr. mull: the only exception is getting the fuel increments, whether or not they will have the stockpile get that will be moved to russia back. that is not in the agreement. according to the agreement they must keep below 500 kilograms. : we will not know --ally whether they have that the arrangements have been made for the enriched uranium? [indiscernible] that is just not

addressed within the agreement. the agreement only cars then to stay below 300 kilograms. know a person: i is in the audience. we talked earlier before he arrived want to to your efforts to secure his brother and get back to the country. would you want to address that one more time, briefly, before i turned to the senator? mr. mull: yes. i can say this is a subject for great concern for the administration. secretary kerry raises the point of him, and the other detainees whom, asthe matter well as asking for help and cooperation in finding out what has happened to others, such as robert levinson, who has disappeared, last seen in iran. e in everyn b meeting. ne in which i have

, he has raised this issue in an ambiguous terms. senator corker: you understand there was concerned -- and i know the senators spoke to an earlier that in spite of this massive agreement that is being put in place, these issues of these four people not being of a lot ofuses consternation in this country, and as to the lack of understanding why this cannot be much better result that it easily is. >> thank you for the courtesy, and i appreciate your testimony and what you are doing. i mean that seriously. this is not the first time you guys have been before this committee. i want to make two comments quickly. i want to apply the ranking member and the chairman for his leadership in this committee, and i have used this word before. morecommittee has nonpartisan -- this is about

global security. i used the word naive earlier. i stick by that word. you mentioned before that you have not heard alternatives. of course, you have. we did not talk about the third alternative. war was not talked about. we never talked about what got these people to the table in the first place. i know how serious these things aren't that have hurt them, and at least we could have doubled down and talk about them as an alternative. let me set the record straight. my colleague from california said this was done in a bipartisan way. i take issue with that. this committee unanimously passed a bill recommending -- it was an act -- that gave us a look at this bill. otherwise nobody would know what agreement other than the administration. we never got a vote on it. could not get it to the floor of the senate to have a vote on it.

that is what drives my people back home absolutely apoplectic. that is what is wrong with this process. it is all talk. 58-42. 42 votes voted to not even move this bill or to the floor to have a debate on it. the last thing i would say about the word "naive," i do not use the word lightly. not just this administration, but other administrations, this country -- we do not have a great record with dealing with rogue nations. 1993, and administration said something similar about korea. united nations has no ability right now in my view accepted that because of the vetoes are part of that security council situation. i think we were placed with a

false choice. i want to set the record straight. want to commend this committee for its bipartisan-nonpartisan approach to this topic. and for what your turn to a that the implementation of this thing those properly. >> mr. chairman, senator purdue effectivethe most members of this committee, but the senate, and i deeply appreciate all the comments he made. i want to put on the record the negotiations took place, including with senator mccain corker it wasaine the envisioned we, would have asked that i press is for the consideration of the iran agreement. in terms of lehman's language, it was anticipated there would be a 60-vote threshold in the senate so it had to be a bipartisan action considering we have divided government between congress and the white house by party. that was always envisioned in

the agreement. there is a different interpretation among the democrats and republicans as to whether we had a vote on the substance or not. i understand that, and as senator purdue was saying, the american people know that 58 senators oppose the agreement, for me to supporting the agreement, and that it did not have the 60-vote threshold that was the ground rules on which the legislation was negotiated, that got the broad support, unanimous support of this committee and nearly unanimous support of the united states senate. i want to put that on the record because there was a difference among parties about how that was to be handled, and i respect that, but it clearly there was anticipation it would take 60 votes. corker: i think i will refrain from entering into the discussion from that. i want to thank you for that. i want to thank you for the role you have played in foreign

relations. i am so glad that things worked senators we have two from georgia, and thank you so much for digging into the issues the way you have. i want to mention a couple things. i do not -- this step back provision, for what it's worth, if we cannot get the un security to the to act relative issues, i do not think any of us apback ishe sn real. we can call for it, but in other countries have to implement it. if they are not willing to implement, it has no effect. i think if the un security council -- and i understand what senator boxer was saying -- much of the discussion is to try to shame the administration and

shame the un security council into taking action. that is what people want to see happen, and much of our comments about russia and china are simply push them into being willing to address this issue. again, if they are not willing to do that, i think it renders the snapback provision useless. he can call it to happen, but the other countries do not have to policy and call those sanctions to snap back into place. it is not real. that is a concern, and we are not talking at you, we're talking with you. we know there are others that will be taking these actions. is leftissue that o hanging out there, is there any pressure -- i realized the reason iran is doing what it is doing relative to moving quickly, which as senator cardin

mentioned, that is what we want them to do. we understand there is political issues occurring within the that there is an election that will be taking place, and we understand the people who negotiated this agreement what both sanctions lifted prior to that election so that it is going to affect the outcome. we understand that. i do not think you would question that. my question to you is, are we dragging -- is there any pressure within the -- isstration to drag that one of the reasons you do not want us to implement the sanctions that are going to be expiring next year right now? or is there pressure relative to this agreement to somehow cause inaction to have effect in the parliament elections taking place in march? >> i agree with your analysis of

the political situation in iran. it is breath, i hasten to stress that what happened internally, politically in iran is not part of my brief in terms of implementing this agreement. we have a specific roadmap of what iran has to do. on the first day that my office was created, president obama stopped by the state department theongratulate negotiating team, and he told me you know what you have to do in making sure disagreement is fully implemented. you cannot make a single mistake. it was a pretty impressive way to start working a new job. it has been very clear we are fully focused -- there is politics in every country -- but we have a deal that we need to implement and that iran needs to give regardless of its internal political situation. i understand you

are not the enforcer. outside your purview there are others within the administration that have the ability to put in place sanctions, right? countryman can call for them, but others will actually decide. my question, have you sensed any enforcing,tive to punishing relative to the elections that are coming up in the spring? mr. mull: senator corker, as asary kerry recently as yesterday as well as other members of the national security team have all said that we need to follow up -- we need to make sure there are consequences for violations of international sanctions -- international prohibitions, on such things as the recent missile launches. so we are fully committed as an administration to exercising

those sexy authorities when it is warranted. no one hasman: asked me to modulate or accelerate the limitation of the steps we are considering due to considerations of an electoral calendar in iran. i've seen no such indication. senator corker: we all hope that we are successful at the un security council, that the administration has the ability to direct sanctions that will take place. let me ask one last question. whenrocurement channel -- you think that process will be fully agree to and in a place where we begin imitation? mr. mull: the last meeting, the joint commission, i attended along with ambassador shannon last week in vienna, we reached

agreement on how the channel would work within the joint commission, and this week as we ofak we are doing a test run the process with a number of tests. the personal managing will meet india next tuesday. the p5 plus one as well as are presented as of iran describe how we did in the test run and make necessary improvements. a piece that has yet to be agreed upon, we are to coming agreement on this, is how that process indirect with the security council, because it is the security council that has to give its blessing, the transfer of any of this technology of iran. we are very close to agreement with the security council. how to security council will staff the process and interact with the procurement channel. senator corker: any other questions or comments? we thank you for being here, for

your service to our country, and we wish you well as you ensure that this is implemented with i got it.ossed and we thank you for being here today. without objection, the record will remain open until the close of business monday. if each of you would respond fairly probably, we will appreciate it. we wish you a very good holiday season, and with that, the meeting is adjourned. thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

journalisttonight, colin woodard explores cultural divides that defined today's politics. here are some of his comments on how red and blue is based on cultural difference. not party affiliation. >> you can see, if you really want to understand the red-blue politics, you have to look at the county level. that is where you start seeing those divisions. you can see it right there. presidential election maps.

you can see western reserve of ohio up that way, the left coast appearing, the deep south. no, i have not messed with the colors. the red is really republican and blue is the impact. this is not a recent election. this is the 1916 showdown between woodrow wilson and charles hughes. republicans for the first intury was a party founded yankeedom for a century. the parties come and go. the current parties have swapped over the past 40 years their constituencies and their program. it has shifted around. trying to understand what has happened using parties -- red versus blue, democrat versus republican -- is an exercise in futility. the lasting differences that

really matter are regional are cultural. >> more from journalists colin woodard tonight at 8:00 eastern. his talks took place at iowa state university. announcer: c-span takes you on the road to the white house, at town hall meetings, speeches, and we are taking your comments on twitter, facebook, phone, and every campaign event the cover is available on our website, www.c-span.org. governor chris christie of new jersey held a town hall meeting with voters in

new hampshire last night. he was introduced by three local republicans and answered the crowd questions. governor christie: he would have been and should have been the governor that new hampshire needs now and would be in the future. hisintegrity, honesty, this me inightness supported my thinking of this candidacy. new hampshire would be much better if he were in concord. walt, thank you for your contribution to the state. the chairman man u campaign is here, wayne mcdonald. wayne has been right with us from the beginning, and i

appreciate so much as leadership and the support that he is given to me and to our family. i want to thank the sheriff. he also has become a great friend of ours overtime. thank you, dan. remember that earlier meeting? it was hot in the summer, we are trying to convince people that this campaign was going someplace, you believed it, i appreciate very much. all the things are building blocks, foundational building blocks to building a successful campaign around new hampshire and around the country. but the biggest blocks, even these folks will admit, are what we are doing right now. what we are doing right now is have a group of people who are willing to come out on a monday night and give me a listen, give me a chance to convince you that i he