we have stuff to do. you help me? it takes work. the problem is, the well is so badly poisoned, it will take a lot of extra effort. if i do not think i could fix this, i have this one and this one. i'm going to waste their lives by wasting my own. no way. you need to work at it. respect is a big part. you don't have to agree. at the opening of the debate, i said we need to come together. that does not mean i have to give up what i believe, but it means that i give a little bit. sometimes, you walk away. when reagan was in reykjavik, he walked away. you don't always have to walk away.

gordon humphrey, the senator, there are no tougher guys that sit on the face of the earth, but he was successful, because they knew how to stick to principles encompass things--principles and accomplish things. yelling and screaming can do it. bellyaching and bullying? you know better than that. right here. >> for 40 years, we've had a national strategy around containment of communism. that didn't just drive military and foreign policy, it drove olympic athletes. in the last 20 years, but has been our national strategy? this survives whoever sits in the white house, whoever's in control of congress.

gov. kasich: i don't think we've had a national strategy? once the wall came down, we no longer thought we might have to use nuclear weapons. mutually assured destruction convinced us we didn't have to. but, when the enemy came down, it was like, now what do we do? we do not recognize early enough the issue of radical jihad. if you thought about afghanistan, what the russians were experiencing in chechnya, i i remember having an aid tell me they didn't want that. remember, in the first debate, they asked what they'd do with

the iran nuclear deal. "i'd tear it up!" you don't know what you will do in 18 months. that's just press. "i'd tear it up!" what we ought to be doing is talking to them, saying, i think these guys will cheat. if they choose, we have no debate -- if they cheat, we have no debate. if we know where there is a nuke, we will deal with that. we don't do that. they kill these people in paris, and we don't send anybody to help mourn. they have a climate conference and say that is how we are fighting radicals. i don't understand that. there are three parts to this.

the first part is the russians. the russians have to understand that nato still exists. you're not going to invade a nato country. now that you have invaded new -- ukraine, we will on them to defend themselves. if you think you will go to finland or sweden or lithuania, you will meet us there. that's all it has to be said. we need to work at a framework in central europe. china? i have to read these articles, but i've always been interested. warning b-52s not to fly within several miles of the islands they are building to take over the south china sea. don't tell them, just do something. talk is cheap with the chinese.

these are not your islands, we will have free air flight. if you want to cyber attack and steal secrets in businesses and disrupt the government, we can defend ourselves. we know how to go on the offense. now, let's go to long -- get along. china is not going away, but we do not need to have a war with them. we do not need a war with russia. we just need to let them know what we think. the best leader in europe is merkel. why? she listens. she leads. she is the best. i can't wait to meet her. we need to be close with the allies we have. we need to listen to them. we will always carry more of a burden than we like.

we are america. i am just telling you my view. we have to tell the world who we are. we have to destroy isis. this is a really, really bad -- i mean, they want to destroy our way of life. what do i worry about the most? proliferation of weapons. i don't even worry about proliferation of weapons in the -- about weapons. i worry about people who have a country and do not wear a uniform. who am i talking about? hamas, hezbollah, al nusra.

isis, do you think they would ever hesitate? this radical, deranged ideologues as they get a reward for destroying us. i do not like to talk about war. i had to vote on war. we have to do this. the longer we wait, the more dangerous it will be. the more dangerous, the more complicated and the more we will lose. i completely and totally disagree with the strategy of the president and his people. i have seen it all. tell the world who we are. tell them what it means to have it -- inequality for women, respect for education in science. tell the world. we used to tell them. go tell them. then deal with these groups and rebuild our intelligence. peace on earth? maybe for christmas. but there is always going to be

these problems. we just have to manage them. peace comes later. not here. management. you are right, we have been adrift and as a result we have created voids invoice have been filled by things not in the interest of civilization. not america, civilization. >> i am a native of ohio. i have lived in new hampshire for the past 40 years but my brother and sister still live there. the first thing i want to do is congratulate you in bringing ohio's economy back. i know how bad it was. i know what it is like today. i was in columbus in 2008 and last winter. it has improved significantly. congratulations. you have accomplished something as an executive and i appreciate that. you also have a legislative and

defense background. we need that in a residential candidate. how would you handle the syrian refugee crisis today? gov. kasich: we have to figure out a way to vet them. one of the things that worries the people who support me in politics is sometimes kasich's heart's so big. i do have a big heart but i am not going to endanger our folks. let's talk about controlling our borders. immigration. control the border. 11.5 million. if they did not commit a crime since they have been there, half of the legalization. let's move on. we must control our borders. we must control the thesis, the k-one visas. with the syrians, we have to vet them. what i have been proposing, you have heard this so i do not

sound like a broken record. no-fly zones. help jordan. i do not think lebanon would do it, but it would be great if lebanon would take some. the saudis have responsibilities. we can give them money, i don't know what they needed, but we have to keep them there. they want to be in the region anyway. now, let me tell you something about the administration. we had we thought, ebola. in ohio. i called the center for disease control. i get voicemail. i call the department of the secretary of health and human services. i get voicemail. we just had a situation where minors from central america were placed in our state. with no idea who they were, where they went, who their sponsors were.

we asked them to give us information. we just had another situation, all i got was voicemail. what did they do in washington? answer the phone. i am serious. they do not answer the telephone. we should abolish voicemail in washington. when you have voicemail, nobody has to answer the phone. i do not take we have the capability now to figure out who they are. now, if we can get the fbi and all of the intelligence people to say these people here will be safe and here is where it they will go in and work with us, i am fine with that. but i do not trust them on this now. i am not telling you they are bad people or something like that, i just do not trust what is going to come. and that is how i feel about that. if we did not allow refugees and, i would be running for president of croatia. so that is where i am on it. the whole thing needs to be

fixed. that is why john and i and chris and gordon have talked long and hard. move the transportation back to the states. move the welfare back to the states. let's move the education programs back to the state can't get the government to do what it is supposed to do and let us do what we can do. you worry about highways in the state. let me give you my idea. we have voted on it a bunch of times. we tax ourselves and we send our money to washington. gas tax. they have committees down there. i will take you to committees sometime. it is really something. you talk about a monopoly, ok? they use their wisdom to divide up our money. they wanted me to build a high-speed train route. that would go 39 miles an hour. you could run faster than that train. all it would do is put you in

the hole. so here's what i suggest. by the way, after they divide all of this up the central money back and you get less. so what we do this? when we send a couple pennies to washington to maintain the interstate system so we can drive across the country and then we do not send any more. we keep all of that money here in new hampshire, and ohio, in minnesota, wherever. we fix the roads the way we want to end up the raise the gas tax all the money stays here and then we fix the highway any way we want and if they raise the gas tax, all of the money stays here. i would get all the rules, regulations, get rid of them. send a couple pennies to maintain the interstate. you could even have a tax cut. then we would keep this federal money. it makes perfect sense. you know who does not like that

idea? the committee. [laughter] gov. kasich: the committee doesn't like that idea. that is part of the other issue. you cannot come with crazy ideas and get stuff done. right, doug? you can have bold ideas, but the numbers have to add up. you cannot just throw it and stick it on the wall. you will not yet any votes. they talk about a flat tax now. how many of you think we're going to get a flat tax? why do you like when they say that and you cheer? what we can do is get lower taxes and a simpler tax code. we can do those things. you have to be realistic. how did you hurt yourself?

>> [indiscernible] >> how are you coming along? what is that? >> i married into an ohio family. >> oh, you are all ohio state people. >> boston college. governor kasich: oh. >> i think, in this election, a big influence at the end of the day a year from now is going to be those folks with stagnant incomes over the past eight plus years. there are a bunch of guys saying it is the billionaire's fault. we have to regulate all of these industries and that will enrich the federal government. that is appealing to some.

what would you say to that group, who i think you have to get out in big numbers to believe in self-reliance and pulling their own selves up. gov. kasich: i grew up in that. you think about stagnant wages. we do not have zero inflation, particularly for people who have to go shop. they are stuck. when they are stuck, they get frustrated. they get angry. i do not blame them. but my mailman father told me, "johnny, we do not hate the rich. we want to be the rich." i think that is right. why are wages growing fast in ohio? because we are creating jobs and we are diversified. we are faster than the average. we have exciting new jobs.

amazon. energy jobs. jobs in financial services. they are diversified. in our manufacturing, we have advanced manufacturing. which means you have to have a little bit of a skill to operate in this new world. you want to know what i believe about is this. when the education system fails to give a person a skill, they do not have the value that somebody that has that education has. and k-12 education is the hardest thing to change. because we all believe that our schools are great. and, some are. and, some are not. that whole system, this is not a washington thing, this is you, that whole system needs to

change. this one here, she loves fashion. you know, some of the best days she had was when she went to pink and she went to victoria's secret sport. she learned about fashion. i wish she could go a couple hours every week and they would teacher more about the importance of math and the importance of computing. this one, emma, she is a runner. she got injured playing soccer. now she thinks she would like to be in the medical area. maybe physical therapy. she should be taking biology right now. she does not love biology. but maybe if she was working, and i took her down to the ohio state hospital, she went around with the doctors and saw the babies.

we have to connect people with their passions, their skills. their god-given purpose to get something they really get excited about. give them a skill. some are going to go into vocational education. we start vocational education in the seventh grade. you hear them talk about it, we have been doing that. seventh grade, you can go into it. you get a skill. automobiles. you know a kind money you can make if you get to be really good with automobiles? the fact is, given the skills, then, you have to get more education. you have to be more narrow. you go to community college do up your game. you go to a four-year school to up your game. you have to have a sense of what you want to be and the school on to say, what do you want to be? this is the job that exists.

this is what it pays. this is what it takes to get one. all of my schools are doing this now, and if they do not, a well. they do. they do a good job. we hook education with in-demand jobs. with training, skills, money. it is not that complicated. if you have skills, they have to pay you. they pay the best football players, baseball players, computer operators. it is all about those skills. education in america today, in the 21st century, his lifetime education. it should never stop. and, let us stop beating up these companies and get these profits home from europe so they invest in our country. we have to get the jobs going and realize we are in a new environment in the 21st century. we can get this done. we are doing it in our state

and i can do it in the country. wages can go faster. let me tell you one other thing we need. you cannot do this on your own. you have to have the smartest people you can find. are you smart? good. >> i am glad to hear you talking about this. what role do trade agreements play in developing quality jobs, not low-paying jobs so we can rebuild the middle class? gov. kasich: i voted for nafta. why? their stuff was getting in, our stuff was not getting out. our trade agreements, sometimes

we do not enforce them. there are countries that play games and dump products in our country's and take other people's jobs. why the time we win, our people are out of work. we want an expedited process so why -- when we see something happen that represents an unfair trade practice, we are immediately. it goes immediately to the international group, they don't want to do it, we cut it off and i do not think we should put up with nonsense. when i say dumping, they are producing a product below cost and shipping it in here to take our jobs. that hast to stop. we are not aggressive enough on that. we need to be. i also want to tell you there is hope. the last thing i want to say. i was in michigan at what is called a tier one manufacturing company. they provide parts to the major automobile companies. they have to be really good. i go into this factory, everybody was like to i grew up

with. there were no high-saluting folks. just hard-working folks playing by the rules. in that factory, they do not touch anything anymore. they use a computer. it is amazing. all of the stuff goes on conveyor belts. they hit this, they had that. i said, how are things going? higher productivity. the more you can make in the same amount of time, the more your wages go up. i said, how about employment? employment is up as well. with manufacturing it has changed. it is more skills-based. which means more money for the workers. those are the folks i grew up with. the steelworker and the chemical workers. look, anybody know how the

steelers are doing? anybody watching that? no? that is good news, being from pittsburgh. are they going to get slaughtered? so much for that. i have to go. i wish everybody here a merry christmas. gordon is going to talk. gordon, you talk and we will take pictures until the cows come home. if i were you, i would want a picture of my wife more than of me. you know who is with us tonight? kitty sununu. john sununu's wife. she had to put up with a lot. [applause] gordon: ladies and gentlemen, you are invited to come forward with your camera without

hesitation. thank you. [indistinct chatter] [indistinct chatter] [indistinct chatter]

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[indistinct chatter] >> i have a great record and a plan to be able to move us forward and that's all i can do is to present it to people and that's why we do town town halls

and i'm very pleased at how they're going. we're going to leave no stone unturned. we'll see. >> a lot of people are trying to decide between you and governor bush and governor christie. why should they be choosing you? >> i think i just said that. yeah. >> if it's down to three of you, what -- >> i have the experience and the record. more experienced than anybody, unique, national security, balancing budgets both being a legislature in washington, executive of big state and really incredible success in ohio. so and a good plan to get this done in washington and people who have such concern about how you get people together, i've done that all of my lifetime as

well. >> i want to get your thoughts, -- called a frontrunner a jerk. >> i don't like personal sacks. that's not what -- personal attacks. that's not what i want to do. >> your campaign putting vladimir putin as running mate. >> i was speaking facetiously along the same lines. >> that sort of -- that's sort of a "saturday night live" -- i don't think even compare. >> one more. >> some people have questioned your campaign has been critical of donald trump. but you didn't go against him in this last debate and you're not making it a big point on the campaign. >> well, i really haven't. i've had my say about what i think about his programs and policies. we just did something in regards to his praise of putin.

but i am what i am. and that's the way it goes. and people either buy it or they won't and i'm optimistic that they'll like it. >> you seem frustrated -- >> i'm not frustrated at all. >> but do you think that mr. trump is hurting or helping the republican party? >> i don't really think too much about it and i don't get frustrated. i'm fine. i'm happy as a clam. i am. >> what's it like to y have your family here? >> it's just great. to -- i've directed some people to see my wife because they're, you know, they say some really nice things and i want them to hear it and it's great to have my daughters up here. it's great. it's like a christmas present to have them with me. they have busy lives. they're not going to be here a lot because they have their own lives. but they'll come whenever i -- whenever i really ask and if it can work out for them, it'll be great but this is on my

shoulders. ok? thank you. > thank you, governor. >> c-span takes you on the road to the white house. best access to the candidates at ton haul meetings, and at meet and greets. we're taking your comments on twitter, facebook and by phone and always, every campaign event we cover is available on our website, c-span.org. >> tonight, hear a doctor tell a story by a patient that was killed by a gun and how it affected her practice. >> i got involved in the issue of violence 25 years ago when an

entire family of my patients were murdered. i had just seen the baby in the newborn nursery. i talked to mom about breast-feeding. i talked to her about car seats. all those things that i as a physician back then has been trained to talk about. but physicians were not trained around violence. i'm here to tell you that that is changing and changing fast. but when valerie gam beau taylor decided that she was going out one night and her husband, paul, killed their two children, killed her mother, killed his 2-year-old nephew and then waited for her to come home and for me was a at transition point. it was a point for me to say what could i have done differently?

how i can make the difference of a lives of my community? because of screening people for domestic violence, sexual assault, guns in their homes, talking to them about safety, talking to the children that i take care of and the teenagers that family physicians take care of all over this country, i know for a fact that i have saved lives. >> and we'll have more on gun violence from the charleston a.m.e. church beginning at 8:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> coming up next, a discussion on the israeli-palestinian conflict and what the prospects are for a two-state solution. for anything to succeed, there needs to be a high level of diplomacy. the washington institute hosted this event just yesterday.

>> welcome everyone. good morning. thank you for coming. please take another minute, those of you still getting muffins and coffee and find your seats, please. we are delighted to have this special event today. today we are going to have the a round table. i want to emphasize the dialogue of it. espite the fact that the table is square. [laughter] but we are going to ask each of our two speakers to talk briefly, then we will have

almost a full hour for comments, questions, and maybe debate. let me welcome our two speakers. an adjunct fellow of the washington institute. a fellow at an institute in jerusalem. a former member of israel's parliament. and has just written a beautiful and interesting and creative policy paper for the washington institute. there are printed copies of it outside at the front desk in the lobby. you can pick one up in the lobby on your way out if we have not un after them. it's called qu" aligning policy with preference." it provides one possible way of getting around the current diplomatic impasse between palestinians and israelis.

as the subtitle says, preserving a past to a two-state solution." our second speaker is a senior fellow at the washington institute. a good friend and colleague. omeone who played an important role as the key member of the palestinian authority egotiating team. was afterward a senior member of the american task force for palestine and now to our great good fortune is here with us at the washington institute and has spoken widely and creatively on hese issues. we look forward to the omments. i want to give a shout-out to our deputy director and my good riend who came back from

vacation in order to be here with us and who is an expert on ll peace project issues. we hope you will have something to talk about in our questions session. now without further a do, i am going to give my friend the floor. >> thank you. thank you for the opportunity. i want to start by saying often, when i am asked by diplomats if i am in europe, less in the united states, how can i help? hat can we do for peace? my answer is, if we were left alone it would be best. i believe we do not benefit from having this conflict being constantly played out on the international stage.

i generally add immediately acknowledgment are not going to be left alone, that is not ikely. countries from around the world and western countries are heavily involved in this onflict. what this paper is basically looking at is what western countries are doing with respect to the conflict. to making peas, preserving or trying to achieve a two-state solution. how it can be more helpful and what is happening with the hanging of paradigm. what appears to be happening is there is a general sense that the two state solution such that it ever was a solution, is in jeopardy. it is in jeopardy from a variety of directions. the growing intellectual

discourse. the israeli government and its nominations, appointments, and policies. the settlement building. president abbas's call for the orld to stop negotiating and take action. the two-state solution is in jeopardy get it still remains the most widely accepted idea of how we can have peace between jews and arabs in the small piece of land between the jordan river and the mediterranean. for quite a few decades, the governing paradigm was negotiations. direct negotiations based on the

land for peace formula that over time became more detailed. the notion has been to privilege the process over the outcome. the idea was no matter what is happening, the support is for direct negotiations and general sanction is for those who try to circumvent negotiations to achieve outcomes in the absence f negotiation. that would seems to be happening is certain frustration, ultimately expressed by many countries and their leaders, that negotiations have failed to lead to the desired outcome and therefore, if we cannot trust negotiations, president abbas even called for abandoning the paradigm of negotiations, what can be done to achieve an outcome that is desired. we are seeing in this context a variety of actions taking place.

most prominently, the direct recognition to a state of palestine. labeling of french and new zealand efforts currently at bay. a united nations security council occasional resolution. security that the united states might not veto, so leave the floor open. we are seeing things taking shape. greece is emerging as a country that is looking to recognize palestine. hat i decided to look at is, where is all of this leading? what would happen if western

countries basically decided to say, ok. negotiations are not leading to the outcome we envisioned. we are going to try to create this outcome in the absence of egotiations. and, i am not prescribing this. i am not saying this is what should be done. as i said, i believe if we were left alone without the global spotlight and attention we would have long ago managed some greements. i am describing and trying to analyze what might happen given the combination of frustration with negotiations and the sense that the two-state solution is in jeopardy. i begin to look at what negotiations have yielded. negotiations have not yielded peace and have not yielded anything close to peace. they have yielded a more detailed understanding of what peace would look like were it to

be achieved. often known in the phrase of, we all know what he's looks like. or, we all know what a two-state solution looks like. repeated a random negotiations. the geneva track to agreements. all of these have ultimately yielded a set of preferences. the more detailed preferences of the west for the outcome. for what a two-state solution would look like in practice. they include the following elements. the establishment of a palestinian state side-by-side ith the state of israel. recognized borders that separate the state of israel and the tate of palestine based on the

1967 or the 1949 c siphon fire agreements. -- cease-fire agreements. in exchange to equivalent to land given to the state of palestine so that the state of palestine territory is equivalent to the state of the west bank in gaza, if not exactly the territory of the west bank of gaza. this is the question of borders. israel and the capital of jerusalem with a residential and jewish neighborhood to be the capital of israel. the residential neighborhoods to be the capital of palestine and special status for the holy basin. the one square kilometer of the city and a few sites to ensure a religious observance for all.

this is the question of jerusalem. that is what it is called in the roadmap and agreed as just, fair. it has generally come to mean that those internally displaced people, refugees, and their descendents stay registered. seven or 8 million palestinians would be -- would have a right o live in palestine. they will also be, those of them who want, have a right to settle in the countries where some of them live today. such as jordan, syria such as it is, and lebanon and that they will have a measure of compensation and the state of israel will accept some of the original refugees and their descendents.

the numbers are listed from several thousands to several tens of thousands over the year. it represents an end to all claims and the closure of the issue. this is what is referred to in the paper as the question of displaced persons, refugees, into their descendents. given that these are the references and a more detailed two-state solution, that has emerged from over 20 years of negotiations. where did the policies of western country stand with respect to their preferences. if this is the preference for outcome, do their policies reflect that preference? basically, the short answer is no. sometimes it is a big no. for example, almost all western

countries want to see a state of palestine emerge. but almost all do not recognize it as existing in the present. they say it does not exist but it should exist. in that sense, their policy is not aligned with their preference for the outcome of a palestinian state. this is the issue where we are beginning to see a traditional breaking of ranks with the paradigm that the negotiation should determine the emergence of a palestinian state. sweden, iceland, the vatican, greece have bilaterally and directly recognized a state of palestine as existing now. this is a line that has been in the past preserved. they have offered palestinians the trappings of a state, recognizing ambassadors, but never recognizing palestine as a state that exists. it appears to be changing as

more countries look to align their policy with preference and say, since our preference is for the emergence of a palestinian state, we will recognize it as xisting now. on the issue of borders. what is happening there is what i call essentially an overshooting. ll western countries basically treat all israeli preferences before the treaty as illegal. regardless of whether you think it is right or not, this is the reigning consensus. the view is they are all equal. it could be a neighbor, it could be an outpost of the mountains and the west bank. they are all a equally illegal,

equally condemned. there is an overshooting where there is no incorporation of the facts that whether it is the bush letter or the arab league eclaration that have allowed for swaps, there is a and the understanding that the 1949 cease-fire will not be the borders. there is no treatment and policy of western countries that we have already moved to a different view of equivalent territory rather than the precise border. to align policy with preference in this case would require western countries to do the hard work of delineating a border. of saying, we accept, because there is an notion of the settlement law that has never een established.

been established. it does not say, this is the two or 3% of the west bank that will be part of israel. we will no longer condemn building in this land. but everything else we will take harsher measures. this would be a more proper alignment of policy with preference. at the moment, the tendency is to maintain the overshooting policy which does not recognize the developments that have taken place in negotiations. the issue of jerusalem is particularly interesting because here western countries remain attached to the 1947 partition proposal. that shows you how much their policy differs from their preference. according to the 1947 partition proposal, jerusalem, a large swath of the area, belongs to no one.

the official policy of all western countries, with respect to israel, is that jerusalem belongs to know one. as a result, there is no recognition of west jerusalem is a capital of israel. no western embassies. one at all in west jerusalem. you will see it here in various comments, tel aviv a poses that. there is no tel aviv as a seat of government. a complete denial that west jerusalem is the capital of the state of israel. yet, in many declarations, east jerusalem is treated as palestine. you will hear it being said, occupied palestinian territory. occupied palestinian jerusalem. what is happening, and the case of sweden is particularly instructive.

sweden declared after it recognize palestine, it will see its councils as the ambassadors to palestine. it will not open an embassy in it will not open an embassy in ramallah. sweden recognizes palestine, but the ambassador to palestine from sweden lives and the east jerusalem. in arab east jerusalem. yet, sweden will not take the corresponding step of moving its ambassador to west jerusalem. basically, israel is judged by the 1947 ideas and the palestinians are looked at through the 1967 lens. there's is no consistency nor coherence. if policy were to be aligned with preference, which we would see as a recognition of residential west jerusalem as the official capital of the

isreal, including moving of embassies, recognition of residential east jerusalem as he -- the capital of palestine and a continued effort to ensure that the holy basin remains open to all religions. the notion of the separate core, which was the 1947 jerusalem would now be relegated. as far as the descendents, here is the most glaring inconsistency between policy and preference because the , preference is for peace by means of two states for two people. the jewish people have a right to self-determination. the arab palestinian people have a right to self determination. yet, western countries are the sole supporters that points the that a u.n. agency

essentially perpetuates the notion that the palestinian refugees and their descendents have a right to become citizens of the state of israel. the so-called "right of return." those who fund that, including the u.s., claim that they are funded, but it does not mean they condone the notion that to refugees and their descendents have a right to return to israel. but actually they do. , this is what is happening in practice. many ways,nians, in view international support as a guarantee that the international community supports their right of return. again, sweden recognized palestine as a country already existing. sweden is also one of the largest single country donors to anra.

that palestineys exists, it also supports an organization that says about 2 million people live in the west bank and gaza, most of whom were born there, live though their entire lives, have never been displaced, are refugees from palestine. they live in palestine, but they are refugees from palestine. this can only be squared of the palestine they are refugees from is greater palestine. the palestine that will one day supersede israel. this is not the policy that is in line with the idea of two states for two people. a coherent policy would recognize palestine is the west bank -- in the west bank in gaza and then immediately argue those who live in palestine are no longer refugees from palestine and those who live outside can be granted citizenship and be acknowledged as citizens of

palestine living elsewhere but not as refugees from palestine. if western countries were to go to the logical end of the idea of trying to focus on outcomes , rather than on the process, a full consistent alignment of their policy with their preference would mean recognizing a state of palestine fully and directly with its eastal in residential arab jerusalem, while focusing on worship like in the holy basin, doing that in a way that reflects the idea of swaps or settlement blocs. and acknowledging that those who live in palestine are no longer refugees from palestine. that would be a full into coherent policy. i end by saying that, will this promote peace?

the argument for countries that recognize pedal sign is that this will help peace. what i am arguing is that the only way this has a chance of helping peace is if it is done as a package in a coherent manner not just recognizing , palestine. if you recognize palestine but leave your embassy in east jerusalem without moving your embassy to west jerusalem while continuing to argue that those from palestine are refugees. you are sending a mixed message. the only way this can begin to have impact is to do all of this fully and consistently and coherently. finally, i speculate that this might be helpful to the cause of peace because it operates in line with prospect theory, which says that people value benefits

less than they fear it the equivalent loss. people operate according to the idea they are not trying to maximize the benefits, they are more likely to try to minimize their costs, there risks. this policy actually will work with prospect theory. what does it do? it basically gives up all of the advantages at ahead of time, recognizing palestine. moving embassies to west jerusalem. doing all of these things, which were kept in the past as bargaining chips for a final status agreement, and they will be given up in advance with no expectation of return. because this benefit is less valuable than previously thought according to prospect theory. , it would be minimizing the loss that both sides feel. because if everyone recognizes a state of palestine, for israel

to recognize it no longer becomes a huge concession. if the world no longer supports , the western world, no longer supports the idea of a right of return, the palestinians might continue to dream of it but they will no longer feel that they are losing something the entire world supports. it would minimize the sense of loss for jerusalem and borders. if it is implied fully, coherently, and consistently, it might actually help promote the outcome of peace by means of two states, because while it gives up ahead of time all the benefits, it also substantially minimizes the cost. thank you. >> thank you. boy, that is different. that is very interesting and probably a little controversial. i am going to turn the floor over to dave. is this a good plan? or is there a better way?

dave: two words. first of all, this is a timely piece. as you mentioned, greece today has recognized the state of palestine. we expect the government to follow suit shortly. i would say as long as the negotiations are absent, and i say they will before long time to come, it is a good contribution to the conversation and a very courageous one. it is an extremely controversial issue. the way we usually look at this we love party intervention if it , agrees with our position and if it disagrees with our position, it is unacceptable interference and borders on anti-palestinian, and so on. so you are walking into a big

topic. i will look at it from three angles. one is analytical what is . what is practical. one is maybe about what other options are out there. i think this paper does a great job at doing a comprehensive, rigorous, and analytical study. one think you did not mention, one of the things i found most useful about this is the fact that you address some of the challenges that face something like this. and in analytical terms. i would not dwell too much on mention somewill of the things you mentioned, including, for example the risk , of an approach like this creating confusion. what would happen of some countries say arielle is going to be part of it and some countries do not include it?

what if they and up having a wide variety of international positions? the difficulty of balancing the two challenges. on the one hand, we like to say we know what the solution looks like. i am not sure if this is accurate. but it is certainly not accurate -- we might know with the contours look like, but the deeper you go, the more disagreement you have in terms of content. for any parameters to be useful , they have to be fairly specific. as i will go into later in more detail, this is an intention with the need to pay a wide coalition. it has to push these issues. how do you balance the need for having one international coalition and the need to be specific enough to be meaningful? i would add two layers of complexity that you have not addressed. the first is the fact that many of the issues are not simply

bilateral issues. but issues that have implications for other players. those interests have to be taken into account. for example, you talk about the issue of anwar. you make suggestions regarding that. these are issues that relate to jordan, lebanon. any changes that are not only logistical, but also with very deep political concerns. recently, there was a major push back in jordan, because jordanians felt this might affect the issue of refugees. it is not only a palestinian, jordanian, arab, muslim issue. this is something to take into account if we want to analytically approach the issue. looking at the way it relates to the imbalance of power can

actually create an implementation scenario that might disadvantage the palestinians. for example, when you talk about the world recognizing the jewish neighborhoods of the east jerusalem as far as the current parameters as part of israel, i suspect palestinians will not be comfortable with israel being beingaeli sovereignty extended. unless these ideas reflect a change on ground, i suspect they will create a high degree of unease among the palestinians and their supporters. but, otherwise, i would say the piece itself presents what i believe is the most comprehensive analytical overview of this issue. my issue is not within analytically it is with the , practical implications of whether or not something like this can be done constructively

at this time. i would argue that it cannot. it cannot for diplomatic reasons, and it cannot for domestic reasons. i would argue that the region is too busy elsewhere to focus on this appropriately. and in the domestic scene in both the palestinians and israelis, the domestic political configurations do not allow the leaders to actually engage in any meaningful way with any major diplomatic initiative, be it something like this or be it in your negotiations. or anything of major diplomatic nature. as you indicate in the paper, for this to work, for this to be meaningful, it has to be undertaken by a wide international coalition. you focus on the western countries, but i would say it also needs to have the air of -- the arab countries as part of the coalition. why? first of all to avoid the issue

, of confusion. but you also need it in order to deprive the parties of an exit. what happens usually say the , u.s. and the couple european countries go to the palestinians and say, these are the parameters they would say fine. , this is your opinion. they will quickly go to the arab leaders or arab countries and say, i want a solution -- i want an arab position that is completely contrary to this international position. unless we have this international coalition, it becomes hard to create the kind of pressure you need in order to get the parties to respond. i would argue today, because of the competing priorities, and frankly because of the trust deficit that the u.s. has with many of our arab allies, i do not see the possibility of this kind of coalition emerging.

i mentioned the arab countries both because they are important to create pressure on the palestinians but also because i think presenting international parameters without engaging the arabs runs a different risk. the arab league issued the arab peace initiative, which has been a paradigm shift to the whole process. and since that was issued, it continues to be under a criticism from a number of arab countries. this criticism continues. i feel if we reopen the issue of parameters right now without having a solid arab backing, this will be a reason for the arab countries who want to see the api get rid of, it will open a place for them to do that. this is one practical implication. the second risk is political.

i will not talk about israel, it is enough to say if something like this came, i suspect the current israeli government would not be supportive. yet, and israel, i suspect also, center, center left, the scam, -- the peace camp and many even , on the central right would find this to be an reason to engage in the peace talk again. i suspect it will be different on the palestinian side. on the palestinian side, the palestinian authority is so own and going through its legitimacy crisis, any of these parameters of this sort would be immediately rejected. the first person who would speak against the parameters of any kind of concessions by the palestinians would be the chief negotiator or members of the cabinet. this would create a very dangerous precedent. i believe this, rather than creating a debate, you will have

the palestinian authority coming out against it and everyone taking over from the right. if we think the parameters would re-energize the peace i see the -- the peace conversation, i feel the current political situation does not encourage this kind of dynamic. instead, it might force the palestinian and maybe even the israelis to adopt an even harder negotiation. given that i do not believe right now is the time for any itor diplomacy, be negotiations or something like what is being proposed here. my question is, what can be done? i believe at this moment we we cannot aim too high. big,e aim for something to

we're going to fail. as we have learned from the last failure of negotiations, failure comes with a price. i would suggest, let's move away from this type of the gauge men -- of diplomatic engagements, let's look at something smaller more complete, more achievable , in engagement. there are three fronts we can engage the parties on. i would argue saying no is at a premium among the israelis in palestinian. put them in the room and ask them to negotiate about the color of this, they would talk about the accords from 1948 there is a political reason they . cannot reach this kind of deal. we need to approach it in terms of how do we as in terms of international community, it has to be led by the u.s. because nobody else can do this job.

how can we engage that community to give certain deliverables to us, not to the other side? i would argue that you would need to engage both sides to see what they can do that is meaningful. that is doable, but also meaningful to the other side. on the palestinian side, we need to engage the palestinian on two fronts. is this something that we should say you either stop this or there is a price. the second front is the issue of maintaining security cooperation. has not think the p.a. interest yet the more they talk , about it, the more they create the potential for success. these are two fronts we should be very strong as an international community with the palestinians and say -- don't give it to israel. you give it to us. the failure to give it to us will have costs from honest, not -- from us not from the , israelis.

we have to engage them in terms of what can and cannot be done in terms of giving palestinian access to area c, a majority of the west bank to which the palestinians have no official access. given the security cooperation, there is a lot that can be done to increase palestinian access. we should let the idf take the lead in determining action. this would be significance -- significant enough to create a sense of hope for the palestinians. in addition to these steps, we should also engage the palestinians and israelis on to wo other bigger fronts that will preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. the israelis, i would argue given the solid perception of , the current israeli government as being ambivalent about peace, i think we need to engage israel to do a certain action that will reaffirm israel's commitment to

a two-state solution. there are a number of issues that could be suggested. you touched upon one of them. israel actually harmonizing its settlement policy. meaning for areas of israel , claim, israel can have , and it is toere show that israel actually has a peace map. elsewhere, israel has to stop expanding settlements. this will not be official for the palestinians, but it will send a message that they are ready for something costly. for the palestinians, we need to engage them on the issue of reform and revising the issue of palestinian reform and institution-building. right now, there is a major legitimacy crisis. part of the dimension is corruption.

80% of palestinians believe they corrupt. they believe they are being ruled by thieves, four out of five believe that. they do not have what we need to get to a two-state solution. i think it is key for the international community to approach the palestinians on a bilateral conversation, palestinians and the world, to reprioritize the issue of reform . what ideas will get us to a two-state solution? reaching peace can only be done through high diplomacy and negotiation. some of these ideas, in the absence of the possibility of a peace deal, some must create a degree of civilization and hopefully bring us closer to a two-state solution.

thank you very much. i am looking forward to the conversation. >> thank you, both of you, for a really interesting discussion. i am going to take the prerogative of the chair very briefly. i know there are probably a lot of questions and comments. i want to do three quick things. i forgot to introduce myself. i am dave pollock, the councilman fellow here at the washington institute. i also direct a portion of the institute's website forum for , dialogue. let's continue this dialogue online on the forum. i would love to have contributions from all of you there. it it is an interesting discussion so far and will only get more interesting. i am going to pose a quick question to each of you and then open up the floor. a quick question. one often assumes a two-state

peace, that i do not think that is a really good assumption. they are not the same thing. you could have a palestinian state and still have conflict. my question is, what about security? that is the one thing that sounds to me like it may be missing from your very interesting new paradigm. before you answer, my question to dave is, what you are saying is something kind of like this is good in theory but not in practice. my question to you is, do you recommend then that outside powers somehow just back off on the big issues of recognizing palestine or dealing with the refugee issue or jerusalem or other borders or other things? if that is the recommendation, how is that going to happen and how are you going to get them to

stop promoting, let's say, bdf's in europe if they do not match that with some other action? >> first of all, i forgot to mention, this paper decided to deal only with policies that are entirely within the decision-making power of western countries. they do not require israelis or palestinians to accept, reject, things that can be done as western countries. so everything i mentioned, from recognizing palestine to moving an embassy to the funding of policies, that is within the decision-making capacity of western countries and this is why it looked at them. what i am seeing as western countries increasing looking to do things they can do without needing to engage with all the difficulties mentioned.

the one thing that clearly cannot be done through the means i reviewed here is the issue of security. nothing in all of the kind of diplomatic steps that i reviewed can remove a single soldier from the west bank or can disarm a single rocket in gaza. everything that has to do with security, the occupation, ending israeli military presence in the west bank, the question of the blockade, all of these things are in the hands of the sides. no outside power, barring military intervention, but no outside power has the tools to change that situation on the ground. so everything that has to do with security coordination, , israeli military presence, palestinians arming themselves

-- all of this remains the one clear issue that is in the hands of both sides. it will need to be understood that nothing that western countries do diplomatically will change any of that. they can take actions that would recognize that, that would say how important it is for the palestinian state to be demilitarized or for a transitional israeli military presence on the jordan river. or all of these things, or they could say we recognize palestine, but we recognize palestine as continue to be under military occupation. it can say these things, but there is nothing that western countries can do to change it in the absence of the --. >> thank you.

you can ask short questions. i'm not sure we can give you short answers. >> will try. >> though i make my living being an expert in the peace process, i am really not a fan of the word "peace." it does bring to mind unrealistic expectations of fuzziness and warm feelings and whatnot. we are talking about arrangements here. many of the points that were raised are enough to create a stable arrangement. can we get the world to back off? one of the reasons we cannot get the world to back off is that this is not only a policy issue. it is also a political issue for almost every country that i can think of in the western world. the united states, the greek parliament votes for the palestinian state, i expect it is not going through an extremely rigorous policy conversation. rather there are political , reasons, and therefore as long as this issue remains political, the world will intervene. from typical statements, even things like bilateral

recognition which ultimately i , think, whatever you think of them are neither here nor there. , they are not game changers. we are used to this kind of window dressing throughout the palestinian-israeli history. what i very concerned about is the kind of an attempt to impose a solution from the outside on all of the parameters without doing the homework. the homework of actually making sure that this kind of a political initiative could succeed. we conceived two kinds of iterations of how this could work. either an attempt to create a security council resolution with parameters, which we saw a glimpse of back in december of 2014, almost an exact year from now. which was problematic because we we -- we saw them the difficulty of actually creating that kind of a coalition. one of the biggest assets that

we have in diplomacy these days is an international consensus on a two state solution. push prematurely for a resolution that does not reflect everyone's vision of a two state solution, you might start seeing the breakdown or the fragmentation of international consensus. i'm not sure this is helpful. it's one of these think that if you overreach you might actually end up doing more damage to. -- more damage than good. the second scenario, which is also quite risky, and i think you touched on in the paper -- is the u.s. coming up with american parameters. we hear every now and then, speculation that there will be obama parameters before the end of the administration. it is not the first time we have done it. clinton did as he was leaving office. again, december -- just a month before he left the white house. it is a little bit different now. it is different in the sense that i think the biggest risk is

-- what if we have an american parameter without doing the homework? similar to what we had when the president spoke at the state department of aipac with partial parameters. without lining up the players. i think it is not good for u.s. leadership and u.s. standing to come up with parameters that are not immediately supported by our european allies, our western allies, and which are not -- even which are opposed by our arab allies. it is too much to expect for the palestinians and israelis to endorse these kinds of things. at least we need to show that the u.s. continues to be the leader of this fight. coming up with parameters that do not have the support, the prior support, of our allies when -- will actually expose the u.s. as week and will be viewed by people in the region as another indication that the u.s. power and leadership in the region is willing. i do not think this is good for u.s. national interest. >> great, thank you. i will turn the floor open and

try to take questions in the order that i see them. mohammed. >> i would like to ask both of you about what you might call the camel in the room. [laughter] >> [inaudible] >> -- leadership in either palestine or israel were committed to peace. what leadership -- they are against any effort to make peace in the area. -- the palestinians because peace might usher democracy and then this will mean the end of this leadership and so, in this way, this leadership would like to stick to the status quo.

on the other side, because peace might and israeli expansion policies with regard to certain -- they are totally against this piece. so, what do we do in order to actually put the good ideas that you might have in the field, when you have leadership committed to know peace education, no peace ventures, no people to people -- and actually are very active against moderates and against the peacemakers? what do we do with this problem? >> ok. please. >> first, a couple of comments. one of the reasons i decided to do the analysis in this paper is i think one of the reasons we are facing difficulties, there are many reasons and we have worked on it together on the

difficulties for achieving peace, but some of it is really the mixed messaging that comes from the world. that does not send a clear sense of it is either here or there. that makes it more difficult. but, i must say, this is my view of the conflict in general. i do not put a big premium on leaders in this conflict and all. i think the leaders on both sides can operate at the margins. of this conflict. i think this is a conflict that goes so deep to the story of each person, their sense of what is just, what is due, who they are, that leaders cannot depart substantially from how each people views the essence of the conflict and what it is all about. i think leaders can operate at the margins, they have some new bring room at the margins, they can try to at least not make things worse, which is certainly

something that in israel, i would want to work toward. if we can't make it happen tomorrow, how can we at least in short -- i think this is our responsibility -- to ensure that we do not make it harder for future generations to achieve it. how can we keep, at least, the option open? at the end of the day, i think the conflict go so deep to the history and the injustice of both peoples, that when people ask me, so what is your prescription, what will finally bring peace? my answer is two words: mutual exhaustion. i think what we will reach -- we do not know how long this will take -- but when we reach a moment of mutual exhaustion, when both sides are finally what you call the big dream and the little hope, when both sides are willing to finally say, ok the other is going nowhere, they cannot be made to disappear,

they cannot be made to give up, surrender, and go away. when there is a real understanding of that, and that can only happen after you ask for all of the other terrible options and you have reached a mutual exhaustion, then you can begin to look toward making peace. >> do want to comment on the palestinian or israeli side? >> i still believe that leaders actually have a great role to play. if i look at peacemaking and the air of-israeli conflict, frankly it has been made by leaders. from -- at one end to -- at the other end. i think this begins the peace efforts that we have made. all of the leaders move beyond the comfort zone of the peoples. i don't see the hussein's or others in the horizon anytime soon.

i was trained to be diplomatic. all right? when i said that the political environment does not allow for the leaders to engage in major diplomatic initiatives, i would not go as far as you and your question. i can get into people's heads. clearly, the track record has not been one that is one that shows great risk-taking or leadership to be honest. that is why, in some ways, i am more interested right now in putting both leadership systems to the test. and getting them to a point where they must make a decision. that's what i believe we should engage israel away from the pressure of having to kind of show the public they are not fryers or suckers. when it comes to the palestinians on a bilateral negotiation platform, and have the world, to see how far this leadership can go. on the palestinian side, as

well. my believe, is that without reform, and by reform i don't mean technical military, but deeper reforms, constitutionalism, security sector reform, democratic reform, without that, not only is the current leadership incapable of reaching a decision, but we do not have a system in the palestinian policy that can help create leaders who will emerge. if we create this state of reforming and good government, the palestinian system can start producing new leadership. we saw this when the u.s. and the world was pushing for reform, it allowed reformists to emerge. i suspect we need a new initiative of this work the international community to start energizing and possibly redefining palestinian politics. >> ok. there are a lot of hands it. i will really try to do this in order. so, i have the professor and you up front. ari, please. >> i was hoping that the

rebuttal would be at least partially done in a swedish accent. [laughter] >> that perspective is kind of missing from the discussion. so, i would like to try to put myself in the shoes for a moment of the swedish foreign minister who is probably -- would probably say to you, we know very well these things. we know about jerusalem and refugees and orders. were not ignorant. we view ourselves as having a role here. our role here is to try, it if you would be honest, he would put in those terms, our role is to try to level the playing field and what. to try and do something in order to balance the asymmetry. and therefore, there is no policy dissonance or if there is a policy dissonance it is intentional because we view ourselves as playing a role. he would say, probably, as long as there is a policy dissonance from the israeli side, as well as having all of the cards,

advocating for or saying that it supports the palestinian state, but actually is engaging and policies that counter that -- have you expect us to not have this kind of dissonance? >> a good question. >> in a swedish accent. indeed, when the swedish foreign minister mate her declaration in october of 2014, of recognizing palestine as an existing state, she said that she believed this would promote peace by leveling the playing field. so, she justified sweden breaking rank with the international consensus of privileging process negotiations over outcome by the fact that she is saying she has a certain analysis of why there is no peace and an analysis is the power of asymmetry and she thinks i reckon i think palestine can at least contribute to changing that.

so, i want to address it on two levels. she said, i'll say that she thinks this act will bring peace. as i said, because she analyzes why she thinks there is no peace. so, regardless of the analysis, i'll address the analysis and a moment, it's and a terrible message when she pulled out one element of all and basically said, we will recognize palestine, we will continue to be one of the foremost supporter of an organization that is essentially keeping the dream of greater palestine a life and we well also say that this promotes peace. my argument would be, choose two or three. you cannot have all three. if you say palestine exists, and you continue to condone the notion that those who live in palestine are refugees from

palestine, don't tell me this promotes peace. you're promoting the idea that the jewish people don't have a right to self determination in this land. that is fine if you think that, but then don't tell me that you're promoting peace. if you want to promote peace, recognize palestine and at the same time you can also do that tomorrow, say that as a major donor to -- you will no longer condone the idea of those who live in palestine have been born there and lived there all their lives are registered as refugees from palestine. then, i can believe her, that she genuinely seeks piece by means of two states for two people. that is in the truth of the message that she said. now, she has an analysis. power imbalances are the source of a lack of peace. i disagree with this analysis. i actually think that the power and balance still is that the jewish people remained -- remain

in and welcome minority in the middle east. -- remain an unwelcome minority in the middle east. although they are powerful as a country, they are actually still a minority that is not acceptable in the region. this is my analysis of why we came close to peace in the 1990's. i actually don't credit where being and i don't credit our -- rabin and arafat with being, in that sense, great leaders. there were leaders who took advantage of an opportunity that if anything, in my view, was created by ronald reagan and gorbachev. those are the people i would credit more. what did they create? they created a moment in history where the arab world or some of the arab countries lost their soviet backing. america emerged as a hyperpower. one million soviet jews were immigrating to the united states -- to israel. israel emerged all of a sudden

in the perception as a very powerful nation. the arab world and the palestinians lost legitimacy when they supported saddam hussein in some of the weakest moments. if you believe that at the core of the conflict lies the continued denial of the arab world that the jewish people have a right to self-determination, have a real claim and an attachment to the lands, if you believe this is at the core of the conflict, then peace can only emerge when the arab world despairs of the possibility that the jewish people can somehow be made to go away. so, that is the moment of parity. the moment when the notion that the jewish people are here to stay, then you have an opening for peace. so, my analysis is exactly the opposite of the swedish foreign minister. and the thing is, if you begin to have different analysis of why there is no peace, you begin to create a diplomatic arms race where every side is trying to convince that they should be

strengthens for the cause of peace. that is not helpful, which is why i say if you want to be helpful, be consistent across all parameters. recognize palestine, move your embassy to west jerusalem, announced that your embassy is now the embassy to palestine, and honor those who live in palestine are no longer refugees are palestine. at least then i can see that you really mean peace. >> ok. yes, please. >> a couple of points. a reaction to that point. the first thing, if i will create -- credit and outside player, it would be george bush -- george h.w. bush, who authored the liberation of kuwait which send a message to the region.

and to the palestinians and israelis. when my interests are being challenged, i take action to do that. and also, the region as an something. at the end of the day, it was american money and american lives that actually created the liberation of kuwait. which enable the united states at that point to create the coalition that we needed to create in the madrid process which ultimately produced everything. that is on one point. i disagree with you on the issue of asymmetry of power. you might be describing a regional reality, but i think when you zoom into the palestinian-israeli conflict, i would argue that this is not the case and we have a very clear power imbalance. there may be a narrative imbalance which is against israel's favor, but certainly when it comes to power and the ability to make decisions, the israelis are in a much better place. i would argue that reforming narratives is not necessary for reaching state arrangements. i would challenge anyone here to find more than 10 egyptians who actually like israel or who

believe that israel has a right to exist. it does not matter. egyptian-israel peace treaty has survived not because of accepting america, but because of creating arrangements that create a balance of interest. now, my problem with the swedish arguments though, is even if i accept that it is about the imbalance of power, it is not clear to me how agonizing the state of palestine changes any of that. it does not move a single israeli soldier into the west bank nor can it stop a single act of terrorism. it is nice symbolically. it would even be a good opportunity to kind of show that the current palestinian leadership is doing something. but, how it plays into any implementable operational, diplomatic or real difference, still eludes me. beside being just a symbol that

would happen and life goes on. >> i want to take you up on your challenge to find 10 egyptians that think israel has a right to exist. [laughter] >> you had said in the beginning that if we had been left alone we could have solved this. and you hear a lot of that today. leave us alone, we can take care of this ourselves. could you elaborate on that? >> their markable thing about our conflict is that it is actually one of the world's smallest, least violent conflicts if you were to be crude and do a body count. i one side table of violent conflicts around the world and now the table would be even worse. it would place the conflict and number 49. so, essentially, if people were really just concerned with reducing body count in the world, they would not be focusing on this conflict. and, i think that having all of

our energy -- i would be out of a job, but i'm ok with that -- having all of our energy be spent on playing out this conflict on the international stage, magnifying each and every tiny incident -- forcing us to use all of our kind of resources, best people, to playing out this thing on the international stage, i think is not helpful. i think if the conflict were placed in the non-theological context of just two tribes battling over until fairly recently a resource -- or a piece of land, i think we could have come to a lot of understandings and arrangements that would have allowed us to achieve something, not peace perhaps, but something. in fact, one of my personal criticisms of the secretary of

state, and cemented a great quote for that, is when he introduces is very passionate effort, when he failed to understand is that netanyahu had long ago signed a no peace agreement. under that no peace agreement, for quite a few years, able were not dying. now, granted, you do not get a nobel peace prize for people just not dying, but for as, having lived through two decades of this euphoria of near peace and then this dissent into the bloody mayhem of the second intifada, just having a few years where you wake up a live was pretty good. it is not that this was good and this was piece or this end of the occupation, but the two sides were able to understand the two leaders or non-leaders were able to understand that this is as can be done at this moment. i think it's a were brought down to that size, we could have actually reached arrangements that would have let us at least at the minimum live the most

dignified lives we could live. >> yes? upfront? >> i agree with everything you say, both of you. [laughter] >> afterwards a way to explain that. >> even though the property rights of jews who were kicked out of arab lands were not mentioned. >> it's in the piece. i did not mention it. >> when you refer to a two state solution, you assume that the pa has control over gaza. i think until they -- hamas and pa come together, i don't think there will be a two state solution. thank you. >> two quick reactions. i think there is a reason we don't mention the jews who work in air countries, because that is not the

palestinian-israeli-ish real -- issue. it is an issue for israel to take up with tunisia and iraq and whatnot. sometimes we confuse arab and palestinian, these are not the same things and the dramatic terms. the unity -- my own view is that these two sides hamas and the other will not unite and should not unite. they should not unite because you have two very different visions that you said they cannot reconcile. therefore, for my perspective, to wait until there is unity, we will get no peace. both in reaction to what you said and earlier. yes, we had a time that we were not killing one another, which was also a time where the constituency for peace was actually eroding by the day. time works in a certain way, equally, i think with the internal palestinian conflict. as long as hamas can claim that using violence and terrorism produces results, as they did when they abducted the people,

and as long as -- they cannot show -- time works in favor of hamas. my perspective, some of the small ideas that i came up with, would allow the pa to stand up and say, we are getting something out of our collaborative relationship with the israelis, but ultimately, the palestinians will choose which way to go once confronted with a final peace deal. either hamas wins or the other. i do not think one of the narratives can win before we get to that moment. >> ok. thank you. david? >> thank you for your paper and for your presentation. even though this is beyond the scope of the paper itself, the logic of what you said, the policy with the preference, do it as a package deal -- i will leave you right up to the edge,

it seems to me, having the security council before parameters because the odds of 100-200 countries synchronizing their borders all in the same way, i think we would all agree, and the practical sense, it is probably not likely. it leads us all to there. you can even argue that in the absence of it, the point become saline, which is that the europeans busted their own devices. they're not out to create a cosmic sense of justice, they want to put their thumb on the scale because they feel the israelis have more power. they're not going to come up with a grand balance of their own. so, explain then, why, even though it is be on the scope of the paper from methodological reasons, why is a bad idea? >> why it's a bad idea to do what? >> to have a security council resolution. parameters.

which i think you would have to say is a 50-50 chance that the administration might do after the november elections. >> so, i would say, and this is where we get into the theory and the practice. i don't deny that what i presented has major practical challenges which is why, also, countries are choosing what i call the easy way. they mechanize palestine and they will not deal with all of the implications. sweden will announce that it is not opening an embassy and from -- in ramallah and let it be that and continue to fund the other. i wanted to highlight why that is deeply unhelpful. and why this sends a very, very problematic message about what the world is trying to achieve. in many ways, what i'm saying is that if you cannot do that coherently and consistently, please don't do anything. because, what you are doing in the middle, since most problematic message of all.

so, i wanted to present what a coherent, smart strategy would look like. given the practical problems, i would at least prefer to deal with you on alternative that would not be a halfway detrimental job, but to not do anything. yes, i knew that there was a real chance, somehow the stars align, and there's a real chance to put forward a security council resolution. in the paper i mention that after years of what was considered constructive ambiguity, which was destructive, now we know that we need constructive specificity. we need to be very clear on the details if there was a real chance for a coalition around the detailed proposal that addresses all the issues and essentially refuses to sign because it gives embassies in jerusalem and ends recognition of the right of

return and gives palestinians a capital in jerusalem, it would confuse the sides. if there was a chance to have a specific package that addresses all these issues, i would support it. david: good. i want to make one quick note for the record. believe it or not, in the u.n. resolution that admitted palestine as first an observer and then a member state of the organization with some qualifications, jerusalem is recognized as israel's capital, believe it or not. if you look at the u.n. documents, you will see that the palestinian authority itself recognizes jerusalem as the capital of israel and palestine.

that is a historical footnote, but it leads me to a much more fundamental issue i want to mention, which is security council resolution. so what? does everyone listen to every single security council resolution? if governments adopt a policy, does that mean partners will carry it out in practice? probably not. that is something that we also need to keep in mind as we consider that diplomacy and limits of outside intervention or nonintervention. in the back? >> thank you both. this is fascinating. i do want to say that i think the ideas are interesting and compelling. however, it does not work in a vacuum. i wanted to ask you what you think the role of public opinion, specifically in the u.s. and maybe other countries

as well, will be to promote certain solutions that may be effective in the long term? einat: my personal view and one of the reasons i am publishing this and speaking here is that i think public opinion matters. we see public opinion having an impact on the recognition of palestine. i want to highlight why that, in itself, is not helpful. and if the public can be made aware to the needs of a more coherent and packaged approach, maybe that will have some political impact as well. david: howard? >> thank you. great presentation. i really enjoyed it.

i think i agree we are moving to a point where any western power can put parameters on the table. i am not sure the things you propose instead are going to get us anyplace. on the palestine side, you say we need them to reduce incitement and maintain security. we have security cooperation and have had it for some time. on the incitement issue, that is in the eye of the holder -- beholder. on the israeli side, you suggest we open access, which we have tried to do since the days of george mitchell. my question would be, how do you see us making progress? what else can be done to show it israeli commitment to the palestinian state? and i think the idea that israel completely frees settlements is something so politically impossible right now that we