about bipartisanship in the u.s. addison desk senate. we also look ahead as congress returns this week and the president from his two-week vacation. what to expect on capitol hill, and josh crush our will talk about the elect -- congressional elections on 2060. "newsmakers" is next. have a great weekend. ♪ than a, "newsmakers" house hearing on how new technology will impact cars of the future.

after that, from the annual tech business leaders and entrepreneurs discuss innovations in technology. susan: our guest on "newsmakers" this week is nicholas rasmussen, who is the director of the national counterterrorism center. he has held that position since last year, and he has spent his entire career in foreign policy and national security isssues. let me introduce our two reporters who will be asking the questions. eric schmidt of the new york times is covering national security. also damian paletta covers national security for the wall street journal. eric, you are up first. eric: there has been some success in ramadi in iraq. i was wondering if you could take this opportunity to assess the state of isis not only in iraq and syria but in europe and the united states, and the

threat it poses? rasmussen: you're right to talk successes.t but we do live in a heightened threat environment that is isil directed or isil inspired plotting. a lot of what we see gives us concern about isil's ability to inspire individuals in their own locations to carry out activities. we also see indication that isis is looking to organize direct plotting aimed at western targets as well. focusing narrowly and specifically on iraq and syria, the effort by iraqi syria security forces is an important step forward in the effort to degrade and push back and shrink the size of the territory that isis controls inside a rock. as we've said all along, from an analytical perspective, there is

no single action that is going to result in the degradation of the isis threat. this is something that will take time. damian: you have been at this a long time. it seems like some of the counterterrorism model for al qaeda was to follow the money and also to root out communications and intercept planning that might be targeting western targets. the inspiration idea that we saw in san bernardino where you have two people that have self radicalized. have you guys have to adjust what you do in order to address that sort of idea? rasmussen: the two different variants of plotting you just described pose different challenges. when you are dealing with an organized terrorist group

that has the ability to direct and plan and plot over a long. of time, while that is potentially dangerous because of the complexity and scale, it also gives us many points along the way in which disruption opportunities are possible. the longer it takes for a plot to mature and for resources to be gathered, the more opportunities exist for our intelligence and law enforcement and military to do with they do what they do best, to disrupt plots like that. when you are dealing with the second category, something that is more self initiated, acting in the name of the terrorist organization, if not with their explicit direction or sanction. that is much more of a challenge particular here inside the united states. you are not able to rely on the kinds of indicators, kinds of clues and tipping information

that would give the opportunity to play that disruption card at the right stage. i think you have heard the director talk about this publicly. secretary johnson has talked about this. this is where we need help from communities around the country. it is in cases like san bernardino, involving our own population of homegrown violent extremists, it is these cases where the single greatest opportunity we are going to have to disrupt individuals is when individuals in those communities recognize the signs and bring it to the attention of law enforcement. eric: why has it been so difficult for the united states to counter the islamic state's narrative? rasmussen: if i can answer that 32nd -- 30 second sound

bite, it would be a lot further along than we are. different aspects of that isil narratives appeal to different parts of the target population. some are clearly drawn by the idea of the caliphate that isil , is creating on the ground and islamic state in fulfillment of a historical prophecy goes back centuries. and now is the time for individuals to join that project as it takes shape. others are attracted by the sectarian narrative sunni versus , shia conflict. others are attracted by the opportunity to engage in the civil war in syria. others are attracted to the idea of the sheer adventure that comes with joining the military struggle with the chance to cut your teeth on the ground in an active war zone. there is no one piece of that narrative that is the single most prominent draw for isil's target population.

when they try to bring recruits to join their organization. our strategies have to be aimed at each and every one of those different motivating pieces. that i thinkings will give us the greatest leg up to counter that isil narrative overtime would be success on the ground inside of iraq. that's why mentioned earlier the , effort to retake ramadi is so important. over time if iraqi security forces are able to expand the degree of control the exercise over iraqi territory that will , help chip away at the narratives that isil has right now that the caliphate is a prospering enterprise. damian: with their control of raqqa and syria they

, seem to have deep roots in these areas. it gives them a place to kind of plan the iraqi army was able to take back ramadi but we have these big areas where they can broadcast their signals. does that make your job harder to try to monitor domestic and international plots? how much harder does that make your job. rasmussen: any time a terrorist organization enjoys territorial safe haven, and certainly a territorial safe haven of the size that isil enjoys in iraq and syria, that presents complications for us. it makes it harder to get out specific terrorist operational cells may be plotting and planning. it makes it difficult to collect the intelligence we need to disrupt their plotting. that is what we play such a priority on shrinking the size of that safe haven overtime. as i mentioned a minute ago,

there are positive signs to point to. even that side of the ledger is going to take time. when you heard intelligence community speak about efforts to degrade or defeat i soul overtime, we talked about that being a project that will take time. there is no single step that is going to result in an immediate turnaround of the situation. over the time -- over time, we identify thee to vulnerabilities and weaknesses that we can exploit. : when you look at the has expanded, it by its declaration to at least eight franchises around the world. how serious is this as a global threat as opposed to these branches that have just been

branded as isis and trying to take advantage of the group's notoriety? tenuous ties back to the main headquarters in syria. rasmussen: you have the isil narrative being attractive to different extremist organizations in different parts of the world, as you suggest in your question. in certain areas, i would argue that it does not add cumulatively that the threat that we face. it may be a bit of a rebranding. one terrorist organization simply re-affiliating itself with another. on the other hand, there are some areas in which isil is operating right now which give us particular concern. i would highlight libya as a particular concern. the isil branch in libya is one that is taking advantage of deteriorating security conditions in libya and putting itself in a position to coordinate isil efforts across north africa.

that is of concern to us because one of the things we have seen as libya has descended into civil war and political chaos is that it is very difficult for us to engage in the kind of counterterrorism operations that we would typically want to do in dealing with the threat like isil in libya. the various branch or affiliate organizations tied to isil, libya is the one that gives me the most concern. damian: there was this debate in america about the scope of nsa surveillance. congress passed a law about six months ago that sort of changed the usa freedom act to change how the nsa collects this information. it was supported by the white house and supported by both parties in congress. after the san bernardino up attack -- attack in paris attack there has been some pushback , that maybe we shouldn't of gone that far.

maybe the country is less safe. can you offer your views on whether you feel like you guys will need more flexibility? or do you think you can work within the confines of the new law. rasmussen: there's no question that the new law provided the kind of collection of intelligence that we find so necessary for disrupting and responding to the terrorist activity. i think i would lean on what said it is too , soon to tell in some cases. we would not have supported the the measure as it was passed without confidence that we can make it work and collect the kind of intelligence that we need. at the same time, if over time we discover otherwise, that i think there is an obligation on us to say so as well. at this early stage there's nothing that makes me question

that we cannot operate in this framework. air: you have spoken in your public remarks before that this is a time when you see more different kind of threats, a more diffuse threat environment. i wanted to bring you back to look at the paris and san bernardino attacks. what has the intelligence and counterterrorism communities what have they learned from , these attacks? one seems to be more than directed approach, and the husband was radicalized well before the creation of the islamic state. what have you all learned as you try to combat these in the next years ahead? rasmussen: we have to literally be on our toes in locations all around the world and here at home because we cannot necessarily predict from which direction the next threat will

emerge. as much as the conversation has turned in recent months to isis related plotting around the still in the intelligence community spend a great deal of time, effort, and resources focused on al qaeda, groups affiliated with al qaeda that we call more traditional terrorism threats. we have been monitoring and tracking and working to disrupt in the period since 9/11. i tend to look at this as being additive or cumulative. it is not as if we are in the position to shed or subtract from that list as well. we have had a fair amount of success. i have talked about it publicly, as have other members of the community degrading core al , qaeda operations. degrading their ability to carry out complex attacks in the west,

and that is something we should all take great satisfaction in. there is no question that al qaeda, securely as it feels a sense of competition with isil, there's no question that al qaeda and al qaeda affiliated organizations are continuing to look for opportunities to carry out attacks against the west. i guess if there is a lesson learned here from paris and san bernardino, it is that we cannot really predict where and from what direction the threats we see next might come from. eric: do you feel you can rely on the forces in europe and they were plots right under the nose of the officials in belgium and france? are they doing enough? rasmussen: our european partners are clearly confronting something in their societies on a scale far different from

anything we are seeing inside the united states. they have to make their own judgments about whether they have the right array of legal authorities resources, money, all the things necessary to carry out effective counterterrorism operations inside their own country. is a bit ofif there positive news over the past few years as we have dealt with the conflict in syria and iraq, it is that our level of cooperation and engagement with some of our european partners has really increased fairly dramatically. the sharing of information about individuals who may be traveling to the conflict zone in iraq and information sharing of potential threats. that information sharing is much more advanced than if we had this conversation 18 months ago.

paris has brought to the fore whether the europeans as a group are postured well enough to deal with the kinds of threats that they face. this is not something that is going to go away in some six or 12 month. of time. i would expect to see our european partners engage in some introspection about how to deal with this. susan: twitter announced a more assertive monitoring policy this week. i am wondering whether or not that is something you welcome, or whether that takes away your ability to monitor some of the activity on social media? rasmussen: whatever help we can enjoy from private sector is on its face a good thing.

the challenge of monitoring social media is an immense challenge. it is one of the things that i have found most troubling about the counterterrorism environment that we are in these days, is so much of the information that we find relevant to a terrorism analysis is now showing up in social media, rather than in the usual traditional disciplines of human intelligence or signals intelligence. while that in some ways that makes it much more accessible, as you can imagine the volume of that information is so vastly greater than traditional intelligence information has been, that we are struggling i would say to find ways to make sense of all that information that we have available to us. it simply is impossible for an tc or our other

partners to be monitoring the social media utterances of everybody who has an extreme ideology. and yet, when you look retrospectively, looking back at attacks that have taken place, we also see signs that someone was radicalized in their engagements on social media. that is something we're going to have to build into our expectations what level of worry , we can expect from our intelligence community in terms of dealing with terrorist threats. can we talk about san bernardino? you mentioned that paris will have to do a self-evaluation. if something similar going on in post-san bernardino, is there a review underway? were signals missed? were there things you guys could've done better?

i think a lot of americans will notice if this is just the new normal. there would just be attacks in the workplace that killed 14 or 20 people, or if there is ways we can tighten up to prevent this. rasmussen: it is a fair question. every instance in which there has been a significant terrorism incident affecting u.s. interests overseas or at home, almost as a matter of reflex each of our organizations of the federal government goes through its own self-diagnostic, what could we have done better. this is an approach we have taken in the aftermath of the boston marathon bombing, certain overseas events. looking at ourselves and saying what could we have done , differently? what might have been notable? what might've been apparent to us if we were looking in the right places? that doesn't mean that you are

necessarily finding a smoking gun that a facility made a mistake, or there was a government screwup. we are trying to do our jobs better and holding ourselves to the highest standard of accountability. san bernardino is an ongoing law enforcement investigation, so i am a little bit limited on what i can say about that. i will say at this point, i have seen nothing to indicate that there was some dramatic bit of missed opportunity on the part of law enforcement or intelligence to get ahead of what happened in san bernardino. i mentioned a few minutes ago in the context of talking about homegrown violent extremists, the kind of activity that we violenty see homegrown extremists engage in is activity that won't necessarily be visible to law enforcement. as a result our best opportunity , to get ahead of that sometimes will come from relying on the

community individuals who have , daily firsthand contact with a potential extremist actor. to recognize clues of abnormal behavior, or to identify changes in the way they are engaging with their peers at work or in the social setting. those kind of community engagements, and you have seen secretary johnson and director comey talking, we need help in dealing with this challenge particularly here home. i'm not sure if we're going to be handed on a silver platter the kind of intelligence that will tell us some is trying to plan this kind of attack. eric: you have talked about the community and the need to be engaged. we have seen in a short span of months terrorism rising to the list of the public's top concerns. we saw it in the republican debate a few weeks ago. people have expressed a lot more fears about terrorism now.

?re these fears misplaced rasmussen: i don't think i'm in a position to say that the public spheres are misplaced. i would say, it is important to keep the threat environment in some sort of perspective. one of the things we can point earlier, is the great deal of success we have had in minimizing core al qaeda. the most lethal terrorist adversary for most of the last 15 years. minimizing their capacity to carry out a large-scale, mass casualty attack inside the united states, and that is the significant achievement not to be messed. at the same time, the kinds of smaller scale but nonetheless quite lethal and quite frightening attacks that isil is able to inspire, they definitely contribute to a sense of fear

and insecurity in the public at large. i certainly understand that. if you look across the spectrum of terrorist threats that we face these episodes are still , remarkably infrequent. the number and frequency with which they've taken place still relatively small. i would argue, as much as we are isis, and the threat they pose around the world, this is not an existential threat in traditional national security terms. in some ways it is the kind of threat different from al qaeda. it was interesting to note, at least according to some of the public reports, that the san bernardino perpetrator was in fact inspired by material that predated the rise of the islamic state.

one could even argue that it is possible that that attack might have taken place even in the absence of an isis or isil narrative being part of the discussion. these are persistent threats that have endured over time. but we are resilient and we have ability to fight back, to counter to recover from these , kinds of attacks. i would never minimize the sense of fear and insecurity that people feel. i would also urge them to keep it in some sort of perspective. damian: i went with secretary johnson to a mosque after san bernardino. president bush did something right after 9/11, trying to engage with muslim leaders and trying to send a signal to wasicans that what happened not representative of all muslim americans. he seemed to gently nudge them

that they need to do a better job of communicating with the u.s. government and figuring out what exactly is going on in their communities. is that something we have been good at, engaging with the community, or is that something you need to do better at? rasmussen: it a constant work in progress. secretary johnson should be commended for the work of trying to do this. in my role in the national counterterrorism center i often , work with fbi and homeland security. when i have found, it is literally a different conversation in every community. what works in new york city may not work as well in los angeles or in chicago or in dallas or miami or detroit. in each of those communities, there needs to be a dialogue with federal law enforcement and the local community in the form of religious leaders and community leaders, civic leaders

to try to figure out how to best keep and i out for the signs of extremism, and there might be homegrown violent extremists who are willing to act. a stimulus coming from isis overseas. we are not perfect at this yet. we are expanding our outreach to these communities. we can certainly scale of these efforts considerably. there is a lot of work to be done. i am proud of the work we are doing in this area. that is it for our time. i want thank you for being with us on newsmakers. you are watching newsmakers. our guest was nicholas rasmussen of the national counterterrorism center. eric schmidt, i wanted you to ask you to explain in this pantheon of alpha that that is responsible for keeping the

country safe, what does the national counterterrorism center do? eric: the national counterterrorism center is a kind of a clearing house for all the information that is coming in about potential threats. the information will come in and its analysts are really charged with trying to analyze this information across the various agencies of government. trying to assess the different kinds of threats that are coming in, and they are helping to produce the products for the president and his intelligence briefing. susan: where is it in the reporting chain? damian: i imagine fans on the urgent it would go directly to the president. the director of national intelligence deals with the whole pantheon of issues whereas , the national counterterrorism center focuses specifically on counterterrorism. susan the director described to : us a world of more diffuse

threats. what is the level of cooperation between agencies for sharing information at this point? infrastructure that has been created in this country after 9/11. eric: you get out to the to field the cooperation is quite good. you can have the military working closely with cia operatives who are working closely with fbi agents, and other counterparts from other governments as well. but when you get back here to washington you see some turf battles breaking out over sources of method, over money and those kinds of thing. certainly that corporation is better years after 9/11, but it still needs to be improved. damian: we also need cooperation with foreign intelligence. in syria, there is a whole bunch of countries that have competing that are claiming they

are trying to fight the islamic state. maybe the russians have some intelligence that we don't have. maybe the french has some intelligence, or have stopped collecting it due to new privacy laws. more international cooperation, but at the same time, there is the sense that the folks to get too carried away. that is another challenge he has to deal with every day. susan: and what is the temperament in congress these days to response to the request? damian: i think there is more sympathy in congress, especially what has given -- taken place in san bernardino. are we talking, you know, more tanks and places like birmingham, alabama? i think they are trying to figure out how best to deploy those resources. one of the challenges, though, is because we are in a campaign

season, there is going to be a lot of debate about having a military, whether the nsa or cia should have more powers, but that will drive the congressional debate as well. the lawmakers are going to take their cues from what is polling well on the campaign trail. susan: could you give us a sense of what 2016 looks like? eric: first of all, as mr. rasmussen said, we need to be watching what happens in iraq. will iraq be able to build on the momentum they have now and push the islamic state out of iraq? then you have on the syrian side, you have the u.s. assisting syrian opposition fighters, who in the east are fighting against isis. if you can shrink that territory, isis is different because it derives much of its income through its territory. if isis holds firm, that will pp