lethal threat to the united states of america. it's a very strong statement. let me walk you through why i believe that. the nature and the significance of the threat posed by isis flows from the fact that isis is at the same time a terrorist oup, a quasi-state and a revolutionary political movement. we have not faced the likes of it before. as a terrorist group, isis poses a threat to the u.s. homeland. in mid 2015, just six months ago, that threat was largely indirect. isis' ability to radicalize young american men and women to conduct lone wolf attacks here. that indirect threat remains today. there are thousands of isis

sympathizers in the united states, more than al qaeda ever had. the f.b.i. has over 900 open investigations into home-grown extremists. the vast majority radicalized by isis. and a large number of which relate to individuals who may be plotting attacks here. such attacks have already occurred. in the united states. including the attack in san bernardino last month, which in terms of fatalities was the largest terrorist attack in the nited states since 9/11. there are other isis supporters who have been arrested before they could act. today in addition to that indirect threat, we face a direct threat from isis. an isis capability to plan and direct attacks in the homeland from the group's safe haven in iraq and syria. largely from racka in syria.

just like the group did in paris in november. the paris attack, as you know, watt the largest attack -- was the largest attack in western europe since the madrid train bombings in 2004 and the first isis-directed attack in the west ever. what's the difference between the direct threat and an indirect threat? why does it matter? a lone wolf attack, while horrific, is likely to produce fairly limited casualties. on the order of the boston marathon bombing in 2013, three killed. or the shootings at fort hood in 2009, 12 killed. a directed attack, however, carries the potential to be more complex and more sophisticated. multiple simultaneous attacks, for example, and therefore more deadly. again, just like paris, 130 killed, or london in 2005, 56 killed, or even 9/11 itself.

the attack in paris was the first manifestation of an effort that isis has made to put together an attack capability in europe, an effort they began less than a year before the paris attack. more attacks in europe are likely. the head of the u.k.'s domestic security agency has warned that isis' planning mass casualty attacks in britain, isis has said that it wants to conduct similar attacks in the united states. one of the things i learned in 33 years in the c.i.a. is sometimes it's really important to listen to what your adversary tells you. sometimes they tell you exactly what they're going to do. isis has told us they're going to attack us here. now that they have the attack capability in europe, they are almost certainly working to do the same thing here. and unless they are degraded, they will succeed here. i don't have any doubt about that. switching from terrorist group

to quasi-state, as a quasi-state, isis poses a threat to regional stability. isis is a state in every respect of the word except one. it does not have foreign recognition or relations with other states. but in every other respect, it is a statement it has an executive, it has an army, it has a police force, it has a set of laws, it has a judiciary. it provides social services. it takes care of its poor and it raises taxes. why does it matter that isis is a quasi-state? two reasons. one is that as a state it can utilize all of the resources, human and otherwise, within the area that it controls. in the pursuit of its objectives. the best example of this is the tens of millions of dollars a month in revenue that isis earns from taxing the people that are inside the caliphate. they actually earn more in taxes than they do in oil sales. and two, the second reason it's important that it's a state, is

that it's going to make it more difficult to dislodge them. they have become deeply rooted in the areas that they control. the isis threat to regional stability is a threat to the very territorial integrity of the current nation states there. a threat to inflame the entire region, i think, in sectarian war. all of this, all of this in a part of the world that still provides almost 1/3 of the world's oil supply, a region that is home to one of america's closest allies, israel, and a region that is home to a set of close american allies, the gulf arab states, that are a bulwark against iran's bush in the region. -- push in the region. third, as a revolutionary political movement, isis is gaining affiliates, this was mentioned in the opening statement, isis is gaining affiliates among extremist groups around the world. they are signing up,s they groups are signing up for what isis desires as its objective,

a global caliphate, where day to day life is governed by extreme religious views. in the mind of isis, its global caliphate would extend to the united states of america itself. when they join isis, these affiliates evolve from focusing on local issues, local grieveances, to focusing on establishing an extension of the caliphate themselves. they want their own little caliphates. and their targets evolve from local to international ones. this is the story of the bombing of the russian airliner by an isis group in the egyptian sinai. only the third airliner brought down by a bomb in the last 25 years. it's remarkable. isis has gained affiliates faster than al qaeda ever did. from nothing a year ago, there are now militant groups in nearly 20 countries that have sworn allegiance to isis. they have conducted attacks that have already killed they can grab

large amounts of territory. libya is a place where they this could happen in the near term. isis controls territory in libya, they are currently expanding that territory, and foreign fighters are beginning to go to libya to fight with the isis group there. i would not be surprised if we woke up one morning and isis and libya had grabbed a large art of libyan territory. degrading and ultimately defeating isis will both require removing the leadership from the battlefield, and will require the shrinking and the eventual elimination of the safe haven, the elimination of the quasi-state, which is currently the size of great britain. the safe haven, the state, is a key part of the isis narrative, that it is winning. as long as they have it, right? they have narrative that they're winning. this narrative is absolutely

critical to them. it's absolutely critical to radicalizing homegrown extremists here and absolutely critical to creating affiliates among other militant groups around the world. the safe haven provides security for isis to plot and to train. there are two things that are necessary for a successful attack on the homeland. a desire to do so and the capability to do it. the safe haven allows for the building of that capability. and the safe haven provides a place for foreign fighters to gather. no safe haven, no place to gather. nearly 30,000 individuals from over 100 countries have traveled to syria and iraq to fight. some are homesteading there to help create the caliphate. others will die on the battlefield. but still others will return home carrying with them the potential to conduct attacks. this is already happen -- this has already happened in europe, as you know. this creates the potential for attacks that cause more

casualties because the individuals who return home will have battlefield experience. removing the leadership is easier than eliminating a safe haven. the former requires good intelligence and the military assets to turn that intelligence into action. the latter requires complex military operations in both iraq and syria and it requires a political solution in damascus to the problem of al-assad and a political solution in iraq to the problem of the disenfranchisement of the sunnis there. mr. chairman, let me close with this. early last month, during a debate in the british commons, over whether parliament should authorize british air strikes against isis in syria, the labor party shadow minister for foreign affairs gave a remarkable speech. some of the colleagues called it the greatest speech in the history of the british commons. breaking with his own party leader in supporting british air strikes in syria said, and

i quote, we are here faced by fascists. not just their calculated brutality, but their belief that they are superior to every single one of us in this chamber tonight, and all of the people that we represent. they hold us in contempt. they hold our values in contempt. they hold our belief in tolerance and decency in contempt. they hold our very democracy in contempt. he went on, and i quote, what we know about fascists is that they need to be defeated. 's why this entire house stood up against hitler and muse linney. we must now confront this evil. mr. chairman, i associate myself with the gentleman's remarks. that's the picture as i see it, as a former intelligence officer who spent years watching al qaeda and other terrorist groups. i look forward to your questions.

mr. vickers: good morning. it is a privilege and pleasure to be with the house armed services committee to provide an outside view on u.s. strategy for iraq, syria and the global jihadist threat. my former colleague and dear friend, michael more he will, has described the -- morell, has described the threat that isil or isis poses. isis, of course, the isis threat is nested in several other conflicts that are raging across the middle east. civil war and sectarian onflict, the global jihad, and then proxy war between saudi arabia and its allies and iran and its allies. in my opening statement this morning, i'd like to offer a few thoughts on how i believe u.s. strategy needs to be intensified and accelerated to deal with these challenges. the aims of u.s. strategy in the middle east should be three-fold. one, to prevent a major attack on the u.s. homeland and defeat the global jihadist threat. two, to reassure our allies and partners and contain iran.

and, three, to restore a favorable balance of power and greater stability across the middle east. i will discuss in turn what i believe are the needed adjustments to our strategy in syria and iraq against the global jihadists and against iran. beginning with syria. syria is the center of gravity for middle eastern conflict. it is where the battle for the future of the middle east is largely being waged. a coalition victory in syria would roll back iranian power and deal a significant blow to the global jihadist movement. i believe we need to adjust our strategy in syria in two principle ways. first, u.s. strategy has treated syria as a secondary theater of war in the iraq-syria war. we need to shift to a syria-first strategy and re-invigorate our efforts to remove assad from power. second, we need to significantly intensify our operations. strike and the wait of strikes need to be -- weight of strikes need to be significantly increased, as this coalition support both quantitative and

qualitative for the moderate syrian opposition. it is not too late to decisively support the opposition. we did not develop a war-winning strategy, for example, until the sixth year of our covert war against the soviet occupation of afghanistan. or in president reagan's second term. let me now briefly turn to iraq and make four points. first is the retaking of ramadi shows, a more intense application of air power and more aggressive use of u.s. combat advisors is also a good strategy in iraq. second, the key to a sunni tribal uprising against isil or isis is decisive u.s. engagement. the key to sustaining that uprising is the desklusion of political power -- devolution of political power in iraq or across sectarian lines. third, we are in a question tigs with iran for influence in -- we are in a competition with ran for influence in iraq.

fourth, more broadly, to both iraq and syria, raids by special operations forces will contribute an important line of effort to our strategy, but to be effective the temple of operations needs to dramatically increase. for this to happen, the iraqi government must approve an increase in the number of personnel on its territory. now turning to the global jihad. global jihad is me taft sized and time is not on our side, as michael mentioned. global jihadists cannot be detained. they must be defeat and continually disrupted while they're in the process of being defeated. sanctuaries must be denied. there are three points i would like to make. first, disrupting and defeating the global jihadists in syria and iraq and beyond will require roughly the same ways, air strikes, ground forces, and sufficient means. the global jihadists will not be defeated until the ungoverned space in which they operate is eliminated, their

ideology is discredited and stability is returned to the middle east. this will require a significant long-term investment and capacity building of indigenous forces, irregular, as well as regular, and sustained u.s. engagement. second, the predator has been our most effective weapon in our campaign against the global jihadists and the size of the predator fleet will remain a critical limiting factor in the conduct of our campaigns. third, intelligence is our first line of defense and accordingly investments in this area should have top priority. i would like to conclude by saying a few words about u.s. strategy for iran and the need to reassure our allies. iran remains on the offensive in its quest for regional i had gemny and our allies feel increasingly under siege as they confront a multifront war with suedy radicals and iran -- sunni radicals and iran. further estrangement would pose a serious challenge to our campaign against the global jihadists and will result in our allies becoming more

vulnerable to iranian and adical islamic aggression. strengthening our fraying arab, turkic, kurdish coalition are critical. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. like forward to your questions -- i look forward to your questions. mr. thornberry: thank you. ambassador ford. mr. ford: mr. chairman. thank you very much for the invitation to address you and the honorable members of the committee today. it gave me an excuse to come down from the cold winter up in northern new england. i'd like to, in my remarks, speak above all about the politics that is under way in iraq and in syria. i'm going to avoid the strict military discussion, because to me the islamic state is more han the sum of its fighters,

it's actually, as mike was saying, it's a quasi-state, but it builds support, it recruits, it replaces fighters who are killed, it even trains little children. and so confronting something like that, we need to think about what is a sustainable solution over the long term. i'm going to talk about resources and the politics of national reconciliation. first, iraq. i visited iraq a couple of months ago. it was my first thyme there on the ground for five years. i worked there for five years. my sense is that in iraq, on military side, there is progress. but there are two big challenges. two big challenges. first, on the resource side, both the iraqi government in

baghdad and the kurdish gional government both are heavily dependent on oil. and oil sales. and low oil prices are really crunching their ability to mobilize resources in the fight against the islamic state. it was very noticeable to me that the kurdish leadership, whom i have known since 2004, were genuinely concerned about their budget abilities to sustain a fight against the islamic state. some of their peshmerga fighters had not been paid for three months. but even in baghdad, the authorities were concerned about the resources. the second issue on iraq. the politics of national reconciliation. mike vickers just mentioned the importance of devolution and decentralization. i certainly agree with that. and i'm hopeful on that. because the sunni arab leaders,

again, whom i've known since 2004, have really come around 180 degrees. they used to be in favor of a tight, strong central government. and now they are arguing for devolution of power. that is what the shi'a and the kurds always wanted 10 years ago. for the first time, i have actually seen the sunnis, the shi'a and the kurds in iraq all talking about sort of the same system of government. that's new and that's hopeful. but, at the same time, as events northeast of baghdad yesterday showed, there is serious sectarian tension. the islamic state yesterday exploded several car bombs in a city and there was immediately concern among the local sunni arab population that shi'a militia would retaliate. there was actually fear that they would attack sunni arab

mosques. in order to mobilize sunni arabs to contain the islamic state, there must be efforts at national reconciliation. and this is important because we don't want the islamic state to be put down militarily and then revived, as happened between 2011 and 2013. i really don't want to see an islamic state version 2.0. it is important for the americans, therefore, to maintain pressure on the shi'a militia problem in iraq. there are iraqis, such as the prime minister, ayatollah, a superb religious leader in the shi'a community, people like on the sunni side, a speaker, who a are all working for national reconciliation. so in iraq we need to help mobilize resources for both the central authorities in iraq,

baghdad, for the kurdish regional government and we have to be engaged on the national reconciliation, working with the gentleman i pointed out. on -- gentlemen i pointed out. on the syrian side, i'm much less upbeat, much less optimistic. there has been some progress on the ground in northeastern syria, but that has been led by syrian kurds who have a separate political agenda and their political agenda is, first, autonomy, and, second, fight the islamic state. make sure we all understand that. first autonomy, second, fight the islamic state. because their first priority is autonomy, in that area of northern syria, these syrian kurds have already stirred substantial resentment among local arabs. i would note that human rights watch and amnesty international have both issued reports accusing the syrian kurdish

militias, the ones we're helping, they have accused them of ethnic cleansing and war crime against the local arab communities. that does not help national reconciliation. at does not help build local sunni indigenous forces to contain the islamic state. we don't need to help the islamic state recruit. as michael vickers just noted, the only way really to generate morin didge news to forces is to help -- more indigenous forces is to help the syrian opposition and see the removal of al-assad at some point and the creation of a new national unity government. the sooner that can be done in syria, the better. only a new national unity government in syria is going to be able to mobilize enough syrians to fight and destroy the islamic state. in both countries, in both countries, iraq and syria, as territory is cleared of the

islamic state, local authorities who are trying to keep the electricity going, trying to keep hospitals operating, trying to keep the water going, are going to need help. the islamic state operated these things, as mike just said, it acts as a state. when it's gone, services must be contained. that will be a job for the u.s. state department, its people in turkey and in jordan, and for the u.s. agency for international development. they will need resources to do that and they're going to have to be able to move around, despite the security risks. finally, if i may, one last word about north africa. i served in algeria's ambassador and was there in the mid 199s to, during the civil war there, where the algerian government had to confront a pre-al qaeda insurgency. i'm watching what's happening in libya with concern. even if the islamic state,

which can s capturing oil facility -- which is capturing oil facilities, even if it can't sell oil the way its affiliates in iraq and syria s done, they may be able to use the oil assets they have locally to generate revenues. they are an administration. they have an increasing ability to project military power out of their base, and they have a safe haven space to organize, plan and recruit. just as the attack in paris was organized in syria, so they have space in libya to do the same kind of thing. it will be important, therefore, mr. chairman, to help a new libyan government and to help it control territory. and we will need to be ready to do that. thank you very much, again, for the invitation to address the committee. and i look forward to your questions. mr. thornberry: thank you all. much to think about and much to follow up on. all committee members received notice that mr. smith and i agreed for the purpose of this

hearing that after the chairman and ranking member's questions, that members would be recognized in reverse order of seniority, if you were here at the time of the gavel. then we will proceed according to when you entered the room, as we normally do. to get that started, i'm going to yield my five minutes to the gentleman from new jersey, mr. macarthur. mr. macarthur: thank you, mr. chairman. i thank all three of you for being here. it was very helpful listening to you. you painted a bleak, and i think, compelling picture of why isis poses a real threat, strategic threat and a lethal threat, to the united states. and if i heard you correctly, you mentioned three things. one, they are capable of direct and indirect and direct attacks against us and our interests and if we don't stop them, they'll succeed. three, they're really a state in every sense that matters. and i would add on that, that i

think it might serve us better if we recognize that. we call them a quasi-state, but they really are a repressive or an illegitimate state. but they are a state. and they act as one. thirdly, you said they have a growing network that will speed their -- spread their influence. it seems that the bottom of all of that is their control of land and people. and resources. and so i wanted to ask you if you believe that we are doing everything necessary to get them out of that territory, and if not, briefly, what would you suggest that we add to what we're doing? mr. morell: i agree with both of my colleagues here that we need to do more. i also believe very much what robert said, that we really can't have military success, there's a lot we need to do on the military side, but we really can't have military

success without political solutions in both places. hat has to come first. air power alone is not going win it. we need to do more air power. mike can talk about that. there's more we can do with air power. but air power's not going to win this thing alone. we need a ground force. there is a strategy in iraq to get that ground force. ramadi showed that that trategy has potential. there is no ground force on the syrian side that carries the same kind of potential as the iraqi military carries. and we can do more, i think, with the moderate opposition. but at the end of the day, i think assad's got to go. and we have to take syrian litary security resources as degraded and they've become and turn them into a force that the

international community supports in taking on isis. so i think we need to be more aggressive on the military side, to put pressure on both isis and assad in the short term, while we get very, very aggressive on the political side, on the diplomatic side, to force political solutions in both places. mr. macarthur: let me segue on that comment. because dr. vickers also made it clear that he sees a syria-first strategy in which assad's departure is at the center of it. now you've said the same. what do you see -- maybe i'll start with you, ambassador, because you've spent a good deal of time there. what follows assad? and while i agree with you, he's a bad act that are ideally would not be there, sometimes the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know. and what potentially follows assad in that region? nd that state?

mr. ford: very briefly, we don't know who would follow assad. had we asked, who would follow saddam hussein, we wouldn't have known the answer to that either. it will be a negotiation among syrians. i suspect, frankly, it will be a very wobbly initial national government, if the syrians can ever have a serious negotiation. and that's a big if, congressman. therefore, a wobbly government like that, just as the wobbly government in iraq in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, needed help, that will be the case also in syria. i do not believe that if assad goes, only the islamic state takes over. i think that is wrong on multiple levels and is indicative of a sense that there is no hope.

whereas actually there is quite a bit of hope. as big as the islamic state is in syria, it is actually not the biggest force fighting assad right now. the other elements of the opposition are actually much bigger than the islamic state. mr. macarthur: i thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. mr. thornberry: thank you. ms. sanchez. ms. sanchez: thank you. gentlemen, isil has successfully expanded its influence and has received oaths of allegiance from groups in afghanistan and pakistan, yemen, nige, libya, egypt, tunisia, france, belgium, the u.s. and so many others. i recently read an article where a supposed expert says that the goal of isis is establishment of shari'a law through muslim lands, but they've actually created a caliphate and are trying to stablish a government.

where or estion is, what is isil's center of gravity? where should we be focusing our time and resources? that's my first question. the second one is, if you can talk a little about the worries or what we need to do about the issue ran government going on. thank you. mr. vickers: the center of gravenity is in racka. they draw a lot of power from iraq's second largest city in mosul. where they seized a lot of assets. generally, the sunni areas of

western and northern iraq and northeastern syria is where they comprise. but rac sambings really the center of gravity and that's why i advocated a syria-first strategy that tries to take that on sooner rather than later. the iranian-saud competition is something that dates back to 1979. it's ebbed and flowed. it's intensified very dramatically. probably predates that. but certainly it intensified in 1979. from the gulf arab point of view and particularly the saudis, the iranians have allies all around them with lebanese hezbollah, with syria, with these influence with the government in baghdad and then in yemen. and then they see a threat to the kingdom as well.

and so, they see themselves fighting a multifront war in this area. and also against sunni islamic adicals. mr. ford: i think michael is right. raca and mosul are the two centers of gravity physically, geographically. but the islamic state's fighters have a saying which is, i'll translate it from arabic, it's, we're surviving and we're expanding. if they lose racka and mosul, hey'll still be there.

it's important to have indigenous forces who are staying and will keep it under control and grind it out of its holes little by little by little. i think grinding it out of its holes will take much longer than retaking ramadi or retaking raqqa or retaking mosul. i worry we do not have enough people in places lycra mehdi, anbar province, other provinces, to do that. i think right now the numbers are 30,000 iraqis. not sure 30,000 is going to be enough to secure that syrian order and control those towns. mr. morell: i think you hit on something very important, beginning of your question, whether you talked about what are these guys after? what do they want? i think, as an intelligence

officer, i think it's really important to understand your enemy. and what he's guys, what these guys are all about, is they believe that allah has chosen them personally to prepare the world for the coming of the mehdi, and that preparation involves giving people the choice between becoming a muslim, a good muslim, in their definition, or being killed. and then once that -- once all of that work has been done, that's the establishment of the caliphate, then the mehdi comes and the end of the world happens. and god sorts out the good from the bad. that is what they believe. they believe that based on not very good readings of the koran. not very particularly good interpretations of what it is they're looking at. it's exactly, exactly what the al qaeda leadership believed.

exactly. the same. about what their ultimate goals are and their ultimate objectives. we need to understand that. ms. sanchez: thank you, mr. chairman. in the interest of time, i just -- i think we really have to get to what it is they want before we come up with a strategy of how -- we can no longer contain them. if what you're say something true, they go down a hole and they wait. something that someone had said was, not that they have established the caliphate, they have the khalif. this is the lynch pin for them to be able to do this shari'a law and everything else that comes with it. or as you said, maybe the coming. i think as members, we need to really begin to understand what moves before we can understand that not just bombs will get rid of this. thank you.

>> can i add a point? i think this is important. the establishment of the caliphate was very controversial within jihadi circles. very controversial. why? because many jihadi clerics, including al qaeda, said, you can't declare a caliphate if you can't hold territory. mr. ford: and apply shari'a law. you can't declare a caliphate. it's illegitimate. that's still the position of al qaeda today. with respect to the islamic state. holding territory, therefore, taking it back from them, taking bacharacha, taking back mosul, taking back -- taking back raqqa, taking back mosul, taking back other cities, matters. it will put a big dent in their recruitment. because they will lose a great deal of legitimacy that they have enjoyed within jihadi circles. they will still go underground. and they'll still have to be rooted out. but it will be easier if they can't recruit as well.

ms. sanchez: thank you for that enlightenment. i've really been one of those who has been trying to understand what's the root of this. thank you, mr. chairman. mr. thornberry: ms. mcsally. ms. mcsally: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen, for your service and testimony today. in my time in the military, one of the things that was our most concerning at first threat was the combination of a terrorist organization with a weapons of mass destruction. i serve on homeland security, i'm the chairwoman of the subcommittee, we've done some hearings on the threat of chemical and biological terrorism. and if you look at what isis has said, you know, they've stated on open source that they want to use these weapons and export their terror on us. the fact that that could be a game changer, for not just small scale physical attacks, but then actually using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear capabilities. what we've seen with isis, as you know, is that they're not just trying to acquire them and there's reports they've used

them on the battlefield. but they try to recruit individuals with the expertise so they can create those abilities themselves. not just from scratch but importing those with the experience. so i was wondering if you could comment on the w.m.d. threat with isis and your concerns about that and what to do about that. mr. morell: i share your concerns. they've made two things very clear. publicly. in documents that have come out. one is that if they acquired these weapons, that they would use them. and they wouldn't care that the vast majority of those killed were civilians. and they've also provided a religious justification very similar to al qaeda's. in fact, i think identical to al qaeda's justification for using such weapons. i have no doubt that they are pursuing such weapons. i do not know how far along they are. i don't have access to intelligence anymore. but one thing -- the safe haven

here is so important for many, many reasons and one of the reasons is exactly this. when you have safe haven, it gives you opportunities to work on weapons like this. al qaeda made significant advances in anthrax research because they had a safe haven. and so i am concerned that as long as they have a safe haven, they will have the space and because they are a quasi-state, they can use the human resources within that state, right, as they pursue these things. so, i don't know where it stands at the moment but i'm deeply concerned about it. ms. mcsally: thank you. i have been extremely critical about the military campaign against isis. the caliphate was declared 19 months ago. this so-called arab campaign has been going on. i have friends who are still at the pentagon and are involved in it. they sarcastically call it operation shade which means they have fighters stacked up on top of each other and they're providing mostly shade to those on the ground as opposed to using air power for

all it brings to the fight. it's been very two dimensional. it's been very is he consequential, very reactive. as opposed to using air power for all it brings to the fight, by identify foog those if favor will vote aying those centers of gravity which you mentioned and taking them out and unleashing air power in order to destroy their capabilities. it's been very much a gradualistic approach, as you noted in your testimony. when we had the secretary of defense and the chairman here a couple months ago, they stated they just started talking to the state department, single digit months ago, to look at a comprehensivive strategy. they just started looking at the oil infrastructure and figuring out how to hit it when we know it's been $1 million minimum a day. what's going on here? we know from, again, our intelligence understanding, it's not that difficult to figure out where their resources are coming from and go after them using air power. i would like definitely dr. vickers, and really any of your comments on what needs to change from the military strategy. because we do need to destroy their capabilities. there is a political solution,

obviously. but we have to destroy their capabilities. mr. vickers: to put some numbers on it. if you compare, i think the best air campaign analogy to what we face in iraq and syria, is afghanistan, 2001, 2002. and the number of strikes that afghanistan in 2001 is the factor of about eight above what we've done in iraq and syria. and then furthermore, 2/3 of coalition efforts have really been against iraq and not against syria, where the more dangerous threat has existed. so i think those are the two fundamental problems with the air campaign, that it's been a fraction of what it should be in mass. as we've shown since, really 1990, but certainly when we started putting precision weapons on bombers, you can

combine mass without sacrificing prevision. as michael said, though, air power alone is not enough and ambassador ford as well, we have to have an indigenous ground force to exploit the effects. if you want to deny a sanctuary sooner rather than later, just like in 2001, having some ground force that can exploit the affects of air power, makes big difference. ms. mcsally: my time's expired. thank you. mr. moulton: thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you very much for your long years of service. i regret that we are -- you still have so many opportunities for your service continuing now. i feel somewhat the same way. i had a much shorter period of service in the marines. but when i was a part of the surge in iraq, very much felt like i was a part of finishing the job. we had messed it up for years. we got it right. and then i went home. and now i'm back here watching

us have to return to iraq just five years after we left. while we can debate and there's much to discuss about the military strategies to defeat isis in the short term, the focus of my questions today is about how we ensure we don't find ourselves continually going back and having to apply military power against isis or the next isis successor in the long term. we've heard many people testify before this committee about the importance of a long-term political strategy. general petraeus joined us last week and emphasized that. another general talked about the importance of state department coordination and how it hasn't been happening for a long time. so to begin, i just wanted to see if we're on the same page with a few high-level points. is there any one of you who disagrees with, from the iraq perspective, the need to empower the central iraqi government? that that's the best strategy we have on the table right now for a long-term political

olution in iraq? >> sthi the -- i think the iraq central minister is someone who believes in national reconciliation and i believe he has a political vision. mr. ford: but i worry when you say empower. because i think so much of the sustainable solution, you were in anbar, so much of the sustainable solution will not come just from baghdad. but will come from local sunni communities who feel that they have a stake. mr. moulton: nor federalism. but we're not talking about dividing up the state at this point. mr. ford: no, i hope not. mr. moulton: do we all agree that say sad -- assad needs to go in syria? is there any disagreement with that? ok. and i was struck by your point about the kurds. i think it's very tempting for americans to say, let's just on board with the kurds because they're great allies, they're strong fighters and they share many of our values.

but that's not enough. we have to empower the sunies as well. is there any disagreement with that? ok. and then, taking this all together, what type of time commitment are we talking about? the american people understand what this will take, diplomatically and politically, after we leave, and perhaps with the residual military presence. so we don't find ourselves in a situation where after we militarily defeat isis we have to send young troops back to fight them or their successor again in the next five to 10 years. are we talking about a germany and japan type of commitment? what will this take? mr. morell, perhaps we could start with you. mr. morell: i think it's a long-term commitment. i can't give you a number of years. but i think it's a long-term commitment. i think the departure of u.s. forces from iraq in 2011 is a

big part of the story here of why we are where we are. i'm not casting blame in any direction here. i'm just saying, i think it's a big part of why we're sitting here today. mr. moulton: the general made that point as well. if we'd stayed more integrated in iraqi politics as well, we wouldn't have this great vacuum that's allowed isis to take over. mr. morell: we needed to be in south korea for a very, very, very long time to maintain stability on the peninsula. think you're looking at 10, 15, 20 years of u.s. commitment to this region in a very, very significant way. mr. moulton: if i could go to you, dr. vickers. based on your experience with past conflicts, what kind of additional political support can we be providing in iraq and syria? when we say there needs to be more political, diplomatic support, there needs to be that kind of strategy, what kind of resources has the u.s. used in past conflicts that we are not using today to ensure longer

term success? mr. vickers: this is honestly n area we've struggled since 9/11. the korea, germany, japan models are all good ones. but very, very different strategic context. michael mentioned, shifting to a security assistance model, an embassy-based presence, where we lost our political influence, but also frankly the iraqis work in progress and working out power sharing, i think, has got us to where we are. i think we require a long-term political and security commitment. but not necessarily in large numbers. just in terms of enablers and advisors. because as ambassador ford said, even if you get a national unity government in syria, it's going to take time to make that government strong. mr. moulton: thank you. i'm out of time. if you would be willing to

follow up details of what that morrow bust political strategy might look like, i think it would be helpful for us in you could do that. thank you. ms. stefanik: thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, gentlemen, for your thoughtful testimony. early on in this congress, last march, we had hearing with the undersecretary of defense for policy. and i asked her a question related to, what is the administration's policy toward syria? and it was quite clear in her testimony that there was no could he heernt strategy toward -- coherent strategy toward syria. i think that's clearly still the case today. i agree with your assessment that we must have a syria-first approach to much of the regional instability in the middle east. but one significant player that has not been brought up today is the role of russia. i'd love to get your feedback on the fact that the vacuum that the united states has left has allowed russia to fill that vacuum, propping up the assad regime, and how that will play into the geopolitics of phasing

assad out. mr. morell: i'll start. i think that vladimir puent's main objective, there's a lot of different objectives in what he did, but his main objective when prop up assad, who putin moved, made his move, was really -- assad was at his weakest point since the fall of 2012. putin believes that he needs to prop up assad because putin's concerned that if assad goes, there will be chaos in syria and there will be more running room for isis. and like robert, i don't necessarily believe that. it depends on what comes next. what we need is, we need a transition from assad to a government that all syrians can agree with.

that's the transition we need. if that happens, then putin's wrong, then assad going is not a bad thing, assad going is a good thing. what putin has done is now made that potential transition much more difficult. because assad was on the verge, right, of falling essentially. and allowing us to get to that new government. and now russia has made that so much more difficult. what he's done is also now made russia a player at the table. so russia's now going to get to determine how that negotiation goes because of what he did. i'll let others comment as ell. mr. vickers: i agree with. that i don't think our interests are very well aligned with russia. there is some commonality but i don't think it's as much as some have said. i don't think we should be deterred by -- from our objectives in syria, from the

relatively modest russian intervings -- intervention, if you look at the few thousand troops and 36 aircraft and the number of strikes. it's not the world's biggest combat power there. so there's a lot of syria they can't control. our policy will drive -- having had experience with the russians in afghanistan with a much, much bigger force, this is pretty small by comparison. mr. ford: we need to get to peace talks. and getting to peace talks by itself isn't the answer. that's just a venue. hat really is needed is deep concessions, deep compromises on the two sides to the conflict. the assad government and its opposition. i think the russian intervention has made it infinitely harder to get the concessions needed from the assad side of the table. which will impede getting to a

new national unity government. therefore i don't see what the russians have done so far as very positive. if i thought the russians were going use their new and improved leverage against assad in the peace talks, then i would feel better. but the fact that they're using clust ever bombs, the -- cluster bombs, the fact that they're targeting civilian areas regularly, the fact that they're targeting aid convoys, humanitarian aid convoys regularly, this does not look like a russian policy designed to extract concessions out of bashar al-assad, to advance a peace process. ms. stefanik: great. in my last 39 seconds, way tonight shift gears here. one of the proposals that's been introduced by some of the leaders, military leaders, general petraeus is one, do you think an additional four-star commander headquarters under sent comis necessary for -- centcom is necessary for control?

mr. morell: we have a unified three-star now with sean mcfarland who is a very capable officer, who as a colonel led the operations in ramadi and in those seven. mr. vickers: we don't go to war anymore with our combatant commands. we form as task force underneath them. so whether that's three star or four star is really a function of bureaucratic politics and the weight in the building. i guess i'm more agnostic than picking the right three or four star that will get us to victory. ms. stefanik: any other feedback? thanks. yield back. mr. walz: thank you, chairman. i thank you, gentlemen, for being here. i'd like to build on where mr. moulton was going on this broader strategy. i think the timeline on this, i had the opportunity to be in damascus in 2009 and i know ambassador ford early on challenged the assad regime, at great personal risk.

i thank you for that. you are articulating this clearly. in 2013, when president obama made the now infamous red line statement, i held periodic town halls, whatever, on that one hundreds of people showed up. i'd never seen anything like this, the involvement of getting into syria, to take assad out, because what he was doing with chemical weapons was unacceptable. and in that group of people that showed up, all 100% of them were opposed to any intervention. trust me, i've had them on health care, it doesn't quite work that way. it was an amazing thing that the american public at that point, weary of war, weary of this, not commit to the strategy, didn't know what to say, and i bring this up because i think from where mr. moulton is getting at, you're talking decades. i think you're absolutely right. i think your assessment is correct and i agree with that. what i think we need to understand here, that is multiple administrations. some will you like, some you will dislike. and our commitment of that overarcing strategy of smart

power, what are the things we can put in place that can start to ensure that that transition is more coherent and more stable? because i worry about that. you wait around here long enough, you'll blame somebody else for where this happened. my concern is that we get the strategy in place, and if it is 25 years, that needs to be clearly articulated to the american public, with a strategy that they can get behind. because if hundreds of people show up in a small grocery store in minnesota and all say no, it's very difficult to make this work. i'd be interested to hear your thoughts on implementation, broader thinking, how do the chinese factor into this? some of the things we should be thinking about. whoever wants to take that one. mr. morell: i'll start. it's a great question. i believe, and i'm going to broaden out here from just isis in iraq and syria, to the extremist problem in general.

since 9/11, the united states of america has done a remarkable job at protecting the homeland from another attack. we've done a remarkable job up now with isis, i'd say, disrupting, degrading terrorist organizations so they can't conduct an attack here. when you find -- we've put intelligence resources on it, in a substantial way, military resources on it in a substantial way, if you're plotting an attack against the united states, we're going to find you and we're going to do something about it. what we've done a horrible job at, an absolutely horrible job, is dealing with a fundamental oots of the problem. for every thousand hours that i sat in had the sit room talking about what to do, about terrorists who already exist, i spent maybe an hour talking

about, how do we prep vent the creation of terrorists in the first place? and for me, i'm just making up these numbers, but for every $1 million the united states of america spends on dealing with terrorists that already exists, maybe we spend $1 on how do we prevent the creation of terrorists in the first place? and it's not something the united states can do on its own. we need the leadership of muslim countries, we need clerics in muslim brothers -- countries, we need teachers in muslim countries and patients in muslim countries. there needs to be a big strategy to get our arms around this. it's economic, it's political, it's social, it's religious. we and our allies need a strategy to deal with the radicalization problem or, as quickly as we deal with one group, another group's going to pop up somewhere, we're going to have a problem somewhere else. i'd say that the next administration really needs to take a really hard look at how we deal with radicalization in the first place.

mr. vickers: i would say, we're at a real turning point in our nation's history. if you look at the post-9/11 era and the cold war era, in the sense that we have three challenges in three critical regions. rise of china, resurgent russia, and then a middle east in chaos, that are not amenable to short-term solutions in either case. you're going to, like the cold war, you're going to be at these things for decades. so you have to come up with not only a strategy that allows you to contain the problem, but eventually resolve it. but that's sustainable across administrations. much as our cold war strategy was. i liken the current period that we're heading into now as like 1947. with new actors. mr. ford: i take to heart what you said about the reticence of the american public to get

involved in 2013. i remember that vividly. now, however, we're flying daily combat missions in syria and iraq. it's funny how things work out. a couple of just thoughts on the long term. . i think the long-term in syria will take decades. syria is a failed state. what's left of the government is propped up by foreign militias, mainly out of iraq, organized by iran as well. rebuilding all that is going to take years and years. it should not be and cannot be something that only americans do. i think part of a political strategy is to get an agreement among all of the regional states as well as russia and china to stop promoting individual clients that in turn then degrade the ability of the central state to operate and we've seen that historically in

iraq, in lebanon, we've seen it in syria. we see it in libya where different regional countries are taking different sides. that's one part. sec part is reeconstruction. should not be an american responsibility solely. but i don't think any country can lead an international effort to rebuild in places like syria or libya better than the united states. we have the diplomatic heft. but that means bringing a a lot of regional states to the table. it means bringing organizations like the world bank to the table as well. and then finally, as i mentioned before, there has to be an effort to get local services running. this was always a big problem in iraq, as i'm sure congressman moulton will remember. getting things like electricity and water. not that usaid has to go in and do all of that but there may be areas where we can help local

people, syria has a lot of engineers, a lot of planners. but they may be able to use help in some of the planning system of that's a third thing. >> thank you, mr. chairman, for the time. mr. zinke: i agree with your assessment of isis but i don't think al qaeda is out of the game. my fear is being number two, al qaeda will strike in a larger way because they're in a battle for influence. i'd like to turn the attention to iran. since congress failed to stop the president's iranian deal, we've watched them fail to stop two icbm's, we've watched him embowden and influence the shia militia. to your point about reconciliation between the sunnis and shia. iranian influence begins to

be emboldened, i don't see how a sunni reconciliation can occur without checking iran. and there's reports, i believe they're valid, as the shia militia went through, anti-sunni rallying cry and battle cries, and my fear in rah maw tee, although i think we're wise to put the iraqi military in charge of that operation rather than the shia militia, as the territory is gained, the result is simply the shia militia and greater iranian issue in the anbar province, i think that's perilous. how concerned are you about iranian influence about iraq and syria? >> i'll go first here. i'm deeply concerned about iran. the nuclear issue is not the only problem that we have with the iranians. we've got a long list of

problems with the iranians. number one, they want to be the hedge monic power in the region -- the hegemonic power in the region, they want to call the shots, they want the influence. it's not incorrect to say they want to re-establish the persian empire. it's not just this government or this supreme leader, it goes way back in their history. that's number one. that's not in our interest, in my view. two, i think it's fair to say, michael, correct me if i'm wrong, i think it's fair to say iran is the only country on the planet that still, itself, conducts terrorism as a tool of state craft against its eighbors around the world. he quds force conducts terrorist acts. not a good thing. three, iran supports

international terrorist groups. hezbollah couldn't exist without the support it gets from iran and just a reminder, prior to 9/11, hezbollah killed more americans than any other terrorist group on the planet. four, it is iranian state policy, and it is iranian state policy for the state of israel to be wiped off the face of the planet. if you don't believe me, listen to the supreme leader he, says it all the time he has a nine or 10-point plan to wipe israel off the earth, you can google it. israel preme leader nine point plan. he claims it's nonviolent. i don't know how you remove a country from the planet without violence. then you put the nuclear program on top of all that. this is, i believe a strategic threat to the reand a strategic threat to the united states of america. any sign do you see

iran has changed their tune? mr. morrell: i do not. we have to show them we're going to stand up to them. that will send them a powerful message and send our allies a powerful message. right now, our allies think they're all alone against their version of the soviet union. and that's not too strong a statement, congressman. mr. zinke: a question directed to you, mr. ambassador, and thank you for being here, is that talking to our allies, there seems to be a problem with trust. i would that our allies don't trust us and our enemies done fear us. i do believe a solution, both political and military solution is called for. part of the military solution cannot be just a u.s. only force. it has to be made of, because

this is a war between islam as much as it is east and west. are you concerned about the level of trust in our allies? i agree with your assessment, only the u.s. can lead this successfully. yet the -- how do we gain the trust back of our allies should we decide to bring a force in and allies -- a group of allies. i think you know the members. mr. ford: i think it is possible that some of the states in the region, gulf states, jordanians and others, would be willing to insert ground force into a place like syria. they're not going to do it without the blessing and even the support of the united states, that's sleer -- that's very clear. what the mission of that force would be would have to be defined and i don't think it's the answer by itself. it might be one part of a longer list of things to be done. by itself, it's not enough. in terms of your question about how do you rebuild trust, i think two things.

number one, the administration needs to show people in the gulf, in particular saudi arabia, but also countries like kuwait, united arab emirates, qatar, that we may disagree on a lot of things, human rights issues and other things, but where we have a deep disagreement, but fundamentally we stand for their security. in the tit for tat between iran and saudi arabia, i have not heard the administration come out and say, we may disagree with the execution of it, but the stability and security of saudi arabia is a vital american national interest. i have not heard that said. second, just on an operational level, i would actually like higher level envoys to take that message out to the gulf. i'd like to see some people from

washington, and not just people in uniform, as important as they are to this, but i'd also like to see high level envoys from the department of state and the white house go out and deliver that message. so that you can begin to have a conversation, a really frank conversation, about what we're all trying to do in the region. mr. zinke: thank you, i yield back. mr. castro: thank you, mr. chairman, thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. there was a suicide bomber that attacked istanbul about 10:15 a.m. tuesday morning in turkey. because of that i want to ask a few questions related to turkey. the first one is a preface question. how effective do you believe, or have you seen the turkey -- that turkey has been to stem the unwanted flow of fighters and oods out of their country? >> congressman, it was more or

less an open border in 2012 and 2013. the turks have taken a lot of measures to tighten that border. it is very different from what it was three years ago, four years ago. mr. ford: that said, that border is still not completely shut. there are lots of little goat paths and donkey trails that date back hundreds of years, smug. ers know them and the turks can know them but it is a manpower intensive operation and the turks need to assign enough man powe -- manpower to do it. mr. castro: turkey decided recently to seal its border, create a buffer zone in northern syria and allow u.s. aircraft to use the interlink air base for bombing in syria. what additional role do you foresee turkey having in the fight against isil. i ask this also because of the

instability in the region and recent tension with russia over he downed jet. >> you mentioned the major contributions. mr. vickers: turkish policy puts assad ahead -- or they're intertwined certainly, ast tennessee -- and it's an area where we've had some disagreement. >> congressman, i think two things the turks can do. number one, as i said, put more manpower down on the border and shut the last smuggling trails. mr. ford: the second thing that they can do is increase their assistance to syrian rebel groups that are themselves fighting the islam ibbling state right now. for example, north of aleppo, where there's quite a dog fight going on between the islamic

state on one side and moderate syrian rebel forces on the other side. the americans could actually help the turks in that effort by directing some of our air strikes against the islamic state in coordination with the syrian rebels that the turks are trying to help. >> let me ask you, i know there's been a lot of discussion about how we stop isis and other terrorist groups from recruiting folk, whether it's in the region or in europe or the united states, and i think everybody here would agree that terrorism has essentially become a franchise in the middle east and north africa and growing in other places in the world, and so, mr. morrell, you mentioned, i think you mentioned there were about 900 cases the f.b.i. is investigating of folks who have been recruited toward terrorism by isis. essentially, have you seen a difference in what europe is doing to address that problem and what the united states is

doing? or the difference between the united states and any other region of the world with respect o the internet specifically? mr. morrell: i don't know the answer to that question. i don't know if the europeans are doing something we're not. i do know the problem is bigger in europe than it is here. the radicalization problem is much worse. muslim communities in europe are simply not as well integrated into european society. muslims in america are much better integrated. the internet is a huge problem. but the bigger problem than the vehicle for the message is the resonance of the message. and it's a very powerful message, very powerful message that the west, led by the united states, is trying to destroy our religion and we need you to fight for us. we need you to fight for your

religion. and we don't have a lot of credibility, we or the west european governments don't have a lot of credibility in pushing back against that message because we don't have credibility because we're not muslim. so there's others who have to get the right counternarrative. so it's more the message than it is the vehicle for it. i will also say, just to reiterate something robert said earlier, the fact that they have a safe haven gives them great credibility

laces away from syria? mr. ford: the opinion polls i have read, somewhere between 70% and 80% say they left because of the aerial bombings of their neighborhoods. the barrel bombs. and some fled the islam exstate, although actually the numbers that flee, the assad

government's aerial bombing is much, much higher than the number who flee the islamic state. as brutal as the islamic state is. you've got to deal with that root cause in order to convince people to go wok. there could be reconstruction. we might be able to fiend ways to hetch the country rebuild. you can't do any of that as long as the war goes on. i go back to what i said. with respect to keeping them closer versus father, yes there's big debate about syrian refugees right now. i would just say this. having refugees in camps indefinitely, even near syria in lebanon or turkey or jordan or iraq where there is no hope also breeds resentment and actually helps the islamic state recruit as well. and so as we the americans think about whether or not we should

take refugees, i think we also need to bear in mind that choosing not to take refugees plays into an islamic state recruiting effort. and we will have to judge a whole series of factors as we make that decision about efugees. mr. langevin: thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank our witnesses who tissue for their service to the country and also for your appearance today. in particular, mr. morrell and dr. vickers, my eight years on the intelligence committee and my years here on the armed service committees, always appreciated your candid testimony before me on those -- both those areas. clearly the, obviously we have extraordinary challenges in our efforts to defeat isil and both on the military front and on the political front. d you all have outlined some concrete steps on both.

the biggest challenge we see is going to be defeating isil on the political front, especially given the fact that there are countless examples throughout the koran that isil uses to justify their actions. one of the most effective -- what are the most effective ways for us to delegitimize isil , in particular given the head winds we're up against, when isil or al qaeda are using the koran to justify what they're doing? in the emerging threats cambodia subcommittee held hear option countering extremist messaging and a countermessaging demo and the white house announced a new task force for this very purpose. as we work to bowles every information operations in our

fight to delegitimize isil's ideological messaging, what capabilities do you also believe we need and what tactics, techniques, and procedures should military and new task orce employ. mr. vickers: i'll start. as we were talking about earlier, it is the call fat on the path to end times that is our most -- our biggest opportunity. it won't destroy their opportunity but put a big dent in it. as you saw when al qaeda was expeled from afghanistan, aldie

a -- al qaeda's stock went down in the islamic world for a while. they were seen as a loser rather than a winner. >> conditioningman, i would add the delegitmyization of the religious justification for what jihaddists are doing, whether they're isoirs al qaeda or anyone else have got to come rom the muslim leadership. president sisi in egypt gave a speech a year ago this month where he said there needs to be a revolution inside of islam. he has not done any followup to that as far as i'm aware but it was a remarkable speech at the time and it was absolutely right. there are plenty of verses in the bible that seem to justify violence but there aren't a lot of -- there's not a significant

number of christians who act on that. we've moved beyond that. islam needs to do the same. that's what president sisi was saying. we don't have credibility in making those arguments. we just don't. so we need to have conferrings with the leadership in the muslim world about how they immediate to take this on themselves. but i think that's something that america's diplomats need to talk to the leadership of those countries about. mr. langevin: ambassador? mr. ford: the most effective social media video i've heard about in the last sex months to delegitimize the islamic state came out of the syrian -- the the free syrian army. it shows victorious free syrian army soldiers marching a bunch of orange-clad islamic state

prisoners and says we're now going to execute these guys because they're infidels. they're apostates. which is what the islamic state has been doing to flee syrian army soldiers they've captured. but at the last moment, as they're about to behead them, a screen comes on and quotes several verses from the koran that says, god says grant mercy. don't ill -- god says don't kill people. and at the last second, their chains are pulled back and they're set free and they say, join us. that video has been viewed tens of thousands of times in the middle east. my point is, it was indigenously produced and it played to themes they understand better than i ever would even though i spent 30 years in the region. what we can probably most do is help people like that get their messaging out. but it can't be put on a.gov website because young arabs

aren't going to get a lot of guidance, shall we say, they're not going to take a lot of dvice from a .gov website. mr. langevin: thank you, my time has expired, i thank you all for your testimony. one thing , in writing, if you could respond, identifying our most significant intelligence gaps and what we should do to close those. i know my time is up so i yield back, but if you could respond in writing to that, that would be helpful. >> dr. wenstrup. mr. wenstrup: thank you, mr. chairman. i thank you all for being here today. as i look at what we're facing and what you've talked about so well today, i believe the united states needs to lead on this we can't lead and do things alone. we need to develop our coalitions whole heartedly with our european allies and with our allies in the middle east. you know you see what happened in paris and then france wants to become more involved.

and i think that we need to establish that. my concern is that we're not doing enough. we're not doing enough to establish these dip mo lat -- these diplomatic ties with our allies. possibly we need to share more information, coordinate better. and certainly can possibly do more as far as trying to disrupt them economically. and then of course there's the component of what we're going to do militarily. ambassador, i appreciate what you just shared with us because that's withinen -- that's been one of my concerns all along, what are we doing? i've seen some of their videos and how they try to recruit and i'm leek, are we doing anything to counteract that to get people to go online, to pay attention to these things, to get another point of view? and i would hope that we would do something more like that to counter how effective they've been in that regard. but i'd like to just ask each of you, what more do you think would be -- we should be doing militarily and nonmilitary and

maybe even more nonmilitary as i discussed as far as diplomacy and trying to hurt them economically? you mentioned before how much they collect in taxes, i mean, that's pretty incredible. and i don't know that many people realize that. that was kind of a new revelation to me. i thought most of the revenue was coming from oil. so what are some of the things we can do militarily, nonmilitarily, and how should we develop our coalitions? because to me this is a global good versus evil event that's taking place in this time. i'll start with you, mr. morrell. mr. morrell: i'll answer the intelligence question now because it's an area that we need, i don't know if it's put more emphasis on because i know there's a lot of emphasis but it's an area we need to improve on significantly. we need two types of intelligence out of isis. we need intelligence on their plans and intentions and

specific plots that they're planning, both in the region and in europe and the united states if we're going to be able to disrupt those. and we need intelligence that will give us a lot more targets on the ground. you know, mike talked about our success against al qaeda and the taliban in after fan stan post 9/11. it was because we had very specific intelligence on what the targets should be. all right. so i think we need a much better intelligence in those two areas. it's very difficult to get because we're not on the ground ground in the caliphate system of we're going to need partnerships with a lot of different people in order to get the assets that we need to get inside the isis leadership and to get those targets on the ground that we need and it probably needs to be the most important thing that the intelligence community is doing at the moment.

mr. vickers: i agree with that. if you look at our counterterrorism campaigns, that approach has worked well where we've built up our assets over time, from afghanistan to pakistan and tribal areas. it started to pay big dividends in yemen as well. we're trying to close the gap in syria. as far as the outlines of the strategy, the military side more intense, going after isis as a state. you've got to take that state down for political reasons but also that's one thing our military really knows how to do. then to exploit the effects of that, you have to have indigenous ground force. mr. wenstrup: i appreciate that. what do you see that looking like, it's something we are good at but i don't think in this situation, having served in iraq, i don't want to be seen as occupiers. i don't want to be there by ourselves. i think we need to have people

from the region as well that are holding that ground. mr. morr -- mr. vickers: he talked about the rebuilding task, if we fry to do that, we'll fail and two, we'll subject ourselves to a lot of unnecessary pain. mr. wenstrup: ambassador, do you have anything to add? mr. ford: can i shift slightly? i talked about saudi arabia and the gulf and our shared interest in their stability. i think two other things on the diplomatic side that need to be done. number one, i think there's a need for a much more frank, high level discussion with turkey. i'm very happy every time i see that our president has talked to their president. i wish they would talk all the time. because turkey is probably the most important country in the syria conflict aside from iran

and it has an ability to really help and an ability to really be a spoiler. and so we just have to have a really frank behind closed door discussion, i think the vice president is planning to go to turkey, i hope he does. and i think the message needs to be blunt but needs to be behind closed door, that is not an argument that should be aired in public. to be fair to the turks, they have interests. i mean, they have interests with what's happening with the kurds and what's happening with the neighbor to the south in iraq and syria. so second, and realed to that, turkey and qatar are backing one side in the libyan conflict and the egyptians and others are backing the other side. the fact that they're pulling in opposite directions maybe this -- makes the libya problem more difficult. there are other countries that have interests in libya too. algeria shares a long border and has a problem itself with

islamic extremists. tunisia where there have been multiple terrorism attacks, the european union. there has to be a greater sustained effort on the libya diplomacy side. secretary kerry was with the united nations in rome where they talked about putting together a government of national accord. it's not a one time meeting kind of thing. there needs to be a sustained, high level effort. mr. wenstrup: thank you, my time has expired. mrs. davis: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for bringing your expertise to us today. we appreciate your distinguished service. i wanted to srt -- sort of respond to some of the conversation that we've had and i think that we all acknowledge and understand one of the first things that we need here, i think, on the committee but also in the country is patience. it's very difficult to push when we know that the timeline is out, i remember one of the iraqi

generals saying, we think we might be operational by 2020 and everybody looked at him like, yeah, come back another day. and so that's important for us to acknowledge. and the other thing that you've all mentioned and i think particularly ambassador ford is reassuring our allies. so i wanted to ask you, ambassador ford, because you, you know, highlighted in talking to syria, issues of conditionality. particularly as we're working with those who are fighting with the opposition. where is it that we have fallen short in seeking more conditionality moving forward? how could that be done differently? certainly this is a whole government approach to a large extent and you've been talking about sustaining the effort in terms of the state department and at the same time we know that whether it's funding or

whatever that may be where we often don't engage at the level we should, where should those efforts be, specifically, in terms of syria? mr. ford: i think, congresswoman, on two levels oren a national geostrategic level with countries of the region, turkey, saudi arabia, who are big players in syria, and iran, and i'm -- i assume the secretary of state is having some frank conversations with the iranian foreign minister. of course the iranian foreign minister doesn't control iranian policy in syria. another man in the iranian government, suleimani from the revolutionary guard corps, controls it. but there needs to be sustained engagement there. when you talk about conditionality, to me one of the basic elements is, we tell the turks and saudis we're not interested in helping extremists in the syrian opposition who

will reject a political solution and insist only on military victory. any assistance we give to any syrian opposition group should be conditioned on their acceptance of an eventual political deal, not military victory. second level for conditionality engagement has to be at a more local level. there are areas being liberated whether from the islamic state or the assad regime. you need to keep the services going. state department has tried to do this. i have to be honest, my colleagues who are still in government tell me it's becoming more difficult because of security and i certainly hope, and i know chris stevens would hope that what happened in benghazi does not prevent colleagues from doing their jobs going forward and engaging with people locally in the case of syria or iraq to help national reconciliation and restoration

of capable local governance. mrs. davis: thank you. thank you for that. i don't know whether many morre will l or dr. vickers you wanted to comment on that area of conditionality, but i wanted to follow up, dr. vickers, you spoke about trying to look at the afghan strikes initially and kind of taking a look at that. i'm not -- what happened after was a far greater problem but are you suggesting that we really do need to have far more strikes than we're having and issues of collateral damage, issues of -- issues of greater radicalization of the area that can occur, are these considerations that come into equation and what's -- how does this play into really the issues around a no-fly zone as well? vickers: i am arguing for a

more intense air campaign, as you said that didn't end the war but it eliminated al qaeda's sanctuary in afghanistan and toppled the taliban regime. taliban lived to fight another day. ms. dais: and unfortunately we went to iraq. mr. vickers: yeah, all sorts of things. one of the things you see in these campaigns is that collateral damage is obviously a critical concern. it does not go up linearly with the intensity of strike. mainly by the way we operate. if you look at areas where we've had more relaxed rues of engagement and done more strikes, had more liberal policy, versus others where we've been more restrained, you know, you occasionally make mistakes and so you have that 1% where no matter how hard you try, you're not perfect, but

there's not this correlation by a factor of 10. that was true, again, you know, war zones are different from areas outside of the hostilities but you know, we're in generally a precision world right now. i think that you can responsibly intensify the air campaign because as you said if you do have collateral damage, you will defeat your purpose. you'll turn more people against you and everything else. so that's just driven into our operations right now. i don't know if my colleagues want to address that. mrs. davis: i think i'm out of time. >> mr. kot -- mr. scott. mr. scott: gentlemen, thank you for being here. i know we've talked about syria and other parts of the world outsdz the u.s. i want to go back to the u.s. for a couple of minutes. you said the f.b.i. has over 800 open investigations in this country. >> 900. mr. scott: 900. i'm honestly surprised it's not

even higher than that with what we've seen. do we know what percentage of those investigations are u.s. citizens and what percent abbling are not u.s. citizens? >> i think congress map, the vast majority are u.s. citizens. mr. scott: the vast majority are u.s. citizens of of those who are not u.s. citizens, do we know how they got to the united states, whether refugee or visa or what gaps -- did they come across the border illegally? mr. morrell: i just don't that data. mr. scott: these are things i think we should follow up and try to find what the commonalities are of those who seem to desire to be a part of that organization. the other thing that there seems to be uniform agreement on is that as long as isis maintains large blocks of territory, then they will be a power in that region of the world. how many countries do they claim

to have territory in today? mr. morrell: i want to say it's eight to 10, something like that. nigeria, al jeera, lib ark the sinai. there's militant groups in about 20 countries that associate themselves in some way with sis. mr. scott: do they claim territory in all those areas? >> no, they claim territory in a handful of them. mr. scott: they call them provinces. mr. morrell: and some of those have no contact with the isis leadership, some of them do. isis has sent emissaries to some of these places to interact with these guys. mr. scott: would you agree an area where they claim territory, that is different than having an

operation, the actual claim of physical territory and land? mr. morrell: all three of us have made points about how important safe haven is, how important territory is. and that's true for those militant groups who associate themselves with isis as it is for isis. mr. scott: is one of the countries they claim to have a safe haven in saudi arabia? mr. morrell: no they have cells, they have terrorist cells in saudi arabia. mr. scott: so which one of those territories or nations they have -- they claim to have territory in would their operation be smallest in? mr. morrell: algeria. they have an affiliate, algerian province it's a group, it's not very big, probably maybe 50 to 00 fighters.

mr. scott: you hit on the point i was trying to get to. it's not very big. so while we're trying to figure out how to carry out extremely complex military operations and diplomatic operations in countries like syria, why couldn't we destroy them in these other countries that they claim territory in? get small victories against them? why shouldn't we just wipe them out there? if they only have 100 people, why can't we -- why don't we, i should say, wipe them out, so instead of claiming land in 10 countries, they claim it in two or three and you defeat the small ones first and then the big ones. then you're not playing whack-a-hole when you go in and take on the big one? mr. morrell: with respect to a place like -- mr. vickers: the algerian

government is pursuing this group they hate them, despice them, been fighting them since the early 1990. the algerians are sensitive about the deployment of foreign forces on their soil. they are hyper sensitive. it would probably be easier, congressman, to deploy special operations forces politically, it would be easier politically to do it in a place like tunisia or yemen. mr. scott: if i can finish up with the 15 seconds left. that's what creates the challenge with the authorization for use of force. they are in so many countries that are sovereign states and us as a country, operating militarily in those states without their permission is a tremendous challenge and so any suggestions that you have, i'm out of time but certainly in how the authorization for use of military force could be drafted that aloud taos carry out those operations, you're talking about multiple countries, not just one

or two. that makes it extremely complex issue. congratulations on the national championship dr. vickers. we look forward to beating you next year. mr. vickers: that was a great game. >> ms. gabrd. -- ms. gabard. ms. gabbard: mr. morrell you spoke about president el-sisi in egypt and the speech he gave and the need for leaders in islam to combat and counter this radical extremist ideology that's driving groups like isis and al qaeda. you eloquently drew that line between connecting groups like isis and al qaeda and how that ideology is exactly the same. i had a chance to meet with in dent el-sisi in egypt,

november,, spent close to two hours with him. heard how he continues to meet with imams and gathering of muslim religious leaders and continuing this effort but remains frustrated by the cold shoulder from the united states and the lack of action on our part in the need to identify and understand your enemy and the ideology that's driving them system of when we understand and know that isis has the same ideology of this radical political islamism that al qaeda has, that al nusra has and many other groups that are fighting in syria to overthrow assad, to establish their caliphate, why is it in your opinion that the and is only targeting isis is not targeting any of these other variety of islamic extremist groups who adhere to and are fighting under and are motivated by this exact same

radical islamic ideology? >> we are. particular the corson group associated with al nusra and is the external operations arm of al nusra. mr. ms. gabbard: do you know when the most recent attack on them was? mr. morrell: there was a couple of attacks on them early. they were successful. the focus is on isis for obvious reasons but my sense is we are targeting other groups in syria. just to go back to what you said about egypt, which i think is very, very important, congresswoman, i agree with what robert said earlier that it's important for the united states to be able to segregate. it's important for us to be able to say to president el-sisi, here are the things you're doing we don't like.

here are the things we're going to support you on 100%. i think it's important to be able to have those conversations and to separate your policy in a way that you can be supportive of the very, very important things a leader may be doing even though you've got other problems with them. >> i think even folks working within egypt on our side recognize that there's still a lot more that needs to be done in order to form that partnership that's knew chally beneficial for both of us. just to your point about your sense is that we are targeting al qaeda, i have been asking that question multiple times of multiple people and have not gotten that sense that we are targeting al qaeda and al nusra and one of the reasons that i see and some of you have been talking about the opposition forces, it has become very clear to me that we're ignoring, the united states is ignoring the fact that the most effective

fighting force within that opposition that you and others are referring to who are trying to overthrow assad are al qaeda. they are al nusra. they are islamic extremist groups who have been reports as they've taken over territory to be implementing and enacting this political islam, forcing women to bear wur kas and implementing this religious law on the society that they have in the sarme way we have seen isis in the territory they've regained. go ahead, dr. vickers. mr. vickers: one, i think -- i generally agree but i think you need to draw aties twings --dis-- distinction between the ex-term proplotting arm of al nusra, a number of those attacks hich began september 2014 have continued as those targets have been developed. i think al nasser or somebody,

there were a series of them over the past year, i would say. al nusra proper, which is, i don't know, some 6,000, 9,000 troops or so, they're spread across the country, i would agree that a lot of the foot solerer js -- soldiers have done tactical alliances with other parts of the opposition and have not been targeting in the same an that -- partially it's intelligence issue and the big focus has been on external plotters, i believe. ms. gabrd: i think that, and i'll just close with this, to me the problem is very clear that there are two contradictory u.s. wars that we are waging, one to overthrow the syrian government of assad, which is exals the executive of isis and other group, and the other is the war to defeat isis without a clear strategy or clear action that i've seen at least against al

qaeda and other groups. thank you, mr. chairman. >> dr. fleming. mr. fleming: thank you, gentlemen. i've listened to your testimony. it's all very interesting and informative. let me ask you this. have all throw of you worked within the obama administration? i believe you have. and i listened intently as, as you in particular, mr. morrell outlined eloquently how the current state of the islamic world is an apocalyptic sort of view coming out of their religious studies, out of the koran. many believe that if you're an infidel if you're not a believer, you should be put to death and there will be a messianic figure to come and kind of rule over the world. i guess my question is, have you had these conversations with our

president? >> i'd say that there's not much that i say here today that my former organization hasn't shared with the president of the united states. mr. fleming: would you say the same? the reason why i ask that question is because the american people, i think, just listening through the media, reading newspapers, agree with what you have to say. but our president seems to think that it's merely a coincidence that terrorists happen to be of the islamic faith and the problem with that, of course is that limits how we deal with the core issues behind all of this. also heard you articulate very importantly how nonislamists, ourselves, we don't have the

credibility to say, guys, these beliefs are not consistent with pieces of the koran and it's not consistent with how we should live together in this world. you really need to turn away from this philosophy. we need to rely on the muslim world to do that. but yet it seems to me, and i'll tell you that most people in my state of louisiana seem to feel that even though there are many muslims around the world, both domestically and abroad, who may not be in the fight, they still agree with the philosophy, the base exphilosophy and that's the reason why there's a resistance for them to come through and say, look, we need to cut this out. we need to stop killing people because they're not believers in islam. i'd love to have your response on that. >> i do believe there are the guys who are actually acting on

the beliefs and there's another group who share those beliefs and aren't acting on them. . morrell: and there's a not insignificant number, not a majority but not an insignificant number, who are comfortable with all of it. and you see it in polls. absolutely you do. it just reinforces, right, what we talked about earlier that the importance of getting your arms around the creation of terrorists in the first place and not just dealing with them once they've been created. mr. fleming: would you other gentlemen like to add to that? >> some of the opinion polls i've read, done by the pew organization, pew research, has some statistics that are shocking. mr. ford: the number of people in countries like egypt and jordan who support, for example, chopping the hands off thieves

sometimes goes up into the 70% or 80% range. things which islamic state already does. that's not to say those people are all believers in what the islamic state is trying to do but it is to say they're religiously conservative. that's just one of the complications dealing with the islamic state. that said, michael morrell was talking about the role of president al l -- president el-sisi. i was struck that about a year and a half ago, 300 scholars, some quite well known, within the islam exworld, sunnis, came out with a very, very strong denunciation of the islamic state and the caliphate. it was about three months after it was announced and after they had done the first really gruesome beheadings of foreigners as well as syrians and iraqis. i think it's always good to remember that the vast majority

of victims of the islamic state are themselves muslims. christians have offered unquestionably and others, but the vast majority are muslims and that's why i think the most effective people to talk back to the islamic state are not americans, who are not muslims, but other muslims. mr. fleming: i'm running out of time but i would just end by saying it seems absolutely necessary that we energize and stimulate the muslim world to see this for what it is. it's only going to make life difficult for everyone until they get involved and actually begin to counter these terrible philosophies that are really keeping us away from peace around the world. i thank you gentlemen, i yield back. mr. o'rourke: thank you, mr. chairman. ambassador, i'd like you to comment on a relatively recent development which is the u.n.

security council outline for a peace process in syria, and i'd like you to do so within the context of everyone's agreed goal of ultimately seeing assad replaced. want to make sure that we minimize any threats to the united states and our allies. we'd like to see stability in that region. we want to minimize the loss of human life and suffering. and i think we all, the united states and the world community, would like to see justice served for some truly horrific crimes in that area. train and equip hasn't worked to that end so far. it's been an abysmal failure. mr. morrell, prior to saying at the end they have day we've got to get rid of assad, assad's got to go, we don't have a credible ground force in syria. tell me, ambassador ford, your thoughts on the prospects for this process, how aggressively we should commit to it, if you

agree that it's the path to take, and what we can do most effectively militarily, diplomatically, economically or otherwise to get to our goals through a more peaceful process. mr. ford: thank you, congressman. in brief, i don't think the process is going to go anywhere. and i didn't think that a month ago before this saudi-iranian latest spat erupted. there's nothing in the documents that came out of vienna, where secretary kerry was with other foreign ministers, nor is there anything in the security resolution that says assad maust go, it's not addressed. second -- to me, that's something syrians ought to negotiate, it shouldn't be precondition but it should be on the table. second, right now there's a lot of goofing around going on about who should represent the syrian opposition and the russians are

trying to put their friends on the opposition delegation. iranians are tri-ing to put some of their friends. and frankly the turks and saudis are trying to put some of their friends. syrians are not in control of this. that to me spells disaster. especially if the really serious armed opposition guys, who accept the political solution, if those serious armed opposition guys are excluded from the negotiation, i can't imagine they'll sustain their support for a political deal. there's been a lot of talk about getting acease fire, you know, the picture of the saverbing -- starving people, medalla had a cease fire, you can see what a cease fire looks like. if you're in an area where start a cease fire you to criticize the regime, don't want to appear in their television spots, your food