an afterword written by dr. cornel west. thank you. it was one year ago that tavis programas on book tvs and you can go to book to be.org and type in >> tonight paul ryan talking about republican policy agenda for 2016. vice president biden talking about cancer research. and then rising tensions between iran and saudi arabia. >> congressional republicans finished a policy retreat in baltimore. at the close paul ryan held it press conference where he discussed the political agenda focusing on national security, economy and health care. this is 10 minutes.

mr. ryan: today is the anniversary of the packers first super bowl win. good morning. we just completed a very successful conference. with everything that is at stake in 2016, we have been talking about how do we go on offense ideas and how do we make sure that we offer the country a very clear and compelling choice? they deserve that. we want to earn their choice by offering an agenda that fixes their problems, because of we do not like the direction the country is going and we do not, we have an obligation to offer an alternative, so starting today, we are beginning to work on developing a bold progrowth agenda. this agenda will focus on five areas. first, national security. americans are very anxious right now, rightfully so.

how do we go about making sure that we are secure here at home? how do we go about building a clay for century military and make sure that we are equipped to defeat isis and the threat posed by radical islamic terrorism? next, jobs and economic growth. our economy is far from reaching its potential. wages are still stagnant. families are still hurting. people are working harder than ever before but they feel that they are sitting behind. how do we fix our tax code? how do we rein in the regulatory state? how do we maximize our energy potential? third, health care. obamacare has taken us down the wrong path. higher prices, higher deductibles, fewer choices, restricted access. how do we not only repeal the

law but what solutions lead us to lower cost and a truly patient-centered health care system? fourth, poverty and opportunity. there are 46 million americans living in poverty today. what solutions will help get people out? right now we have a safety net that is designed to catch people falling into poverty but what we need is a trampoline that gets people out of poverty into lives they want for themselves. how do we get them back into the workforce? how do we restore upward mobility? the last piece of this, and it is so critical to all the others is restoring the constitution. we are a country founded on an idea, and our rights do not come from government, our rights come from god, our rights are natural and the constitution is this beautiful system of rules, a beautiful system preserving liberty and freedom so we can exercise those rights, that we

are sovereign and free. how do we restore the constitution because the president executive overreach has undermined the constitution and has damaged the people's trust. people more and more do not trust our government and it is because we have deviated from the constitution. so what do we need to do to restore the separation of powers and protect our constitutional liberties? these are critical questions. these are the ideas that we will be advancing. we will work with our colleagues through our committee led task forces, that means every member and their constituents will have a chance to provide their input. a suspect we will have a complete agenda by the time we have a nominee. this is nothing short of a generational defining moment we are in.

the country is crying out for solutions. the country is crying out to be unified. the country is crying out for a positive vision that brings us all together. we want a confident america and now is the time to get to work. thank you. questions? >> you have been circumspect -- in terms of how specific this agenda will be and you said that will be discussed at this conference. is there a resolution as to whether this will be legislation or something less? mr. ryan: we just launched the process. we're not going to predetermine everything. we are going to do this to do this together with our members but believe you me, the people of our country will know who we are and what we stand for when this is done and they will be given a choice in 2016 so when

they go to the polls, when they vote for republicans, they will know what they are voting for. >> some of us talked to bill florez in the hall and he said republicans should develop a technology whoever winds of being the nominee. and do you see because it is unclear who the nominee might be, there is one person who people are concerned, that may be the tail could wag the dog and influence them based on what you do in the house this year. mr. ryan: we are worried about congress working. we're worried about the constitution. we are worried about solutions so we are putting out an agenda that rises to the occasion and we are not sitting here thinking about who the nominee is going to be. we do not have time to think about that. >> that is not in the back of your mind? mr. ryan: no. >> how exactly are you interpreting this poverty

program, how the administration would heckle poverty or how you envision a poverty program because it seems like it would be a completely different vision of how the administration would do it. i am curious as to how you envision it because your voters are thinking a poverty program, we are talking about billions of dollars of social programs. mr. ryan: the status quo which is the obama administration, they believe that measuring success in the war on poverty is spending more money and having more federal programs and having washington dictate solutions to communities. we fundamentally reject that premise. we fundamentally disagree and so we agreed the more effective way of fighting poverty and combating the lack of upward

mobility is to go at the root causes to break the cycle of poverty. we believe in freedom, liberty, self-determination. we believe in communities. we believe in federalism. so what does that mean? work works. washington does not work. we will take those principles that we have and apply it to one of the biggest problems we have in america. people living in poverty and a lack of upward mobility. at the beginning of the portion -- there was the issue of senator cruz. mr. ryan: that is not worth the seconds worth of thought. thank you. appreciate it. >> awaiting vice president joe biden who will be holding a roundtable discussion on curing

[indiscernible conversations] >> there are different committees working within that area. you look at health care. you're going to have different groups of committee chairs working in these task forces in committee. >> monday is martin luther king jr. day. we have feature programs on all three c-span networks. live coverage of the british house of commons debate whether

to band donald trump from their country. coverage will re-air at 6:30. william jones and his book the march on washington, jobs, freedom, and the forgotten history of civil rights. said you better get martin luther king, get his support. he went to mark mr. king. he said i will support you but let's expand the goals of the march. not just about winning equal access to jobs. it is also about winning the right to vote in the south. >> john lewis calls his involvement in the civil rights movement. and an international history

professor at the london school of economics. >> iran had to look to a third power to preserve independence and sovereignty against the imperial ambitions of russia. a ramble to germany to play the role and after the second world war a whole generation of as a country that had no imperial ambitions and no history of colonialism in the region. in 1963 interview with martin luther king junior on his nonviolent approach to civil rights. for the holiday schedule go to c-span.org.

students are telling us the issue they want the presidential candidates to discuss. tweet. a bob goodlatte tweeted -- students from lakeside high school tweeted more of our day at the capital. thanks john vines and senator clark. there are $100,000 in prizes. the grand prize is $5,000. the deadline is january 20. the winners will be announced march 9.

>> joe biden talk to reporters about the cancer research initiative described as a moonshot and the president's state of the union address. with psychologists and other medical researchers to discuss -- discuss breakthroughs. this is 15 minutes. >> please sit down. welcome, welcome. thank you very much. sense this is taking you from the important work you are doing. .r. collins and i are here i had opportunity to speak with my friend.

and, i like so many of you and maybe members of the press and their families, my family has been touched by cancer. some family members have survived. some have not. mother used to have an expression. little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing. and when you're engaged with someone you love who is fighting for their life, you become acquainted with at least the parameters of what they are dealing with and you as that will tell you, you do everything in your power to be able to learn as much about the fight that is underway as you can.

and so i want to make it clear, when the president set up -- when i decided not to run for president, i had indicated in the rose garden that when i made that announcement that had i been president, one of the things i would devote my administration to was a manhattan project, a lot of moon shots on cancer. the truth of the matter is i believe from my exposure over two years of my son fighting glioblastoma of the brain comics stage four, i became acquainted enough with the brilliant minds around this table and others to realize that we are on the cusp, you are on the cusp of some phenomenal breakthroughs.

in my terms, not your medical terms, we are at an inflection point in the fight against cancer. if you think about i say the media, this is everyone in this room understands this, i used to have a good friend named bob gold and i is to ask do you understand, he would say i over stand you. everyone in the profession over stands what i am saying. until in my view and iamb no expert here although i tried my best to learn as much as i can the last two years, it really was not until before eight years ago we began to challenge the typical way in which we treated cancer. everyone of you who have had a family member over the last 10 years with cancer, you learn the

same thing. there is a scalpel to remove a tumor, there is chemotherapy, and radiation. it is a pretty brutal process. a lot of these docs and docs around the world, i met with over 200 leading oncologists in the world and clinicians, part of what moved these men and women, it is presumptuous of me to say is more humane treatment to do with this disease. and god willing in a decade we will look act and say how did we treat cancer in the 1950's the way we treated it? there is a lot of talk about the dream of a possibility of genomics. there was not on the horizon. and so i had a long talk with the president and told him what my intention was and i am so flattered that my fellow congressmen are here. an irish guy who is a republican, you should we a

democrat, i kid him all the time, he is a great friend of mine and others that are here. we really are committed as a government, as a congress, and there is not the cause of me. the only thing that got a spontaneous standing ovation was the announcement of his -- us taking a targeted approach. i want to make it clear, i will yield to dr. collins in a minute, this is not an nih program per se. this is not a federal initiative per se. this is using all the assets and capacities of the government. we task every major agency to be at my disposal and a literal

sense and take from them the best they have in the areas they have, kind of like i did in the recovery act and put together a team and happen executive director where we become -- we already are, i believe through nih -- value added. and are part of the process. where we break down where it is real, some of us imagined, where there are bureaucratic barriers where we can accommodate and speed up rationally and safely additional research and development. but one of the things i have found is there is a awful lot of stovepipe. i hope my medical -- medical friends here will not be offended but i used to have a

grandfather named ambers benny -- ambrose finney. he's to say there is because of politics, church politics, union politics as in labor, and there is politics and he said they are difficult in that order. i hope you're not offended but there are four kinds of baltics. there is cancer politics, church politics, union politics, and politics. they are difficult in that order. it is not even intentional. it is not intentional. there is a desire for everyone here to be collaborative. there is a desire to be collaborative and you are working with other organizations, major cancer research hospitals, but as i go around the country and i have now met with scores of folks, we have the quilt coalition, the

parker institute which you are part of here, the and college he research informational exchange network, the american society of clinical oncology, the gbm agile project which includes 170 international oncologists and researchers. there is the biotech industry organization, friends of cancer research, etc. and they all have particular expertise, none more than here at the university, and what i'm finding is that there still are still up that exist. more existed in the past, but today, they still exist. some of them are and i will be coming to my colleagues who are the leaders in the house and senate in both parties but for example, basic questions like when you do this -- they genomic tests, who owns the genome, me

or you who do the test? right now that is not so clear. most of these -- you'd do not want the individual to own it, you want to own it. there are a lot of practical questions but by and large, what is exciting, i have noticed in the last two years the cost colonization that is going on now that did not exist before. all these doctors are in their own right exceptional. i just happen to know dr. june and his repetition more than most. i mean it. he is internationally known as

others of you are. when people think of dr. june they think of immunotherapy. but he is working closely on genomic and there is a lot of collaboration going on now in virology. a whole range of things that 5, 7, 8 years ago, we almost did not mix. there is even movement and i do not know enough to know whether how much catered there may be there but the neurosurgeon who did two of my craniotomys, they had to go in twice to find a brain 25 years ago, the head of the department of surgery at the university of virginia is talking about high-powered ultrasound. there is all kinds of things that are occurring in the field that, up until recently, other disciplines would save we are

not going to invest in that but i find a much more collaborative atmosphere. and so what my role will be, it may be above my pay grade. this is one of the most difficult and complex undertakings i have taken on in my career. in some time. i became an expert on strategic doctrine, nuclear weapons on the issue relating to arms control. what i was able to do, i sat down with our laboratories and they sat with me over six months and taught me how to make a nuclear weapon. so i fully understood what a soviet silo was. so when i spoke i knew as much or more than anybody i had spoken with. hopefully i can be informed

enough across a wide spectrum that i can be and my colleagues, we can do two things. we can have the federal government and the american people step up in their contributions, financial contributions to the fight and investment in these technologies. as well as coordinate and collaborate all the agencies within the federal government led by dr. collins. so that we are partners, not impediments, we are partners with the private sector. lastly, madam president, there are some very generous people out there. i have now met with -- i did not know there were so many billionaires in america, literally.

i met with some extremely, parker who is free much involved with your efforts here, there are some really fine people including governor huntsman and others who have made enormous investments, charitable investments and philanthropy to deal with this subject. and so my hope is that i can be a catalyst to overstate it, oversimplify it, to get everybody on the same page. the goal is whatever breakers we can make in 10 years, my goal is to make sure we can do it in five years. my goal is that we find absolute cures but for some cancers we get to the point where i can manage them, they become chronic diseases. i do not want the press or folks out there saying biden is being naïve and saying we are about to cure all cancer and we will do it tomorrow but we can find --

fundamentally change the life circumstances of millions of people around the world. worldwide. this is the biggest killer. if the u.s. is nothing else, i was once asked by president xi, we were having a private dinner and he asked, can i define america and i said yes, i can, in one word. possibilities. that is the uniqueness of this country. limitless possibilities for good -- possibilities. and the dedication we have just run this table. throughout the nation and throughout the world, this is a place where the united states

can make a contribution that exceeds almost anything we could and will have done so far. to humanity. i was joking with my colleagues a moment ago, i was saying to dr. dang, if my mother was here she would look at you and look at you, dr., and say you're doing god's work area that is what this is about. we can do so much. with that, what i would like to do is yield for a moment to dr. collins and then i would like to open up and educate me. i would like you to talk about what you think i should most be doing as i put this task force together and my commitment is not just for the next 12 months. my commitment to do this and i have been stunned by the response worldwide. you have seen some of it. i have been stunned at the overwhelming response welcoming me to be a facilitator and convener.

i plan on doing this the rest of my life. [applause] >> tomorrow, donald trump will hold a campaign rally in portsmouth, new hampshire. you can watch the live coverage starting at 11:30 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> book tv has 48 hours of nonfiction books and authors every weekend on c-span2. here are some programs to watch out for this weekend. watch thet 1:30 p.m., coverage of the second annual bill of rights book festival on the national constitution center in philadelphia. at 10 p.m., a pulitzer prize-winning journalist assesses her book, a story about china's most radical experiments

about the impact of china's recently discontinued one child policy. author,nterviewed by an chasing fortune, truth and fate in the new china. >> china should grow economically. in one or two generations, we have seen everyone go from bicycles, aspiration for a bicycle, to a vehicle. good for them. if the one child policy had helped, would we get to that stage, i would be all for it. the problem was they did not have that much to do with economic growth that china has for the last 30 years. >> on sunday at 7:15 p.m., press -- professoroung courtney young examines the impact of breast-feeding policies on american society. >> breast-feeding fits very americantly into an health paradigm that increasingly blames individuals themselves for poor health outcomes and the soaring costs of american health care.

>> watch book tv all weekend, every weekend on c-span2. television for serious readers. >> next, discussion about tension in the persian gulf between iran and saudi arabia. analysts at the hudson institute talk about the u.s. strategy in the region, the conflict and the war against isis. this is one hour and a half. >> good afternoon. thank you for coming to hudson institute. i would also like to welcome our c-span1 audience this afternoon for what i know is going to be a fantastically interesting panel. also a very timely one, given the events of the last week.

especially, the detaining of the 10 american sailors this past week. of course, other recent events including the attacks on two saudi arabian diplomats in iran. given the topic, the turmoil in the persian gulf, it is poised for more conflicts. we will go for about an hour and 15 minutes. then, i will open it up for questions in the audience and maybe open it up earlier. we have an fantastic panel. to my left is a senior fellow at the foundation for the sense of democracies. to his left, philip smyth, who is an adjunct fellow at the washington institute. philip and i have known each other for a while. philip also owns a blog. to his left is my hudson

institute colleague, michael duran. i thank you for coming. ali, if you would begin. >> thank you so much for your kind words, your invitation, and for providing me the opportunity to present my analysis. the detaining of american soldiers in the gulf by the revolutionary guard came as a surprise to some, and the relatively fast release has been almost like a victory by the secretary of state and the government of iran. i must admit that this is hardly surprising, and it's because of the revolutionary nature of

tehran. i will talk for a few minutes about the revolutionary nature, and after that, i will try to argue why some in the gulf region, by mistreating the population, are indirectly helping tehran. in that way, i will probably put myself in a position to be attacked. so, for most americans, the revolution in iran was an historical event that took place in 1979, 37 years ago. particularly here in washington, 37 years is a long time. it might has well have been when the pyramids were built. it's an historical event.

no one has a long memory. it's an ongoing process for the government of iran, the revolutionary guard, and the supreme leader. the revolution is a permanent revolution. it is not historical. it is an ongoing process. and the one institution with is charged with the permanence of that revolution is, of course, the revolutionary guard. by engaging in acts against the u.s. navy, by staging and attacking diplomatic missions in iran, and by constantly attacking the institutions of state, because there are such institutions.

it is to safeguard the territorial integrity of iran, to safeguard the revolution and its achievement. it is abstract, and it has to do with ideology. if you compare the mission of the police with the mission of the revolutionary guard, the police are charged with upholding law and order in the country and with protecting the diplomatic missions in tehran, the permanence of the revolution. this is the duality. this is the parallel structure that we have in iran. so, what tools do the revolutionary guard have at their disposal to continue

spreading the revolution in the entire middle east? that is by reaching out to shia populations in the persian gulf and beyond. now, most unfortunately, some sunni governments are making the job of the revolutionary guard easier rather than more difficult. particularly when you look at the kingdom of saudi arabia, where the shia population is practically treated as second-class citizens. you make it easier for the revolutionary guards to appeal to them. and you end up chasing saudi shia into the arms of the supreme leader. the same thing is happening in bahrain. if you look at other countries -- kuwait. shia are loyal citizens. they participate in the political process. they are good citizens. same and united arab emirates,

and many other places. if there is what policy recommendation that we should think of -- and i hope our good friends in saudi arabia and bahrain will listen to -- if you treat your shia populations as citizens, they will be good citizens. but if you look at them with suspicion, if you suppress them, if you suppress their demand's for being treated in a dignified way, you end up chasing them into the arms of the revolutionary guard, into the arms of the supreme leader, and you end up contributing to the permanence of the revolution in iran. thank you. host: that was fantastic. thank you very much. there are a number of things i want to circle back to later, especially the point you made about the parallel structure of the revolution. i want to talk about our democratic revolution and the

state, and are these parallel structures at odds with each other. philip. phillip: i got into studying what was going on with certain shia armed groups, particularly in bahrain, because i was following social networks that are completely controlled by the iranians and the revolutionary guard. i found this fascinating. i am going to try to go into that and demonstrate what this means for the region and how we are supposed to be looking at this. i don't want to remove agency from certain actors on the ground. ali is correct by saying that certain sunni moves to put shia in a position where they have to or want to reach out to the iranians and will much more quickly by into their propaganda, be trained by the revolutionary guard, do this, do that.

i think there is a broader sectarian narrative here that has been played out due to the war in iraq, the war in syria. the war in syria, again, the sectarian narrative was driven by the iranians, so we have now come full circle. a few other things attack what's going on in the gulf. one of the big issues i noticed was with bahrain. in bahrain, i have counted around 15-22 groups that have declared they want to use a militant message to depose the monarchy. this has direct implications for u.s. security policy, and some of these groups have actually called for attacks against americans. one of them actually openly announced two days ago that they had links to certain iraqi militias very publicly on their facebook page. they came out and said they

would want to launch rockets. their new rocket -- they said they wanted to launch these rockets back in 2014. a number of bombings have taken place due to these shia elements in bahrain. usually they target security, any security target they can get their hands on, or government targets. the message is very clear. it's to send a message not simply to bahrain and the gulf, but also to the americans, that they can start a low-level brushfire war if they want to in the backyard of an american military base. there is a very close relationship between saudi shia who live in the eastern province and bahraini shia. a lot of these factions are interlinked, so you will see,

when arms transports are going through, magically, some will get dropped off in saudi arabia, and some will get dropped off in bahrain. going forward from there, there have been a number of developments in the past year. one group, which has links to saudi shia and iraqi shia, and a very active militant element within bahrain, was essentially smashed by bahrain security services. there have been a number of arrests and arms caches found. about 1.5 metric tons of explosives were seized by bahraini authority in addition to what we call an esp manufacturing plant. if you look at the bombs and some of the firearms confiscated, if you look at the cells that were formed, they were very similar to the cells forming in southern iraq back when the united states was there.

so, when you see this upsurge in technological capabilities, it is obvious this outside hand has had some sort of presence. does iran want to escalate the conflict? i am of the believe that they are long-term thinkers, strategic. this is a long-term goal. i have heard arguments from different policy makers and different policy makers in the gulf that have said may be americans during negotiations have said why don't you take a break from military activities in bahrain and saudi? again, i don't have any proof to that effect, but you can still see action going on. i do believe iran wants to keep it on a low burn for now.

interestingly enough, there were arms seized going into bahrain. i think there is military activity, but it is on the low burn. host: thank you very much. mike, if you would pick this up and round off our introduction. mike: thanks. i would like to talk a little bit about the u.s. reading of all of this and the dilemma. i would start by imagining a conversation between the united states and the saudi's to on a recommendation that ali made that the saudis should treat their shia population differently.

i think that conversation today would be unfruitful. it would be unfruitful in a most any circumstances, but particularly today. the saudis would listen politely, say thank you for the lecture, and then ignore it. for me, there are many different reasons, but especially now, because from the saudi point of view, the region has tilted toward iran and away from saudi arabia. that is with respect to the larger question from 30,000 feet of what is the proper regional order in the middle east? the number one question for everyone in the region is syria. the conflict in syria is the center of gravity of all that is happening.

as far as regional actors are concerned, the united states has taken the side of bashar al-assad. that's not the rhetorical position, but it's the de facto position based on what they are doing on the ground. if you look at u.s. policy anywhere from baghdad to beirut, the united states is in alignment with the iranians or with other actors that are hostile to the established order in the sunni areas. the united states is arming kurds in syria who are, for all intents and purposes, an extension of the pkk, who are separatists in turkey. if you are sitting in ankara and

looking at u.s. policy in syria, the americans have a policy that is leading toward a new order in syria in which turkish separatists are going to have a safe haven. if you are saudi arabia, you see a syria with a revitalized iranian role in the country and the assad in power in perpetuity. if you are the israelis and you are looking at what the united states is doing, you see that eventually what is going to happen is that the russians and iranians are going to help assad reassert control, and you are going to have irgc members on the ground right on the israeli border. if you're the saudis and you look at what the united states is doing in iraq, the united

states is the air force of the shiite militias armed, trained, equipped, and effectively led by iran inside iraq. so, if you look at the way this is going and imagine the conversation that ali suggested we had, from the saudi point of view, you can say hey, washington, what about all these militias iran is arming, training, and equipping and four or five different arab countries? what is your policy for stopping that? and of course, there is no policy for stopping that. when the saudis executed this shiite cleric inside saudi arabia, that was preceded by conversations between the united states, u.s. officials and saudi officials, in which the u.s. said don't do this, this is a provocation, a sectarian

provocation that is going to cause difficulty with iran. from the saudi point of view, this was the united states effectively reinforcing iran's voice as a representative of shiites around the region. it was the united states saying the iranians have a legitimate say in how we act with the shiites in our country. in effect, and i think lee actually wrote this in one of his columns, this was a death sentence to nimr baqir al-nimr. the only way our voice with the saudis about the way they treat the shiite is going to have any resonance is if they believe we are building a regional order in which they are larger security concerns are going to be addressed and their fear of an expanding iran is going to be addressed. if they believe we are going to

help roll back iranian militias, then we might be able to have a fruitful conversation with them about what's going on inside their country. but under the current context, it is impossible. host: thank you, mike. one of the things i want to come back to that you brought up, which will play on a point i wanted to come back to with ali is about revolution and the state and if it is possible for the white house to integrate a revolution into regional order. a lot of what we are seeing right now is the result or the function of trying to integrate a revolution into the regional order. but i believe all he wanted to respond to something you said --

ali wanted to respond to something you said. ali: they do point a hidden sunnisacy against the in the region. what i see in the middle east is mostly because of indecisiveness in the white house and the middle east policy that is wrong. this disentanglement militarily from iraq, completely prematurely, before the iraqi state was capable of defending itself, before it had the institutions to take care of its own security. i think there is a vacuum of power in the entire middle east that iran was in a better position to take advantage of. they have institutions, the revolutionary guard, and other

institutions which serves the purpose of exporting the revolution. this, of course, creates a lot of concern among sunni regimes, particularly in saudi arabia which, in this case, is justly concerned about what the united states is doing because it's changing the balance of power in the middle east. if saudi arabia and bahrain continue treating their own populations as second-class citizens when it comes to shia groups, then they would be more open to watch propaganda from the iranian regime. i am not arguing that the obama administration has had the correct policy. i think some of the problems we are seeing are consequences of that. host: let's come into this conversation about whether it is

possible. isn't this something that henry kissinger said a while ago, that iran has to decide if it's going to be a state or a revolution? one of the things we are coming up against is the fact that in iran, it's really a revolution. and the revolution overwhelms the state. ali: yes, that is the case, and whenever the iranian government is facing exes tension threats, it begins to behave -- you have -- existential threats, you see the rise of people who can charm washington, but whenever that need is no longer there, they are expendable.

host: is that what is happening now and what happened with taking the sailors? ali: of course, because the revolution survived. the revolution, in particular, has to survive. there are two objectives. first, to humiliate the united states, and second, to tell the world that the revolutionary guard, which is in charge of iran's foreign policy -- and the fact that they were released faster than the british sailors, it's honestly no cause for celebration in washington. if secretary kerry wants to build an arc de triomphe for himself in washington, fine, but -- host: he did say the diplomatic channel is open and see how productive it has already proven.

ali: the revolutionary guard is the one in iran making the decisions. host: philip, could you give a little more detail about how the revolution -- i was reading an article by one of our colleagues, and she was talking about the nigerian sheik, and i just went to get a little more detail about how the revolution dictates various structures around the world. if you could give us a little more detail about how it replicates itself. philip: there is a model they follow, and it is the lebanese-hezbollah model. there is a military section. there is an ideology of

resistance that is always embedded in there. it is anti-american, anti-israel. you have all of these things wrapped in the anti-western sentiment they have. the ideology the islamic republic is based upon, often these groups will have that incorporated in the structure. it doesn't necessarily mean they are public about it. in bahrain, groups don't necessarily announce where they are ideologically. you will see inklings of it at times. the february 14th youth movement, which started as a

peaceful movement, now they are throwing molotovs. .hey've had protests invented by ayatollah khomeini to celebrate the downfall of israel. it never really works that way. in bahrain, you have to remember the shia population, these are not khomeiniists running around. many of these people are independent in terms of who they prefer for their leadership. sometimes they like more radical types. in iran, what they are attempting to do is co-opt that.

they co-opt the anger that comes with their distrust and dislike for the regime because of how they are mistreated and they say iran will address our interest. and what iran will do is say by the way, why don't you learn weapons? why don't you do an ideological training seminar? i think this gets passed over quite a bit and a lot of analysis. i focus a lot on iraqi-shia militias being formed. not every group follows khomeini. there are around 200 and 50, like a new one every week, but beyond that, what they are doing in iraq right now, they feel secure enough to say they are with the islamic revolution in the region. same with syria. there is a group that a few irgc leaders are calling syrian hezbollah.

when you see something like that, they feel far more secure in those environments. when you see something like that, they feel far more secure, so it can just come out. in other environments, they are far more patient. they want to pull in numbers and also want to make sure people -- maybe it is more nationalistic. i love the propaganda music, i am assessed with the stuff. in 2006, you will notice that the had a song about victory of the arabs. and then they had in other one where -- another one where they are talking about the feeders of

lebanon. this comes in after the destructive war in 2006. now it is all syria. who cares about lebanon? they will shift the narrative whatever they need to to pull in more people than they need. i think when we are looking at bahrain, with more covert organizations, they have to be. they had a covert security apparatus with american assistance. you don't always want to come out and say, did you know how many was the best guy ever? they don't want to do that. that is very interesting also, how you would use different messages in different communities, different societies. very interesting. interested inre coming back with this question about revolution versus state, or if you would like to pick up another thread? >> i think it is both revolution in the sense that they

explicitly want an international revolution in the middle east in the sense that they want the american dominated system that exists to disappear, and a new system in which they are the central player to replace it. ask you something? first, i should point out for the audience about the different articles you have what -- you have written explaining the administration's iran policy. if i could ask you to give some sort of -- did the administration see that they were effectively tilting toward a revolution, or did they think they were going to turn the revolution into a real state? mike: i believe the obama administration sees iran as a ,illar of middle east stability as a partner for middle east understands that it is tilting toward iran in

syria. this tilt toward iran is happening in kind of a fit of absentmindedness on the part of the americans, or the americans might say we don't what to get inwant to get involved syria, so we are hanging back, and iran is filling the vacuum. we don't need to argue about it, because it doesn't matter, in a sense, what we are trying to understand the dynamics in the region. whether the united states is thinking about the invasion from mars, or whether it is actually thinking consciously about aligning with iran. the same dynamic is taking place, because as ali so

correctly pointed out, iran has these institutions and the ability to project its power by building these proxies on the ground that look after its interests. u.s. policy is facilitating the expansion of iranian power throughout the region both directly -- i mean, the iranians intervened directly with the russians as part of a military coalition to prop up al-assad. they are also using proxies. we are going to have implementation day on the nuclear deal probably this weekend, could be as early as saturday or sunday, the moment where we start releasing 100 billion dollars to $150 billion to the iranians. if you are sitting in saudi arabia or israel and you see this, and you see the united states about to drop $150 billion on the iranians, it looks like the united states is tilting toward iran. maybe it's not. i believe it is.

the iranians play this game of being both the arsonist and the fireman. the irtc stirs up problems -- and they are very talented at staying behind closed doors with kerry. saying you know, we understand each other. we have interests. you have interests. we have overlapping interests. they present themselves as consummate players. they say we have overlapping interests. we can cut a deal. right? and the americans believe they are domesticating the iranians, that they are showing them that a partnership is possible, and

in doing so, they are elevating the more pragmatic and defensive elements in iranian society. it's a complete fiasco, basically. what's amazing to me -- and i will stop on this point, is that every time something happens in the middle east where there is some kind of outrageous provocation from the iranians, we either ignore it or put a ridiculous interpretation on it. right now, hezbollah and the iranians are starving the inhabitants in syria. 30,000 people are starving to death. this is a policy of the al-assad regime, a policy of iran. this is going on while the saudis executed nimr baqir al-nimr. which issue did we decide was a secretary and -- secretary and

-- secretarian provocation? the execution, and not the starvation. which every sunni in the region sees as a sectarian provocation, of course. very few people in the american media are even aware of the perception of people in the region about this and reporting on it. same thing with the sailors, right? ali described very accurately how the navy put out to the region that we are in charge of what goes on. our white house decides to picture this tremendous diplomatic victory because we got these hostages released within hours. irtc is sending to the region is irgc isessage the sending to the region is very clear, and our news media just

repeats the talking points of john kerry as if it's a deep analysis. host: is this the incorrect interpretation? are you telling me the white house has not really succeeded in empowering moderates? will it take more time? will it ever happen -- will it ever happen? empowering moderates? ali: i think what we are most likely to see is that the supreme leader is going to block or disqualify many people to run for parliament. host: will he disqualify romani as well? lf ali: probably not rouhani himself, but his network. what we will see is rouhani being an isolated president, and the body that will appoint the

next supreme leader is going to be dominated by regime loyalists, and then you have technocrats going back into the shadows. who is, by the way, going to benefit from the money being released because of the sanctions relief? the most likely scenario is that the money is going to be transferred to the economic business empire of the revolutionary guard. -- thegest contracts largest contractor in iran is going to get the contracts. it's not going to be the private sector. they are arguing if you give us the money, we can make the private sector come back into the economy. but in reality, the private sector, moreivate to be than not, is going

soft contracts to the revolutionary guard. you could strengthen the irtc control with the business elites of iran. that calculation by the white house, i think has been completely wrong. host: this is how the white house speaks about it publicly. you would look very strange if you said we don't care about empowering moderates. we are dealing with extremists. these are hard men around the region. as the president apparently said to a number of gulf arab officials at camp david in may, he spoke approvingly of the guys who get things done around the region. you wouldn't really be able to speak publicly and say look, we have done a deal with the extremists, but in fact, that's kind of what has happened, and a nuclear agreement with the regime locks in the irgc. mike, you and i have spoken

about this a bit. do they actually believe they are empowering moderates? or are they much more like, we made a deal with the extremists, deal with it? mike: i believe both. it's a deep aspect of american thinking about international politics to gradual,n the moderating influence of international markets. there's a model they have in their heads, and the model is china. the chinese are our rivals. they are building their military. but we also have this economic we haveendency, so changed the calculus in beijing it is worthwhile to challenge the united states, because there are so many economic interests that are hanging in the bounds for the chinese.

create conditions in iran that will bring about the same kind of calculus. they understand that in the short term it is going to lead to the strengthening of the more hardline elements, but over time, once this money starts penetrating and there is this interdependency, this will change the calculation. plus, there are two interpretations of iran in washington. one sees it as an aggressive revolutionary power. the other says nobody in iran really believes that anymore. the system was set up so they have to pay lip service to it, but in actual fact they are pragmatic actors. president obama has said this in a number of interviews. they are pragmatic. we can cut a deal with them. that is what he is banking on in

the end. host: have they lost their taste for revolution? ali: the revolution and revolutionary behavior serves their corporate interests. the big difference between iran and china is that when president dixon -- president nixon made the deal, the communist power your -- communist party was firmly in power. the people's liberation army was under total political control. in the iranian case, if there is a one-party system, the party is the party of the revolutionary guard. it serves the interest of the revolutionary guard to be revolutionary, not only to pay lip service, but to practice it once in a while. but whenever the threat from the the threat from the

inside is threatening the revolutionary guard, they do engage in pragmatic solutions. it's highly ideological and it serves their interests. not to deliberate too long, but what do you think will happen next? what is the regime likely to do next in the persian gulf? philip: i think we are on a low burn trajectory until they want to turn up the flame. they are building groups of the future. host: what would turning up the flame look like? what does that mean? orthey have an interest getting then

persian gulf hot right now, or is this more like throwing matches in the persian gulf? every once in a while getting people upset and walking it back. what will the next few months, the next year of the obama presidency look like? philip: for starters, i think it will be throwing matches. you have to look at this from a strategic likable -- from a strategic level and their messaging angles. a lot of groups have been expressing their support for groups like hezbollah. they are right now, forming a rhetorical

narrative bubble, the islamic resistance is growing. beyond that, the attacks they are doing, which are in good part due to security measures that have gone on, have not been that effective, but they are continuing. but it's the low burn. the low burn is effective for now. host: again, i'm not asking you to -- philip: almost randomly. i look at timing. it is interesting that a lot of these other groups were sending anti-american threats. they were going to target a starbucks. target a chili's. target the ritz-carlton hotel. fire rockets at the u.s. naval base. but those didn't really coincide with a big push by the americans in the region. not even really with negotiations. i think sometimes, they might just want to press the button a little bit and say, all right, let's see how they react to this.

as therries me is that united states pulls out of this region more -- and again, we are in the last year of the obama administration, and this is kind of the trajectory of where it's going. i think they may be emboldened. you look at what's going on in iraq and syria, ground battles are not that great for them right now, but if they feel emboldened, they might try to do something a little more spectacular. but again, i think we are on a low burn trajectory, and they wilkie didn't like that until they really want to start things up. i am sure there are elements on the ground converging with irgc saying we really need to do it now. and they are just saying, not yet. will be a little bit more pragmatic about our revolutionary militarism. but just because you have a revolutionary mindset doesn't mean you can't pursue it

pragmatically. when you have revolutionary actors who say ok, maybe we need to be a little more patient -- the iranians are very big on supplication when it comes to launching the revolutionary goals. ali: keeping the region on a level of low intensity crisis serves the interest of the revolutionary guard. i do believe it is going to continue. i see that some sunni leaders are playing into the hands of the revolutionary guard. keeping someone detained in prison in bahrain, and there is not a sentence. we see not only a beheading, but

i also heard that he was crucified. these are the policies of some sunni leaders. it is hardly surprising that the revolutionary guard and radical leaders in iran have an easier time persuading the shia people to follow the path of the iranian revolution. host: why is it in the interest of the revolution of the islamic republic to keep the region in a state of low intensity conflict and anxiety? why are they an anti-status quo power? is it about the united states? ali: in order to increase and spread the influence of the islamic republic, in order to operate more freely, you need a crisis. if they are a well ordered society in which there is no political crisis or social

upheaval or suppression of the minorities, then the revolutionary guard has a much more difficult times operating in those environments. this is why the revolutionary guards were not happy with the overthrow of saddam hussein. they want a state of crisis in iraq so they can replace the old order with their own people. so that the moderate saudi shia iraqis would not be a part with iraq, so structure in the saudi shia do not cooperate with the saudi regime. so a state of permanent crisis helps them to attract the support of the shia populations. host: mike, again, without asking you to use your crystal ball, what do you see happening over the next year in the gulf region? mike: let me just start by emphasizing how much i agree with what ali said.

maybe we could draw a conclusion from this. i do believe the obama administration is looking at this mess stretching from baghdad to beirut, and it looks at tehran and sees a stable country that behind closed doors talks the language of regional stability to it, and it thinks wow, if we could just incorporated the iranians into the security architecture, they will work with us to stabilize the region. we don't have to call them revolutionary. they have an interest in stability. the way to think of them is not as pillars of stability, but as actors who are carrying out protection. what do they call with the mafia -- it's a protection racket. they develop instruments to blow things up, and they tell you if you work with us, we won't blow

it up. if you don't work with us, we will blow stuff up. that's how they operate. they don't have the money. they don't have the political skill. they don't have the institutions to work to stabilize any of these regions. we have sold ourselves a bill of goods, and we've convinced ourselves that they do. they don't. host: i don't want to move to far from the subject at hand, but i believe one of the arguments the administration would make, quietly, about syria, is that they don't like al-assad, but the fact is that without him there will be even more chaos. secretary kerry -- that's why the iranians and that's why the russians have been invited to negotiate over serious future. they certainly do believe that it is a potentially stabilizing influence. mike: again, we have sold ourselves a bill of goods. host: but their argument of what the problem is --

mike: i understand the argument they are making, but it's false. let's say our number one interest is to defeat isis. i actually think our number one interest is actually to contain iran, and isis is number two. but how the obama administration looks at it, isis is the strategic threat. we cannot defeat isis unless we have sunni allies on the ground who can help us to take and hold -- that's the important part -- these areas that isis now controls. when we are in alignment with iran and iraq and with the shiite militias in iraq, when we are in alignment with russia and alld in syria, we alienate those forces on the ground. what is russia doing? what is syria doing? they are not attacking isis. they are starving men, women,

and children. that's what they are doing. they are dropping chemical weapons on them. they are going after the opposition elements that the united states themselves have trained. day that the russians started bombing, during the you in general assembly meeting in september, the russians consciously bond -- bombed elements that the u.s. has trained. what was the u.s. response? john kerry met with the russian foreign minister and started talking about de-conflicting. that sends a message to all american allies in the region that we are not going to back up sunnis on the grounds that we had designated previously as our allies. the consequence is, we are not going to achieve -- and i can say this confidently -- we are not going to achieve our

strategic goal of stabilizing the region, and i don't think we are going to defeat isis. all of these countries -- it's not that saudi arabia once isis there or turkey once isis there -- wants isis there or that turkey wants isis there, it's that the alternative is an iranian dominated order. if that's the choice, they will muddle through with isis. president obama brags that he has a 65 member coalition with the most powerful countries in the world working to defeat isis for a year now. this is 20,000-30,000 nasty guys with pickup trucks against the most powerful countries in the world, and we don't have a significant victory to show for it, and why? because we don't have a political vision for the region that is attractive to any of the major actors in the region that we used to call our allies. host: let me ask you one more question before i go to

questions from the audience. ali, it is going to come back to something you were speaking of before regarding the gulf states and their treatment of the shiite communities. i believe the administration has in many ways handled it incorrectly, spoken too much about sectarianism, spoken too much about sunni and shia, and instead, it should see it the way american foreign-policy makers have most successfully seen the middle east, in terms of strategic interest, rather than in terms of sect, right? so, saudi arabia is problematic, but an ally. iran, a revolutionary regime, instead of sunni power or shia power. is there a way, given the way

the region is going, not to put it on the gulf states alone, but is there a way to take away some of the sectarian tension or even to reduce the way we talk about it here in the united states, which i think is not helpful? ali: the stability of the states, the stability of u.s. allies also depends on how they treat their citizens. that was, by the way, one of the reasons the shaw's regime collapsed in 1979. the problem with the saudis is not that they are not modernizers. they are actually enlightened. they have been modernizing their societies extremely fast, but the process of modernization has not had a parallel process of providing the citizenry with with powers tos, control the government of their own -- a process of democratization. this is why the shaw's government collapsed in 1979. and unfortunately, we see this all over the middle east.

this is what the arab spring was all about. the realist argument makes sense, but we also should pay attention to the dynamics of the regimes inside the states. host: i certainly agree with that. i guess i'm thinking specifically about -- ali: shia versus sunni. host: exactly. if we could take that language away. if we could just say, look, we are an ally, but we are worried that you are doing this and that. this is a classical part of u.s. foreign-policy and seems like a good idea. how do we move away from the sectarian language? ali: you need to promote democracy rather than talking about different sects because it is also sunni citizens being persecuted by the state. make some political comments in saudi arabia are thrown into prison. they are sunni, not shia. with theissues

suppression of freedom of religion. those issues make u.s. allies much weaker. and these are good allies. they want to liberalize society. that process, the parallel process, that is creating huge problems for them. in the long term, it's also a problem for the u.s. because they are good allies. that is what we should emphasize, not the sectarian nature of the issues, but the issue of human rights and democratization. phillip: i think both actors are playing the sectarian message. if we talk about how the press handled it. >> the regional press? concerned am not so about that. >> i didn't need to cut you off.

but -- ali: it will not be bad. phillip: unfortunately when it comes to journalism there is a lot of repetition because people want a narrative and it is easier to convey. if you want to produce an article for some woman living in denver, how else will you describe it? it is hard to get in with all the nice nuances. put this in a bigger picture and say, by the way, here is the revolutionary region on this end. i think also those two entities are promoting their own interests and promoting the message anyway. i think now what we are seeing with their region, this is something i follow closely and there is a monograph for washington, about how iran is manufacturing this jihad as if they were defending a shrine

from israelis. it is very hard to pull it back when it starts to embed itself in the populous. state thee islamic and supplied with supplies. you go out with one of these man pads and it will send a message to the populous. it is very hard to escape that. this is coming from the administration. a lot of this is response. when you're stuck in a paralysis, how do we handle it and address it to the american people. so this is the most acceptable way. and when you're dealing with entities, particularly the iranian, they know how to deal with it. they know how to get the message out. when we talk about martyrdom

information, the timing of it and everything is well thought out. i do not want to say, we need another government department to handle this but i think we need a more foresight from this. however they -- how are they presenting it, or should we just roll with it? that is not the best idea. host: that is something that mike work don -- worked on. how the government counters the message. what is the way to take down --level of secretary and secretary and discourse. or the islamic state. mike: i don't think there is any way to avoid it, but i do not think we should base are onrting -- base our strategy

it. you have to be aware of the issues. if you do not, you will make bad policy. what we are doing right now in the united states, everybody riotsunderstand if we had in harlem and the united totes worked with the kkk stabilize harlem. and if they said camilla said we said,ve -- and if they listen, this is what we want to do. we are aligning ourselves with those who are starving the sunnis and getting angry with the saudis when they do not like it. it is ridiculous. we have defined sectarianism in the u.s. government, this is

sunni sectarianism, there has been no discussion, public discussion at all and very little awareness with the jihad. which is sectarianism, but it is also the spread of iranian government influence. militias,create these they arm them, they train them, they offer them report and as -- support, and they in doctrine them. means alternately, what it means practically is submission to iran. what they are supposed to do is all orders given to them by iran and it is very much like the commentary in the days of the soviet union. so if the u.s. wants to tampa

is -- break this down, there iran and not iran. iran can have forces in iran, syria, so let's not talk about sectarianism. we can talk about geography. we will open it up to the audience. wait for the microphone to get to you. you can wait for it, there in the blue shirt. andalk has been about iran you have certainly neglected saudi arabia. the question is, is the saudi regime strong enough or is it too brittle to confront iran?

>> michael? mike: the saudis are any in acult situation -- difficult situation. they have declining oil prices. they have taken on numerous projects, which are costly and have no end in sight. the saudi's are not going to roll over and hand the region to the iranian and that is a signal they are try to send us very clearly. they are going to fight where they have the resources and ability to counter this rising iranian power. deploy they are going to those resources it is unclear, but the idea that they're going to fold up and have no interest

in what happens in syria and neighboring iraq, i think it would be a miss take -- mistake to assume that. >> you have had time there and you are aware of their capabilities. philip: where do they put those resources? with yemen, this is not some way with the ethics gains -- this is not simply within the f-15s. with al qaeda, they have actually killed a bunch of them, but they are a good quite of course -- fighting force. what happened in syria? in have syrian al qaeda there. and a number of gulf states are facilitating that. needse need a vacuum, it filled. they are looking for actors that

are strong, project and know how to kill enemies. it will not be the u.s. with happy moderation, you know what, they might as well turn to them. the second order that comes from it, al qaeda does not like the united dates -- states. if they feel like they have been abandoned, going back to your question on the regime, is it brittle? i do not think so. they are scared. we have a very good security relationship with them. is now what is happening, it collapsing from within. i have seen so many names in the gulf or you will run into policymakers and they will say, we -- they screwed us. what is the result? you share e-cigarette outside -- a cigarette outside, but where do you go? they do not build up so well and

we know that. what happened next? they are not really -- there is going to be less considered for the american point of view. they will be more worried about what will happen to saudis. groupust watched another go into saudi arabia. they say fine, we will back these guys, they know how to get jobs done. it is something that worries me. i have talked to a lot of policymakers, they are not saying, al qaeda is the best and we love what happened on 9/11. they are not. when you are presented with certain options and you try to pick the worst one, i worry that unfortunately they may come to that decision if they feel pushed into the corner and a by enough byns -- corner the iranians. morewanted to make one

point. i agree with everything you just said. but i want to say that i think washington's attitude right now is to point out hardships and to hector -- heckle the saudis and suggest they do not understand their own interests and going down a bad cap. -- path. iran --ne, they have this is an existential threat. it is a mistake to think it is not. iran would like to crack up saudi arabia. if they could. we should keep that in mind, because the saudis see a threat and they will act to prevent it. we willfail at that, then have the crack above saudi arabia and what will the u.s. do? will they sit back and do nothing and let chaos ensue?

or will the united dates feel compelled -- states feel compelled to send in troops? we need to think about that now. that does not mean tackling the saudis, it means organizing something that would prevent saudis from being prebuilt take these actions. host: i wanted to call on a colleague here at heads and, bill. hudson, bill. he has a lot of information about the detainment. bill was in the navy. he understand the details -- understands the details. you can hand it to the gentleman right here. liddy -- ludey. a former naval officer.

i have a general question about the administration's response to the two marrying votes -- marine .oats and the 10 sailors there seems to be unhappiness in the way that the administration handled the response to our sailors. given that the secretary of defense has confirmed that the , they had anducted navigation error and when to -- went into iranian waters, but it appears the seizure violates to happen three well-established principles of maritime law, the first is innocent passage. ships, whether coastal or landlocked, have the right of innocent passage through waters. in this case, the u.s. marine

boats were heading to change a command base, irrespective of they weretion error, conducting innocent passage. a normal country would have rendered assistance at sea and instructed them to leave and a send them on their way. the second credible that naval navalncipal that commanders rely on is that of sovereign unity of warships. a sovereign vessels are not subject to search, seizure or detention of the crew. even in traveling in court or in -- -port or in territorial waters, a normal place whatever just instructed them to leave. while we are not technically at , it is clearly

prohibited the photographing and filming of confessions or apologies for propaganda purposes. this is not a little violation of the law, this is certainly a violation of the spirit. >> i believe tony blair in 2007 when iranians caught british sailors and held them for 13 days, he made the same case. it was a violation in geneva. three principles of international maritime law, these rules are extremely important to u.s. naval commanders. they are vital to the safety of cruise -- crews and the efficiency of operations and they rely on the enforcement and adherence to these rules.

why do you think the administration has not even orched or formally protested even thrown a marshmallow toward the iranians? host: mike? day, the implementation the nuclear deal is about to go into force and you can rest assured any discussion in the white house when this thing broke was, oh no, this could endanger the nuclear deal and we need to make sure that the deal goes through. we should ask ourselves, not how releasediranians sailors so quickly, the answer to that was they want the money. not that this was a fantastic channel with kerry, it was for

the money. with $150 billion hanging in the balance, how come they risked taking -- how can they take that and put it at risk? themr one, we have shown that we will not -- we are so hell-bent on achieving the deal that we will not take retaliatory action and number two, it is the revolutionary guards showing iranians and everybody in the region and s that they are -- and us, that they are in charge. even with $150 billion within they behavedse, like this. you think that they will moderate over the next months, you are mistaken. that it i agree with have to do with protecting the

plan of action, but i do believe that -- mike and i have about role is to have extricated the u.s. from the middle east, not to commit us to more turmoil. i think presidencies that -- president sees that. but whenever it happens, he turns the other cheek. i will not take the bait because this would be a bad thing. the problem is, i think that that does encourage that behavior. actually, i will ask you to round this off. if you can say, in 1988 how did the reagan administration check iranian factions. parallel.w to close a >> when the iranians were laying

mines in the persian gulf, we were ordered to sink to major combat and -- combatants and that is how we responded. there is a question in back. thank you. >> i have a question picking up i have aing -- question picking up on something that could have been alluded to. is there a realistic vision for restoring stability in the middle east that we can commit ourselves to that does not require the tension of -- extension of -- over iraq? so, how do we do that without the u.s. assuming the central dominant presence it had in 2008?

ali: unfortunately, i think that this is a lost opportunity. after the u.s. assimilation of iraq mother was a true sense of optimism. not only in washington, but among shiites. of grandhe grandson ,otal of two -- hetollah because he was critical of the regime in iraq. he was preaching a very different kind of the allergy that we are hearing from the mouth of --. and othersiraqi shia who cannot speak freely in iran, because they have the ideology of the state and the state takeover of religion and the right to suppress the divine law.

they sought asylum in iraq because they considered it a free place where they can think freely and they can speak freely, but most unfortunately because of the guards in iraq, it sank into chaos and the u.s. has returned from iraq and unfortunately we see more or less domination of this in iran. many of the proud schools of theology are now more or less directly or indirectly dominated by money, by theology, by the politics which are dominant in toronto -- tehran . so this is why i am saying, even in the sphere of influence, there should be schools for shias. there should be media, debate, there are many of those who are critical of the regime in iran,

so they can find a safe even and debate freely and develops etiology -- develop theology. kuwait is not too late. and all those societies we need a little bit of freedom for debate. so that people can express themselves freely. >> thank you. you brought up a big point. host: i can give you a small example. phillip: if you allow for more voices to grow, it makes radicals crazy because they believe their interpretation of shiism is the only answer and everybody else is crazy or not following the religion correctly. so, i was looking at hezbollah, i read an article about the independent shiite in lebanon. drove the that

radicals crazy was that there could be scholarship developed in lebanon to teach scholars how to do their jobs. the hezbollah tried to control, they aredo now, um, trying to get control of these clerical voices and leadership with money, through force, people are afraid to leave them. even if they disagree. so i still think, i would like to see the united dates promote this -- states, promote this form of thinking among shiite. this is the narrative form of shiism that was going on until -- host: we know exactly what the administration has done and in lots of ways different societies in iran, the administration cut

back forms of funding and an limit on -- lebanon, the administration cut off funding for different programs they had and did they are very opposed to hezbollah. that is an independent organization and they are opposed to hezbollah. phillip: when you watch this, what do you think it will mean for the future? it is not very sunny. when i look iraq, there is still a good level of control. there is a militia structure. when you are competing against 100 something iranian backed shiite militias that have all of the cash and nobody else's saying, here is some money, political some work, it makes things -- support, it makes things hard. -- whenthe direction shiism was supposed to become

the model. had we counter that? i hate saying this but i would rather just get it out there, it means the u.s., if we are interested, we need to play dirty. it means backing radical element. some of them will not talk to us. look at all solder who had plenty of problems with the iranians. it, if he is not welcome to -- if it means he will cause problems for the iranians. do we have the stomach for that where we will get in into -- get into every microcosm to save iraq? i think we dropped the ball. host: mike? how easy itot know would be to cry southern iraq --

iran.uthern iraq from it is a rising power and it has influenced, but that is because we have not contested it in any way. huge contest it, there are vulnerabilities and we can make number and up to $150 million we are about to give them. and that place to do it is in syria. it is honorable -- vulnerabl.e e. if we topple one, we topple the other. we could give a huge defeat to iran if we started turning up the on them in syria. how many fighters does hezbollah have? seriously, active fighters? not much more than 2000-3000. sometimes you hear 10,000, that is an exaggeration. we could cause them in norma's rmous pain in syria

appeared we just need to train forces -- syria. we just need to train forces. that would send a message into second. -- in 2 seconds. host: the microphone. >> i have a question about iran. when theent is that they is reduced -- given, people will benefit and the economic trickle-down will make the movement stronger. katie please tell us -- could yo u please tell us, is there any hope this theory has any credit? host: we political scientists have a poor record of predicting revolution. [laughter]

host: we did not predict the fall of the berlin wall. ali: we are not able to make those predictions. it is important to know, the iranian society is vibrant and it does surprise us. people go to the street and they protest, the interesting thing is that there is james -- the infiltratemanages to organized opposition activity. but this activity is not organized. people go to the street because there is a sense of anger toward the regime. he cannot predict it. this is why the movement became a green movement. now, i do not have, i must say i do not share this argument because the money was -- or is supposed to benefit the iranian middle us. as well as strengthen security?

it will strengthen the revolutionary guards. we have seen the budget of the military and the militia, it was increased by 20%, this is even before the government got a hold of the money. there was a 20% increase in the military budget. we are likely to see that many of her structure developments, which they will start once they have the money, this will be given to contract firms and they will be hiring private sector actors as subcontractors. that gives more control to the revolutionary guard, not less. been at a, i have debate some time ago, this is -- unfortunately in iran, the spread of technology means no control, so everybody has a mobile phone, but they can

control you more efficiently than ever before. so these things need to be looked at critically and do not make rash predictions to liberalize the system. i do believe that mr. economy -- rihani is viewed as expendable and the elites of iran are looked at as expendable individuals. they are no longer needed because the deal is old, so you can activate these rebellious elements again. public isranian actually going to rise with this mechanism, this we cannot predict. host: a few years ago we spoke about this. you said they need to be careful because, if this deal comes

through, they actually managed negotiations and you will become not useful anymore. they need him -- he will not need him as he was. the gentleman in the back. >> josh london with with zoa. in the short term, the duration of the obama administration, we have a pretty good guess that nothing is going to change. what is the time horizon between now and then of things reaching some kind of conclusion? whereas large or small, rather than folks just treading water and the clay usually -- and occasionally flicking matches. they may decide here's an opportunity to seize and hold an