entry to heroin -- you know, the fastest way to get there is prescription drugs. i cannot get them, i cannot get the oxycontin, and now we have a problem in ohio with another drug. this one.n to this is how wacky this is. thank you if you are die cancer parent -- they are is a drug that they give you if you are dying of cancer. fennell.led they have figure they can take the drug and laser with her when to give you even stronger effects. that means that there are people who are actually taking this stuff, making money, taking it out of the hospital. every time youd get your hands on it, there is another amoeba out here. i believe it is busting the drug dealers, and here is another thing, this is interesting. el chapo. you wait and watch how they try to glamorize the sky.

i like what you said about the multiple messages. today, i havevie watched a couple of movies on the plane that all of the people that are with me, they love these movies, and they are all about violence and drugs. that is what they are all about. it is craft because it keeps sending messages to these young people. it is bogus because it keeps sending messages to these young people. we have this great band, 21 pilots. they know the founder of the band. they do not glamorize any of that stuff. they are good. do you like 21 pilots? [laughter] >> they are pretty good. all about being stressed out. because they talk about how to deal with it.

we will have you made them sometime. [applause] [laughter] i have said enough. i love what these young people are doing. we have to bust these drug dealers. we have to rehab people when they are on drugs. let me tell you, by taking dollars -- frankly, we have moved our addiction services into the prison, and we treat people, and we release them into the community, and our recidivism rate is less than 20%. there are significant things happening, but we have a raging crisis, but we know it now. , ihink we are going to move think we're not going to be here. i think we are beginning to realize it. we have to get the network in place that sends the same message out over and over and over again. if you have better luck with your schools then you ar we are having, you have to tell me the secret.

collegesing into the and universities, and they will be more cooperative because i will make them more cooperative and we need to six more things in the budget to get these local schools. -- stick some more things in the budget to get these local schools. >> work with the kids. >> i think it is great. do you want to say anymore? no. no. no. why aren't you in school today? [laughter] why don't you wrap it up? >> i don't have anything else to say. >> yeah you do. [laughter] oh you have questions. yes? one person, dealing with one other person. the stuff you of want to do, until you get the people whose boots are on the two,d, one-on-one, one on

you will not get anywhere until you do that. >> speaking about dr. king and all that message, we are our neighbors keepers. maybe we do not think we are. but we better be. violence,ether it is wilderness drugs, we better keep an eye on what is happening around us. you are right about that. i wrote a book many years ago, and i talked about what is called the home run theory. with cannot hit a home run the bases loaded, sometimes we think we should not even bat. you save even one last, if you talk to one kid as a time, you are right. you are right. you need to stick your nose and these kids businesses when they are at the restaurant. what you think? playstation of this please don't do drugs, because i do not want to see you get crushed.

stay away from the drugs. you know what my staff tells me, we go to a school, don't tell them not to do drugs because you sound like an old man. who cares? saying that there was one person who does not do drugs and his wife, he may grow and come up with a cure for alzheimer's. and in his lifetime he may grow up and come up with a cure for alzheimer's. you hear that? >> there is a story where he talked to the kids at the high school. one thing that he found is that after he does his presentation, he takes questions. after the program, and everybody files out, they start to come back in and say where can i get help, i have a sister, a brother -- >> heartbreaking. >> we need to have someone there to say here is a number to call, because it is affecting

everybody. >> you know, and when you think about that, the heartache and the heartbreak, this little 13-year-old girl, i am looking at her, and i can see she is ready to collapse. a darwin addict. -- zero win addict. she is 13 years old. i get wet when it would've been like if your mother wasn't -- think about what it would have been like if your mother was a heroin addict. >> tv is very much a part of our school. the work that kids do is in our building. every day. it is a terrific opportunity. i do not know about those oh io superintendence. >> part of it is that the schools have so many things going on, and the open rate has

been pretty good. yourhink i'm standing up saying this, i will not get a bunch of people angry in ohio? you don't think i know that? that doesn't matter to me. this is a crisis. we have the open rate, it is a pretty good open rate. if you have 5000 people on a call, and you get 200, that does not mean we do not have great superintendence out there. superintendents out there. maybe part of it is they do not think they can make a difference. i do not know what explains it. but i do not like it. at it and add it. i give a lot of credit to the attorney general because he thinks about this all the time, as our lieutenant governor does. we just have to do better at --ting people wer why have you paid so much attention to it? >> it is here in our community.

we address how to be a good citizen, and responsibility have as an adult. i think the work that nora and all of the kids here do because their peers listen -- is incredible because their peers listen to them. we got a lot of grief for the presentation, that it was too gory. a number of parents were very upset. i still think was the right thing to do. the message got out there. it showed people at the end of this, that we did the right thing. >> it doesn't matter if they get mad at you. right? >> absolutely. >> 20 going to do? -a hole somewhere? -- what are you going to do, hide in a hole somewhere? like a short. have to be followed up, followed

through. we have to be constantly going. then i think once we get beyond that, because i actually think the prescription drugs is extremely serious. i agree with the other issues. problem,ription drug if we can crank that down over time, i think we will have better results. that is my sense of it. do you agree? >> i agree. i think the coordination between the pharmacies, the pharmaceutical board, the physicians, and the state licensing people is huge. for a number of years, people have acted as islands. if you had your wisdom teeth , here's your prescription, and call me. but they were pretty free and easy. and now -- >> and in our state the medical board looked the other way.

i am pointed a guy named don kenney, and he' does not tolerate any all caps on of our physicians. if you violate hippocratic oath, you are god. interface, the way i understand this is that if you're a pharmacist, and in his report to the pharmacy board, just until not long ago, you , contacte to log out the pharmacy board, and log back in. now we have a pharmacy interface where they do not have to log out and log in. make their lives easier. i think it is catching on. kroger, you don't have kroger up here. it is a grocery chain, it is vague. -- it is big. the ceo of that chain has been awesome. all of the pharmacies are doing this, and we are trying to find out if everybody is doing it.

this interface and this reporting -- the other thing that we did, this was a couple of years ago. i have this lady who runs this department of aging, and she is unbelievable. if you get in her way, she runs right over you. i asked her to meet with all the other prescribers. they originally wanted me to mandate a law on how they could prescribe. i said why don't we get everybody together, anybody who is involved in prescribing, and see if we can get a voluntary situation. when you get voluntary, it will be much better than if you hammer somebody. and that is really great because then you will understand the problem. yes? >> i understand the importance and value of prescription drugs. huge issue that we need to address is marijuana. it is huge. it is addictive, and in a lot of states, and i know ohio just

went through a vote for legalization, it will come up again. this is a very big issue. we see it coming in the back door with medical marijuana. the rights of the state, even though it is federally illegal. that is a huge issue that cannot be neglected. >> i think that is right. when i look at the problem, and where the most acute problem is, i find it in the other. i'm not we did tell you that that does not matter, i was so thrilled with the people of ohio voted it down. use of marijuana is not as trackable as the use of prescription drugs. they setot know when about thc levels and all of that, but i have found in looking at all of the things that we know is the prescription drug gives you the kind of high that you want sustained with heroine. that is what i know. they said exactly what i have not saying, which is you do

want to legalize marijuana because you do not want to send a mixed message, do not do drugs, but this one is ok. one of the perverse ideas about this is we can make money and have more money for a budget if we legalize it. that is nuts to me. aren't you glad i talk the way i always talk? i am not we do say anything different. my wife will say john, tone it down. i do not agree with that. the medical marijuana is a different issue. what i have told people in the state is we cannot use it as a backdoor. doctor or to come to me and there is an element of that that can be used to deal with the problem of seizures, because some of the young people can have 30 seizures a day. think about.ng to

but as control, tightly controlled. i do not know what we want to on that yet. but the other issue is the fact that we can just look the other way, like they are doing in colorado. i do not agree with that, and i'm glad ohio turned it down. >> we have passed the medical marijuana here and it has taken almost three years for to actually get the system in place. but it is very tightly controlled. going to lookably at it because he put it on the ballot, you're likely to pass it even if it has loopholes. our legislature is beginning to look at it. i talked to speaker rosenberger about it. we will have to see what we do on that. i appreciate what you're saying. yes, sir? >> governor, i want to thank you for your time today. it has been about you, and not about competition. you are qualified, i wanted your delegates, so i hope i see you

again. it has been a wonderful campaign. ? by the way, they are coming to treasury. they have already started. jeb, mr. i play on the high ground, he is bringing his negativity and trash and i guess when you have a lot of billionaire friends, you can go ahead and do stuff like that. but it is all half-truths, and that is the way politics is. i have a lot of press around me. they all want to know what are you going to do to break out? what am i supposed to do? lower the bar? and i supposed to be yelling stuff? what about my daughters and my wife? ,y wife said to me yesterday you have seen the family for 20 minutes since the third of january. -- on here being a goofball, that it is not worth

it to be away from them. thatld rather be with being a goofball. if i can raise the bar, and get people to realize that there is a way to improve our country, you do not have to be a yeller, a screamer, or negative, then i'm proud of what i've done, win or lose. when our list, does not matter. i'm going to do my best. we all have feet of clay. i'm not telling you that i do not have the capability of doing something dumb. i'm going to do my best. i believe lies in short, sir. thank you for being a delegate. i want to leave a good legacy. winning election is not all that matters in wife or is a letter people that watch, and one that sees everything. i do not want to get crosswise with him, believe me. >> we are proud of you. >> thank you.

i am very appreciative. last night when we came in there were 50 volunteers at the airport. they got in this car, and they had the headlights turned on. it was like a movie. they shine the light on the volunteers, and i got to meet them all. and i got to talk to them about believing that things can be the way will they hope they are. i've been around politics a long time, and my idealism has not been checked one bit. i am a believer. one of the reporters asked me don't you think that politics is a zero-sum game? it is just the opposite. to solve this business problems and help people to rise. everybody wins. everybody wins. i have to tell you, one of the y isgs that is most happe that we have had some tough court cases in cleveland.

i have encouraged protests, but violence. everybody came together, the ministers, the community, the mayor, the senators, and we have gotten through it, and we are moving to the next thing. that meant that everybody worked together, and so it was a win, win, win. we are going to change parts of the system that we do not like. but we do not want to be driving negativity. that is what i think. i very much appreciate you saying that. last one? then we're going somewhere, but i have nowhere else. today.k you for coming i love what you just said about family and community. you said disapproval of adults is what keeps kids not using, if they know their parents disapprove. we have the schools on board. we also have prevention. prevention out that

is totally underfunded. there is a huge recovery divinity that needs to be embraced and put into the prevention world so we can have one mask community working toward shifting the addiction field at what it looks like. know, when you become president, if you'll put more funding towards prevention, treatment intervention, and recovery, because prevention and recovery are the best things you can get for our money nowadays. >> you don't know this, but i have been absolutely hammered because i brought resources back mentallyo treat the ill, the drug addicted, and the working poor. one of the attacks from jeff is that i did this. jeb is that i did this. i feel great that we did it. we have the resources there that freed up the local community to --in a position where to be where they can treat people. not just those who are poor, but

it is profitable circle to people needed. this is a national issue. both inalance budgets, ohio and in washington. they all said it. pay me now, or pay me a heck of a lot more later if you do not talk about these issues. i want to go back to what she said. it is family, it is community, it is the state. she will tell you that this state is changed because of this crisis. they are now aware of it, and it is a higher and higher priority every day. that is what i hear. of course, i'm going to provide the resources, because we have to win this battle. it is so multifaceted. when the movie comes out on el chapo, don't go. [laughter] -- sorryn penn, that

sean had, you're out of luck. [laughter] [applause]

[captioning performed by the national captioning institute, wiich is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] >> c-span takes you on the road

to the white house. best access to the candidates, speeches,ll meetings, rallies, and meet and greets. we're taking your comments on twitter, facebook, and by phone. and always, every campaign event we cover is available on our website, c-span.org. as i have been letting the campaign this year, it is almost interesting to look at the republicans as the democratic side. that may have some to do either withre -- something to do why there is more interest in these candidates and their books. on q&a, the book critic for the washington post discusses looks by the 2016 presidential candidates. >> every one of them has , andesting stories politicians who are so single-minded in this pursuit of power and ideology could have

particularly interesting ones. when they put out these memoirs, they are just sanitized. , they areetted for minimum controversy. >> sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span q&a. machine to governor rick snyder is expected to discuss his long-term plan to resolve the water problems in flames, which have led to the corrosion of land and other heavy metals from pipes flowing into people's homes. he also discusses his plan for detroit public schools, which is expected to run out of money by the end of this school year. we will have live coverage of governor snyder's speech before the legislature of the state capitol building in lansing, michigan. why coverage at 7:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. the supreme court heard oral argument in a case that could

end the practice of nonunion public employees and us paying s to unions. a group of teachers are challenging unions, alleging that their first amendment rights are violated when they fees toired to pay unions whose opinions they oppose. here is that oral argument. it is one hour and 20 minutes. chief justice roberts: we'll hear argument this morning in case 14915, friedrichs v. the california teachers association, et al.

mr. carvin. mr. carvin: mr. chief justice, and may it please the court: every year, petitioners are required to provide significant support to a group that advocates an ideological viewpoint which they oppose and do not wish to subsidize. abood's authorization of this clear first amendment violation should be overturned, both to end this ongoing deprivation of basic speech and association rights, and to restore consistency and predictability to the court's first amendment jurisprudence. justice ginsburg: mr. carvin, is it permissible, in your view, to allow the union to be the exclusive representative so that nobody else is at the bargaining table? mr. carvin: yes, that's fine with us. our objection, of course, is being forced to subsidize that exclusive representative. the fact that they are exclusive representative impinges on my clients because it disables them from individually negotiating with the school board, but that is justified by the need for an exclusive representative. and that is why, indeed, requiring agency fees in the collective bargaining context is less justified than, for example, requiring agency fees to support union lobby. in their collective bargaining context, we are required to free ride on the union because they are the exclusive representative

and we don't have our own vehicle. so the freerider justification is far weaker in the collective bargaining context than it is in the union lobbying context. justice scalia: mr. carvin, is it okay to force somebody to contribute to a cause that he does believe in? mr. carvin: i wouldn't think, your honor, that you could force republicans to give contributions. justice scalia: yes. that's what i'm thinking. could you enact a law? let's say the national political parties are in trouble so they enact a law that says all members of the republican party, if you want to be a member you have to contribute so much money. mr. carvin: no. justice scalia: is that okay? mr. carvin: no, it's not, and that's because the bedrock principle, as harris made clear, is not whether or not you vividly oppose what they're saying justice scalia: right. mr. carvin: it's because you don't wish to subsidize it. justice scalia: exactly. so i don't know why you're putting so much emphasis on the fact that your clients oppose. it really wouldn't matter, would it? mr. carvin: no. and i don't -- i did want to point out that that's the reason

that they've brought this lawsuit. but no, you're a thousand percent right, your honor. you don't justice kennedy: if you were to prevail, what would happen with private employers in a state which said that there should be a union shop? mr. carvin: nothing, your honor. justice kennedy: and, and because? mr. carvin: because the first amendment doesn't apply to private employers, and because in beck the court established the rules for agency shops based on the statute without any first amendment -- justice kennedy: i think that's correct as a basic distinction. it is true, though, assuming that you have a state statute which allows an agency shop or a closed shop, that that is state participation in the very kind of coerced membership and coerced speech that you're objecting to. mr. carvin: well, i don't, in candor, think that that would create state action under the court's modern jurisprudence, such as moose lodge, where it turns on who is making the decision that is being objected

to. in your hypothetical it would be the private employer. but that aside, as the court made clear in harris, even if it did reach first amendment, there's a serious difference between a grudging authorization or the government permitting private employers to engage in agency shops and the government itself affirmatively imposing them on its own public employees. justice ginsburg: what about the railway labor act? mr. carvin: i apologize. justice ginsburg: the railway labor act. mr. carvin: yes. justice ginsburg: you answered justice kennedy that, in the private sector, this is all right, you can have an agency shop. how about under the railway labor act? mr. carvin: well, as you know from street, you can have agency shops but the agency fees can only go to things that are germane to collective bargaining. in other words, they impose the abood rule in the private sector as a matter of statutory

interpretation, and nothing the court says about -- justice ginsburg: but you don't have any first amendment argument about that, about either the private sector or railroads. mr. carvin: not at all, your honor. we are strictly limiting ourselves to public employees because public employers obviously are subject to far greater constraints under the first amendment. justice kagan: well, one of the points of your public employee cases generally, mr. carvin, is essentially to ensure that when the government acts as an employer, that the government be put in the same position as a private employer. in other words, that the various constraints that would constrain the government when it's acting as sovereign fall away and a different and lesser set of constraints apply that are meant essentially to ensure that the government doesn't use its position as leverage over things it oughtn't to be able to control, but that the government can do the same things that a private employer can. and so why doesn't this fall within that category of things? in other words, you've just said

private employer can decide to do this. that's not a constitutional problem. so too with the government employer. mr. carvin: for two reasons, justice kagan. first, i must respectfully disagree with the premise. none of the court's first amendment says public employers have the same rights as private employers. they can discriminate on the basis of political affiliation. they can even discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. but nobody thinks that public employers can do that. plus which, even under pickering, for example, the deferential review you're referring to imposes greater constraints on public employers than private employers. justice kagan: as i said, mr. carvin, there's a lesser set of constraints. and the lesser set is basically to draw a line and to ensure that the government doesn't use its position as employer to do

things it oughtn't properly to do. but the government, when it's acting as an employer with respect to its employee workforce, really ought to be able to do the same things that a private employer can. mr. carvin: the court's government-as-employer speech and first amendment draw a clear distinction between restricting employee speech, like under the pickering line of cases where there is deferential review, and circumstances such as this where they do leverage the employment relationship to coerce the employee to subsidize or associate with an outside group. justice sotomayor: how is that different? mr. carvin: for example, rutan is subject to strict scrutiny because they are leveraging the employment relationship to force you to associate with a political party. justice kagan: well, that sounds like you're drawing a distinction between restricting speech and subsidizing speech. and i had always thought that these were two sides of the same coin, that compelled speech is no less and no greater an offense than compelled silence. mr. carvin: yes. certainly in terms of petitioners' rights.

but your honor, the scrutiny given to the speech being subsided doesn't dictate the level of speech scrutiny given to the compulsion speech. for example, you can stop unions from making political contributions under the case law, but that hardly suggests you can compel a nonmember to subsidize the union's contributions. you can stop public employees under the hatch act from engaging in basic political participation, but that hardly suggests that you could require a nonmember to subsidize political activity. so there's always been a clear distinction in the case law between those two things precisely because subsidization is an entirely different infringement than restricting employee speech. restricting employee speech is an inherent part of the employment relationship. the employer has to be able to restrict the employees' speech, as this court has frequently noted, or you couldn't have a workplace. plus which we give deferential review because we don't want the federal judiciary micromanaging the literally hundreds of thousands of personnel decisions

that public employers make every day. neither of those concerns is present when you have a categorical rule that requires one set of employees to subsidize an outside advocacy group like a political party or like a union, and that's because you're not involving the federal judiciary in personnel decisions. and it's certainly not an inherent part of the employment relationship. it is, to use your phrase, leveraging the employment relationship to require something that the state couldn't require directly. justice sotomayor: well, why are we treating the government differently than a private employer? you just earlier said, and i think our our cases are replete with the point that as employer, the government can already restrict speech which is, i think, a higher problem than subsidization. we've already permitted subsidization of bar associations, of government programs.

we've permitted assessments on a lot of different levels, so why can't the government, as employer, create a state entity? because this union under california law is a state entity. mr. carvin: no. justice sotomayor: oh i beg to differ. hold on, mr. carvin. i'll get you the section. mr. carvin: sure. justice sotomayor: it says, when recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative, a union assumes an official position in the operational structure of a school. so it seems to me that california tells the union what topics it can negotiate on, it requires them to do training, and in the end it accepts their recommendations with respect to the issues of employment at its own will, meaning the state is

creating the union as part of the employment training and other responsibilities. mr. carvin: justice sotomayor, i think it's important to draw a distinction between having an official position, they certainly do. they are the exclusive representative of the employees and suggesting that they are somehow state actors. if they were state actors, the state legislature could tell the unions not to advocate pay raises. it could tell them not to -- justice sotomayor: oh, in fact, it might be able to do that. if it tells them what they can give the state legislature has given them the right to do that. mr. carvin: right. justice sotomayor: but what would take away from their right to say, no, you can't bargain on these particular topics? mr. carvin: the first amendment. in other words, the scope of collective bargaining is obviously something the state can dictate. it could never dictate the union's position on collective justice sotomayor: absolutely. mr. carvin: well, then, that's my point.

but of course if the, if they were state officials subordinate to the state legislature, the state legislature could tell them, don't advocate pay raises, don't advocate this for health and benefit. justice sotomayor: well, they wouldn't say, don't advocate this with respect to the state legislature, but they could say that's not going to be the subject of discussion at the bargaining table. those are two different things altogether. mr. carvin: well, again, we need to distinguish between collective bargaining and lobbying. justice sotomayor: exactly. mr. carvin: exactly. and here's the point, they couldn't. collective bargaining is unique, because it requires public officials to meet and negotiate in good faith and mediate any impasses with unions. none of that exists in lobbying, for example. state legislators could close their door whenever they want. justice kennedy: aren't charges -- suppose the union has an article or a public relations campaign to protest merit pay. i take it that's a chargeable expense. mr. carvin: yes, under lehnert. justice kennedy: so collective bargaining in this instance

includes this wideranging effort on the part of the union to have a public relations campaign in favor of principles that some of its members that some teachers strongly object to. mr. carvin: exactly, your honor. and my point in response to justice sotomayor would be if they were really state officials subject to subordination by the state legislature, the state legislature could say, just like they could say to their own employees, don't run public relations campaigns adverse to the government. and the key point is, i think they say you can ban collective bargaining, but you can't ban lobbying. but it's important to focus on why that is so. the reason that is so is because we are imposing an obligation on public officials in collective bargaining, that exists nowhere else, to negotiate in good faith with the union. but they couldn't tell the union don't advocate to the school board, pay raises, and things like that. they can simply revoke collective bargaining by saying, just like the state legislature,

the school board doesn't have to listen. so the distinction is between what public officials have to meet and negotiate on, but that doesn't translate into any ability to tell the union what to say or do. the respondents will agree with that. justice sotomayor: but the teachers can lobby. there's nothing wrong with the teachers speaking. mr. carvin: and that's the whole point. the teachers can lobby. they can go to the state legislature. justice sotomayor: just like the union can. mr. carvin: just like the union can. and yet, they can't be forced to subsidize the union's lobbying. however, with respect to collective bargaining, they can't negotiate. so the freerider rationale is much weaker in the collective bargaining context, because the teachers' right to negotiate with the public officials that the union is talking to is extinguished in those circumstances, even though in lobbying, they can engage in their own lobbying, but we don't allow agency fees for lobbying. justice kagan: mr. carvin, you come here, of course, with a

heavy burden. that's always true in cases where somebody asks us to overrule a decision. it seems to be particularly true here. this is a case in which there are tens of thousands of contracts with these provisions. those contracts affect millions of employees, maybe as high as 10 million employees. so what special justification are you offering here? mr. carvin: there are two special justifications, justice kagan. the first one is that this abood erroneously denies a fundamental right. it doesn't expand a fundamental right. and as the court made clear in gant, the right of the citizen not to be subject to unconstitutional treatment outweighs any reliance or predictability interests of stare decisis. justice kagan: excuse me. mr. carvin: sure. justice kagan: you say this a lot in your briefs. but i guess i found it hard to understand that the idea that every time we deny a claim of right, whether it's the first amendment or the fourth amendment or the fourteenth amendment, that that denial of the claim would not have any stare decisis effect.

i mean, we do that constantly. we do that tens of times every year. mr. carvin: but you are asking what if the court concludes that abood was erroneous, what special justification is there? justice kagan: yes. and your answer is essentially you don't need a special justification if the initial decision improperly denied a claim of right. mr. carvin: right. justice kagan: i guess i'm saying that i find that an extremely difficult concept to understand. it would take away stare decisis effect from numerous, i mean, just hundreds, thousands of our decisions. mr.carvin: but justice kagan, with respect, i think the proof is in the pudding. the court has never upheld an erroneous denial of a right on stare decisis. justice breyer: and you think all the fourth amendment cases, in your opinion, are correct. i mean, you know, the police can go search a car, the good faith rule in respect to admission of evidence that was seized unlawfully under the fourth amendment. i read a lot of criticism of those things in the paper.

and it seems to me you could get people who are judges, who are up here, who thought that the fourth amendment should be really extended and, in fact, there should be no rule that gives police any special authority to search a car. there should be no rule that stops any incidents from coming in. i mean, there are dozens of cases where this court has denied individual rights. and you're saying all those cases are now free of any stare decisis inhibition. is that the point, or is it just labor unions? mr. carvin: no, no. your honor, in fact, the fourth amendment is not a hypothetical. that was what gant involved. and gant is the one that i was quoting when it says the right to constitutional treatment outweighs the reliance interests of stare decisis. justice breyer: well, wait. well, what about the eighth amendment? that's a good one. there's an individual right, some think, perhaps, against capital punishment. the court has consistently ruled against it. so i guess if that's ever

considered again, under your view, the court would give no weight to stare decisis. mr. carvin: if the court was convinced that capital punishment was clearly outlawed by the constitution, i think it would be very strange to tell people who were being executed in the future that even though this is an unconstitutional execution, we are bound by our erroneous prior decisions. justice kennedy: well, mr. carvin, let's assume that stare decisis is an important consideration for the court. let's assume that. mr. carvin: sure. justice kennedy: what about the answer to justice kagan's questions about the many contracts, perhaps thousands of contracts? would they suddenly be endangered? would they all be void? could you address that? mr. carvin: there is no reliance interest. these contracts will operate precisely the same, the day after abood is overruled, as they would before. justice ginsburg: but what would happen then? mr. carvin: sorry.

justice ginsburg: what would happen to the employee who said now abood is off the books? mr. carvin: right. justice ginsburg: i want back the agency fee that i was compelled to pay. that was an unconstitutional exaction. so all of the people who paid these fees against their will -- have a right to get it back? mr. carvin: no. no more than anybody had the right to get recompensed under citizens united or the commercial speech cases, once you relied those first amendment speeches doctrine there. as i understand it, the court's analysis prescribes prospectively. that's all we're asking is for prospective relief. it doesn't apply retroactively. and to get to the point, all of the benefits remain precisely the same. they simply, the union's future bargaining efforts would no longer be subject to unwilling agency fee. justice kagan: remember, one, you're assuming that these provisions are completely severable, which i imagine depends on the contract.

but number two, even suppose that they are severable, these provisions are bargained for benefits. the contracts would read differently. the unions would have gotten different things if that provision had not been there. so you're essentially saying that the exact same contract should go forward, notwithstanding that the union has given up things, or has not gotten things, because the agency fee provision is in the contract. mr. carvin: no. again, i must respectfully disagree with the factual matter. the union did not go in and say we would have asked for a 10 percent increase, but now we're going to sell out our members' rights to a 9 percent increase so we can line our own pockets with agency fees justice kagan: for many ways of dealing with their need for adequate funding in order to perform their collective bargaining responsibilities. they asked for this way and not

for other possible ways of achieving adequate funding. and you would be essentially stripping them of this way, and not giving them anything to replace that with. mr. carvin: well again, they didn't negotiate with the employer for funding because they don't get any funding from the employer, they get it from their members. so no position they took in collective bargaining is at all affected by the completely separate issue of how they -- justice sotomayor: ah, but that's the question, isn't it? would it be illegal for the government, as employer or government, to fund the union? mr. carvin: that's what i thought about that, justice sotomayor. it's a very tricky question. under johanns, for example, the government can engage in a lot of speech that it can't compel citizens to engage in. the government, for example, can subsidize planned parenthood, but it couldn't require citizens to subsidize planned parenthood. so in that sense, yes, the government would have far greater leeway. justice sotomayor: so if the union had a way, or something to negotiate, which was right now, the union participates in the grievance procedure and it pays certain expenses for that, it could have said to the employer, we're no longer getting enough

money to be the exclusive representative of every employee. mr. carvin: right. justice sotomayor: so now we want you to fund certain things. that could very well have been part of the negotiation. mr. carvin: not in california, for two reasons. one is the state statute requires agency fees. the employer couldn't have done anything with respect to agency fees. that's all decided by statute. justice sotomayor: i'm not assuming the state of the law as it exists now. i'm assuming that we were to undo and say they can't charge an agency fee. mr. carvin: right. justice sotomayor: all right? california's going to have to respond somehow. it's now breaching the agreement it had with the union. they're going to have to come to some sort of accommodation. mr. carvin: right. and they would excise the agency fees part of the contract. justice sotomayor: even if they did, could they then decide to fund the union? mr. carvin: oh. but that's a separate question. if they wanted to go ahead and fund the union, as i said, they've got some discretion to do it.

i think the one area the government doesn't have the power to subsidize speech is when it's engaged subsidizing political speech in a viewpointdiscriminatory way. justice sotomayor: let's take that aside. i'm talking about the collective bargaining part of the union. mr. carvin: oh, okay. then i'm maybe not understanding it. if the union is, could they subsidize the union's collective bargaining efforts? justice sotomayor: mmhmm. mr. carvin: i think they might be able to, but of course no state -- justice sotomayor: all right. so why can't they assess all of their employees a tax for that contribution? mr. carvin: right. and that was the point i was trying to get to, which is agency fees don't go just to collective bargaining. as we know, they also go to political activity. and i don't think the government could fund political activity in a viewpoint-discriminatory way. justice alito: is there any history in american labor management relations, at least

going back, i don't know what, 75-80 years of employers paying for unions? i thought the union movement was against this long ago. mr. carvin: your recollection of history is correct. and of course, currently no government ever funds unions. just one more sentence. under the nlra, it's a felony for the employer to give the unions money because it would influence the unions, and contrary to the entire structure of collective bargaining. justice scalia: is it a bargainable subject? mr. carvin: excuse me? justice scalia: is it a bargainable subject? i mean, it's a political subject. i suppose you can enact a statute that says the government will fund you, but is it bargainable? is it one of those items that the union can bargain for? mr. carvin: it doesn't exist, it's never existed in american society, and there's no way the public employer, particularly because agency fees as a matter

of statute, could all of a sudden say, sure, we're going to take our taxpayer dollars and start giving money to unions, because they've always been funded through voluntary contributions. if they did become recipients of federal or state funds, that would impose all kinds of restrictions on their speech and other activities that the unions presumably would never have asked for wholly apart from any funding shortfall. justice breyer: i have a somewhat different subject, and i don't know how to get you to focus on this exactly. because i think there are good arguments on your side, and there are good arguments on the other side. when you go into this, it was, in my view, a kind of compromise , i mean, maybe marbury v. madison was wrong. there are people who argue certain aspects were. and the concerns i have in terms of workability are not so much

the details. i guess something would work out in the labor area. it would certainly affect the bar. it would certainly affect the integrated bar. it would certainly affect at least student fees at universities. it would require overruling a host of other cases, i think, at least two or three that i can find, and that's quite a big deal. mr. carvin: it certainly is. justice breyer: and so what is it, in your mind, that you can say from the point of view of this court's role in this society in that if, of course, we can overrule a compromise that was worked out over 40 years and has lasted reasonably well, not perfectly. i guess people could overrule our decisions just as easily. i've had a few dissents. in those dissents i think i'm right and the others are wrong, and they think i'm wrong and they're right. all right? there are a lot of people who think that. do you see where i'm going? i'd like you to talk for a minute, because it is a matter of considerable concern to me, even when i'm on the other side of something. and you start overruling things, what happens to the country

thinking of us as a kind of stability in a world that is tough because it changes a lot. mr. carvin: and i think you put your finger on precisely the same question. i think the principal reason to overrule abood is that all of the rationales offered in support of abood's result directly conflict with other precedent of this court. so by overruling abood, you don't do what you're saying, you do just the opposite. if i could walk through the list for you, the standard of review, the new rationale for abood is it's subject to deferential government as employer review. it's contrary to harris, it's contrary to knox, it's contrary to abood itself, which is huge pickering analysis. the notion that the union's duty somehow justifies agency fees because they've got a duty to represent nonmembers, which we've chatted about, that comes from the dissenting opinion in lehnert. so you'd have to overturn lehnert, which characterizes this argument as turning the court's principles on its head and is wholly unworkable in the

name of preserving another precedent. the notion that collective bargaining doesn't involve matters of public concern, which has been offered up, that's contrary to harris, abood itself, which said it was, pickering, which involved basic issues of school finances, so you would have to strike all of those down. respondents' radical arguments that it's not entitled to any first amendment protection under the employee speech doctrine and under the glickman commercial speech doctrine is contrary, not only to abood, every abood case, and the harris dissenting opinion because everyone recognizes there's some first amendment protection. justice kagan: i mean, it seems to me, i guess we have one disagreement, which is how well abood fits with all of our other employee speech cases, because i think abood fits pretty well. it didn't cite pickering, but it essentially had the exact same concerns as pickering, which was

the employer's interest, the government's interest as an employer, and how that related to an employee's speech right and basically arguing for a balancing test. so really what your argument comes down to is two very recent cases, which is harris and knox. and there you might say that harris and knox gave indications that the court was not friendly to abood. but those were two extremely recent cases, and they were both cases that actually were decided within the abood framework. in the harris case, the parties came here and explicitly asked us to overrule that case. almost all the briefing was about overruling that case, and the court decided not to overrule that case and instead to say that the employees there were simply not public employees at all. so taking two extremely recent cases, which admittedly

expressed some frustration with abood, but also specifically decided not to overrule abood, i mean, just seems like it's nothing of the kind that we usually say when we usually say that a precedent has to be overturned because it's come into conflict with an entire body of case law. mr. carvin: again, i must respectfully disagree. i think the classic justification for stare decisis overturning the case is that subsequent cases have undermined the reasoning and principles there. i think we can certainly agree that harris and knox certainly undermined the doctrinal underpinnings of abood. the fact that they're really recent as opposed to not so recent doesn't change the fact that abood has been overwritten. citizens united pointed to two differing lines of cases in the first amendment area as its principal rationale principal ratione the hudgens v. nlrb case. in logan valley, it upheld something. in lloyd corporation, it distinguished it but not

overruled it. justice breyer: i'll accept that. let me accept that what you can do is you can go through, and you're good at it, and so is the other side. you know, you go through the cases and you draw the line here, there, and the other place. and i'm trying to abstract from that in a very basic way for this reason. i think plessy v. ferguson was a case that certainly should have been overruled. it certainly should have been overruled because it was basic, because it was a right to treat people equally, and there were millions of people who were not. now, you see the level of abstraction i'm working at? now, if i put that same level of abstraction here, i see the following, you will go out this door, and you will buy hundreds of things, if not thousands, where money will go from your pocket into the hands of people, including many government people, who will spend it on things you disagree with. i don't see anything too basic in the lines you're drawing

there. the second thing is, what you said was and it's true employees can say what they want. we're talking about six people in a room bargaining about wages, hours, and working conditions. that's pretty far removed from the heart of the first amendment, and pretty close to ordinary physical activity carried on through words. regulation, if you like. so i can't find a basic principle that's there that's erroneous as in these major cases that we have overruled. and if you have a response to that, i'd like to hear it. mr. carvin: sure. as to requiring people to give money to which they don't wish to give, thomas jefferson said that was sinful and tyrannical. james madison famously said, requiring three pence is the thing. so it's not at all something that we've invented. for example, you couldn't require, as rutan makes crystal

clear, people to give money to a political organization. because money is not money when it's supporting speech, it is association with an advocacy organization. and the compelled association is something that this court has consistently condemned as basic to the abood itself said it's contrary to the most basic principles of the founding, which is to force people to -- justice ginsburg: mr. carvin, do i take it was something that justice breyer said, you didn't respond directly to it. he said if abood falls, then so do our decisions in keller on mandatory bar association, on student activities fee. do you agree that that would be a consequence of your theory? mr. carvin: well, no. in fact, that hypothetical was completely eliminated by harris, which made it quite clear that neither keller nor southworth was in any jeopardy, because the rationale of those cases was significantly different than the rationale of abood.

justice kagan: those cases start with abood, mr. carvin. those cases say abood is the framework, and those cases decide the questions that they decided specifically within that framework. mr. carvin: a lot of cases cite cases, but the question is -- justice kagan: it's not a cite. it's a this is the way we look at mandatory fee cases. mr. carvin: again, i must respectfully disagree. they do have that in common at that level of generality, but there's a key distinction, as harris, itself, pointed out, between giving money to a bar association, and giving money to a union. the key thing is that the bar association is a nonspeech restriction. it's like what the court said in the glickman commercial speech context. the initial association has nothing to do with speech. there, it was regulating lawyers, not advocating on behalf of lawyers. justice kagan: bar associations do things all the time that lawyers disagree with. they engage in certain kinds of litigation and not other kinds of litigation. they take public policy positions on certain issues and not other issues. i mean, i think it would be impossible to make a distinction along that score. mr. carvin: keller struck down

mr. carvin: keller struck down those kinds of activities by bar associations, taking positions on federal jurisdiction, taking position on gun control. it said they could only spend money -- justice kagan: do you think bar associations do, now, nothing that members of the bar could disagree with and find hostile to their own views? mr. carvin: if they do it, and if it's not germane to lawyer ethics or service, then, by definition, it's a violation of keller. so i sure hope the bars are not violating the clear pronouncements of this court. the keller only upheld expenditures that are a necessary incident to their principle role of regulating lawyer ethics and legal behavior. all of the other things that were law-related were struck down in keller. justice kennedy: any jeopardy, if not -- justice scalia: i think that we're talking about two kinds of bar associations. i mean, voluntary bar -- associations get into a lot of

those other things. you're just saying that those bar associations that you're compelled to join as a condition of your practice do not get into those things. mr. carvin: oh, absolutely. if they required me to join the aba, i would have an absolute first amendment right not to do that, because virtually every word out of their mouth i disagree with. justice kennedy: mr. carvin, i see your time is running. could you address briefly the optin, opt-out requirement, an issue which, i take it, is in the case, regardless of the way we rule on the issue we've been discussing? mr. carvin: it certainly is, your honor. and that's because it will only affect the amount that you need to opt in or opt out on. and my short answer, and i am running out of time, is, if this regime is upheld, that means tomorrow the state of california could say every public employee contributes a percent to the governor's reelection campaign unless they affirmatively opt out of doing so. no one thinks, realistically, that's a voluntary decision to give money. there's only one purpose behind that kind of requirement, which is to inflate the governor's political war chest, just like the only purpose behind this is

to, through inadvertence and neglect, inflate the union's war chest by people who really have not made a voluntary decision to do so. unless there are further questions, i'd like to reserve the remainder of my time. chief justice roberts: thank you, mr. carvin. general dumont. mr. dumont: mr. chief justice, and may it please the court -- california understands the first amendment interests that are involved in this case. but the state also has critical interests in being free to manage the public workplace, much like a private employer, unless we are improperly leveraging the employment role to coerce or suppress citizens' speech. so let me try to briefly address why i think, if we are going to have collective bargaining in the public sector, mandatory agency fees can serve important state interests without unduly

burdening citizens' speech. justice alito: before you get -- mr. dumont: if -- justice alito: before you get into that, could i just ask you a preliminary question that came up earlier in the argument? do you think that the california teachers association is an agency of the state of california? mr. dumont: no. i think a union that becomes an exclusive representative, under the perry case, has an official place in the functioning of the school district. but it is not -- it does not become an organ of the state. and that's actually a very important point. precisely because of the company union concern, what's delicate about this, from the state's point of view, is that we want if we're going to have collective bargaining, we need to have a system where there's one representative that we can deal with, and that representative has to be both a good partner for us, from our point of view, but also perceived by the employees as representing their interests, which is why --

chief justice roberts: but it's not -- mr. dumont: we can't take it over. excuse me. chief justice roberts: no. go ahead. finish. mr. dumont: well, which is why it's very important that we not fund it directly, and that we not be perceived as controlling the speech of that representative. chief justice roberts: it's hard to visualize this in a pure employer-employee relationship, when the collective bargaining agreement itself has to be submitted for public review and public comment. that suggests that you're doing more than simply regulating the employment relationship. mr. dumont: well, the public employment context is certainly different from the private context, and that's one of the important ways. we don't contest that. but i think the question is, before you get to the final legislative approval or board approval stage, what kind of system can we have, legitimately, that will be a workable system, both for our employees who overwhelmingly have shown they want collective bargaining, and for the local managers, the actual managers of local governments, of school districts, or of state agencies who need to have the practical

problem of reaching an agreement agreement that will govern -- chief justice roberts: if your employees have shown overwhelmingly that they want collective bargaining, then it seems to me the freerider concern that's been raised is really insignificant. mr. dumont: with respect, i disagree with that. because many people can want something in the sense they view it as very advantageous to themselves, but if they are given a choice, they would prefer to have it for free, rather than to pay for it. this is a classic collective action problem. so when we -- so from the employer's point of view, when we're going to have collective bargaining, we want one union to deal with. we want that union to deal with all employees. and so we require it to represent all employees fairly, whether they supported the union or not. they might have supported the rival unions. they might be in favor of unionism, but they supported a different one. but once the majority has said this is our representative, then that is going to represent all employees. and it's important then, from

the employer's point of view, that that representative be adequately funded and stably funded, so that they can work with us or work with the employer to reach actual progress. justice kennedy: but it's almost axiomatic. when you are dealing with a governmental agency, many critical points are matters of public concern. and is it not true that many teachers are strongly, strongly disagree with the union position on teacher tenure, on merit pay, on merit promotion, on classroom size? and the term is free rider. the union basically is making these teachers compelled riders for issues on which they strongly disagree. many teachers think that they are devoted to the future of america, to the future of our young people, and that the union is equally devoted to that but that the union is absolutely

wrong in some of its positions. and agency fees require, as i understand it, correct me if i'm wrong, agency fees require that employees and teachers who disagree with those positions must nevertheless subsidize the union on those very points. mr. dumont: and let me -- what i'd like to do is to separate out the important public policy issues, which we do not deny crosscut between the public's fear and the realm of citizens' speech and the isolated collective bargaining realm. they do crosscut, but that does not mean that the two spheres are the same. so in the collective bargaining context, what the employer needs is to get one agreement with one group of employees, which we do by having one union. it's a democratic process. the employees get to pick that union. and because it's a democratic process, it's almost guaranteed

that not everyone will agree with all the positions that are taken by the union that represents the majority of employees. from the employer's point of view, we need to get a contract, is to have one representative that can speak with one voice for all those disparate people. now, i understand that you'll be speaking on delicate issues. and the important point here is that outside the context of getting a contract, we do not try to suppress at all the wide or enriched variety of viewpoints that employees may have as citizens. and they can express them in the legislative realm. they can express them at the workplace, just not in the bargaining room. justice kennedy: do unions have public relations programs of -- or newspaper articles, media programs to talk about things like merit pay, protecting underperforming teachers, and so forth? do the unions actually make those arguments, and aren't those chargeable expenses? mr. dumont: the union is engaged in a variety of speech.

some of it is chargeable and some of it is not. justice kennedy: some of the ones i've mentioned are chargeable? mr. dumont: i believe under current law they are. and if there's a need to adjust the current law because the court feels that some of those things are more in the political or legislative sphere than they are in the collective bargaining sphere per se, that is a more of a lehnert question than an abood question. it does not -- justice scalia: well, if it -- mr. dumont: require it would not justice scalia: the problem is that everything that is collectively bargained with the government is within the political sphere, almost by definition. should the government pay higher wages or lesser wages? should it promote teachers on the basis of seniority or on the basis of all of those questions are necessarily political questions. that's the major argument made by the other side. mr. dumont: and your honor, i don't disagree with that. but it does not change the fact that as a government, we have two things that we're doing. one is trying to run a workplace, another is trying to run a government in which the

debate must be wide open, and we would not dream of being able to impose -- chief justice roberts: what you said, you agree with that. you agree with that everything they're negotiating over is a public policy question? mr. dumont: no. i don't agree that -- chief justice roberts: why? mr. dumont: every issue is a public policy question, but i don't want to dispute the fact that many -- that there are deep public policy implications to many of the topics and to the general tenor of public employee bargaining. many of the public -- chief justice roberts: if you disagree with that, what is your best example of something that is negotiated over in a collective bargaining agreement with a public employer that does not present a public policy question? mr. dumont: mileage reimbursement rates or how you're going to have public safety. chief justice roberts: it's all money. that's money. that's how much money is going to have to be paid to the teachers. if you give more mileage expenses, that costs more money. and the amount of money that's going to be allocated to public education as opposed to public housing, welfare benefits,

that's always a public policy issue. mr. dumont: which is why i would say i would not try to draw the line by saying that some part of this speech is not a matter of public concern or whatever term you want to use. what i would say is that when we're trying to run the public workplace, we need to have some flexibility because for us employers, we're trying to reach workable agreements to govern particular workplaces for particular periods of time. and that involves compromise, and it involves reaching some decisions on some of these issues. and many of them are controversial, but we need to have concrete decisions with one group of employees represented by one union to do that. justice alito: where does the state of california think the line should be drawn? a provision of california law, this is section b of the california government code, says that agency fees may be used for, quote, "the cost of lobbying activities designed to secure advantages in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, in addition to those secured through meeting and negotiating with the employer."

is that constitutional? mr. dumont: i don't know the answer to that question. i don't think it's the question presented here. it's not what the union's here -- it's not the position that they have taken in this litigation. and if there is a need to adjust that line, which there might be, that would be a question about where to draw the fundamental line that abood draws. but the question here is whether that line -- justice alito: well, one of the questions is whether abood is workable. so i do think it's relevant to know whether you think that is on one side of the line or the other. mr. dumont: i think there are arguments about why that kind of thing could be considered germane to bargaining. but what is most important to the state here would not be preserving that line. i don't want to concede it, but that is not the fundamental point here. what is fundamental is that we need to be able to run our workplaces, and that involves prescinding somewhat from the broad debates about public policy, which will continue to

go on, but getting particular contracts. chief justice roberts: is there -- mr. dumont: and the particular speech restrictions, if i might, just excuse me. i'm sorry. chief justice roberts: is there any legal argument or factual basis on which the state of california disagrees with the position of the union? mr. dumont: i'm sorry. any aspect of -- chief justice roberts: well, we have -- i'm trying to sort out. we have, as you know, three respondents here, and i'm trying to sort out the different position. is there anything in any way in which your presentation disagrees with the union's presentation in its brief? mr. dumont: i don't think there's necessarily any fundamental disagreement. i think we would emphasize that our interests here are not -- are primarily interests of employees in coming to practical accommodations here. there was a long history in california in the '50s and 1960s

of labor unrest. it led to a commission that issued a report that was very comprehensive and addressed this issue, among others. this issue of agency fees was part of the debate that went into the legislative decision in the early '70s to adopt this system, and we think that was a legitimate legislative decision. justice scalia: general dumont, you are arguing that, and i sympathize with the need of the state to have an efficient system for dealing with its employees, and i can agree that dealing with just one union makes everybody's life easier. why do you think that the union would not survive without these fees charged to nonmembers of the union? federal employee unions do -- do not charge agency fees to nonmembers, and they seem to survive. indeed, they prosper. why is california different? mr. dumont: the federal situation is different. they have very different scope of bargaining. i wouldn't say that it's been established that they prosper.

they have about a 30% membership rate. and from -- justice ginsburg: as opposed to -- what is the membership rate in the california teachers unions? how many are members of the union? mr. dumont: actual membership? i'm afraid i don't know that. mr. frederick may know that. justice ginsburg: because you've pointed out the membership is low in the federal sector. but there is no bargaining about pay, right? mr. dumont: there is no bargaining about pay, that's correct. justice sotomayor: general, there was no factfinding below on this assumption, factual assumption of whether -- mr. dumont: there has been no factfinding at all. justice sotomayor: no factual development. so there's a presumption in the question posed which is that it can survive, but we don't know that factually. mr. dumont: we don't know that factually. the state would prefer not to take that risk, and i don't think the constitution requires us -- justice scalia: you're the one making the argument. it isn't the job of the opponents to show that it, you know, that it will survive.

you're the one that's saying we need to do this because otherwise it won't survive. it seems to me the burden is on you to suggest why that's so. mr. dumont: with respect, your honor, i don't think -- justice kennedy: you have a compelling interest. mr. dumont: with respect, your honor, i don't believe that what we need to show is that the union would not survive without this. from our point of view, the question is are we using a technique that the private sector uses widely that is reasonable from the point of view of the employer and that doesn't impose an undue burden. and let just me say for just a moment about the burden that's involved here, because i don't want to minimize it, but let's remember that there is no personal attribution of this speech here to any individual employee. there is no restriction on any individual employee's speech as a citizen, either in the workplace or out of the workplace. all this speech is workplacerelated, and if it's not, then that's a matter of -- justice kennedy: it's odd to say that if x is required to pay $00 -- $500 for someone to espouse a belief that he doesn't share, that he is now free to go out and argue against it. that means he has to spend another $500 so that it balances

out? that makes no sense. mr. dumont: see, what i would say here is, to me, your honor, this case is very much like southworth, because what we have here is something where it is important to the state to have a system in which we are not the speaker, because that would defeat the purpose of the system. the same way the point in southworth was to have students speak -- justice kennedy: the whole idea of southworth was a public forum. are you saying that the whole purpose of agency fees is to have an open public forum? mr. dumont: no. i'm saying it's to have a bargaining forum, but that it is legitimate when we have compelled association to have that bargaining forum. it is also legitimate to have user fees that fund it. chief justice roberts: thank you, general. mr. frederick. mr. frederick: thank you, mr. chief justice, and may it please the court -- abood correctly held that states may reasonably insist that nonmembers pay their share of costs for the services provided by a union to the government and to all employees as their exclusive representative.

overruling abood now would substantially disrupt established first amendment doctrine and labor management systems in nearly half the country. let me talk about what a collective bargaining is, and how the agreement is struck, and how it evolves over time. because it's not simply one contract where there might be a severability provision, but it is really a system of agreements that are established over time, and a body of relationships that build up. and if you look at the joint appendix, there are several examples of collective bargaining agreements. they are very long, detailed agreements that include a wide range of services that are negotiated between the union and the government. and some of these are monetary. many of these are hot-button issues, to be sure, justice kennedy, but many of them are also mundane issues about health and welfare benefits, what times teachers need to show up, how long their lunch break can be without having to perform a duty, what the policies are for transferring teachers between and among school districts, and these are all basic services that require research, legal

representation, conferring and consulting, communicating with members, trying to ascertain what the positions of all members of the workforce are before the union presents a policy -- justice kennedy: well, i suppose, if that's so convincing, the union can convince teachers to join the union. mr. frederick: well, and, in fact, in california, the overwhelming majority of the teachers are in the union, and it's only a small percentage that have opted not to. but i would go further, justice kennedy, in saying that what we are talking about here are a range of services that they're providing. we're talking about a service fee for the state law that provides for the exclusive representative to be the union when that is voted for by a majority of the workers. and here, this court's cases have distinguished between citizens' speech, where the very teacher who might disagree with the union's position is free to go and speak publicly about that position, and employment speech, where this court's cases have

been extraordinarily deferential to the government in upholding restrictions on what speech employees may make. justice kennedy: but philosophically, if you use pickering in this case, you're committing error of composition. you're comparing a whole group of persons who have their views coerced or compelled against one person that -- pickering is just inapplicable on that on that ground. mr. frederick: well, justice kennedy, i think that it is fair to suppose that the government, in deciding whether it's going to establish a relationship with its workers and were to get input, is necessarily going to be dealt with a cacophony of views unless it comes up with a reasonable system of management to get those views collected and have them represented by an exclusive representative. and that is the basic tradeoff that abood recognized. and i would note that because different states have chosen, based on their history, their culture, their experiences with the labor management system in

the private sector, to come up with different results. and here, i would say that wisconsin and michigan, which recently adopted alterations to their public management sector, established this point. because on the one hand, the legislature in wisconsin decided we're going to do away with public sector agency fees for school teachers and for government workers, but we're going to keep it for public safety officers, police officers, firefighters, because we determined there is a legislative interest in having agency fees. why? the firefighters brief in this case explains that many states don't have safety regulations for firefighters. and so a lot of these regulations end up coming through the collective bargaining process, where firefighters work out negotiated rules to establish what is a safe way to fight a fire. chief justice roberts: and all of that would still survive if the petitioners prevail, unless your basic argument that if you

do away with agency's -- agency fees, the unions are going to collapse and not be in a position to negotiate those safety requirements. mr. frederick: chief justice, the necessity standard has never been the standard when the government is operating as employer or proprietor. it has always been a case that you would judge the agency, the government's decision on the basis of what is appropriate or reasonable. and if you look at it from that standard, what the firefighters are saying here is that it's actually essential to have agency fees, because they are using those fees to benefit all of the workers in the -- in the unit through getting additional equipment that the county may not be able to afford, additional training so what when they're called upon to fight a fire -- chief justice roberts: i'm sorry. they're getting additional equipment that the county may not be able to afford? mr. frederick: that's right. the union members and the nonmembers of the union in their the unit are putting their money together through the agency fee process so that the union is supplying -- justice breyer: there's something other than that. that would be the same as justice scalia's question which raised an issue, and we heard it

before. your last colleague mentioned this. california needs this rule that it has, because it wants, on the other side of the bargaining table, a coherent group of people to negotiate for the workers on wages, hours, working conditions, et cetera. now, the chief justice said, i can understand that argument if the alternative is the union is destroyed, because then there's nobody. and you say that that argument's a good argument because they're going to buy fire trucks and some other things. is there anything else that backs up that argument? mr. frederick: sure. justice breyer: i think it's important, and i'd like you to explain it. mr. frederick: yes. the flip side is that the state briefs and the city briefs that have been submitted in this court note what happened when the agency fee process didn't occur. in new york city, for example, there were strikes that were occurring all of the time until an agency fee system was put into place, and that enabled the city to better deliver transit

services, school services, and the like. so you have both the positive story by -- justice scalia: i don't understand that. i just absolutely don't understand it. why would agency fees enable the city to do things that it couldn't do before? mr. frederick: because it enables all of the workers to know they are making a shared sacrifice for the purpose of working together to establish a coherent position with their employer. that's -- justice scalia: you say that, but it doesn't mean anything to me. mr. frederick: i understand -- justice scalia: you have a union bargaining, and the city says no. and you're saying that if there are enforced fees to the union, the city will say yes? mr. frederick: no. what i'm -- justice scalia: i see no connection whatever between what the city is willing to give in collective bargaining and whether you have agency fees. mr. frederick: justice scalia, all i can report on in the absence of a factual record, because this was basically brought as a facial challenge, is what is in the amicus briefs. in cities, states, school districts, hospitals that are

managementside have supported agency fees because they find it to be a more workable system by having -- chief justice roberts: well, i -- mr. frederick: employees buy into the policies that are being established chief justice roberts: i mr. frederick: through the collective bargaining process. chief justice roberts: it sounds to me like your argument cuts exactly the opposite way. the problem that's before us is whether or not individuals can be compelled to support political views that they disagree with. and you're saying, well, the reason they should be able to, because if they do, then those political views are going to prevail. they are opposed to particular funding. that's why they don't want to join the union, because the union is pushing that. but you say you should force them because then the union will prevail, contrary to the objecting employee's views. mr. frederick: no. what i'm saying, mr. chief justice, is the states can make rational and reasonable judgments that for their workability of a system, they can have an agency fee process. abood recognized the very federalism interests that are at stake here, where different states have different experiences, and this is an

opportunity for the states to draw upon those distinctive experiences in coming up with a system that's fair for everyone. justice ginsburg: mr. frederick, you didn't ask for this judgment. it was thrust on you, this judgment on the pleadings. you did say you wanted to make a record in the district court. if you had had that opportunity to develop a record, what would you have put in it? mr. frederick: well, the first thing i would have put in, it would have been a response to justice kennedy's question, which is that ms. friedrichs has said publicly she's happy with the positions the union is taking on pay. it would be anomalous to suppose that we're going to decide a case of this kind of constitutional import with a lead plaintiff who has said publicly she agrees with the union's positions on pay. chief justice roberts: can you -- do you think you can find one employee who doesn't? mr. frederick: no. i think that that's the point,

i think that that's the point, mr. -- chief justice roberts: you don't think. mr. frederick: no. i think that there are undoubtedly issues in a hundred-page collective bargaining agreement in which reasonable people can say, we don't like where the bargain got struck. but the point here is government workability and assessing the reasonableness of the government's position. justice breyer: do you think you can -- i mean, obviously one thing that's come up is i know that you're right on this, the thaler law was a mess. it was strike after strike. but what you would like to show is that that approach, compared to the assessment of wage, hour, and workingconditionrelated fees, that the latter makes an improvement in the coherence of the union's position, and therefore there will be fewer strikes. that's something like that is what you're arguing, and i would guess that people would have written articles about that now, and if that's so. mr. frederick: well, justice breyer, i guess the question is, are you going to decide a case of this constitutional significance on the basis of a

hypothesis based on -- justice breyer: all right. my argument to you was, do you want to put information in the record on that point? mr. frederick: i think that is a one of many points that a record would be helpful, but let me just say that we're talking here -- justice sotomayor: mr. fredericks, this is the -- justice kennedy: mr. fredericks, we, i suppose, mr. fredericks, we could assume that a state is always benefitted and is more efficient if it can suppress speech. mr. frederick: and your decision in garcetti, justice kennedy, allowed for the suppression of the speech by the prosecutor who -- justice kennedy: that was in the workplace. it doesn't apply to merit pay. it didn't apply to the protection of underperforming teachers. it didn't apply to classroom size. it didn't apply to educational objectives. mr. frederick: those are all classic workplace situations. you are talking about workplace -- justice sotomayor: can we go back to this issue of burden? there are a lot of assumptions

underlying your adversary's position, whole set of questions -- can the union survive? hold on. i have about 10 of them. is it necessary? and your adversary says you or one of my colleagues has said you bear the burden. but this is an overturning of a decision on stare decisis, isn't it? mr. frederick: that's correct. and the point -- justice sotomayor: and what burden do you have, or is it your adversary who has to show no reliance interests that the foundation is wrong, et cetera? mr. frederick: we submit that, given the four-decade history, they have the burden to demonstrate that the way the system has worked would be unworkable if it were to be if were to be sustained. and justice kennedy, back to your point. i appreciate that a prosecutor's memo might be viewed in your eyes as workplace speech whereas the teachers' position about what size the classroom might be may not seem the same way as workplace speech.

but from the government's perspective, i think you have to assess that on the basis of the reasonableness of the system >> you are again talking about a whole class of persons whose speech has been silenced. not just one person. big difference. >> their speech isn't silenced. they are paying a service fee so that an exclusive representative can negotiate their health and welfare benefits, mileage reimbursement, voluntary teacher transfer policy. the question about when teachers have to show up, how long their duty-free breaks are during the course of the day. these are all relatively mundane points i think you would agree with me. and there is nothing in the agency fee process that suppresses the ability of teachers to speak out publicly, because the law itself allows for merit pay to be a subject of bargaining if a mine orte of the teachers can convince the majority if this is a position.

>> counselor, i think you you would agree we are dealing with some sensitive and important constitutional issues. what is the burden on the union that counter ways, requiring opt-in as opposed to opt-out. then you ensure that people are making a conscious decision about supporting a union before they are compelled to do that. >> on the second question, we think the decision should be affirmed. here there was basically no burden on the person who wanted opt out, that that was in itself a core question. >> would you say it is easier for a person to check a box saying i opt out. it is also easy to check a box saying opt in. >> in a system where the overwhelming majority, and we are talking about more than 90% of the people who are paying the fees to support political

activities. it is straightively much easier to count a smaller number. the question is whether the suppression of their constitutional rights is such -- is to rise to the level of come pullings. here we would submit that where there is a one page check box, they can send it in, they are ability, and every petition on the other side has successfully opted out of paying those. that the burden is on them to show that the government has made an unreasonable choice as to the kind of administrative scheme to be established. >> opt-out is not always as easy as you say. in one of our prior cases, anybody who wanted to opt out had to send a certified letter in a certain period of time. what if a person says i never want to pay. what is the justification for saying that person has to opt out every single year? >> let me say that perpetual opt-out is not an issue in this case, and had it been raised it

may well have been an acceptable way to do it. that has not been argued here. if it were to be argued, there are reasons why that might be appropriate, but here having an annual process to follow this court's hudson decision, where the union is required on an annual basis to provide notice on things that are chargeable and not chargeable, it allows more flexibility. >> thank you, counsel. >> first in the four decades that it has been the law, this court's juries prudes in the

area of employment relations has converged in a way that fortifies its foundation and does not erode them. what those cases have recognized is when the government is acting as employer, manninging the work force, it should receive reasonable review in order to give it the latitude comparable o that of a private employer managing work forth and not the scrutiny when a government is a stofert regulating citizens. states have enacted and enforced laws that allowed public employers in those stays the same latitude that congress gave employers to decide work place conditions, whether work place environments will help them achieve the purposes for which they adopt collective bargaining agreement. it goes deeper than the laws.

in those states, the agency fee requirement has woven its way into the fabric of the relationship between workers in management and the public's fear. in those states, the unions have taken on such obligations as training and the like, funded by agency fees that make the work place more effective for management as well as more effective for the employees. and if you were to take those away, you are going to disrupt those long-term relationships that have developed over time and the expectations that have developed over time, and you are going to replace them with a different kind of a situation had in which the union is going to have a different set of-in ntives trying to ensure that the max number of people are going to pay fees. they try to convince employees that they need the union because otherwise, management is going to do them harm. i think that is a significant

problem here from public employer perspective now in a time of budget area constraints, where difficult decisions have to be made and cuts have to be made. it is of great benefit to the employer to have the union participates in those judgments so that they are perceived as fair by the work force and so that the union in effect vouches for management with the work force and prevents disruption. so i do think the reliance interests go deep here. the third point i would make is that we are talking about overruling a precedent of 40-years standing. there needs to be a showing of changed circumstances it seems to me. with respect to the question of the role that agency fees play in the process, i think it is quite important, and this goes to a point you raised, scalia. abud has never said that agency fees are necessary to survival.

it couldn't have said that. ruled as it did, cap hartley had not on the books for decades. what congress had said with respect to the private sector is that employers get to choose. they get to decide whether the agency fee will help them acheechoo their work place goals. what the court set in abud is that public employers ought to have the same kind of choice to respond to work place needs and conditions. >> the fact that abud has been around for 40 years, does it affect your point at all that the main justification for abuk is being advance today is one that it did not adopt? justification is way hear most prominently.

>> what i said at the outset is the key point. that this court's first amendment law in the public employment context has over time converged with abood in the cases generally have recognized that when government is acting as employer, it has interest that if government were acts as sovereign regulating citizenry wouldn't justify. >> pickering is the heart of your argument, so i do want to ask you a couple of questions about it. is it different from the situation here in several respects, one owusu brought out. the pickering cases brought out the difference of a single employee after the employee has made a statement to which the employer objects. his is a prospective rule that

applies to a huge category of employees. the second is whether restrictions on what employees can say are the same as compelling an employee to make a statement or subsidizing a statement. so as to the latter, there are circumstances, are there not, in which the department of justice could terminator take an adverse employment action against a d.o.j. employee for something that that employee says as a citizen on a question of public concern? that could be done, could it not? >> yes. >> there any circumstances in which the department of justice could compel an employee to make a statement as a private citizen? >> i can't think of one, but that goes right to the difference, right to the difference between government acting as employer manninging the work place, and government

acts as sovereign managing the citizenry. that would say that is not government acting and imagining the work place, that is government leveraging its control over the employee, acting as sovereign, and that would get scrutiny. that is the key. we are not arguing that abood applies to it's own terms. there is something that under lace it. if you look at those, what those cases all say, contrary to what my friends say is that when government can show the political affiliation is a reasonable requirement for the effective performance of the job in question, that affiliation requirement can be upheld. that again is not exacting scrutiny. it is reasonableness. every case lines off that axis. that is the key point about pickering. if i could i just want to address a couple of others points -- >> when a union is bargaining of public er

concern, you are saying that is not the same as comments on a matter of public concern? >> no. i am saying it occurs in the matter of a collective bargaining relationship, which has to be subject to a different set of constitutional standards. it has to be. with respect to collective bargaining, there is is a specialized channel of communication. the government controls who can speak, what discussion is going to occur and what topics are discussed. >> nobody denies that. the problem is that it is not the same as a private employer. that what is bargained for is in all cases a matter of public terest, and that changes the situation in a way that may require a change of the rule. it is one thing to provide it for private employers.

it is another thing to provide it for the government where every matter bargained for is a matter of public interest. >> i guess what i would say about that, is what i read this court case as saying in the employee speech context, in the context, ffiliation yes, it is not wholly free of independent scrutiny, but recognizes the government's interest and prerogative as employer, you apply reasonableness at not the exactly requirement as a sovereign. >> you may know. the case in which any government as employer is most likely to want to control what the employee says and where he has the right to do that is likely to be a case that involves the institution's job. i.e., the public interest. >> yes, certainly. that is why i think -- there

was no doubt in garcetti the speech was a matter of public concern. i could say that in any number of cases. that is not the distinction the court has drawn. the distinction the court has drawn is the government acting as employer a workforce and government acts as sovereign of a citizenry. i say that distinction applies with equal force here, and especially giving the stare decisis considerations, that ought to golf channel the court's decision in this context -- on to govern the court's decision in this context. what this court has recognized through all the public employer context is the same principle for which abood stands. >> you seem to' cueto government subsidy with government speech. do you think our cases give government subsidy the same compelled they give

speech or come pellmanned silence? >> what i would say about that is that in this context, the subsidy goes to the process of of contract formation and contract administration within that collective bargaining process i described earlier. the first amendment standard has to apply. >> thank you. three minutes, mr. car vin. >> as to the absence of the record here. it is important to point out we gave them an answer where they could make any allegation they wanted. at page four of their opposition, it said the unions do not oppose the entry of a judgment on the meanings. why is that? it is their burden to argue that agency fees will lead to the demise of the union. but they didn't make any such allegation in their answer or any such response to just

disginsberg's question. that is because they can't make such an allegation in the real world. how do we know that? 25 states prohibit agency fees. read it. the federal government doesn't allow agency fees, and only a third of the members are union members. yet that union survives. here we have 90% union membership, and mr. frederick said 90% of the non-members continue to contribute. so the notion that anything could happen adversely here simply doesn't square with things. the notion that abood put forth that some government policy in favor of agency fees is contrary to the fact. it prohibits agency fees if the state prohibits. so it allows states to prohibit fees, and preempts states that

seek to require agency fees. not only with respect to its own work force, it is contrary. there is a stark difference between single personnel decisions and group decisions. mpeu makes that quite clear. in the pickering context when there was a general rule with respect to outside honor romero, the court made it clear that the burden of justification is much higher. they can't possibly show that agency fees will lead to the end of the union. and contrary to my brethren, that is the only thing that matters. we are talking about the government's interest as an employer. all they care about is having one union instead of two so they only have to speak to one person. they kopitar care about how robust or effective this union is. indeed if anything, they don't want them to be effective because nobody wants a strong bargaining partner that is did go to drive up public

expenditures. >> so what do you do with the law enforcement people who submitted their brief, who said the union's actually do training, they provide uipment the county can't afford with fees. what the general has been saying is we have to leave it to each state to decide. because with this kind of agency fee, there are things that unions can do that we would choose not to do. the unions in california do teacher training. >> exactly. and they do fire training. they do safety training. can you think of something that is more a matter of public concern, more important? yet they dismiss these. they are basic to our democracy, and that is why we have an absolute right not to subsidize it. >> why? if you are receiving the benefits of it? it is your benefit. you may disagree with that

judgment, and you can speak about it, but why is it hurting your first amendment right if you can speak? going is a great on debate in education reform today. they have the right to take their side of that view. what they don't have a trite to do is demand that the other side subsidize their views on these essential questions of basic public important. >> thank you, counsel. the case is submitted. >> on road to the white house former a palin, the aska govern and will endorse donald trump. it provides mr. trump with a potentially significant boost just 13 days before the state's caucuses. they say her support is the highest profile back fog a republican contender so far.

look for live coverage at c-span.org coming up at 6:00 eastern. omaha.com reporting that michigan government rick snyder is likely to dwote much of his state of the state speech to the drinking water emergency that has put flint's residents at risk. t is contaminated with heavy metals. online coverage of the governor's remarks live from lansing at 7:00 eastern here on c-span. and more live coverage. attorney general lorta lynch will be on capital hill to answer questions about the president's executive actions on guns. a presidential subcommittee will hear from her, efficiency and gun control advocates about implements the rules. that is 10:30 a.m. eastern

tomorrow morning here on c-span. we covered a discussion today looking at federal land management in person states and the potential for the transfer of control of those lands back to the states. it was held at the heritage foundation. we will watch as much as we can before heading live to michigan for that state of the state at 7:00 eastern. >> we have to push it this week, i guess. >> good afternoon. welcome to the heritage foundation. we welcome those who join us on our hire taj.org website on these occasions. we would make our in-house guests to make sure cell phones have been silenced as we prepare to begin. our internet viewers are reminded that you can submit questions at any time, simply

e-mailing speaker @heritage.org. hosting is becky norton done lob, vice president for external relations. he over sees heritages outreach nationally and internationally to policy organizations, leadership organizations as well as policy activists. prior to joining heritage, she served in the cabinet of george allen. she has been a senior official in the ragan administration, serving in the office of presidential personnel as the deputy assistant director and special assistant to the president for a cabinet office. for purposes of today's program as well, she was deputy undersecretary of the department of the interior and assistant secretary for fish, wildlife and parks. please join me in welcoming becky norton done lob. [applause]

>> thank you very much, john. and let me add my words of welcome to the group we have here today on behalf of the heritage foundation. you know the heritage foundation is an organization, a research and education organization that spines its policy roots in the constitution of the united states of america. i think that is a very important point when it comes to having a discussion such as the one we are going to have today. we think that if you are an orangist, that you -- originalist, that you don't look to prior court decisions. you look to the constitution, and what does the constitution in how we should behave and act in this country today. we have a great conversation hat we are going to have today . it is one that we need to have more often these days given the challenges that we are facing and given the opportunities that we have. it is certainly particularly

timely. it is my privilege to introduce the person who is going to moderate the discussion today, southerland eum -- has been active on the background and legal work done on this very important issue of o should be in charge of the lands in several states. it has done a lot of the support of the legal work. it also is the home of let's say the face of this battle these days. ken ivory is also with us. tan directs the sore land -- and coordinate eights the institutes office. he has a tall order because we

have a whole table full wonderful speakers. let me introduce stan who will take over from here, introduce our speakers and make sure we have a robust discussion. stan, welcome to the heritage foundation. [applause] >> my sip sear thanks to john and becky -- my sincere thanks to john and becky and to the colleagues no having me here today and hosting this important and timely discussion. america is a land of promise. the american promise asserts that government exists to secure equal opportunity, fundamental fairness and the inalienable rights of freedom, the right of control of property and the right of individuals to determine their own destiny. to protect life and liberty, but to take away the right and control of property, which is the fruit and the badge of that liberty, is to shatter this promise, leaving states and their peoples as second-class citizens. at this point in time in

january of 2016, the federal government still controls more than 50% of all the lands west of the rocky mountains. but less than 5% of the lands east of this continental divide. this inequality and fundamental unfairness breeds political exploitation, harms the environment, depresses communities, stifles national opportunity and undermines our constitutional system where self-reliant states provide a double security to rights of the people. our history attests that until we realign with the american promise, there will always be dissidence, discord and frustration. the solution is for congress to transfer all multiple use federal lands for more effective local care, management and leadership. today, presenting overviews of the legal, environmental, economic and taxpayer impacts of this inequality and fundamental unfairness, we will

be hear from robert nelson, matthew anderson, ronald rotunda and from mr. george wi -- wentz. the we will talk about work to work to he remaining be done to redress these problems. following that we will take questions and answers. well first take a look at the environmental elements. bureaucracy ands has a policy of land over people. particularly in the state of utah and throughout the west. among the most articulate and persistent voices addressing these issues is dr. robert h. nelson in the school of public policy at the university of maryland. professor nelson? [applause]

>> well, i'm pleased to be here. this is an important meeting, and it seems as though we might be on the verge or hopefully on the verge of some major new developments on the public lands. i am going to talk actually more about history than economics even though i am an economist by training. but i've long had the view that a historical perspective is critical to public policy making. i will start with a little then al history and present a broad picture of public lands history. it will have to be very broad given the amount of time that i have. anyway, i came to the interior department as a young staff economist in the office of the secretary of interior in 1975. one of my first assignments was to study the grazing program. not having been raised in the rural west, i was surprised to

discover that the federal government was deciding the specific pastures where cattle should graze in various specific months of the year over tens of millions of federal acres in the west. it struck me it hardly looked like a federal question. i was wondering what we were doing. and then later i looked into another thing that influenced my thinking, which was the financial aspects of western public land management. i looked at the grazing program . grazing fees were bringing in about $15 million a year, while the cost of the grazing program $100 million a year. this was symptomatic of the federal lands presence in the west. by the early 1980's, i was arguing, still in the interior department. and a surprising number of my economist colleagues even in the interior department agreed

with me that we should simply get rid of much of the federal lands in the west. not the national parks, but the vast areas of what you might call ordinary public lands or multiple use public lands. since public recreation was the most valuable use of these lands, i proposed to give them away to the states. this was in the early 1980's -- where easy public access could be maintained. privatization i came to understand was a sure loser. at that time werners complained that saudi sheiks would become their new landlords. so i was encouraged when ronald reagan declared he was a sage brush rebel in 1980. this is when i started learning, however, that things could be complicated. i didn't interact much personally with james watt, but the head of my office did.

so i had access in that way to watt himself. but he said based on his information that the states did not really want the land. they were concerned the management cost would be too high, so the man transfer ideas and proposals of the early 1980's went nowhere. i decided to take a longer strategy of thinking and writing about the future of public lands. if any major public land reform is going to happen, a lot more public knowledge and understanding would be necessary. i've been working on this project now for more than 30 years, including three books. one in 2000 with the title -- a case