announcer: a debate on the u.s. use of drone warfare. road to the white house coverage continues with john kasich holding a town hall in clemson, south carolina. and jeb bush talking to voters in the columbia city. and live from las vegas, with a campaign event from hillary clinton. the chicago council on global affairs hosted a debate on the military use of drones as part of u.s. counterterrorism strategy. professor university mary ellen o'connell blames

jones strikes. coll defended the use of drones. ivo: good evening, ladies and gentlemen. on the half of the council for global affairs, i am delighted to introduce our distinguished panel tonight. i look forward to a spirited that isn an issue answerly without a clear to right and wrong. and others, we are thrilled you have taken time to come here tonight. thank you. as you are aware, in recent years, drones have become an important weapon in the war on inror, conducting attacks afghanistan, pakistan, and beyond. the increased use of drones for targeted killing has become an

increase controversy. many questions arise both at home and abroad. this is a particularly interesting debate for me. as a former infantry marine corps officer, both the pros and cons of this debate -- and of drone strikes in general -- hit closer to home them probably for the general audience. on the one hand, drones are quite attractive. they provide the capability to have me here or true -- near or true reconnaissance coverage, and issue strike coverages on criteria being met, all are removing the risk of a downed pilot scenario. by the way, which would inevitably lead to hostage rescue situations. hand, there are

very real second and third order consequences from these strikes. collateral damage may be lower than the alternative, based on analysis from academics as well as the cia, the potential increase in the actual overall number of strikes makes these consequences very real. because when we talk about collateral damage to we should be very clear what that means. we're talking about civilians. so each person needs to ask him or herself, you know, how many future enemy combatants and we actually created through these actions? so clearly, there is much more to account for when debating drone strikes. much lesst debatable, drones are here to stay. according to the intelligence review, the market for military drones is expected to almost double to over $10 million.

given this, we must grapple with them, their effects on our as well, our society, as political and legal frameworks. so tonight, i'm truly looking forward to an in-depth and informative discussion on the topic. you all have biographies on your chairs. so please allow me to briefly introduce the panel. director alberto coll, of the european and latin american legal studies program collegel university's of law. previously, he served as dean as principle secretary of defense. o'connellmary ellen is a professor of law at notre dame university, where she also does research on international dispute resolution. she previously worked for the u.s. dod in germany, as a professional military educator. our moderator tonight's

ivo daalder. he is director of european affairs at the national security council. so without further a new, ladies and a moment, please join me and welcoming the panel. [applause] ivo: thank you for the very kind introduction. and for setting the stage for the issues that we're going to be discussing in the next hour that yout dilemmah have sketched out. we are just talking about the drones that are going to delivering your packages next week or that your kids are flying in the backyards. or at least mine are. we are talking about a particular kind of drone, armed

and capable of inflicting harm on people who are capable of striking with military weapons. these drones, they came and were developed as part of our counterterrorism strategy. the idea of actually putting a missile on a drone came from the desire by the united states to target a single individual. osama bin laden, who was in afghanistan. and this was well before 9/11, it was actually done during the clinton administration, and spurred by both the agency, the cia, and the defense department. but encouraged her very much, by people inside the white house. so it was very much thought of in terms of a counterterrorism strategy. the employment of these systems in the last decade's plus, really since 2000 an01, has

raised a whole host of issues. issues that are important for us to understand, because whether we like it or not, these systems are with us. they are here today, and they're likely to be here tomorrow. and more and more people will have the capacity to decide when and how to use them. they raise fundamental issues of morality and ethics, issues of effectiveness and military strategy, and issues of legal that the legality of the use of these weapons. particularly, when it comes to killing civilians in a foreign country. but possibly in other ways. so, that is what we will be discussing today. debatesomewhat of a format for the two participants here do not necessarily agree on every single point when it comes to the legality of the use of

these systems. the unarmedioned vehicles, drones that have been around for a while. they were used by the u.s. first in the military in the 1990's. they were then armed for counterterrorism in afghanistan in 2001. after a whole variety of other theaters, afghanistan and pakistan and the middle east in libya and yemen, and in other places, it is not just the united states that has these capabilities. increasingly, other countries are using and employing these weapons, as well. so, here is how we will have our discussion. i will say nothing. for about 10 minutes. willse our two panelists each have five minutes of introductory remarks.

we will start with faster o'connell and move on to professor coll. light, andave a red orange light, a green light. but let me tell you, we are going to try to stick to these times so we can have a little discussion. o'connell: i am a law professor and irishman was a speaking for five minutes will be challenging. just two years ago, we were so focused on the drone. i attended a wonderful conference from tom durkin who is here. some of you may be asking why we're still talking about drones? isn't isis the only issue on the agenda? i think you are right to ask that. but in my view, the comments i want to make, i will bring these two topics together. a policy ofink

counterterrorism that soaking to focus on and use the drone has been, in part responsible for the rise of isis. isis came up from, according to the cia, nowhere. but of course, they were around. just did not watch as they were focused on using drone killings. drones that terrorized the , note who are affected just the targets, but those who have to live under the constant threat of attack. and they are open to the recruitment by groups like isis, when they say, the people who sent you the drones are our enemies and we are going to train you to fight them. in fact, the drone has become the single biggest recruiting tool for islamic terrorist organizations since guantanamo was used for that purpose. actual may be the success of isis, and self. reliance on drones has

distracted the u.s. from pursuing other, more effective counterterrorism measures. it has distracted the cia from intelligence gathering, and they are associate with destabilizing the governments we need in place to oppose groups like isis. the focus on drones squanders precious resources that could be used to a college far more good, especially in establishing conditions for greater global security. drone use models violence. and in defiance of the rule of law, as an acceptable means to a competent positive goals. in a world awash with conflict, the u.s.'s failure to develop alternatives to the unlawful use of drones has helped give rise to groups like isis. lay out thebriefly law that i am talking about that we have defied in using drones.

then spend a very brief moment, with more evidence on the negative consequences of that defiance of law. the drones we are talking about tonight our military drones only, as ivo said. the ones we used the reaper -- which is the main drone in our arsenal now that fires only one weapon. the hellfire missile. it was designed by lockheed martin to kill tanks. this is not a police weapon. if you're going to use a weapon like that outside the u.s., you have to meet the rules of the united nations charter. these are the rules for the force which are binding to the u.s., a full party in the u.n. and to other rules of international law. the charter says that all use of military force is prohibited,

with two narrow exceptions that are in the charter, itself. the security council can authorize force, which it did most recently in libya in 2011. or a state may use force in self-defense to an armed attack. occurs, thatttack is what the charter says, and for such time -- until such time the security council enters in and helps defend the country. so when the united states went to war in afghanistan, after 2001, we dider 7, so on the basis of article 51 -- self-defense under the u.n. charter. that is what our letter to the security council said. but it does not end there. not only do you have to have an armed attack, as we did with the 9/11 attack, but you are using force, and must meet other principles. it have to be a last result.

achieving the defensive purpose. second, the force has to do some good, it has to accomplish the necessity of that military defensive purpose. and third, it has to be proportional. you cannot kill more people would do more destruction, create the conditions for ongoing revenge in your strategy whatrry out defense than was originally inflicted upon you. so, this is a very narrow right to use force as self-defense. and if you're using a bomb against the territory of a foreign, sovereign state, regardless of who is there, you have to only attack the country that is responsible for the initial triggering attack. droneoblem with using the in places like pakistan, yemen,

somalia -- those countries never attacked the u.s. and what has happened and what has been the result of the u.s. using the drone? unlawfully in those countries to which i contend has been the case, yemen is in far more worse condition than when the first day we use the drone there -- in december of 2002. our drone use, constant military force against that small, fragile country helped trigger the civil war that --the stabilizing destabilizing the country. i could give other examples of what actually works. but we actually did in the case of osama bin laden, we did not get him with a drone. we use, basically, police tactics. we used intelligence gathering, and we sent a commander team that apparently according to john brennan -- with orders to

arrest. and if he resisted arrest, we could kill him in the resistance to arrest. we did not use a drone against bin laden. that is actually a model case of how to go about in countering, not military force. we have been hearing from more and more of our experts in this field, that drone use has this unlawful use in all of these countries. and at the end of the day, as of today, it has been counterproductive. just spoke atlger notre dame in the fall, and he on terror haswar been lost. we have been using military force, which is not effective against terror to them and dictatorial governments. general michael flynn, former head of the u.s. intelligence agency, said drone attacks have been a failed strategy. 18, 2015, four

former drone operators, all veterans, publicly criticized president obama's targeted killing for inflicting heavy civilian casualties and developing an institutional culture callus to the death of children and other innocents. well, when you're children are being killed unlawfully in this the through drones, families are going to send their surviving children off to an organization like isis to get revenge. there is a better way, one that is lawful, ethical, and effective. ivo: thanks very much. as a law professor and an irish person, you can stay within the time. can a human person to the same? want to thank the

counsel for the hard work. and also my good collie, mary ellen. i have had the pleasure of knowing her for over 20 years. i respect her profoundly for scholarship. and all these things do not prevent me from disagreeing with her, quite vigorously. [laughter] which shows that, of course, one can disagree with people very strongly and still admire them soundly, as i do. so, here is the problem the united states has. ok? we have individuals in certain parts of the world who are engaged in planning and carrying out attacks against the u.s. ok? and they operate not in china, not in russia, not in iran, not in great britain, or mexico, where we might be a would extradite them or be able to ask those governments to detain them.

they operate in areas where we ofnot have a peaceful option detaining them or incapacitating them. and so, as a society, we have an obligation, ok? to respond to those attacks by attacking them. and that is covered by the ruled nations charter's on article 51. mary ellen talks about self-defense against the armed attack. and indeed can only use drone strikes against those individuals, we are responding to an armed attack. we are not responding against an attack by human. the yemeni government. we are responding to an armed attack by the individual operating in yemen. she did not tell you, of course, that under international law, yemen, pakistan, and somalia

have a legal international obligation to prevent individuals in their territory from carrying out attacks against the territory or the nationals of the state with which they are at peace. just as the united states as a similar obligation. you know, we are obligate to prevent any individuals from carrying out attacks from u.s. territory against any nation or state with which we are at peace. now, these governments -- pakistan, somalia, yemen -- either in able or in some cases are unwilling because of deep domestic political divisions to prevent these individuals from operating. and so my question is, what are we supposed to do? do we simply cross our hands and allow them to operate with impunity? they are not operating in a zone of armed conflict, and might be area, or iraq, or afghanistan.

but they moved to another area and we allow them to operate with impunity? is that what natural law, morality, what the law really allows? and i suggest to you that when the language in the united nations charter was written in 1945, ok, we did not have this problem. we did not have the capacity of individuals and terrorist organizations operating in these lawless areas, striking against the u.s. or against other countries. so, we have to respond. now, i agree we have to respond using necessity, using proportionality. we may agree that sometimes, perhaps, we have used too many drone strikes. and we might agree that maybe we have to be more selective, more careful. ok? but to ban drone strikes as unlawful, i think, makes a

travesty of what international law is. as it has been famously said, it is not a recipe for suicide. state saidetary of this about height of the cuban missile crisis read and so last cases,and yes, in many it is a last resort because peaceful resolution, detention, arrest does not work. i find it interesting for mary ellen to call obama's osama bin laden operation a police operation. it was not a police operation, ok. and it was not a police that it was the use of u.s. military force. it was an attack, a combat operation against an individual who had engaged in an armed attack against the u.s. now, obviously, had osama bin laden surrendered, we were under

a legal obligation to arrest him and bring him back to the united states. and we would have done so. if he did not surrender, we were there to kill him. ok? and it was a combat operation. obviously, you, know drone strikes are designed to be proportional. sometimes going to do cause collateral damage. innocent people get killed. and we look at how we could make some of these operations much more discriminate. we do go out of our way to make these operations very discriminatory. and we try to avoid collateral damage. we make every effort not to hit individuals who are present in mosques, and hospitals, in places where there is a high likelihood of collateral damage. we still wind up killing innocent people. but i suggest to you, that if we were to use so-called police

tactics, as mary ellen has suggested, to arrest these individuals, we was still have massive collateral damage. we was still wind up killing lots of innocent people because the militants against which we would direct the so-called police tactics would have armed supporters around them. and they would use shelters in the civilian population to force these civilian casualties. our member very clearly, of course, and somalia, we actually sent u.s. forces there to arrest mohammed, the somalia warlord. and we all know what happened. he mobilized his militant sympathizers, they surrounded a group of u.s. special operation forces, it was a firefight. and the result was hundreds of innocent people killed. so, we have to look very closely and at the question, what

options does the u.s. have in some of these cases? ivo: great. thanks to both of you for i think of very clear, definitive statement. i will throw out a few questions, in order to get the disagreement going. [laughter] i will not discourage any of you to - - mary ellen: i think it is going great. ivo: let us hope that this of it. mary ellen, let me start with you. i was intrigued by the idea that it was the unlawful use of force that was a big recruitment tool for isis. which seems to imply the lawful use of force against isis would not be a big recruitment tool. and yet, we know that, of of 2014, the june

u.s. has engaged in military action in a lawful way against isis. because it was invited by the defend iraqment to -- they cametack from syria, not a foreign country -- i do not think there is any dispute that the u.s. was acting on behalf of of the iraqi government, or with the support of the government. and that ava has of the government, -- and at the behest of the government, it is likely that isis is using that as a recruitment tool. because the bombs falling from an aircraft, as opposed to a droned,from a hellfire might not be distinguishable, particularly to the person being killed. so what is it about the unlawful use of force that is a

recruitment tool, as opposed to the use of force? mary ellen: there is a very clear understanding among people who have been victimized by drones whether they are living in a combat zone, a place that has fomented an attack on the u.s. ort they, or their neighbors country responsible for it, there is clear understanding between that and people who believe that they have done nothing to this country. and yet, are being victimized. the evidence is overwhelming. political scientists collecting data, journalists collecting data, have shown time and again, the people living in a rural pakistan, that do not believe they have done anything to the u.s. -- and they are correct -- they are the ones who are saying, if we're going to be victimized we're going to look oura way to respond, government will not stand up for us. it is under the thumb of the

u.s. and we are going to do something, we're not going to just try and live our lives and put up with this kind of business. so, that is how the recruitment tool -- and that is because international law, ivo, really does track -- it is older than u.s. law. up incrementally brood it does follow a great deal of common sense. the rules, as alberto already suggested, on the use of force in the u.n. charter are rules that alberto seems to feel we can adjust as our own u.s. policy permits. rules dating from, or emerging from, the just war doctrine. they are very deeply ingrained natural, moral understanding of what is right and wrong. and people around the world have a very instinctive and strong

moral sense of when they should be free of this kind of violent attack, this kind of destructive attack. and when they are on notice, the example,r syria for when opposition to the members of the government decided to people throughout syria and they were now in danger. but the people of pakistan, where we have been attacking and have made some of the neighbors have common cause with the afghan taliban, they do not see that as an attack on the u.s. and they do not understand why they are being victimized. so, that is where recruiting -- and i can make the same comment even stronger about yemen -- ye men had a problem with certain coming, terrorist groups there and taking advantage of their relatively weak government. much stronger than the situation

in yemen now. and in those days, the u.s. was working with the yemen government, during the clinton administration. after the attack on the u.s.s. cole in 2000. and the fbi, another response to alberto, was being very effective and rounding up a small groups of individuals who are carried out that attack. they were prosecuted, they were in jail. men.ook our eye off ye we did not give them the report that that small government needed when they invaded iraq. and it was easy for al qaeda members to get out. and at that point, the u.s. was using drones regularly in yemen and in pakistan by then. and they were able to use al qaeda members in yemen -- they were able to use that fact to

say, do you want to see muslims, innocent women and children, being attacked? because when a drone strike attack, it is not like a bullet in the head. an assassination of that kind. these early strikes especially, they were inevitably taking 20-30 people every time. not just the intended target, the people who had nothing to do with anything that individual might have done in the past or the future. it is a clear, straight line between drone attacks, which began in 2002 in november, and the growth of al qaeda in yemen. so those drone attacks were unlawful. people knew it. to thehelped recruit, point where isis does not need the point of drones anymore. the fact that they have been successful against u.s.-backed forces from iraq, and the u.s.-backed opposition in syria,

it is that very success against the military might of the united states and the proxies in the area. so we are now in a very bad situation, created by the failure to take the wisdom and guidance of this ancient area of international law, restraining the use of force, with the embedded morality. follow that, maybe it takes more patience and time come alberta. but at the end of the day, the ira,he british control the the germans control their terrorism problem: the way were having great success against al 1993 world trade center attacks and the 1998 embassy attacks, we took our eye off the ball. we had it under control. we did not do the good police work, we did not patent into the intelligence in 2001.

and we exacerbated that mistakes are using military force and thearing and exacting global war on terror. you could ask, but i have said enough, so i will say that for later. ivo: because we do get into a very different argument about the global war on terror, versus the one instrument. i want to stick with the instrument, the centrality of the instrument in this discussion. and alberto, you make the observation that we do not -- that we are living in a slightly different world. that is different than one in 1945, when we drew up the charter in san francisco. in which we were concerned about to war against nations. now, we're talking about individuals were going to war against nations or other individuals in other nations. facehat is the dilemma we

from an international legal perspective, but also from a practical security perspective. as i think you made the case. how far do we want to push this? let me take the case of the united states deciding it is ok to kill american citizens in other countries. as indeed, the u.s. did in the of --f yemen, in the case scott, was here a few months ago, he wrote a book on the dilemma. where is the legal justification that says it is not just a foreign individual, but now an american individual, who can be targeted? yes, i do not have a problem with that. nationals, ok,n

who leave the united states and have planned attacks against the u.s. become combatants. and we have a series of u.s. supreme court decisions going back to the 1940's, the very famous case of the german saboteurs, two of them were american nationals. ok? and we have lots of german-americans who at the outbreak of world war ii, they went to germany and joined the german armed forces. they put on german uniforms. and when we were fighting against them, we did not say, well, we have to detain them because they are american citizens. we simply engaged in combat with them. and so, american nationals, like who leave the u.s. and become combatants, they are assuming the risk of becoming combatants.

and the president can order that they be attacked. now on there has to be a process in place. ok? ad the president has to have process in which the intelligence is reviewed very carefully, to determine that indeed they are combatants. that they're not just preaching fiery sermons in a mosque, but they are indeed engaged in planning an attack on the u.s. and that intelligence should be reviewed by legal counsel in the administration. ultimately, the president, under the constitution, has the obligation to protect the u.s. planningeople who are attacks. let me make it very clear. we are not attacking simply an enemy. this is not a case of political assassination. ok? i do not condone political assassination. i do not condone trying to kill fidel castro, who may have been enemies of the u.s., but who

were not planning attacks against the u.s. that is the key distinction. so, as combatants -- individuals placing himself at risk -- you cannot simply say to the u.s., well, we have to arrest them. of course, we can try to arrest them, mary ellen. i am all in favor of peaceful solutions. i think your comparisons with is inappropriate.yer migh we have the appropriate legal instrument to deal with them. but these individuals who operate in lawless areas, in which the governments are either unwilling or unable to turn them over to us or to allow us to work with them, we have to be able to defend ourselves. and to the extent that the fbi was able to do this in yemen early on, i have bought their efforts.

i think that the airstrikes -- whatever we can -- but i think we are not able to do that in every place around the world. there are places around the world were the fbi is not able to operate to bring these individuals to justice. and you also protect ourselves from the dangers they are posing. think from the rules, i of are still there. i'm a strong believer in morality, the just war tradition. the rules of the charter are there. but an armed attack is not the same thing in 1945 as what it means today. in other words, armed attacks are carried out not only by states and also by these individuals, who because of technology and globalization, and all kinds of development including social media, they're able to attack us in ways that they really cannot do back then, 70 years ago. did not say this before and i want everybody to understand, regardless of

alberto's argument based on practicality and the world changing, the law has not changed. in 2005, the united nations held a world summit in new york city. and every member of the u.n. agreed to abide by the u.n. charter rules that i explained to you, as written. there was no exception made for this idea that was first trotted out by some think tank folks in the u k. that instead -- ivo: nothing wrong with think tank folks. [laughter] ellen: but we do not let them decide for our countries what international law is. and they want to allow a state being unable or unwilling to prevent terrorism. the world community is never going to accept that.

really, we're going to allow vladimir putin to decide the ukraine is unable and unwilling to control a lawless problem? seriously? we are would let the ayatollah khomeini decide that israel -- no, it does not work as a general rule. and it will never be adopted. nobody gives the u.s. and exceptional right to decide who is unable or unwilling to control their lawlessness. they say it is lawless in yemen, or alberto does, that is not a view in yemen. yemen is to control its own country. and the lawlessness there you find it a, in fact, has a lot to do with us. a we get back to becoming cooperative, supportive country helping to build the rule of law, supporting criminal justice, we will be able to do the extradition, the deportation of the people that did work in the u.k. and germany and the

u.s. itself. regardless of what works or does not work on the law does not permit what alberto is suggesting. here, scott shane was talking about his new book, which is focused on and war a la this, this very technology is driving people to think that what you can do with it must be lawful. you have the capacity command you want to use it, and therefore, that is crowding your clear-eyed view. shane's careful reporting showed that he was no combatant. he was guilty of propaganda and of inducing people to commit terrible crimes, although he is never been tried for that in a court of law, as opposed to inside the white house. and shane makes, i think, a very strong case that he was killed

out of revenge. not because it was lawful under our constitution, under the human rights treaties that we are committed to, or under the u.n. charter that this country, our president franklin delano roosevelt, wrote. this is an example of how careful you have to be with seductive technology like the drone, that makes it so easy, with very little risk to the puttingitself, not their own individuals in harms way, not asking them to pay the price and patients with doing the right thing. -- and they have some short-term benefit -- but really long-term costs. that is absolutely the isis story. want to give you one chance to come back. and then we want to open up the floor. so, start thinking of your questions, if you do not have any. you have not been listening.

[applause] [laughter] but as you come back on this point, international law, like youlaws, the dilemma that have with states no longer being able to control necessarily what happens in their territory. as for example, changing humanitarian law with the responsibility to protect -- which 200 world leaders have accepted -- the we have not agreed what to do about it. but that is true for most of the things we do under the law. how does international law change? because it changes international law reflects festivity. professor thomas frank, the late professor, a wonderful scholar of international law and a wonderful supporter of international law, he argued in

the last decade of his life, the article does not prevent absolute prohibition on the use of force. it had to be interpreted in light of what actually was going on in the world. and nobody would accuse him of being a nihilist. but he said, look, you have to recognize that the use of force is not just simply conventional armies invading another state, 90 saddam hussein did in 19 when he invaded kuwait. what we have here is a very serious problem. ok? and regarding russia and the ukraine, if ukraine allowed armed groups in its territory to carry out attacks against russia, ok, russia would have legitimate grounds for holding the ukrainian government to its international legal responsibility. these governments have an international legal responsibility to control the launching of armed attacks from the territories against another

state. and when they do not exercise that kind of responsibility, you cannot expect another state to say,y folded his arms and welcome and might take 10 years. we're going to try to arrest them. in situations were that is not practical, i mean, if it is practical, yes, we need to do it. and so, i think that we need to understand this. and you united states, can look at the policy and say let us see how we can improve it, and maybe there have been to many of these drone attacks. but to argue that this analogy is simply unacceptable, i think i'm basically deprives us of a very legitimate means to right toour self-defense against individuals who are planning attacks. i think there was a lot of intelligence. he was not just a simple preacher. he was involved in operational planning activities. ok? and i think that was part of the

intelligence that led to president obama to authorize his killing. and so, i think that, and the answer we have to look at these issues and say, states have a right to defend themselves. and this is not simply a matter of discarding the rule of international law, but recognizing that these rules have to be applied not just in terms of restraining the use of law, but allowing law to be used to justify self-defense and legitimate situations. ivo: at this point, i really want to go to the audience. and weput up your arm, will have someone bring a microphone. one of the things we like about it when you ask questions, that you actually ask a question. so that we can have as many people participate. we will start right here, up front. wait for the microphone. there you go. >> thank you. i teach university level courses on terrorism. the question i have is a

question of fact. whether or not before 1945, considerable non-eight actors that involved attacks on civilians and on governments, one thinks of the beginning of world war i for example, but also the people's will in russia. and a all host of other examples, how does that fit into your factual statement, that in 1945, the law was based only on nationstates. presumably, the treaty of wes t phalia. alberta: the treaty was not there. you can mention, for example, in serbia, there were people who hated austria. and hungary. and the prince came from those groups, ok. but there was not the ability to systematically organize and carry out attacks against

transnational boundaries, across large distances, azeris today. very different situation. mary ellen: they absolutely did have non-state actor groups in mind. there are provisions in international humanitarian law, of course, that were built on the spanish civil war. where there was plenty of non-capacity to carry out a lot of violence. technology becomes more and more widespread, the -- it will become incumbent if you want to have any kind of sense of order and restraining of the taboo onaise the violence.of to stick to the rule of law as agreed by the international community and not take the soft interpretations that your needs of the moment, but they do not have the idea of how we're going to really raise in people lines

that violence is beyond the pale. and the answer is not to turn to the bomb. you do have the possibility of being part of a government that gives you a voice. the emphasis by alberto that somehow, i am saying you do not have a right to self-defense, yes you do. but the united states treating a combatant, one individual, and use the law that was created to defend the modeled on germany's invasion of poland, that is where we are putting debt where we are really getting things wrong. and not understanding the lessons of history. thanks for your point. a good one. alberto: just very briefly, when we attacked him, we were not attacking the country in which he was located. we were attacking him. mary ellen: that is not what yemen thinks.

of course we were attacking the country. ivo: let me pointed out. frankly, that is dilemma. right? if you are attacking individuals in your country, another thing if there are none other country. that is where they exist. the question is, is it a combatant or not? maybe it is or is not a factual one. but let me bring on another person. with a question. >> yes, i am dr. dale lemmon. we are watching everyone. come visit us. i would ask you, professor w talked about the seductive technology of the drone. let me ask you what a drone is? it is a flying robot of death. now, and we not set a dangerous edentonvenient prec of killer robots limiting certain human beings? and the robots will continue to

evolve, by moore's law. over 18 months, how long will it be? think about the unintended, secondary consequences in the future. of allowing robots to become bringers of death to human beings. mary ellen: i thank you very much for the comment. because one of the things we do not have time to talk about is what is happening. in the laboratory in the u.s., the u.s. is hard at work on what we call the fully autonomous robotic weapon. and this will allow us to attack, atrone to some time the distant future, years after the programming, on parameters that the programmer today thinks are important. technology,sensor

and other means that are also being developed, the robotic weapon carries out its legal task. that is a super problem in my mind. technology is now the subject of the you win review in switzerland -- the u.n. review in switzerland. and there is a very strong effort to try and create a rule that fully autonomous robotic weapons will not be permitted. there always has to be a human being. in the near time, the decision to kill. and i support that. but what support even more is understanding that the best way to -- we are not going to -- the history of arms control is that we are not going to stop the intervention. the way we succeeded in the past is creating legal barriers to use. the prohibition on the use of the nuclear weapon, the

prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, the prohibition on the use of a blinding laser weapons, that is what has exceeded. so, we need a legal prohibition on fully autonomous robotic weapons. and we need to restrict the use of drone technology, with the hellfire missile, to armed conflict zones. and not to policing matters. alberto: i think we are in danger of confusing issues. one, is the issue of technology which is not supervised by humans and i fully agree with professor o'connell read absolutely, we do not want a situation where weapons themselves make the decision. right now, that is not the situation with drones. they are fully controlled by the president. they are under full command. there is no robotic drone out there on its own, deciding who to target. so let us not be overly dramatic about this issue. the second thing i want to say is that, with regards to

, if the american people want to have a conversation and decide that we want to ban drones, along with other states, and we might ban chemical weapons or biological weapons, that is a very legitimate conversation. but we need to be aware of what the costs will be. ok? twitter different from the costs of banning chemical -- which are different from the cost of banning typical weapons. we are vulnerable to attacks by these individuals, who will not operate in an armed conflict zone, but will operate somewhere else. and they will have impunity to plan attacks against us. in areas where we will not practically be able to arrest, detain, or get the government to do that. if we want to incur that risk, and we decide that that is

morally acceptable, that is a decision for us to make. but i think that right now, you know, the idea that somehow we could allow these individuals to find areas in the world where they can operate freely, under the justification that this is not a combat area. therefore, we can attack them, that is morally inappropriate. mary ellen: alberto, it is a non sequitur to say that if we do not have drones we cannot do anything about the terrorist threat. we did lindsay about the terrorist threat before we had drones. so that is simply a non sequitur. alberta: i disagree. mary allen: and we have but he that we can do. and i'm not saying that the legitimate use of drones on the battlefield, they have been, as we heard from our introducer, they can be very, very helpful. in a close combat engagement situation, where you know you are engaging two sets of fighting forces. where they do not -- where they have been unbalanced and nobody

doubts this, counterproductive, is in trying to go after single individuals suspected of a past crime. and perhaps planning a future one. we do not allow that in the u.s. we could do the same thing. we have put the of people putting things here, as we know. and by your logic, we should be using these invaluable drones to fly around after them. insay that we can do this the small list of countries, is to say that we based -- they do not deserve the same respect as a resident countries in the world. and we are in no position, under international law, to make those claims are you my real objection is that your pending this black and white extreme. that if we do not use drone attacks in yemen, we can't do anything.

alberto: in many ways, we cannot do anything in certain places of the world. is why i draw a distinction. there are many places where they do not operate. even though they may not like us, they do not allow attacks against us. mary allen: what you do agree come alberto, that international law does not say to the u.s., welcomed, you can pick and choose the countries where you want to. international law does not say that. alberto: international law does say that states have responsibility to prevent their territories from being -- mary ellen: what does international law say is the right response to a country that is not fulfilling obligations, diligence.ue unless the country is responsible for an armed attack on the u.s. can we have to work with countermeasures, sanctions, or cooperation to get them in line. raise whatd just happen in 2001 as a counterexample, which is to say that a terrorist organization, trade and operating from

afghanistan to protect the u.s. we invaded in october. and our invasion of the country was designed precisely to go after the individuals who were responsible for this. because the government explicitly failed to take care of it. and so, i think the issue there was one that you could use military force, as we did in notanistan war, when we do have drone attacks. they probably would not have been very effective. or not? mary ellen: their somewhat different. when we went to war in afghanistan, the british have produced the detailed white paper that pointed out for purposes of international law analysis from the links between the taliban government and the al qaeda training camps. and it was on that basis that the u.s. and great britain made their cases to the security council's, and a pair of

letters, that went forward and pointed out the exact rule of law that i'm emphasizing here. that afghanistan was responsible for the 9/11 attack. subsequently, we know that the british have a problem with cooking the books. as they did with 2003, as well. so, the factual case that they had made, that the international community accepted as the proper legal basis for going to war in afghanistan, under article 51 in elf defense, was weaker. and to our great regret, because how many years to be fight their? and what is happening today? it was also a case. and if you read lawrence weght's "the looming tower," would be far better off if we had taken wholesale force. based on the evidence, we were fully in compliance. ivo: i will open up the issue

here actually is not about drones. it over here. is germany the only foreign country from which the united states launches drone wars? mary ellen: we have bases in half a dozen countries now. but the only european country. know, there is an investigation into whether germany is implicit in supporting unlawful killing and providing intelligence. i expect there will be action to end that complicity in unlawful conduct. ivo: there are no, as far as i'm being used on

german soil. >> congratulations. i am more confused about who is right than ever. [laughter] you mentionedoll, the degree of certainty that either an administration or intelligence agency would need to authorize lethal force. really, that is the ultimate question, right? how do we define that degree of certainty? just to go a little deeper in that, it is very well documented

essentially, machine learning algorithms have been used to indicate a potential threat moving forward. used to authorize lethal force. i would like to get your thoughts on that. you, professor. kid ourselves. a-ok with us launching drones from their territory. anything, we were potentially doing them a favor in doing less. we may have encouraged them to do more in their own right. , whenu talk more about

the u.s. is launching the stripes on individuals with implicitlyicitly or agreement from the host nation? alberto: i think the standards the president and his attorney general have tried to articulate , the standard is not simply speech, ok? it is not sympathy. it is not the fact that somebody is an enemy of the united states. it is the fact the person in question is participating in , then supporting, ok planning and carrying out of an attack against the united states. and that is gathered on the basis of intelligence and the evidence has to be multi-source, not just one human intelligence source saying, johnny is

plotting to do this, ok? there have to be several sources, and that is studied very carefully, the planning and participating in an armed attack against the united states and u.s. nationals. evidence is reviewed by councils within the executive branch. i think those are reasonable standards. we need to continue to subject them to scrutiny and demand the president abide by those standards. we are not talking about speech. we are talking about specific steps taken by an individual to plan and participate in an attack against the united states or it -- united states. first, the facts with regards to pakistan, there

is an excellent new book on the shaw -- shah. he is a pakistani international detailedat has information about the authority structure in pakistan. it is clear from his book and my research that the united states explicit clear and authorization of the elected president of pakistan. we had some cooperation and quid pro quo negotiating. you let us kill our guy, and we will let you kill the guy you want to kill. that is the poker-playing dealmaking that is offensive, hopefully, to every american from members of the i.s.i. cia ifco were to ask the they could kill some of their druglords in miami on vacation because it would be an easier

whereto send a drone than they are, having a good time all the waters of miami, because the u.s. cannot control its borders. can the cia give mexico authorization? we have given them drones to take out a guy. this is the same as asking i.s .i. for permission to kill somebody on their territory. in yemen, we did. 2000 two, the first use of a drone outside of a combat zone was to kill six people in a vehicle. there was a 23-year-old from upstate new york who had not fired a weapon, as far as i know, that decided al qaeda was the real deal and was in the vehicle with the one intended

target. drone and shot two hellfire missiles into the vehicle. the cia flies in, takes dna to prove they got their guy. chaoticthe longest situation alberto is talking about. we had an indirect ok for that. as far as i know, presidents of countries cannot give the ok to deny the fundamental right to human life. there was no armed conflict in his country that he invited us in to help, as we were invited into iraq, afghanistan. on which wehe bases used force for 12 years in afghanistan and iraq right now. we had consent to suppress a civil war.

what is going on in yemen. permission to violate fundamental human right to life. i do not think he had the permission to give. so so much for consent. back.he gentleman in the >> i think this will be short. you mentioned, professor coll, that the basis for a drone strike is a government's inability or unwillingness to control its own territory. diedyear, 17,000 americans as a result of drug overdoses. thousands more killed indirectly. that is more than terrorism has killed in the last 1200 years. forco is the primary source illicit drugs. the mexican government has been unable to control territory,

particularly in the south. i wonder if you feel targeted drone strikes are a legitimate tactic to use in mexico against drug lords. if so, why not? alberto: absolutely not. there is a fundamental legal difference. drugs kill people. so does air pollution, cancer. so does reckless driving. regard tons with mexico and drugs coming in, is the matter fit for criminal law? ok? criminal activity, not the sponsorship of an armed attack using weapons against the united states. >> you are saying it is only the motivation? alberto: not just the motivation. there is a distinction between attack, ok, and simply exporting to a country substances that may cause people who wish to consume the product

great harm, including death. two very different things. no more than the united states, when phillip morris exports cigarettes to a foreign country that causes cancer, that country would be justified in firing drones. significant difference. an armed attack is something an sellingth substances that may cause harm. mary ellen: the important point is how the thinking about drones is diluting the idea of when and where you can use violence. 2001, our ambassador to israel said this country was morally and legally opposed to targeted killing. now, we do it without hesitation. as soon as the cia brings evidence to the white house this

guy might be planning something in an future and he is area where we will only kill maybe six or seven people around him, let's kill him. we used to think that was anathema, that that was wrong. of a falsemodicum security, we think that is ok. so why not the drug lord, the reckless driver who is drunk driving and killed six people? he knew when he went out drinking and did not make arrangements to get home. why can't we pull out guns and kill that guy? we have seen this view that killing is ok in different contexts has impacted police forces. we have taken violence as acceptable. this leadership from the white house, lowering the threshold that we think violence is beyond

the pale, is causing an endemic that you are worried about. alberto: i would like to respond, ok? the framework mary ellen is giving us would leave us unable respond to a very serious threat posed by individuals and groups against the united states. the rules of international law were not intended to prevent the united states from defending itself. all the great moral theorists say there has to be a means by which law recognizes the new, and sadly ever more creative ways of violence are created. there has to be a means of responding so that individuals will know if they operate in certain parts of