useful for the legal questions i want to ask next. mr. olsen: >> it provided a significant amount of the intelligence reporting we received. a day did not go by that an thelligence report contribution was from section 702.

this was a statute a few years old. you should not take my word for it. i went back to look at the ,eport, the definitive account where they had access to all the classified information. they concluded that section 702 had allowed for the authority of .pecific terrorist attacks they identified targets, the means, the identities, the locations of the participants. they came down strongly on the side -- recognize that the value is difficult to overstate. >> you also need to step back

702 for itsuing ability to stop particular plots at a particular time. if you're talking about stopping a plot, no, you will not find a lot of plots stopped by particular programs, but that is not the way intelligence is used. it is used along with human intelligence and open source material. together,ut it all that allows you to prevent getting to the point where somebody is chambering a round. mentioned the one aspect of the section 702 program that has generated at least in some congressional ancern and push back, and fair amount of concern in the ngo community, this idea that

information can be collaterally collected during the course of a foreign intelligence investigation about an american , and that u.s. person even though the collection of that information would not have or authorizedss purpose of it, that information once collected according to critics is usable for foreign intelligence purposes and they are concerned, possibly shareable with domestic non-intelligence purposes. mind will be ground if any of the major portions of discussion when it comes up for reauthorization. a couple of questions, your perception of the frequency with which that happens here it your

. your perception of the legality of it. your perceptions on the way to minimize the problem, and ultimately your opinion on this is as the critics say a category mistake that is allowing collection that does in the end attached to american citizens without fourth individualarrant and judicial officer protections. that is a big question. >> the key operative word is incidental. consider what happens to intelligence gathered incidental to intelligence being sought about foreign persons. are you then to discarded? thatif iteris you that

united states person is about to commit some mayhem? i think it tells you that a united states person is about to commit some mayhem? you have to protect against the expansion of investigations for the purposes of conducting gathering incidental information, and that depends on the good faith of the people who administer the program and the diligence of the people who oversee it. about atalking madisonian trifecta, oversight from within the executive, oversight from multiple legislative committees, and oversight by a court. >> i agree with those points.

imagine what the alternative would be? t 70 two allows is a judicial mechanism of oversight to obtain broad -- what 702 allows is a judicial mechanism of oversight to obtain broad orders. authority with court oversight and congressional oversight to target selectors like e-mail addresses. someone overseas is not a u.s. citizen. you are doing that to see if that person is a terrorist, is seeking to carry out terrorist attacks. you are now collecting information against that person, seeing the information that person is creating, for example an e-mail address.

that person that the analyst is following communicates with somebody in the united states, and communicate some sort of attack plan, and at that point in time you really achieved exactly what you want to achieve as an analyst. you now see this person in yemen is communicating with someone in new york city, and they're talking about an attack. be the alternative to focusing on that person in new york city? that would be madness, right, to ignore that? is thatpens in fact once that person in new york city becomes the focus of attention, then the rest of the statute kicks in which protects u.s. citizens, it now requires the intelligence community to go and obtain a probable cause,

essentially a warrant, from the court to target that person in new york city, and then the collection focuses to that person. that is how it works in practice. that is how it worked in the case i mentioned before of a prison in denver who is communicating with the target in pakistan and they shared information about a bomb recipe. allows the intelligence community to focus on this person in the united states and understand he was planning to travel to new york city to carry out an attack to blow up the new york subway. that is how it works. beyond that, the information that is incidentally collected is subject to minimization procedures that protect u.s. persons privacy. for example, you cannot

disseminate information about a u.s. person unless that information is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence, and it is also subject to judicial oversight. is last point i will make that when 702 was passed, some folks in this room were part of that effort. there were a couple of compromises adopted to protect u.s. persons. one, for the first time a judicial order was required by the private court to target any u.s. person around the world. so someone outside the united states who is a u.s. person. in order to do that, there were provisions that prohibited reverse targeting, which basically said -- the government -- cannot target somebody overseas who is not a u.s. person in order to collect against a person in the united states.

that was prohibited by the statutes. good jobte does a very of balancing and enacting compromises. >> you mentioned minimization procedures. one of the other criticisms i have heard from people who are worried about the program is that the procedures themselves and the adherence to them are not subject to judicial review, but rather administrative and internal executive branch review on a case-by-case basis. the overall procedures themselves are approved, but whether or not we succeeded in islying them to rosensweig not something we could get to a court for an independent, neutral observation. does that criticism merit our concern? >> actually it's not entirely true i think. the failures, if there are failures within the system, have

to be reported on a periodic basis to the fisa court. are failures, those can be reviewed by the court one at a time or in gross. they are largely reviewed to determine whether there was a problem with the procedures, and then those are adjusted one way or other. >> the court would review and approve the minimization procedures at the outset. there is the oversight within the executive branch of the implementation procedures that is not done just by the intelligence agency but also by the department of justice. issues, then they are reported to the court, and they can be amended. happens ishing that if there were an instance where this information were to be used in a criminal case, the defendant would have the

opportunity to challenge the application of the minimization procedures in that particular case for that particular judicial review, not unlike how it works in the criminal penalty context. >> let's wrap up the 702 discussion. it will come up for renewal next year. if it does not renew, and lapses. your recommendations to congress? renew as is? let lapse? or renew with modifications? what, if any? >> the only modification would be to eliminate the sunset provision. as far as i know, al qaeda does the islamic state does not have -- a sunset provision. in any of their campaigns are ose issued for the

murder of americans, don't have sunset revisions. it is always open to congress to to requireatue, but that we go through this every several years does not make for continuity in intelligence planning and the ability to plan long-term. we can do it this way. general hayden is probably the most tolerant of anybody i have ever seen. if that is the way we would do it, that is the way we will do it, but we ought to do it with our eyes open and awareness that we are in a sense handicapping ourselves purposefully by imposing a requirement like that. >> if i may, you mentioned earlier the policy decision extending privacy rights to non-american citizens.

would you recommend that be considered and modified in the course of the legislative consideration? >> you mean to eliminate that presidential directive? >> could prohibited? >> it could. theresomething for which is neither need nor sanctions. beginning, thee constitution is not a treaty with the entire world. if you want to go back and pick a really long view of this, the folks who drafted the constitution did it in a summer under conditions of strict secrecy. they kept the windows closed. this was before air-conditioning. it was a hot summer in philadelphia. nobody was permitted to discuss it at the time or afterwards. secrecy,it with strict and included a directive

that congress publish a journal on a regular basis of his proceedings except for those parts of thought to remain secret. these were practical people. they were drafting a document for other practical people, and we ought to be practical people with that in mind. >> it is on the question of 702 and the sunset and reauthorization for next year, i basically agree and would eliminate the sunset provision. it tends to mean that congress will wait till the last minute, the final hour, to renew it, and that wreaks havoc operationally within the intelligence community as it prepares to pull the plug or continue the program, and it is not a good way to run the intelligence community. the more fundamental question of does it need to be changed, the answer is no. 702ntioned before that

reflected years and years of effort to reconcile competing interests, reflected judicial decisions come executive branch experience, legislative efforts. an authoritative, privacyve report of the and civil liberties oversight board finding it was essential, lawful, consistent with the constitution fourth amendment, and importantly found no instances of misconduct, so there is no problem to solve. know there have been to district court decisions, one in organ and one , and in bothw york , not fisathese judges court judges, but criminal cases found it was constitutional and lawful. it works. it's legal. don't change it. >> adding something to appoint

made, the that matt criticisms of it have been hypothetical criticisms, not criticisms based on real instances. people sit and contemplate the possibility that somebody could abuse 702 if they have a mind to do it. apply that to the local police department, a police officer arrest,use the power of could abuse the fact he is carrying a weapon. that is not a reason to withhold the arrest powers, to disarm police. the hypothetical possibility that somebody who is of a mind to do it and has the time to do their jobnsiders of preventing attacks allows for recreational use of 7022 abuse -- of 702,alistic

two abuse it, is unrealistic. that ford has announced it is boardting a review of -- has announced it is conducting a review. the intelligence community sets out roles and responsibilities, contains some substantive restrictions with prohibition on assassination. that report to is likely to come out later the sheer, so let's later thisthat -- year, so let's talk about that. does it offer an independent surveillance authority? or is it a structure for

implementing existing statutory grants? >> i don't think it has any grant of authority within it or that it is intended to do that. the the standpoint of intelligence community, it defines the lanes in which each of the entities within the intelligence community function. it doesn't itself grant of authority. is granted by statutes which are granted by the constitution, but the executive order itself does not have a grant of authority. it has an assignment of responsibility for exercising authority under statutes already , and it has succeeded as you heard in the last panel largely because the components of the intelligence community get along. thing as ansuch

order that will enforce itself. so it depends on a large extent ability of the people within the agencies to communicate with one another and to be aware of one another's boundaries. >> that me press on that just a bit good some critics have eo 12333 expands -- do you think that is a mischaracterization? or is it fair to say? say --ink it is fair to no, it is a mischaracterization that it expands authorities. what it does is make authorities that are already existing and statutes permanent.

pairing them back by executive order i think is -- would be a huge mistake. gaps in 12333 is cyber. it will probably have to be dealt with the statutorily. when i went out to nsa and talked to general alexander, he said he had the power and authority to do something about of theg penetrations defense department and possibly of the .gov. something comingg into.com, the only authority i have is to sit there and say, it

is going to be a bad one. >> the last panel made this point is well, but it bears repeating. 12333 is the foundational document for the intelligence community that has signed responsibility to the various agencies within the community and places important limitations i juste authorities, so operates against the backdrop of constitutional article two of authority and statutory authority already granted, so there is no new authority granted in 12333. we in the intelligence community have probably muddied this up a bit ourselves. authority there is an 12333 that is denoting,

suggesting it is out of pfizer or some other statute that regulates that type of activity fisa or some other statute that regulates that type of activity. >> give us an example of one of those. oute is a larger audience there in c-span land, so give us a couple of examples of that. >> collection that would be carried out in terms of surveillance activities, because 12333 is all intelligence election activities and beyond that, analytic activities as well. in terms of collection activities come he think about the surveillance side. it would be conducting surveillance outside the united states, not targeting a u.s. on the and not relying assistance of a us-based service provider, so activities --

-- a cia safeuse house looking over a house that might belong to osama bin laden, let's say. activities outside the united states conducting surveillance of a foreign intelligence target where you are not targeting u.s. persons are relying on u.s. internet providers based in the united states, that is a broad swath of activity. what i described is what the nsa does. when we talk about 12 triple 12333surveillance -- surveillance, it's not regulated by pfizer. fisa. of information

based on the powers of the executive to defend this country , and obviously they don't need particular authorization to go someplace else in the world and that couldhing conceivably be of value to the u.s. government in defending itself. >> so then it is fair to say that you would characterize 1233 3 as an organizing document, not resource of any authority exercised by the intelligence agencies? >> except it is important to say it is an organizing document, but also a limitation document. it includes restrictions or limitations on activities that are from the point of view of than -- itons other is those limitations that are part of the daily discussion that takes place at agencies

like the nsa about whether this particular activity is consistent with the executive order. both in the you role of senior national security legal advisor to the next president of the united states, whoever he or she may be, and i amlook at you and say, thinking about revising and 3,issuing executive order 1233 what restrictions and there should i get rid of? e want to be mor aggressive, post belgium, post pakistan, what restrictions can be removed entrenching upon constitutional and statutory limitations, and conversely are there any restrictions we should add for good and sufficient reasons? what is your recommendation?

restriction i can think of that i might remove is at least aty of nsa pass on information about the privatemage to sector from hostile cyber activity. intelligenceignals , but gathers it in and out lee fashion, -- an outwardly fashion. yes, i agree with that. cyber is an area where 12333 does not address it in a way that helps sufficiently guide the roles and responsibilities of agencies within the intelligence community. that would be something to try and tackle, but my first advice would be step cautiously.

first, do no harm. remember that these rules have evolved over several decades now going back to 1981, and maybe talk to general hayden and others involved in the last largely it works. the general body of restrictions, including the onic ones on prohibition assassination, but also more importantly i think in more relevantly for example saying the cia is prohibited from engaging in electronic surveillance in the united states. the fbi is the only body that ,an conduct physical searches so these are restrictions that assigned particular responsibilities to agencies given what they are good at.

sense behindt of them, so step cautiously in trying to remove these restrictions other than try to tackle the cyber issue. >> let's pay of it once more to another kind of area. this one is more speculative and looking forward a bit, but we are on the cusp of the development of a host of new and platforms.ction anybody who has seen "eye in the say, it is a good movie? i like it. there was a drone the size of a beetle that was declined as part of the activity, which i understand is not quite , so we were look at

drones, be able to detroit large-scale facial recognition technology, large data collections capable of analysis. broadly speaking, how it should law approach that. our current laws sufficient or do you think the novel collection technologies will require us to up a collection rules? let's start with that as a general question. in need ofs modernization to accommodate new technology? i would wait until the new technology in pensions or is seen to impinge actually, not potentially, not by somebody fantasizing about what is possible, but actually on somebody's privacy before deciding to limit.

also, we have to keep in mind oft there are other entities government that have an interest in ne this. local government, for example, things like drones, there is talk about having the federal government be the sole regulator of drones. that i think is a mistake. that is not to say that federal agencies should not be permitted to use them when otherwise appropriate under statute, but governinge regulation what goes on in the backyards of every state in this country i think is a big mistake. >> i agree. we ought to take this iteratively. making great advances in terms of the

processing power of computers, technology like you described with drones and the ability to mass and store large amounts of we give a ton of that data to private companies. -- thethe question is example i go back to about 702, it took us a while to respond to technological changes. one lesson is that it is standard for the law to lag behind technology. it will be the case that we will catch up to the legal rules to make them well adapted to the pace of technological change, so i would say the fourth amendment has been around a long time and served as quite well and has proven to be sufficiently adaptive and agile and continued to more or less be the right way to balance the competing

interests between national security and domestic security and protection of privacy and civil liberties, so i would caution trying to anticipate which direction the technology is going to go and try to make legal changes in response to that. >> you mentioned facial recognition technology. that will obviously allow for great advances in intelligence gathering and in solving of crimes. on the other hand, do i want the government to have cameras on ofry corner and a bank information about me and where i have gone every moment of my life and be able to consulted? no, i don't. on the other hand, we are long distance from the possibility that anybody would consider doing that, and that is not a reason to forgo the use of that

technology, where it can be used effectively to deal with problems that are in the here and now without worrying about anticipating science-fiction problems. >> you are a good lawyer. great lawyer, indeed. so now you are in the next administration and the cia director comes to you and says we can do ploy this, start capturing pictures out of cctv's that are in london without the brits knowledge. let's make it france so i don't make it a problem. your impression in terms of foreign intelligence would be no promise all because e foreigners protections from the fourth amendment. >> you can't capture it for

recreational purposes. >> i could make the argument easily that paris has a now the target of three attacks in the tot five years and is likely be the target of more. we have a great database of pictures from iraq and afghanistan of known terrorists. we can create a good early warning system. we will by the way incidentally have to collect the facial pictures of every american who visits paris along the way, and minimize and discard. what principles, if any, should guide a program like that, which is not to speculative? >> you named to principles, minimize and discard. if somebody does not match up to a group of known terrorists and you're not going to be banking those images.

you are going to use it to compare to people you already know about, not to simply gather trove in casea you should come up with somebody who you might want to trace. under 12333, the executive order that requires any agency that conducts foreign intelligence to have rules, specific rules, to protect u.s. persons, this is what the executive order requires, that are approved by the attorney general. every agency has a set of roles, a u.s. persons that of roles, so in your scenario, the rule that would apply is one you can't search that data for a u.s. person, so for a known u.s. person, unless you have probable cause finding from the attorney general to search for that u.s.

person, so that is quite protective of the u.s. person. you can't use that data and search it without approval from the attorney general. you can't keep information about a u.s. person for more than five can't disseminate information about a u.s. person and less necessary to understand the foreign intelligence. adopted rules that are on all these activities, including the activity you describe. you think thef lawfulness of a collection methodology is dependent upon the efficacy or in efficacy of the analytic methodologies, which is to say that increasingly at the backend we are able to get more information out of the same data that has been previously collected? some have called this the principle of obscurity, that data used to be too difficult to analyze, so we weren't as concerned about over collection or alleged over collection because of an under analytic

capability. today, it's going to the roof in terms of its possibilities, facial recognition a good example, metadata and alice another example. does improvement and analytic capabilities council changes in collection methodology? is governinguncils the analytic capabilities. you mentioned metadata analysis. yanked,efore 215 got and metadata collection program that allowed us to keep a trove of telephonic metadata to be consulted only when we had a number that was terrorist related. fact you limit the use of a database in that way, then you

can take advantage of the analytic capability and yet prevent, for example, simply data mining all telephone metadata for the purpose of drawing a profile of a person or for other purposes as well, but it is how you limit your analytic capability, not had you limit data collection. >> i think that is exactly right. the fourth amendment reasonableness of a collection program depends in part on how the information is handled, how it is processed, so the answer to your question is yes, it is relevant to consider how information is handled and analyzed in determining whether or not it is lawful, at least looking at it under the fourth amendment guys. -- guise.

hitsis where the rubber the road on this question of the ability of the government, not just the government, but technology to analyze massive amounts of data and store , becausemounts of data there is a case the supreme court ruled on in 2012 call jones involving a gps tracker here in washington, d.c. while the case was decided on these grounds, this was a case where the gps tracker state on a car for multiple weeks, 28-30 some members of the supreme court were very concerned about the fact that this was a lot of data to be able to collect on an individual, even though that person was exposing themselves are driving around, exposing where they were publicly, so maybe if that happened for a day or two days, then it might not

have been such a very concerned, but the fact that that amount of data was being captured on this person for 28 days and the ability to store it, analyze it, look for patterns, and we learned so much about the person's life and implicated the privacy to such an extent that that was a concern for the court. we are at the vanguard of looking at some of the doctrines looking at the fourth amendment, in particular the third-party that you no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that would be a significant change if we take another look at the third-party role. >> that was going -- third-party rule. >> that was going to be my next question. of what thetion intelligence community collects, it does not miss early collect directly.

,t collects from third parties whether it is telephone operators or police departments or google, you name it. there is a host of collection platforms out there privately operating that the government muchap into, often without if any judicial intervention come because as you say the third-party role that has been around since the 1970's says that if you have expose this information, your bank, your telephone company, you don't have any fourth amendment privacy right and the statutory rules often have pretty broad national security, law enforcement, exceptions that allow ready access. question i will ask you to talk about is your prediction about whether or not and that is going to change, and your assessment of whether or

not it needs to change, or whether you are comfortable with the legal rule at a constitutional level that does not involve courts in the collection of information from third-party providers? i am generally comfortable with the existing set of roles. i can't anticipate the challenges we will see based on , and aes, jones subsequent case called riley and involving a cell phone, so the trend is one we will have to watch carefully. i was a prosecutor here and washington, d.c. for 10 years. i can imagine a regime where as a prosecutor i can't go get cell phone records for a suspect or ,ank records with a subpoena but a subpoena is a low standard relative to the criminal investigation. sort of changing the basic rule that once you turn that

information over you have lost your expectation of privacy seems to me to be fundamental to how we think about how we conduct criminal investigations. again, it is important to note, it is subject to a subpoena so there is court oversight. so there is an opportunity for people to challenge that subpoena, but i think it is a good question because we will see some efforts to change the rule going forward. >> i would put my faith more in legislative oversight and solution to the kinds of problems you have anticipated then i would in a court solution. i used to be a judge and hung out with judges, and i can't think of a group of people, most are political silence majors and history majors and whatnot, but less suited to making this kind of decision by training, by their ability to

evidence. they have no ability to gather evidence could they consider what people put before them. they are not better suited. people may have more confidence in them, but that confidence may very well be misplaced. it is a responsibility better exercised by a legislature that has the ability to gather facts in private, when necessary, and session when necessary, and put restrictions on how information is handled rather than have courts cut with a meat ax to determine what is reasonable or unreasonable. >> that is an interesting perspective. i am reflecting on that fact to what general hayden said on the last panel about the growing lack of confidence that he perceives the american public having in their representative institutions for making these decisions. granted judges are even less

representative, but you have just premised the entire, well, bulk of your response on somehow reviving that confidence in congress. i guess i agree with you, but that sort of troubles me in some way. it troubles me to to say that people don't have confidence in a representative government, but ought noto say we to turn it over to somebody else because people have lost confidence. the answer is pull your socks up. >> a last thought on that is we have experience in cases going back to the pen register statute, smith versus maryland, you don't have any expectation of privacy in the numbers that are doubt into your phone, and

congress enacted a statute that regulated the government's ability to obtain access to that exact type of information and established a regime of court approvals based on standard that even though it was not required by the fourth amendment, it does further the privacy and civil liberties interests of americans. >> i've got plenty more questions, but we have about 10-12 minutes left, and i thought i would invite the audience to participate. two, anybodyen over here want to get my attention? >> tim wilson, american citizen, british veteran, involved in counterterrorism. are not to me that we the only country that has problems like this.

britain to has been through a fair amount. mainland was being bombed by the ira. the city of london realized it was incredibly vulnerable, at the time the most expensive real estate in the world. it was private enterprise that installed the first huge network of cameras with facial network recognition software, or bought by various companies around there for the city of london police. britain still seems a pretty free country. i am delighted to see this debate going on, but it does seem to me that there may be some element of reinventing the will. perhaps we can look at other nations. we are not alone on this. it your thoughts, please. -- your thoughts, please. >> london has the most comprehensive network of cameras anywhere in the world. nowd not known that until that this was provided by

private enterprise. bit of aw having a tangle between government and private enterprise in another i think we canre learn from it. we can learn from the fact that people go around and go about their business in london perfectly relaxed about the fact that cameras are focused on them because they know that although the camera may pick up their image, there is not some public officials sitting in their office someplace monitoring their particular activity, and that is the distinction. it is not the gathering of the information, but rather how it is process, who processes it, and for what purpose. so long as it is being processed in every are number of instances, people are perfectly relaxed about that. >> in the front here, sir. my name is -- japanese

security consultant. simple.ion is very national counterterrorism corporate, you mentioned sharing with japan. >> the question is how do we conduct information sharing with japan, and i can make it more broadly other countries. the national counterterrorism center, we weren't the main way the information get shared on counterterrorism, because that was largely done by the collection agencies themselves, with theira, and fbi

counterparts. they are the initial collectors of information and new who to share with and what rules would apply to the sharing of information. that said, we had strong relationships with japan and particular countries in europe and elsewhere in asia on counterterrorism efforts. what we were often sharing were analytic information that was collected, and we had a rigorous way of sharing that information with other countries, including japan. [indiscernible]

cia or fbi, each cooperate with the japanese police and agency in japan. >> thank you. buts a good perception, sometimes coordination is not as well directed as it might be. here.oman wait for the microphone, please. hear. no, no come of this woman. thanks. >> thank you. doris, typical housewife. the question i have as i am listening to this is i don't think people in america don't

not have faith in the law, but the question is when the law ,emains consistently the same and policy change -- how does that policy change affect people that your level in terms of where you draw the chalk line? law andtation of the what can and cannot be done, are you personally affected by new policy on the executive level? i think that is what frightens people, that we don't know that we are protected by the law. i would assume you guys would your -- no matter what the laws are. the policy determinations are made by the political branches

and the people who are selected to staff them, the people they appoint. the law remains is supposed to remain constant. -- you gety request a policy request from either in the department or from an entity outside the department goes to the office of legal counsel and they answer questions every day, can we do this, can we not do this, so the policy is supposed to be what our democracy is about. it is supposed to be the basis policy ore apply this that policy, but they will apply it in a setting where the law is supposed to remain the same. >> i would just add, i think your question is -- reflects this view that many people hold that what we've learned about in the last few years is that the

intelligence agencies were abusing the authority that they , and i think that is really unfortunate because i served as a lawyer in the justice and that is not the right perception. there was not an abuse. like i identified, reports, independent views cited as much. these agencies are working very hard to stay within the bounds of the law. role thanay a greater ever before in terms of channeling, guiding intelligence activities, and that has generally been a positive thing. the perception that the nsa has run amok the last five years is a false perception. famousavorite is, the

shakespeare line, first thing we do, kill all the lawyers, but it is set by someone who wants to disrupt and create chaos in society and he things killing the lawyers will eliminate the glue that binds the society together. this lady here, that general and there, and that will take us to the end. >> claudia rosett, i am a journalist. >> that is an understatement, folks. >> i have a question about the broad theme. you have been discussing here these detailed fine points of how to ensure justice, follow the law, what should be done, and following on the housewife question, these sweeping policies where we see the rise of isis in syria, we see iran having access to enormous amounts of money and markets and mobility and so on, all of which

affects things like the terrorist threat in this country in major ways. here i would like to ask you, ok, the job then is to try to is thereounter it, but a rising frustration that makes it at some point if a call to get good work done? meticulous crafting of things to try and track down these threats and then broadbrush policy that engenders massive amounts more inside the intelligence community, how does that play out? >> i think your question suggests a reality which is the in somewe face are ways expanding. i think they are becoming more complex. spread, a, the jihadist groups has grown. so the threat in some ways is , and at the same time,

our capabilities are going down, so the trend lines are going in the wrong direction. that is certainly a source of frustration for people who are responsible and charged with protecting the country. and let me say little bit more on wine, one of the reasons our capabilities are going down is because we explain so much, have given away so much, let lose so much information, about how we conduct surveillance. that is a critical way in which i saw the intelligence community lose capability to conduct surveillance of terrorism targets, so we have lost capability at the time we needed that capability more than ever. >> your principally talking about snowden. >> yeah. >> gentleman over there. worked in air force

intelligence and now i am an entrepreneur where i can move things along a little quicker. , intelligence agencies, how and where should they cooperate with the private sector, and we can think about apple and the fbi, if you want to do that, or speak more generally. the negative repercussions of the snowden leaks, in some way from my vantage point, the most damaging has in the impact on the cooperation between the private sector and government when it comes to protecting this country. we have seen it play out in a number of ways. it has been critical for the intelligence community to be able to take advantage of the innovation and ingenuity within it technology community and the united states, and if that is not available to nsa, cia, fbi,

that will make a significantly less capable. some of theined ground we lost because of the snowden leaks in terms of the trust of the american people and our working relationship with our allies. i think this was caused for serious concern. think it was an interesting development when people someone they are more likely to trust a large, private company to defend their freedom than they are their own representative government. description,t is a not a critique. i mean, maybe that is where we are right now with some of the --wden revelations relegation's. trys not the madisonian part model.

11:55, we areis going to take a five-minute break, and come back for our keynote lunch address, michael rogers. please join me in thanking michael mukasey and matthew g. olsen. [applause]

>> i will say down here and give you -- i say, i mean, yeah. well, welcome back from that short break. i hope you enjoyed the second panel as much as i did. we are going to continue the conversation, and i am particularly pleased to have former representative mike rogers to give us his viewpoint now as a former member of congress in a key post. we have heard from two panels giving you the view from the executive branch perspective. and we are building our way to the last panel, "a view from inside the white house: how the president actually uses intelligence." for now, we have a lunchtime treat for you.

my friend, mike allen, is going to be giving some framing remarks, then we will hear from congressman rogers. mike started his career after law school. he worked for president bush in the white house national security area. for three years, he was the staff director at hipsi. i cannot think of a better person to introduce our key note speaker than mike allen. mr. allen: thanks, david, and thanks to the heritage foundation for organizing such a great event. it is an honor for me to introduce my former boss and future national security leader, mike rogers, former congressman and chair of the national intelligence committee. i want to speak by way of introduction about chairman

rogers's time as the chairman of the house committee. he was a strong, conservative voice for a conservative internationalism. a strong national defense and an aggressive in fair intelligence community. himself, once a man in the field as an fbi agent. he knew what it was like to be around the campfire and to be at the tip of the spear. he brought those instincts back to washington. when i was his staff director, and chairman rogers had a reputation for jumping on c-130's and going down range , as it was called, two different places where our intelligence community officers might be surveying, he was unhappy when i explained the intelligence community, for reasons of security, or was unenthusiastic about his ideas to go down range while he was chairman of the committee. but the main point is that he was not content with the party line in washington and always

wanted to go to the source to get the real story. through that experience, he won the confidence of the men and women in the intelligence community and he was able to earn their trust. they would give him, and by extension the committee, the real story of what was going on. the first example, i think, and a great example of what you can do when you are on the intelligence committee is a member was the role the chairman rogers played as a member before he was chairman with regard to the war on terrorism. he became aware of a misalignment of resources in some of our direct action programs, and lobbied very hard, all the way up to president

bush, to try to correct what he saw as rule of engagement issues and micromanagement that was hurting the way that national security operations were running in the united states. he brought this attitude to the chairmanship. when president obama and some of his directors became weighed down with rules of engagement and other micromanagement issues, were able to take their concerns directly to the director, in some cases over, and over, and over again. on a couple of occasions, it was over dinner and i was relieved that there was wine served to calm the atmosphere. chairman rogers knew when things needed a good airing in the intelligence community. history will show that he was one of the ones that broke the

dam on chinese economic espionage. he spoke out on this on our worldwide terrorist threat hearings in 2011 and 2012. i think history will show really started the moment in which people began to talk about the thievery and pilferage of as intellectual property. chairman rogers was a friend and compatriot. someone who listen to what people in the intelligence community were telling members of congress. in the case of chinese telecommunications giants that seemed to be growing across the world, chairman rogers announced an investigation and put out a report that i think educated people around the globe. you cannot read an article today without there being a reference to the report that chairman

rogers and mr. rufus berger put out, warning of the element of a rising china. finally, in the age of snowden when so many people would not defend the national security agency, chairman rogers stood tall and help to explain to the explain to theo american people the need for great intelligence and why it was so critical to our national security, diplomacy, and are giving indications and warnings across the globe. this was at a time when it was not popular to stand up, and certainly at a time when the president was not doing all he could have been doing to back some of our men and women in the intelligence community. he was a tough critic of the intelligence community and went after them on budget matters and authorities, in areas where you thought there was too much micromanagement. his chairmanship will be regarded as one that

reestablished the tradition of aggressive, but fair, oversight of the intelligence community. i am pleased to introduce the chairman. chairman mike rogers. thank you. [applause] mike: i wish mike was that nice to me when i was chairman. [laughter] mr. rogers: i'm fortunate that i see former staff folks here. i think we have assembled some of the most able national security people in this town, in this country, to help. any success that i had was led by my staff director and the able team that he put together. i was honored to not only called and colleagues, but friends, in what i thought was very serious course work in trying to get the intelligence business right. i also want to point out was the closest i ever got to one of these was when david called me and asked me if i wanted to participate.

he is a guy whose integrity is impeccable. i had the great privilege to work with him the entire time i was on the intelligence community. it was a loss when you left. there is still a hole that is left to be filled with your experience and intellect to you apply to the cia and dea. i wanted to say "well done." some of other day i was with the former secretary at an event. someone asked, what is the biggest threat facing us today? you have to stop and look at the world. it has certainly changed. the security structure, the

threat matrix, has significantly changed in the last few years. i've said, one issue, one thing scares me more on all of the land, air, sea, cyber, space threats that we face. that is miscalculation. what if we get it wrong on north korea? what if we get it wrong on some maritime small conflict in the south china sea? what if we get it wrong on the iranian new missile testing program they are proud to show the rest of the world? what if we get it wrong? what if one of our allies gets it wrong? they make a mistake? the japanese are eager to push back on the chinese in the south china sea. when you are having meetings, they were aggressive about wanting to show they could push back against chinese aggression with the united states' help. they wanted to lead that charge. we are seeing the chinese airplanes brushing up against our airplanes and ships.

what if that miscalculation cannot be put back into the bottle and you have a conflict that rages out of control? we could spend two hours talking about the threats. i give cyber talks all across the country, and apparently my job is to scare the bejeezus out of people about what is coming. [laughter] rogers: we have a diplomatic corps that is engaged everywhere in the world all the time. secondly, it is good intelligence. intelligence has taken a beating by reputation. i think, completely undeservedly. you think about where we are and what kind of problems have been caused by nationstates deciding intelligence services are bad. europe is suffering under the hangover of world war ii.

they cured laws on what the activities of intelligent services based on what they witnessed and suffered under intelligence services whose business was to impress the populations. so you can't blame them. you can blame how they got there. when you look at what happened in brussels or paris, even the united kingdom, you can see where those rules, laws, and restrictions are pushing into the strategic value of intelligence services protecting its populations. intelligence services are bad was their fundamental building lock. that is not going to work. let's look at an example. belgicom is a major telecommunications company in brussels, and it was restricting the ability for law enforcement to do the operations it needed

to keep russell safe. -- bruelsssell's safe. to get the information we needed on a counterterrorism threat for sure. other european intelligence services decided there were lots of threats to this particular country. these folks were coming through great britain according to public reports, going to places across europe. they needed information on these individuals as they traveled across europe. they decided that they were going to go in to get those communications, follow those individuals across europe, i going into one of the telecommunications companies that have lots of access to those targets. it was belgicom. the snowden leaks come out. saying this is spying on europe, how awful and terrible. we need to close it down. what happens is all of the information that the u.k. was

collecting was dispersing -- there is a great article you can read in some british reporting -- talked about the value of the information they were getting that they could go back to brussels intelligence services and say, you have a problem and you don't know it. here it is. they could go to places like they could go to places like paris, say, you have a problem, here it is, they could go to places like germany, say, you have a problem, here it is. that went away. the european union decided to target the intelligence service's ability to collect information that was lawfully appropriate to protect both their country and the added

benefit was across the european union. think about that debate. in that same time period there was a ramp up a fake passports. in late 2015 there was an iranian individual that travel to thailand on a fake passport. he stayed in thailand for 20 years on a fake passport. his sole purpose in thailand was to engage in the production of fake passports. his number onelientele were middle eastern clients seeking passports to get into europe. when they arrested him, and it was all a fluke and how they arrested him, it was all gumshoe detective work. it was not a big intelligence operation. someone found a case of stickers going to a random place. that is how they found him. the guy has been there for 20 years. when they came in the door, they had 1000 passports ready to go. 173 were already named and id. -- id'ed.

way, they also had visa stamps. they were exceptionally good. the pakistani ring was operating in greece for the past five years. they broke up a ring recently. how did they get that? same way. someone in syria was mad at the competition. they were sending a case of these resident stickers that were immaculately close. they were so good, so detailed, so accurate. all you had to do was take it out of the box, put it on your passport, you are ready to go. your legal in greece. -- you are now legal in greece. and if your legal in greece, you can go other places as well. the reason they got onto it was not a great intelligence network and people trying to figure out what bad things are trying to happen to these country, it was

someone got jealous because another ring had opened. and in syria, someone said, i have a case for you going into greece. you should look at where it goes. we used to love those cases in the fbi. you want that cooperation. but that is not the way when you are under siege to protect your nation. strategic intelligence can help you. unleashing the power of these services to find out what they can do, versus the time and energy we spend telling them what they cannot do. and we missed that boat. we saw that here in the united states. the president issued a directive in the u.s. that restricted collection activities in the united states. we will pay a price for that. i argue in many ways we have already paid a price for that restriction. the political debate was how do we restrict the big, bad intelligence agencies from doing and awful?ig, bad,

everything was legal and appropriate. even the president's review teams wound they were legal and appropriate. the congressional operations found they were legal and appropriate. now we may not have liked what they were doing, that is a it wasnt topic, but important. the debate in the nsa contractor leak of massive amounts of information, we got a hangover and decided our intelligence agencies were bad. think about the threats. think about what is going on today. the russians are certainly changing their policy on cyber. they have fundamentally changed for their coming at us. we are going to get that miscalculation effort somewhere. they have gone into a place like ukraine and shut down their electric grid. now the good thing about ukraine is that it was not connected the way that our electric grid may be connected.

they went back and, i got in trouble for this, i love my ukrainian friends, they pulled the lawnmower start for transfer stations and personally man them they got power in short order after this massive attack. guess what? we could not do that. it would take a very long time. seewhen you start to russian policy change on being more aggressive in cyber in ways that we have not seen before, especially when it comes to distract of attacks overseas, and doing activities in the united states were it doesn't mind their signatures are found, that tells you we have to pay attention. we have a strategic problem in cyberspace. they have launched sophisticated nuclear submarines with more runs to the arctic. we announce that we are going to cut our standing army by 40,000 troops. then out -- they announce about one month later that they are sending 40,000 to a training exercise in the arctic. strategically, we need to understand what the world is

thinking. that is how you avoid miscalculation. what are the chinese thinking , for the first time in their history, by announcing by parliament last year they will allow chinese troops outside of their defensive region? when they passed it in the parliament they announced they are sending troops to djoubti for the first time ever. they have military components outside of their defensive region. they have upped their silent submarine cashe to a level that is disturbing. they have developed counter ship missiles they make our navy folks very nervous. they are basing their strength on what our strength is. they're trying to go after our shield. they are concerned about how russia and china have militarized space in a way that could disrupt our gps. you think of the strategic advantage of the united states

of america -- it is because we have smart weapons, smart ships, smart aircraft, and everything else that is pretty smart. the navy worries about this. if the navy is worried about it, you should worry about it, but every new naval officer after 2017 has to learn to use the sextant. yeah? developed in 1724. every new naval officer will have to use it. why? because the military is concerned what happens when the carrier gps goes out? many of you are thinking, how do i get to starbucks with that thing? can you imagine 30 million very cranky non-caffeinated americans in the morning? we're going to have a problem. it is serious. [laughter] rogers: if you look at

the strategic threats and how that has happened, many will start to argue and a lot of circles in this town and around the world, about america's loss of strategic advantage. someone say it is a little, some with a lot, some would say it is 10 years out. our adversaries are working that every day they get better and we don't. every day they engage in strategic espionage and we don't. the cia director said the cia does not steal secrets. i don't know about the rest of you, that scared me to death. as an fbi agent, you do not want your fbi agents stealing secrets, but you want your cia stealing secrets. that might be a problem in how we are approaching the strategic intelligence. if you are not stealing secrets, how on god's green earth do you know what chinese military leadership's intentions are?

when they show up in djoubti, we need to know, what are their intentions? you do that to avoid miscalculation. sometimes people are upset, i was not one of them, but they be we are looking at our good friends and allies on occasion. we do that because sometimes your allies can get you into more trouble you can do yourself. what if japan decides they want to be aggressive with the chinese convoy? we ought to know that. we ought to know that. what if the filipinos decide they are going to be aggressive on pushing back without coordination? we have a defense pact with the philippines. shouldn't we know that? shouldn't we know that germany had relationships with iran? if i'm a policymaker whose finger is on that button, we need to me as aggressive as we

can. so we are in this hangover period, basically where we are today. we are still hung over. we are trying to figure it out. the fbi beats up apple, apple beats up the fbi. completely inappropriate in my mind. there is no path forward. all they have found now is that they've found a solution that doesn't mean they have to go to court. fair enough. all those policy discussions have to happen. this is what worries me most. self-restriction, big problem in the u.s. intelligence collection. for really not great reasons. not because we find anything illegal, but because it didn't feel right. bad call, interesting decision, not great for our strategic value in trying to avoid miscalculation. but when you look at the alliances of economics and

security in the world, some of them are starting to part. apple, and this is a great example here, why do they say that we are for encryption, we don't care, fbi, go stuff it. we don't care that we have the ability to get into a phone that can lead to the full investigation of the death of 13 americans because their economics have not aligned with our national security. they need to sell these devices in europe, they need to sell these devices in china and europe and asia. the security and economics of that problem did not online. -- align. if you look at some changes in world demographics, one of our allies in asia is australia. about 25% of their gdp is

related to exports to china. so now, every time you have a national security discussion with australia about how we're going to push back the chinese in the south china sea, they pause for a minute. they are still one of our greatest allies and they are not going anywhere. but you can imagine the challenge of trying to get to a place where we have a common decision matrix on how to push back when 25% of their gdp comes from the nationstate at question. the national security posture in our economics didn't quite align. and so i argue the reason strategic intelligence, the reason an aggressive intelligence pture is important and why we ought to go through every line and every personal and presidential directive when we get the opportunity -- i know they debate it. i think there are some restrictions that we can improve on. we ought to go back and say, what serves u.s. interests, and what serves the world's interests, by the way? we should stop apologizing for

helping europe because we had an aggressive intelligence campaign that may have found the culprit for a new cell, or the fact that the taiwanese were able to get passports that were used in thailand, packaged through syria to get people into europe. we call that a good day's work in the intelligence business. but none of that happened the because of self-imposed restrictions. when you look at belgicom -- look, we took a major resource of finding bad guys traveling through europe and took it off the table in 2014. how many in belgium today would like to have the ability to get an intel share sheet that said you have a problem brewing in belgium? we found them because we are talking to people in france who are talking to people in great britain who are talking to people in syria. we lost that. and for what appreciable reason?

it caused a lot of problems. spending a lot of time beating up the intelligence services. not a lot of time catching folks with fake passports. the residence permits case was fascinating. when they got it through customs, remember those stickers -- we love those. about, they do look what we stumbled on. back. they follow it there were 4000 of these box,ents stickers in this one box, 4000. when they got to the place, something on the order of 20,000 documents being prepared in a forgery factory in the back shop of the front. one operation.

another great example, and i want to takes and questions here , and michael mentioned what i thought was a groundbreaking investigation on the committee because we had pretty good information that the chinese were engaged in a nationstate craft, espionage craft, of trying to get a company that is a chinese company into markets where they could collect information. it was one of the largest operations to collect information against u.s. targets, asia, africa, they were aggressive. and what happened recently, pretty interesting, the commerce department -- and this is why that should teach it to litigation -- that report freed

up some of our services to be more aggressive in the investigation so politics does not get her the way. vpe on the entities list i because of a complicated in everything you do not want, north korea, somalia, iran, other places. as it wasnteresting determined and you can find these papers on the department of commerce website. if you are interested, i say do it, read the chinese version first. that is how i would know you are really serious about this. then they have the english interpretation of the document. the chinese company was working anothercode name of company, and they were working

with f7 to further this conspiracy on trying to get these units into places where they could own the pipes, and when you own the pipes, you get to look at everything in it. they were trying to do this in united states very aggressively. they worked successfully in a small way in the united kingdom. they were trying to do it in australia, canada. new zealand. i find that interesting, all five -- nations. still trying to work into the united states. was -- so out that f7 much for the denial that these were not intelligence operations platforms trying to get into the united states. without rest of intelligence and strategic thought in how we reply our resources, we are going to get behind the 8-ball. there are more spiked in united states from foreign nationstate than at any time in our history.

they aree, and stealing of the. if it is not bolted down, it is going, and they will figure out how to get that. they are doing it through human operations,cyber they are stealing intellectual property at a breathtaking great, government secrets. anyone look at the recent chinese fighter? the j-31? looks like an f-35 me. one of the great fbi cases was catching chinese trying to steal separate,hnology on caught them exporting that material over a long-term spy operation on the west coast. i woulding case that highly recommend you go to the fbi website. they have a lot of these lifted in these cases. their espionage networks against the united states. think of the debate in the lt

months. the government is bad. mukasey said it best when he said, interesting that we think these private companies are going to handle your information better than government. we always joked in the intelligence base, we would love to get 1/10 of what google has on you. unbelievable. the fight has been in the wrong version. how do we get privacy? you can do that. it is called the fourth amendment. now is not the time to curtail our strategic value in intelligence. if you want to avoid miscalculation, we better know what russian front companies are doing, we better understand what they are trying to do in the arctic, what putin is trying to do in syria, not just from an on paper, that is where his troops are, but what are his intentions and long-term intentions? what are the iranians trying to

to do and how far will they push the united nations on missile testing? better know that. we all bitterness that or we will pay a horrible national security price. thanks for having me. going to some questions, comments, concerns? lunch? [laughter] yes, ma'am. >> [indiscernible] mr. rogers: look at the time. no, and let me tell you why. two things that i did not support it. there are good components in the iran deal. we have given away every ounce of leverage we will ever have. the whole notion of provisions is not accurate under the law, so there is a provision in the deal that talks about grandfathering any contract not specific to the nuclear program. doch means if it does not

with aluminum to's, but car parts, that contract will stand, which is why you see this huge flood of inking contracts. we have a great american country that they are trying to ink a contract with, and it would be a huge deal to this comedy. once that is signed, some notion that the u.s. will go back and when thee contracts deal says specifically it has to be related to the nuclear program, i think is very tough. the argument that -- i had this debate last week on the west coast with one of the -- who is a great diplomat and a very smart -- we just passionately disagree on the arrangement in was we willlt reclassify those contracts. if somebody will help me through that. the deals is one things. they want to request -- good

luck with that. it is not good. part of my fear is we have lost all this leverage to contain them, is why they step and missile program. two parts of the nuclear program, weaponization, enrichment, and missiles they just ramped up their missile testing clearly. they get to have an investment -- and enrichment program. it was legitimatized. can do this through your modeling that you do not have to have the trigger test like you used to. you still want to do that to confirm your weapons system, but you can go a long way on weaponization. my argument if that was our goal, we swung and missed. i do not see a way now to get it back. we will continue to put pressure -- the next president says he will reprint off, and it sounds great, but it is unfortunately not realistic. yes, sir. do we have enough information

on north korea because of our nuclear weapons they are developing? mr. rogers: anyone will tell you we never have enough. no, i do not. and since they were able to do --e things i think that were that happened under the nose of many intelligence services, including ours. and so they had some advancements. i think our intelligence services were caught by surprise a little, which tells you they have been very good about making sure that those operations are cover of those operations is pretty intense. we have some things they can go through our checklist to figure out if you are doing something bad. you have to do these five things. a lot of times you would see one

or two, maybe three, but you would never see 45 until this -- four or five until the last so-called hydrogen bomb which caught a few people off guard. it is in their heart target, -- it is a very hard target, very hard to penetrate, which means all of the avenues we have available he satellites, have to have a human component. if you want to avoid something big and that he done the road, better invest in this and use it up front. hopefully that woke china up a little bit. they have economic leverage in a black market on their northern border that never gets talked about. if you really want to hurt north korea, the chinese cooperate with us in closing down the black market for goods and services crossing the border in the north. the problem china is in an economic downturn, so i would argue good look with.

yes, ma'am. >> hi. i am a lawyer in washington, d.c. you said that we have more spies -- nations in this country more spies in this nation in this country that every before. how do you know that? mr. rogers: that is what the intelligence community is designed to do. everybody does it a little different. the russians tend to have professional intelligence officers. the chinese do it differently. they recruit people that are not necessarily officers perform intelligence activities when he gets united dates. if you look at the rash -- united states. if you look at the rash of prosecutions lately, especially on the chinese program, it highlights how they do their business and how these folks are not necessarily trained intelligence agents.

they might be engineers, they might fill in the blank scientists, someone who is sent for a specific goal of stealing a very specific piece of intellectual property. it is a very difficult thing for our fbi to get their arms around because it is massive, huge. and the numbers are overwhelming. you can see it on the russian front. you can see it on folks from iran their activities here, and opportunity come through, if you add up the numbers, it is clear that their activities against the united states have increased, and i am mature we have adjusted quite correctly on the way we are going to respond to those activities here in the united states. yes, ma'am. >> hi. i am a lawyer also, but a former naval reserve intelligence officer. comments were interesting, so my question is

what the interplay between congress and the executive branch. dte was put on the denied parties list of the department of commerce, but a few days they do, major attractions occurred, or what were perceived to be major attractions -- d attractions occurred. can you talk about some solutions, some ways forward to repair what has happened to the intelligence service and the role that congress can play to rein in some of the inconsistent actions that the executive branch takes that frankly seem to be shooting us in the foot? mr. rogers: this is a problem when your largest maker never -- largest banker -- never punched ? banker in the nose it is important we get to a balanced budget. it is important we stopped those with intentions -- and if you

think that. please do not. they will be aggressive in pursuing their interests around the world, and they do not have the same instructions we do. they understand some of our weaknesses are also our strengths. have a great free market oriented economy, and it is a string for us, and they see that as a weakness, which is why i would argue zte would make these offers are trying to get into any network at any time. if you look at their activities, they are still up to it. they have repurposed some wompanies that they are no trying to offer these services and say they will do it for free. remember, there was a sports team recently that was going to -- they would by come in and do every thing for free. if you look at the numbers, it sounds like an expensive operation. you start coming to the

conclusion quickly that this is not a for-profit enterprise. how did you do that? congress needs to push back a little bit on this. the information is pretty clear. the fact they made it on the entities list, there's lots of reasons for that. my argument is for the investigators that went through that process, they ought to be up at congress laying out the facts so you cannot let the administration get away with saying maybe it was bad, but not so bad. no, it is bad. if you allow them to control the types of information in the united states, they went, we lose. in a story. so i think we have to be aggressive about pushing back. it does not me you are calling for a trade war not like engagement in china, you have to be careful about people saying this is just about you want to set up walls and being an. absolutely not. i want to teach china to be good

business partners today so that when they are an explanation yet leverage. when they become a consumer nation, we won't know longer have leverage. catchingt by steps on when their intelligence sources are doing bad things, like they were, and we aggressively push back from a congressional perspective on the administration that says there might be financial implications. i feel that pain now, or we will definitely feel that pain later. i think we can get through this. serious problem. we will get through it. and your transparency is a great thing. just show the world who they are and why it is free. if it is free or dark close to free, there is a reason. so when zte shows of that great offer, remember who controls the information. thanks for having me. i appreciate it. we are not done yet, but you

get to eat. so for the ventricle provided in the anteroom, and we will the viewt 2:00 to hear from the national security advisor on how the president uses intelligence. see you after lunch. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> tonight president obama will wrap up the nuclear security summit. news we wait for the conference to get underway, we look back at his remarks made earlier with progress from the iran nuclear agreement. president obama: good morning.

it is a pleasure to be with our p5 plus one partners, european union, and the director general of the international atomic energy agency. because of the nations represented here today, we achieved a historic deal to prevent iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. toay is an opportunity review progress as that deal continues to be implement. our work together is a key part of the comprehensive agenda i have outlined in prompt seven years ago, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and seeking the long-term vision of a world without them. that included strengthening global regime that prevents the spread of nuclear weapons, and one of the greatest tests of that regime was iran's nuclear program. after two years of intensive negotiations, backed by strong sanctions, countries represented in this room achieved what decades of animosity and rhetoric did not -- a long-term

deal that subjects iran to conference of nuclear inspections ever negotiated. and thanks to this deal we have seen real progress. iran has already dismantled 2/3 of its installed centrifuges, shifted 98% of its enriched uranium stockpile out of iran, remove the arrak reactor core. january, the iaea verified iran had fulfilled key commitments of that deal. today we will get an update on the information. our nations have lifted nuclear-related sanctions, and it will take time for iran to reintegrate in the global economy. iran is already beginning to see

the benefits of this deal. i think it is important to note this deal does not resolve all of our differences with iran, including destabilizing activities in the region. except for limited exceptions, the u.s. trade embargo on iran remains in place. we also continue to vigorously enforce sanctions pertaining to iran's support for terrorism, and ballistic programs. that is u.s. policy. but what this group that does not agree on all aspects of policy does agree on is that this deal has achieved a substantial success and focused on the dangers of nuclear proliferation in an effective way. the road to this deal was not easy. it took commitment, hard work, it took the leaders and the countries gathered around this table coming together and working out our own differences in approach.

and continued implementation is going to take that same kind of cooperation and consultation, but i am a streaming grateful to our partners -- i am extremely great for our partners in this effort. faceas he continued threats around the world, this deal reminds us when the community stands as one, we can it finance our common security. of thent to thank all leaders gather here today, the countries who are participating, the director general. this is a success of diplomacy that hopefully we will be able to copy in the future. thank you very much, everybody. >> we will be hearing from president obama live shortly at the washington convention

center, in downtown washington, d.c., as he wraps up the weeklong nuclear security summit. while we wait for the president, a look back at his remarks on international efforts to secure nuclear material and efforts by terror groups to acquire nuclear material to make devices like dirty bombs. president obama: if everybody could take their seats, we would like to get started. [indiscernible]

president obama: good morning, everybody. it is my privilege to welcome you to washington and to formally convene our fourth nuclear security summit. i convened our first summit six years ago, in this same room because the danger of a terrorist group obtaining and using a nuclear weapon is one of the greatest threats to global security. our nations committed ourselves to action -- concrete, tangible steps to secure the world's vulnerable nuclear materials. and we continued our work at our summits in seoul and the hague. i want to, again, thank our friends from the republic of korea and the netherlands for their leadership on this critical issue.

back at our first summit, i quoted albert einstein. at the dawn on the nuclear age, he said, "the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything." and he added, "a new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive." over the past six years, when it comes to nuclear security, we've embraced a new type of thinking and a new type of action. this is a perfect example of a 21st-century security challenge that no one nation can solve alone. it requires coalitions and sustained coordination across borders and institutions. and the good news is we've made significant progress. we've made nuclear security a priority at the highest levels. and i want to thank all my fellow leaders from more than 50 nations and key international organizations for your commitment to this work and being here today. some of you were here for our

very first summit. many of you have since taken office and joined this work. but it's a reminder that the task of protecting our citizens transcends political ideologies, parties, and administrations. to date, our nations have made some 260 specific commitments to improve nuclear security -- and so far, 3/4 of these steps have been implemented. more than a dozen nations have removed all their highly enriched uranium and plutonium. countries have removed or disposed of several tons of this deadly material. nations have improved their nuclear security, including stronger regulations and more physical security of nuclear facilities, and more nations are cooperating to prevent nuclear smuggling. leading up to this summit, nations have fulfilled additional commitments. argentina, switzerland, uzbekistan all successfully eliminated all their highly

enriched uranium from their countries. china recently opened its new center for promoting nuclear security and training, and i'm pleased that the united states and china are cooperating on nuclear security. and japan is working to complete the removal of more than half a ton of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, which is the largest project in history to remove nuclear material from a country. i'm also pleased to announce that in recent days, after many years of work, 102 nations have now ratified a key treaty -- the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. as a result, we expect that the treaty will enter into force in the coming weeks, giving us more tools that we need to work together in the event of theft of nuclear material or an attack on a nuclear facility. several of the nations here made the extra effort in recent weeks to complete this process in time for this summit. and i want to thank you very

much for helping us get over the line. once again, i'm making it clear that the united states will continue to do our part. today we're releasing a detailed description of the security measures our military takes to protect nuclear material so that other nations can improve their security and transparency as well. for the first time in a decade, we're providing a public inventory of our stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, which could be used for nuclear weapons, and that inventory is one that we have reduced considerably. when it comes to our nuclear-powered ships and submarines, we're exploring ways to further reduce our holdings of highly enriched uranium. in short, everybody has been participating, and by working together, our nations have made it harder for terrorists to get their hands on nuclear material. we have measurably reduced the risk. but as we discussed at last night's dinner, the threat of nuclear terrorism persists and continues to evolve. fortunately, because of our

coordinated efforts, no terrorist group has succeeded thus far in obtaining a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb made of radioactive materials. but we know that al qaeda has long sought nuclear materials. individuals involved in the attacks in paris and brussels videotaped a senior manager who works at a belgian nuclear facility. isil has already used chemical weapons, including mustard gas, in syria and iraq. there is no doubt that if these madmen ever got their hands on a nuclear bomb or nuclear material they most certainly would use it to kill as many innocent people as possible. and that's why our work here remains so critical. the single most effective defense against nuclear terrorism is fully securing this material so it doesn't fall into the wrong hands in the first place. this is difficult. at hundreds of military and civilian facilities around the world, there's still roughly 2,000 tons of nuclear material, and not all of this is properly

secured. and just the smallest amount of plutonium -- about the size of an apple -- could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people. it would be a humanitarian, political, economic, and environmental catastrophe with global ramifications for decades. it would change our world. so we cannot be complacent. we have to build on our progress. we have to commit to better security at nuclear facilities, to removing or disposing of more dangerous material, to bringing more nations into treaties and partnerships that prevent proliferation and smuggling, and to making sure that we have the architecture in place to sustain our momentum in the years ahead. with so many members of the global coalition against isil here today, this will also be an opportunity to make sure that we're doing everything in our power to keep a terrorist group like isil from ever getting its hands not just on a nuclear weapon, but any weapon of mass destruction. so i am very appreciative of the

excellent work that's been done and the excellent conversation we had last night. with that, what i'd like to do is to invite prime minister mark rutte of the netherlands to review some of the specific progress that we've made since our last summit. mark. prime minister rutte: mr. president, dear barack, esteemed colleagues, and ladies and gentlemen, barack, your initiative in 2010 to convene the first nuclear summit has bolstered our defenses against the nightmare of a nuclear attack. the vicious terrorist acts in brussels last week only underscore the importance of the nss process. and it's fitting that we are completing this cycle of four summits under your leadership. in 2014, it was my privilege to welcome the nss tohe