the white paper that columbia water has produced, and i think it is so important, and we have a lot of challenges ahead, but as we address them, i think it is really important we do so in the context of climate change and social equity, and we have a great opportunity ahead of us to do that. not solve today's problems with yesterday's technology. we have got new opportunities ahead. the backdrop is climate change and social equity. computer question peter: i agree with that. we have 19th-century infrastructure and 20th century institutions and 21st century problems. we need to build the 21st century infrastructure and institutions to deal with the 20th century problems we did not deal with and the new problems we're adding on, like climate change. n: take a new approach. so i just want to wrap up by

saying thank you for hosting this event. it is great. thanks for each of you. brett,ime i you, and, first i seen from you, but i am so glad you are on this roadmap process, and we look with interest for the results. thank you very much. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] delaware up a smith primary for this coming tuesday, and this coming tuesday, we will bring you coverage of republican presidential candidate donald trump as he speaks to supporters in delaware. meanwhile, democratic candidate hillary clinton is campaigning in pennsylvania, and clinton talks to voters in pennsylvania. and tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span, supreme court

oral arguments over the obama administration immigration policy. texas court stopped implementation of the executive orders that would result in some undocumented immigrants staying in the u.s., and you can hear the argument in the case of the united states versus texas tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern. announcer: saturday night at 10:00 p.m. eastern, we will take a look at some of the speeches of president obama during his appearances at the washington correspondent's dinner. this year will make his final appearance at the dinner. president obama: jeb bush has identified himself as hispanic. it is an honest mistake. it reminds me of when i identified myself as american act in 19 d1. announcer: join us saturday night at 10:00 p.m. eastern, and be sure to join us for our coverage of this year's white house correspondents dinner on c-span.

♪ >> this month we showcase our student cam winners. this is a documentary annual competition for middle and high school students. this year's theme is "road to the white house." and students were asked, what issues do you want presidential candidates to discuss? one of our second prize winners from high school is from cherry hill, new jersey. a 12th grader at cherry hill high school east madeline bowne , wants discuss presidential term limits. and her video is titled "when a house becomes a home." ♪ ♪ ♪ >> the presidential campaign of 2016 -- as we approach the

elections, the press are revealing a trend. many americans say that the political outsiders like trump and carson over the career politicians. it would appear that americans are so fed up his politics as usual that many now favor unusual politicians. >> americans revile congress but keep reelecting incumbents over and over. it is really a bizarre moment. >> they are really at odds with one another, and -- >> based on a study, independent of the people of the bottom 90% have no impact on the actual -- actions of congress. the opinions of the economic elite and special interests, however are reflected in the , action of congress. >> what looks like responsiveness to the public overall is really a responsiveness to the economic elite. to distinguish the economic elite from other americans, the middle class and the poor, who

have virtually no influence over government policy outcome. >> while the study suggests the government does not reflect the people, it can also suggest that congress is susceptible to corruption. but not necessarily corruption by a traditional definition. >> well, it is not the petty corruption of trying to earn a few bucks on the side. the corruption of congress is centered on whether failing to represent their constituents. >> in 2010, a citizens united january allow union special interests and corporations to spend unlimited sums of money on candidates. the court of claims these do not give rise to corruption. or the appearance of corruption, because they're not being spent in court nation with the campaign. while it is illegal for candidates to donate directly, they were able to donate unlimited sums of money to super pac's, which then use the money for political advertising. one possible solution and term

-- for term limits is not a new concept. go all of the way back to the ancient greeks. some of the first supporters of limited terms. according to aristotle, it was a long-term that was the cause of establishment tyranny. fast-forward to the framers of the constitution, thomas jefferson urged the limitation of tenure to prevent a danger that might arise to american freedom from remaining too long in office. while the term limits were not implemented into the constitution, most representatives at that time limited their own terms. >> in the first century of government, under the constitution, the vast majority of members were serving one or two terms. >> let's go back to the present. >> it is one of the few issues were congress couldn't be more out of step. and that is because it is almost a conflict of interest. >> in the 1990's, initiating a movement to set to pass laws

that would limit the terms. of their federal legislators. an overwhelming amount of states did, but by 1995, the supreme court ruled against term limits, determining that states do not have the right to impose limits on federal legislation. >> is term limits constitutional? well, let's look at the text. how much weight do they put on that 10th amendment, and how do you see the interaction? there is no real answer to a lot of these questions. >> critics claimed it would effectively curb corruption and that it would affect experienced legislators. >> it is the experience of legislators that are given as $18 trillion national debt and two unending wars in the middle east, and the prospect of more, a government that is spying on every american. i would say that is not a very good argument for experience in office. and it might be a better argument for rotation in office which was what the founders wanted. many of these congressmen never go back and live under the laws they have passed.

>> an argument against term limits has particular resonance is the argument that term limits are undemocratic, the election process effectively limits them -- members of congress giving voters the power to put people into and take people out as they choose. >> the fact is, there are already term limits, it is every two years there is an election held. if the people want change, they have the power of their vote. they have to exercise that power. >> and right now, it seems to me that with 98% reelection rates, that is not real consent of the governed. that is just an incumbent protection racket. >> the organization represent us is currently championing the anticorruption act, a piece of legislation that proposes a three-part plan to stop robbery and secret money and the power of the voter. >> this idea of getting money out of politics is kind of a misleading term. it always costs money to run for

office, you know, and our contention is that it is better for the money to come from a diverse swath of the electorate rather than this tiny handful. >> with the recent supreme court decision, the so-called dark money is now permeating the election cycle. change to theic way congress is acting. our best hope to address some of these crucial issues like campaign-finance reform could bring new people into the process people that aren't , bought by the political machine. >> while many opponents of congressional corruption disagree over which route would effectively root out corruption, they all agree that the status quo is no longer an option. >> you know, i think a president who said, look i want an up or , down vote on term limits, and talked about it on the stump all over the country and continue to use the bully pulpit to

highlight the issues could have tremendous influence. >> i'm here the democratic debate in manchester, new new hampshire. temperatures are low here, but passions are running high. >> there are a lot of important issues. we respect that. but we respectfully believe that they will not be able to solve any of the other problems that they are talking about until they address the corruption of big money in politics. >> in order to have a true diverse citizen legislator they must get rid of the ruling ruling class that is protected via money. whether that happens with term limits, can find finance reform, --a combination of the two, campaign-finance reform, or a combination of the it is two, important we bring that conversation onto the presidential stage and into the national spotlight. >> to watch all of the prize-winning documentaries in this year's student cam competition, visit student cam.org.

announcer: now, a look at those who have buys on many issues, and a look at partisan politics. from the conference on the american role in the world, this is about an hour and a half. >> all right. welcome back. and i hope you had a good evening last night. we are going to begin this morning with a very weighty topic, the big vision of america's foreign policy and america's place in the world that goes by the name of grand strategy. presidential administrations have long sought the holy grail of having a grand strategy, of being the administration that

produces the next containment policy or détente or even the new world order, and that search for grand strategy has been instrumental, actually, in helping to build schools of international studies like this one. some of the first international studies policy schools that were created in the united states in the 1930s came about because of grants from the rockefeller institution and the department of states to help the government formulate a grand strategy for the united states. so this is a place where the nexus between academia and policy making is strong. what is a grand strategy? and is it achievable in the current moment or really even in any moment? i think there are a number of basic components that we can point to. one is it's an integration of

the part of strategy. it involves military strategy but also diplomacy, trade, technology, economics, and even military and goals thrown in into a single narrative, a of the kind of world that the united states would like to create. it's a narrative that should resonate or at least appear to resonate with the shared values that would give it appeal both doemestically and to key allies abroad, and it ought to have some durability that would make it last for perhaps more than one administration. so not surprisingly those three traits of policy, integrated policy, one that's durable, one that has -- that reflects consensus values.

it's not surprising that it's so historically rare that a consensus behind a grand strategy is achieved. so one question we might be asking today is whether conditions exist now for creating such a grand strategy. we have a terrific panel of experts to discuss this with us today. all of them are on your program except for professor sarah bowerly dansman who will be joining us to talk about the economic aspects of grand strategy. let me turn first to dean james steinberg who is a former deputy secretary of state, now dean of the maxwell school at the university of syracuse to ask what does the exercise of trying

to create a grand strategy do for policy makers? why search out and try to be the next george cannon? why do policy makers want to have a grand strategy? >> well, it is a great question, and it is great to be with such a wonderful group of people and to be in the presence of the great leaders of our country and made such a powerful impact in getting us to think about these questions for america and the world, so i am really honored to be here and be a part of this. the discussion about the grand strategy, there is almost always a linear, geographical conversation about how far you muchrom washington and how you talk about grand strategy. there have not been very many meetings any the situation room where people have set down and have said, good morning, ladies and gentlemen, what's our grand strategy for the united states? we all kind of have this vision of cannon getting in his office, an office that i sat in, the policy planning shop at the state department and saying,

let's have a grand strategy and puffing on our pipes, but the reality is quite different. and so i think it is important, first, to ask does a president need a grand strategy? i mean, i know we all in the academy think this is really important and critical to the success of the united states achieving its objectives. first we need to ask, does the president need a grand strategy before we ask the second and equally difficult question, which is, is it possible to have one even if we need one? because the two don't necessarily go together even if we do need something that meets some of the criteria that you've laid out, it may not be possible to actually have one. and so my answer to the first question is, sort of, yes, we do need something that approaches what you talked about although i think less grand than what the grand strategists would like us to have. and also sort of in terms of whether it's possible. so briefly on the first.

why do we sort of need a grand strategy? i think we need something that is reasonably integrative and has a sense of the core objectives and means to achieve them. that's what strategy is after all. it's identifying goals and a means to achieve them for a couple of reasons. first, for all of us who have studied or practiced international relations in foreign policy, the choices that leaders have to make are difficult. we don't have the tools, the metrics, the algorithms that allow us to know precisely how a choice of a particular means will lead to a particular end. we have to -- and in terms of deciding and making tradeoffs sometimes between conflicting objectives. so we need a set of tools that allow us in this world of great uncertainty to make choices, that allow us to decide, well, if we have a conflict, should we intervene or not intervene? we can evaluate the pros and cons. in the end, they're judgment calls that require a broader perspective to allow us to make

the difficult choices, to make the tradeoffs, to make the judgment calls. in that sense the strategy are overall objectives and the best ways to achieve it helps break the tie or break the -- you know, provide the decisionmaking principle under a situation of uncertainty so, you know, you can take an intervention in libya or syria and say, should we do it or shouldn't we do it, there are lots of good arguments on either side, but if you have the view that united states interests will be threatened if the dictators are allowed to suppress their people. look, these are messy conflicts, the united states should only intervene in situations where there's a direct threat. those are places in which a broad strategy can help decide under considerable uncertainty. the second reason we need something that sounds like some of the things that you talked about is that presidents and the principles in government are very busy people.

they cannot sit around and decide every little question, so there is a huge bureaucracy, a decision-making operational mechanism that conduct the policy for the united states and other countries. people need to kind of have an orientation about what to do, and having such a grand strategy allows the system to have a whole sort -- sense of orientation and to have some guidepost as they conduct the day-to-day is this of government in day-to-day government affairs. we can talk about it perhaps later but, you know, one of the tools that have been developed in recent years is the so-called national security strategy. the national security strategy report that came as a result of actions by congress in the act that required the president to do this. the goldwater nichols act. i remember when i was at the

nsc, we had done one of these things and they weren't very satisfactory for reasons we can talk about. you began to wonder whether it was worth it. i ran into at the time the assistant secretary for the middle east at the state department. he happened to be -- you know, this is really important. i said bob, why? , he said, because i have to do this day-to-day job of being assistant secretary and trying to run my bureau and when i try to think what are the goals and objectives, here's a document, a set of things i can look to, that help me think about how i do my job. this is equally true for the military and the pentagon in terms of its own planning and thinking about resource development. having a kind of broad blueprint actually helps facilitate the day to day work and make sure there's some degree of coherence to what goes on. in government. the third reason it's important is one you alluded to, in terms of communicateing to external constituencies. you have to have some kind of narrative to explain how to think about all these individual decisions which in isolation can seem hard to understand or difficult to see how they fit together.

whether it's talking to congress or talking to the american people or talking to friends or talking to adversaries, having some kind of narrative or strategy i think is very powerful both in terms of people understanding what you're doing but also influencing how they respond to you. if they thing about what the goal is, if you have a view, for example, when we were dealing with the problem of nato enlargement. you thought that that was going to be something that motivated the united states. it allowed other countries, europe and elsewhere, to the the overall approach that the united states was pursuing and what they could do for it, so i think for all of those reasons, something that approaches your categorization of a grand strategy, but it is hard to do. >> what's your sense of when that narrative gets constructed? does it happen in policy discussions after an administration has begun or should it already be apparent to us in the context of the presidential campaign?

steinberg: so i was going to say something which i'm not -- i don't know if my colleagues will agree or not. first of all, i've had the privilege of working with some, and even though they have not to thee time they come presidency, they have a view of the world. when you think about all of the presidents, the grand strategy or the strategy he pursued by president obama, this comes from him and from his views. it is not they come in and say, ok, guys, what are we going to do now? what is our strategy? the president comes in with some. officials can help flush it out and put the pieces together and make sure they fit,

and so the formulation or the feeling you have takes place over the course of an administration, it comes from the perspective that the president has. it in a dates the forming of the government, and it would not be successful if it did not really reflect the kind of values and the orientation that the president himself or herself brings to the job, and so i think this sort of notion that it is a blank slate that you are going to write a new strategy on in the situation room, it belies the reality. it would be surprising in a democracy that somehow you were electing somebody who did not have a view, whether it is present reagan or president carter or president obama. they come to the presidency with a view of the world, with those principles, values, orientation. to talk about why it is also hard but not impossible.

host: i want to go to the professor next, too, as the historian on the panel here, to ask -- yesterday, we had a lot of discussion about ideological deadlock kind of paralysis in the current political situation. and i'm wondering if historically or in your own experience if that is necessarily an impediment to creating a comprehensive vision or useful vision of foreign policy or whether grand strategy can be made in circumstances of political polarization. mr. zelikow: well, thank you. as someone who actually has been the drafter of a white house grand strategy, i share jim steinberg's skepticism about these documents and the process. let me tell you as a historian what actually really happens.

what really happens is that presidents come in with notions of the world that are not terribly surprising. then things happen which they did not expect. and for which the military has no plans. they improvise either ably or poorly. and then the country is either happy about the way it turned out or unhappy. and then in retrospect, they rationalize how that all happened and what the grand strategy was looking in the rearview mirror. after they've already done these good and bad improvisations. ofean, we had this legend george cannon containment 1947. i was taught this in college. of course the containment grand strategy doesn't start get talked about that way until the middle of the 1950s. well after the korean war was over. and then you look back oh, it , was george cannon. cannon's importance greatly exaggerated. but of course having that sort of story makes it easy for undergraduate teachers and easier for undergraduate students, and so to bar an old quote from a movie, "the man who shot liberty valance," this is

the west. if we have the truth or the length legend, we print the legend. so i'm skeptical about that. now therefore, i'm also a little , optimistic actually about your ability to do things. because actually yes, there's all this partisan gridlock, and most of the gridlock has to do with old political scripts that people carry in their heads that actually at the moment are increasingly really pretty irrelevant to what's actually happening in the world and what is actually going to happen which will probably surprise them. so then since they're going to probably be surprised and they're all -- then they're going to improvise. and you see the partisan trench warfare won't dictate very clearly to them how they're supposed to improvise. i mean for example, i'm looking , at nick cullather here. ofund the time at the end the cold war, which came upon us much faster than anyone expected, the senator improvise

gee, let's do something about , nuclear weapons in the former soviet union to help clean that up, and that was a brilliant piece of improvisation which turned up brilliantly, but if you looked backward and say, he wouldn't be able to do that because of partisan grid look and none of parties had been talking about any of these ideas, and so he had a chance to make a move. the two constructive points i'd like to make to the audience are these. first, we are actually entering a new era of world history. from the era that i and all the older people in this room grew up with. i grew up -- i was trained as a cold warrior. i grew up in an era in which the primary issues were international. that is between rival blocs of nation states and the issues were defined by the borderlines between the blocs. since the end of the cold war, we're increasingly in an era of

world history in which the issues that will shape the future of the world are transnational more than international. that is, instead of being defined by the borderlines between states, they're defined by the borderlines in a way within states that cut across them. what do i mean by this? the great issues i think the historians will decide turn the first quarter of the 21st century will be things like energy and the environment, the handling of ultrahazardous technologies. whether cyber, nuclear or biological. issues of global public order. including immigration, terrorism and transnational crime. including places like mexico and not just iraq. the fate of global capitalism and whether it can be effectively managed and

an increasingly globalized world with global companies. and the fate of the bottom billion who live in the 50 broken countries in which their people cannot advance. how those issues are handled i think are likely to be the decisive variables that historians will look back on and determine how we did in this century. so if we were to -- if you think about that, there are a couple of implications. first of all, of course, hardly anything in the political process is really focused on this in the way i've just described. second, note that a big difference is when i grew up there was a pretty clear dividing line between domestic and foreign policy. all the issues i've just described tend to present themselves in every country as domestic issues. although, in fact, their causes and the ways to solve them tend to be global and can only be addressed effectively in partnership. so in a way, what you then need

is to develop coalitions of common domestic policies. if you think that through the implications of that, for politics, for the whole institutions that we built in the 20th century that are increasingly ill suited for these problems. and then on top of that, we are experiencing the most profound economic revolution in 100 years. since the end of the second industrial revolution which is the digital revolution. i believe we're in the early phases of a revolution that will be as transformative as that one was 100 years ago. with dramatic effects. economic, social, cultural, others. so now, hold that first idea in mind. that is, international, the transnational, the blurring of the domestic and the foreign and all that means. now, think about a second concept alongside that. just think about the role of the united states. imagine for the moment that everything the united states

does will mainly rely on what i'll call an indirect approach. i'm cribbing a phrase from an old military historian long de what do i mean by that? look, policy consists of mostly confronting a bunch of problems. there are big problems and thin problems, fat and tall. and you confront these problems. an indirect approach means basically we can't solve almost any of these problems by ourselves. and mostly the american people don't want us to solve all these problems by ourselves directly. they're kind of disillusioned about that. so that means to solve these problems, whether it's global waves of immigration, breakdowns in global capitalism. the problem of isis. the transnational crime in mexico and central america, all of those are problems.

narcotics, cyber. i've got to work through others. i've got to work through others. the battle against isis will not be decisively won or lost by the united states troops. it will be decisively won or lost by muslims fighting with other muslims. that's a slight simplification but it's not a dramatic. so then the issue, if you care about the outcome of those fights is you ask yourself how do we raise the odds that a side we want to win in that fight wins? we can't do it all ourselves. we have to work through others. then you think, how does the united states role play in ways that enables others or the causes we prefer to be more likely to succeed than not? if you think, then, about all our tools in that way and you kind of look at our institutions, we actually build our institutions for a world in which we mostly relied on doing it directly and ourselves. in lots of different ways.

and i'm suggesting actually a very different building up. there are elements of it now. really building up a much different kind of skill set. if you just thought for a little while about, say, u.s. policy towards mexico, which by the way i don't think gets nearly enough attention. the united states isn't going to invade mexico to solve any of those problems. the more intrusive our presence there, the less we're going to be able to achieve. but the -- actually the mexicans need the americans to be able to solve any of their great problems. they need to be working with the americans. then you think through, what are the tools there, what are the role wes roles we can play. when i was young, a country seen as a basket case, which is co colombia. you think about court system, police.

many of these issues are domestic in mexico but yet the mexicans, we're not accustomed to think in this way. by the way, if we think in this way, what you end up doing is you end up flying over and skipping over most of today's partisan arguments and gridlock and mochblving the debate into a new place. i find it ironic that we're so stuck in these old arguments. it's kind of a nationalist position. we don't want to be multilaterally tied down how we handle the law of the sea. so the republicans have been stuck -- the republican party, much of, has been stuck in this rut for more than 20 years. today, the republican party, by taking that position, is the

biggest ally the chinese government has right now in the south china sea conflict. because it is a significant liability in confronting the chinese over the issue of the south china sea that we can't use the law of the sea argument as effectively because we won't ratify the treaty ourselves for reasons that are 20-plus years old. w we're actually really helping the chinese on a crisis that actually matters a lot to us. because we won't endorse a transnational rule set that actually would be hugely in our interest. again, because we're following these old scripts. so the thing i want to leave you with, if you internalize these two messages each trying to suggest, transnational, indirect approach, you might be able to see a way to get around, fly over or reconceive a lot of the partisan arguments that paralyze us now.

>> i wonder if i can turn to you to talk about the implications of that element of grand strategy. which has been pretty stable i think over the past, i don't know, 50 years or so. the united states has advocated a policy that we might call free trade which has had pretty solid domestic consensus. are we at a moment right now because of these transnational trends, because of the way in which they manifest themselves in domestic politics or seem to, in which that grand strategy or that piece of grand strategy might be falling apart? >> yes, i want to also echo those who spoke before me. thanking this wonderful conference. we had a great conversation yesterday and i'm looking forward to continuing that today on this panel. and the one in the afternoon on indiana's place in the world. so thinking about transnationalism as it applies locally as well.

and as a scholar of political economy and international political economy, what i'm struck by in this conversation is oftentimes when were talk about grand strategy, we're really thinking about the ways in which there are specific orientations to the world that influence the ways in which we deal with crises. and what different about trade policy is trade policy tends not to be driven by particular events or by crisis. and so there -- it's this important aspect that has been in the background of u.s., i would argue, grand strategy. i believe this has been a huge part of what the u.s. has been trying to do in creating order in the world for a long time. and i was agreeing with the notion that now what's most important is understanding how trade policy and the ways in

which the u.s. attempts to continue to institutionalize free trade globally is increasingly about trying to facilitate transnational networks. which is quite different from oftentimes we're trying to disrupt transnational networks. so there's these interesting parallels and crossovers. but in particular, you know, i view that one of the important things that the u.s. needs to continue to maintain is our centrality and prominence in trade and financial networks going forward. and one of the ways that the current administration has been trying to do this is through the transpacific trade partnership. deal. which now needs congressional behavior to be implemented.

and i think that the tpp really helps to pivot us more towards asia in important ways, especially in terms of helping to create more ways for -- to create multilateral negotiation structures and also i think most importantly creating specific regulatory advantages that allow small and medium businesses both in the u.s. and also in the asia pacific sphere to integrate into global value chains more easily. i think a lot of what we've been talking about over the past couple of days is how does the u.s. maintain leverage in a growingly, you know -- in this devolution of u.s. power.

when you build affinity net works, the need for leverage becomes less important in some respects because you create shared interests. and so i think that this is very important to understanding the ways in which trade helps to facilitate the strategic objectives of the u.s. more broadly. and to get to your point about what's happening domestically is that i think that what is happening right now in the u.s. with our -- with the presidential primaries on both sides of the aisle is an understanding that there has been -- there is a sense among a percentage of the electorate that this is not working for some portions of the american public. and i think that in a large part, this concern about globalization is a bit misplaced, but i do think it reflects problems that the u.s. hasn't dealt with their trade policy in terms of selling it to

the american people and understanding the ways in which we need to facilitate ways to allow people who have been hurt by globalization to be retrain retrained. you know, trade is good overall for our economies but it also creates displacement. when the u.s. doesn't really address that part of trade, that downside, we're putting ourselves at a disadvantage. so one specific example, right, is that when the senate authorized a fast track promotion, they did so without attaching as well the particular bill that would allow some trade adjustment practices that would help those that lost jobs because of the tpp. i think it's important for the u.s. to understand how those

sorts of -- those sorts of policies interact with our global -- our foreign policy as well. >> so grand strategy is going to require some adjustment in domestic policy in addition to foreign policy. >> otherwise, we won't be able to continue to push for, you know, institutionalizing trade more broadly. >> interesting. the digital revolution is an aspect that professional zelikow highlighted yesterday as well. something that is transforming the world. empowering individuals for good or ill. at the same time creating situations in which governments like ours can't keep secret their secrets. i want to talk about this rapidly moving technological terrain, whether it's even

possible to think in terms of a grand strategy to react to that. >> thank you very much. let me echo my panelists in saying what a great privilege it is to be with not only distinguished colleagues here but in the audience. for me it's a special pleasure. if you'll just indulge me for a moment. to be sitting next to general renuart. also carried out the sacred duty of tracking santa claus on christmas eve as command earn of norad north com and answering calls of anxious children who wanted to know where was he. from my point of view, that's the highest form of public service so -- i think it is possible to have a grand strategy. i'm going to encourage, at leetch in the rellleast in the realm i think about, the role that cyber plays in every aspect of our lives, to maybe abandon the word "grand." i think any

strategy would actually be incredibly helpful. if we can possibly get a rash rational policy. i think it's desirable. i think it's necessary. i think it's achievable. let me just say a moment to say i'm not a wildly optimistic person when i talk about these issues. because we have created a world now in which digital technology undergirds everything we do. every communication we make. every sector of our economy. our cars rely on computers. if that's not good enough, we want driverless cars. by the way, we're going to have drones flying overhead to ensure we live in a totally digital world. if we do it right, we will all be gone and it will just be digital technology enjoying the planet and global warming won't matter to these technologies. so we're in this odd situation

where we have built into everything. you buy something at target. there's only one on the shelf because the moment that bar code is scanned, they order another one which comes in by a truck. it will be an automated truck within days. that puts it back on the shelf. we use a supply chain that's entirely digitally based. we control all of our most basic utilities all the way from the sewage treatment center in the city of bloomington to switches on our rail ways to our natural gas pipelines. every bit of that controlled digitally now. go look for a wheel you can stand out there to turn to change the flow of water or change the flow of natural gas. you can't find it. it's all digital. and of course we're all carrying devices which digitally track us. which digitally record us. our every thought is captured. whether we send it by e-mail or voice mail or text or anything. even places where we've been using technology for years, we have decided it would be a really good idea to put it all

on the same technological backbone, namely the internet. think about atm networks. 30 years ago, you drove around looking for that little symbol that was on the back of the card. i need a cirrus network or i need a -- no longer. banks figured out we don't need to own networks. networks are expensive. we can just use the internet. that will be terrific. right, because this is the same internet that connects the rest of the world. this is the same internet that connects pornographers and drug dealers and terrorists. airplanes as they flew from sector to sector through dedicated networks. until some bright person said we can save money by doing this on the internet. so now that control is handled on the internet. the same internet our kids are playing games on. even when you think about an airplane in flight, you know, every airplane, three redundant systems.

if it's a critical flight system, it must have three redundant systems. what is the backup for the a-380, the now largest commercial airplane flying? it's an ipad connecting to the wireless game network on the plane. now, that's great for the airlines. they save a lot of weight and money. but it means at the end of the day, that whole plane is no more secure than that game network is. and then those ipads are. where do we get this technology from? every bit of it comes from outside the united states. do we know if it's secure? we have no idea. none whatsoever. it is beyond the capacity in any economically affordable way of any agency to make sure the routers it's using, the equipment it's using. it's not a question of simply we can't do it, it's that we're not even trying to do it. we're so excited about the money we're saving. the convenience we're adding. the new toys we're building into our lives. so the federal government's been busy replacing thermostats with

digitally addressable thermostats. was it that big of a deal to have to have someone go room to room to change the thermostat but now we can do it from one location. the same sensors that pick up temperature also can record voices. so we've now digitally connected to the internet a microphone in every government office and conference room where the switch has been done. and now we're reverse engineering it. we're going in at great cost and replaysing those with digitally secure thermostats. medical devices. we're all going to be wearing one somewhere. i have an insulin pump on. this insulin pump controls my life. you can have an implanted pacemaker. you can have any number of devices. all of which for convenience sake we made wirelessly addressable. no one has to open up your chest to test your pacemaker anymore. they use a blue tooth connection. did anyone think about securing that? that would have been expensive. that would have used up

additional battery life. something we weren't required by any regulation to do. so we haven't. here's where we are today. we're living in a world in which we are dependent for absolutely everything on an infrastructure that is fundamentally insecure. and there are no meaningful incentives to make secure. there are moments where you see a lot of attention to something specific. but that passes away and we go back to using an infrastructure, an insecure infrastructure. even when we use security, there's been a lot of debate recently about inscription. very strong encryption. that's a lot of character. you can't remember that. what do you do with your encryption key? you store it on your iphone which you protect with a four-digit password. your fancy encryption key. which meets dod standards and should. it's very high level of

encryption encryption. is utterly worthless when you protect it with a four character password. better yet when you write the password down is especially appreciated. on the back of laptops. which surveys have shown the majority of users of laptops do. so this is the good news. we are relying for everything, for our lives, for our economy, for our safety, for our national security, on an infrastructure that is incredibly insecure. that is highly interconnected. that is addressable from the entire world. so we need some strategy to deal with this. today, for many perfectly understandable reasons. i don't for a moment cast dispersion on the people involved in making those decisions. we don't have that strategy. we know how to do something in the military. when we invade iraq, iraq knows it's been invaded. right. we spend billions of dollars to

do it. we put command structure in place. when we deal with cybersecurity, we have a coordinator. that is the highest ranking official for cybersecurity in the u.s. government. a coordinator. i can tell you, if the government is anything like the university, coordinator is not the title to get a job done, right? commands no resources, no authority, no budgetary authority. you know, can give speeches and write blogs and try to use moral persuasion power. similarly, we have totally and many ways this has been a good thing but i think it's a good thing that has gone too far. we have stayed away from regulation in this area. despite the fact we know there are significant reasons markets don't work here. tragedy of the commons problems. problems of the misplaced incentive. amazon says of course we would require multifactor authentication. thereby requiring you to have some sort of key fob or password to log in.

if only our competitors would require it. the public will abandon a transaction if it's delayed for even as little as a few seconds. so we can't be the only ones to do it. if only the administration or congress would require the use of this technology or even incentivize it. currently there's none of that. literally outside of health care and finance. and of course very highly regulated industries like nuclear power and so forth. there are no broad-based cybersecurity regulations applicable in the economy. so i think it's not surprising that we don't have a strategy and therefore the rest of the world, which to be honest does look to the u.s. for leadership in areas such as this, is totally baffled by what we think we are doing. let me just give you one practical example. this relates to current events. but, you know, we've been sort of locked in a struggle with europe for -- well, three centuries really.

for the past decade over the question of whether the u.s. provides adequate data protection. and europe keeps threatening to ban exports of data to the united states and we keep putting together solutions that are designed to make it look like we have the standards of data protection, of privacy protection, that meet european requirements. it's been a very uneasy relationship. it's threatened trade. threatened security because of an unwillingness to share data if we don't have adequate protection. we had a safe harbor agreement under which companies could voluntarily agree to this agreement and then they would be able to move data back and forth. after the snowden disclosures, it became very hard for u.s. companies to say your data will be well protected because it doesn't matter what the company does. the company can say we share your data with no one. but if the nsa intercepts it from us, that's going to be a problem. the u.s. has worked mightily and quite effectively as a matter of fact with the national security

community moving people back and forth, explaining the steps we take to protect data. to stay out of corporate data. unless it's a suspect for investigation of a serious crime or terrorist offense. then we have the apple/fbi. in which the fbi ends up announcing to the world two really astonishing things. one, we know how to break into american technology. as of this morning, measure sharing this with our state and local partners so they can do it as well. thereby eliminating this intense diplomatic work with europe to say really we're a restrained government. we have a process. we have a foreign intelligence surveillance dortcourt. aparentally the fbi has none of these officials. it's out on its own making this announcement. simultaneously making the announcement. by the way, apple, the world's largest operating system, has a vulnerability.

so for those of you who have nothing better to do, you might want to go look for it but we have a copy of it on our website if you want to come look for it here first. security people around the world are looking astonished. not over the question of should the fbi get there. that's not at all my point. but rather the way we as a government chose to deal with incredibly sensitive issue that has enormous trade, enormous diplomatic relations and, frankly, enormous security ramifications. let me stop there. >> wonderful. >> is catching a plane at the end of this panel, i could see he was getting a little uneasy as heyou were talking. >> ask general rr enuenuart. has a history of following strategies.

is there a part of the world where you think american strategizing is particularly weak, where we need to step up our game in terms of strategy? >> thanks, nick. it gives me a direction to go. again, like my fellow panelists, i want to thank the dean, the school, for just an extraordinary couple of days and the opportunity to interact with people that are leaders truly in the world. fought on some of these issues. i want to get to that question in a two-step process. i think jim steinberg makes a great comment about grand strategy and can we get there. i think as a military planner operator, most of my career, i try to pull those statements of

national intent and ethics and values and relationships down to a level that you can distill from a national security strategy to a national defense strategy. and of course as was mentioned, the dod hangs on that its budget. so i worry sometimes that we translate national strategy to not there, won to next year's presidential budget as it goes forward. it limits us in the way we view and pursue strategic objectives. jessica matthews made a great comment yesterday. i've used this in a different set of words. but we are 100% wrong at predicting the future. we can create a grand strategy, as you mentioned, phillip, that has specific goals. but understand that tomorrow something will occur, 9/11 is a

great example, that completely changes strategy. we the bush administration came in and secretary rumsfeld became the secretary of defense, he had a vision, truly a strategy, of transforming the department of defense. it was too cumbersome, too expensive, too big, caught in history. 9/11 happened. and it changed his framework for what transformation that ought to be. so as we go forward, i think we need to try to return a little bit to a view of really what should america do around the world. and for me i go back to the four elements of national power that were sort of -- not beat into me, but certainly exposed to me from the time i was a lieutenant until the time i was a four star general. and that is the combination of diplomatic and informational and economic and military elements of national power really allow

you to achieve a strategy, grand or tactical. and i think we've gone away from that frankly. i think we've -- we've allowed ourselves to become episodically consumed. each of those has a strategy potentially none of those strategies mesh together. so i think we have to understand that's the world we're going to be in. as phillips said, it's less bipolar and more transnational. so now to get to a region, i think there are probably two where i would say we have not quite got this right. one of them, phillip mentioned in central and south america, i think the transnational criminal activity tt occurs in that region is something that we are in a period of containment. we're not in a period of active

solution. part of that problem is the demand signal for much of that criminal activity is here. it's drugs and it's gangs and it's -- not immigration. illegal immigration. and so i think we've got to go back and look at those elements of national power and deep side how do you take this problem on with all four of those elements of national power effectively you'd litzed. mexico is a great case study. i spent 3 1/2 years focused on next koeb as the commander of u.s. northern command. and i had a wonderful relationship with the ambassador in mexico city to create a strategy that we could engage with the mexican government on. lots of success. lots of setbacks. obviously, two change governments much like we do. so that does create some challenge. i think we have to understand in

places like mexico, colombia's another good example. it was the message of the united states being a partner with a country like colombia and continuing to interact. people talk about, you know, we've been in afghanistan or iraq for ten years. i think we've been in colombia for a couple years more than that. we're still having discussions with the government on how do you solve this. not simple solutions. it took us arguably 25 years after world war ii to create the kind of stable model in europe that they are certainly benefiting from today. so, i think we've got to really focus on all those elements of power in central and south america america. now at a time when some of those countries are very vulnerable.

we see significant investment by russia and by china in that region. and they're not there to buy them military equipment. they're there to buy influence. and we see some of that influencemanifested. on difficult issues when interestingly some of these countries come out publicly in favor of a position that china or russia supports. truly, it's in many cases because of that economic input that has been used there. and we don't do that well. the second region of the world and i'm going to use the term maneuver in the global commons. sounds like a military term. by the way, digitally, i just sent a signal to move fred from the naughty to the nice list so that santa will get to him next year. amazingly, the power of these military commanders. talk about how you move military forces. it is how do you as a nation lead in areas that are

transnational. phillip mentioned a number of those. one he didn't mention that i'll make a strong point on is access to water. we will fight another fight somewhere in the world over access to or limitation of the flow of water in the countries. and so i think we have to be present in each of those areas. the global commons certainly in the sea. the law of the sea. as a military four star commander, i was arguing in favor to republicans about passing the law of the seas. i think it's critical that we have a seat at that table in order to solve some of these things diplomatically. not militarily. yet we find ourselves having to use that military tool sometimes too often. the global commons certainly are the international maritime environment where we move

arguably 90% of the world's economy every single day through a number of choke points we don't always control. space. cyberspace. i was in annapolis yesterday morning at a board called the energy systems network. is really focused on how to become a leader in energy systems. we have a great presentation by a gentleman talking about autonomous vehicles. and when you think about how that vehicle operates, everything it does comes from the digital world. gps, laser, radar. camera images. all tied together in a computer that tells the car how to drive and they demonstrated it driving from the east coast to las vegas for the ces last year. so i think that is a common space we have to lead in.

and if you think about movement of goods, good goods and bad goods. we have to lead in how do you secure the movement of trade and how do you secure from the movement of illicit traffic across borders, across regions of the world. how do you influence nations to become a part of a coalition to take significant action there. i differ with some folks who had spoken that say the u.s. is -- we're clearly in a diminished role of leadership in the world. i disagree. i think we have the opportunity to continue to be a leader in the world but in very different fashion. i don't have to put the largest investment in to a particular activity if i can get 12 of my friends to put in a lesser investment and we solve the problem.

but i spent a lot of my time just as an anecdote post-9/11 i was the director of operations at u.s. central command. and so that was planning and executing all of the operations in afghanistan and iraq. we couldn't do that as the united states. we had a coalition of 70 nations. some as small as estonia. some as large as our most significant partners. what you find when you operate that, and our diplomats do this every day, is that you've got to create common sense of purpose among each of those nations. and they all have to feel like they contribute to that. so as we circle back to can a grand strategy be effective for the united states, i think if you can look at those core elements of national power, and you look at where nations can contribute and the u.s. leads that effort, i think you're successful there.

one final point that i think is, you know, maybe a good anecdote about why we've got to really pay attention to this, in another job in the pacific, i lived 2 1/2 years there, and part of my role was to be one of the key planners in how do we defend taiwan. if china chooses to, you know, return taiwan to the fold. and as part of that, we studied chinese military strategy. what was striking to me is that our strategy literally deals with the next five-year defense plan maybe. their strategy deals in the next 50 years. when you look at the things the chinese have done militarily over the last ten years, i can look at that study of strategy and they're right on track. they believe they can challenge the united states in those global commons where we are most vulnerable.

trade, economy, information. certainly military. we see that with direct dissent. we see that with air bases being built on atolls in the middle of the south chinese sea. the united states can't allow that balance of power to shift in that way. we're slow to realize that. i think part of it is because we don't look at a long-term view of how we, the united states, should be involved and lead in those regions of the world. >> for our students, i'd like to -- i'd like to connect this to actually what happens in policy making. about the generals comments. gives us a chance to look at a particular problem in how strategy can make a difference. i've been thinking about the president's decision to go to cuba and to build more normal relations.

there's a question about when you go and if that undermines your defense of human rights and democracy by giving credibility to this regime. but one of the things, you know, phillip talked about indirect means and the general talked about the importance of cooperation in this hemisphere is that for me strategy helped resolve this question. one of the big barriers we've had to deal with these transnational problems in our region is the fact the united states have become marginalized by fighting over cuba's ability to participate in hemispheric matters. every time we went. it was a significant barrier to getting cooperation from our partners on a range of issues which are important to us. i think in the end strategy helps you decide, well, yes, there are arguments for or against dealing with a repressive regime in cuba.

work being closely with mexico and others who don't like our policy and find it harder to cooperate with us because of our cuba policy. you say, okay, hereby's a framework to help decide this argument where we have policy arguments on both sides. for me, that was -- a strategy to help did the president do the right thing. i think that's the place where strategy can make a difference. if you have your ideas focused on the kinds issues. you say, how did it fit into the broader framework. it is the thing that allows you to at least come to a set of rules to help you engage in the process of policy making. >> that's interesting. i think what you're talking about there is just the need to have a kind of intentional process for reconsidering the old threats. the ways in which foreign policy can be rooted in habits. there was a house -- i think they now call it the international affairs committee.

hearings in 2008 on grand strategy. one of the comments that was articulated at that was the united states doesn't have a grand strategy. what it has is a lot of habits. i may just throw that out as a question to the entire groups. what old scripts do we have right now that are worth intentionally discarding. prof. zelikow: let me tackle that a little bit. remember i argued to you if you accept it if this transnational hypothesis is right, that the old line between domestic and foreign policies is blurrier. so actually a lot of the foreign policy issues are really domestic policies. so right now, there is a huge global struggle under way over the character of domestic governance. there is actually a hostile block of powers. let's call them iran, russia,

china. they're not formal allies in any sense. they're not united what they're for. what does unite them is what they are against. what he interest all against in domestic governance. they are all against what we think of as classical liberal ideals of governance. that is, there are against freedom of thought versus dogma. they come down on the side of dogma. when it comes to open participation based on merit and opportunity, instead of hereditary or faith driven or criminally driven oligarchy or aristocracies. they're in favor of oligarchy and not in favor of opportunity. when you look at the

opportunity, basically do you prefer an open economic system with maximum opportunity for new entrants or do you prefer monopolyies in league with the government. they tend to prefer monopolies in league with the government versus opportunity. all the things that go with this. this is an old argument about how to rule societies that goes back now more than 200 years. notice now for example right now what's happening in central and south america on these issues. look at the domestic issues in brazil. where you have a brazilian government that's on the verge of being impeached and replaced. look at the domestic governance issues and what's just happened in argentina. where an anti-liberal government has been overthrown in preference to a liberal government. look at the tension that's going on right now in the country of ecuador.

look at the tremendous conflict that's now unfolding in venezuela. with a totally anti-liberal government moving towards complete dictatorship in a country undergoing full economic collapse, fighting against people who are trying to clamor for the restoration of liberal ideals. that is a domestic struggle that's also occurring all over everywhere else in the world. whether we're talking about the recent elections in indonesia or we're talking about struggles in india or in burma. if you think about that, the struggle does not fall neatly into the category of a foreign policy issue. so then you ask yourself though of course the united states should care about how the struggle turns out. we don't want the anti-liberals to win. if we want generally to foster what i would call an open civilized world.

so if we don't want the anti-liberals to win, how do we support the people who favor liberal ideals of governance? it's not as general renuart pointed out, the use of military right and left. it might be thinks like defrost the difficult environment in the americas. the problems with cuba were interfering with our ability to rally liberal causes in latin america actually and kind of paradoxically. but think about the positions that america would adopt in a lot of different controversies around the world in order to align itself or strengthen these causes in these domestic struggles. do we care, for example what happens when the anti-liberal elements challenge norms in europe in places like hungary or now even a little bit in poland?

i don't think the united states is indifference to that but it's not as if we can intervene in hungary. how do we wield our instruments? how do we exercise an indirect approach to simply tilt the odds a little bit that one side comes out on top instead of another? take china, for example. this is where i'll close. the great issue of china. yes, there are surface encounters with china in places like the south china sea. but the fundamental issue of china is what is china going to be when it grows up. the chinese themselves do not know the answer to this question. and they're deeply uneasy and anxious about it. right to the level of the top leadership. and, by the way, any american who claims to know what china's going to be in ten years, one way or the other, is someone whom you should not listen to any further. so, but then does the united states care how china resolve

these great domestic struggles? of course it cares. it will have enormous effects on us. ask yourself, how then, if the u.s. cares a lot, does it foster one outcome over another when obviously direct intervention in china is out of the question and not feasible. that's where you come in to ideas of you foster certain kinds of norms, create certain kinds of incentives. whether it's a broadly shared consensus law of the sea that unites everyone around china but china, that chinese notice and see. whether it's other kinds of norms where you make global capitalism and the digital revolution look like it could work. et cetera, et cetera. this is the place where we need to figure out how to advance our conversation on how we foster these sorts of transnational advances on all the issues we care about while increasingly

not relying on blunt force direct intervention which the american people mostly don't support anyway. >> can i piggy back on that for just a half second. another great example of how combining elements of national power can create political change. you'll also recall maybe that that was the hotbed of the revolution in, with the government in that portion of indonesia. subsequent to that infusion of international aid and development, the rebels agreed to peace talks, not without the

understanding that this influence, this infusion of global good through the use of military and later civilian activities maybe provided the opportunity to negotiate an internal political discussion that could lead to peace among rebelling parties. i think that when you think about solving a problem in that multidimensional way, it leaves a strong impression. interestingly, relations with cambodia and vietnam considerably warmed after that, and they were observers. they just watched what happened. so so, the united states is the only nation that has that ability, that unique ability, to incorporate each of those critical elements of national power in a way that you don't paint the picture of military, you paint the picture of a

nation with compassion, with values and with the willingness to help. and i think, to sarah, the importance of trade in this is critical. i think, philip, maybe we have a better opportunity to influence directly via trade than maybe we do in all of the other areas because both countries are critically dependent upon each other for their livelihood. dean cullather: i'm going to leave plenty of time for your questions, so, if we could have the microphones come down here on either side. let's see, we already have one person with a microphone, good. mr. wilson: am i on? >> yes. >> keith wilson from the political science department here at iu. thank you for the extraordinary panel. i wanted to maybe get back to the original question about grant strategy, and i guess i'm struck by maybe some disconnection between the principle of a grand strategy and the practice of it.

dean steinberg had mentioned the usefulness in certain context where there's a lot of murkiness going back to the grand strategy as kind of a framework for solving problems. my own reading of the national security strategy, if we were to take that to be an example of the grand strategy, leads me to believe it's a great articulation of a variety of different principles, but then, general, you may know better than anyone, when it comes to actually facing challenges, a lot of times you can go to the national security strategy and the grand strategy at large and you can find solution -- you can find a number of different courses of action that can result from that. i just wonder if you could articulate maybe some of the weaknesses to the grand strategy, and ultimately, if, in fact, the grand strategy leaves you in a situation where you're not able to get to some of the very practical solutions i think that professor zelikow alluded to. again, what really does it accomplish?

>> let me just very quickly, and then i'll let the others mention. the important element that dean steinberg mentioned is that it's a framework. it's a document that we look at and helps us sort of figure out what the vision, the interest -- those principles are of the president. from the military perspective, we then take a national defense strategy review that tries to translate that into each department of the armed services. but it's also a document that other nations look at to understand where's the u.s. mind in all this. one of the failure -- one of the pitfalls with becoming too specific -- that may not be the right word, but too direct in a grand strategy, is that you now limit yourself.

so, you really want the overarching national security strategy to outline those key principles, but not limit your response. recall, we're 100% wrong in predicting the future. and so, what you want to be able to do is below the level of that grand strategy create the framework that allows the u.s. to be agile in some fashion as it applies itself to unique problems anywhere in the world. and i'll stop there and let others -- dean stei prof. zelikow: i'll add this. one thing that you can do is, it is -- and let's not call it a grand strategy. but one thing that leaders can do is describe the world they're in, and basically, offer a diagnoseis of the patient. as i tried to do in a small way. and then you can ask yourself after you've heard it, hmm, does that offer me any insight that i didn't already know?

and by the way, around the government, if you can describe the world in a way that kind of maybe adds a little clarity or a little focus that wasn't there before, then you've advanced the ball. that's actually a very important thing that you can do. that's actually a very important -- i remember when franklin roosevelt was giving his fireside chats, he wasn't laying out a roadmap. and before pearl harbor, he didn't lay out a roadmap for how the allies would win the war. mostly, the purpose of the fireside chats were just to tell americans, here's the world you're living in today. in fact, in one fireside chat, he asked them, please take out a map of the world. and the newspapers printed a map. so that he could simply tell them about the world that they lived in today, so they could basically understand the diagnosis that disposition would call himself dr. win the war, dr. new deal giving

way to dr. win the war. this is what the doctor was saying is going on in the world. and later, you'd hear more about prescriptions. and the other thing -- then if you want a grand strategy, grand strategy really just begins to provide a roadmap that offers some sense of direction of which way you should drive. maybe very detailed directions, but usually not because you don't want to tie yourself down and you don't want to annoy anyone. so, these doctrines are often just terrible bureaucratic things that are cures for narcolepsy. but -- or induce it. what you should ask yourself whenever you hear an important strategic statement, or read one, is did this tell me anything about what the united states wants to do that i didn't already know before i read this statement? or if it says, like, the united states wants peace, strength and prosperity, gee, i could never have guessed that.

all right, so, then that tells you really nothing. and then it's basically, these are just placeholder documents that are designed to allow you to do whatever it is you actually need to do and make sure it's consistent with the strategy. so, but occasionally, rarely, the government does say something that actually tells you something you didn't know before you heard it about what it's going to try to do, and then that can be important about overall goals. >> down here in front. >> adam. adam: thank you for the opportunity to ask a question. my name is adam lift, professor of international relations here in sgis. i have a question for the entire panel, but was inspired by some of the things that philip was saying. and i extract two important themes from what you were saying. first, the idea of the scripts being old and being in need of an update. and second, a theme that was echoed in the remarks of several other panelists, the unpredictability of events.

i think a key part of strategy, grand or otherwise, that is often left out of the debate, perhaps because it's less sexy, but is arguably essential, fundamental, is the importance of designing institutions to effectively, efficiently and expeditiously achieve those objectives. this is very much in my mind these days because two of my major research projects today are on looking at the rationale behind and the likely consequences of both china's and japan's creations, establishment of new national security councils in late 2013 and the implications those likely have for crisis management with the hook of a possible east china sea low-level incident. so, how do we, how does america need to reform or restructure the key institutions in the government and in the military and reallocate resources effectively to maximize the

flexibility, adaptability and rapid response that this new 21st century, the challenges we face require? thank you. >> adam, you stumped them. >> no, i think we could spend a semester on this, and we do in many different contexts. i mean, i think that first of all, it's important folks understand where institutions get value, but not to overstate it, because i think this is, like grand strategy, architecture gets a lot of attention in the academy, and you know, is often kind of more of an academic exercise than a reality, that somehow, if we just move the blocks around, things are going to work out. and there's no doubt that institutions, both domestic institutions and international institutions, can solve some problems that are difficult to achieve in the absence of institutions. the fact that you can have repeated interactions, lower transaction costs increases predictability, knowledge, dependence on each other. so, there are plenty of reasons to do it. but it's also true that the institutions have to work with the underlying forces that are taking place.

and they are the substitute for it. so, when we think about all these architectures, whether it's reorganizing the government, if we had a different nse or a different state department or pentagon or a different interagency process, yeah, there are different things you could do on the margin that would mirror things phil talked about the margins, the trends, do we have ways of talking about the transnational domestic things and whether our institutions are, you know, surface those things and bring the right people to the table. but i think for me, it's always been substance is more important than the formalities in the organization. it's understanding the points that philip and others have raised here and their importance. the process can adapt to that and will adapt to that. and we've seen this over time. you can make changes in the organization on the margin, but it's only when you get the insights about the substance that you really begin to then make the adaptations and get the commitment that allows the organizations to adapt.

>> let me -- you may know, this is the 30th anniversary of the goldwater-nichols act. and currently, senator mccain and the armed services committee are undergoing kind of a review of that, and should that change in some way. and you know, i'm -- here i am as a military guy, saying we need some more government involvement in this, but one issue with respect to goldwater-nichols is while it drove the national security strategy process, it really then focuses attention on the department of defense and how it was organized and created the joint commands and the regional commands. it didn't say anything about that whole other behemoth out there that is the rest of government. and we don't have right now any instrument other than the national security council and the consensus that it reaches through the principles to the president to drive the rest of government to be more interagency focused.

a number of us have sat in deputies' committee meetings and principals' committee meetings and national security council meetings, and i think all of us probably have the frustration that so often you spend great national resource in terms of the people that are involved in that room and you walk out without a decision. how can we not get there? and i think part of it is that we still need to connect the other half of what a goldwater-nichols did for the department of defense so that government -- and you talk about, you know, these old, rusty things that we have -- government is forced to have those interdepartmental discussions in a way that drives to decisions. and obviously, that's something i think steve, yesterday on a panel, said he would like to see new presidents sort of not create a 100-day road map and then charge toward it, but rather, step back and take 100

days and do a new assessment of how the government operates and maybe where we ought to go and what we ought to change. so, i think there is some of this that without some direction from congress, it will continue to be very difficult to move with the agility that we need to in some of these areas. >> so, a quick -- let me go out for a quick example. look at capacity of what you want to do, then work back from that. so, just an example, the united states -- there's a lot of problems of public disorder around the world. very quickly, very quickly, if you look at these problems of public disorder, this is domestic disorder at its roots and would ideally be solved by police and administration of justice with then heavy use of the military as even in those countries as a last resort, because military units aren't going to stay there and police the town for the next 20 years, right?

so, then u.s. government wants to help with policing and administration of justice. so, when the united states actually was asked the question of how has the capacity in the u.s. government to train policemen better to solve problems of great disorder? looked around. state department. [laughter] >> like, and who -- the state department had no particular administrative capacity to know how to train police, but there was a bureau at the state department that knew policemen. so, what they did, basically, is gave the state department hundreds of millions of dollars at one time and said -- and what the state department did is, any companies out there that say they know how to train policemen? a couple companies raised their hands, say yeah, we know retired policemen who would be happy to take your money. so, the state department then just becomes a contractor for people who -- for private companies that claim to have the capacity to do what it is you need to do. now, and this turns out not to be a good story, and it gets

addressed and patched in various ways, but never really has become a good story. and by the way, to this day, it is not a good story. why? we look to a foreign policy agency to have the expertise to handle an essentially domestic function. if we wanted to solve the cyber problems that mr. cate mentioned -- let's suppose we wanted to create safety codes -- i sometimes prefer fire codes -- to create safer systems. you would not find the institutional know-how, the capacity to do that in the department of state. actually, if you ask where would you find the capacity to do that in the u.s. government, this would be a hard question. one place you would look, actually, is the department of commerce, which has an entity called "nist" that hardly anyone has ever heard of, that actually has a little capacity in this space. but that's what i mean, is that these are important international problems. the capacities to solve and address those problems usually lie in outside the traditional

national security agencies or don't exist in any agency at all. so, then ask yourself, how do i build this capacity, and then ask yourself the question, and by the way, what label do i stick on that, and i'll figure out later what meetings they go to. >> let me go to ken moss in the far back. we'll make this one the last question. >> thank you very much. ken moss, retired here in bloomington, taught a number of years in the national defense university. first, a very brief comment that's already partly been amplified. foreign governments amplified. foreign governments and foreign audiences study these u.s. national security documents. they read them like romans read

in materials -- end trails. and to some extent, almost to a point that is distressing. and i'll leave it at that. i can tell personal stories, as certainly a number of the people on the panel can. i'd like to pick up on a point that general republicannuart has pointed to in part, and i guess link it in the relation to the program and the relationship between this process, the national security strategy process, and the academy at large. there is an argument often made that our national security process within government has become so absorbed by the daily momentum of events and demands that there is not much long-term thinking, and that the long-term thinking, in effect -- and i'm trying to say this as succinctly as possible -- is increasingly being outsourced, in effect, to the think tanks. that's where you have to go if you're going to get longer-term, visionary thinking that is beyond the four or five-year cycle, either of u.s. elections

or other matters. is that something that you would agree with? is there a problem in that? should there be more long-term thinking within the government, or is it a responsibility that increasingly is going to have to fall on the outside specialist who comes in, either into government at times, or floats out? >> let me just briefly comment on that. i mean, having been head of policy planning. this is kind of the standard rap on government. on one level, of course, it's true. people say, in fact, you have to deal with the crisis in the moment. but i think the bigger problem is recognizing that you can think long term, but you act in the short term. and the real issue is bringing the horizon of the long term

into the decision-making that you have now. so, i don't think it's the absence of long-term thinking, i think it's the lack of effective tools to take those broad perspectives and to think about, if we want to be in "x" place in ten years, what will we be doing now that gets us there. and i think it's that nexus. so, so, you just get a disconnect between the two. and i think it takes a very special kind of set of frames of mind and intellectual tools to be able to link the two, and i'm going to leave on this as in my life as an academic, who is a former policy planner, is that this is where the academy can play a really important role, is to think about that part, not just think about grand strategy in the abstract, but to think about how you take those perspectives, those long-term trends, the kinds of things that philip talked about, and translate them into choices that we're making now. because otherwise, you can write long policy planning papers, you can write think tank papers, but they're not going to matter to the decision-makers, the actors, unless you can say, well, if you accept my broad, long-term trends goals, et cetera, what would that mean for me to do today?

and when we engage in that kind of analysis and thinking, then we're actually bridging the gap between those different mentions -- dimensions in a way that's useful and meaningful to the policymakers who are not indifferent to the long-term impact but have very few people explaining to them how the choices they make now will have those kinds of long-term consequences. nick, i'm going to apologize -- >> and that seems like a very good point to end on, so please join me in thanking our panel. [ applause ] ♪

>> the primary election in delaware is coming up on tuesday and we will bring you live coverage of donald trump, talking to supporters today in delaware. we will have it live. and hillary clinton is campaigning in pennsylvania, which also hold a primary on tuesday. c-span2 will have live coverage this evening as mrs. clinton talks to voters.

tonight, at 8:00 p.m., it is the supreme court arguments over the obama immigration policy. a texas court stopped implementation of the executive orders that would result in undocumented immigrants staying in the u.s. hear the oral arguments in the case, tonight at 8:00 p.m. president obama delivers his last speech to the white house correspondents association at the end of the month. this coming weekend, we take a look back at previous routines. here is a portion of what you will see. president obama: nobody is prouder to put this process have certificate- birth matter to rest. finally, we can focus on things that matter, like, did we fake the moon landing?

roswell?ly happened in and where our biggie and tupac? [applause] obama: all kidding aside, we all know about your credentials and experience. [laughter] president obama: seriously, recently in an episode of celebrity apprentice, at the statehouse -- steakhouse, the men's cooking team did not press -- impress the judges and you mr. trump recognized the real problem, the lack of leadership, so ultimately you did not blame littlejohn or meatloaf. you fired gary busey.

and these are the kinds of decisions that would keep me up at night. >> you can see more from the president's speeches on saturday night at 10:00 p.m. we will also have background on the tradition from a white house correspondent. this year's dinner will be saturday april 30 and we will take you there live at 6:00 p.m., one of the biggest social event of washington. this will be the president's final one as president and it will feature a comedian from the nightly show. ♪ night, the historian talks about the hit broadway musical, hamilton appeared -- hamilton. >> i was reading it on vacation in mexico, looking at about song hop song. at the hip

and i was thinking, what on earth is this guy talking about? me on theuy said to spot, because mcpherson was was -- because my first question was, can hip hop be the vehicle to tell this story, and he said we are going to educate, and he pointed out that hip hop can pack more information in its form because it is so dense. and he talked about hip-hop with internal rhyme and he started educating me on all these different devices that are important to the success of the show. >> sunday night at 8:00 p.m. on c-span

? . republicans to unite before the presidential spokeon, a representative in florida, telling the group that a republican convention will be fair and the party will support whoever the candidate is. we will show you as much of that now as we can before the donald trump rally begins. [applause] >> as you all know, we have taken initiative to push back against misconceptions, the rules for how we choose the nominee have been transparent and effective for decades and this year is no different. i will say more about the convention and the process and a little bit, but i want to keep the rest of my remarks brief. i am proud of what we have done over the last two years in the

inhave put our party position to win the election. we will be holding our convention in cleveland, in the heart of will -- heart of one of the battlegrounds of america. we are implementing strategies to raise money and connect with the voters online. and our national organization is making an important difference in registering new republican , all overthose states america, we have soared by 70% to 2012. -- since 2012. these a compliment are significant -- accomplishments are significant, but will mean very little if we do not unite behind whoever our candidate will be. this goes for everyone, whether you are a county party chairman, and rnc member or a candidate.

politics is a team sport and we cannot win unless we rally around whoever becomes our nominee. wrong andprove people show that republicans will stand side-by-side with each other, stronger than ever before. and our candidate have a special opportunity to show leadership on that front. our candidates are running for the nomination of the republican party. they are trying out for our team, nobody is forcing them to where our jerseys. we expect candidates to support our party and our nominee. [applause] i know that our candidates are going to try to say some things to attract attention, that is part of politics, but we need to get behind the nominee. unity makes the impossible,

possible. and division makes the possible, impossible. scripture warns us about how bitterness can easily damage unity in the church, but it also describes how pleasant it is when god's people dwell in unity. the same applies to our party. millions of americans will vote, but they are making decisions right now about who they will vote for down the line. the sooner republicans unite, the sooner we will show america we are the only party ready to lead the course that america is waiting for. [applause] and that brings me to my second point, you saw from the video, we are working hard to lay out what might happen at the convention. it is a good reminder to remember the preamble to the rules, which says, the is

resolved, the republican party has the party ofhe open door. ours is the party of liberty, equality, and opportunity for all. and favoritism to none. our duty is to be the party that lives of -- up to the ideal of our preamble and that is what we will be doing for a fair and democratic convention. in march, we launched our conventions' thatwebsi -- website to make sure that people know what will take place at the convention. theill, educate and engage for the convention. as the nomination process goes on, we are preparing for every scenario. we might have a nominee by july,

or we might have a nominee through a valid process at the convention -- balloting process at the convention. the rules say that you need so many delegates to be the nominee, we will not and the nomination to anybody with a plurality, no matter how close they get. you need a majority. [applause] goes, as the old phrase close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades. we remember the fire of 2009 over obamacare when it looked like obama would be three votes short, we did not say, just give it to him. he needed a majority. thomas jefferson wrote, where the law of the majority ceases to be acknowledged, the government and -- end. if we do not abide by the majority, we do not honor the

value of american government. majority rule is as american as anthony -- as apple pie. contestedo an open or convention, the process is nothing new to our party. this is the way we have done things. it took abraham lincoln three ballots. it took me seven ballot to become chairman. a big landslide. [laughter] >> the process of writing the rules will also be completely above board. having a committee to set rules is not unique, it is true for the boy scouts for the rotary club, or any other group that has an organizational structure. it only makes sense that the convention is governed by rules written by the 2006 he delegates

-- 2016 delegates. they have been written by those on the floor and everyone will have a chance to see info on the changes, if there are any. transparency will be the hallmark of our convention. the whole world will be watching the democratic process at work and we are excited to show off the best our party has to offer. regardless of when we get a nominee, the bottom line is that republicans will leave cleveland united and ready to win in november. [applause] we need to do,g we need to stop hillary clinton. the country cannot afford a dishonest, flip flopper who is chomping at the bit to rubberstamp the obama agenda.

we know that she wants to appoint a left-wing judge to the supreme court, who will treat the constitution as a doormat. our party is focused on the future and she wants to drag us back to the 1990's, again. i am sure her server probably still uses windows 95. [laughter] >> i guess we do not know where the server is. speaking of which, the fbi investigation into the secret server is going full speed ahead. we are looking at former staffers being called on to testify. will -will will- if that is not a sign of trouble, i do not know what is. we are letting americans know that she cannot be trusted in the white house. [applause] >> by the way, we hit almost

record turn out for our meeting this week. we never miss an opportunity to drive a message, see you probably noticed, if you need to access the wi-fi, the process -- password was, hillary cannot be trusted. everybody had to type that in to get into the wi-fi. [laughter] >> you know the clinton machine is on the warpath against republicans because they are desperate to hide their flaws. they know that americans do not like her, do not trust her, we need to be prepared for how they will throw everything but the kitchen sink at our candidates, because it is their only hope for victory. in the ditch, where they are. in conclusion, we know that the stakes are higher than ever in this election. we do not win in 2016, future

generations may never know what kind of freedom and prosperity that has marked our nation from its birth. it might sound dramatic, but i think it is true. and it may be more difficult than ever for the party to make our case for our values in the face of a can't -- president who the obamaoint -- put administration on steroids. it will not happen on our watch. we will come together. we have inspiration from that great book, team of rivals. there were four men wanting to be the nominee for the republicans and whoever one was going to lead our nation in the face of a gathering on that storm. we know the end of the story, lincoln one the nomination. and other men later served in

his cabinet. they had their differences, but even though all four of them disagreed with each other, they did not just take their marbles and go home. they knew the challenges facing the country were tasty to -- were too steep. they worked together because they knew it was the right thing to do. we as republicans today are bound together by the same shared love of country. we know the americans tories -- stories and the freedoms we enjoy are not easy to keep. the legendary packers coach, once again vince lombardi, he said, the -- once achievements of an organization are from the combined efforts of each individual. i know that each of us is doing our part right now. and our efforts will amount to

something great. there is no other group of people i would rather be in the trenches with then all of you today. your patriotism is true, your convictions are clear, and i am proud to be carrying on the fight with you. there is no limit to what we as a party can accomplish together. let's make this year a republican year together. we will put a republican president in the white house, together. thank you and god bless you. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you. thank you. now i will call upon my cochair.

>> good morning. thank you, mr. chairman. on behalf of my committee members, we want to thank all of you for coming to our home state of florida for this quarterly meeting. i want to thank them for their hard work and service that they provide for the party, the state, and our country. and i want to thank katie and anna catherine for making our florida sunshine even brighter with their efforts this week. [applause] thank cheyenne and mike and leave -- steve, for showing us that on tuesday, it was 5:00 somewhere. [applause] >> this november we are committed in florida, we are

back in the republican column, and to make sure that we elect the next president of the united states, a proud republican. usnow in this room some of did not get our first choice for canada, maybe not even our second or third choice, but i want to remind you that the ultimate choice we will face in november is a choice between our republican candidate and a lying, hypocritical, untrustworthy candidate by the name of hillary clinton. for a socialist turned democrat, by the name of bernie sanders. and if either of these candidates are elected, we will all be feeling the burn and unfortunately it will be harper -- heart burn. democratshoices the are offering, our only choice is to work as hard as we can to win.

not for our party, but for our country. we started with 17 candidates, well-qualified candidates who sought our nomination. we are not on to three candidates. along the way, there have been days where we have heard and seen things that candidates have said that have made us cringe. and sometimes they make us want to reach for our televisions and use the parental block. sometimes, they even made us wonder why we are working so hard when it seems our efforts are misrepresented and criticized by so many, but all we are trying to do is make a difference. i know that some of these things have been hurtful. but as republicans, we know that we are strong. we know that we are positive about our opportunities and our future.