at the same time over a very short period of time, given a government's lifespan. today, we are talking about how fragile is this government, how fragile is afghanistan, what will happen next, should we talk about alternatives, should we talk about plan b's, c's, and so forth? we can discuss -- this is, in a nutshell, how i see things shaping up. mr. smith: omar is right to i do not know that afghanistan, in 2016, is it more fragile than in 2015 or even 2014. what has changed -- and relevant from where we sit in washington -- is we have come to the end of our wishful thinking. what we learned in 2014 and 2015

now convinces us that the dynamics in the national unity government significantly improve. the taliban are probably not going to comment to the negotiating table. the afghan security forces will not be the miracle we had hoped and to some degree convinced ourselves it would be. and elections will probably not happen in 2016. that leaves us with no real way out of what was supposed to be the beginning of an emergence of a slightly abnormal constitutional situation that we are in now. that is why we are looking at alternatives. we have run out of the optimistic scenarios we once had. that is what is sinking in and

making 2016 a particularly challenging and different year, even though the fundamentals may not change that much. mr. kugelman: i imagine we will discuss how things are going to be getting worse, etc., which is true. but to start with context, things are bad, but it is not all bad. there are plenty of people that did not expect the national unity government to get as far as far as it has now. obviously, it has. and for all the talk of a deepening taliban insurgency, the taliban has suffered setbacks, including the other day in kandahar. a major operation killed several dozen taliban fighters. you also have often special forces that have been distinguishing themselves on the battlefield. that said, i would highlight very briefly three changes that are making existing challenges more difficult. 1 -- and this was alluded to -- there is a new urgency -- sense of urgency pervading politics in afghanistan because of the

national unity government's agreement, which stipulated certain things happen by a certain time, specifically september of this year. and they have not happened yet. one could argue there is a clock is ticking dynamic that could amplify the fractures -- fra ctious nature of the political environment in afghanistan. secondly there have been taliban victories, victories, like the takeover of kanduz. third, you have quite a few afghans leading the country, including from the middle class. these are things that happened in the past and are happening again today. it is difficult to start to deal with the deeper challenges afghanistan faces when a number of your best and brightest are headed for the exit. >> let's look specifically at the national unity government, formed a little over a year and half ago.

how have these developments we have been talking about specifically affected the possibility of survival of this government? by all accounts, ashraf ghani, who had a popular beginning, has eroded. we hear there is a lack of confidence now, which has grown. so in answering this, i wonder if we could address what it is he could have done differently and indeed, what can he now do to assure the survival of this government another three and half years? omar? samad: having spent almost a year and a half in that unity government, i am unfortunately

not at liberty to say much. but to give you some perspective, i can say that i think this was meant to be -- i do not want to go into the why it has value -- everyone has their own theories in how this came about. we leave that to history to judge. but once it came about, it was meant to follow a certain recipe and a certain set of guidelines, and it has not. for those of us who have been inside the system, we know, by now, why and what are the motivations. some of it is very distressing. some of it has to do with petty politics and power struggles, and some of it have to do with

real and substantive issues that have created a sense of a dis-united government and not a unity government. it was supposed to be a political marriage, of sorts -- in the modern sense. one side is playing a very traditional role in this marriage. traditional in the afghan-eastern context. trying to dominate, trying to push, trying to impose. the other side again in the eastern sense -- accommodate, the flexible, to that extent possible, given its own political limitations. you have to realize that this is not just a marriage between parties or factions or

individuals that fought in the elections. they are made up of a conglomerate, each one. so this is very difficult to handle. we did try to bring everyone under the tent, with very few exceptions. this is going to be a sort -- it was the only alternative. the tragic part is there was no other alternative but to create such a unity government, with the two top vote getters. the individuals who legitimately had received the largest amount of vote in the country. whether one was more or less than the other is another issue.

but now -- once we had it, and once it was ratified, and the afghan people accepted it, the international community put a stamp of approval on it, i think it was the mistake of letting this government sort of find its own way, thinking that they know best. that they know all of the problems and have all of the solutions. especially the president has always given this impression that he knows all of the problems and has all of the solutions. that he knows the answers to all of the questions. this came back to bite them, especially the president. people had this image that had been promoted, this image that had been created over the years that -- someone mentioned something interesting. they asked me if he is really a modernist? or is he still tribal? post-triabl or still tribal? or stillpost tribal tribal? i never thought about this. this is a very interesting

question, for an afghan. i think it is a mix of both. when he sits here, he is modern and post-tribal. when he goes back, he is tribal , but post tribal. even the majority of afghans cannot connect with him. we could not find the balance that was needed. the equilibrium needed in order to make this a more functioning . again, i agree that not everything about the national unity government is bad. and again there was no other , option at the time. even today, i am of the view that we should not be looking for a revolutionary alternative. something that would further destabilize afghanistan and put us in a very vocal situation, politically speaking. there is still time to try everything possible, try all means possible, to impress on the leadership of this is him

and government -- and i him and think john kerry tried to do this a couple days ago -- and impress on the afghan political elite and the afghan people that we need to stay the course, but we need to correct the course. we need to learn some hard lessons from the past year and a half, both in terms of governance, in terms of relations with the international community, in terms of how we connect with the afghan people and play politics. one of the biggest problems is that we have amateur politicians. we do not have professional politicians, who know how to even play politics, in afghanistan. the best example we had was hamid karzai. because he would walk into a

room and tell you everything you want to hear, but he would not agree with it. and someone else would come in he would say the total opposite. this is a good politician, we think -- it is not. hamid karzai was a failure. but we need to learn the lessons from the past 15 years, especially the last year and a half. >> one of the interesting paradoxes of this government national unity is there is a much more significant and organize opposition to the national unity government then to the government of hamid karzai, which was a government of singular powers run by one person. the other thing is what is our responsibility for this government? i think omar is correct that after a bruising election, a transition that was not well handled and an economy that was tanking, we set the government up with its internal frictions

and said you guys take care of this. when the iraq war was being debated in 2003, i think it was colin powell who said if we go in and break it, you own it. with governments, it is different. if you fix it, you own it. i i think that is what we hear with kerry's repeated visits to try to get these guys to work together. to the specific question of what can be done, and a lot of us have been advocating for a long time that the two leaders of this government, if they are not able to work together, at least project that they are working together. but for a variety of reasons, this has not happened. and as i said, i do not think it is likely to happen. i think there are some things regarding strategic indications that have been achieved. people like us in washington are pointing this out, not the government itself. that is leading the afghan people know what we have done, what we are attempting to do, and how you can see we are getting there. a lot of the frustration with this government is the sense that it does not understand the

sense of crisis that afghans themselves feel. that is what helps power, this opposition made in large hard by politicians that are not so good. they just happen to be in the position. -- as you say, made by politicians that are not so good. they just happen to be in the position of ring in the oppositional government that is even worse. >> thank you. mr. kugelman: picking up on the good point scott makes on the government not acknowledging the crisis it faces, i will take the question as to what the president can do to strengthen his position.

in some ways, there are not that many options. in my view there are two issues. , one is how the president can position more broadly in the eyes of afghans, the international community, and so forth. and secondly, how he can strengthen his position in his own government. in the broader context, there needs to be effort to articulate a clear plan of action for the coming months. articulate, for example, how it intends to answer these questions about time frames for local elections, etc. he needs to try to reduce these high levels of uncertainty, which breeds concern and elevates volatility. in the more narrow context, that is more difficult. perhaps one suggestion is for him to make -- offer a clear assurance to abdulla abdulla

that the position is intact. that his position is still in tact. it is something to be said for clearing the air. it may be asking too much, but it is a start. prof. jalali: many years ago -- 2004, i believe -- we faced a difficult situation. a respected international figure said something we thought was against afghan culture. we argued that it would go against the constitution. now we face against something

else. -- now we face, again, something else. what we have today has its own problem in the inception. to have -- in the history of afghanistan, in many cases, there was a tendency to solve difficult problems by tactical solutions. i was one of many others who said that counts this votes 100 times, and eventually announces one winner. the winner that will be accepted by -- today in afghanistan, coalitions are fine. but coalitions are successful only if they can balance two

things. maintain unity and govern effectively. if you maintain unity at the expense, at the cost, of effectiveness, you fail. if you want to be effective but it undermines unity, again. what we have today are two leaders. one is the president. the other is second among equals. the president gets the power from the constitution and appoints or delivers some of the qualities to this second of equals. the second of equals does not have a strong standing. he uses political clout.

it turns into opposition within the government. that is the major problem from day one. i think it was both of the leaders did a lot of sacrifices, made a lot of effort for this unity government. however, they are not alone. they have people around them that helps to bring them to the elections. the election vote was not based on to make a difference. it was based to win the elections. so both sides actually are dependent on borrowed constituencies. these borrowed constituencies today have their demands, and that slows down everything. all decisions in afghanistan, in a country facing security, economic, political problems.

in that case, you have that kind of government. that is the problem. however, it does not mean it will not work. afghanistan has many situations actually enable afghans to survive. it depends. it shows the resilience of the afghans. i am not saying the government will fail. it will not fail. but the more they put effort to make it one government and to -- integrate all of the access they have into one government, -- in other words, instead of

making a salad bowl, make it a melting pot of all elements. today, it is a salad bowl. which ministers belong to this and which belong to that guy. which ministry is reporting to that guy in which reports to that guy? it is not one government unless you make it one government. and it may take a melting pot. it is hard, but that is the way to make that government effective and successful. amb. samad: just to add a bit more to this discussion. if we are going to take the route of the constitution itself and what is constitutional and what is not, what constitutes legitimacy and so on and so forth, we have to be careful. we can open many cans of worms that we have seen the past two

years, especially 2014. especially in how the election was handled. especially in how much fraud was orchestrated. that is also constitutional or anti-constitutional. if we want to talk about political opposition within the government, knowing there is a lot of political opposition outside the government, we have to look at exactly what happens on a daily basis. again i told you earlier i , cannot get into that, but i will tell you there are probably individuals who act as political opposition within the government. but the motivation and aspiration and the wish of the leadership is not -- and i am talking on the abdullah camp

side -- has been to work with the president within the confines of the political agreement signed in december of 2014. it is a political agreement that is being trampled on a daily basis and is being ignored, that they all signed on to. there is a list of more than 100 high officials from deputy ministers to ambassadors to the mayor of kabul, to the head of the constitutional reform commission, and so on and so forth -- high-level positions that are awaiting final approval by the president for the past 16 months, or 14 months, or 12 months. because someone, somewhere, does

not want to see these individuals. and the president is asked to interview every single person, in person. from the position of deputy governors to district police chiefs even further down. he wants to interview every person, in person. when you have this kind of governance style and you have hundreds of people waiting to be appointed for the past year or more, obviously, you will face a crisis and there space to blame one side or the other. one side has done its job, the other side has to do its job as well. we can go on and on about what goes on on a daily basis within that government, and who was accommodating, who is not. who was playing petty politics,

clanish politics, and who is taking a larger look at what is good or bad for afghanistan. every afghan's hope is that we would be driven by national interest, not clanish or fractional or personal interest, as was the case under mr. karzai for so long. the hope is that we will broaden our minds in the scope of what we do and how we do it. marvin: in 2016, there were be two policies. one, election for a new parliament. and the holding of a loya jirga -- grand council -- which could do a number of things, but was expected then to take up the issue about whether there would be a prime minister position created, as was agreed to when

the government was formed. as you know, dr. abdullah is designated as chief executive. i want to ask the panel what are , the possibilities of these processes going ahead? what are some of the obstacles and what are some of the consequences should they not be completed in this year? michael? mr. kugelman: there is a quick answer and a longer answer. sorry. here is the quick answer. the idea of holding local elections within the next few months to be would appear to be to be nothing short of a miracle for a variety of reasons. when there were presidential elections the last time around there was much more time to prepare for them. the taliban was not as strong as it is now.

and yet, at this point, you are being asked to do something in a mere few months. the loya jirga issue -- i will refrain from getting into the legalese, but i think the crux of the matter is that the founding political agreement that form the national unity government especially says you need a loya jirga to happen in two years. but understandably it does not spell out the consequences of not holding one in two years. is silent on the issue of how long the national unity government is to last for. the agreement did not save the -- say the national unity government is null and void if there's no loya jirga. the issue of if the election or loya jirga does not occur, it comes down to one of two interpretations. you can look this great fundamental legal or business

perspective and contend when two parties enter a contract and do not achieve what the contract is stipulates to achieve, you can argue the whole thing could become null and void. that's one interpretation. the other is an argument of omission. that this political agreement does explicitly say that the government must fold if there is not a loya jirga in two years. in terms to what interpretation is proper, i am not in a position to say. marvin: that was the short version. mr. kugelman: yes. [laughter] ali? prof. jalali: i think there are two issues to take into consideration. one is the inequality of who wrote the constitution, and how the game changes.

[indiscernible] the other one -- the election of afghanistan is for five years. this government was elected for five years. there is no constitutional problem that this government continues for five years. have people vote for this government? the helm ofnow and this government got the votes from the people. however, in order to respond to the problems that occurred, the election, fraud in the election and votes, in order to bring together these two people, who got the majority of votes, into a government, some kind of arrangement was made. an arrangement to make this government work. if a loya jirga could not be

held in september or next year, or if the parliamentary election does not do well, that will be a problem. they should deal with it. the legitimacy of this government did not originate from the clear-cut result of the ballot box. it emanated from a deal that its legitimacy depends on its effectiveness. if it does not act effectively, then they have a problem. the loya jirga will be convened -- not that the loya jirga will be convened in september or not -- that is not the problem. it does not undermine the term of this government of five years. people voted for them for five years. the constitution gives that.

but the loya jirga, elections, all of these things, if it helps the government function effectively, if that does not happen, then this is a problem. mr. smith: since i started working in the first afghans election in 2003, i have always been bothered by the unrealistic timetables we have always set for ourselves. we got away with in 2004 and 2005. but when i saw the september agreement -- and one day i hope the history books will look at this -- i was appalled. whoever negotiated this put in place a series of processes that could not possibly be held within the timelines it was supposed to hold them, which meant it was doomed to begin -- fail from the beginning. i do not think anybody thought

we would be having district, council elections this year and district-council boundaries have not been able to be drawn for 15 years. why would -- why we would be able to get electronic ids issued to every afghan citizen when it has not been able to be done in the last decade of an attempt. so what do we do? i agree there is a legal and political case that this government last five years. but for once why do we not take the three and a half years that remain and set up an agenda that allows you to do reform that is not compressed, allows you to plan an election that can be feasible in that time and look , at it as a chunk of three and half years instead of the next six months, the next six months, where we fail to achieve anything and find ourselves in may of 2019 with no preparations done, because we did not take a longer view point. that is what i would do. and provide the assurances, that are legal -- a degree that says

the powers of the chief executive are not transferable. provide the assurance to dr. abdullah that nothing will change in those five years and get the country back on a more rational path towards election and return to constitutionality. amb. samad: obviously, we got sort of sidetracked and derailed by a lot of different events. and we did not stick to a agenda and the timeline. there has been a concerted effort to play a delay tactic to prevent the election reform commission to be formed, first of all. for them to do their work properly. i was part of this on a daily basis, dealing with these issues. these issues could have been dealt with within the time frames that were allotted to them. if there was political will. this goes back to political will.

not to whether three months was enough or not or six months were enough or not. it also poses this critical question of how much do we want to rock the political boat in afghanistan and when do we want to rock it? and look at what happened. first, the president's first item on the agenda is overturned to pakistan. it was not to put the political structure back in place. it is to go to islamabad. we thought that -- and remember it was announced by march 2015, we would have peace talks. then instead of peace talks, we had suicide bomber after suicide bomber after suicide bomber hitting afghanistan in all places.

we had all those foreign fighters who had been pushed inside afghanistan throughout 2013 through 2015. they had set up shop and were ready. there was a strategy to take over as much territory as they could in 2015. it was the afghan security forces and our international allies who basically put a stop to it. yes we lost a few places here or , there, but the strategy was to gain a foothold and take over a few provinces. that has not happened. so this distraction took place in 2015. and then there was no -- not enough political will to implement the accord. even today. yesterday, i got a note from kabul saying the next step is the selection committee, which is supposed to look at who is supposed to be and under what conditions and what criteria are

supposed to be used and one of -- what is the legal framework for the next election commission. independent election commission. very important. we saw with the former one did. and there is no political will to move forward, one side or the other. it is easy to blame time when you know that the game is something different. mr. smith: game or not, from a technical perspective, i think it is not a question of political will. if we keep thinking that this could happen in a few months, we will keep making the same delays. again, we want circulatory preparations when we need them to happen. amb. samad: we had five years between 2009 and 2014 to fix the elections. some of you who worked on it are here.

what kind of election did you prepare for afghanistan? where did all of this money that the u.s. spent on electioneering and how to make this election look -- where did it go and what did it produce? that is how the afghans see it. it is easy to say we can blame time, but the afghans saw what happened. within the five years you had to fix the elections after the 2009 travesty. it was not fixed. marvin: let's switch gears just slightly. maybe a major shift by looking at the fact that, as is pointed out, we do not have a peace process in the works. it now seems as if it is post peace process. we are looking at some of the consequences of that. one of those seems to be that

the bright days of cooperation between pakistan and afghanistan have -- seem far behind now. the president delivered an address to the parliament very recently which, although he did not entirely close the door, indicated now if he had not closed it with the taliban, he probably had closed it with pakistan. so relations with pakistan have certainly deteriorated. i want to ask the panel what are some of the implications of what could amount to a real breach in relations with pakistan? and in addressing that, is there anything the united states or the international community can do to alleviate what might be a serious development? and for that matter, going back to the earlier discussions, is the role for the united states

and the international community or generally, stepping in on the political side as well, having done so so many times, do we have any cards left to play? prof. jalali: first of all, let's note that peace talks are the means, not the goal. if it can help bring peace and stability in afghanistan, fine. but it is not the goal. afghanistan faces security threats and instability. there are two ways to respond. one is to do things, to use means to reduce the level of threat to security. the other means is to better -- build their capacity to respond to the threat.

sometimes they go hand in hand. i think it will be very good to have peace talks and then reduce the level of threat. however, there are many complications to it. on the other hand, the longer the afghan state has survived, the less chance the taliban will have to have their way. whether the priority is to support the survival of the afghan state or to beg others to help us to bring some kind of political settlement, acceptable or not to the majority of the people. this is the problem. i think the first thing that ashraf ghani went to pakistan thought without better relations with pakistan it would be difficult to bring

taliban to the negotiating table. so pakistan was when he went to first. pakistan, he had three demands from them. first, end this undeclared war between afghanistan and pakistan that has been going on 15 years. this should be done, or some indication should be presented that this undeclared war is over. once of this is done, then afghanistan can establish normal relations with pakistan. over time, maybe we will have a special relationship -- political, economic, security. that did not happen. he told me he had given pakistan until march of that year -- did not happen.

two months later, pakistan tabled another kind of package. everything is our package. this is not acceptable. as long as this difference of approaches is there between afghanistan and pakistan, it will be difficult to ask pakistan to help bring taliban to the negotiating table. so what is the other option? the other option is the capacity of the government and the armed forces to respond to the threats over time to convince the taliban that they are losing, and they will come to the negotiating table. the last two opportunities to

have peace and failed conditions. one was in 2001, when the taliban were excluded. although 85% of the television -- television were ready to participate in the political process. the two sides in the civil war. the civil war ends and either one side defeats the other, or they make a peaceful agreement. neither happened. oneonce i was actually removed from power but not defeated. the other opportunity was 2003. when the taliban approached the government, different elements in the government, that they wanted -- at that time neither the international community nor the afghans were ready to do that. now the longer the state survives the less chance they have to comeback.

the priorityhink is not to do everything to bring that taliban to the negotiation table. the priority is to build the capacity in the government with the international community so that this will force the taliban to come to the table. marvin: we do want to leave time before so we can participate. so i will asked the panelists a little question. michael? michael: when it comes to the peace process, it comes down to the taliban. the taliban will sit down to talk when it has an incentive and it does not have one right now. if it were to be beaten back significantly on the battle field and if it was held it were on the fence, they would have reason to come to the point right now. i certainly think this the

quadrilateral peace process is for all intents and purposes dead. but the idea of a peace process is not dead altogether. but is certainly off the table for the foreseeable future. i think that the issue of what role the united states could play is useful and i do not think that has been brought up yet. i will say this. i am a bit more optimistic about washington's's ability to address reconciliation within afghanistan than between afghanistan and pakistan. iowa's thought the u.s. leverage over pakistan was somewhat of a myth. with afghanistan, it is a bit of a different story. economic assistance, in a context with a level of dependence on u.s. support is significant. as we discussed the u.s.

government health afghanistan out of the election crisis a few years back, and i imagine if they get tricky down the road over the next few months, we can assume john kerry in his last few months in power will make kobul a fairly frequent destination. president obama i imagine that this point in his tenure is in a legacy stage and i imagine he will not want to be remembered for failing to keep the afghanistan government from falling apart, he will not want to leave office knowing the afghan government he helped put together ended up falling into pieces. i do not want to overstate the ability and the desirability of the u.s. to be getting involved in this type of thing. it's probably better for the step back. there is certainly and should be a role for the u.s. and the broader international community to play.

>> i just want to say that i think we have had a lot of lessons learned along the way on the taliban and pakistan's role on the geopolitics of the region, on the history behind this. the taliban are now 22 years old. i think this undeclared war in , my opinion, did not start in 2001. it started in 1992. and it was not really -- it was part civil war, a civil war because it was not like, ethnicities were all against each other and they were fighting each other. afghanistan fortunately has

never experienced such a disaster. i think there is a strong unity core within the afghan identity. i think from the beginning it was obvious there are geostrategic and geopolitical objectives that have to be met. once the soviets left and the communist government fell, the biggest and most powerful player pakistan who had handled and managed for a decade of war, billions of dollars that have come through pakistan to be distributed to the afghans to fight the soviets. it had gained so much leverage. this is not a question in afghanistan. this is as the sand and the moon and the sky.

what you are seeing is the continuation of that policy in different shades. the shape changed after 2001 and took on a different image or exterior. maybe in the 2014 to some extent. i do not think anyone in afghanistan believes the core strategy behind pakistan's use of proxies to control at least our security and foreign policy is in any doubt. if it is still in washington, i am aghast. i would be very disappointed to think people in washington or london still think pakistan has some other motivation. let's call a spade a spade and let's deal with it in that

context, not under solutions -- illusions that do not make sense. i think with the president should have done -- as a diplomat, i am for overtures and talks in dialogue. but we have to be ready for that. but we have to be ready for that. we have to be ready to speak as a stakeholder and a party to any talks and negotiations. you have to have a strategy. where was the strategy? i know there was one, but it did not have the african backing. -- afghan banking. -- afghan backing. this is why it has not resulted in anything. what we need to do is regroup, and politically speaking, we need to reunite afghans around

an idea, something workable and practical, in terms of relationships or issues with pakistan. in terms of defenses, we need to bolster our defenses and this is where the united visit others -- united states and others have an amazing role to play to makes sure our forces are protected by whatever is needed, whether air or land or intelligence, and that it is not just, you know, easy talk. it has to be demonstrated and this is why i think the next administration, has to look at it from a perspective of, what have we learned what to do and what not to do.

how do we bring durable and real peace to afghanistan that has the backing and support of the afghan people? if there are afghan taliban, muslimsto attack fellow , which happens on almost a daily basis, let's not fall for the ethnic linkages and so on and so forth. those things have passed the test of time and have not amounted to anything. i remember at one point, the use a symbol, as their spiritual leader, to make advances in afghanistan in the 1990's. he had some recognition and was somewhat popular and people had a good memory.

kabul, as they took they said if they ever get a hold of him, they will hang him. they did the same thing in they are doing the same thing. in the name of the brotherhood or whatever people think they are doing or not doing. going forward, we need to have learned the lessons, in my opinion. marvin: for a moment there i thought you were going to suggest building a wall. [laughter] >> in a sense, we do not have a shared vision of part of the conflict and you can be a mediator. it is mostly between afghan. another said it is mostly between them and pakistan.

patella been -- the taliban said it is between them and us because they want us out of there. pakistan said the conflict is with india and afghanistan is a strategic point and that is where the weight of the resolution has to live. so that is a very brief way of pointing out one of the real challenges and why we have not been able to get this out of the ground. without getting into the details of the differences in the tele-band. -- the television. .- the taliban and talk about incentives, right now the biggest disagreement as whether to negotiate or not said to push them to negotiate is to push them towards fracture and that is not going to happen. >> let me ask you to be recognized for questions, please keep questions short. introduce yourself briefly. i will take down front and we will move it around.

john: thank you. i am john dempsey with the state department office of the special representative for afghanistan and pakistan and what i am about to say is not necessarily the view of the state department. i'm speaking in my own personal capacity. to look back at negotiations in 2014, and i know scott mentioned he was appalled at terms included in the political agreement. there were certainly things included that were, at the time, probably not achievable, but it is important to remember the top priority at the time was to have a democratic transition to a successor from the president. what happened following the runoff election that summer did not give much confidence that they were going to be able to achieve that transition successfully anytime quickly. as time moved forward without

resolution there were fears both here in and in other places that there would be manipulation of the political chaos to president karzai's advantage to remain in power. to cobble together some kind of interim government where his interest would be of paramount concerned so we were able to get there successfully. the other point i would make is on the difference between a political and legal and constitutional westerns. -- questions we are facing. agreement is a political agreement. in afghanistan, the reality is people are getting bogged down in what is legal versus what is practical and i think the latter is much more important. >> we will take that as a comment rather than a question. thank you for sharing.

>> i knew i would face flak for that comment and i appreciate the arguments. but i think it is irresponsible not to raise the point. the idea of trying to re-create a political order based on the role of law that you know will be violated because it is unrealistic, to me, is counterproductive. >> the gentleman here. please, short. >> other people in the audience who i want to give an opportunity to. identify yourself. >> i am president of the national coalition of tribes and of afghanistan. i've been involved with every

in afghanistan. the unfortunate thing is that the west, with one it came, they tried to build up afghanistan to the nation image of the west. afghanistan is a nation of tribes. the tribes have protected and preserved integrity and independence for centuries. unfortunately when the soviet union invaded, they broke the structure and when the west came in, they totally disregarded afghanistan's tribal structure, which is a foundation. they started building a roof on imaginary walls. you cannot build a house on imaginary walls. the walls of afghanistan, both of these have been totally disregarded. so long as we continue to disregard it, we are not going any peace. peace with the taliban, which one are you talking about? saudis? which are we talking about?

show me a hero leader that could control all the taliban and -- there is no such thing. this is a pipe dream. biting the ice and leaving it in the sun, for god's sake. why don't we sit down and face reality and the fact of what is going on in afghanistan? the people of afghanistan are saying, where is the west, why aren't we allowed to go to the united nations and file a larger complaint with the united nations national security? thank you for that arguable -- thank you for that valuable comment. so, with his hand up. yes? >> i am with the afghan american chamber of commerce and we have been focusing on the political here but you still have the business which has to successfully function during this chaos. the business side is willing to do that if some basic aspects of

security can be figured out. currently, with the rules of private security, if the business is in turmoil and waiting for turmoil, is there any chance that could be sorted out while the politics come later? >> would you like to take this? >> i think i -- in a week or so , my report will be published. which is focused on afghan national defense and security forces. capability and future. security does not happen in a vacuum. and, the national security forces are just one element in providing security and the -- in the country. there are political, economic,

regional, and the dramatic dimensions to it. i think it it was a year and a half, and they proved they can hold their own. although with a high casualty rate. but it means that if that security forces are used and the capability capability gates are -- capability gates are backed by international support, that force will be able to guarantee our survival. that is the key. the more stability comes the country, i think you will then have more opportunities and encouragement for people to invest in afghanistan also people not to take their money out. so, it all depends on the stability of afghanistan and the major elements as to the

political effectiveness of the government. and defense and security. >> i would add an important plank in all of this is to effectively fight corruption as well. and provide an environment where people feel somewhat not only secure from attacks but also from civil servants and those contractors, whoever they may be, can be involved in this business practices. one of the things this government could have done better and has done to some extent but not as much as they could have, is to fight corruption more effectively. marvin: i am looking for a woman. right here.

>> i am from women for afghan women. i have two questions for the panel. my first question is about the peace talks coming from afghanistan. he is willing to join me the government of afghanistan, but only if his requests are resolved. he wants his name to be dismissed from the blacklist of the united nations. what is your opinion about that? my second question is about the government, not the sum of constitution of afghanistan, is for futuresful model elections or just specifically period?presidential

thank you. >> quickly on the talks, i was in kabul last weekend asking people what this was about in the response i got was, one, it was a question of growing old and feeling that he wanted to restore his committee. -- his dignity. two, it probably would not have that much influence because they are not the main perpetrators. some people wanted to believe if a deal could be struck and the struck between him and the government, he would be a positive demonstration to the taliban that yes, you can make a deal. they said it would be announced in a week or so. i do think they may put some stress on the government and depending what the conditions are, it's sort of does seem to certain people as quite a good

reward for having fought a long time against the government or let's see were the details are in the deal. >> if you look at the history of afghanistan, it comes incrementally, not in one package. maybe we would be very optimistic to assume that one will sit down at a table and sign. there are some fighters in afghanistan.

when he integrates his people, it should be on the basis of the established rules in afghanistan, not some kind of political damage. in afghanistan, all resilien res fail as long as the government has some kind of support from the outside. twice, national governments failed when there was no outside support. one was the 1920's. once in 1990's, united states disengaging from afghanistan. otherwise, governments were always able to defeat rebellions. this rebellion has some support from pakistan. the principles show that rebellions can be defeated by the government as long as it is not alone by its international partners.

>> i cannot think of a more unsavory character in all of cap -- all of afghan history. we have not had a pakistani voice. there is one back there anxious to speak. we do need a pakistani. briefly. >> i will be the most brief. much, marvin, for arranging this panel. very helpful. you mentioned unity. this is something that is ideal and we need to become more pragmatic. mr. scott mentioned pakistan is not willing to bring towels and

-- taliban to the negotiating table. he does have some influence but they have no control over them. pakistan's own plate is full and pakistan fully understands stability in afghanistan are in pakistan are interdependent. i do not find any incentive to here.kistan destabilized somebody looks asked, how are you doing any text, so far, so good. it does not change the reality. my question is, are the taliban gaining ground, losing ground, are they marginalized, and can there be any kind of comment

which is broadly based in terms of rule of law without incorporating the taliban in the system, negotiating power with them? thank you very much. >> about the taliban -- >> can i? i think if you look at the record, for the past 15 years at least, afghan leaders have made every attempt to ask the taliban to come and join everybody else. i do not recall a time when this has not been done. yes, we missed some chances. i agree there were opportunities that were missed at the beginning when it probably would have been the best time to do so. but later on there was a realization that we need to come to terms with this particular group that continues to fight.

it has access to sanctuaries, it has access to funding and all types of software and hardware outside of afghanistan. and, obviously, recruitment. outside of afghanistan. i think that at this moment, the taliban are probably portraying an image of strength. i think that inherently, they are probably at one of the weakest points ever. that is my assessment. and i believe not only are they politically somewhat in disarray, the leadership is not united anymore. but i think over the past few weeks, they had been facing some

major assaults and major losses on the battlefield. it is not just what you and the press think about the afghan taliban. the problem goes beyond the .fghan taliban coul it involves many other elements who are in one way or another linked to the taliban and have been for 22 years. sometimes, the linkages seem weak and sometimes, very strong, depending on the politics of the day. the problem is we need to fight all the different elements now under the name of the islamic state, daesh, other names, and people coming from all over. most of them are people who had retreated back into the region of afghanistan after the taliban

were overthrown. whether they are the al qaeda type or whether they are other arabs or other middle eastern, or whatever connection they had, and they had centuries in the -- sanctuaries in the tribal regions going back to the 1980's and 1990's. most of them find themselves back in afghanistan for some reason. this is the situation as i see it. i think as long as the afghan forces are able to not only contain the taliban but also put pressure on them to make you -- maybe lose some momentum, we would be closer to a peace deal. the more you put pressure on them, the closer we will get to a peace deal. marvin: ok. we have to be concerned with the

two sides being weak, which one fades first. this will have to be our last question. i will take a woman back here again. i always get criticized for this. >> i am glad i wore pink today instead of black. maybe i should past mic to the person next to me. my name is liz wilson. i work here in dupont circle and we're working on a higher education project in afghanistan now. with the departure of a lot of young, qualified, afghans, i am wondering what are some ways the government might have some strategies to keep young people in the country during this time of transition. our organization has been working for nearly a decade in higher education in afghanistan.

been a lot of investment china to keep young -- trying to keep young people there. for staff who i work with on up, it seems there is a big struggle. perspectives on the youth and education in afghanistan? >> you cannot build walls in around afghanistan. they should have incentives. in the next four years, 4 million more afghans will hit the job market, unless you provide incentives for jobs and also a future, i think it will be difficult to prevent that as you educate people. educatedxodus of afghani people. in the last 14 years, thousands of afghans were educated inside the country and outside.

there are still many talents in afghanistan. the approaches to use these capacities, yes, i think unemployment, declining economic situation, security, and ineffectiveness of the government, these are issues that probably provide incentives for people to leave the country. otherwise, many people would be happy to have a job. unless you provide these opportunities, you cannot prevent the exodus afghans educated like many other countries. marvin: i will apologize to the panel because i do not know about you, but i have a feeling

we are just getting started. there is so much they have to share with us and we are just skimming the surface here. i want you to join me in thanking this superb panel. thank you for coming. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] >> in both iraq and afghanistan,

i helped both countries with their constitutions, being a facilitator of agreement on key issues among iraqis or afghans. your influence is considerable. the government is anxious to meet with you. , "the envoy:ht kabul to the white house." by the surge, by reaching out to the sunnis, by building up iraqi forces, by establishing a unity government, killing security, bring about violence was way down. unfortunately, when we left in

the vacuum was filled by rival regional powers kerry iraq apart, violence escalated and we have ice is now. -- tearing iraq apart, violence escalated and we have isis now. >> hillary clinton is the declared winner today in the .uam democratic caucuses she won nearly 60% of the vote, giving her four more pledged delegates. she secures the commitment of all five superdelegates, bringing her total to nine ddsator bernie sanders a three delegates to his count. for eitherportunity candidate to pick up delegates is this coming tuesday, the west virginia democratic primary where there are 29 pledged delegates at stake.

♪ >> madam secretary, we proudly give 72 of our delegate votes to the next president of the united states. ♪ [applause] ♪ the bureau of labor statistics reported yesterday that the u.s. economy created 160,000 jobs in the month of april, leaving the unemployment rate unchanged at 5%. a closer look now at the jobs report from

joining us now is neil irwin, the senior economic correspondent at the new york times during he also works that post." thanksn for joining us. thank you for joining us. we will be talking about jobs. here is the story in the new has times that says hiring picked up. machine -- job's the 160,000 payroll increase reported by the labor department follow the best two years ofetch since the tech boom the 1990's. what did you make of the numbers? guest: we had a few several months in a row. these things jump up and down.

you've seen these numbers totally consistent month after month. this has seemed the usual bouncing around. it was a mild winter, that means there is more hiring in the winter. there are less jobs added in the spring when the weather improves. that may be part of it. what we are seeing is a jobs market on a steady trajectory. ways not booming quite the that it seems, but growing at a nice steady pace. host: the unemployment rate stayed steady at 5%. is that a good or bad thing? guest: we all wish the unemployment rate would get lower. that said, there is something to be said for a nice, steady unemployment rate. that as employers are adding jobs, they are filling those jobs by pulling people into the labor force, who

were not even looking for jobs and now finding a job. the unemployment rate is staying steady because that is happening. if the unemployment rate was theping much lower, -- labor market is so tight that you see inflation and the federal reserve raising interest rates, which is slow things down. host: 5% is the national average. it does very. here are numbers showing the unemployment rate. for whites, it was 4.3 percent. blacks, eight point 8%. asians, three point 8%. for hispanics, 6.1%. guest: it is not just a race. you also see the same thing among college grads versus noncollege grads. see it in different geographies. have a 3%places that

or 4% unemployment rate. other places have my percent or 10%. 9% or 10%. host: you can join in on our conversation with neil portland as well. your are the numbers. if you are unemployed, call us at 202-748-8000. part-time workers can dial in at 202-748-8001. if you hold a full-time job, 202-748-8002. everyone else call 202-748-8003. we are speaking with neil or one of the "new york times." the story in your publication this morning talks about wages. what have we seen happened to america's paychecks should mark -- america's paychecks? wast: in april, the number

up 3/10 of a percent hourly earnings. that is up over the last year and higher than inflation. inflation is low. 2.5% is not terrible. when inflation is under 1%, that amounts to a meaningful rise in buying power and earnings. at the same time, we have seen much stronger wage growth. you will often see 4%. the question is whether that changes? do we start to see the labor market tight enough? employers say, if i want workers, i have to pay more. host: you wrote a piece for the upshot, workers are getting more of the economic pie and shareholders a little less. american workers are reaping fewer gains of a growing economy . shareholders are reaping more in

corporate profits. that shift has been one of the more important economic stories of the last several decades and is key to understanding stagnant wages and a soaring stock market. that trend appears to be reversing itself. why? guest: a couple of things. we are 5% unemployment. it is a tighter labor market since 2011 and 2012. employers are having to pay more money to their employees because they have no choice. if you want better workers, there are bidding wars happening. that is good news. on theer thing is corporate profit site, there are pressures pushing down corporate profits that were not there a couple of years ago. energy prices are way down that is hurting energy companies. also, there is -- companies, paying what they are workers comes out of profitability.

company profits are down, workers' pay is up. it is starting to reverse. host: let's bring in some of our viewers and listeners. wayne from harrisburg, pennsylvania is calling on the unemployment line. go ahead with your question are common. caller: i would like to know, when you are looking for a job, they want to give you a credit check, right? then they want to know if you have been locked up, right? they ask you all this stuff that even be asked.t why would you want to credit check somebody? mostly the minorities are unemployed. when is somebody going to do something for the minorities? the hispanics? the blacks? when? we have a black president and we need this done now. we have no time to wait.

president obama got in office, -- since president obama got an office, blacks are having a harder time. issue wayne raises this of people having criminal records not to be able to get jobs, which is a real issue. a crime andcommits does their time, the idea you get out of jail and a lot of employers have a box on the job application, have you ever been to jail? that is really problematic if you want to help people we enter society and be productive. there is a movement trying to make that illegal or a less common practice, called ban the box. there is a lot of discussion around these issues. , the tighter the labor market is, the better it are on thele who

fringes of unemployment, who want a job, but have a hard job getting one. at the time of a percent unemployment, employers have their pick and can hire anyone they want. lower, get to 5% or employers might say, you know, i generally wouldn't higher someone with a criminal record, but for this job, i need good people. they know what they are doing, even though they are not my ideal candidate. host: keith from chicago, illinois. keep hold a full-time job. caller: wow, that was quick. i understand some european countries have a minimum wage for their citizens regardless if they are working or not. when they are -- and then when they were, they get a wage above the minimum wage, so that could control the costs of

unemployment so employers can hire more people. what do you think about a minimum wage regardless whether you work or not? calledthis is a version a universal basic income. the idea is if you are in a rich country, create some threshold that everybody, whether you are working or not, you just get a check in the mail or money put in your bank account. it's a low enough number. you can't live high on the hog with that check. but what you are is added to that. it is not been tried on a large scale anywhere. northern european countries have a more extensive social welfare system than the united states. quite tohave not gone that step. every adult gets a check every month or something like that. it is one of these intriguing ideas. is this something, if you took away a lot of the bureaucracy and make it more efficient, as

that of the thousands of people tried to figure out where they are eligible for benefits, you cut a lot of that overhead and make sure nobody is below a certain threshold of poverty. in ay is really trying it large country. but it is one of those ideas discussing more -- being discussed more. host: the jobs report was a topic in president obama's press conference. inseven years ago of april 2009, the economy lost 730,000 jobs. aprilyears later, in 2016, our economy added 160,000 new jobs. that makes april the 74th month -- e

businesses have created 14.6 million new jobs in all. wages have been rising at an annual rate of more than 3% this year. the unemployment rate has been growing. unemployment has been falling. and wages have been rising. the global economy, as many people are aware, is not growing as fast as it should be. it -- there is lacking growth in places like europe, japan, and china. in the united states, people are still hurting. we have to do everything we can to strengthen the good trends and to guard against some dangerous trends from the global economy. and if the republican congress joined us to take some steps that are pretty common sense, we could put some additional wind at the backs of working americans to create new jobs.

to create infrastructure, they should invest in schools and bridges. in flint, michigan, that shows you the kind of work that needs to be done. we could be putting people all across this country back to work with huge multiplier effects across the economy if we started investing in the infrastructure that will make us more productive. to reward some of the hardest working people in america, congress should raise the minimum wage. this is something that would not only help those individuals who are getting a bigger paycheck, but it also means they are spending more and that would be a boost to business. to level the playing field for american workers in krakow on unfair foreign competition, they should pass smart new trade agreements and congress should reform our tax code to promote growth and job creation which includes closing loopholes and simplifying the tax code for everybody. host: we are talking with neil

irwin of the new york times. how is the economy playing out on the campaign trail? guest: it is funny. one of the big lessons from political science over the last couple of decades economic conditions matter for elections. there won't be an incumbent this time. economists -- economy matters. if it the employment rate you want to pay attention to -- is it the employment rate you want to pay attention to? gdp? what we are seeing in terms of wages matters in terms of how people think of the state of the country as they go to the polls. what we are seeing are earnings up 2.5%. low inflation. maybe not what it was a limit to thousands thousand, but a solid number. that suggests things aren't so bad. host: edward from fort collins,

colorado is our next caller. edward is calling on the unemployed line. go ahead, edward. caller: hello. host: hello, good morning. , whyr: i would like to say is the 5% employment -- unemployment rate always thrown out there when that is such a false figure, a false percentage? only the percentage of how many are applying for assistance. it just keeps getting thrown out there and makes you guys look foolish as a government. is not quite right. so the 5% number is flawed. it is not the end all be all of the state of the economy. it is not based on who is getting benefits, it is based on a survey that the labor americans of,s of do you have a job? are you looking for a job? -- it is true that it

is not capturing everybody. if you have not been looking for a job in the last month, you don't get counted as unemployed. you could work, but you are kind not you don't count in those numbers. there are other measures to understand what that looks like. for example, 9.6% is a broader measure of unemployment. almost twice as high as a 5% rate. that includes part-time workers and people who have given up looking. that is one way of thinking of the broader number. atre is also -- if you look the adult population that is not working, that is 42% of the entire adult population. that includes plenty of people that we would not expect to be working -- college students, retirees. so if you are looking at that broad number, and some

candidates have you said number, to get to that number, you have to include some of these people who are not working. if you want to use something broader than the 5% number we that my can look at .6%. >> c-span's "washington journal." morning, sunday discussing women's politics with former ted cruz supporter rebecca halen. and then jennifer lawless, the director of the women in politics institute at the school of american affairs on the impact of women in politics and why women are not running for public office.

the political impact of mothers -- including paid maternity leave, childcare, and the discrepancy in ginger -- gender pay. >> now, a look at potential vulnerabilities with personal data and what could be done to debtor protect against cyber threats. the discussion is followed by retired admiral dennis blair talking about the future of counterintelligence and the risk devicescting every day with the internet. this was part of a forum hosted by george washington university. >> all right. we going to kick start this. time crunch, i want to make sure we have enough time for the panel to share its

insights and thoughts. this covers a wide range of issues from foreign threats to cyber security is, but i hope one of the things that we are able to do is show where they come together and where they don't, and quite honestly, they are treated as separate disciplines, but i think we have a great group to just -- to address these issues. introduce michele van cleave she is one of the titans in this world. .he was a director of ncix under president bush she was running ncix. and she has worked on the hill. she has worked on numerous committees focusing on cyber issues and counterintelligence,

security issues, long before they were cool. she is young, but before they were cool. >> thank you, frank. frank: one of our senior active, looking at defense issues. he comes from a background in the private sector and the public sector. he is a former special forces officer. cyber at the plan is i thinkhe spear, which adds flavor to the issue and has worked at small companies like microsoft. least, we havet to thank forwant supporting the conference today, and he, too, has come to his current role with extensive background in a number of cyber security companies, ranging from

red sky 2 -- reminds me. >> bell labs, arc light -- -- frank: axa brings a very good perspective from cutting-edge companies in terms of some of these issues. i thought we would start with michelle, provide a picture, provide a primer. i think when people think counterintelligence, they immediately think security. obviously michelle, i do be curious what your thoughts are. how should we frame this in terms of thinking about some of these issues? michelle: let's start with considering