your ideas on that is how you get there and how you train that force well. gen. allen: general allen: it is a really important point that is about the security of the border and security inside with the future state of palestine. the approach we took when i let the process was to, again, look very hard at a trilateral process and a regime of cooperation, where we would see an intelligence fusion capacity where all three parties participated, which would hand off developing intelligence to an operational entity, a fused operational entity, which would be emphasizing a palestinian counterterrorism capability, a

swat entity of some form or another. then go through the process of building the intelligence and target package, launching on the mission, and as we typically see coming off the objective with detainees, that goes to your point, not just the capacity about running the technical operation, but having the capacity to run the judicial process that follows to hold people accountable and then have the capacity to detain them in a credible way, in a process that does not enhance the inherent increase of extremism we frequently see in detention processes. it is not an uncommented process, but it is -- it is not an uncomplicated process, but there are few unknowns. from the development of the intelligence to incarceration, that process, the juncture of the operational forces, the process of the judiciary, the function at the

end of the judicial process with the process of incarceration, which would include some aspect of the radicalization, reintegration into society. a lot of effort put into that. it was not just a casual process. the other aspect of it is, virtually, all that we did with a comprehensive approach. it was not, as sometimes is portrayed in the media, a high-technology approach or a single dimension to the approach. it integrated technology, infrastructure, training, unit organization, and it integrated relationships in a very comprehensive way to achieve a synergy that gave us the outcome that we chose. a couple points here -- my conversation with very senior is really officials and my palestinian counterparts, who were, frankly, very forthcoming the entire time i worked with them on being a partner in this that this i told them process is a dynamic process and

that the plan, ultimately, that would be produced, if the israeli side and the palestinian side were to come together and be able, without our help, to find the final outcome that they were seeking with respect to and palestine and a secure israel, there probably would not be the need for an american plan. but chances are, until trust is developed and a willingness to embrace risk, we will get there somewhere and this point, and the plan is to bridge that point, create a long-term relationship with the united states and israeli partners and palestinian partners, a training command, a multinational training command. a number of states have demonstrated real interest in helping to train palestinians to create this environment in time, weer a period of bridge the differences to give both sides the confidence necessary to take the risks and

ultimately, to come together on their own. that is very important. and what can be done today, and a part of the study talks a bit about that. it is not in the study, but in conjunction with the work that i a detailedmissioned assessment of the palestinian security forces, very detailed. supported the process, and it was directed that the seven security chiefs participate actively and eight. several months long. our intention was to look at the institution changes necessary for the palestinian ministry of terror, because it is not a military force in the end, it is a law enforcement entity and security entity. changes would be needed for capacity, what organizational changes would be needed to improve the capacity of the various palestinian security entities, and then what functional changes would be necessary? in conversation with senior israeli leadership, there are

things that came out of that study that can be done today and improve organizational capacity to be even more efficient, to better support the organizations in the field from the ministry of interior, to improve medical support, improved career training, improve access to schools. all of those things can be done today and do not, this is important, do not increase the risk to israel. it increases the capacity or the palestinians to be better security partners, which increases the security of israel. we could move out today on that, even if there is no political challenge are no political conversation occurring. and that was well-documented. we did not release the report, because at that moment, we saw the problems emerging in gaza spirit we were not sure where this was going to go. we did not want the subject of the report to be taken apart and pieces of it used inadvertently. but there is great work that can be done.

you, john.thank michele, i want to turn back to you -- thank you, general alan to in michele, i want to turn back to you. one of the things that israel is will say, and what has been laid plan,s quite a rigorous but what skeptics will say is, look, americans trained forces in iraq and afghanistan, and those forces fell apart. how do we know we will not have a repeat of that? at the end of the day, you just do not know and cannot really trust them. michele: if you look more closely at the american record, to record of training relieve counterterrorism as much or positive, mainly for a couple of reasons. tend to be the best forces available, and you get the best human capital to work

with, it is also true that we'll most always sustain the relationship, and we continue working with them. so even in places like iraq and afghanistan, were some aspects of the force have underperformed, the elite units have stayed very professional and have continued to serve very well. i think the key lessons for me are, you have to sustain a relationship over time, not just for training, but to avoid the proliferation of the force. would have been iraq that caused for the visions to fall apart is not lack of training. what happened is that the senior leadership, prime minister liki, put his political cronies into the forks. he politicized the leadership of the force, and then you had units that were no longer fight and die for someone.

a force andy with stay engaged, as we would be making a long-term commitment to partnering with israel and the future palestinian state as a guarantor of this, we would be partnering long-term to ensure that this force had not only the training and equipment needed, but also that continued relationship, mentorship, to ensure that it did not become politicized in some way. or if that is happening, we're able to see it and raise that political issue at the political level. ishink the track record actually better fan it looks, and i think it is clear enough that we can learn some lessons a very much apply to in sharing that we can do the best we can. moderator: thank you.

that will still be a continuing conversation and a challenging one in any future proposal, because so much of it is dependent on people, not just technology. that is one of the reasons the cover of the report you see, there is a picture of israel he security forces and palestinian security forces. at the end of the day, external upgrades and facilities and infrastructure, all of these are important. that the single most important thing is human capital, people, and the political environment that makes it work here at i want to turn to the issue of the jordan valley in the border. i want to start with john to talk about the details of how you think about the border security system as a whole and some of the work we do during those discussions and also in the report. well, we do not have enough time to lay out the

detail allen: well, we do not have enough time to lay out the detail. first of all, anybody reporting in the media has never seen our plan -- that is the first thing in so they really do not know. i will tell you that there are very few of my counterparts in any of the countries involved here who have actually traveled all 93 kilometers of the jordan river from the dead sea to where it passes out of what will become the palestinian state and looked at every meter of that ground to ensure that we could control that ground in one way or the other. comprehensiveis a approach. first and foremost, it is a time-phased approach, where the israeli presence over time, will reposition, and over time would

time-phaseda approach with milestones looking at the standards to be achieved with palestinians before is really forces depart. that is the first thing the process is over years, not just in months. it is over years. i will not talk about the numbers of years we were talking about, but i will tell you that we were coming towards the center and the conversation. but it is a matter of years. but it is more than that. it is the training command that we established down to the details of the individual subunits of the training command that would work closely with the palestinian entities to build the capacity to the standards we talked about, to work then closely with their american trainers, advisers over a long period of time, decades of a to ensure both that there is a continual professional uplift and to be present in the event of crisis.

and do that in a partnership with our israeli partners so that over time, as israel repositions initially in the jordan river valley and then along the jordan river and ultimately repositions back into israeli borders, that the kinds of residual force along the the levell provides of security. in conjunction with that, very detailed they are your plan with and a sensorrs system, which provides for the capacity to look in all directions to ensure that we can see air threats and that we can see moving threats on the ground. then, of course, as we talked about having joint border coordination centers, one in jordan, one in palestine, jointly manned by all four parties involved, so that we have a common visualization on the great walls of those operation centers so that it is seen in israel, palestine,

jordan, and probably seen in an american command center somewhere. we have the same visualization. all of this together constitutes the conference of approach, which is time-phased with milestones and standards-based, supported by technology, but very importantly, a highly well-trained palestinian force worthy, over time, with american assistance and is really assistance if that were to come forward to be the replacement force on the ground. again, all of that is to be negotiated, but the details of the plant exist today and could be implemented relatively soon. moderator: compared to what sits on that border today, do you see this as a significant upgrade? general allen: no question. end -- in theny end, with the infrastructure

build, barrier fences, control roads, base garrisons, istrolling units, that entirely new infrastructure. the sensor system would be mostly new but also of high-quality, proven sensors we have used in a lot of places where it has worked out well. so there is no comparison with what will be produced versus what is on the ground today. and including border coordination centers, which will create habits of cooperation between policy and is leading the center at some point and the new palestinian state with their jordanian counterparts across the river, with americans, jordanians, palestinians, and israelis. it will create habits of cooperation which will provide for strategic viability and security. i would like to invite you to follow-up on that.

two questions. one is, any additional comments on the overall system john is describing there? i know you have spent a lot of time there. we have talked about that. -- despitellow up all of these different systems, you know, there is still this question about, ok, who in the long-term is that force sitting on the river, you know? the report offers a number of different options but ultimately comes down and says that the american force is probably the most politically digestible option. talking about a small number of americans either on their own or together with the palestinian force. it is a major issue in israel and a major concern. maj. gen. shamni: most israelis over like to see the idf it. but i think it is impossible to

do it into achieve peace agreement with the palestinians. by the way, we had the same dilemma in the past with the corridor, the border between gaza and egypt, a very short corridor. very short, but still, a lot of problems. i commanded the division of gaza in the height of the conflict with the palestinians and with hamas in 2003, 2004. hamas was producing rockets, ied's, everything. after the that disengagement from gaza and while egyptians did not pay enough attention to the border, bring a munition and

knowledge -- bring ammunition and knowledge and bring people to train others. it is true, but still. if i looked at the situation in 2004, and in was in gaza, it could have been much worse had we stayed in the corridor, much worse than it is today. why if someone does not understand military issues or strategy, you know, it caused a big dilemma. by the way, he already decided to hold elections in jerusalem, and in those elections, hamas won. hs., aren't you afraid that -- i asked, argue afraid that

hamas will win? he said, ok, we will handle it. part ofould see that as the solution in the future. going back to jordan, same thing . we have a very committed jordanian force on the eastern side. i hope there will be an american force. israel has that experience with the international forces. that is the way of thinking. but if you look carefully into it, take the example of lebanon, for example, 1701. lebaneseght the military into lebanon. bad or worse? we are enjoying the longest time a quiet in lebanon. hamas is deterred. the plan that general

did, you know, is very comprehensive, but at the end of the day, it is not a matter of equipment and technology, it is a matter of equipment. i believe we can do it, and we leave the palestinians with the feeling that sovereignty is there. , thenk an american force american contact and commitment israelis.preciated by a small capable american force working side-by-side with the jordanians, enough land to portray a unique zone, about 1.5

miles on each side of the river, idfanian and u.s. forces, and palestinians, sharing everything in that zone. , andtem of border crossing i think it can lead to a good solution. sinai. examples like the mfo is not designed for similar missions. with equipment and the mandate they were given. so now they found it difficult to cope with the threats in the sinai. this is if an american force would be in jordan. so i think this is something

that can be addressed. i know the current government does not like it, but we did not do this plan for the current government. we do it for the state of israel. i think that that is the way it should be. moderator: gadi, one follow-up, comment/question. really, the focus with the jordan river here, and it is important, you talked about a 1.5 or two commenters zone on that keeps it east of route 90, keeps it in visible from the palestinian's, which is critical. there is argument with the need to hold the edge where -- the entire jordan river valley. but it has a lot more to do with the conventional military threat, such as invasion from the east, right? i mean, it seems a lot less likely at this point, obviously, that what do you say to people say there is no need to maintain the entire jordan river valley? first, doesamni:

not exist now. can it evolve in the future? yes. but i think that with the region and structures, as we talk about, with the jordanian commitment, with an american commitment in the security of jordan, things will look totally different. when you talk about the multilayered system, that is the idea. layers of security, layers of commitment, layers of partnership. that is the way to do it. i think the conventional threat is something that can be dealt. at the end of the day, israel is a sovereign country. , if we see something threatening the existence of the state of israel, you can see

what is happening in lebanon today -- the russians are there. do they operate when they need to operate in lebanon or in syria? we do. it is never restricted, you know, international forces, never restricted israel from operating when there was a real need to do it. answer -- i is the hope it is the answer to your question. moderator: that absolutely answered it. michele, the proposal here, we should hear about it from the american perspective, as well, the idea of, we're talking about 300 to 800 troops who would do the border security mission and do part of the training, which can also be done internationally with other forces that are already there and committed to training, and implementation and monitoring, most of which would be done by americans.

-- do youu think think the u.s.-israel relationship is strong enough to withstand that kind of challenge? if it becomes a challenge, which is something israelis worry about, do you think there is a commitment here with congress and the american public for this type of forms -- forces and in terms of the u.s. being willing to have these types of forces? ms. flournoy: if you look at history, when presidents have gone to the american people and made a compelling strategic case for why u.s. forces need to be deployed forward, whether it was in germany and central europe during the cold war or south korea at the uncertain termination of the conflict or the balkans to keep the peace as the conflict died down and of the statesture of former yugoslavia, you know,

i think when that case has been made, the american people have shown themselves quite willing to support that. if you imagine the context here, ,he context is we have achieved we, collectively, have achieved this historic agreement that is going to secure the state of israel long term, and sure its international recognition, legitimacy, peace with its neighbors, ending the occupation, creating a viable palestinian state. i mean, in that context, to ask for a small american commitment to ensure that is successful? i mean, i think this is not a hard strategic case for an american president to make to the american people as a small investment that disproportionately has positive impacts on the future of the region. general allen: well said. ms. flournoy: i would be ready

to make that case. moderator: i have one final question i dug out to throw out john and inadi or h questions pier 1 other issue that pops up a fair amount and the dialogue today, concerns nott either tunneling -- the border, but talk about the border with jordan, but we have not talked about the border between the new palestinian state in israel. look at the tunneling threat, and also, for example, areas around, let's say, been going on airport -- the airport and how to deal with those challenges, even rockets, and things fired from gaza. i want to throw that out there as another issue that is important to address when we tackle the report. then we will open it up for questions. general allen: i will defer to here in aadi, moment. we took this very seriously.

we watched what was unfolding during the gaza conflict at the time we were doing negotiations and some of the horrific activity that occurred in what became known as subterranean warfare. in fact, israel today probably leads the world in nocturnal thinking about the applications of subterranean warfare and how, ultimately, to face that threat and deal with it. and we are looking at it, as well. that would be an important part of the conversation, part of the negotiations in the conversation with the three parties are the multiple parties on how we secure the subterranean border for israel and palestine at the same time we're securing both border and the airspace. the three are intermingled and interrelated. we would need to make sure it is comprehensive and we do not take our eye off underground. i think i will leave it at that.

,aj. gen. shamni: as john said i think we are about to reach a breakthrough in technology. we cannot talk about it too much know,but i think, you israel has invested a lot of money in the last year, very comprehensive cooperation with u.s., to find comprehensive solutions to the tunneling issue. it is a very complicated issue, and the concept is talking about multi-sensing. there is not one single silver bullet that solves the problem. we have to have a wide spectrum of technologies and capabilities to deal with different arenas. ,t would cost a lot of money but it is only a matter of time. you see, the most effective

thing against tunnels is how committed people are. when the egyptians decided the tunnels would not work anymore -- [indiscernible] i guess they did the same with the jordanians. i hope it will be the same with the palestinians. .t is more complicated by the way, over there, an international presence is problematic. this is something that can lead -- over there, you do not have too much time. talkto react, to think, to , when the border is 500 meters from an israeli time, it is a very short time to react. you need to be much more flexible and agile. the airspace and the maritime

domains are also addressed in our paper. i think that we have found the right way to coordinate. at the end of the day, i think that israel will have to have some overriding capabilities in domainse mains -- those because of the region. -- it is like delaware, that is it. best expertsd the sitting with the palestinians arejordanians, and there solutions for everything. moderator: absolutely. that is a point to emphasize as we turn to questions. so much of this is done -- ultimately, the report is

written by americans and israelis, but security is such a core issue for israelis him and there is so much about what the united states can provide. there was heavy coordination with the palestinians and jordanians. with that, why don't we move to questions? there should be a couple of microphones in the room. so wait for a person with a microphone, and please identify yourself before asking your question. and i also encourage questions, as opposed to statements. we will go right back there. >> good afternoon. my name is doug samuelson, president of a little consulting company in town. with negotiations of this kind, how do you secure any agreement against the possible problems of political change within the parties? the nextty could, at

election or other event, take a very different look at it? what do you do about that volatility? moderator: on the palestinian side, what happens if you end up with a hamas government or on the israeli side, what if you end up with a government that is not -- general allen: that is difficult, let's just put it that way. [laughter] moderator: fair enough. i can open it up to any of our panelists or take a crack at it myself, whatever folks would like to do. general allen: i do not want to kick the ball out of the grandstands here, but we said at the very beginning, israel, no part of the agreement will ever eliminate the ability of israel to defend itself and to take those measures that are necessary. the hope is that as this process goes forward, it will stabilize the political process, not

create greater political instability so that an extremist organization or an extremist ideology won't find its way into the leadership position. the greater the stability, the more likely then the relationship, and the stronger the relationship would be between israel and palestine. i think that would be an enhancement to stability, not a recipe for greater instability. but that said, if the process for the establishment of the thestinian state and preparation of the palestinian security forces moves forward in a manner, as suggested by this report, i think would would find -- i think we would find that there would still be a very professional approach by the palestinians enclosing clear partnership with the israeli security forces. i will simply tell you, from my experience with the palestinians and my great respect for the ones with whom i

felt in the 15 months -- with whom i don't with in the 15 months i was doing this, they were unambiguously and utterly committed to finding solutions. there were details that were difficult and details that needed to be fixed, but they, they chose to depict themselves as with a hope to be, an island of stability in a region where much of the rest of it was exploding before their very eyes, and they wanted to be a good security partner for israel, because it enhances their own sovereignty and stability. my sense would be, those forces, if well-trained and advised and still in american prisons and close partnership between the three parties -- still an american presence in close partnership, you will likely not see some form of extremist entities moving into leadership. moderator: and i would emphasize that point, at least from my own experience with palestinian security officials, how they see themselves not just as being an agreement with israel, but they see themselves as partners with

the united states. they recognize their pretty small, but they want to play that role and be positive in that way. we have a question here in the corner. as an number of the panelists said, it comes down in the end to people and perception. clearly, what you have articulated, i think it is breakthrough and shows promise. are you morestion, secure in israel and elsewhere? although you are just rolling it out in general, maybe this can be spoken to more, the issue of how it is perceived here it as you roll it up, what is your assessment as we perceive putting side elections only with the israeli populace and the new emerging palestinian leadership? moderator: that question probably makes the most sense to in terms ofadi,

how the israeli public is likely to see this. maj. gen. shamni: well, i will , i will start by describing the problem we face today. today, we face the problem that israel has been invited into a few groups, ok? is pretty well-organized an ideological, right-wing, that is ofually controlling a lot political issues in israel. is very weak,up almost nonexistent, left. in the most important group, in my view, is the center, which are indifferent and live in their comfort zone. so that is my answer.

that this might crash to the world of indifference. i hope it will be able to, you somebody, and i hope it is not silence, that it will wake us up, that the republic will do something about it. with a group of 200 and more generals and senior people that are supporting -- it is still difficult. but i believe that we should do it. we should put the paper, put the offers to be used someday. but you have to remember that a

condition -- you know, to use not to keep changing the realities on the ground. if you change the realities on the ground dramatically, it will not -- [indiscernible] the not really know what is trend today. i think there is good understanding among the israeli leadership that this problem has to be addressed. it is an israeli issue. we have to achieve a two-state solution. that is what lieberman said and what the prime minister steadiest -- said yesterday. i believe the israeli press, ok? [laughter] and if that isi: so, if that is the case, maybe one day these ideas will help.

i am sure that general allen's plan will help. and i know the level of effort invested in that. and we saidn came, we need a solution for our security, and he said, ok, and he brought this huge group, like you americans know how to do. [laughter] ms. flournoy: and overwhelming force. numerous shamni: with airplanes that landed. and they made a good plan. there is a lot of commitment. think palestinian side, i that people are committed, many people are committed. general allen: i agree. maj. gen. shamni: i think that most israelis understand that by the end of the day, we will have withve side-by-side palestinians forever, so we have to find some kind of solution. many israelis, you know, i have a son who just joined the military.

his mom is very nervous. them that when they grow up, we will not have wars anymore. that is what i was told to a debt what my wife told my family. is what my wife told my son. moderator: i want to go right over here. >> thank you. i am from partnership for secure america and am a native of gaza. do you ever see hamas is part of the solution in the future? i know they are part of the problem now. important think it is to differentiate between the palestinians on the ground living in gaza and the people living under hamas as an entity? do you see a way to

differentiate between the citizens of gaza and the people on the strip, hamas? hamas as part of the solution? i say this because i do not want to, as a palestinian, i do not want to to negotiate with you. already know that you want to make nice. i want to negotiate with the ones that do not want to make peace. this is what i was stuck in negotiations. do you ever see them being invited to the table to be involved in the process? sooner or later, their palestinians and are there to stay. how do you restore hope and the people who suffered at the hands of the israelis and the people who suffered at the hands of the palestinians? how do i tell them that there is hope and the will be a day where we can live in peace together? noderator: question for gadi o gaza and hamas and its role, and

for any of you on how to restore hope in the situation. start on gaza. maj. gen. shamni: as i said, i think that at the end of the day, hamas should be part of the solution. hamas is a deeply rooted movement. i know i have some palestinian friends here who do not like hamas at all. but at the end of the day, there are 1.5 million, maybe 2 million people in gaza, kind of captives of hamas right now. it addressed this issue, i think that, first and foremost, the

internal palestinian issue should be worked out somehow. second, there are certain in ations that were put long time ago. military capabilities, denounce terrorism, you know, the conditions. if hamas accepts all this, it is not the same hamas anymore. it can be important. in the past, we had relationships with hamas. go to visit hamas leadership, and i could do it today, also. -one level. that is not a political issue. if you talk politics, this

agreement, this is something else. i think now we can start with the west bank. we can start talking about gaza. gaza cannot be part of this system unless hamas acknowledges and accepts those conditions. if it does, it is not the same hamas anymore. name,ill not change their but they will be able to if they accept those conditions. ms. flournoy: in terms of the question of how to give hope, i think that actions speak louder than words at this point. is,know, i think there , are are a set of actions set of actions that could meaningfully improve both

israel's security and the plight of the palestinians absent an agreement. but steps that could be taken to meaningfully improve people's situation that would still be consistent with where you think an ultimate final status agreement could end up. not making that impossible or undermining the likelihood, but steps that could be consistent with where you would likely end up. i think for each side to take some of those steps would force the other two sort of say, hmm, actually, maybe there is a somebility of rebuilding confidence and maybe there is some possibility of a change of , sot or change in situation maybe we should keep a more open mind. it is fine, figuring out

that set of actions that each side should take to start rebuilding some confidence in a way that is consistent with ultimately getting to an agreement, even if it is not a near-term possibility. general allen: i think the issue now is there is very little to no trust. and when trust against to become a feature in the process and trust then generates the willingness of one or the other a both sides to take a risk, to take a risk on the other, when that can occur, then we can move forward. i would have conversations during the time that i was doing this job, and folks would say that palestinians will never be committed. my response would be, how do you know that? how do you know that? how do you know that if, on the horizon, there is the real possibility for a two-state outcome where one state become sovereign and independent and

stands on its own, how do not know they will not be more committed than you can imagine to their own security, which works to the benefit of israel's security? a have said to me, we want to be that island of stability in the region. how do you know they will not have the will or the commitment? where have we seen other places in the world where people were freshly independent have the will to enforce their sovereignty and ultimately be proud of who they are and demonstrate the will we would want to see? nobody knows for sure. this goes to the trust, and it also goes to the issue of risk. this is the area we have to oflore, the outer edges trust and risk and do it with the kind of underwritten security plan that provides confidence to both sides that they can move forward in a way that builds trust and makes them willing to take risk so both sides can be committed to each other. moderator: very well-said in a

perfect way to end this discussion. we are going to move on to our second panel. i want to first think michele, gadi, and john. [applause]

>> a short break in this conference on the israeli-palestinian conflict. more discussion in the next panel focusing on security solutions in the region, featuring a former state department and israeli security official both discussions today will be available on our website, c-span.org to it we want to let you know about our trip to laredo, texas, tomorrow and thursday. "washington journal" live from laredo, focusing on immigration and we will speak with u.s. border patrol agents. and on thursday, focusing on cross-border trade. online coverage on "washington journal" tomorrow and thursday and every day starting at 7:00 a.m. eastern it we will bring you coverage here on c-span this afternoon on the center for new

american security, and the house and senate both out this week for memorial day break my back on june 6 and june 7 with legislative business resuming next week. i could have everybody said down, we're going to start the second part of our discussion.

, everybody. a very good start. what we would like to do now is continue the dialogue and discussion, specifically with a group of experts and people who have been working on this particular challenge in the israeli-palestinian conflict for years and explore deeper some of the areas in the proposals and in the report and hear about other dynamic, on the ground right now. again, we have five colleagues with us. bauman, nimrod , and others that i will introduce as we go through the discussion and a little bit about the background. somebody who worked as part of the palestinian team,

negotiations at camp david. i know that you care deeply about the security question. the real meat and potatoes on the ground issues a point for palestinians. i want your perspective first on what you heard from the previous panel and your overall impressions of the proposal. are these the type of things that get you in the ballpark of the conversation with the palestinians? what do the palestinians care about? also understanding that this security plan, by itself, will never be accepted by palestinian leadership, or could it be in the context of, for example, a trade-off on borders, so something like 67 borders with equal sides and security? things like that. i wanted to open it up to you first. with 6 -- within six

minutes, right? moderator: usually between six and eight minutes. >> from my washington vengeance point, -- a vantage point, there important things. what i see in this report are the kind of things i have only seen in the past and memos in negotiations, things that have never been in the public domain. this is a great resource, and it is very well-timed. frankly, over the last couple of years, there is a new narrative that says security is one of the unsolvable issues, almost of the there with the symbolic issues of jerusalem refugees and security. this says that there are security problems. toar security answers political problems, political

decisions, but the issue can be resolved by security measures. with theortant washington conversation. on the palestinian side, if you want to see how they react, you want to look at how they see security. the first thing with palestinians and security, the palestinians will not be happy with any security arrangement that we will have. why? conflicts in the permanent state, there is a limitation and in some cases intrusion to sovereignty. they have to make concessions, and they can only make concessions of the get compensation. in thee to look at it context of a big deal where the palestinians make concessions for security and get compensated in other areas, like borders in jerusalem and things of that sort. yourself, as you said in the first session,

palestinians early on realized that security is something they need to move towards the theelis on, because palestinians were willing to accept they would make concessions except the basic it would be non-militarized, no military capabilities, and even with this, there are certain red lines. thee are identified, and report starts to see how we can deal with the red lines, issues of contention at of two categories. you have two that relate to sovereignty, including issues or indefinite israeli prison spirit palestinians whenever accept that. -- including long-term or indefinite israeli presence. there is the idea of the phased approach, where israelis get

replace gradually by forces. one of the concerns of palestinians has always been if to theve the decision israelis themselves, the israelis will never leave. they no longer trust israelis to act in this way. internationalan verification group of future resolution mechanism is the kind of thing i think the palestinians can engage in a the second issue related to sovereignty is the issue of the violation of palestinian territorial integrity, israel's right to act in its own defense. think -- i think it has been wisely concluded that the palestinians will never agree on it. put it an agreement where the palestinians to not have to agree on something they cannot agree on. here start proposals

dealing with issues of sovereignty. concerns the palestinians of the security side, issues of how the security viability ofaffect the palestinian state. the question of viability has many components. one is territorial. in the report am a you try to deal with it by lessening the footprint of certain security demands. in previous negotiations, israeli's role consisted of early warning stations. ideas're coming up with to the second one is economic five billet. there is -- the second one is economic viability. component,e security and there is a key economic aspect. this is also being dealt with. now what i like about the report

ell i think it will play wil with palestinians is to look at two things. end point. with palestinians now, you show them the end game, what it will look like 10 years from now, and the fact that you designed a phased approach with a lot of visible change early on, change that is possible because of the security cooperation, this is key to building the trust. the second one is, what can be the now to start preparing ground for getting to that point? i would like to reiterate two points. one point is the question of building the capacity of palestinian security forces. on this issue, we have a very effective, very successful

american program on the ground, the u.s. security coordinator. they're doing a great job, and we can invest in this to continue to build the capacity of the palestinians. also, you mentioned the issue of general governance. this is something we sometimes lose focus on when it comes to security. forget theus and governments, whether it is the security sector or the private sector. in the first panel, i think michele mentioned the issue of how to avoid politicizing the security sector. through looking at the general governance aspect. finally, i would say there is a lot that can be done on the ground. that based on the existing security cooperation, that can get closer to a peace deal, lessening the footprint of the occupation. something of the swordfish is the palestinians that the

israelis can be partners for the long-term -- something that shows the palestinians that the israelis can be partners for the long-term. a combination of the strategic aspects in the report, a realization that that need to be taken into account. so thatonsolidate and on the israeli side there is a willingness to move forward, something that would not excite the imagination of the palestinians to celebrate in the streets, but would start addressing the sense of impossibility and that things can start moving forward. a perfect follow on to that was a discussion we had with chris, general all en's chief of staff, and one of

the co-authors of the report, calling up on the point of the question of not believing in this transition process and how you manage that. part of what the report does in in grueling detail, is this of the final decisions on redeployment and the mechanism for solving it in a andthat works for israelis palestinians. chris, i thought it would he good for you to share on that level, because it is a politically difficult question. chris: that is somewhat of a challenge. is core of the entire system a thing called the security implementation and verification group. ivg is something to supervise a process, and this is one

focused on security. model on the coordinator model, led by a three-star general and deputies, and those three would oversee this entire process. it would have several components within it, a planning component, the violation component, etc., and the way it would work would look like the planning component to develop this detailed transition plan that would show you how you get from today to the end state. it is not the plan we put before you now, but this plan would be more detailed and hundreds of transitions about how you have the milestone. is all threerocess parties would be involved in the plan. israelis, palestinians, and americans would agree what the

palestinian forces would have to meet, and if they are objective and agreed to, that makes chances for disagreement down the road lower, and it differentiates between true security issues and more political issues. so the planning sector develops that, and the training sector that could involve other international partners would conduct training to meet very specific criteria that we have outlined ahead of time. we know the target we are aiming for. there is no target about what palestinian security forces are able to achieve. this would fix that. outcomening plan or the of the training would be evaluated by an evaluation section that would have israelis and palestinians and americans involved, and they would be evaluated the security forces based on the subjective criteria. i cannot emphasize how important those things are. if they passed a particular violation, the transition plan

supposed the way it is to do. if they do not pass and all agree, the planning section makes a remediation plan to get those forces to the level they are supposed to be. in a more likely event, probably that two of the parties agree to have missed the criteria and the third part of the does not agree, that is when he gets problematic. the same thing would happen. when that determination is made, the planning section would come up with a remediation plan that is no longer that half the original plan for that particular set of criteria for those forces them and they would execute that plan and make a second evaluation. round a that second remediation, there is still disagreement, israelis saying do not meet the criteria, then we have to bump that up to a political level, has more of a

political side to it. it would be a set of envoys or a heads of states. does israel have a veto? time the answer is yes, but the second time through, it has to be more adjudicated. the key is that israel has checked on the system, but the palestinians know it is not indefinite. even though there is a check, there is a target timetable, there is a shorter timetable the second time around to keep the issue on track. one of the other things we talked about during the first panel was a discussion on the broader regional security, and all -- i amacts going to -- [indiscernible] you need norg:

introduction. guested -- our guest is uniquely qualified to discuss the regional question, both from your experience and working for shimon peres. oslo, as somebody who has led two of the biggest joint ventures between israelis and arabs states on key economic questions, two of the largest is business deals-- done by the air states, and being one of the people in israel who talks to their colleagues at deep levels of diplomacy. so maybe if you could talk to us about the regional implications israel'show it affects

security, also the news today on comments that prime minister netanyahu and the new israeli defense minister, you can talk about that as well in terms of their comments about the willingness to engage and look at the air of piece of the issue. >> sure. panel, there was a discussion on the concept of this whole study. security for israel in a permanent status agreement situation is comprised of the border between israel and palestine, internal palestinian nerritory, betwee jordan and egypt, and the broader regional conflicts. when we spoke about the region in the study can in the chapter, we dealt with it with a capital

r. the smalll are comprises the triangle between jordan and egypt on the other with palestine and israel. very deep,nt we have intimate security relationships with both. the evolution of israeli-egyptian security sisiation after president c reached levels that were previously unimaginable. people who were those who signed the peace treaty and those who opposed the signing of the treaty the same argument in the questions about what happens if, takes overs if hamas and palestine, if something

,appens to president so that will something happened to presidents of dots, and it survived. supported the peace treaty at the time did not though this will be the outcome. inn israel takes a risk signing a peace treaty with a neighbor, it is based on one primary dominant assumption, and -- ifs if we can take it the worst comes to worst, having said that, let's see what we can do better than the worst coming to worst. the same goes with the palestinians. layers of security of the outer envelope beyond the letter-palestinian context on based on changes that

have happened in the region the last two years, you're all very familiar with them. which yielded in israel a very superficial and's shallow letter context on basedconclusion. if i make a caricature of it, it can be encapsulated in the following -- if you wake up, if intelligence officer, you wake up in the middle of the night, israeli counterintelligence officer, wake up in the middle the like -- middle of the night and make a list of security risks to the country, they would come up with same lists. basically, they will have iran nuclear, iran stop meddling in the affairs of the countries in the region, threats to regime obviously,n jordan, isis or daesh in the region, they broader issue of

cross-border terrorism and so forth, the shallow conclusion was given the overwhelming weight of strategic threat consideration on both sides, we can now leap from the palestinians into the arms of the region. there is such powerful reasons to cooperate against the common enemies, but the palestinian issue is no longer significant. those who argue that some of you mentioned statements of yesterday, today, and the day before, those who argued that if some checking in the region and found out this is not going to happen. they found out that the region in order to incorporate -- for those countries in the region who are still relevant to strategic cooperation with prerequisites before they are able to come out in public with us. one is that israel says yes to their initiative, and the other significantel makes

progress with the palestinians. that in and of itself is of strategic importance and development, because most of you know it by heart, the text of the initiative, where it promises normalization with the ar world at the end of -- rab world at the end of the route. once we are finished with this, we're finished with palestinian some of the state solution, n, lebanon, the issue of the forms, and so on. the change of the strategic changes in the region produced was it was no longer necessarily the sequence, that there is more if we starty, or cooperating with each other, so the shooting element of the region produced a change that makes israel more palatable for strategic cooperation.

several checking in the region, from the gulf to the immediate difference, and we spoke with security types all over the place. our partners in this have been the good people of the israel policy forum, and one of the , when we landmarks were talking to people from the theon, what would it take, appreciation from the respect for israeli security, and intelligence contributions and otherwise is very serious, and israel too a sufficiently not arrogant toe left assume that we can have everything on our own. these challenges require more than one country to be faced. harnessing the operational

capabilities, coordinating amongst them -- it will be a long process to evolve, but this will add a very significant delay or to israeli security, and that we are concluding in for theects, one, israeli defense established, regional cooperation is essential, they consider it an essential layers of national security because of the reasons i mentioned, that those challenges cannot be adequately met, but being -- by ingle single country in the rine gion. the second is that regional cooperation will not only increase israel's strategic depth by giving us intelligence from the gulf although the way to the jerusalem, but also is taken by israelis as evidence

that regional acceptance is not a mirage. just as we do not trust the arabs, just as the arabs do not trust us, the israelis do not trust the arabs on delivery. regionaltoward integration in a security context will be taken by israelis as a very important progress with the palestinians indeed will yield regional acceptance and see reduced threat perception and increase the ability to meet those threats. mr. goldenberg: thank you. you can tell, especially his thinking about the layering that goes into how we think about the security system comes from this core concept of starting with

the region and going in, which is the vision you just laid out that is so important. another guest,to and i hope you can focus on -- we talk about security elements, economic elements, how they tie so closely, they go hand-in-hand, especially when we talk about steps that need to be taken soon, early for palestinians, things that can be making the institution of the palestinian state sustainable so the security structure we're talking about fits together. you have unique experiences in this, but your time in the working for president clinton during these negotiations, but also your role mitchell, in the early parts of the obama administration, and then and are -- then an administrator, the senate foreign relations committee, and we talk about the

types of issues you are dealing with and how you were trying to influence the situation on the ground on so many of these challenging questions, that there are sometimes security or closely to security. i hope you talk a little about that and how they tie together. , and i appreciate that. it goes to the comments that were made and where the last panel left off. in a number of ways, it does go to building capacity, drastic to the question about hope, that we are always aware, and how we get from where we are now to where the report wants us to be. and in some ways i think there is a continuum, between security, building capacity and security, and there are times where i think that talking about economics here and security here

really does not a whole lot of sense -- does not make a whole lot of sense. and when i'm talking to you and you were on the hill, i thought frankly about our budget in terms of u.s. -- as one budget, millionas between $400 and $500 million a year, and about one third of that was for security portion that was o for security training, and two thirds was everything else. it was very important for the united states, for the palestinians, and israelis that that funding came as a package, and it was port not just because the different pieces were integrated and it worked that they did, it was important politically, because it really was not even though in congress,

it was attractive to get the security money and much less attractive to give the other portion, it was not of much use to the palestinians to get only the security money, because they could not politically for them -- it was not sustainable. to get only money for their security forces and not get the funding that they desperately needed for work on water, or for work to help create jobs, or for schools. they could not have security forces out there not being traded and not have people not being able to get to their jobs, not have water come out of taps. israelis with whom i worked understood that, and oftentimes helped, with the briefings we have on the hill as well as the palestinian prime minister. at the time he absolutely helped in strategic planning with it. these were very much integrated

pieces of work. in terms of the capacity building that needed to happen, it was also integrated, because the work that you needed to do for example and how water got delivered into the types involved governance issues, governance issues between the israelis and palestinians that was very complicated. it was not just about infrastructure building that went back. it would about how groups of people worked together to get decisions made in a very complicated situation. yes, it is about rule of law and the courts of justice system, but it is about building a government and building institutions that deliver the assistance, and so it takes the micro level of work, the integration of all these component parts, it takes leadership at the top, for israelis and palestinians who to get thesew pieces of work done, it takes an awful lot of work getting done

behind the scenes out of the headlines because that is where on a lot of the capacity the mostwas i think progress can get made is out of the headlines, and it takes a consistent amount of funding and support and integration of a lot of this effort in sustainable ways over time. the other piece of this and it takes a political -- and one of the reasons the report is a tremendously helpful is it shows the framework that you can get to on a very tough issue. on security i was encouraged on the other permanent steps issues, it also comes about to take away the cart and show how you can get there on some of these very challenging issues, at the same time that people show the steps and show how to make progress on the steps towards getting there, and i think that is critically with the political

will from all of the different players involved, for how you get there. is also critically important and showing steps along the way and be able to make progress on those steps. mr. goldenberg: thanks. especially on the last 40, showing how you actually make it happen. i think somebody came up during the break and asked me this talking about jerusalem, refugees, and there is different issues that have gotten different levels of depth associated with them in previous treatments. security got less treatment, because people used to assume that that was the easiest one. -- but iey intifada agree with you there is a need of some of these complex and technically issues, especially refugees. palestinian and maybe europeans and canadians do

serious work on refugees and do the type of work that we are doing here at security and some of these issues to peel off layers of complexity involved. mine and hobbyhorse of you keep me up for purple, but now i will assume i role as moderator and like to go to our other guests, and the reason he is last, he is leading a unique movement, more than 200 israeli retired generals and security officials at the same flag officer level, and working closely, he has been very helpful with our efforts, and working with the m and willlicy foru be doing important work on these types of ideas, and none specifically focus on what can be done today, and he does it

from a very new unique ledpective, as an man who israel's armor graves that were dealing right on the edge of the line, at the very front at the start of the yom kippur war war in 1973, held that line when peril was in the greatest that ever was, and was a major divisionn an armored later on in his career. so i think he comes with a unique set of credibility for him and the fact that he is a messenger for such a broader group of movements. tell us what you think israel should be doing today and what israelis and palestinians can do today as opposed to just continuing to look at some of the solutions and talking more about the past few hours. >> if i may, i would start with some comments.

betweenthe cooperation importantarms is very , not only to the israeli republic, but the american public, and if i may, to the american administration as well. is why now.estion i would start to say i am not objective about it because part cis was the theme of the study, but still i would say this delay of a plan to launch it, and in the middle east, especially in israel, you have so many days of -- why not do things, and you have just one reason why to do everything as

soon as you can. during it's very short -- very short history ofit 68 years, israel two extraordinary military threats for its existence. the war of independence in 1948, and the second one was in 1973 with the yom kippur war. is they understanding father of five kids and 16 isndchildren that israel losingnternal threats, a democratic as

jewish country, and, therefore, more than 200 generals and their equivalent who were fighting in fightingefield are now for a peaceful future for generations to come, both in israel and in other arab countries. is now inthink israel --ind of stunt of emergency state of emergency. as i said before, i support the , but whenry much -- it isy, think about a kind of illusion. things are getting worse and worse.

and the question, not what israel can do, but what israel should do, has to do. now, once you stick with my earlier friends about the two peace,solution, about th about hope, it is something above the sky. you do not there to mention peace. when you start to think about a two state solution, the immediate answer, we do not have the partner, we do not have somebody to speak with. so instead of focusing on the real matter, we have to think where we have a partner, we do not have a partner. you have to decide to negotiate

or not. once again, even in our movement, this agreement about mys issue, according to personal best understanding, we do not have a part. ur ofve at least foj them, president sisi is a partner, the king of jordan, the king of saudi arabia, and hamas. the question before, what do you offer them? so we came to the conclusion that we should come with a plan. questioned with the whether we have a partner or not, and what israel should have done immediately without any

delay in order to reach four main objectives. improve thee is to personal security of the people of israel, and their national security. prevent --is to prepare the option for future -stateations for a two solution before it will be too late. to the third one is to how -- is how to enter into some kind of security regiment. in the last, but not least, is its status in the international community.

, one thing about national focusty -- we should not only on the military aspect of it, because once you think about security at the higher level, it militaryination of aspect,economic/social values, and there are some others. we come with a, mixture of security measures, measures, andic political declarations. i cannot entertain all of these

issues in a very short time, but i would mention just some of them. as to the security measures, first of all to say the idea we stay in the west bank until piece -- until peace will be achieved. cynicism.idged with secondly, we think about how to secure the people of israel. plans, to the security up until now, only 60% of the security between the west bank and israel was completed, and we asked the government to conclude the direction of these security plants. now, it was not concluded -- plans.

now, it wasn't concluded, not because of any security problem or budget problem, but because of political issues. i think by doing it we will secure, or provide better security for all of the settlers in the mega blocks, not to think of the israelis within the green line. having said it, we have a fragile situation where about more than 50,000 illegal workers , throughing the fence the gate, working in israel illegally,mission, and we say that amongst them there are some terrorists who the cities.

we think the government should deal with it in a very efficient way. now, as to the palestinian neighborhoods in jerusalem, it is a no man's land. doesn't enter into these neighborhoods because it is a part of israel. the palestinian security forces, they don't enter it, because they are not allowed. and unfortunately, the israeli enter because of no reason, and there is a lot of illegal weapons, not to speak drugs, prostitution . there are some other steps. civilian economics --

there is a long list of measures that should be taken. i didn't mention that when we speak we are speaking about not only three aspects -- three types of measures, but only three geographical areas. west bank, jerusalem, and gaza strip as well. make a like, only to political declaration. i would like to mention very isrtly, very briefly, it also for israel to accept the adjustment.d, with israel should is declare israel doesn't have any

territorial claim or sovereignty the territory as to the security fence, which is 90% of the west bank. it doesn't say the rest is negotiable. that all of the palestinian neighborhoods and vigil is -- villages in jerusalem will be part of the future palestinian state, and a very sensitive measure issue that we are speaking about in a, kind of, intermediate plan -- israel will keep the status quo in mount temple as well. package, a kind of very comprehensive one, and we think that israel should launch a, kind of, independent

initiative in order to save the future. ilan goldenberg --mr. goldenberg: well, thank you, amnon reshef, about a future we believe is possible. we will move to q&a. we have folks with microphones around somewhere. so, wait for them. i will go way in the back first. joel? joel: hi, my name is joel run the eye exam -- i am executive director of the alliance for middle east peace. i think it is very true that security hasn't been explored,

and this report really lays out something really good, but like all the other final status issues, it is a problem of political will and constituencies for peace to move forward on good ideas. in the report -- i just read it because it just came out -- i have a question about detail. given the need to give the israelis and the feeling that they can go in -- if there is an emergency, and sign -- side agreements with the americans, have you undercut the entire detailed report you put out in the first place? if the americans are the essential referees, the implementation, and anything else, and the palestinians are aware there are side agreements with the stronger party, that they can enter whenever they see fit, and the perception being the side agreements are not being made public? did we create something worse than the committee -- i know it is a cap, thorny issue, but with what you selected, it seems a good will be a complete

nonstarter for the populations that will have to vote for this in the next generation. >> do you want me to start? what the report says is that in extreme soon -- extreme circumstances the united states would support israel taking action. it is not a carte blanche, whenever. talked about today -- to make it precisely a last resort and make that less necessary. the report also makes clear from the details that palestinians will never sign off on this. they want, but just as some of these issues were discussed in previous rounds, they are beginning to be aware of what is in it. we're not talking about the u.s. ad israel secretly going and grain on something palestinians don't even know about. if that was the case, we wouldn't put it in the public --

agreeing on something palestinians don't even know about. that was the case, we wouldn't put it in the public report. they do not have to be aware of the details, precisely, but they have to have enough of a sense of it to know that it will not violate their bottom line. i can throw it over to others to address, especially the authors, if that makes sense, or also if you have a perspective from the palestinian side, as well. >> my perspective, as you said -- in the past, through negotiations, we end up with a statement. on the one hand, israelis are saying we cannot give up the right to do that. we were saying we could never formally accept this. you get to the point where you have irreconcilable positions. you can say we cannot reach a peace deal. where you can see there is a price if you do it -- you might want to get support from americans, but don't force us, because we will not.

do not create a point around which you cannot have a peace deal. create a peace deal with things can be done de facto. ultimately, things will be done. if you don't do that, i think you get to a point where security becomes an issue. there are some things that do not lend themselves to an agreement, but to the normal give you donations and everything that would come with that. ilan goldenberg much in the same light --mr. goldenberg: much in the same way the u.s. went and took out osama bin laden -- we did not ask the pakistanis for permission. in the front. daniels: i have managed that in this issue for a long time myself. you mentioned, in a poignant way, that israel was in

a state of emergency due to some internal factors. i was wondering if you could prioritize what are those factors that you think are contributing to this state? is it the perception -- you know, what the international community thinks? push, ors -- america's lack of push on the israeli palestinian state, division -- how would you prioritize this? maj. gen. reshef: as i mentioned when ourry beginning, doesn't havesrael

to rely or depend on any second or third party. it should be done independently. phase, enter the second which is the two-state solution, the i think we would need commercial community, especially , to support this kind of push. we would call it support. as to the first stage, it should theone regardless about palestinian reaction, or any other reaction. it is up -- it is according to the israeli interest, and

phase is athe second total different story. weigh in onrg: this. >> just to add a layer to the story? of the 212 generals -- 213. mr. nvoid:: we give birth to generals. amnon reshef by the way, i would --maj. gen. reshef: by the way, i would say most of the security generals are in cis. >> their arguments, however all

of them have signed on to the newsman -- movement vision. it said in the past israel had asked potential challenges from the outside. --longer so from the moment moment. other is internal. it is related to the concern that if we don't go to a two-state solution israel, as we know it, will not survive it. society,cratic jewish it cannot survive if we don't separate from the palestinians for the reasons you are also familiar with. the drive to get there is a very selfish one. it does not come out of the military and -- generosity.

generosity --mr. goldenberg: generosity. mr. novik: generosity. yes, we have that, but primarily for self-preservation considerations. toie: we are so thrilled partner with centers for new american security and commanders security, to help advance and promote the ideas and plans contained in both initiatives. first of all, i want to say congratulations on the rollout of this most important work. about theask question interim steps that are such a critical part of both plants. , in israel amnon reshef --amnon reshef, in israel, you present -- presented your plans to the public. mr. al-omari: -- ilan goldenberg

you are doing this report today. in order for there to be agreement, the need to be good that are willing to undertake those steps. so, my question is, how do you see the next few months in terms of the conversations in the rooms where they need to happen with the right people, with the various constituencies, in order to create the kind of atmosphere that makes it possible -- imperative, perhaps, for the leadership to take these into room steps? i can -- mr. goldenberg: i can -- i am going first? >> you are the moderator. mr. goldenberg: i will do it. i will step out of moderator for a second. i think that, you know, nothing that we are proposing is so controversial and impossible that it cannot be done.

i will amnon reshef before himself, but some of the recommendations remix the degree about what can be done today that you really heard general allen talk about -- i think you fromet sympathy for this people on the american side, palestinian side, and two on the israeli side, including in the current government. we need to have a more effective counterterrorism force. any copy better trained, better supported. -- they need to be better trained, better supported. general allen side of a study that laid out where the palestinians are in reader. then everyone -- greater depth than anyone has ever done, and it is easy to go from there to where i got to where the gaps in work and start filling them. these are the things that can be done today. honestly, those are the things that are less meaningful to the palestinians today in terms of reshaping on the ground rather than some of the areas maj. gen.

amnon reshefp -- got into. we have seen discussion with people on the hill, and you can build momentum with a lot of the ideas. what is difficult to do right now is build momentum for the game, but i don't know -- you others want to hop in? maj. gen. reshef: ok, the cis, with respect to think tanks here in d.c., we're not a tank institution. we are activists. one should take into

consideration that during the the israeli50 years brainwashed by all of involvedus governments in the necessity of the west bank, the necessity of the settlement in the west bank, in order to secure israel and all of this stuff. verye are going to face a difficult challenge. mindo change the state of of the israeli people. of veryquestion intensive, long work to be conducted. campaign just on

sunday evening. using all of the -- thecation channels traditional media, the new media, the as, the facebook, the youtube. receiveda lot i have just around the time thinking -- --facebook and youtube , thinking about facebook and youtube in order to raise people's attention. it was viewed by almost one million people in israel. it is remarkable. so, that is just one step in a very long trip.

so, you know, i don't remember who mentioned -- i think it was talking about the two camps. they arrived. >> three. the middle.shef: the three camps. we have about 50% or 60% in the center, the light right. we have to oppose these people. -- approach these people, and want to conduct a poll about the -date.of the two i would say 50%, 60% are supporting, but they are afraid of the security aspect. to educate, trying this many people.

behink the third stage will we last www.c-span.org -- two months and we will see the results. we are conducting some polls through the campaign, and will continue according to the but it will not be a short journey. it will be a long one, because there is a lot to be done in israel. time wehink in the same tould cooperate together approach the american public, especially the jewish public in welltates, and capital as because it all will be combined together if we want to achieve something.

>> do you want to go first? >> certainly -- if you look at what was just said, with palestinians finally getting meaningful version of sovereignty and dignity -- one figure causes there to get behind than that, and if we can do it safely, which is what we propose -- the way you do that safety -- safely, that is a great thing to get behind. mr. novik: well, you cornered me -- i have to make a class -- clarification. the union believes the door on the two-state solution will be close. i do not think the one-state solution will ever materialize

because i do not think these two peoples will agree to live peacefully with each other under the same roof as co-equals. we israelis can hardly tolerate equals, weies as will not voluntarily incorporate in a 2 million palestinians and become a minority. i think the one-state solution is an illusion, however we're going to bleed each other until we separate. the role of leadership is not to prevent the one-state solution. it is to get to the two-state solution before the bloodbath, but that was just a personal comic. [laughter] mr. novik: on the question that suzy race, i want to take up leftly from where amnon off, and dhaith spoke to that as well.

there is a block that will never accept the two-state solution. it is a minority in the knesset, but a majority in the coalition. however, the overwhelming majority that is resigned to the idea of a two-state solution -- i don't want to say support -- something this is essential. some say that is unavoidable. that is clear. amongst them there is a block that is really hesitant because of legitimate fear, and that fear, i think, is very effectively addressed by the study, and that fear is also addressed by the here and now security first of the unknown and the cis. when addressing the israeli public, i think that when we f's role inthe ip

educating the american audience, we are hiding another layer -- and that is that the israeli body politic, the israeli public, and the israeli media are affected by what is happening here. there is and i call. .herefore, -- an echo therefore when you do an effective job, it makes our job over there slightly easier. the last comment is government -- i don't think that anybody on this panel is ignorant of what this city thinks of our current prime minister. and his credibility -- and it is not unique to this city. some in europe share their appreciation. [laughter] mr. novik: and when he made the ,peech of a two-state solution

people took it with a grain of salt. therefore, the assumption is never. as long as he is around, never -- it is not going to happen. even though i come from a very different school, i don't buy that, and i think what happened, and you alluded to it, what happened over the last 48 hours, which really is not 48 hours -- it is a derivative of the si initiative. the when he made the statement and his willingness to host a regional approach to the palestinian-israeli negotiations, it did not come out of thin air. yet certain commitments from jerusalem before he made that statement. those commitments were made when -- was to be the foreign minister. and, obviously, the egyptians got concerned that when that did reallypen, did somebody

si -- did somebody really pull the rug from under president siss. i.-- sis they reiterated their commitment to the initiative, and that included basically yes, but, to the initiative, and a commitment to the two-state solution. it doesn't mean that we're going to get there on their watch. it just suggest that something like security first might not be so alien to them as a first step in making the initiative -- in the beginning of an original approach possible. theefore when we approach original context, we're talking about two parallel processes. ,n israeli-palestinian process

bilateral, which makes it possible and legitimizes the other players in the region to talk to israel, and the evolution of a regional security structure that reinforces the israeli > i would like you think everyone for joining us here to dave read i would like to thank our panelist. [applause]