u.s. military presence in the region. and i believe being our exquisite about an intent -- being explicit about our intent to do so. folks should not be guessing keeper we intend to a robust military presence. there was a concerted effort to build and maintain a u.s. military footprint in the middle east in the wake of the withdrawal from iraq. dod, where i served in the last 2.5 of the administration, we called this setting the theater. to make sure the u.s. has the capabilities to execute all options if the president so ordered. we need to set the theater in the years ahead. we have that capability there today. we still have more capability in the middle east than the u.s. had prior to 9/11.

that will come under increasing pressure from demands in other regions, in europe and asia, where there is high demand for more u.s. military presence. also budget pressures here at home. also the sense of jcpoa having solved the problem, being less of a demand for u.s. military presence. we should commit to maintain that. that includes aviation, maritime, ground presence. maintaining a carrier battle group. second, planning, making sure that this needs to remain operational. we must maintain the military planning for all options. a little history is important. when obama administration came into office, the planning was not in the shape that we had expected it to be. 2000's --ing in the secretary gates initiated a a series of efforts that secretary of defense panetta will continue to ensure that the u.s. military

has done the necessary planning to execute any options that the president ordered. we nature it was resourced and exercised. we cannot let that atrophy again. i think it is more important in the next 10-15 years to keep that planning tight. a critical component is u.s. capabilities and the development of weapons to address the unique and hardened iranian nuclear in the structure. a lot of resources and high-level attention over the past few years when into entering that the u.s. maintained that military capability to address the nuclear threat. we need to continue that work on weapons design and procurement in the years ahead. a final point on our declarative posture. of the various leader summits, the united states has reiterated the carter doctrine in terms of you estimate to the security of the gulf. it is worth exploring, as the

report suggests, looking at expanding the nuclear umbrella in the event that iran proceeds to break out. i think that is something the next administration should take a close look at. i command the report's idea that it should seek prior authorization from congress if iran violates the deal. unfortunately i think it's unlikely, given that it's hard to see congress authorizing the war we are currently in, let alone one that is theoretical. i think it's something we should pursue. third, partner capabilities. we need to focus on enhancing partner capabilities in the middle east. that has been a big project of the obama administration the last seven years. working with our golf and israeli partners -- gulf and israeli partners to make sure they can deter iranian integrations. -- iranian aggressions. there is more on the table the needs to get over the finish line soon. we need to implement the

commitments made in camp david at leaders summits, especially on greater cooperation on maritime, missile-defense, cyber security. and we need an expedited process for weapons acquisition in the united states. when i was in office, i work closely with investor type on. it is a frustrating process, to say the least. i think a new congress and administration should take it up .o come up with some new system we need to recognize that some of our best partners should get major non-nato ally status. that is something that this report suggests that we do. forth, corporation. -- fourth, cooperation. the u.s. and our goal partners

-- our gulf partners tried to create a conversation about the iranian nuclear threat and what we wanted to address it. it has continued on to the leader level. that is something we need to lock in for the future. it is important for these summits to continue. it fills a gap. when you think of the u.s. engagement with other parts of the world, there are regularized leader summits. the president of the united states will meet with those regional partners. we do not have that in the middle east. i think that is what this process has started. it's important for the next administration to continue it. in the first six months of the next presidency, it recommends that there is another one of these leaders summit. i think that is a good idea. i think that there is another ministerial meeting for foreign and defense ministers with their golf counterparts. -- gulf counterparts.

and although the report notes it might be a bridge too far to think about more finding security alliances, like nato, there are some ideas that we could import into the conversation. for example, it might not be article 5, mutual self-defense, but it could be article 4 of the nato treaty. a consultative mechanism that is built into the alliance that, if a particular partner feels threatened, they can call for immediate immediate -- emergency consultation. that is something we can look at as a regional security architecture. two final points. first, it is important for us throughout the process in the next 10-15 years to keep the onus on iran. to make sure that we maintain the leverage that we created together over the last 7 years. where iran was seen as a partner that was the outlay or, the recalcitrant party.

whatever the u.s. does, we can't let our action allow a run to turn the tables and make the u.s. the recalcitrant partner in the eyes of the world. that is very important. secondly, this is not just an american project. this is a common project of the united states, our middle east partners and european allies. it is important over the next 10-15 years, where it will be constantly tested. there are so many uncertainties that the u.s. keeps the world together on this. getting to this point required one of the most intensive u.s. diplomatic efforts in our history, alongside camp david under president carter. is going to require the same kind of energy, creativity, relentlessness in the next 10-15 years that it required to get to this point. the next administration will have to lead on this.

this is not something that will just be about nice words. it will have to take on a series of tough and relentless actions. that is yet another reason why the choice we have in front of us over the next year in terms of a new administration is so important. thanks so much for your time. >> you have been one of the most articulate voices on this deal, in its most strictest terms, but the broader recognition that the deal does not address the real challenge that iran poses. recently you wrote in a wall street journal op-ed that the iran we have long known, hostile, expansionist, violent, is a life and well and is deemed -- and is dangerous as ever.

can you speak to how you see the early phase of the implementation going, and the broader challenge the region perceives from iran? >> i want to thank brookings from having me tonight. derek andagree with that this report is the most objective and thoughtful on the iran deal i have seen so far. thank you to richard and bob for all the hard work. countriesost of the in the region, is a much broader threat beyond the nuclear. i think the nuclear file is probably the easiest part of the iran threat to deal with. i agree with the report's conclusion, that for the next 10-15 years, we have gotten herself -- gotten ourselves a runway. a safety zone. we have taken off one of the most important issues. we believe in the next 10-15 years, it will be impossible for iran to get a nuclear weapon. having said that, if we can now

move to work effectively together as in international committee to address the other part of iran's behavior, support rebels inlah, hamas, yemen, creating havoc in saudi arabia, or or in kuwait. then this deal will be judged as a good deal. if, on the other hand, we now fear risking this deal but pushing hard on iran and taking our foot off the gas, the steel will be largely judged - this deal will be largely judged as a bad deal. this is not often taken into consideration when people discuss the deal. they look at the deal and say, we have prevented iran from getting a nuclear weapon. our job is done. know it is not, our job is just beginning. --t i wrote in the article this was an easy article to write because i wrote facts. i simply won't -- wrote what iran has done in the last months. they have repeatedly tested

missiles in violation of you when security council. -- of u.n. security council. they continue to support hezbollah and rebels in yemen. what i wrote is how the rebels -- how those in the region see iran's behavior. can we make a run pay a higher price -- make iran pay a higher price for this activity? on thatcan press you point, are you seeing from the obama administration the push back to iran's behavior that begins to rebuild some of the confidence that has been lost around the region? >> i do. but i also see next messages. i see a desire to push back iranian influence. at the same time, i also see u.s. officials encouraging european businesses to do business with iran. there is this mixed message that

we receive. on one hand, yes, don't worry, we have your back. at the same time, we are trying to open a broader avenue into iran, despite their current bad behavior. i think if you ask anyone in the region, they will tell you that they see 2 sides of the same coin. to abuse my role as moderator and pose a couple questions to our panelists before i bring it out to the audience. but i want to speak first to the assessments within the report, then get to the solution oriented aspect, which i think is important. in terms of the assessment, the one area that seems to be a wildcard is the politics of saudi arabia. i wondered how confident you are

that the changes we are seeing in saudi leadership, in dynamics with the royal family will mean for the durability of the assessment. that in fact the saudi's will prioritize the vital relationship between the united states and riyadh in a way that would deter them from taking any sort of action in terms of proliferation. clear in many ways that the saudi's are concerned with current u.s. leadership. they are acting more independently, more assertively, especially this generational change. the defense minister took a must role,ssertive regional

especially in the campaign in a yemen. in our research, richard and i heard many regional countries concerned that the saudis may be overreacting and may be stimulating instability and even blowback to their own interests by doing this. it's a very delicate balance the u.s. has to pursue, and is trying to pursue in the obama administration. on one hand, showing our support for the security interests of our partners, including saudi arabia. providinger hand, not too much support for actions that the u.s. believes may be going a bit too far. i think the u.s. knows, and certainly president obama has stated, that it will be important in the long run to

achieve a balance in the region between iran and its supporters and the sunni arabs that are concerned about iranian behavior. establish this balance with a strong u.s. credible military presence. but there is a second part of that will track approach -- that dual track approach. after demonstrating our commitment, is to encourage some kind of regional accommodation. it is difficult politically to do that in the u.s., to seem as if we are mediating between our traditional partners and the country that has caused so much instability in the region. we canhink unless promote, perhaps an accommodation, reconciliation. but at least some kind of balance so that both iran and the saudi's feel that they can

stand down a bit in terms of military activity in the region. that is going to be very important. the saudis are demonstrating their independence in a number of white, not just in their campaign in human, in the support -- in a numbner of ways, not just in yemen, the with discretions of other suppliers of arms and other security corporations. in meetings with russia and other countries. but what richard and i learned, think we met with senior saudi officials, including a ministry of defense, was that at the end of the day, the kingdom relies on the united states for its security. and is going to be unwilling to jeopardize that by flirtation with other suppliers. it notes no one else is going to be both able and willing to fill in for the united states.

so that i think is stabilizing influence. but the u.s. has to be a good security partner and engage in activities along the lines of what derek has emphasized. suzanne: let me post one question to you.one of the key aspects of the deal was the sunset provisions in it. very contested on the part of many here in washington and the region. you have talked in this report about using various aspects of the deal, making the iran deal a platform for nonproliferation activity across the region, potentially more broadly. but clearly the timeline is going to matter. the clock is already taking on the expiration of the various provisions in the deal. what are the key steps that a new administration might want to work on expeditiously in terms

of setting the bar high, trying to do the best possible in terms of ensuring that some aspects of this deal survive well beyond the 8-15 year expiration dates? i would invite any of you to tackle a few words on that. >> i'm not going to answer that. [laughter] i like to tack on to your question -- what happens if it is not done? what if, after the end of 15 years, those for judgment are lifted -- those restrictions are lifted, and iran enriches its capacity, its are in the capacity, and restrictions are lifted off and iran his stronger economically. that is an important question to address too. it goes to the heart of the report itself. >> i will take a swing at answering both of those questions.

the reality is that a lot of the steps part of the jcpoa are atomicthe international energy agency to incorporate more generally. online enrichment monitoring, which safeguard inspectors used to see what is going through the pipes -- that is a very straightforward way for and inspector on the ground to be able to say, yes, what the country is telling me that they are doing is what they are doing. the way that the iaea can use that technology, especially remote monitoring, that gives you a lot of confidence that what you think is going on is actually going on at the plant. it might seem overly technical and a little bit too pedantic to focus on things like that. but frankly those of the kind of steps that give you confidence to know when break out as started. like it or not, at the end of the day, iran's nuclear weapons ambitions are going to be

hamstrung or facilitated by its fuel cycle capabilities, and what is presently have and will have in the future. if you know what they are doing at one moment, that gives you greater confidence that you can react quickly. if there is one on heralded a compliment of the deal -- one un heralded accomplishment of the deal, in nature that the entire -- it made sure that the entire year was usable. step thatmportant allows countries in the region to know that what is going on in that enrichment plant is still what will be going on later on. you can see value for bringing that technology and similar safeguard measures into the broader global context. i think there are other things that would be useful. prohibition on some activities directly related to weaponization. the jcpoa usefully highlights a

few key pieces of technology, like the systems used to validate a nuclear explosion will work when you testa warhead, x-ray cameras, and so forth. you could have broader export control rules or agreements on countries not to pursue those capabilities. for the very fact that they are so destabilizing and risky. , suggesting all of these things are easy. -- i'm not suggesting all these things are easym but straightforward technical issues, you could bring to bear . let's say we are able to bring forward all of these fixes and legal and infrastructure fixes to how nuclear programs are done. i don't think the obama and magician ever foreclosed responding to an orion enrichment program -- iran enrichment program in 10-15 yea rs, including return to economic sanctions and use of military force. the a running tab some awareness of -- the iranians have some

awareness of their vulnerabilities. it will only increase their the ability to the possibility of economic sanctions. for those that say there is no chance we will get that kind of sanctions against iran, i would point to the sections we have against russia. russia is by far a more significant oil producer. we still have sanctions on them in responseto ukraine and they are doing damage on the russian economy. there is no reason you cannot believe you could introduce those measures against iran if you want to build the sanctions back. if military option is what you choose to pursue, them we have a better understanding of where the nuclear sites are. all options do remain 10-15 years from now. to it, this isdd a critical matter, what happens after 10-15 years. this is one of the areas that has been focused on most by the critics. it is important to recognize

that sure, iran legally can ramp produceapability to missile material after 10-15. it legally can do that as part of the jcpoa. question is, will they do that? they say today that they will do that, that it's committed to have an industrial scale enrichment program in order to produce fuel for their future fleet of nuclear power reactors. but how realistic is that? the realityis that iran is not going to be able to produce its own nuclear reactors for many many years. for decades. it will rely on foreign supplies. the russians in particular have been their major source. the russians insist on providing fuel for all the reactors that they sell to iran, which

eliminates any persuasive rationale fo rirar iran to haven industrial scale enrichment program. that needs to be pointed out. there is no legitimate peaceful justification for iran to ramp up its programs. and we should be looking at further incentives to convince iran that it doesn't need to to this. also technically, it is not at all clear how iranian research and development on a new centrifuges will go. will it even be in a position to ramp up its capability to the extent that it says it is committed to do? we will see. but we should adopt policies to discourage them from building up their ability to the extent that is legally permitted. also there is a misperception, i think, of how the jcpoa works. yes, iran ken legally -- iran

can legally ramp up its capability after 10-15 years. say its not -- let's decides to do that. it ramps up its capability. is it free to use that capability to build nuclear weapons? no. the jcpoa, as well as the continuing nonproliferation treaty prevents them from doing that. plus, after 10-15 years, all of the intrusive intrusive monitorg arrangements under the jc poa will remain in place. so if they decided to break out of the jc poa and go for nuclear weapons, we would be able to detect that. and we would have the opportunity to intervene if necessary by the use of military force to stop them. speak as if it is automatic that come after 15

years, we will have a nuclear-armed iran. we have tools to intervene and stop them. derek: if i could just add to what bob just said. you used the phrase one way or we are in a zone now. i think it is important that we see the next 10 to 15 years that way. , as suggestedhard in the report, and as i firmly believe, we cannot pretend that this deal has done the job for now and will -- and we will kind of punt for another decade plus. it is really how we use this moment that we are in. and a lot of what bob and richard have suggested, what i have talked about is ways that we can build up this muscle tissue of regional cooperation,

dialogue, capabilities development, so that come as we get closer to the timeline as laid out in the jcpoa, we can make a common judgment and what needs to come next. in the meantime, we are doing a lot of things that will hopefully deter and influence iranian behavior on all the issues you rightly pointed out that are not addressed in the jcpoa. the key to that is not taking any option on the table. yousef: i think that brings me to my roller a point, how this deal gets a plummeted over the .ext 10 to 15 years if it is implement it as written, it will give everyone the comfort and reassurance that they seek and there will be less worry over what happens in the last set the end of 15 years.

over what happens at the end of 15 years. it is crucially important for the sake of the deal and for the sake of the countries outlined, how they will react throughout the deal. we are going to open it up to the audience. if we could get a microphone up to the front. we had just one hand that was raised even before we began. salina -- haveer solana.avier javi thank you very mucher: -- thank you very much for

the fantastic explanation. thank you very much for the report. i have not had time to read it completely. i think it is a fundamental piece for everybody to read and it is impossible to agree on. the report, with all the details you have given, i think it is a good guarantor it -- situation, they did that it will develop in the right direction. to let me say that we have repeat and repeat many times that did agreement is not an american agreement. it is an agreement by the international community. and to maintain that, to my mind, is fundamental. this agreement was signed in a very difficult moment. the tension among the big powers world -- was already there. proliferation is an important

issue for everybody. i think it should also be read what we got involved in this arrangement, trying to get the agreement. gethought that to [indiscernible] issue, it was the basic element for security arrangements in this region. with the threat of an iran with nuclear weapons, it would be absolutely impossible to have an agreement originally. now we have the agreement. everybody has agreed that we years -- 20 years in which we can be safe. but nothing that has been said in 20 years, is to act. to be with open eyes, etc., etc. are notnder how we going to be able, the

international community, in 20 years or in 15 years, to get an agreement? i think [indiscernible] everybody will be so exhausted that we will not put enough energy to get an agreement. that is very important to maintain a chinese in russia on board. they are very interested in being part of the deal. less relaxed about the investor has said good i think we have to put -- said. i think we have to put all our energy to get this arrangement and that will guarantee security in this region. that will be necessary after syria appeared so let's get to work in that direction as much

as we can. thank you. buster, would you like to talk about the viability of any kind of regional security or dialogue that would actually incorporate iran? i think it is inevitable. had these have discussions in the past. we cannot continue to live in this kind of environment without hopes or at least a path for a solution. absolutely is we see no desire from the part of the iranians to do that. the conversations we always have with their friends here in the u.s. is how are we going to sit down and how are we going to send signals for iran to sit down and have discussions on syria and on yemen? -- my question to them is why is the burden solely on us to send a signal? what has iran done to send a signal to sit with us? what positive, collaborative,

friendly message has -- have they sent to us that said, yeah, part of the responsibility falls on them? we have seen nothing but more support for terrorism. we have seen nothing but more to her fear -- more interference in our internal affairs. and i am not mentioning the rhetoric, the tweets and the statements by the supreme leader'. while we recognize -- supreme leader. what is recognize necessary, there is another side to the equation and they have to be willing to sit down with us in resolving syria and yemen and all the challenges and are part of the world. and like i said, i don't see any of that at the moment. suzanne: thank you. we have about half an hour for questions. i would like to have -- take perhaps three at a time. i think two onve the other side of the row and one of front. >> your excellency --

suzanne: if you wouldn't mind standing up and introducing yourself. >> yes, your excellency. i am here with my class studying nonproliferation. it is an honest -- an honor to see you. iran has all but increased its export of militarism in the region. yousef: your question is what should policy be toward iran going forward. it is a very difficult question to answer. i think the short version is we need to see, nation of carrots and sticks. we need to see carrots when there is good behavior and we need to see sticks when there is bad behavior. but as long as any country, not just iran, feels that they can continue to behave a certain way, and when there is no price associated with this bad

behavior, it's want to be very difficult to work in a collaborative approach. i have two young kids. and if one of my kids does something wrong and i don't punish them, guess what. they are going to keep doing it. at a pointwe are where, now that this nuclear deal is behind us, i think we need to rethink what our approach towards iran should be. i understand that there is a moderate side in iran and that there is a desire to work with that moderate element. and believe me, we have that desire as well. let me be clear. there is no country in the region that will benefit or be better positioned to work with iran if iran behaves responsibly than the uae. theeconomic cooperation, investments, the energy, the cultural exchanges we can have. don't see the moderate side on the syria policy, in the iraq also, in yemen. i only see tmo