mr. herring, you mentioned dr. comby's testimony several times. his testimony, which he referred to the handling of classified information by former secretary clinton as extremely careless. i don't recall, i don't ever recall those two words used to describe the actions of anyone who ever served as secretary of state, extremely careless in handling classified information. i think the director expressed concerns that her account, e-mail account, her server may have been hacked. i think you need -- i think all of you should appreciate the fact as members of the oversight committee, we have a responsibility to look out for the interest of the whole country, you know, folks tried to make this about politics. it really isn't. i think there's some legitimate

concerns about national security and the safety and well being of our officers in the field. i want to ask you, what would happen, you know, mr. russell brought this up about the handling of national security information, cutting and pasting. what would have happened if they moved classified information to an unclassified system or took it outside the skiff? would it be taken lightly? what would be the consequences? would there be a ride up? would there be a reprimand? i mean, would you investigate it? >> i mean certainly it's not my -- >> i'm not asking you, i'm asking you a general answer of the context of the fbi? would that be a problem for any of you? >> sure it would. it would be be reported to the security division. they would look at the facts and circumstances. >> let's just do a hypothetical

here. >> i prefer not to do any hypotheticals. >> okay. then i will. i will assume that if you were the director of any part of our national intelligence agencies, or the director of the fbi and you had an employee who repeatedly did -- handled classified information with extreme carelessness, i would assume, based on your service, that there would be pretty severe action taken. is that a valid assumption? >> yes. very serious sort of-tsh. >> thank you. do you know of anyone reprimanded for violating security procedures? >> not immediately -- not that immediately comes to mind. >> have you ever copied classification information on an unclassified system or removed classified information you weren't supposed to remove? have you, mr. kadsick? >> no, sir.

>> how but, mrs. fridayfelt? >> no. >> ms. walsh? >> no, sir. >> mr. higgins? >> i can think of one occasion of which i have accidentally removed material from the skiff and immediately put it back to the skiff. >> you didn't take it home? >> no, sir. >> mr. samuel? >> no, sir. >> mr. seoul? microphone please. >> sir, i took one home and the document was destroyed. >> so in two instances where you accidentally did something and you showed due diligence, took care of the situation. you did what you should have done and you reported it to your

superior. that's not what happened here. so my problem with this is that, again, that i think this committee has a responsibility. i think the chairman's articulated that quite well. so exercise the oversight the constitution invests us with. and that we need to look into the possibilities of how a secretary of state acting, handling classified information, with extreme carelessness may have compromised agents in the field, possibly national security. there is a number of issues here and it begs the question, if that's not the issue then why are you withholding 302s? why is so much of this stuff redacted? >> as far as 302s go, we provided some. there are a lot of them. it is in the process.

can i go back and look at getting you the access that you need. i think the personal identifiable information where individuals do have a privacy interest. and we generally do try to protect that type of information. obviously, one question that obviously we would consider is how does it relate to the oversight interest of the committee at hand? >> but you have to let us do our job. we want you to do your job. but you have to let us do our job. my time is expired. i yield. >> we recognize the gentle woman from wyoming, ms. loomis, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. when we're home in our districts, we meet with our constituents. while i was home in my state of wyoming over the august work period, among the things people asked me was, have you ever read classified documents in a skiff? and i explained that i had on two occasions.

in fact, three. visited a skiff by myself where i had to surrender my electronic devices where i was watched while i sat there and read classified documents. by people who were ensuring that i would not write anything down, that i would not use my cell phone to take photographs of classified documents and take them out of the room. for some it is hard to read in a room where it is really quiet and so as a member of congress and i have related to my constituents in wyoming is very different from the kind of thing we're hearing today. where we have heard at least on television, that secretary clinton had maybe as many as 11

or more that she used to communicate with. a classified server, unclassified server. if someone takes something classified and restates it without noting that it's classified, that it can be discovered by people who are hacking an unclassified server in the basement of say a secretary of state's house. this is the kind of thing that concerns my constituents. so that's why we're having this hearing. it's not because we're trying to make your lives miserable or our lives miserable by meeting late some monday night. it is because our constituents are worried that classified information was compromised in ways that might allow hackers to refer that information to people who want to do harm to america and its allies.

my question is this -- have any of you that are on this panel separated or begun to separate the classified information that is in the skiff from the unclassified information? or from the sensitive access information? anyone? mr. herring would you, yes or no? have you begun to separate that information? >> i'm not exactly sure what you're talking about. but generally, the information in a classified document is portioned and it stayed together in the stiff. >> so hopefully those dockments that we will be talking about in a little bit, with i know whether i was viewing something that was classified? something sensitive? something unclassified? >> the information should be properly portion marked. >> okay. so you could separate classified

from unclassified from sensitive? based on information available to you in documents that are currently in the skiff, right? >> if it is properly marked, you can certainly distinguish the classified from the unclassified. i do think though in our production to congress which is what we are here to talk about, there are other sensitivities and sort of nonpublic information and certainly not suitable for public release. >> okay. why have -- why have we, as members of congress, not been provided access to the nonclassified, nonsensitive information that is in the skiff? >> ma'am, i think you've -- i think you've been given access, or certain members of the oversight committee, and staff, have been given all information in the skiff, ma'am. >> mr. chairman, i would like to yield the balance of my time to you. >> thank you.

mr. herring, the problem that we have is that the redactions you have given us doesn't allow us to look at full and complete file. that's part of the challenge. let's start with mr. sole there, the nsa, do you have an understanding of the total universe of the compromised classified material that was found in the universe -- >> absolutely not. >> explain that to me. hillary clinton took four years of communication outside of a secure communication. do you or do you not have an understanding of the universe of that breech? >> if you mean the importance of it, i certainly understand the importance of it but i don't have personal knowledge of everything that is said to have been released. >> does the nsa understand the universe of the breeched material?

>> my understanding is that every document that was referred to us but i will want to talk more in closed session, sir, we had the opportunity to review and i can give you the results of that in closed session. >> but do you have an accounting that -- there were untold tens of thousands of things that were destroyed. we heard testimony from it, secretary kennedy just last week, they now have 14,900 additional e-mails, plus tens of thousands that have been given to them in the last 30 days. so i'm asking if the nsa understands how much classified information from nsa has been compromised in a nonsecure setting. >> sir, i would have to speculate. i do not know that and i do not know that we do know that. but can i take that back. >> and you'll get that to me by? >> sir, i'll look, i don't know.

a week, is that acceptable? >> that's fair. mr. samuel, same question. >> sir, while i prefer to discuss this in the closed session, yes, nga is aware of and has reported back to congress the extent of our equities found in those e-mailes. >> can you give us a general sense, though -- what percentage of the compromise do you believe you're aware of? >> sir, again, i prefer to discuss that in a closed session. >> mr. samuel, when did you first become aware that there could have been a compromise of this data? >> sir, we started receiving requests last fall to give this information in earnest and that's when i first became aware of it.

>> mr. soule, when did the nsa first become aware that there might have been a breech of this classified information? >> sir, like my nga colleague, i believe it was last fall, but i don't have that information in front of me. >> okay. just so members know, this criminal referral started because the inspector general got word that there was classified information in a nonsecure setting. they confirmed it was in a nonhe is security issing and that's when they gave it to the fbi. part of what we need to understand is when did they all understand? when was that information recovered? we need to know whether or not odni understands the scope of what was potentially sending those e-mails. do you feel, ms. walsh, that

odni knows a hundred percent of what was compromised? >> given that that's outside my role in legislative affairs, i would have to -- >> can you get that back to me in a week? is that enough time to answer that question? >> i'll do my best. >> a week then? >> we'll do our best. >> a week? is that fair? >> sure. >> thank you. appreciate it. gentle woman yields back. do any other members have any other questions appropriate for an unclassified setting? mr. go sp sar is recognized. >> thank you. mr. higgins, cia collects a great deal of human intelligence, collects information from foreign individuals often at the risk of that individual's life. is that true? >> yes. >> are you aware that state department released among classified e-mails from

secretary clinton with a redaction that said quote b 3 cia persons back slash org. do you remember that? >> i will admit i do not remember all pursuant to the request. >> so that means information redacted with sensitive information about an individual organization affiliated with the cia. correct? >> i will take your word for it. i don't have the manual in front of me. >> so if information from a single or small group of cia officers or agents makes it to our adversaries that could be a huge risk for their safety, right? >> sir, i wouldn't want to speculate without knowing what information we are discussing and i prefer to -- >> but potentially. given that circumstance, it could potentially have serious ramifications for those people. >> again, it would all depend on the information in question and i prefer to discuss the classification review and any classified material in a closed setting. >> that is hardly a

classification that we can't talk about right here, is it? >> if information of cia methods were known to an adversary, yes it could have complicationes. >> so it could be life or death? >> it could be, yes. >> even a few sentences from a source could expose that source, true? >> with it would all depend on the few sentences. >> but it could? >> potentially, yes. >> so someone treating information with our spies abroad carelessly should be trusted with a security clearance? >> sir, that is well outside my -- snez i watched the chairman ask each one of you gentlemen and ladies, going back over classified, did you remove any information out of a skiff or any documentation and those that said yes, said, hey, there was seriously to it. right? >> i believe people with access

to classified information treat that responsibility seriously, yes. >> say that one more time? >> i said i believe people with access to classified information treat that responsibility seriously, yes. >> really? >> i do. >> so why are we here? >> i would defer to the chairman. >> no, no, no. so why are we here? because we have a secretary of state that had a whole server that was off line. kind of unusual, wouldn't you say? >> again, sir, i am here and ready to -- >> that's fine. mr. soule, nsa is tasked with collecting intelligence electronic with your signals, is that correct? >> yes, sir, that's correct. >> would leaking signal intelligence damage national secure snit. >> yes, sir, it would. >> what if the personal looking at intelligence thought the information wasn't important. is that a valid excuse for leaking signal intelligence? >> no, sir.

>> leaking any signal intelians can leak intelligence cape bigts so even if information seems innocuous, is that correct? >> generally i agree. it would depend on the facts. >> still should be treated as classified, true? >> if it was classified and properly classified, it should be treated as classified. >> has the nsa ever lost an intelligence tool? been burned, is the quote, because classified information about that method made it into the wrong hands? >> yes. >> would you say that someone who treats nsa signals and intelligence exceptionally carelessly should be trusted with a security clearance? >> generally i would agree with you sir. but i would have to have you stand the facts. in the general premise, yes. >> mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank the gentlemen. does anyone have question force an unclassified setting otherwise it is the intention of the chair to recess and reconvene in a classified

setting. >> sorry, just a couple of questions for ms. frifield. she didn't submit her e-mail record to the state department, right, until december of 2014, almost two years after leaving the state department, correct? >> i don't have the dates but i -- >> about? >> i think that's in the range, my understanding. >> is that two-year delay in turning over federal records in compliance with your policy? what is your general policy of how quickly records should be turned over? >> i believe the rule is when you leave your records should be turn offered. i don't know if there is a time lag -- >> maybe a couple months. not two years? you know of anyone else that took two years to turn over their records? >> i'm not aware of any. >> okay. and even that submission rate turned out to be incomplete? the fbi submitted thousands of e-mails from the state

department that uncovered in the course of their investigation, correct? thousands of e-mails that she didn't turn over? >> i would defer to the -- i don't know how many. she didn't turn them. >> okay. >> will the gentleman yield? >> sure. >> the undersecretary for management patrick kennedy testified there were 14,900 additional e-mail answers tens of thousands he received in the last 30 days. is he accurate or inaccurate? >> i assume he is accurate but i -- >> there you go. go ahead. >> that's not my specialty. >> that's huge point for us. >> right. >> was failure to turn over eye mail in compliance to the state department policy, do you know anyone else who hasn't turned over that huge number of e-mails upon leaving? >> i don't -- i'm not aware of any. >> anyone not turning over any e-mails since you've been in your position that you'reware of if. >> i don't monitor that. but i think we are each responsible for our own e-mail answers we file them and save them.

>> do you ever hear of anything like this happening since you've been involved in state? anybody not turning over e-mails? >> i haven't been involved in the records retention issue. i know that we are working hard to improve our records pretension system. we have a new process, new people involved and it is helping us all to understand how it's done. >> okay. secretary clinton's i.t. contractor deleted an e-mail archive from their servers after they were made aware after preservation order from the benghazi committee. so after they were told to preserve it, they deleted it. was the deletion of that e-mail or those e-mail archives with the state department policy? >> i think the policies are not supposed to delete e-mail possess. >> right. these are particularly severe because she particularly wasn't supposed to delete these. so that would be -- what would happen to a regular garden variety employee of the state department if they had done this sort of thing?

>> i don't know. usually you saved your e-mail answers pass them on as records. >> i know that's what you're supposed to do. everybody does it. if another employee just -- put something in your mind, another employee deleted e-mails like this, what would the state have done about it. >> i honestly don't know. >> they never think about it? never occurred it would happen? okay. will she or any of her aides who helped participate face any negative consequences for their actions in doing this? >> i can't speak to specifics but in general when there is any kind of violation or issue, reviewed through administrative procedure out of the diplomatic procedure office. >> i'll yield the remainder of my time to the chair. >> thank you to the gentleman. this round of the unclassified questions has concluded. committee will take a short recess. reconvene in the house senator's

visit room 210 to conduct the closed portion of the hearing. we will give you 15 minutes and try to reconvene at 8:25. committee stands in recess. >> the house oversight committee is holding hearings this week related to the fbi investigation into hillary clinton's use of a private e-mail server while she was secretary of state kerry tuesday, they look at what committee leadership calls the state department's failure to preserve federal records. 10:00 -- 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span3. hillining us from capitol is john fleming from louisiana. congressman fleming, you are going to offer this resolution of personal privilege to impeach the irs commissioner. the impeachment resolution from earlier this year reads

impeaching the commissioner of the irs for high crimes and misdemeanors. what are those high crimes and misdemeanors? with all ofore you the dates and times but the basic thing is that right after he was confirmed i the senate to be the head of the irs, he received a subpoena to protect and take into custody all information, all evidence that was involved with lois lerner who we found out targeted certain taxpayers for their political beliefs. within three weeks of receiving that subpoena, he either destroyed or allowed to be destroyed 24,000 e-mails and 422 tapes even after saying to congress, promising congress, that he would protect them. then, later, after they were

destroyed, he lied to congress and said they were all protected and preserved. then, he came back and said -- no, something happened. they are gone when in fact there were some that he did not apparently know about that the inspector general found later. and he did not tell us about that. we had to find that out on our own. the point is that it is clear that he lied to congress, was not responsive to subpoenas, and it was clear that he either destroyed evidence or obstructed justice or allowed it to happen on his watch. as a result of that, we fear he is not -- we feel he is not fit for duty and he should lose his job. >> this is the second time around for you. you tried it back in mid summer. they have two days to move forward on your request. what are you expecting? before the two

legislative days expired. in this case, that will not happen. we will be here for at least two legislative days so leadership will be forced to bring this up for some type of flow. there are several possibilities on how that can be done. the bottom line is that once this is moved forward, there will have to be a vote on it. >> have use earn any signal from leadership on how they might move forward? i have not. only that the speaker made the comment that he would leave it to the will of congress. i think that is exactly what we should do. but how this will be a direct vote on impeachment or if it will be a vote to table it or to move it to committee, any vote other than moving forward with impeachment would be viewed by the public as no on impeachment

and removal from office. the reason for that is this resolution, in a similar form, has been in print for well over nine months. put that in as chairman of the committee. and i put one in, in july. and the leadership and the judiciary committee have failed to move forward on impeachment hearings. it is clear that nothing is going to happen unless someone me, --, in this case unless i move forward with a privileged resolution to require a vote and then let every member answer to his or her constituents why we should allow high-level officials the privilege of getting by with doing things that are unlawful, potential he criminal, and not being held accountable for their behavior. i get asked all the time by my constituents -- why is it that

there is to standards? there is a standard for everyday americans, the average taxpayers and one for high-level officials. the head of the irs for example. apparently, he does not have to respond to subpoenas or respond to the same sorts of things that we as taxpayers do. that applies to others like of course eric holder. you talk about the standard of moving through the judiciary committee. we understand his attorneys have filed a memo accusing some republicans of not going through the judiciary committee. you talked about the judiciary committee a moment ago. why not let that process play out? >> we have let that process play out in the judiciary committee and leadership have failed to begin that process. they have had ample time, months. there is no new information here. they have had everything they

needed for many months. it is clear that they will not act and the american people believe that congress should act. , georgeable people will, just came out with an op-ed. jonathan turley, a famous attorneyonstitutional said we should move forward and there are other notables that are saying that congress is going to become irrelevant if we do not do our jobs which in this case is to hold high-level officials in the executive branch accountable for their behavior. republican a house meeting this week. rep. fleming: the evidence is self-evident. i'm not going to try to persuade anyone to vote john koskinen out of office. i think cautious -- conscience voters and the will of congress. they can read it as easily as i can. there is nobody whipping votes

as far as i can tell. we simply should have the opportunity to vote, and i would say to every member of congress, certainly in the house where this will be voted on, you're going to have to go back and face your constituents. if you vote to protect a high-level government official who has lied to congress and has ignored subpoenas and who has allowed obstruction of justice on their watch, then you're going to have to answer to your constituents for that. certainly i know i'm going to say to my constituents, and that is i was there for them. >> the irs commissioner tries to stave off impeachment with .lanned that with some members you plan on meeting with the irs commissioner before any potential vote? i haven't met with him. he has not asked to meet with me. i don't see what the mela -- the relevance of meeting with john koskinen would be.