[applause] >> we're covering a hearing today on counterterrorism efforts by local jurisdictions. officials from local law enforcement agencies, including new york city's deputy commissioner for intelligence and counterterrorism, testified before the house homeland security committee at 10:00 a.m. eastern live on c-span3. it live ato watch c-span.org or listen live on the c-span radio app. between 2007 and 2015, the price n incorporated epipen application rose by an estimated to% from 300 -- from $100

$317. .eo's compensation rose today, she testifies before the house oversight government reform committee live at 2:00 p.m. eastern on c-span3. you can also watch it live on c-span.org or listen live on the c-span radio app. >> the c-span radio app makes it easy to continue to follow the 2016 election wherever you are. it is free to download from the apple app store or google play. get audio coverage and up to the coverage, plus podcast .imes stay up-to-date on all the election coverage. c-span's radio app means you also -- you always have c-span on the go. up to the debates between hillary clinton and

donald trump, we look back at house presidential debates saturday on c-span at 8:00 p.m. eastern. today, it is gerald ford and former georgia governor jimmy carter. >> were faced with heavy inflation, over 12%. we were faced with substantial unemployment, but in the last 24 months, we have turned the economy around, we have 500,000 with jobs today that were out of work three months ago. increase and0% unemployment in two years. >> then ronald reagan and president jimmy carter. >> when i made my decision to stop, as the result of a taking of hostages, i announced then and have consistently maintained since then that if the hostages are released safely, we would make delivery on those items,

which iran owns. adequate warning that there was a threat to our embassy, and we could have done what other indices did -- either strengthen our securities or remove our personal before the kidnappers took place. >> and the 2000 presidential debate between former texas governor george w. bush and incumbent vice president al gore. gore: i will balance the budget every year come i will take down the national debt come i will put medicare and social security in a lock box and and protective. 1/4bush: i want to extend of the surplus to important projects and 14 of the surplus to people who pay the bills. >> watch it on c-span, the c-span radio app, and c-span.org .

mejdrich is appropriations and budget reporter with cq roll call. the senate votes to move forward limiting debate and that's procedural jargon and there's a lot of senate procedure left where they actually consider the resolution. >> one of your capitol hill colleagues tweeted in effect, they were voting on a blank page to move forward. in fact, the headline at cq kind of reflective of that, saying that the senate forges ahead on the cr at last, but without a deal. what do they have to have in

this deal to move it forward? kellie: the public senators have seen no final text on the resolution. as majority whip john cornen yn told me and other reporters, take a step forward that has to be done before september 30th, otherwise the government is going to shut down. because procedure takes longer in the senate, this is a clear indication that the senate wants to move ahead. now, complicating this, and perhaps spurring this vote to move ahead with the continuing resolution, even though there's no final agreement, is the fact that republican studies chairman had his own version in the house. it runs the same length that senate majority leader mitch mcconnell says their cr will run to, which is december 9th and it contains aid to combat the zika born virus, complicating

associations, and contains full instructions and one of the spending bills that the republican-controlled congress hopes to send to the president, but the house version contains controversial riders that democrats in the senate have threatened to block passage of legislation over. that includes targeting refugees and halting the transfer of an internet domain organization that the u.s. currently has control over, that the president wants to transfer over to the international community. and so, right now, we're seeing a little bit of a tussle between the two chambers about who is going to move forward first. although, you know, majority leader kevin mccarthy on the house side says he's waiting for the senate to act and for the senate to deal before they move forward. >> on the senate side, who are some of the major players and senators involved on either side, on both sides, i should say in the negotiations? kellie: so, this is really a

high-level negotiation at this point. senate majority leader mitch mcconnell, minority leader harry reid, and then mikulski, the ranking democrat on the committee and the chairman of the senate appropriations committee working with the top appropriations members on the house, hal rogers, and working with paul ryan and nancy pelosi. this is really a high level negotiation that's going on, but the main contention has to do with provision they want attached to the stop gap measure, since the congress didn't finish the appropriation process. just funding to the government level at fiscal 2016 levels, last year's levels. there is no increase in spending or anything like that, but one of the things that has made it hard for them to move forward on this negotiation is lawmakers want to attach aid to combat the zika virus. that's linked to severe birth

defects in infants of pregnant mothers who were infected with the virus. once that happened, there were a whole myriad number of lawmakers, including, you know, high-ranking republican funds, on the house side, for example, who had interest in louisiana , which has been ravaged by floods. you know, high-level democrats on the senate side who want to see money for the water contamination crisis in flint, michigan. senate minority whip dick durbin told us this morning that the white house appeared to be a little bit frustrated by so many different demands coming from all different directions, trying to attach on to this continuing resolution. and the reason- and the reason -- >> the house has to be -- is here until september the 30th. tell us about the timetable, the senate is facing, the majority leader. the senate is going to be in next week. is it likely they'll be in longer than that?

kellie: so, we're really unclear at this point. but remember, that originally, the idea was to try to maybe get out of town by this week. now, majority aides wouldn't confirm this. that was the rumor around all kinds of lawmakers, including the senator saying that at the hearing committee. senators are eager to get home because as your viewers probably know, this is a very contentious race for control of the senate, and so their hope was given that the house has been -- the house republicans have been in disagreement over the lengths of the continuing resolution, senators were hoping to pass legislation and leave town, leaving the house no option but to concede to whatever the senate did, otherwise risk shutting down the government. but this is an indication that republican leaders in the house are willing to maybe, you know, exert a little bit more power over the process since they don't see a lot of development on the senate side. we've been in negotiations for, you know, two solid weeks of of really top level negotiations. and still no bill text has emerged.

>> kellie mejdrich. follow her , appropriations in budget reporter for cq roll color. follow her on twitter @kelmej and cq.com. thanks for the update. >> next, wells fargo ceo john stumpf testified before the senate banking committee for two hours and 45 minutes.

>> the committee will come to order. today, we'll learn more about the events and the circumstances, that led to the enforcement action against wells fargo by the city attorney, and the occ and the c.f. pb. but first today, we'll receive testify from john stumpf, he's the c.e.o. and chairman, who is was us. >> welcome. >> we will then here from the los angeles deputy cheer whose office was the first for commence the action and finally from the occ and. c.f. pb. we look forward to hearing from both panels because much remains

unclear about what transpired at wells fargo and the regulators response. it appears that wells fargo's own analysis concluded that think seanlsd of its employ piece opened more than 2 million account that's may not have been author raised. subsequent licks wells fargo terminated 5,300 employees and has agreed to pay 185 until fines, and 5 million in customer remediation. sales dated take show they have been an industry leader to cross sell products such as credit cards. checking accounts and home equity loans a. number of former wells fargo employees have described a work environment mint by intense pressure to reach sales goes n. a 2010 letter. john stumpf wrote that wells

fargo goal was eight products per customer because eight rhyme we had great. the result was a corporate culture that drove them to open millions of accounts, using their customer's funds and personal information without their permission. i have said that banking is based on trust and that trust was broken at wells fargo. while much has been written about these events i believe there's several questions that warrantans. first when did this conduct start at wells fargo and why were the regulators unaware of this growing problem? >> when did john stumpf and his senior management become aware and how did they respond? third, have all the appropriate -- wells fargo employees been held accountable and to what extent? finally, where were the federal

regulators while certain employees were taken advantage of unsuspecting customers over a period of many years? here's what we do know, wells fargo's internal review only covers unauthorized accounts, dating back to 2011 news reports significant these problems might have existed long before then. the 2013 times articles led to the l.a. city foarnls' office investigation into wells fargos sales practices. thousands of manhours by a dozen city attorneys, culminated in a lawsuit filed against wells fargo in may 2015. this timeline begs the question, where were the federal regulators? if the occ and the c.f. pb were aware, before the l.a. city attorney's lawsuit, why did they

wait until 2016 to bring an enforce meant action? why did it take the -- l.a. times reporter to uncover what should have been uncovered by wells far goes regulators. if there were ever a textbook case where consumers needed protection. this was t. how many millions of unauthorized accounts does it take before the c.f. pb in thes and while the bureau is billing this, as the largest settlement it is unclear whether it had any significant role in investigating the bank's conduct. just as it is fair to ask john stumpf what he knew, when he learned and what did he about it, it's fair to ask those same questions of wells far goes regulators. the simple, facts and circumstances, questions that both the occ and the c.f. pb should be able to answer without violating any confidentty restrictions.

i look forward to the hearing as both congress and the american people, the achieved consumers have been kept in the dark for far too long. >> mr.^chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. i want to commented the city of los angeles, for their actions, and the l.a. times for bringing this to light. i was stunned, when i learned about the duration of the trade committed by wells fargo. i hope today, we can begin to understand what went wrong and what needs to be done. i call it fraud because i got tired of the words a long time ago. this is not a matter of customers who received products and receives they did not want or need, as wells fargo puts it, that makes it sound like there was a mix up under the christmas tree and i got the glove that was meant for my brother. this is 5 3,700 employees, he

calls them team members. forging signatures, stealing identity, social security numbers, and customers hard-earned cash so as to hang onto their low paying jobs, and make money for the high paid executives at wells fargo. they did it for at least five years. wells fargo's reaction has been remarkable. it did not treat this the as a big problem until it appeared in the newspapers. it did not begin to make customers whole until year. we don't know whether the bank chose or was told they had to do so. wells fargo is taking out full page ads claiming it is accountable and it has not admitted to responsible for a single misdeed with the city and the fem government. wells fargo claims to have made things wright its customers, but

its efforts, it's not clear that pw c. calculated the cost of a lower credit score, which might be paid every month for 30 years. at times the bank has been down right hos tile to customers. rather than letting victims have their day in court. wells forced customers to abide by the arbitration, clauses in their real accounts. the bank invoked the fine print on a real account, to block redress on a fake one which wells fargo had created. wells fargo team members, many struggling to support a family on 12 dollars a an hour, is tellers, make about $11.80 on hour. the team members struggling to support a family, followed their manager's guidance to do whatever it took, to make their quotes to. offers cut corners.

for missing goals. goals that wells now admits were too high. they have been accountable. these low-income workers. they lost their jobs, with no parachute of any color. it's not just 5300 team members, because many more were fired when they couldn't meet the quotas and many quit. by contrast, miss tostead, the senior executive vice-president for community banking, has done quite well. she knew of this problem at least five years ago and is retiring with a package, that may be worth more than the c.f. p.d. of 100 million. so 5300 team members earning perhaps 25,000, 30,000, 35,000 a year, have lost their jobs, while miss tolstead walks away with 120 million.

despite firing thousands of team members, she decided it was not important enough to alert the head of the company, john stumpf are on the board or anyone else for two years, if ever, even though, you both sat on that board. senior management, and the board of directors agreed, once the scandal became public, actions were stepped up against frontline team members, but the praise and performance bonuses continued to be lavished. upon her, until two months ago. you would think the let sons of the financial crisis which came at such a high cost to our country would change the way the banks do our business. many bank did at that time lessons to heart and for the largest bank, every week, we hear of a new lawsuit or action against one of them. week-after-week-after-week. what are some of these lessons the culture needs to change.

that starts at the top. second there must ab way for complaints to end up in the suite rather than the circular file. >> banks need better controls because fourth, if you pay people on the basis of how many products they sell, that's what they'll do, whether it is in the interest of the customers or not. base pay needs to be increased. change the pay structure, make incentives deferred so customer and company interests are aligned and enduring. wells fargo has come up short, on all five counts. it is laid a scan development they settle we had the occ, for 11 years' worth of deception, above deceptive practices, and selling protection. so, at the same time, the bank was stealing customer identities

it was charging for protecting them. if the wells i.d. theft product that, they sold didn't discover the fraudulent wells accounts, perhaps some refunds are do you this. april, wells settled a false claim act suit for 1.2 billion because it had used bonuses to get staff to improve a kwanive fha loans. applying pressure on loan officers, and underwriters, to approve more and more loans, as quickly as possible. thousands of americans, so well, although, far too few of us know any of these people personally, they lost their home. so i hope john stumpf you will level where this committee and the public. words that come like a fog on little cat feet, won't cut t. these were not delivered unwanted products.

this was fraud. through not find, or fraud that you did not fix quickly enough. instead of focusing on damage control, you need to admit to the problems, and, fix them and treat your customers, in real life, like you do in your vision statement. that would be the best damage control of all for your customers, for your bank and industry and our country thank you. >> mr. stump will you rise and be sworn. >> you may be seated. >> mr. stum stum your written statement will be made as part of your record. john stumpf i am chairman of

wells fargo where i have worked for nearly 35 years. it is my privilege to lead this company which was founded 164 years ago, and has played avite tal role in the financial history and development of our country we employ more than 268,000 team members, 95% of whom are in the united states. one in every 600 working adults is a member of the wells fargo family, and we have a present in all 50 states. i many deeply sorry that we failed to fulfill, our customers and team exphebs to the american public. i have been through many challenges as wells fargo but none of which pains me more than the one we will discuss this

morning. wrongful sales practice behavior, in our retail banging business goes against everything regarding our core principles, our ethics, and our culture. it runs counter to our vision of helping our customer succeed, and it is not representative of wells fargo as a institution. i am here to discuss the situation, today, tell you about the actions what have taken, and our commitment on,000 move forward. our entire culture is centered on serving our customers, and in this case, we let our customers down. our retail banking practice issues is sales inches are into the reflection of of our hard-working team members who deserve thanks for helping our

customers with their needs. i want to make very clear that we never directed, nor wanted our team members to provide products and services to customers, that they did not want. that's got for our customers and that's got for our business. it is against everything we stand for as a company. that said, "i accept full responsibility for all unethical sales practices in our retail banging business. i many fully committed, to fixing this issue, strengthening our culture, and taking the necessary actions to restore our customers trust. let me tell you, here today, the wells fargo board is engaged in this issue. the board has the tools to hold

senior management accountable, including me, and tol instead the former head of the retail banking business. any board actions taken with our named executive officers, will be disclosed. i want to be clear on this. i will respect and accept the decision of the board. under new leadership we have begun taking steps to ensure that the sales culture in our retail banking business is wholly align we had our customers' interests. on september 13, 2016, we announced a major decision that we will end product sales goals for everyone in our retail banging business. because we want to make certain that nothing gets in the way of doing what is right by our

customers. the new leadership team's primary mission, will be to provide the best possible service to our customers. i'm also announcing today, three new initiatives, that will reinforce our commitment to our customers. first we're expanding the scope of our account review and remediation town included 2009 and 2010. second, we'll be contact every single one of our customers across the country, using this same process, that we agreed to, with the city of los angeles for our california customers. third, we have begun contacting hundreds of thousands of our customers with open credit yards, including those for whom we have refunded fees, to

confirm whether they need or want their credit card. in addition we started second customers, a confirm making e-mail with one -- within one hour of opening any new deposit account, and acknowledgment letter before submitting a credit card application. we recognize now, that we should have done more sooner, to eliminate unethical conduct or incentives that may have encore threadged many conduct we took many steps over the past five years, in an attempt to address these situations, but we now know those steps were not enough. in 2011, a dedicated team began to engage in proactive monitoring of date tax specifically for the purpose of

rooting out sales practice violations. in 2012 we began reducing sales goals that team members would need to qualify for incentive compensation n.2013 we created new corporate wide oversight for sales practices. in 2014 we further revised the compensation plans, to align pay with ethical performance. in 2015, we added more enhancements to our training materials, further lowered goals and began a series of town hall meetings to reinforce the importance of ethical leadership. throughout this 5-year period, we identified inappropriate sales practices. we investigated those, and we took disciplinary actions. terminations of managers and team members for sales policy violations.

the 5300 terminations other than five years. despite all of these etceteras we did not get it right. one of the areas that we missed, was a possibility that customer could be charged fees in connection with accounts opened without their authorization. because deposit accounts that are not used are closed, we assumed this could not happen. we were wrong. we took steps to refund fees that were charged and made changes so this could not happen again. in august 2015, we began working with a third-party consulting

firm price waterhouse coopers, which conducted extensive large scale data analysis of all 82 million accounts, deposit accounts and nearly 11 million credit card accounts that we had opened from 2011-2015. of the 923 million accounts reviewed, approximately 2%, 1.5 million accounts, and 565,000 credit card accounts were identified as accounts that may have been unauthorized. to be clear, they did not find they had been unauthorized but because it could not rule it out, these accounts were further reviewed to determine if any fees had been charged. pw c. calculated, that approximately 115,000 of these

accounts had incurred 2.6 million of fees, which have been refunded to those customers. even one unauthorized ask the one too many. this type of activity has no place in our culture. we are committed to getting it right, 100% of the time, and, when we fall short, we accept responsible tics and we'll do everything that we can do make it right by our customers. i will close by saying again, i am deeply sorry that we have not lived up to our values, in this way. i also want to thank our 2678,000 team members, who come to work everyday, to serve our customers. today, i am making a personal commitment to rebuilding our

customers and investors trust, the faith of our team members and, confidence of the american people. i'm happy now to address your questions. thank you. >> according to your testimony, wells fargo began making internal changes in 2011 to address the opening of unauthorized accounts. did these problems start in 2011 or could there have been activity before then? why 2011? >> i think we all know that not every team member will do everything right, everyday of every minute. and, we dollar a lost training of our team members, coaching, and they each sign an annual ethics statement, and, i can't guarantee it did not happen before that time.

we are trying manage it within the business and that's why i announced today that we're going back for 2010, and 2009, because at that time, ausmight recall, we were putting the wells fargo teams together, and we just thought we don't want to leave any stone unturned. >> wells fargo fired 5,300 employees, in connection with these practice. what was -- what were the criteria for termination? were any personnel actions taken short of termination? what were they? you didn't fire everybody. did you discipline? why? >> yes, so. we have a number of transgu lacings around,000 understand when there might be improper behavior f. some customer shows up with three savings accounts,

they don't need that, or we have ethics lines, we have a culture in the company, if you see something, that you don't think is proper, raise your hand. talk to a manager. so we looked at number of situations. some of them went will a get mat. for those who did wrong, and we have a bond, and people who behave in this way cannot work here. >> your testimony many does not address when the violations were brought to the attention of senior management. specific licks when did you find out that thousands your employees were opening unauthorized accounts? did it take that long? >> thank you.

the business has, their own audgit investigations and sales practice, and so forth contained within the bank or the retail bank. after they had been working on this, issue for a couple of years, and again this was way too many people. but it was 1% of our people, 100,000 team members in our bank, and after we noticed, after the business was dealing with this for a couple years, it was then brought to the holding company and corporate assets, corporate compliance, got very active. that's when i became much more aware of the issue? >> does it bother you, as the c.e.o., that fraud was not

brought to your attention sooner? >> if i could turn the clock back, and i have thought about this 1,000 times, of course i wish i would have done something more earlier. we didn't get on this fast enough. again, recognizing that this was the vast majority of people who were doing the right thing. >> let's go back to the question. i don't believe you have answered it. when did the senior management you and others, learn about this fraud? >> i can speak for myself. i know that other corporate executives at the corporate area outside of the business, it was 2013. before that, it was being dealt with, with the audit and comply

answer. >> the board of directors has awarded the then head of the community banking, tostead success and furthering the companies objective of cross selling products and reinforcing a strong risk culture according to 2015 statement issued by your bank. explain to the american public today, what accountability at a large bank looks like what he executive depart wes millions of dollars in, compensation after thousands of her employees de frawfded customers. >> the leader, had a lot of

requirements, and things that her performance is measure oavmentd putting the business together. doing common branding. doing making sure that customers were treated properly, and throughout that entire periods customer loyalty scores continued to improve. today they're top of class, of large barges. our team member engagement, we do a study every year and today we have 15 people who are engaged in that business, and balances, and customers had grown. now, in this particular area, she did not do enough. we decided, the others, decided

that we could bo in a different direction. but, i want to be clear, she was eligfootball retire when she was told that we were going to go in a different direction. she chose to retire and she got no retirement benefits, and her compensation that she received, in the past, some of it which is not -- has been granted but not yet vested, and, will be krtd by the board of directors, in a process that they have, and i will respect and accept whatever decision they make. >> you have the ability to claw back. >> i'm not an expert in com pen sayings. but i will get you, whatever. >> you're the c.e.o. of the company. >> yes. >> so are you the chair mafnt board? >> yes. >> but i do not --

>> the buck stops here. >> it stops, i'm the senior officer. >> so, are you going to look into this seriously about what this person did? her responsibility and the big reward that's she's getting? >> we will, the board of directors, the compensation committee and they'll refer to the board. i'm not part of that process i want to make sure that's a very independent process. nothing that i say would prejudice their process, but that is their decision and they have all the tools available to them. whether she would have retired or she would have been fired. >> nam lot of banking based on integrity or trust by your customers in the bank itself? they put their money there. they trust you.

what's happened to the banking system? what has happened? >> you know, you think about the way i think about it. trust is the core element of any relationship, and in the financial services business. and we know, we have work to do in that area. i intend to do all i can to help. >> do you believe you violated that trust. >> there is no question with some of our customers, we have violated trust and we have to work hard. >> senator brown. >> i'll make my questions short and ask you to be as concise as possible. your response to the senator you became aware of it in 2013, could you be more precise? >> well, i became aware that, the problems, the local business was working on in routing out

this we may i have year by 1% of our team members, and i don't want to minimize that, that we were not making any progress. >> when? >> it was later. >> l.a. times article? >> yes, later. well i had -- actually i don't remember the exact time. i can get back to you. but it was sometime in 2013. >> you suggest, you mentioned that the merger, that you're willing to go back before 2011, and 2010 because of the merger. the emphasis on cross selling dates back at least to the merger? this has been a wells fargo business plan for a number of years. what year was the merger? >> it was -- will that was 1998.

>> so, this merger, there was -- you are going back to 2009 and 2010 why stop at that? we hear from people that it has gone on longer than that with the cross selling and the pressure and the sales goals. >> well, i would till this. we want to make it right by any customer. we agreed with our regulators, in our agreements to go back to 2011, we made a decision to go back to 24010 and 2009 and we want to make it right. does that mean you're willing to go back earlier? >> i can't -- i can't item that you today. i would have to talk to our folks. i don't know about record questions and so forth. but, i want to make sure any customer, who has had harm of

any kind, that we will do right. >> you have records before 2009, is that a pledge to go back earlier, than that, if, in fact, there are customers that were harmed? >> i will take that under advisement. and i'll get back to you. >> i accept your good intentions why stop there if you know that you have, you have to go back and talk to staff. if you do want to make sure these customers are made whole you should go back as long as you can. >> again, i think that's a, we have considered that. i will take that. >> i hope you more than consider it. talk about the chairman discussion, on the claw back. you minimize your influence, on the board. you're the chairman of the board. understand that the board goes through a process.

i respect that. but you as the chairman, are you going to recommend to the board, back up, you i would assume are more familiar with both the pros and the continues, of performance from her, you were aware that she is getting, some up to 120 million. you're also aware that most of the 5300 people team members that were fired were low-income workers. but were low-income workers. so you're more familiar with that than any board member. so will you, with your knowledge and your position on the board, make a recommendation to this board, that they should claw back a significant amount of her compensation. >> i will answer that question. i want to put something in perspective. the lowest paid worker we have, are entry level in our least

cost area is $12 and our lowest is 16.50. in addition to that, about 6 dollars per hour. that doesn't include the benefits around healthcare. but most of the people who lost their jobs because they violated our code of ethics were not -- those were good paying jobs. people lost their jobs who were bankers, bank managers. and even area president. these were good paying jobs. jobs that were the average i think were in the -- 35,000 to 65,000 area. but with respect to your question specifically, i'm not on the human resources and compensation committee.

they will take that under their deliberation. i don't want to prejudice their activity and i'm going accept and respect any decision that they make on anything. >> thank you. so you are, you are not willing to make a recommendation based on how this looks to the public, that, call them good paying jobs at 16 or 17 dollars an hour. i'll put that aside. but whatever these workers were making, they were in the bottom, of the workforce, they made mistakes, they were dishonest and they deserved to be fired. but, just, you're not willing, to make a public recommendation that you think, to make a public statement that you think miss --

todd instead, you are not willio say that her compensation, over 100 million, that any of it should be clawed back? >> i'm going let the process proceed and the board has met and i made a comment in i testimony. >> that's unfortunate you said, in august, august 2015 your words we began working with pw c. to locate and reimburse customers. that was your decision. >> that was in consoltasting with regulators and with the city attorney's office. >> so you did not, on your own, after finding out, in late 2013 of he's problems, you, through

the rest of it, through all of 2014, and then, into the first 7 months of 2015 it never occurred to you that you should bring in somebody, without anyone suggest it go, it never occurred to you to bring in somebody to find out who was hurt? what kinds of issues were going on? how do we find these customers? >> that's a good question. i have thought about that a lot, about why, and it was -- it was early in 2015, about the time that we were considering or talking about who we would bring in, that we connected a dot. what happens when a ask the opened that is not funded, the system eliminatees it, within a couple months f. it doesn't get

funded, it is not used, it is not started and it is closed. it never dawned on us, for, again, no excuses, and we were wrong, there could be a cycle, where, a cycle, a 30 day cycle would have been completed and there could have been a fee associated with that, it was the first time that lightbulb -- >> i appreciate. but 20111,000 employees were fired. 2012 and 2013 was the peak number. and. l.a. times article. 2015 throughout the year nothing happened. it seemed to never occur to management, to do any of this when -- then today, i don't question your integrity, and then you come in and make this.

it's been five years since at least five years since all of this has been happening. and you say you're, you apologize, you make announcements you are doing the right things. it begs the issue of where was management when these so many thousands of people were fired, stories were written, regulators were starting to come in. i understand that is huge profit center, retail banking. but it just doesn't seem quite right that it didn't occur to anybody on the board, to the c.e.o. or top management that they should do something more, until that will august 2015 date when the regulators helped you suggest and come to that conclusion. >> thank you. >> thank you for being here. >> just as a observation, i know that you have a whole host of

people here with you and i'm sure one of those people is the communications person. i would make the observation, i know you talk with board members, and you have been on boards myself. i would suggest just, again, that tonight to not invoke claw back for yourself and others involved would not be committing malpractice from the standpoint of just public relations. at a minnesota mum i'm sure that's going to take place. >> let me just you found out about this through reading 'the la times'. is that correct? >> no. i don't recall back in 2013 exactly, the time-frame, but i learned about it, later in 2013, remember -- >> so, but it sounds like it was brought to your attention after

a story in a newspaper. that's when the forecus began. >> we had dismissed a number of people and that's what caused 'the la times' story. >> so you had taken some action and they wrote a story. >> your board, you know, i know public boards today, intense scrutiny and all kinds of committees that are set up. when did the board realize that you add unit that was committing fraud? that's one of those things you flag pretty quickly. >> yes, i want to say these team members, they did not do the us right. >> i didn't ask that. >> i'm asking you when the board we aware that you add unit. >> it would have been later 2013 and then 2014. >> so, they weren't even aware of the l.a. times story?

>> i -- i think that was later in 2013. i would have to go back. the best of what i remember. but it was sometime later 13. >> i read a story about her, and i don't know her. sounds like she was a hard worker. got work early and micro-managed and signed leases and i don't know if any of this was true. how do you, when you have somebody that's that involved, is this a case of not raising their head up to 5,000 or 10,000 feet and understanding the kind of culture that was being created by slogans like eight is great. and it is hard to -- it seems to me within a bank, with all the data that you use, to contact customers and you can, without. you can pick this stup you stuff up so quickly. it's hard to

believe there isn't some report within the bank that would cause this to jump out at people and say something is happening here. >> yeah, i think that's -- that's a good question. and in a retail business, where have you 100,000 people in seats at anyone time, there is a lot of turnover. i'm not justifying. >> no, no. >> but -- >> but there's an officer, absolutely, and, all bank have these. that's their job. this is something that you would think would be flagged and jump out at someone who was in that job. >> thank you. in her business, she was i believe reporting, situations,

where there was ethical break downs and. >> not to the board. >> it got to the board level -- corporate level in 2013 because progress was not being made and the board level in 2014, and we have been seeing improvement. >> it doesn't seem like, in fairness, there's a big disconnect there. so she left, after 27 years, and i think it would be good for the audience, to explain the entire compensation. i think it's different than most people think. but i assume her departure was based on this issue? is that correct? >> it was base he'd number of issues. this was one of them. we want to take the business in a different direction. >> she was terminated over this issue? >> no. she chose to retire. our chief operating officer add

discussion with her and we want to go in a different direction and we want to put more focus. but it was a variety of things. and she would have been retirement and she decided to retire. >> my time is up. and out of respect for other members i will stop. i have numbers of other questions. >> thank you very much. let me try to clarify a bit more, your position, going forward with respect to the issues of compensation, not just miss followstead, will you recuse yourself from board deliberations? >> i'm not even involved in board discussions around what the h r.c. does with anything with respect to me and/or as they recommend to the board. so there's no recusal required.

but i'm not involved in that. >> it will come up to the back and forth for a -- a for a vote. >> i'm not part of that. that's done in executive session. >> fine. >> in 2013 when you learned of this, what did you do? this has been asked, did you inform the regulators or instruct someone to instruct the regulators. >> thank you. yes, and i should have mentioned that earlier. yes, our primary, was informed. >> did you inform the board at that time? >> yes, i can't recall the exact meeting but, i can -- it was sometime in 2013 and i know in 2014, various committees of the board were made aware of this. the risk committee, and auddispit corporate. >> did you take any steps to

notify your employees this type of behavior which going back was 11,000, 12, 13, an area manager, did you communicate that or keep these discussions internal to the board. >> do i a team member town hall every quarter, where, i go to one of our various cities, and, there will be a couple thousand people and then we webcast that, across our company. i you know, talk about ethics and doing what's right for customers. in the case, the vast majority do it. but, i was trying to -- bring home. >> there was given specific evidence of techniques, used, to

defraud customers. those specific practice were not focused upon, and made very clear that they were not tolerated? it would seem to be a discussion of for the rules? >> again, i -- at the time that the escal lacing happened in 2013 there were many different meetings, and things happening as i mentioned, in my written, or, my or testimony. reducing goals and having manager meetings and talking with leaders, putting more controls in place, and again, not fast enough, not far enough. and i apalm gees for that. >> it seems, that, the emphasis

on meeting sales objectives, was unremitting. and yet you had examples here. specific examples of things that you knew were happening and should not be happening and yet, what i am hearing is more or less a generic make those, oh, and by the way, we have this rules in place. again i think you have instead, and it's obvious, the tone, what the leader does, is sometimes more important than anything else. >> yes. >> for a period there, this was recognized but there was no specific stop, stop this stuff. >> well, i can till, we said stop this stuff, and, the thing about cross selling is, i would rather have a customer with two products that they use, and they need and they want and they value than four products, that are not used and valued in the

first case, customer wins and we win. in the second case everybody loses. so we tried very hard. we were not as effective, as we could have been in talking about, the goal here is, not you know, products, the goal here is deep relationships. we the wrong tool for too long to make that happen. >> it just seems that, it took too many months, years, for some simple steps which should have been taken be taken and it was only as a result of what the county and the regulators and others did that forced the issue. thank you. >> mr. toomy. >> thank you. thanks for calling this hearing.

i have to say, what we have been learning is so disturbing at so many levels. first we discover, that wells fargo add sales culture that was not good for customers. we discover that management had far too few common sense dplols place to prevent the kind of abuse, that customers were subject to and wells fargo executives out of touch, in 2011, forbes article, wells fargo was rated the best at cross selling its products. it wasn't always cross selling. signing up customers, when you know the customer doesn't want the product. failing to notify customers about these sham accounts, and this isn't cross selling. this is fraud. that's what this is. and then we discover, way too little done to prevent it from continuing after it was

discovered, so, wells fargo employees continued for years, to forge customers signatures, on documents to open up accounts and then the case of kerry tol instead, is that something on the ord he of 20 million of bonuses for her, were awarded because of strong cross sell ratios, yet we know, she was hitting numbers by these fraudulent accounts. so this is unbelievable. let me begin, do you acknowledge that the employees who engaged in this activity were committing fraud. >> i'm not a -- criminal officer and i don't know -- the i'm not a lawyer. i know this, they broke our code of ethic. they were dishonest and we did everything we can do support la-

>> i'm not a lawyer either, and neither are most adults. but, i think most people understand the meaning of the word fraud. it does provide a useful definition. it says nothing misreppresentation or knowing consealant after material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment. how does falsely signing a customer up, how does it not meet that the definition? >> again, if that is the definition, that you know -- i can tell you this, it's absolutely wrong. we found this out, we got rid of those people. and they have no place -- it has no place -- >> that means fraud. >> at what point did you alert your regulators and law enforcement that you had, probably criminal activity happening on a large scale. >> again it was 1% of our peopl-

>> will 5,000 is a big number. >> it's bigger than my hometown. it was, but we also the vast majority who did the right thing. every time, we made a very bright line f. it happened one time. >> i have only five minutes. q.i'm sorry. we sent it to, we did everything, we -- >> did you refer it to law enforcement. >> we did everything accord total rules. >> when did you begin to disclose, in s.e.c. files that you had this adverse set of circumstances that could have huge damage? >> well i don't -- the -- i don't, i can't answer that. i would have to get to our legal team. but this was not a -- i what have to get back to you on that. i don't know. >> well we haven't been able to

discover such a disclosure and the s.e.c. rivers it of material adverse circumstances. but the reputational damage done clearly is material, and that has been manifested by this huge, adverse movement in stock prices. let me raise one other issue. testimony,ed in your and you state i quickly that there is no orchestrated effort or scheme, as some have called it, by the company. as some have called it but when thousands of people conduct the

same kind of fraudulent activi activity, it's a stretch to believe that every one of them independently conjured up this idea of how they would commit this fraud. isn't it possible there was an orchestration that happened at some level. i'm not suggesting it was you by any means but doesn't it defy common sense to think that there was some orchestration of this >> i don't know what motivated the pleaded fire managers and managers of managers, and in the case in area president. we don't want to minimize it but we also want to make sure that we recognize the vast majority of the people did exactly the kind of things we wanted them to do.

we don't open any deposit or credit card without a signature and while there's a couple of cases where they would have a dual notice we are also doing mystery shopping and giving customers a one-hour notice by e-mail or by letter to make sure that we know exactly and they know exactly. >> thank you mr. chairman. first of all things in response. the duration and impact of this gambling must say that i'm shocked and disappointed by the

response of wells fargo corporate is executives. you and the chiecuba and the chl officer laid the blame squarely on the retail bank employees u use. wells fargo touts to its investors and customers that we would never put the stagecoach before the horses. it is to boost your growth and whatever that meant for your share. he fired 5300 employees?

and they were not located in one branch or one district is that right? they were located across the country, is that fair to say? dimmick that is fair to say. >> shouldn't the workplace actions reflect the values of the institution no matter what part of the country they are in? >> i agree with that. >> do yo >> do you believe senior executives like yourself are responsible for nurturing the culture for your employees and your employees actions? so this isn't the work of 5300 bad apples. this is the work and result of the entire seed that routed the orchard and for the employee training manuals that now reviewed more explicitly through the demands from hard-driving managers, you and your senior executives created an environment in which this culture of deception and deceit

thrives. now i know that in response to senator brown's question as what is an average banker at wells fargo made between 30 to 60,000, how much did you make last year? >> 19.3 million. >> now that is good money. this is a combination of low wages punishing sales quotas. when you look at the ethics session did you see this information begin to come up on the radar screen and then to ever more specifically say in the sessions to open accounts

and customers. did you specifically say that? >> when a team member opens an account it doesn't help the customer or us and the vast majority did the absolute right thing. and i said yes, we do not push products. we sit down with a customer and have a needs-based analysis and then based on what we hear, we match the product. >> did you specifically say that in fact i don't want to see accounts open for customers they did not ask for. when did you say that? >> many times in any town halls. >> she made about $9 million in salary did she not? you made the stock awards and

the average salary is 24,000 by 45 and the average salary for wells fargo personal thinkers is 37,560. so imagine do you know what the poverty wage is for a family of three? its 24,300 for a family of three. imagine working with two young children as a personal banker. you have a boss breathing down your neck, you have to call into a call center when you don't need" us and it gets carried over so you have an even higher quota and you are being told to forget about the incentive in

essence this is about losing your job. and you think that that environment is the appropriate environment to protect your customers and have the culture that you portray here. >> we have been reducing sales goals and bringing others into place even before we decide to get rid of the sales product goals and the vast majority of. they put customers first. i can't excuse the behavior of the 1,000. i know it's too many. but the culture is a caring and collaborative culture. >> i know my time is up but let me ask a question for the second

round. did you or any senior executive suffered any financial consequences as a result of what has transpired over the years? today have you suffered any financial? people that are in charge of the risk in the retail bank and in charge of the sales efficacy and those that don't meet their goals are about proper sales yes people are held accountable and will be held accountable.

we know the housing crisis was caused by greed and excess and for too long they often had the unfortunate distinction of having one of the highest rates of unemployment and for closures, underwater homes and those sold in short sales. i assume it's the same that wells fargo has broken that trust. the employees of wells fargo opened millions of cards and accounts without consent. some directly took money from americans pockets in order to artificially inflate company quotas. there's been a number of constituents that happen to be from henderson nevada that was affected by wells fargo tactics

and she said she was insulted they were unaware of these policies. taking the responsibilities conducting internal investigations should only be the first step as we plan to fix this mess. accountability and putting your customer's interest first would be the top priority so with that, just a couple of questions. to my constituents, is there any right to be insulted and heard a number of comments probably more directed at you that you knew nothing as this was moving ahead and i heard this from one of my constituents, what difference does it make attitude and let me tell you why they are talking this way.

the letter to your valued customer you may have seen news recently of the products and services that they did not need. you didn't tell them that you were sorrare sorry and your cusr service letter. you didn't tell the customers that you are sorry. do they have a right to be insulted? >> i had a number of media contacts last week, one broadcast and print and i'm sorry. i am accountable and we don't do ihave it right 100% of the time and i was misunderstood one where i play and team members.

>> we are talking almost 2 million accounts that were opened up. let me ask you this question. was anybody on the board and it did any of you have authorized accounts in your name? >> i haven't seen a letter and i wasn't refunded any of the dollars. >> with what you have done if you have been authorized accounts what would you have done about that? >> of course i would be very disappointed and i could surely understand your constituents disappointed and we have a lot of work. we've been there a long time and

i apologize to all the american people and our customers. we will make it right. would you approve $100 million in the package for her bu wouldu support that? >> as i understand and the i wil give you the information about $100 million part of it is either purchased in the open market or exercised for the 27 year career there are some dollars that are in the options that she's not yet exercised and there is a part of the future grants that will be vested over a number of years and the board will consider all those things.

>> would you approve that? >> i want to be respectful of the committee and their process and not in any way by that decision. >> my time has run out. thank you. >> i've been on the committee for nearly ten years now. you have done something that hasn't happened in ten years in this committee on a major topic and not in a good way. credit card accounts were opened, folks didn't know about them. there were fees charged and if the customers were aware that these accounts were opened up, then there must have been many instances so there were 2 million accounts opened up at the negative information was sent to the credit bureaus. is that accurate plaques to the

>> is 565,000 credit cards that were opened up that were never activated. about 400,000 have signatures on them and 5.7% of the opened up the time were not activated which is a pretty standard industry. we are going to go back to each of those customers now and find out if that was the legitimate, and if not we will make it right. >> was the negative information turned into the credit bureaus because of these actions? >> i don't know the algorithms -- i know that when a credit bureau is requested, it has an impact on your credit score. >> i'm telling you it is a big deal. i could ask for the breakdown on

the 2 million accounts that were opened up, but i'm telling you that if information was sent into the credit bureau because of these falsely opened accounts, the impacts on this or far more than the fees were the fines that could be associated with that. what is wells fargo doing about that or did that information not get reported to the credit bureau? just tell me. did the information if there were fees and fines involved were even if they didn't, did that information get forwarded to the credit bureau? >> recalled a credit report for each of these. >> we are calling each credit card customer to find out if

this truly was a card they wanted. we don't want to take away their credit. if they did not, we are going to go back and make sure that it's made right by the credit bureau and made quite by the customer. >> what is the timeframe for that? >> we already started that process. >> 2011 through fairly recently if i had a credit card issued in the first and in the meantime that information was reported to the credit bureau you with no half% or maybe more than that. and o over 500,000-dollar mortge its 50 grand over four years. what is being done about that?

you are going to go back in and find out even if they didn't do business if they bought a house and whaimplicated infected the t rating you are going to go back and find those? >> we committed to go back to all of the credit card customers and find out -- >> you went back to the credit bureau and reestablished the credit rating as of today. what about the folks that may have bought a house through chase and got a higher interest rate because of it. >> we told them go back and make it right and as we start going through that, i'm happy to have our team come back. >> i think it's important to understand that this is a big deal. >> there are real world implications here are going to

be put into a poverty situation even though it is few hundred bucks and fees. did you find out that they were setting up accounts for the fraudulent signatures and 2013? >> they were opening accounts and then we truncated them. >> it seems if you knew about that it would have been helpful. >> we have even more than that and what we should have done is get rid of the incentive progr program. >> i can tell you use at multiple time it's basically 1% of the workforce. every time you say that you give ammunition to the folks that want to break up the big banks.

more than those that live in montana. 2 million is twice the population of the entire state. this is a major screwup that went on for far too long. there's a lot of work that has to be done to rectify the situation. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to follow up. first i went to ask a couple of questions about the data consumers expect that the private information that isn't used on the authorized account. you have gone through that extensively today. did the third-party analysis that you engaged in determine if these were created uniformly or were there areas in the united states where they were more heavily creative? scenic it was towards the

southwestern part of the country. >> it indicates even more specifically california and arizona. would that be correct? i also have new jersey here on my list. was new jersey heavily impacted the? >> i have the numbers by state and it typically related to their were some people who did more wrong things but more associated with the size of the business were a much larger bank in california and arizona, new jersey. there were places where it fits more of the pattern of the size of the organization in the communities. >> so because of that it wasn't that the management of the communities were potentially the ones that were driving this more aggressively but simply the size of the business in the community. >> it was a bit of both.

>> one of the questions that my constituents have is am i one of those that had an unauthorized account created in my name and you indicated right now wells fargo is calling every customer is that correct? >> virtually all of these accounts came on the andover closed within the 60 day period. so there's the potential again to 2 million accounts that could not be eliminated and i think i said that in my testimony, so i don't know. we just couldn't eliminated that we are calling all of our credit card customers and contacting all of our deposit customers and we have a special number we are asking people to come into the banks. >> if there's somebody that doesn't want to wait for the

call what can they do? >> they will say you can e-mail and we will call you and we will do whatever it takes. i know our study was comprehensive and we try to air on the side of the customer. in fact we are getting people coming to the bank today saying i got a $25 check but we want to make sure that we don't hurt any customers and that if they want credit, they have it and we will try to make it right by them. >> getting back to the credit it impact, the simple opening up an account causes a credit rating doesn't it? >> again i'm not an expert on this field i know on the credit card side we pull the bureau and depending on how many -- i know

that that is a strike that lowers your credit score depending how many requests at that time and there is a positive impact. we will do what it takes to make that right. >> you said that you are going to make it right. you said that the calls have been made and i assume that they are finding customers who have unauthorized and unwanted credit card accounts. that is a good question we are just starting that process. i don't have enough to give you

right now but we would be happy to come back to the committee and tell you what we learned as we do that. >> and a little bit of time i have left i want to shift topics. my understanding is the primary regulators you have been dealing with is that correct? can you give me a timeline when did each of those notify you or did you notify them and when did they get involved? >> i don't know that i have precise dates but i will give you a general timeline. the city was sometime in the time frame of 2015.

they were involved and we shared with them when we learned of a lawsuit. we shared that information but they weren't involve were involr to probably the 2013 timeframe. >> they are a principal regulator and yes. >> than it would have been the final entity. >> we called them i believe in the timeframe of 2015. >> i see my time is over now. stick the wells fargo vision and values to conduct you frequently cite says we believe the values

are not memorized. if you want to find out how strong a company's ethics are, don't listen to what people say, watch what they do. since this massive campaign came to light, you have said repeatedly i am accountable, but what have you actually done to hold yourself accountable, have you re-signed as the ceo or the chair man of wells fargo? >> know i have not. >> have you returned a nickel of the millions of dollar dollars u paid whil via what was going on? >> it's about responsibility. have you returned the millions of dollars that you were paid by this scam going on? have you returned the money you

earned while this was going on? i will take that as a no. have you fired a single executive and i don't mean regional manager or branch manager. i am asking about the people that actually glad your community banking division or your compliance division. >> i'm not asking about branch managers. i'm asking if you fired senior management. >> did use ie o you buy your ane people? okay so you haven't resigned or returned a single nickel of your earnings. you haven't fired a single senior executive and your definition of accountable is to push the blame to your low-level

employees who don't have the money for a fancy firm. it's gutless leadership. it's pushing existing customers to open more accounts. it's one of the reasons it's become the most valuable bank in the world. the numbers of different accounts of their big banks average fewer than the three accounts per customer. but you set the target at eight accounts. every customer should have eight accounts and that's not because he ran the numbers and found that the average customer needed eight banking accounts. it's because eight rhymes with great. great. if it was your rationale in the

2010 annual report. it's not about helping customers get what they need. if it was you wouldn't have to push your employees so much to make it happen. it's all about pumping up the stock price, isn't it? >> it's shorthand for deepening the relationships. the three full years that we know the scam was going on i would like to submit them for the record if i may. these are calls where you personally meet you made your po investors and analysts about why wells fargo is a great investment and in all 12 of

these calls, you personally cited the success at cross-selling retail accounts as one of the main reasons to buy more stock in the company. let me read you a few quotes that you had. april 2012, we grew the ratio to a record 5.98 products per household. a year later we achieved record retail cross sale of 6.1 products per household. the ratio kept going up and up and it didn't matter whether they used the accounts or not and guess what, wall street

loved it. here is a sample of the reports from the top analysts in those years all recommending that people buy the wells fargo stock in part because of the cross so numbers and i would like to set them for the record. when investors sold the good numbers, they did while this was going on. it was very good for you personally, wasn't it do you know how much money, how much value your stock holdings gained while this was underway? >> it wasn't a scam and it's a way of deepening relationships. >> we've been through this. i asked you a simple question. do you know how much it went off while this was going on? >> do you know how much it was?

it's all in the public records because i looked it up. you personally held an average of 6.7 million shares of stock. the share price during this time period went up by about $30 which comes out to $200 million haul for you personally and thanks in part to those numbers that you talked about on every one of those calls. here is what gets me about this if one took a handful of bills out of the drawer they would probably be looking at criminal charges for theft. they could end up in prison but you squeezed your employees to the breaking point so they would

cheat customers and you could drive up the value of your stock and put hundreds of millions of dollars in your own pocket. when it all blew up, you kept your job, you kept your multimillion dollar bonuses and went on television to blame thousands of 12-dollar our employees who were just trying to meet the quotas that made you rich. this is about accountability. you should resign and give back the money you to acquire what was going on and you should be criminally investigated by the department of justice and the security and exchange commissi commission. they almost never hold themselves accountable. not now and not in 2008 when

they crashed the worldwide economy. the only way that wall street will change is if the executive face jail time over massive fraud with tough laws to hold corporate executives personally accountable and we need tough prosecutors that have the courage to go after people at the top. i'm told then it will be business as usual and at the giant bankthat thegiant banks lt seems to me many customers and investors employees as they possibly can. >> what astounds so many americans into virtuall and virf us is how significant this fraud was and how widespread for how long a period of time. and related to that, i am very concerned about the timeline of when the top corporate

leadership do about it if you've been talking in general about 2013. is that when the issue was the focus of the board discussions or was that the first time you knew of the fraudulent activity and these unwanted accounts being different against customers portals? >> they knew not everyone would do the right thing every day and they tried to at the business level compliance and so forth. >> when did you and folks like your board members know of this activity on any significant scale, wasn't 2013 as you suggested or was it earlier?

>> in 2011, about a thousand employees were fired over this. that's about 1% of the whole retail business so 1% of the big part of your business was over fraud and you were never told about that. >> is the business unit to be fired over fraud? >> this matter is mentioned to you if i could go back

>> is too big to manage and regulate. regulate. 1% of the big part of your business doesn't rise to your level >> this is a focus and modifies today >> culture as has been suggested as an atmosphere and what is live wasn't this practice in fact by the numbers part of the culture by definition because it was so widespread for such a long period of tim? >> again it's a large number, but the vast majority of people do it right every day and provide great value invalid according to the culture.

>> i won't make a statement that makes it part of the culture so it seems to me the challenge was to change the culture, not to enforce the culture. finally, what level of confidence from zero to 100 percent do you have that this type of fraudulent activity does not exist in other business lines? >> we've looked at other things. we believe this was situated in the regional bank and other areas have different levels of compliance in different volumes into different requirements that we have looked across a number of things and i'm confident that we have this now solved and we've made a lot of changes. >> so just as an example of the bigger the biggest participant in the program. i happen to chair the small business committees whe committm focused on a lot of small-business issues.

or you 100% confident that no activity like this or no extreme quotas and goals exist in the program? >> we don't have product goals to my knowledge in any one of our other businesses and we have because of this situation, we have doubled down on compliance and reviewed in a lot of our businesses across the board. >> i am writing several of those compliance folks to urge a vote at anything small including the programs as the leader in that activity. >> you previously talked to me about the values. he and look at the mess that we are in.

a community banker from my state called the office unsolicited and said here we go again in the local community bank it's going to be slandered because of what these guys are doing. he said if my bank had a widespread practice of opening the unauthorized accounts and moving customers money without permission, i would be in jail. my banks would be sold and money and tiger management team and board wiki sued by the regulators for a lack of oversight and he is sick to his stomach about what is happening here and sinai. over 5,000 people from indiana, 5,000 who every day as everybody has talked about from their own state, every day these people were nonstop to try to pay the

bills, take care of their families, make sure that they can make ends meet and they hope they can. over 5,000 who had unauthorized accounts. they said it does have a point higher because the credit rating has gone down. it is an extra dime that they will occur over the 30 years because of the fraudulent acti action. it wasn't sam or judy that works at the mill who was hoping to get a payment and they could afford. it's that they had a fraud committed to it.

i don't have a final answer for you but our intentions make it right by every customer. do you promise to pay back every single dollar one of the things that rubs everybody wrong americans are fair people and everybody in this country tries to make sure there is a square deal done. they make $15 the senior

executives walk off with $100 million. americans can smell an unfair deal of my away. they didn't come up with this scheme on their own. is she dishonest and how do you fire somebody making $15 bought the person -- that's like firing the guy throwing coal on the engine and letting the captain go strolling off to a $100 million shipped hel how dou do that? >> most of the people who are bankers and are not making $15 an hour manage those and there

is something very different about violating the code of ethics and being dishonest versus someone who didn't spend enough time making sure that this issue had been closed. >> one of the things the american people are disgusted about is it seems that all flows downhill. because the job they had they are gone and the people up in the top of the hill make 20 million, 10 million. those that started the wells fargo stagecoach this wasn't their plan. this isn't what they do.

for five years so when folks say it's too big to fail for five years you were not able to end this. you look and say for five years americans were taken advantage of and cheated, had their credit ratings remained and accounts opened that they never even knew about and in this bank either you didn't know or you knew it was great for the story. under any circumstance none of the conclusions are good? >> we didn't move fast enough. we should have done better. i've also remind you the vast majority of the people also had done the right thing.

>> i will tell you as a senator i am frustrated, angry and unhappy with what appears to be a toxic culture as your custom customer, with two or three mortgages, a couple of accounts i'm disappointed in the financial institution that puts so much confidence and trust. i am however thankful for the heroes that we have heard so little about. the customers were bringing

oxygen to the very important conversation. why did not these employees find a safe haven up the chain. ththis feels culture that was toxic is incredibly important for folks looking who are working paycheck to paycheck and anyone that suggests folks that make just a little money must cheat the system as inconsistent suggestion i know a lot of folks that are poor that would find that quite disrespectful and

would never put themselves in this situation. i would suggest a higher you go on that chain, the more you find the problem not the person making the $15 an hour to be honest with you. my question is why was there not a safe haven and can you create safe havens for employees who see things that are just running amok and do they have a safe place to go. is there a culture that is being established in either the fewer limiting some of your sales goals that have unintended consequences as well but is there an establishment where the average employee feels empowered and encouraged to come forward to speak and be heard in wells fargo.

if something is being asked of them that they think is not right. they are asked to go to a manager's manager and having anonymous ethics line. >> i wish we would not have this behavior but we have also instituted some things today you mentioned getting rid of the sales goals that we also today have an e-mail we sent within an hour of opening the account on the deposit side or credit card without his signature and we are also doing a big mystery shopping