, heer including that taurus for george w.ador bush from 2005 2 2000 seven and stayed active on the subject ever since. to his left, ambassador jim , not quite what ron newman pulled off in the late 1960's late-night to 70's, but i think it is fair to say to be deputy ambassador for more than three years in recent times probably counts even more than chronological years would suggest. remarkable dedication to the subject and has been associated ever since with the council focus on thes and american security. speaking of american heroes with amazing careers, ambassador james dobbin, number 14 american

president ever since 9/11 with missions as a special envoy for a peace process reconstruction all over the world but certainly in parts of the broader middle east and africa and afghanistan. wasdied it -- jim dobbins -- in recent years, 2013 through 14, and a lot of great work where he remains today. generalegin with petraeus. what is the big idea in the paper and what do you think is the big eyed dia in afghanistan going forward? petraeus: i will note that you left off in the discussion the reasons for optimism, a hugely important football team

started season three and one this year, an extraordinary reversal of experience in recent years. some of you recall i always had to topic off-limits questions. we may relax that this year and what a pleasure it is to be with three of america's truly greatest diplomats, each of whom to workn privileged with in a variety of capacities. the big ideas here are several. continue -- the most important is the reason we went to afghanistan. afghanistan isre never again a sanctuary for al qaeda or other extremists the way it was the 9/11 attacks were

planned and the additional trending conducted there. we have accomplished that today. core.s really the when i was the commander of the u.s. forces there, central command, that was the most in mind. task we very much wanted to help afghanistan in a host of other ways. we had very note realistic assessments of what we thought we could achieve and there was never any kind of dream of turning afghanistan into switzerland in 10 years or less. there were significant obstacles to that to put it mildly. the core objective was and is the reason we are there. afghanistan found to be a hugely important platform for our counterterrorism operations. known the rate of

osama bin laden was washed the mayor and from there, that platform remains very important to us. as an aside, we are welcome in afghanistan. they want us to be there and we in a hostd improved of different ways, whether it is infrastructure, education, various elements of the economy, and so forth. progress has been substantial and afghan security forces, to the we begin at the end of my time, my staff at the spring of 2011, sadly dying for their country in quite considerable numbers, unsustainable numbers, it does indeed give us one of the many reasons for concern

there. the situation has deteriorated in recent years. we halted the momentum of the .aliban and rolled it back we began handing off tasks, that was ultimately completed. diplomatic andhe development of arenas and diplomatic institution so we can hand those as well. increasing pressure by the taliban and other associated groups that do not want to see afghanistan succeed on the liberation ince late 2001. qaeda, small elements, small islamic state, all active and of trying to regain control

the areas they might have totrol before the search and cause problems for the afghan government and the afghan people. literally in the last 24 hours, we have seen reports of the new fighting and i have been assured by individuals on the ground at that they believe they have that in control, one of those we called back during the surge, the police chief was killed in the past day or so, a tragic loss and the police stationed was overrun by them as well. and then the increasing threat also, though i am told there are

1700 afghan forces, and anonymous efforts to enable those forces with the assets we have nonetheless, the chairman of joint chiefs himself has described this as a stalemate and you can look at that in a number of different ways and say stalemate is not all bad if the ,fghans control 70 or 75 somewhere between 65 and 75% of the country. on the other hand, we can harken back to language, thick it was the chairman of the joint chief of struggle, if you are not winning, you are losing. the situation is fraught and concerning and the bottom line we believe the next administration should make an enduring commitment to afghanistan and the partners there. that is the real bottom line and the headline, that we should not

have to go through annual reviews to see how you will draw down or what have you, that we should use the assets we have there as effectively as we ouribly can to support security force counterparts. many of you know those were restricted for quite some time. it warrants further examination to determine how we can indeed help individuals for whom we provide close air support when we were shoulder to shoulder with them and then we did not do that for some time until more recently. those are the kinds of initiatives that should be pursued. i will allow my diplomatic counterparts to discuss some of the other elements of this because this is an enduring commitment. it is not a blank check and has to be a commitment from both sides of the endeavor and there are indeed causes for concern

and the habitual concern of corruption in governance and so forth. indeed again, the key is an enduring commitment to a country in which we have two very important national interests and we very much want to see those continue to be safeguarded and preserved. michael: let me ask a small clarifying question. the 65% to the 75%. we know the figures are rushed -- are rough. the land area generally i think, but actually, i probably should go back to the individual who quoted me that term. it is just an indicator that three quarters of the country or less than that is generally assessed to be under the control.

district complex categorization. i would not want to be quoted on that, which it is. as i go to run for the the generals, former commanders, who are part of the paper forging an enduring that we did, general john campbell, john allen, and i will give you a -- digestible members as we go forward. your focus in afghanistan for many years, i wonder if you could talk a little bit about afghan politics? i do not know to what extent you want to put the current in historical perspective, to what extent you want to talk about how they are doing, if there is anything somewhatbout the

forced an unruly partnership, or if you want to talk about next steps in the united states, dealing with them, i will put the politics on the agenda for you, please. >> afghanistan is incredibly complex. complexity is many people's opinions are fixed. they either want or automatically assess each new fact to fit the paradigm they have already constructed. , if your opinions are completely opposite, you can do that. you can find faxed to support either side. the fact that the media does not cover afghanistan very much makes it difficult for people to --e to independent judges

judgments. a lot is going wrong paradigm frequently remarked it -- reminded of the person asked to its plain one or two words any said one word, not good. [laughter] the weekend came with a surprisingly hopeful note for me. a story in the new york times, her father was in afghanistan. she covered afghanistan for years. one of the most experienced journalists in afghanistan and the article begins with a lot of problems and ends on the beat youngeroking at the generation, at things that have changed since 2001. you get an article by an experienced observer that is upbeat and i was happy with that. general petraeus made the key

first point about our views in the paper, which is that we have big interests remaining in afghanistan. the question which follows after that is, is it possible to achieve those interests. that is where politics are messy, they are fighting with but the bottom line for me is yes, it is possible. it is not the same as guaranteed, as there is some smooth line that you can say we are here now -- this is going to be much more like a roller coaster ride. first of all, we have a willing ally.

general petraeus already talked about it saw will not talk about that. good as were not as would like, and they are not, and it is not iraq. that is a big difference. america side, a lot of the problems are partially self-induced. we tried very hard to move faster than i think we possibly could, by political pressures to turn things over faster. they used to tell me less than weyears, but we expected, determined that we would be required to do it. afghan politics have always been messy. it 1967 and they are particularly messy now

because people have known only war for 30 years. when people have known only war, they do not expect things to get better. a young afghan woman who now dynamic, u.s. educated, she told me when she first came to the u.s., they said, your timing is so good. we have got a three day weekend coming up in a couple of months. and she said the first reaction was how could they possibly be planning something two months from now? was soe she had known constantly changed by external factors come over which she had that she did not understand the idea she spent the next few months waiting

everyday for something to happen that would ruin the plan. that was a huge difference between the basic optimistic who, if yourcans plan is moving along, you think that will work. if you are -- it does not mean anything. ofple have built habits fighting for political control. politically,ting and a lot of people are scrapping for power. that makes the politics will he messy. i think chances are, the rest will stay messy. we will help keep it together and they will probably keep it together. the government will move forward. but it will be messy and this is one of the reasons we talk about the need for enduring commitment.

to -- glideto have through these things. fee to the fire and see that he gets implemented. thing -- the tendency to say all of this is hopeless is exaggerated. people have done a lot to create great things but you have to .ifferentiate accept the interests, then we should not be frustrated. keep ald have to sustainable level and recognize that politics will be messy but

recognize also that we have a lot of influence to keep them from going off the edge. to apply that carefully so we are not responsible for everything and -- in but messy,, andlicated, corrupt, sometimes, their parliament is that an impasse. we should not be entirely surprised by that but i think it is still durable, that is the conclusion. let me follow up briefly with you on another big question, just a short answer to set up jim cunningham. do you see the progress in afghan politics? i think a lot of american voters in response to this would say, i can be patient as long as i see that things are headed in generally a positive direction,

they seem to be stuck in falling backward and maybe there is not a good case for patients. ,hese see actual progress working together in the one to tandem or in other ways, the next generation that you mentioned earlier, do you see a solid basis to be hopeful given the trajectory we are on? yes it is aeumann: solid basis but you need to understand it is cost only step forward, two steps back, sometimes one step forward and he does back. he will have both simultaneously. you need to look at the net. the net has progress and also has a lot we can do to enable more progress, including one of the ideas in the paper, not constantly being in a policy review. one of the things that has thected uncertainty into afghanistan, aside from taliban and all the other things going on, is the constant fear that we

are about to leave. we have constant reviews. so yes, there is reason for optimism and no it is not lose guy optimism that everything will work out. i should mention the other ambassadors who co-authored the paper we are referring to, the first u.s. ambassador after 9/11, well indebted for helping categorized the project that produced the paper, then the great ryan, who has done so much in so many places around the world and served in pakistan. hadt of people on the panel expertise on the panel. i want to make sure you are aware of the additional co-authors. recordningham has set for endurance and navigated the election in 2014 in afghanistan and the transition to the

government, i want your take on the same question. do you see the progress and also what kinds of levers do we have, what kind of influence do we bring to bear in dealing with afghan politics going forward? ambassador cunningham: yes, i would say there is progress. to put this into perspective and take a look at political operations in other countries, then afghanistan is. bitter election campaign. again on the upside, in those elections, millions of afghans went to the polls and voted whole families would go and vote under the threat of

taliban. is an impulse for political engagement and for public participation in politics and the election. contested through hours and hours of painful discussion and we came to an agreement on forming a national unity government and for two years ther to the election, political eat and journalists and a whole range of people had been discussing the need for unity in afghanistan after the election. nobody foresaw how this was going to turn out but everybody foresaw the dangers of an election that was but afghanistan. there was a very strong impulse to try to pull together after the elections p are you had two gentlemen, each of whom general

-- genuinely thought he or she theyon the election and were forced into what is a coalition arrangement. coalition and politics are difficult anyplace in the world. bringing political book -- political opponents together is difficult anyplace in the world. it should not come as a surprise that this was going to be a difficult enterprise for the government to manage. none of the political process as friends smoothly of afghanistan would wish or afghans themselves would wish but they have, over time, step-by-step, come together and checked off the various things they needed to do to deal with the international community and to deal with their internal requirements. recently, they have come up with a plan for the next couple of years on economic development,

which will be presented in an -- in a meeting in the next couple of days. and itsated plan aspirations moving forward. they did a similar thing last -- at the nato summit where an international community, the united states and allies, continue to support on the security side for the afghan military. after this on wednesday, there would be a corresponding commitment for the international community going forward to maintain assistance out of something like $3 billion over the next four years for afghanistan. the planks are again in place to demonstrate that there is going to be a long-term international forgement in afghanistan the reasons dave and ron said. the interest of our some 50

partners who are engaged there who see this project the same .ay we do it is pretty unprecedented to have that degree of international agreement on almost anything. that gets to the other point about changing the calculations of afghans and their neighbors in the region. clarity about what the united states above all will do in the longer term in afghanistan, it is absolutely essential for those of us who want a stable afghanistan in the future and i was spoke about the effect of uncertainty on the afghans themselves, but not only does lack of clarity about the commitment dishearten our friends, but it also encourages our adversaries. withew has always been some frustration during the 3.5 years i was in afghanistan, we e

reviewing every six months or every eight months what our force posture would be. ending that cycle is absolutely critical if we want to have a continuedor not just stalemate, but we want to break that. we have to have clarity that the united states and our 50 international colleagues are all going to be there and remain committed to making this project work and provide the afghans the time and space they need to make their ship steadier than it is today. i think they can do that. there are not any guarantees. much of this now depends on the afghans themselves. we need to keep driving that message onto them. it is their responsibility, their country, their politics. they need to get their act together. they are. they are slowly doing so. i think they will continue to do so. they will not be able to do that if they are laboring under the

continued apprehension that we are about to pull the plug and leave them to their own devices. we cannot guarantee afghan success, but i can pretty much guarantee what will happen if we do not stay. a quick you, can i ask follow up to you ambassador cunningham? all the things that are coming up that are overdue, parliamentarian elections, some people have been talking about having a loya jirga where the constitution might be reconsidered. dr. abdullah could be turned into a prime minister like position is one of the ideas floated. some people have wondered if the limit on two terms for a given president might be relaxed, and this conjures up images of mr. burton in russia -- putin in russia. you can comment on that or not as you wish. on many of those topics, everything sort of seems to be

behind agile. is that a flaw, or is that just the way it is? do people just keep finding their way towards eventual consensus or some type of cap must, and that is the best we can hope for? cunningham: i don't think it is a fatal flaw. little one has to be a humble about imposing frameworks or imposing is the wrong word. viewing frameworks and intentions as deadlines. that is the way we are used to running our society. that does not always work so well, even for us. more importantly, this is a completely new situation for the afghans. they have never been through anything like this. the most important thing for them politically is to maintain

a degree of a little consensus and cohesion around certain central propositions. it was probably unrealistic, i have to say, to thank that over two years they could meet the goal of having a constitutional loya jirga which have certain requirements that need to be met as opposed to what is called a traditional jirga. that cannot amend the constitution. constitutionala loya jirga is not to amend the constitution but whether to create a position where prime minister. for me that off does not seemed to be a fatal flaw as long as there remains a degree of consensus in the body politic that that is an acceptable path forward. so far that is the case. the national unity government is always going to be, as ron said, a difficult proposition.

i remain convinced that there is not any better alternative to that and to making that political process work. they will need a lot of help from friends as well as internally to do that, but they are now after delay, like , theyhing, has entailed are now on a path that has a way forward to hold a parliamentary election and get to the constitutional loya jirga. we need to encourage them to move down that path. on their own doing. >> thank you. let me mention the rest of the co-authors. representativel for afghanistan and pakistan, a presidentcreated by obama. we don't yet know if the next president will want to keep that structure. that gave him a focus not only on afghanistan but pakistan.

everybody on this panel lived that dual reality in their jobs. his job title underscore this. part of our co-author team was marc grossman. bruce riddell from brookings as well as clara walker was the only person i can think of a beer who wrote a book with 70 whont ghani and david work tirelessly at the pentagon for many years aon afghanistan. now you, many people have said as long as pakistan has at best and ambivalent posture towards this position, seeming to want to keep the conflict going, even as it nominally cooperates with us in others, there really is no

hope. as long as there is a section -- ashe for the telegram long as there is sanction for insurgency will live on and there will not be a prospect of stopping this conflict. that is just the provocation. i want to put the more general subject of pakistan for you to address as you wish. how should we think about pakistan's role going forward? >> in the discussions which led to this paper, i think the pakistan aspect was the most difficult. in fact it is the only part of the paper where the authors were not able to come to a complete consensus and where it signals that there was some differences. on the afghan parts of the paper, which is about 80% or 90% of it, i think everybody

manifested what you have heard up here, a degree of confidence -- cautious optimism. if we stick with this in the long term, it will work out. pakistan, i think there was a general feeling on the part of many who dealt with pakistan that we failed. we failed to move pakistan in the most fundamental aspect of its policies towards afghanistan. a number of people do have substantial experience with pakistan in addition to marc grossman and myself, both of whom were special representatives for afghanistan and pakistan. general betray us had a lot to do with -- general petraeus had a lot to do with this when he was in kabul. >> cia director as well. >> yes.

powerct and influence back into afghanistan. failed in 2013 and 2014 to dissuade pakistan from continuing to allow and even facilitate activities of the telegram in pakistan -- taliban in pakistan and afghanistan. i'm not alone. we're not alone. the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff paid 18 visits to pakistan during his tenure. he gave up and admitted he too failed in this respect. i think the paper does recognize -- recommend more attention to this problem by the next administration. of greateration conditionality on security systems, key specifically to

cooperation and closing down taliban sanctuaries in pakistan, and also potentially greater positive incentives for pakistan if it is willing to move in this direction. i do think that pakistan's incentives have changed somewhat over the years. i think they were originally saw the telegram as a positive instrument for influence in afghanistan as part of its geopolitical competition with india. i think they are now motivated positive gain as fear. the pakistan security establishment feels that they have enough enemies that they do not need a new one, and frankly they do not want to number the among the manyas

groups that moves against them. it is based on geopolitical advantage to fear of consequences of confronting the taliban. nonetheless, we need to continue to try to affect this calculation in the government of pakistan. there was a good deal of discussion about reconciliation, about negotiation with the taliban. i think there was an agreement that this was an objective that should continue to be pursued, but it should not be a prerequisite for american policy. we should not count on it or allow our policy to revolve around the prospect of a negotiated settlement. it was unlikely to occur quickly or soon. it was unlikely to occur without a fundamental change in

pakistan, which so far has not occurred over the last 15 years. occur withouty to some rebalancing on the battlefield to the advantage of the afghan government. therefore we needed to concentrate on those things and help that in the end that would produce the circumstances in which a negotiated peace might become possible. >> fantastic. i will work down the panel one time before we go to you all for your questions. a couple additional points that i will take off that are in timu the paper. note that our final co-author, one of the things the paper says an addition two things -- a fairly long-term commitment of unspecified and i'm delineated duration. in terms of the number of u.s.

troops in afghanistan, you're probably aware that president obama has said we will wind up with roughly a thousand or hundred troops at the end of his -- 8400 troops at the end of his presidency. there is some room for a little bit of variation as or since come in and out -- forces come in and out. that will be a modest reduction in the course of 2016. it is a 90% reduction from the peak when general petraeus commended the afghanistan surge. that is roughly where we are. the paper suggests without wanting to get a number because it would require more tactical analysis of conditions that year than we could provide here in washington, nonetheless we thought there was a case to enlarge the range of possible numbers and consider adding several thousand more temporarily.

as the general has underscore, the authorization for what those troops could do may not matter as much as the numbers. in terms of u.s. financial spending in afghanistan, any of you are aware that we devote roughly $1 billion a year to economic and humanitarian aid and about $4 billion a year to afghan security forces. those funds largely come out of overseas contingency operation funds. technically, that is actually enough to make afghanistan the number one recipient of american support in the world today, even more than israel. it is not often described that way because israel funding is long-term. it is worth pointing that out. a dramatic reduction from where things have been, but less emetic than the reduction in u.s. troop totals. there has been at least some progress in dealing with the

corruption mess to afghanistan. a long way to go in that regard. the president is making some serious efforts and dr. abdullah, there has been some replacement of leaders in the military and elsewhere who were corrupt or ineffectual. there is a long distance to go. i will highlight those bullet points for you. i asked the panelists to comment on whatever they would like to. general petraeus. general petraeus: let me offer a couple of different comments. it has always been the fact, even during the various afghan policy reviews that were published, it has always been true that what we were seeking to do was to help the afghans develop the capability to secure themselves and to govern themselves to a good enough -- and -- fashion. that has always been the core of

our effort. it has always meant you cannot do this with just counterterrorist force operations. we are designed at times to circumscribe what we are doing, describe it as a counterterrorist and pain. it has always been more than that. it has always required more than that. one of the paradoxes of the fight against the islamic state right now is that countering terrorism in the form of the islamic state requires more than counterterrorism force operations. it requires a conference of approach. this is what each of us participated in in afghanistan and in iraq. it requires a conference of approach. not justnd all these, limiting this to afghanistan, is to craft strategies that are sustainable. that is because of a recognition, i think, that the efforts in which we are engaged are generational struggles.

they're not the fight of a few years or decades. back in the beginning of the efforts in afghanistan, i suspect many would contend we would never be able to sustain a strategy of the 15 years we have done it, or nearly that. the fact is we have an part over time made it more sustainable in terms of the costs, in terms of loss of life, and in terms of the budgetary commitment. that needs to continue to guide the effort that we are going to pursue their so that we can -- there so that we can pursue an enduring commitment that will not be threatened by concerns about that. comment on the peace initiatives. all of us have always had a real estate assessment to give it -- to give it your best

shot. you cannot go after the enemy, in thathad one major regard, if you cannot do it regularly, it is tough to compel your adversaries to come to the negotiating table. that has always been the sense. we saw recently the signing of an agreement between the former head group and the afghan government. that took some five years. i did the first meeting with, i one othernephew and individual from that group and kabul shortly before changing out as commander. that has actually been concluded. we will now see what the results are in the field in that particular regard. i would also note that with respect to pakistan, we have had

periods of close cooperation. this is been an obstacle is well. i would hold out the year 2009 where both chairman of the joint aeve's and mcmullen and i had close relationship with the were of the afghan -- we helping pakistan in a significant way as they launched counterinsurgency efforts against the pakistani taliban. into different places and started closing north waziristan. there was real help at that time -- hope that you could reduce the area of north waziristan in which al qaeda and others were located so that perhaps other

campaigns could take a toll of them. unfortunately, several developments unhinged that level of cooperation. as i recall, it was wikileaks revelations. it was a book by bob woodward that had uncharitable comments from various folks about some of the pakistani leadership. and a little later it was the affair and the contractor for the cia who shot and killed pakistanis on the street being threatened by them. this to the wheels off the bus of that cooperation. this level of cooperation was considerable all the way down in various opportunities for actual assistance very much being realized and very sad to see that end because of the

prospects that might have had, noting of course they are fighting the pakistani taliban, not the afghan taliban. i would not give up on that, noting really very much the they have lots of enemies already. they know the existential threat is actually the extremists inside the country even more so than outside the country even in times of tension as we see right now and that creating more enemies, and even more so if you do down -- where is publicly known the activities of the pakistani army are greatly circumscribed. these are the realities we deal with. this is what makes it so complex and complicated.

thank you. >> thanks. it is complicated, which is always an invitation to talk to much, for me anyway. three points that are interrelated that are going to be important for the next administration. one is the need for steadiness --in u.s.licy policy. a lot of what we have experienced has been exacerbated by change or the constant sense of change in both high policy and sometimes just operations on the ground driven by that. influentialg, so that everyone takes our position into account when thinking about their own. whether they are friends or enemies. they go down with the u.s. is doing is part of their policy analysis. it is an important piece. when they do not know, they

guess. steadiness is going to be thattant, and allied with second point is explaining the clarity of the policy. you don't make your stump speech once, and go home. you have to make it over and over again. your actions have to be clearly linked to your statements. it is only through your actions that you get credibility for your statements. that will be a big piece. the third point that i want to make and then i will put, we are going to have to maintain pressure on the afghan government for various kinds of reform. to make it we have pressure for reasonable progress, reasonable goals over reasonable times. when we stand up pressures for clean government very quickly,

we are not going to get there. includingof reasons, some which are human nature, we do need to prioritize. not everything is equally important to us. the efficiency of their military is really important. the efficiency of their police and intelligence service is important. we can focus on those and then have more reasonable time expectations. that means we have to be willing to talk in terms that are more graduated and more nuanced. our public discussion turns that tends to be in terms of absolute. -- tends to be in terms of absolutes. a reasonable pace of change which weekend convey to the afghans, that is an important component. >> thank you.

>> i think the final comments i would like to make is that -- goes again to the notion of fatigue and commitment. from my perspective, one has to look at afghanistan not in isolation as america's longest war, which has become quite commonplace now. we cannot continue that were. -- war. the war is not in afghanistan, -- andne within ideology ideology. that is the work. that is the conflict that began on 9/11 when i was investor of ambassador of the u.n.. it is generational.

it is not a military conflict. we cannot win that conflict through military means. it needs to be one through a ofns of -- a combination ideological, religious, diplomatic, and military means. just onean is expression of that conflict. that is a conflict that extends from asia all the way through into africa. we need to find a way to make that clear to our own people and to others around the world. we need to find a way to generate the kind of , aernational cooperation multilateral strategy that general betray us mentioned a little while ago -- petraeus mentioned a little while ago. we have a time and place in afghanistan where we have

invested a considerable amount of time and money and blood, and dealing with that particular conflict. we have a way forward with a willing partner that can work. i hope that will be understood by the next administration. >> ron has stressed the importance of repetition of a message. i think we have probably repeated enough. i will cede the floor. >> we have all talked about pakistan already. there are other key external players that are near the top of the list, iran, russia, and china. i will not ask you to talk about all three. do you want to say a word about anyone of those three? >> one of the reasons he was such an incredible depomed, unlike many of his counterparts, he actually did not hold the

microphone forever and was willing to surrender it. i salute you again. >> thank you. we maintained a dialogue with all of those countries, particularly when i was doing the job 2001 and 2002, i had a close relationship with iran and a productive relationship in respect to afghanistan. a missed opportunity that the bush ministration did not pick up on. inn i was back again 2014, i set up meetings with all the ones you mentioned. all of them helped with the crisis, the electoral crisis in 2014 in urging a unity government. if any of those countries have strongly intervened against

that, we would've had a much more difficult time. that china has been very cautious. it has talked a good game but has not put much on the table in afghanistan. on balance, it is helpful rather than unhelpful. iran has played around with the taliban slightly but not nearly as much as our ally pakistan has, and it supported the regime in 2001 and continued to do so. russia has become kind of sour. their view is, we failed, you will fail, too. they have not done anything to help us fail. on balance, they have been marginally helpful although sour and particularly since crimea more distant and difficult.

>> one last footnote you may want to comment on. republics,its former georgia, they were very important. >> i think there were common interests we had with russia in afghanistan. other places we have conflicting interests to be sure. were threefold. one was that they shared an interest with us and not seeing extremism expand throughout afghanistan and through central asian states and into russia. they have enough problems with that on their own. we felt that they had a very keen interest as well in fighting the flow of illegal no products -- narcotics. the same interest with the central asian states. anally, generally we all had

interest in central asian states prospering and doing well economically also considering that for each of them their biggest trading partner in a place to which they had a default position was russia given their status as soviet republics under the soviet union. for what it is worth, i think that is what enabled us to open a northern distribution network. you will recall the final element, we had to get the president of uzbekistan to agree to do that. we had meetings with them that resulted in getting that approval. >> we will start with two questions at a time here in the second row. then we will go to the panel. >> that is not a harlot. land.t har much for allvery

of your statements. it was wonderful. a hot topic in afghanistan will be participation with the afghan government. unhappy.afghanistan what do you think? what -- willo know be removed from the blacklist? that is a big question. thank you. congratulations. this is an exemplary group. you have done a great service. i have a broader russian people who may want to seek early-retirement. if you take a look at the world today, you have brexit, the colombian public has just haveted farc you

anti-globalization movements in both parties in this country, west nigeria and libya, iraq, iran, afghanistan, yemen. we have all of these crises. putin, and vladimir on top of that one of my greatest concerns is that the u.s. military may be headed to a hollow force because i don't think we will be able to spend enough to keep it at current levels of readiness. an administration comes in, and for six or 12 months it will not be fully manned or ready, how do we enable it to make sensible decisions? if giving all these competitive forces and factors, how do you make the case not just for this but to the larger priorities that will be facing the next president, which are daunting? >> let's see what each person has to say. your,pite the premise of

the world is going to hell in a handbasket -- [inaudible] 1990's,emember the where the world's only superpower, and it all seemed so peaceful. there were more civil wars going on. you have rwanda, massive genocide, war in europe for the first time since world war ii. let's put the current situation in some perspective. the middle east is in chaos. other regions have been in chaos before. to the specifics of your question, happily president obama has decided to lead to his successor the future of american commitment in afghanistan, and he is going to leave a reasonably robust force and a reasonably substantial economic

assistance project which will carry the new administration through a number of months during which they decide what to do. we hope they will take our advice. it is not something they need to decide on in the first three weeks unless something develops in afghanistan that forces early decision. obama has put the next administration in a position where it can take this how deeply andg how enduringly to commit to afghanistan. >> thank you. question about the agreement with hig, the peace agreement contains as an integral part of it that this group will abide by the provisions of the afghan constitution and political

engagement should not be that difficult because there is already a peaceful faction which has been in the government for quite some time. i think that should prove relatively easy to work out. , this isow up on that a pretty nasty person with an exceptionally nasty record. whenever you get a peace agreement, as you had with farc and certain african conflicts, you get this decision between making peace and trying to have some kind of accountability for the past. the problem is if you have accountability, you do not have peace. it is difficult to persuade people that they should make a peace agreement so that they can go to jail.

it isn't a real attractive approach. west, we have not had a really focused conversation about this. we have a lot of discussion of transitional justice and the importance of negotiation. cases, we have come to certain conclusions. it has been difficult for people to accept that at least short-term justice is not going to be possible if you want peace. i think that is certainly the case and afghanistan. once you open the store, then you say, does this mean if the taliban negotiated for peace, they would have to be willing to go to prison themselves? what about all the people who are in the government who have human rights questions in the government? civil wars are inherently nasty

and messy with all kinds of violations. afghanistan has been in civil war for years. i think the back of the matter is that there is no way you can both bring people together to go forward and go backward for account settlement. that is just the fact that we are going to have to deal with. you can engage them in certain ways that prohibit behavior in the future, but the desire for vengeance and the desire for peace cannot coexist. >> let me just take the question from harlan a little bit which is characteristically provocative. all, what jim said about the next resident -- president and hurting, they will take over fighting the islamic

state in which isis in iraq will either have been defeated or clearly on the road to defeat. elsewhere, theen real challenge in iraq is iraq -- is not the islamic state, it .s politics the most complex human terrain and itsf iraq resides politics and baghdad where in the last week alone a faction that is challenging the prime minister appears to be led by the former prime minister has a vote of no-confidence for the minister of defense that removed him and the minister of france -- ynez. -- foreign affairs. politics will be the challenge there.

the fight against the islamic state will have moved forward further and will most likely have been liberated at that point in time to take place presumably later. something iffer have written about, which is five lessons i think we should have learned of the experience of the past 10 to 15 years in the middle east, one of which is america has to lead. -- first, ungoverned spaces in the middle east will be exploited by radicals. that is a reality. the second is las vegas rules do not apply, what happens there does not stay there. it affects our allies and partners in europe, most specifically in the case of syria which has pushed refugees

into your causing the biggest challenge in domestic political arenas in various states there. third, responding to this, america has to lead. particularly if we can employ them in iraq as they are now, you can argue about how long it us to get to seeing the islamic state as a loser, but that is the case now. the use of the assets of our intelligence surveillance, precision strikes, industrial strength intelligence fusion is something only the united states can bring to bear. we were talking recently about america's awesome military and how to keep it that way. by the way, we always want to do it as a coalition, and that

should especially include islamic countries. this is an existential threat for them. it is more of a clash within their civilization rather than a clash between civilizations. this response has to be comprehensive. the paradox is that you cannot counter terrorist forces with just counterterrorist operations, at least not when the terrorists are an army as the islamic state is in iraq. as it is under greater pressure in syria as well. this has to be a comprehensive campaign. thatoal should always be you are enabling others to do that as we have done in afghanistan and are now doing in iraq having helped reconstitute their forces so that they are the ones fighting on the front lines and the costs to us are

kept as modest as they can be because this has to be a sustainable campaign. lesson number five, this is a struggle of a generation or more. everything we do has to be done with that in mind. that affects what we are doing in afghanistan or wherever we are fighting the islamic state, al qaeda affiliates, you name it. >> i am totally agreeing with everything general betray us is safe -- tria -- petraeus is saying. we have achieved in the past at -- s, personality dependent. the other place in the u.s. government where military and

civilian lines come together is the president of the united states. and he or she in the future cannot make all these decisions. there is a seriously or rethinking how we produce greater unity of policy and action that we constantly talk about. ofcould lose a conference approach within iraq and within ourselves. >> we will go to the middle part of the auditorium. the woman in black ear. -- here. yes. after her, gary mitchell. >> hello. i am for afghan women. my question is about the women's rights situation if it -- in afghanistan. alwayst media coverage includes the fear that afghanistan will be abandoned by

the united states and the level of a will decrease. women's rights is very related to the security situation. sorry -- www.c-span.org -- [indiscernible] questions about [indiscernible] >> you have already been clear. i think we can respond. do you want to leave it at that? let's go to gary. he may even take a third this round. to venture into dangers territory, which is a metaphor. as we are thinking about the composition of this panel, there was one area of expertise that wasnot represented, and i

oncology. though we have met today to talk about afghanistan, i think ambassador cunningham justin -- is anted that the enemy ideology. tax that the me a tax -- attacks in places of vulnerability, those areas of vulnerability happen to be for the most part countries with sees, although the enemy per does not have an address. the question seems to me, if this is about the importance of , making commitment clear to people why that should be made, there are two things that must be present.

i'm not sure whether we have touched on them. metrics,me form of something that says to people we told you this would be enduring, and there are certain guideposts, certain metrics that we will determine, much as an oncologist would determine with cancer. , so that -- if that is -- heightensygens the level of domestic support that would be essential for america, for any president or congress to do what this group of experts has said we will do. >> let's take a third question. >> hello.

i was a rule of law advisor in capital and to do -- kabul and k undu. i failed, too. international the community hires, we like to think we hire the best of the best. the university trained and multilingual. we have seen in recent years that a number of these people have taken the u.s. special immigrant visa and come here, bringing intellectual and professional resources here. we have heard that a number of them are not gainfully employed. i have personal knowledge of some of them that are not employed. >> here or over there? >> here in the u.s.. their abilities do not translate well. do we as america have some sort of strategy, or do you know of

some strategy where we are tapping into these people, their rich network of resources, inside knowledge, ties to afghanistan to help us in our future relations with that country? >> thank you. do you want to start? >> i have to catch a plane. >> this will be the final word from general david. saidnear address what gary in a different way. there are lots of metrics. i think we could sort out which metrics might show the kind of progress or lack of progress we are seeking to achieve. i don't think that is undoable at all. we put a lot of effort into in ourreal rigor metrics. what we do have to do as well, and we started to go towards this i think, and countering the ideology.

better in that. we have tried a variety of initiatives over the years. influence malign efforts. you can have people who will be active in social media on the internet trying to provide alternative voices to those with extremism and doing that in the proper dialect with islamic training and so forth. if you look at the resources provided, it just cannot have that significant and effect knowing how much this kind of thing costs and knowing what we achieved when we had substantial resources during the various surges. when i think is helpful is internet service providers and social media platforms. to see what is being done with

google ideas, what is now jigsaw. oryou search for isis islamic stream is him -- extremism, what you get back is not just what you would normally get in the past. you also get stuff that counters that kind of activity and influence. it is basically alternative voices. if you have ever looked for example, i'm told there is a huge effort with this and other areas including in suicide prevention. someone getsis back not just this is the way to do it, but it does not always work, and it is unpleasant if it doesn't. this kind of stuff. that is what is hugely helpful. the fact that twitter is taking haveaccounts now that fairly sizable effort out there to identify this kind of activity. that is hugely important.

we put a stake through the heart of most lieutenants. a significant operational coordinator will ultimately, i soon, -- i assume we will catch up. withoutot run a war somehow ending up here. we will not put a stake through parts -- heart. that will require more and more effort. i'm sure the next administration will have to pursue that. thank you very much. so great to work with all of you. >> thank you. we will -- as you are leaving, a round of applause for you. [applause]

running out of time. i recognize the need for metrics. i hate them. most of them are bad. we live in a world that likes metrics. d that if the amuse weatherman says 50% chance of rain, everett says that is fine. -- everyone says that is fine. we have a few that are good and that are long-term. the state of women in afghanistan, that is going to continue to be of interest. the biggest struggle will be in afghanistan among afghans. there are limits to what outsiders can force. there are limits to how you do it without poisoning the debate

by allowing opponents of women's progress to characterize it as a foreign position. a lot of work and a lot of pressure. my colleagues have been involved in that. it has to fall in behind afghan women and not get ahead of them. it is also domestically one of our strongest bases of support within the congress. on the special immigrant leases. i have mixed feelings. i think it is important that we allow people were taken risks with our troops to get these. farink we have gone way too in the speed with which anyone working in the u.s. government, to thesere entitled visas. i don't think many people working in our embassies or are bases are more at risk than

their colleagues at other ministries. i would like us to see that like to -- like to see us speed up one and slow down the other. the way i understand it, the law does not allow us to hire them to go back to afghanistan where we need the knowledge. we have much less need for them here. it is hard to organize. what we really need is a fix so that when they do get out, they have the green card, the ticket out. let's enable us to use their skills in afghanistan where we need them. that takes a legislative change. >> we will take one last round and give it to you to to respond. gentleman in the front row, and who else? just have some geographic ever sleep. the gentleman in the blue.

>> thank you. i really appreciate the information you have given. i work with the voice of america. things have improved. i was born in afghanistan. i came here in 2008 to go to school. things have improved on 2001. they are not proportionate to the level of contribution that the international community has had. there's almost a sense of dependency created. i could even quote the former president saying that they are here forever, they will not leave. meaning the west. has takes far saying as much money as you can so long as you don't take it to dubai. teaching them how to catch a fish, we're going to provide them with fish all the time. what to do in that regard?

there is a district -- disconnect. >> thank you. final question. >> hello. afghanistan, and i am a student at american university. i had two questions. one was kind of asked already. what should have been done differently in the last government, or what is being done differently with the new government in terms of taking the most advantage of four and a -- for a -- foreign aid? we cannot even afford our military, our public school teachers. what should be done differently? and related to the security forces, i was going to ask from -- general, i will still ask

the afghan military has been able to take over the combat operations and have not made improvements, and they have fought bravely so far. the number of casualties has risen dramatically. armiesmes these afghan are less in the comment field with support, sometimes surrounded by taliban. we have seen a lot of casualties where they run out of ammo and cannot fight anymore. why do you think this happens? to some extent it could be because of the government officials who are corrupt and loose in the case of goodies? dependency versus off-reliance is at the core

the debate. the discussion that has been going on to the afghan government and the international community that started shortly after i got afghanistan in 2011. finding that balance is always difficult. it is part of an ongoing transfer of responsibility from the donor community to the afghan authorities. it is driven by two things. our desire and the desire of the afghans themselves have become more reliant on themselves. that is a huge theme of the current government. it is driven by the realization some years ago that the amount of development assistance that was being provided to afghanistan was inevitably going to decline. part of the process has been to how to manage -- has been how to

manage that decline so that afghans can take more responsibility for their own resources. that is happening. case thater been the there is some magic answer for generating revenue in afghanistan. that is something that has to be realized. there is no mining regime that is suddenly going to make it will take a wild.y finding that talents is crucial. -- it will take a while. finding that is crucial. i do not know if it is a good good about this government from the last government regarding foreign assistance. the fact is the president knows

and understands economics and finance and development, which is a huge asset for afghanistan now if they can't find a way to take that and make it operational. he cares about this. he has been focused on it for a long time. i have heard him speak about it long before he was running for the need to make better use for the international resources that are available. i have no doubt that he is quite focused on that and will do his best to make that happen. on the afghan security forces, casualties are too high and there are still lots of problems in the field, and that is a reason why president obama has decided to maintain military forces that we have, most of which are devoted to train, assist-- advise him and missions. that is helping the afghan

security forces work out the supplys of logistics and and tactics on the ground that they need to improve on to make their performance better, but at the same time, i want to reemphasize what somebody else said, for all their problems, the afghan security forces continue to fight, they continue to hold their ground, continue to take a lot of casualties because they are fighting -- because i think they see they are getting better, they are gaining key greater capabilities greater capabilities, and there have been setbacks. i think we concluded it to that by curtailing our own support during that time of the transition, but that is now being rectified. and i hope that will continue. >> the last word.

opinionnot share the that the progress in afghanistan is commensurate with the resources devoted to it. between 2010 and 2012, over that time, literacy in the country doubled. twice as many afghans can read the 7ite as in 2002, and million children who stay in will quadruple. four times as many as afghans will be able to read and write five or six years from now as they did in 2002. and development program has index which is a combination of health, and it -- education, and standard of living.

one measure is longevity in the country is of 20 years. afghans are living 20 years longer than they did in 2002, largely as a result of the reductions in infant mortality and maternal fatality. in the middle of a civil war, they are living 20 years longer. this is the largest increase in human longevity that has been recorded since we started recording it. i would say these metrics are commensurate with the resources that have been put into it. and i would hope they would be more widely recognized. >> we know things are not easy and well, but is nice to finish on a hopeful note. i want to thank you all for being here and thank the panel. [applause] [captions copyright national

cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> we will have this conversation online to watch anytime. you can find moral coverage today on c-span with tom vilsack who will speak at the national press club at 1:00 eastern time,

and back on the road to the white house, with both presidential candidates. we will hear from donald trump campaigning in colorado, and ohio,y clinton in akron, being held later than previously scheduled, at 5:45 eastern, live on c-span2. for thating, a debate candidates for governor of indiana. we will have the candidates' easternive at 7:00 p.m. here on c-span. of the vice president presidential debate, a look back at the candidates, virginia senator tim kaine and indiana governor mike pence using the c-span video library. news of aseen the bad

shooting or whether emergency or famine. i have seen these stories and there will be more stories. there was something yesterday that was different, and it was you, yours. of optimism and community and hope. is the mostdency visible thread that runs through the american government. good oren than not for ill, it sets the tone for the other branches and spurs the expectations of the people. its powers are vast inconsequential. its requirements from the outset and by definition, impossible for mortals to fulfill without humility and inconsistent as seton on its purposes forth in the constitution of the united states. >> tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span. watch anytime at www.c-span.org, and listen at 8:00 p.m. eastern

on the c-span radio app. ♪ >> this week on "q&a," john podhoretz, editor of "commentary" and movie editor for the "weekly standard." he talks about his career, and discusses movies he has reviewed over the past few years, including "lincoln," "spotlight," and "straight outta compton." brian: john podhoretz, we would normally ask you here to talk straight politics. for years, you have been a movie critic. mr. podhoretz: 37 years i have been a movie critic. brian: when did you get interested in movies? mr. podhoretz: i started publishing in the "american spectator" when i was 18 years

old. i grew up in manhattan, and from the age of 11 or 12, i would wander around to movie theaters and see stuff after school and on weekends. i got fundamentally literate in movies enough that i could write about them. that was over 37 years ago. now, if you are 18 or 19 years old, you have another 37 years you have something to be responsible for knowing something about. i'm not sure if it is as easy as it was then. movies had only been around for 50 to 60 years then, and now they have been around for 90. so there are more movies to take account of. brian: when you read your reviews, you see politics in your reviews sometime. how influential have movies been on what our political culture is? mr. podhoretz: it is always a great question about whether they reflect it or lead it or guide it. i think for the most part, movies reflect our political culture, and they are an effort

to gain the largest possible audience by being the most capacious they can possibly be and offend as few people as much as possible. they don't tend to try to make breakthroughs politically. culturally, i think it is a little different. culturally, you can see how a lot of what i think has been the culturally liberal direction in which the country has gone, particularly in the last 20 years. you do see how popular culture and its portrayal of what we used to call alternative lifestyles and alternate ways of living have now become mainstream, because they were presented as such in popular culture and made more palatable. of course, there is this great question -- disregarding the legal and criminal issues surrounding bill cosby -- even i think barack obama would tell

you that "the cosby show," 20 years before barack obama's election, made barack obama's election possible. the show portrayed an upper middle-class black family as the ideal american family. that went a long way to allowing this image to become one that would not be too provocative for people upon seeing a black man running for president. brian: back in february 2014, you wrote this -- "successful entertainers are often awful people. if you put fame, wealth, and narcissism in a blender, the resulting brew can be toxic. fame causes ordinary folk to worship the entertainer and to view him as a superior being to be served. wealth provides the means and the opportunity for indulgence. and his narcissism makes it also natural, appropriate, deserved." mr. podhoretz: i do not recall

having written that. brian: why did you write that? mr. podhoretz: since i don't remember having written it, i am not sure which work of popular culture might have inspired it. but i think if you think about some of these people, cosby, woody allen is another good example, and to an and they don't need to follow the same rules as everybody else, and indeed they often don't. then the question is how far, what it is inside of them that they can liberate and stretches the boundaries of what is

proper. many people just aren't bad people, so they would not really use their fame and wealth and celebrity as tools to get what they want, whether what they want is moral or legal or permissible. but some do, and it can be horrifying when it gets public. brian: how many movies do you see a year? mr. podhoretz: probably 100, 120. maybe something like that. brian: when do you decide to review a movie, and why? mr. podhoretz: the deadline is a good driver. i have about 45 deadlines a year for "the weekly standard." i write 45 times a year. generally speaking, i have to have a piece in on wednesday night. so i have a full-time job and other responsibilities, three

kids, and a busy life, so i can't just go to screenings at will the way a lot of other people who do this for a living do. i tend to duck in and out of a movie that i think has promise, or suggests that there might be something to say about that. having done this so long and and having written about so much, it becomes a challenge ready about the 11th or 12th superhero movie that was made the last two years. what am i going to say about that? it is often easier to write about smaller movies, what are now considered independent or art-house movies, because they have stories that are really about the way people live and the way people live now and are not just sort of fantasy versions of our lives. there is a little more meat there. brian: let's see what you remember from the movie "selma."

you reviewed that for "the weekly standard" back in january 2015. we will run a clip, and that i will read what you said, and you can embellish on that. [video clip] >> this racial violence continues toward unarmed people of selma while they are assaulted with tear gas like an enemy in the war. no citizen of this country can call themselves blameless, for they all bear a responsibility for our fellow man. i am appealing to men and women of god and goodwill everywhere -- white, black, and otherwise. if you believe all are created equal, come to selma. join us. brian: i am not going to read anything. what do you remember from seeing "selma"? mr. podhoretz: i was disappointed by "selma," because i thought it was a hagiography. martin luther king was a great man and he changed the world. he was a very interesting and

complex person, and aside from the fact that it showed that he had done things that had been harmful to his marriage, he was very much a saint walking through the movie. and that makes for something that is really not that interesting. brian: by the way, what is hagiography? mr. podhoretz: hagiography would be a term for a biography that is a portrait of somebody entirely without warts. it is just simply a celebration that flattens a person out and turns them into a godlike figure. brian: you wrote the marketing genius of movies like "selma," the highly praised docudrama about the march in alabama that triggered the 1965 voting rights act, is that they simultaneously confuse and intimidate critics and audiences by making them feel as though it would be an act of disrespect to speak anything but words of praise for the way they depict life and death, historical events of

great moral moment." mr. podhoretz: that is one of the problems you face when you make movies about people and events -- or people make these movies, and then they feel constrained, because they know that kids are going to see it, and they want it to become the definitive portrait of something and don't want to feel as though they are doing anything to tarnish the reputation or worldview or views of a figure that they admire. i tend to think that dramatically, that is a great problem, because what makes movies or stories about people in crisis, and the crisis either changes them or changes everybody else, and if you don't show conflict

and don't show flaws and don't show someone growing out of their flaws or something like that, you are seeing something you cannot really connect to, and it doesn't quite have the same impact. brian: you said, by the way, "selma" is actually quite boring. mr. podhoretz: i think so. by the way, i think i was justified in this view in the end by the public perception of it, which was people were not engaged by it sufficiently for it to be the movie of the year, which a lot of people thought it would be before it came out. it was being talked about in that way. advanced word was so positive, but the performance of king by british actor david oyelowo was i thought very stiff. king was a very charismatic and interesting, flavored guy with a

sense of humor and spirit. he led and guided people in all kinds of different ways, and if you make him into a plaster saint, you're taking away some of those things that will help people connect to him. brian: we need to update the john podhoretz story. you have been married for how long? mr. podhoretz: 14 years this october. my three kids are 12, almost 10, and 6. brian: what do they think of your movie views? mr. podhoretz: i do not think they have read one. they would not have -- i do not think they have seen "selma." they were too young when it came out. i have written about some of the things they have seen like "inside out," the pixar movies. it'll be interesting to see now that they are getting older -- not only do i write reviews, but i write columns for the "new

york post" and edit a magazine. it will be interesting to see how they respond as they return to the point of wanting to read what i write. brian: who reads the commentary you edit? mr. podhoretz: the commentary has about 30,000 paid subscribers. and on the web, we have about 500,000 unique visitors a month. we scale up. my math is bad, so 10 to 15 times the size of the paid readership. it is like all things older, people over the age of 45 or 50 for the most part, mostly jewish, because it is a magazine that focuses to some extent on jewish affairs. it is a conservative jewish publication, so in a liberal jewish community being mostly liberal, it is a minority publication for the cohort it serves. it is a publication that serves a minority of a minority of a minority.

in that context, we publish a lot of good stuff and a lot of provocative stuff and have some real influence on the national debate. brian: your dad, norman podhoretz, and mother, midge decter, are ok? mr. podhoretz: my dad is 86 years old, my mother is 89 years old. they are both in relatively good health, with some back problems. they are all there. my father was the editor of "commentary" from 1960's through 1995. there was a 14-year separation between him and me when the magazine was edited by my friend, neil. i was recruited to take over by the board. it is a very interesting experience. i grew up with the magazine, and it was the formative intellectual experience of my life to be the son of these two

intellectuals. at the age of 48, i took over this publication and have had to put my own stamp on it in a much different time. brian: you see the movies that you watch and critique where? mr. podhoretz: movie theaters, always. brian: new york? mr. podhoretz: new york. upper west side of manhattan, usually. brian: let's go to another movie. "the boston globe" story, a movie called "spotlight." [video clip] >> this is it. >> this is the law covering for one priest. there's another 90 up there. -- out there. >> we have to go with us now. >> i am not going to rush the story. >> we don't have a choice. if we don't rush to print, someone else will butcher the story. >> mike. >> why are we hesitating?

he told us to get the system. >> we told us to get the system. we need the full scope. that is the only thing that will put an end to this. brian: you say, "i feel about the often insanely false and widely romanticized depictions on screen of the way newsrooms function, and the glamorized portraits of those who work in them, the way many people feel about nails upon a blackboard." what did you think about "spotlight"? mr. podhoretz: i thought it was the best movie of 2015. it is single best portrait of the functioning's of the inside of a newsroom that i have ever seen or ever hope to see. it was set in the year 2000, so what it portrayed is a world that is now gone. physical libraries, morgues we call them, where clips are kept in file folders and envelopes that you can search through piece by piece, reporters sort

of dogging it, doing most of their work on the phone or in the office, having to hustle to courtrooms. a lot of this now has been superseded by the internet and searchable functions that way. a lot of people working from home and remotely. what "spotlight" captured was what happens when a newspaper that is serious about something commits resources and lets something bubble for a long time, with the real possibility that what it is searching for, they are not going to find. in this case, they did in fact find this astonishing scandal involving the archdiocese of boston and how it covered up these molestations, hundreds and hundreds of molestations, and

hid the molesters from justice. it is one of the signal achievements of journalism in our time. the movie is, tonally and in spirit, just a spectacularly good piece of work, in part because it is so quiet, it is so unflashy. it also looks like an old television show, without effects. brian: let's go to another movie, a whole different feeling. "straight outta compton," back in 2015. a little bit different than what we saw. let's watch. [video clip] >> what do you have us on the ground for? >> sit tight and let us do our job. can you stay right there please? we are trying to check these bangers.

>> these are not bangers. these are artists. >> excuse me, artists? what kind? >> rappers. >> rap is not an art. who are you? >> i am the manager. >> you are wasting your time. >> these clients look like gang members. >> you cannot arrest people just because of what they look like. brian: "straight outta compton," compton, california. paul giamatti. mr. podhoretz: a strong, vibrant, kicky movie. i said, as i recall, that i was already too old for rap when it came in. it is a form that does not speak to me at all, and i never felt any connection to it. i am much squarer than that. the movie itself, as a kind of

update of the classic showbiz story about how the band got together and recorded its big hits, it was pretty strikingly effective. there are all manifest ironies in it, liked the fact it gets -- like the fact that it gets very sentimental even though these are guys that word -- some of them did very questionable things in their lives, and the fact that people have ended up playing cops on tv having recorded very anti-cop lyrics, about which i was very disapproving of the time. again, another story about how american success changes everything. if you have ice-t -- brian: that is dr. dre. mr. podhoretz: 20 years later,

he is playing a cop on "law and order." you can see how the culture kind of takes things in and kind of homogenize them, softens them to a point where you can barely remember where they came from. when this anti-cop rap started, these were major political issues. huge crime waves. you had people attacking cops. the cops did not want to get out of their cars to do anything. they were scared about getting out of their cars. policies were not in place to handle crime prevention before these crimes happened. there were hearings in congress about it. 20 years later, one of the major guys portrayed in "straight outta compton" plays a cop in the movies. brian: you have three young kids.

you're talking about language. i want to read this from your twitter account. john podhoretz, contributing editor of "the weekly standard" -- "lately i have taken to cursing quite a bit. life is short." mr. podhoretz: now we're moving on to twitter. brian: the reason i bring this up is because, at the time of this recording, you have tweeted 126,000 times since 2008. what are you doing? mr. podhoretz: i don't know. the good part of that is that there are 63,000 followers there, all of whom i got one by one over the course of those eight years. what am i doing? a tweet is 140 characters, a one-liner basically. i am, in some ways, a frustrated standup comedian.

twitter is a form of haiku performance art for me. i do a lot of joking, and it is also a weird thing, it is like a virtual cocktail party 24 hours a day. let's say you are sitting at your computer, doing something, and it is just too much. you get anxious because you are writing something and just want to turn your attention for five minutes to something else. you can kind of open this door and go in and there is this big conversation going on that you can join for a while, and then you can step out, close the door, and go back to work. it is a form of procrastination. or it could be considered a form of creative process working itself out in another way. the cursing thing is i think a residue of what is to me the nightmarish quality of the election that really began in

march of 2015, which i think is driving a great many people to near insanity. we have 59, 58 more days of this. brian: by the time people see this, it'll be a lot fewer days. mr. podhoretz: it can't come soon enough, because the heightened emotions and feelings and the hostility with which one is greeted, that then causes one to respond with hostility. brian: are you cursing on twitter because you are feeling hostility? mr. podhoretz: well, it started -- brian: your kids know you are doing this? mr. podhoretz: no, they don't. they are not on twitter yet. when they are on twitter, i will

do almost none of it. my kids are not on social media, except someone has an instagram account, which is private. a lot of this started because of confrontations that i had with a group of people who have come to be known as people who heard hillary clinton's speech, the alt-right. it is a group of people on twitter who are possessors of extreme nationalist views. a lot of them are disgustingly anti-semitic. so they would send anti-semitic tweets toward me, saying just the most horrific things like you should get in an oven, and it is too bad that hitler did not kill you or kill your grandparents, or your children should be in an oven. there are three ways to deal with it. one is to ignore it, you can block those people, and the

third is to engage with them. i decided for a couple of months to engage with them. my form of engagement was to spew invective at them. brian: did it make you feel better? mr. podhoretz: i don't know. it is an ongoing dispute about this question of what do you do in these three cases? i felt gutturally that not to respond is a form of acceptance. if you do not respond, you are essentially either suggesting that they got you and you are cowardly about responding, or that it is ok to talk this way. particularly since this is public, that somebody tweets something at me, people who follow me can see it in my timeline. i felt -- a lot of this was

instinctual, but i felt like i couldn't not respond, and that the only proper way to respond was not to say "how could you say such a terrible thing?" but to go at their jugular. sometimes that involves using profanity. brian: we talked about tweeting and language. we can go back to august 24, 2015. right now, the big news is the broadway opening of a musical biography of alexander hamilton told in hip-hop. it is grounds for deep skepticism. i have not seen "hamilton" and may not get a chance to see it for a year given its $35 million advance, but it is not my inability to get a ticket that has brought this sadness upon me. it is about how very little produced these days that provokes the anticipatory thrill

that once went hand in hand with being a serious customer,