helpful to answer this question times" or, the "new york has more readers. it happens all the time and i do not think it is sinister. mcclatchy has more readers or "the new york times" has more readers. the question is whether donald trump would do it because i do not like that story and i will kick them out of the room. i do not think they can be kicked out that they can never have their question answered. >> katie alluded to a case we litigated in the fourth circuit and the fourth circuit did uphold and said, reporters should expect the -- if they are given favors they could be disfavored. the universe was made whole. we have a few minutes to see if there are any questions. we have some people here. >> this is for anita. could you speak about the degree

-- >> they are saying say her name. name.say your >> i am a reporter with mcclatchy newspapers. >> it is not a plant, i promise. >> could you speak to the degree to which a president sets the tone because the white house press corps is only a small part of the coverage of the executive branch? there are secretaries with their press secretaries and career staff. to what degree would a president trump or president clinton's more subtle hostility to the press filter down to other executive agencies or are they independent? >> i think the matter less than i would have thought. we have this idea that josh earnest, the press secretary and the staff, we asked him about all these agencies all the time and we get the idea that they can get -- josh earnest can get them to call us back or give us information or make these other agencies answer her questions. maybe some of that happens behind the scenes, but i feel

like they let each agency do their thing. i do think a lot, it is a lot about appointees. it depends on who the cabinet secretary is, and to that secretary appoints. i feel like it is less about the white house than you would think. now, if a president trump or president clinton decided to make it about that or new press secretary of communication or secretary made it about that and i suppose it could be about that. >> we have got one in the back there. >> my name is jamal, a reporter with diverse issues in higher education. i wondered if anyone can address the potential ramifications of collaborating with leakers. i am talking about entities such orwikileaks or ed snowden something like that. we have both candidates who have been subject to tax of different

sorts but they are candidates now. once they are in office, it is a different situation. what do you see as the ramifications of collaborating with entities like that, with wikileaks, for instance, the timed certain documents to go to certain publications. so how might something like that be viewed by either the candidates once they are in office? thank you. >> let me turn that one over to adam. your newspaper reported it and has had to make decisions. >> we should stand up for donald trump in one respect, he is pro-transparency when it comes to russian hacking of his opponents. news organizations have a responsibility to make an independent judgment about material from wikileaks or anywhere else and decide whether they are accurate, whether they

are newsworthy, whether the value of publishing them outweighs public harm. these are difficult questions. from senator on papers onward, we try to make these decisions, and i think snowden would say there is a difference between wikileaks which simply dumps things willy-nilly without a filter, and snowden, he went to news organizations and said you guys make the judgment about what citizens in a democracy need to see. >> i would add something to that. what we have seen, there is one instance where the u.s. government had attempted in history that we are aware of to prosecute a member of the mainstream media for publishing leaked classified information. that was at the height of world war ii. leaks investigations and criminal charges against leakers have been focused on leakers. it was one of the things that was alarming about the james

rosen situation. in order to get the warrant for mr. rosen's e-mails, the department of justice filed in affidavit characterizing him as a co-conspirator and potentially himself liable under the espionage act. that was something that shocked the media and it was very concerning. what we have seen and we should keep in mind when we talk about what a next administration might look like when it comes to prosecuting leakers, whether we are in the same area we are in now which is the government prosecutes leakers and usually goes after journalists to supply evidence in support of those leaks investigations and when someone like jim rison is threatened with jail time, it is because he is potentially in contempt of court for violating -- refusing to follow in order to testify as to the identity of his sources. he was not accused of violating the espionage act.

the open question is whether a more aggressive department of justice might take that extra step, something we would not , but it is ado question you would want to -- i do not think it is necessarily a closed question, particularly with the mission of the rosen affidavit. >> they were conflicting statements made by different prosecutors in different circumstances about whether a journalist could be jailed. i will say attorney general holder and the discussions about the rosen search warrant did reassure people that a journalist at least under his administration would not go to jail simply for asking sources questions and for doing their job. we took some comfort. >> i am paraphrasing, i do not remember the exact words, calling it the thing from his tenure as attorney general that bothered him the most or the thing he regretted the most. there is that. >> i was on a panel with former

attorney general me casey -- with the former attorney general and i asked whether he had given thought to our security journalists and he said, i suddenly fantasized about it. [laughter] [laughter] >> good to know. more questions from the audience. there is one in the back. >> curtis tate, also from mcclatchy. we are not trying to pack the court here. i have a foia question. in my frustrating experience in dealing with foia and the slowness and the backlogs from the federal agencies that i have , one ofd requests to the things i have been told repeatedly in the past four or five years is that we are constrained because of the sequester. they blamed the sequester for reducing their resources to respond to my foia requests and presumably others. i am wondering is -- is there

anything that the president can do to instruct agencies that they must devote a certain amount of resources to responding to foia? or is that something that congress would have to fix? >> i know everyone loves to talk about foia. [laughter] >> congress obviously could fix it by allocating funds. is that likely to happen? no. could the administration and i think this would be done through the office of information policy at the department of justice. could they tell agencies that it is policy that you spent amount of your budget or you have this many -- it would be scaled, it would have to be scaled based on the size of the agency and the number of foia requests. it is disproportionate. it is not as though every agency gets as many foia requests as the department of justice or the

fbi individually. if it was scaled i think that absolutely, the and ministration -- absolutely, the administration could set those kinds of parameters. no reason why it could not. it has not happened. it is unfortunate. one of the steps that could be taken to improve foia is to fund it. i think that journalists, we are inclined to say and media is inclined to say, what's with the delay? oftentimes, there are resource constraints. i think as the increase my there is an increase in foia requests, there has not been an increase in funding request. >> the obama administration did start the office of government information services that was supposed to help out on the delays at least via an on birds -- an ombudsperson.

>> in office within the national archives, i'd like to put a pin in that. i think things have changed a little bit. with the last foia reform bill passed it could not , independently report to congress. it had to go to the national archives. now it can do that. it has a pretty small staff and it is not an enormous organization, but it does provide mediation server -- services for requesters and to the extent it is going to be successful, it needed the reforms that just happened. it has not been extra nearly successful in the last, here is no, but could it be moving forward? i think yes. there are advantages [indiscernible]

that being said, there is an agency that is looking for a director. i do not know when that position , so it is hard to say how successful that will be. >> just something about that. we have time for one more question. the gentleman in the front row. >> a medical reporter for medtech inside. you mentioned earlier about shield laws and that is something we have been talking about since the first day of j-school. is it something that is attainable or is it a pipe dream and if it is not, how do we get about getting it done? >> we have had several run ups to it, and it cleared the house of representatives, got stalled in the senate, and then edward snowden happened and wikileaks

happened and the political will was lost. and the budget problems took over the discussion. i think we need to get the election behind us. i think we need to get it settled out and nothing will energize things more than another crisis involving a journalist thing threatened with -- journalist being threatened with jail. so we have gotten close, so i would not give it up and it would say to everyone in this room and at home, it is an important effort and we should not give it up and we should continue to press our congresspeople to pass the protection. >> state shield laws, how well do they work to protect reporters or do judges and up -- dojudges and of saying saying, for this, that you and the other reason, you're not shielded? >> they come in different flavors. there are 40 different shield laws and they have different concentric circles to what is

protected. they have been successful in keeping the information in the hands of the journalists where they belong. i think we are about out of time so let me thank everybody in the audience. a special shout out and thank you for my colleague for her help with the powerpoint and arrangements. thanks to the panel and institute. [applause] ♪ thank you. >> good job. >> following the second presidential debate on sunday, both hillary clinton and donald trump campaigns released new videos online. here's a look. president obama: by so many measures, our country is strong and more proper -- prosperous than it was eight years ago. we know the progress we have made. despite the forces of opposition. despite the forces of discrimination. despite the politics of

backlash. that does not stop with my presidency. we are just getting started. that is why i am still fired up. that is why i am still ready to go. if i hear anybody saying their vote does not matter, it doesn't matter who we elect, read up on history, it matters. we've got to get people to vote. if you want to give michele and me a good sendoff, get people registered to vote. if you care about our legacy, realize everything we stand for is at stake, on the progress we have made is at stake in this election. my name may not be on the ballot but our progress is on the ballot. tolerance is on the ballot. democracy is on the ballot. justice is on the ballot. good schools are on the ballot. ending mass incarceration is on the ballot right now.

one candidate will advance those things and there is another candidate whose defining principle, the central theme of his candidacy is opposition to all we have done. ♪ obama: there is now such thing as a vote that does not matter. it all matters. after we have achieved the turnout in 2008 and 2012, i will consider it a personal insult -- an insult to my legacy of this community lets down its guard and failed to activate itself in this election. do you want to give me a good sendoff? go vote. ♪

>> he extracts the most from people because people want to measure up to his expectations. he finds the right person for the right jobs. the qualified person for that job, he puts them in that position and he gives you a tremendous amount of responsibility. he does not micromanage the process. >> he is a mentor to so many and he is kind and that is something that does not necessarily get out there as much as it should. ♪ >> donald trump reeling from criticism by his own party's leadership, he tweeted this, it is nice the shackles have been taken off me and i can now fight for america the way i want to. mr. trump: i have never been so ashamed of this country. >> donald trump appears to be in

total meltdown. >> the shackles are off and now i can really do what i want. are you going to be more outspoken? mr. trump: i do not think i am that outspoken. i was so surprised to see him sign on with the devil. >> he threatened to jail his opponent. that is a new low in american democracy. >> in a twitter tirade, trump tore into house speaker paul ryan. >> i would not want to be in a foxhole with a lot of these people. >> you attacked mccain. mr. trump: give me a break. he has not heard locker room talk before. >> i'd do not know what good it does to trash people. >> you released a ad that revisits the topic of hillary clinton's health. >> donald trump is now out of control in a way we have not seen. this is a nuclear bomb, we are

watching an unhinged candidate. >> i will compare my iq with anybody, ok? ♪ >> mr. trump, we are going to go on. we're going to move on. >> allow a response, please. >> what do you think will happen if aleppo falls? >> aleppo is a disaster. >> what you think will happen echo >> -- will happen? >> how stupid is our country? >> there sometimes reasons the military dues that. -- does that. >> we have to move on. >> getting a subpoena. let alone after getting a subpoena from the united states.

>> we have to move on to an audience question. >> mr. trump, mr. trump -- >> everything is broken about it. >> please a plow me -- please allow me to respond. >> it has not been finished at all. ♪ >> this morning, a look at the presidential election. a conversation with the -- mark halperin on campaign rhetoric. that is live at 8:20 a.m. eastern on c-span2. this afternoon, a debate from economic advisers from clinton and trump campaigns. >> a new survey from the university of virginia's institute for advanced studies in culture looks at the

satisfaction and politics as a whole. the group of professors and a journalist took about a study yesterday for about an hour and a half. >> good afternoon. editor at the institute for advanced studies and culture at the university of virginia. thank you all for being here. center to the vanishing for american democracy. normal election year, that might sound overly dramatic. it might sound like an understatement this year. that is, of course, the title that is an analysis of a recent american political

culture. it was conducted for the institute by the gallup group. if there is an overarching theme to this report, i think you could fall back on the old marxist adage that quantitative change ultimately brings qualitative change. what you will hear today is a lot of trends in our political culture that have been underway -- and not just political culture, our broader culture -- that have been underway are reaching a kind of culmination, possibly threshing a tipping point. that will be the subject of the various panels today. , asre delighted to have

well as two speakers from our own institute, two outstanding outside panelists from the institute. we have presenting first james davison hunter who is the executive director of the institute. he is a distinguished professor of religion, culture and social theory at the university of virginia. of cultureuthor wars, the struggle to define america. as well as many other books, studies and articles. our second speaker who will be talking more specifically about the survey is our director of .urvey research

in addition to leading many surveys at institute, he is the author of brother in society, the cultural transformation of a peculiar people. our guest speakers we have to today -- we have two today, nancy isenberg. the professor at louisiana state university. the author most recently of the acclaimed white trash, before and year untold history of class in america. she is also the author of sex and citizenship in antebellum america. all in founder, the life of particular villain in this season of hamilton. we are delighted to have her here that she heroically took the train from baton rouge to

washington. speaker is toms edsall who many of you know most recently from his very sharp times. in the new york he was until recently the public affairs professor in journalism at columbia university. he wrote for many years as the of correspondent in "the post" and the baltimore sun in the glorious days and many other publications. we are glad to have him here. also the author of the age of austerity. and has also written three or four other distinguished books.

let's move along with the show. james davison hunter, thank you. mr. hunter: thank you tom and nancy for being here. thanks to the gallup organization for hosting this event today. we appreciate all the work you but for being such great partners in this effort. thanks to all of you for taking out time of your busy day. i am going to data right in and --l you a little bit about i'm going to dig right in and tell you a little bit about the work we have done. everyone can agree there is something unprecedented about the presidential election this year with the amount of

attention with every new cycle with donald trump. with the latest outrage the temptation is to say it is donald trump himself with his solidarity not to mention his misogyny and racism into presidential politics. this may be true but distracts from seeing what else is new on the political landscape or four more profound. the question we began at the beginning of the project and guided this research with the political landscape. what are the features of our political landscape that are present and that will remain irrespective of who we elect in november. this can be a different tact than is taken in journalism and survey research where there is a tendency to see politics as a daily contest for power. it typically attends to the

latest changes in political -- who is up? who is down? who is gaining or losing? what did they say today that will be concentrated by something basic tomorrow? it is like studying the weather. it is running the weather -- it -- withsday but it is all of our work at the institute of it financed studies of culture we are concerned with the climate rather than the weather. as it bears on politics, we are concerned with the cultural context within which political context takes place. this context includes the ideals , beliefs, values, symbols and the public rituals that separate people but to direct them with political action. political culture provides the boundaries of what the political legitimacy.

political activity emanates from culture and reflecting back culture deepest values and beliefs. political action in turn reinforces and reshapes the medical culture. of a society may change significantly. the a normative context -- the normative context, the culture of a society will change slowly , but when it does those of the big consequence. the changes that take place within political culture without -- portend much about the future order. so this is the orientation we have taken in the institutes 2016 survey of american political culture that we designed but was fielded by the gallup organization to roughly 1900 respondents nationwide.

what i want to do over the next 12 minutes is provide a brief overview. i want to ask my colleague to follow with the review of some of the data. survey yields a number of important findings and as we dig deeper, we are sure to find more. at the broadest level, the data makes it clear that there are two basic faultlines in american clinical culture. the first faultlines between the general american electorate and the political establishment. line is withint the white population, the white electorate and it represents an evolution in the deep fissures of the culture war. let me unpack this. the first faultlines.

the survey reinforces a long-standing observation of sociology and political science that american democracy is undergoing a crisis of literacy. -- crisis of legitimacy. we see it as a growing disaffection between the american public and the dominant political institutions and their leadership. they say in certain respects there is nothing new here at all there has long been disaffection in public opinion and there are ways in which that disaffection may be heartening. may be heartening -- may be heartening. it's also important to note that disaffection is not a one dimensional reality. analytically we can tease out the three dimensions. the first is mistrust of government. nearly two thirds of the american public has little or no confidence at the government in washington will actually solve

the problems it sets of minds to . by the same degree the majority believes that what americans need is a new political party because the current two-party system is not working. two thirds of population, over half of all democrats and republicans hold this view that three out of four independents are especially adamant about this. this attitude of mistrust extends to other powerful institutions. 90% of all americans believe that wall street and big business profit at the expense of ordinary americans. the second dimension is cynicism towards leaders. it seems to me this is a particular problem, how the government in washington and beyond has actually managed. here the special ire of the american public is directed toward political leaders.

the vast majority believe that most politicians are more interested in winning elections and doing what is right and while the system of government is good, the the people who are running are incompetent. again, this tendency builds over -- this tendency spills over beyond the government to other leadership groups. they believe it's in favor of the wealthiest americans and american corporations media, corporations and technology care little about the lives of most americans. and that the most educated and successful people in america are most interested in serving themselves than the common good. the third dimension is alienation or estrangement which has to do with the sense of agency one has to fix the world that one is a part of.

these are etched in american self-understanding, and it's not surprising that majorities agree that most elected officials don't care what people like me think, and that people like me don't have any say about what the government does. indeed 40% of the american population feels like strangers in their own country. a certain amount of disaffection is found across all dimensions. men and women, young and old, white, black, hispanic, rich and poor and so on. but there's also no question that the pattern we are seeing confirm what we know in a totally info other work that there is a predictable unevenness. some are more disaffected than others.

i'm going to drill into this later, but briefly, once the greatest intensity of disaffection tends to be a bit more male than female, disproportionately represented among baby boomers and those who reside in the lowest density parts of the country though not in any particular region. less surprising is that the most are disaffected are poor, poorly -- a pattern that intensifies further with education and religion. the most disaffected are poorly educated and conservative in the religious faith. the least disaffected are elites . those that are disproportionately well educated . these are individuals or company situated in life and they know it.

-- these are individuals who are comfortably situated in life and they know it. it isn't a stretch to see why they have greater agency unless alienation, less cynicism and greater trust in government compared to those who have less. far more interesting are african-americans and hispanics. while levels of citizens -- levels of cynicism and personal feeling of alienation alienation among minorities are comparable to those in the white community. it it's fascinating to note that african-american's and hispanics exude much greater confidence in the government than whites. in general, whites are twice as likely as blacks and his hispanics to be trustful on a variety of measures. these positive impressions of government are notable in light of perceptions of history and social circumstance where the

majority of these minorities agree our founding fathers were part of a racist and sexist culture that gave important roles to white men while harming minorities and women. the majority also say the police and law-enforcement unfairly target minorities. this compared to only a third of white americans. in spite of the recognition and even in the face of challenging economic circumstances, the plurality remains hopeful believing the future for the people like themselves would be better in the coming years against all odds and difficulty. they tend to see a brighter future for themselves. that is the first faultlines -- how it falls and some of the variation in it. the second fault line, as i mentioned earlier is within the

white middle-class. at least the general population itself. the white middle-class. this we believe represents evolution in the culture wars. the cultural conflict surrounding moral issues that have defined so much of american politics for four decades was always one that took place within the middle-class. yes there were elements to that conflict, but they were mainly the differences between lower middle and upper classes. in the intervening years, this has intensified and transformed into what is best considered two very different social locations with significant class cultures. since 2008, the cleavage between the highly educated, professional and managerial upper-middle-class on one hand,

and the less well educated, nonprofessional lower middle and working class on the other hand has deepened and hardened. these cultures are marked by different values, beliefs and sensibilities, but also by strikingly different life chances. this is at the heart of the new cultural conflict. empirically the line of division is drawn by education. it is the distinction between the credentialed and the non- credentialed. the credentialed have achieved a four-year college degree and the non- credential often only have a high school diploma or less . there are obviously variations here but as a rule, the life chances that these two groups are notably, consistently difference in that difference has important consequences for how each understand public life.

for example, confidential the one and a half times more likely to have levels of mistrust, three times more likely to be highly cynical and twice as likely to express very high levels of alienation. this fault line plays out different worldview of public policy in their ideology, their views of government, immigration and voting patterns. we see consistent patterns of difference of opinion rooted in education while representing polarity and polling consistently in opposite directions. education is clearly a -- discernibless crevass in the cultural

landscape. how deep does ago, how ideas that is that divide? will we push this further in two different ways, it becomes apparent that the fishers disguise a much deeper risk in american politics. we need to push the education factor out beyond those who are merely credentialed with a college degree to those who hold graduate degrees. we oversample this population. by virtue of their educational credentials, they are the best positioned to operate effectively in the global economy. by any measure, these are social elites. the second analytic term was to introduce the social factor of belief. among the poorly educated, the non-credentialed, we pulled of those who are religiously conservative, in this case mostly evangelical protestants

and conservative catholics. they are not only at a disadvantage in the work of the global economy, but they also feel more and more cultural outsiders because of their religious belief. we call these the disinherited. these two groups sort themselves out in predictable ways. the disinherited are poor, high-rises of financial betterment are narrow. they are a bit older. there also found in the midwest and southeast in the least densely populated areas. social elites tend to become citrated on the coast, new england and the far west. they tend to reside in demographically dense areas of these regions. these lines of division, those pertaining to education

credentials and faith are familiar in a new. they represent a risk that the new cultural conflict. it plays out in every front in ways that are fundamentally different worldviews. i should note, in our analysis we added a point of reference with religion being a category. these are noncredentialed. they have the same educational profile high school diploma, maybe some college but no degree . they're also overly religious moderate, liberal or secular. one of the ways in which these groups contract are long the

dimensions of disinfection. -- disaffection. the disinherited are over seven times more likely and the disadvantaged or four times more likely than social elites to have a very high distrust of government. likewise, the disinherited and the disadvantaged are five times more likely than social elites to be highly cynical of leadership. the disinherited are nine and a half more likely and the disadvantaged six times more likely than social elites to be alienated. these are neither small nor subtle differences. it's a world that has left them suspicious of governing institution and leadership on this in the face of a pervasive sense of powerlessness to do anything about it politically or otherwise.

another way we see these groups contrast is how they perceive solidarity with some groups and differ from others. the racial legacy of racial conflict and prejudice has always been at war with the ideals of a just society. certainly those lines of difference haven't disappeared. where do these lines figure in? in the 2016 survey of american political culture, we asked the question, for the following groups, do we see the leaves and values as being completely different, mostly different, mostly, mostly similar or completely the same as americans like you. the one thing that each group shared in common is the perception that the belief of values of the wealthiest americans are dramatically different than their own. the sense of distance from the

cultural elite is also strong though stronger among the disinherited and the disadvantaged. another point of commonality is the moderate distance between african-american and hispanic. the disc disinherited perceive distance from conservative christians as you might guess, the social elite perceives the values and beliefs of conservative christians, gays, lesbians, nonconservative people and muslims. -- as the other see themselves very different from all three. in all of these contrast, the disadvantage holds positions.

there's nothing middling about the distance they perceive between their own beliefs on the -- on the lease and the values of those of the wealthiest americans. it's not surprising that there predispose people toward a vastly different visions of public policy such as welfare, obamacare, gay marriage, gun-control and immigration. on this last issue for example, two thirds of all the disinherited favor banning entry to all muslims until we better understand the terrorist threats to our country compared to just 14% of the social elite. the same pattern of difference can be seen in their views toward "building a wall" across the border between the united states and mexico. the final point i will make here. while social and cultural factors clearly predispose the

american population towards starkly different clinical orientations, it shows how clearly aligned the disinherited and social elite are with the two candidates, trump and clinton. the findings of the survey on american political culture also suggests the candidates themselves have an independent role in intensifying the political divisions. they crystallize political differences, not unlike unlike a flag around whom supporters unite and act together. this dynamic may be especially important and in context their -- in context where personalities loom large while political institutions, parties, special purpose groups in solon fail to coalesce and coherent ways. with that i will pass over to my

colleague. >> i would like to begin by thanking people who have been involved with this project. stephanie at the gallup organization has been incredibly responsive and worked very well with us throughout. josh and matthew at institute for advanced studies and culture have been tremendously helpful in various aspects of the project. it's always a privilege to work with james on a project like this and so i have a few comments. i am not going to try to duplicate everything that james just covered. he really covered the math of

the report. what i want to do is give you just a few figures to highlight some particulars. some of the things we found. first, it doesn't take a political pole to realize that ll to realizel po that this is an unusual election. it doesn't take a social survey to know that confidence in leaders and political institutions is at a low ebb, but it does require systematic measurements to unpack the disconnect, to to examine its contours and to explore the depths of what is happening in our political culture. as the donald trump and bernie sanders campaigns have highlighted, many americans are angry and frustrated and many have lost confidence. if not in the system of government, at least in its leaders and the way it is currently functioning. consider this series of statements. more than half of all americans

agree with all of these statements. these days the government in washington threatens the freedom of ordinary americans. 56% agree. the american way of life is rapidly disappearing. 58% of americans agree. america used to be a place where you could get ahead by working hard, but this is no longer true. 59% agree. the leaders in american corporations, media, universities and technology care little about the lives of americans. agree. the most educated and successful people in america are more interested in serving themselves

than in serving the common good. 62% agree. people like me don't have any say about what the government does. 64% agree. our system of government is good but the people running it are incompetent. 71% agree. seven out of ten americans. our economic system is rigged in favor of the wealthiest americans. this is something that was echoed by candidates this year and 73% of the american public agreed with it. most elected officials don't care what people like me think. 74% agree. we need a president who will completely change the direction of the country. 72% agree. political correctness is a

serious problem in our country, making it hard for people to say what they really think. 73% agree, almost almost three out of four. you can't believe what you hear from the mainstream media. 75% agree with that statement. most americans vote without thinking through the issues. we have 86% agreeing with that. they are as critical of themselves as voters as they are political leaders and institutions. most politicians are more interested in winning elections than in doing what is right. nine out of ten americans agree with that statement. why have we heard here? -- what have we heard here? americans believe that government threatens us, our leaders in and out of government are only in it for themselves, they have little say in what the

government does, that you can't believe what you hear from either the politicians or the media. they have a distinct loss of confidence. as james has pointed out, we have gone beyond these individual statements to try to discern underlying patterns. our initial analysis suggests that the crisis of legitimacy of our governing institutions involves first a loss of confidence in government including the truth of what we hear about its functioning. we have called this mistrust toward the lower left and that figure. second, a profound skepticism about the interest and intent of those who re- rule and wield power. this is on the lower right. we are calling that cynicism.

mistrust and cynicism frame popular attitudes against political institutions and public institutions more generally. the final one at the top has more to do with how americans perceive their own life situation, as one where they feel estranged from those who hold the reins of power. they see their world changing in ways they don't understand. the connection between hard work and thriving has been broken. they feel powerless to change these things. these concepts of mistrust and alienation were not ones that we carried into the survey and analysis. we had so many complaints that people could agree or disagree

with. then we could explore the patterns of relationship among them, and we were able to isolate these as somewhat distinct. -- distinct dimensions of disinfection -- disaffection. americans conclude political events these days seem more like theater or entertainment then -- entertainment than something to be taken seriously. only one american intend would -- one american in 10 would reject the sentiment the number that completely agree has grown by 50% since 1996. similarly, the number of

americans who say they have no confidence at all that the government in washington can solve problems, even when it sets its mind to it has grown by about 50% from 21% -- 21% to 30% in the span of two decades. the prior figures here are from a previous survey we did in 1996, the state of the union survey which union survey which was also fielded by the gallup organization which provided historical context for some of the items that we went after in the study. one of the surprises in our study, given all the attention on racial discord is finding that some of the disaffection we have been describing his lease -- describing is least pronounced among minorities. take the issue of whether the nation is in a state of decline.

56% of whites say the nation is declining, while only 30% of african-americans and 26% of hispanics say the same. in fact, hispanics are the only group of the three where more say the nation is improving then declining -- than declining. minority perceptions of solutions to our nation's problems are also distinct, half of whites say it would make our nation more dangerous if more americans legally carried weapons in public. andared to 62% of hispanics 83% of african-americans.

we found that race and education are the two best predictors of who americans will vote for in the presidential election with race being the strongest. how someone might vote on election day is not what they say or believe about hillary clinton or donald trump, but how favorably they view president obama. 94% of those who view obama favorably say they will vote for hillary clinton and those who view him unfavorably say they will vote for donald trump. there is a political fault line for racial and ethnic minorities is clear. within the white majority and this is the second fault line --

political disaffection is felt among those without a four-year college degree. it is not just a matter of it varying systematically with education. there is a breakpoint on whether or not they have that particular credential. in our efforts to understand this further, we examined the differences between americans who lack a four-year degree and those who have gone on to achieve even a higher degree, a graduate degree of some kind. the latter who we call the social elite have political views that depart dramatically from those without a college degree. the disaffection of the less educated is deepened by religiously conservative belief system as james pointed out. indeed, noncollege educated americans with conservative

religious views are the most disaffected of all americans. we had called them the disinherited who contrast with less educated americans whom we i have time to get only a couple of taste in the difference between these three gates -- groups. disinherited and the social elite in particular and have it dramatically contrasting -- inhabit dramatically contrasting cultures. we limited those to those who are not religiously conservative. consider their presidential preference, 85% of the disinherited say they will vote for donald trump. 84% of the social elite say they will support hillary clinton. the contrast is almost as great here is the contrast between minorities and whites.

similarly, two thirds of the disinherited favor building a wall between the united states and mexico. elite0% of the social share this view. you cannot come up with survey data that will give you pie charts that contrast that dramatically. another striking thing about the socially elite is, not surprisingly, they do not feel at all -- i am missing a slide -- yes here they do not feel at all like strangers in their own land. 8% or 9% of the socially elite who say they feel a stranger in their own land. if you go to the disinherited, it is nearly 50%, in the 40's. that sense of not belonging and

of structuress and the way institutions operate is concentrated among the disinherited. the last chart i want to show you is the social distance, the cultural distance thing that james mentioned. i may be able to do this better and -- if i come out and see what you see. on the left-hand side is the disinherited, the disadvantaged in the middle and the social ev on the right-hand side. -- social elite on the right-hand side. on the bottom, the groups that each of these three groups they believe they share the leads and dies with. that was the question that drove this graphic. on the left-hand side, the disinherited feel that they share the beliefs and values of white americans. completely.

that is true across the board. these are subgroups within the s ine -- within the white american society. you have conservative christians alongside white americans on the left-hand side, as sharing the beliefs and values of the disinherited. if you go to the far right, look at what happens to conservative christians, with the exception of the wealthiest 10% of americans, they are the group that the social elite feel least connection with, least affinity for culturally. on the left-hand side, you have gays and lesbians among the disinherited. americans, andic nonreligious people as being groups -- they do not make sense to them. they do not understand them and it feels like they do not share

the beliefs and values of those groups at all. on the right-hand side, you see gays and lesbians and nonreligious people are groups that the social elite feel very much in common with, they feel they share the beliefs and dies of those groups. -- beliefs and all use of those groups. african-americans and hispanic americans are in the same general sphere -- level across all three groups. there is one other contrast that jumps out and that is that the cultural elite, which along with the wealthiest americans, are seen as being culturally distant by the disinherited and disadvantaged. the cultural elite is a phrase that feels more familiar with the socially elite and they understand that group of people.

unpacks an attempt to that second phone line that james talked about -- second phone line that james talked about and we are still in process in much of this. line that james talked about and we are still in process in much of this. concluding thoughts and we will turn it over to nancy and tom. afternoon by talking about how unusual this election is. it seems so extraordinary. day by day and week by week we hear new things. unfamiliar are so compared to previous presidential elections. survey tell of the a story that is probably more about continuity than change.

this surveyties reveals are commonplace at this point. -- a legitimate crisis of the last 50 years continues and as far as we can tell it is heartening. many americans are more set in their views that government cannot be trusted, that is leaders and the leadership class more broadly are incompetent. craven and self-interested. and that citizens personally have learned clip -- little meaningful influence over the powerful institutions or circumstances. credibility of the mainstream political establishment, its mission, governing authority, and its leaders has taken a pounding over many years. after a half-century of polling that was initiated by the gallup

organization in the 1950's and 1960's, one can say with near certainty that the confident that average americans had in their leaders and the governing institutions of american democracy have suffered blows that will continue to have lasting effects. fault line within the electorate, the cultural war has contributed to the into to vacation of that legitimation crisis. what was seen as reasonable and justifiable governance by one side was the as irrational and indefensible by the other and vice versa. back and forth it went in political discourse. with less about persuasion than about denigrating the opposition through overstatement and hyperbole. the cycle has repeated itself over decades with great predictability and it will continue into the future.

even as the lines of cultural all --t evil -- even olve.all the ev i would like to note following the work of robert putnam and others that in the midst of all of this, there has been a weakening of the mediating institutions directly or indication -- or direct -- indirectly charged. schools, youth organizations, churches, and other institutions of faith and local political parties. of theirreasons, not own making, these institutions have struggled to cultivate the shared civic sensibilities and virtues at the heart of citizenship. in the process, the shared civic dispositions, codes of stability, civic realism, and idealism that underwrote and framed political disagreement

have not been replenished. true that the internet and social media has filled some of the cap's, offering a kind of political community along with a voice for many who were voiceless. communityaker form of , divided into enclaves and build on anonymous ties with little more than burger -- virtual solidarity. this is the story of continuity. there is something new here. the consequence of the conditions long in development. this is a reflection of the things that jay mentioned at the withning, that oftentimes quantity comes quality and change. what is new are the levels of incoherence we find in our political institutions and their governing authorities. on the one hand, the party

establishment and the governing philosophy appears to be less meaningfully connected to the minds and hearts of their constituencies. this is reflected in the continuation of a long-term trend marked by a growing number of self identifying independent, presently of 43% of the electorate. significantly, leading candidates for the presidency that openly challenged or contradicted the ideas and rules of conduct that has long defined the mainstream party establishment. this has been manifestly true this year among republicans for whom, under donald trump, conservatism and party self identification have been strained, if not severed. ,t was also true for democrats most notably in the surprisingly strong campaign of a populist candidate who did not register as a democrat until today of the new hampshire primary. newntil the day of the

hampshire primary. also new are economic changes that have been magnified in public consciousness in the years following the great recession. underemployment, wage stagnation , the decline in certain areas of manufacturing, the loss of industry to developing parts of the world, and the perceived loss of jobs to be illegal immigration. while members of the professional and managerial upper-middle-class have seen their fortunes rise, the working and lower middle classes have suffered. the latter have seen the horizons of opportunity and hope for a better life grow more distant and in some cases disappear. what is more they see many of the values and beliefs that they live by, once perceived as honorable in their own communities, ridiculed as ignorant, bigoted, homophobic, misogynistic, xenophobia, and backward by a privileged and powerful cultural elite. in the face of this onslaught,

they have felt the sting and personal humiliation of social deportability long before hillary clinton spoke of such things during this election year. in this light, the unusual candidacies of donald trump, bernie sanders, ted cruz, and others are not so much anomalous as they are reflections of the political confusion of our times. which has not been addressed coherently and effectively by the political establishment and its leaders. , the soft authoritarian appeal of some of the recent candidates holds a growing attraction because it promises clarity in the face of murkiness and strong effective leadership in the face of a net or corrupt leadership. it does not matter if the champions of such promises can deliver on their claims, it is the promises that count. if donald trump did not exist,

some might say we would have to invent him. electionpresidential is the stage upon which these deeper, longer term cultural and institutional dynamics are being played out. is a weakening political establishment that happen to be democratic against an emerging populist insurgency that had to -- happen to be republican and we know it could have as easily as been the other way, authoritarian impulses bubble up from the right and left. the social, long as cultural, political conditions described above are in place, we are likely to see more election years like 2016 with similar campaigns and candidates. the question remains is this -- does the 2016 election signify a

tipping point in our political culture? of course, we will only know in retrospect, american democracy has never fully embodied its ideas in the past and will never fully do so in the future. there are dark or closets -- darker alternatives. more darker and foreboding than we have seen in a while, the cultural conditions that have made the alternative plausible will be with us likely for some time to come. thank you.

>> this raises several important observations about our political r,imate or should i say weathe and our current political culture. as a historian, i am far more likely to analyze american democracy from what scholars which givesger a priority to long-term historical developments. i see american democracy as far less democratic and less stable than we like to admit. in many ways, as james hunter has emphasized, icy donald trump as both reflecting current discontents but also representing a perfect storm. because he is drawing on a much older set of traditions,

audiological traditions, to talk about the discontent that has a much older history. that is what i would like to highlight today. one question that i would like to pose is for us to think about how american democracy in the past has also relied on exploiting cultural divisions. rather than upholding the bullies in a strong, moderate -- believes in a strong and moderate center. part of what we see going on today is this idea is that the center itself has always been contested. thing wen important have to think about, who claims to represent the center and who claims to feel disinherited or outside of that center? second, and i will spend most of my comments talking about the disinherited because i think it is a useful concept.

ideology on this older that i would argue divides the american electorate into what we would call the rightful heirs of our country and those who are for tenders,as usurpers, or strangers to the american way of life. one of the things we have to -- americanis political practices are often inarting genuine democracy, part because it is an idea that goes back to the early 19th-century, reflecting a term that was coined by washington irving, who argued that our partisan system of political system -- our political system, rather than being a democracy is a long accuracy. is that ourt to say government, or our ideals often

than on words, words that inherently are not going to be fulfilled. promises not going to be fulfilled. in modern times, as report shows, it explains why americans do subscribe to travel party loyalties, because it is -- tribal party loyalties because american politics has relied on political culture, identity politics, and that is much older than a new phenomenon that we often see journalists come on. -- comment on. it also creates problems and you will notice in some of the polling data is that americans are prone at times to want to reduce their political discontent to a single premise, a single idea, a single solution that somehow explains everything.

i could not help notice the one governor's -- what governs the least governs the best which is a play off thomas jefferson which we know not to be true. the ways in which people are looking for certain premises that sum up everything neatly into one set of ideas, one veryion, is also discouraging for getting americans to think about political problems in more complicated ways. i think this ties into something very important about the donald trump phenomenon. ,n the past and the present americans have often voted with their ears. do i mean by that is that they often vote for candidates who they see speaking their language. this is something that has come up with donald trump, people

like him because he is described as speaking with a kind of raw honesty, he is not a scripted politician. i think we have to realize we have a long oratorical tradition which is shaped politics and we have a mass media which is influential in shaping what people think and how they feel. it is important because it shows the idea that america being a source of entertainment has a long tradition, the jacksonian time or colonial time, to get people to come to the polls they had to offer free food and alcohol. you can imagine what happened after they started eating and dragging. this is another thing -- eating and drinking. we know it is easy for politicians and pundits to romanticize american democracy and hold up jefferson's declaration of independence that all men are created equal as one of our highest it ideals -- highest ideals.

throughout history, americans have never embraced true equality. there are so many examples over and over again. slavery scholar knows, produced a very combustible political system. proved thatr along we failed to establish a stable democracy, it fits into the major crisis of legitimacy. it's aftermath, we know that two different political cultures emerged in the industrializing north and the engraving jim crow south. of how thisan idea creates problems for thinking about democracy in the past, because of poll taxes is seven states effectively this and franchised, not only poor blacks, but poor whites in the jim crow era. 32% of00 to 1916, only

the subpopulation voted in presidential elections -- south population, voted in presidential election, dropping to 20% between 1920 and 1924. were not officially challenged by the supreme court until 1966. with the passage of the 24th amendment. , wehrow another wrinkle in know that until 1920 the female half of the u.s. population was denied the right to vote and they are the majority of the population. this is important for how our politics is shaped today. part of the problem is that historically the very definition of stability as often rested on disenfranchising groups deemed as undeserving of full citizenship. on my way up the on the train i was talking to a woman from

australia who mentioned to me, she said, in australia, voting is compulsory, a requirement, considered a civic duty but in our country voting is still somewhat seen as a privilege, something inherited or earned. thatr than something everyone must do and that is kind of a symbol of democracy. i would argue that the cold war was hardly a time of stability with the suppression of the sense, forced displays of loyalty, and a culture infused with fears of nuclear annihilation and which have. -- whence does witchhunts, not only were there duck and cover drills come up but the pta in new york city recommend that children be given dog tags so they could be identified after the bomb was dropped. the 1950's rested on an idea of weeding out dangerous of birds are since that's dangerous

subversives, not only by particle -- religion, sexual behavior, and demanding civil rights in in the case of martin luther king, he was called a communist southern democrats. -- by southern democrats. the center has always been contested and there have always been these ways in which politics does not just reflect party platforms, but reflected how people to find themselves. do they define themselves as reflecting the poor of what america stands, or are they dangerous outsiders? this is a very important strain in american democracy. the report's emphasis on the category of the disinherited i found to be extremely useful and insightful. i think it captures the sensibility of a certain class, and i will focus on the republican voters, or independents who lean republican.

trump sloganonald of making america great again. the language of a usurped democracy is a familiar complaint in the united states. we can see how it has various manifestations. it was part of the language of the moral majority in the reagan years, it was part of the language that was associated with the silent majority -- nixon silent minority and both of the political groups saw themselves up the backbone of american society. who had been displaced by some pretender class. the roots are older. the confederacy as expressed by jefferson davis again and again in his numerous beaches argued that the best numerous beaches, it embodied the true principles of the revolution and they were the rightful heirs of the founding fathers.

before that, thomas jefferson argued that his election which he dubbed the revolution of 1800 was restoring the true and pure principles, the core, the center. it could be traced back to the american revolution. as i argued in white trash, americans class language has relied heavily on the language of inheritance, pedigree, and sorting out the superior and inferior "breach of americans best breeds of americans." the party distrust the state and see liberal democrats as handing over their countries -- country to undeserving class including immigrants, african americans, lazy welfare freeloaders or obamacare recipients, gay people , angry feminist demand equal represent people and classes that have failed to

play by the rules, who have failed to work their way up the social ladder, and have not earned those rights, earned , the privileges which disinherited feel the federal government is granting to them. we know, the report emphasized, 85% of the disinherited has said they will vote for donald trump. the class culture that the report highlights reflects a series of overlapping divisions that underscore the ideology of the disinherited. there is a division between urban and rural, cosmopolitan and provincial. the oldalso say sectional divisions between the north and south is still with us. in donaldes were done trump's followers, west virginia was celebrated as the state most likely to go for him and we know southernthe way -- the

primaries played outcome of the southern way of politics has had a great deal of influence in shaping his appeal and popularity. the disinherited also see social elites as creating this rigged system. one which benefits, not only themselves, better the social elite, but there is this kind of language of patron and client and they see the the class as a benevolent class that is giving patronage to their undeserving clients, whether immigrants come african-americans, or gays. they seem this as creating an unfair system because it is pushing these people ahead of the true americans, the people who are hard-working, religious, and identify with small-town life.

we know that donald trump supporters are not all working-class. in fact, many working-class americans who are in unions support clinton for rob his reasons, not only because she is backed by the unions but people in unions make higher wages and half benefits. -- have benefits. many people in the disinherited group come from middle-class backgrounds but we know, nate thatr did studies suggested that during the primaries, some of donald trump's actual voters were wealthier than those supporting bernie sanders and hillary clinton. they identify -- they see themselves -- they had in five themselves as being from the middle class. they also see themselves, they describe themselves as anti-global isolationist. hence the powerful symbolism of donald trump's magical border

wall which i believe represents not only the desire to keep poor immigrants out and reduce job competition but it is also a very important metaphor and symbol for keeping industrial jobs in the united states. categoryhink about the of thinking of the disinherited as having a more provincial identity, i am talking about a rural identity, this ties into the way they see themselves as being more nationalistic, patriotic, devoted to traditional rituals like standing for the national anthem or traditional marriage. they are more likely to have a more warship view of the founding fathers and believe in an original interpretation of the constitution. in this sense, provincial means protecting a nativeborn colter and which rural life is romanticized as more traditional and less corrupted by foreign ideas and small-town america is

mythologized in ensuring a simpler way of life. life in whichf everyone knows their place. that means women know their place, blacks know the place, foreigners know their place. those pretenders to political power that the disinherited distrust see them as stealing their respect, stealing the assumed male authority of the rightful heirs of america and these are quite men with jobs, heads of households, the makers, not the takers. this is why donald trump's birther-ism is central to his appeal and 40% of his supporters are birther's. it is that donald trump, when he --sident obama and challenge when he attacked president obama

and challenged him to present his birth certificate, he was challenging president obama as an illegitimate president because of his questionable pedigree. , but was not only racist was a way to tarnish him as a stranger, a leader totally incapable of understanding an authentic kind of american heritage and identity. when we think of the tribalism that is prevalent in our class ideology, i want to stress that part of american history has not only measured class identity through working hard, the rhetoric we hear over and over again, working hard you will get ahead, that this is a measure of class identity. it is also tied for the disinherited to not only working hard but being tied to being rooted to the land, having roots. class in the united states today is defined as where you live,

the kind of home and neighborhood you grew up in, and the values associated with that sense of place. the disinherited distrust groups rootless.see as this goes all the way back to a long-standing english patron of vagrants, the mobile poor. for the disinherited, rootlessness applies to the cup of the social hierarchy and the bottom. they resent the actual poor who they dismissed as being lazy, failing to get a stable job, failing to form families, failing to accept their subordinate station until they work hard to get ahead. they also see the social elites as rootless because they are too cosmopolitan, too caught up in political correct ideology. they also are very afraid of the

social elite because they see them as removing boundaries that ensure social order. those boundaries are not just of wall and the idea maintaining boundaries between countries in terms of trade, but boundaries between men and women, preserving traditional roles, boundaries between gay and straight, preserving traditional marriage. also, more importantly, preserving the boundary between the lower class and the middle class. removing that class boundary which works on that system of working hard to get ahead, it threatens the disinherited who feel they will lose out in an economic world that they believe operates according to a zero sum game. what that means is that a zero-sum game implies that gains by one class take away the

rights and gains by another class. i also believe that the tribalism has been created by our media system. cable television news, talk ,adio, facebook, twitter bloggers on the internet. we note that this can create a whole universe of conspiracy feelings and feelings of victimization. it can create a sense of community it can also facilitate alienation at the same time. facilitates, people are victims and outsiders. salon.com reported on some of these conspiracy. which we know best conspiracy theories which we know are french ideas but they are not because brother is in is one of those ideas just birther-ism is one of those ideas, looking at obama as a muslim, strange ideas for people talk about where

obama is gay, michelle is a man, and the children were kidnapped. this world that lives on the fringe, we can say those people do not matter, we can't ignore them but what was striking about the article is that when he described the impulses for those ideals reflected the fears of the disinherited in this report. basically, what drove these fear of a their liberal foreign toxins that are first -- falsely perceived to exist within the circulatory system of the republic. they tend to see donald trump as the flamethrower. returne ashes what will is the rise of white dominance

and a more similar society and that idea as donald trump as a flamethrower is important because it reflects one of the points of the report where people responded and said that we need a president who will completely change the country. disturbing because they did not explain what change they wanted, any kind of changed is somehow positive or good. i think that desire to tear things down without thinking of theconsequences is also authoritarianism, the crypto fascism, it is also that desperation which assumes and we can take it back to earlier traditions of trying to restore the order to its perfect original form and that is very prevalent i think in

disinherited vocabulary. for donald trump supporters, 2800 of a meaning, the recession and decline of the middle class and the illegitimate road -- coronation of barack obama, the disinherited want to restore order to america, a class, racial, and gender order that ensures the true center of america, the quiet, rural, moral, small-town, hard-working, heart of america. so, believe that if they do if they can restore this order, what will come with it is a renewed sense of that center's claim to political authority, the center's claim to prioritizing their values, and also that distrustful and threatened group that feel this is necessary to accomplish in order for them to hold on to their piece of the american

dream. thank you. >> it is a pleasure to be here, i want to thank them for inviting me. they deserve credit for providing a tool to understand the way politics has changed over the past generation. culture wars is a foundational book and a sense. i am pleased to be on the stage with him. i found the survey was very

useful in this division that it makes between credentialed and non-credentialed and the socially elite versus the disinherited. it makes it a good way to look at the way politics are now dividing. nancy presented a very good argument, i have a different take. i think, one way to look at the donald trump phenomenon and the trump electorate is less to demonize them and recognize that they have a realistic outlook on their position in society. it you think in terms of relative status, rather than absolute status, are you moving up in the pecking order or are you moving down? one of the central characteristics of the trump

voter is that they see themselves economically, socially, and culturally moving down the ladder. it is critical and this is in the relative status. you see this with men versus women, the idea that women are on the ascendancy and men are being -- i am not saying this is true but a lot of men since themselves as being pushed aside. that the feminist revolution has left them behind. you see this with blacks and hispanics being quite optimistic because, especially politically, they are on the ascendancy and are in a winning coalition whereas the white working class feels itself to be on the ascendancy.

-- decent and that is clear on the economic front where the fall, the lack of manufacturing jobs, they are realistically on the short end of the stick. political representation is also very important, one of the , right after the great recession in 2008 and 2009 was that black americans who took the worst hit, they lost or wealth, more home value, more income than any other group remained more optimistic than whites because in part they have political representation in the white house and did not feel abandoned whereas whites who took a hit felt much less represented. , thee cultural front survey shows that evangelicals and conservative catholics are

among those who feel clearly left out. they are left out. if you look at our culture, tv, movies, the values expressed in the culture are clearly antithetical to those of evangelicals and conservative catholics. -- as far back as 1998, a leader of the christian right back then, this was right after the senate vote not to impeach bill clinton, paul wyrick declared that there is no moral majority in america. i think he was right on. that is true, there is no longer, in america, what the people who support the values of

the moral majority would say, they are now clearly in the minority. it is clear if you look at the trends on how gay marriage has become a positive figure in a 2004r of eight years, from two 2012, gay marriage went from being a winner for george w. bush as an opponent to a winner for barack obama as a proponent. and it has flipped flipped against the values of conservative christians and conservative catholics in general. phenomena that has taken place that is hard to measure is that those who experience scarcity, which means declining

economic value in your life, declining cultural sense of putnam did this interesting study of the diversity, people living in more diverse communities tend to what he called hunkered down. he found this disturbing because he is a believer in the idea that the more you get to know your neighbor and if your neighbor is a diverse collection of people, the more you would become accepting of them. much to his distress, he found the opposite to be the case, that the more you have diversity , the more people pull in and stay in the house and civic values or civic participation declines. scarcityhave economic people do not turn to the left, rahm emanuel famously said, when

barack obama took office, he was the chief of staff then, he said great recession go by without taking advantage of it. there was nothing to take advantage of because people turned to the right and the circumstance. it was not a situation where the liberal instinct grew. instead, the conservative instinct grew and you saw shortly after that the rise of the tea party and the republican sweep of the house and senate. it crashed down on liberalism. conversely, is the circumstance that liberals need. when there is growth and you feel things are expanding, you are much more prepared to be generous in what you do, more willing to say i am doing well, i can afford to help out people who need help. of -- people on the left

and right become more generous. when you are in a scarce world, and that is what many of these white working-class world where they feel their opportunities are being reduced, you are inclined, it is not irrational to see the world in terms of a zero sum game. things are getting smaller and smaller, income, job opportunities, an immigrant is coming in which adds to the competition for lesser goods. there is also the condition to be pulled toward authoritarian impulses to have someone come in and step in and authoritatively declare you have rights and i will protect them.

what is interesting is that -- and i think this is the most significant thing that comes out of this whole survey -- whites are splitting into two categories, the downscale white or noncredentialed whites or socially elite whites. the ultimatets tipping point in the selection, which it -- in this election, which is liberalism is no longer the ideology of the underdog, it is the ideology and the democratic party with it of the white community,

not in the minority community wh who arehites, the most liberal in mosti democratic are the best educated, the peopletes who are doing well in the current economy. lawyers,e who are the doctors, academics, and journalists who are -- who have a life where they see a positive, good future. conservatism, conversely, has ,ecome, for the first time under donald trump and how long that will last we will see, but it has become the ideology of the underdog. this is very different from conservatism of the republican from 2012 and-- before. i do not know how sustained this will be what this election has produced at least momentarily a

flipping of the two parties. the democratic party for generations, in my youth and well before that, through the whole great depression, well alwayse 1970's, people thought of the democratic party as the party of the working man and woman, jill and joe sixpack and the republican party was the authority -- the party of wall street and elites and professionals. that is no longer true. trump may signal a flipping of that in a way that will be very interesting to watch, post this election. and how this republican party comes to terms with that is one of the most -- from a political reporters point of view, the story to be watching. we have a few minutes for questions.

thank you, tom. we do have a few minutes for questions so please ask away. please identify yourself. >> what about eight years ago, when in an experienced -- he was about change, walking the streets of washington, d.c., about change, that is all you knew about, why is it wrong that trump is about change? >> i have written about how donald trump, when he says make america great again, about turning the clock back, returning to the 1950's, returning to a time where america was more of an , where workingon

beple were more likely to able to support their families, particularly white men. bernie sanders call for a class revolution. that is a dramatic change to be demanded. with barack obama, part of what outgoing on was to point that, from the old republican party who wanted to zoom celsus --e conservative, the change wanted to see themselves as more conservative, i think the evangelical, neocon wing of the republican party has been silenced to a large degree with the rise of donald trump. the problem is that change can be, any candidate can claim change but i think that barack obama had a vision that was moving for the future, moving in

the direction of expanding opportunity and equality. changes not come it is about restoring a group of disinherited people back to the rightful place. you are right to point out the hypocrisy but i think this is the new wants of what people here when they say which direction do we want to go when we talk about change? >> a question over here please. yes. >> frank lockwood with the arkansas democrat is a you -- arkansas democrat gazette. looking at places like christianity today and a lot of them are out there very much anti-donald trump but the polling suggests that the people in the pews are overwhelmingly for mr. trump. how do you explain this disconnect between the two of them? >> who has like that who would

like to feel this -- who would like to field this? >> evangelical christians are basically moderates and also , if they wereand ,ot quite so religiously based they probably would be democrats. whereas the village of vocal population -- the evangelical population feels much more under siege by the culture that we live in and see themselves as isolated and under assault. whereas christianity today at ethics- the head of the and public policy center, these are more intellectuals and the

more intellectual you are, the less you will align yourself with donald trump. gutou are feeling from the which i think a lot of evangelicals responding to polls are,. i wanted to say, i think from ,he very beginning of his rise he threatened the evangelical wing of the republican party. he knows nothing about the bible. the only thing bobby jindal said was right on point, he said he has never read the bible because he is not in it. he threatened the family values wing. they are closely aligned with evangelicals. and the that his past current revelations about his sexual behavior undermines --

what i find so amazing is that the event a local wing that was so powerful and had its place in the republican party has been pushed aside. there is a division in terms of how the voters who want to support donald trump, they may identify themselves as being religious but that is not the attraction that is driving them to support trump. >> i would like to piggyback. survey, we in the were trying to model and develop models to predict support for trump versus support for clinton, education came out as a primary factor. it wassecondary factor, not whether or not someone was , it wass or religiosity

whether they defined themselves as religiously conservative that placed them in the disinherited and made them more likely to support donald trump. among people who call themselves religious moderates, we will -- we were not sure what to do with them that we had another question asking people whether they consider themselves born-again or evangelical. in modeling the data, it seemed with moderates, if you took those who call themselves evangelical or born-again, they belonged with the disinherited. with religious conservatives but moderates who may be very religious in terms of prior and yer, whonds of tests pra did not say they were born-again or evangelical, went with another group in terms of their support. >> we have time for one more question. we could go over.

yes. we will have time for two. >> richard miles. one number that puzzles me is the president's overall approval rating. that does not seem to fit in with your data, if seven out of 10 or eight out of 10 people are really mad at the system, distrustful and cynical and thenated, how is it that president have approval -- the president has approval number in the mid-50's where you expected to be much lower, especially given the fact that his signature program is running into a lot of problems and seeming to be emblematic of what people are mad about? i have no idea how we get there. >> i will respond to that. i cannot explain it. we do find the same pattern in our survey. we have a favorability measure

of obama, he comes up as much more favorable than either hillary clinton or donald trump do. focused uponre ourgs that tie-in with historical study and also for this election year, we have not gone into that but it is a very good question and we should spend more time on it. >> one more. right here. >> criticism of the report, less of the study but i was disappointed looking at it, that it did not have more trend data, it has none. slide andow one in a as any pollster will tell you, the trend is more important than the absolute value because you never know, people tend to tell

the host what they think he or she wants to hear. the emphasis both in the in bote title and the presentation is on vanishing, on dynamics, i think it would strengthen the report, and while gallup does not have exactly these questions over time, just adding some wouldound trend data strengthen the argument and looking at the variable term -- we have had much more now,fection than we have but looking at recent trends, i think what strengthens the report. >> there is a section earlier on in the report that looks at some of the historical data and