>> good afternoon, and welcome, on behalf of the brookings institution foreign policy program and on behalf of the atlantic council. i'm deputy director of foreign policy at brookings. i would like to extend a special welcome to my counterparts from the atlantic council rejoined us here today including the deputy director and ambassador richard lebaron. i would like to extend a special welcome to our distinguished guests on the diplomatic community. we are here to discuss a report written by my colleague, who over the pastor has convened the task force is working group on politics, governors, and state society relations. this is one of five such groups organized by the middle east strategy task force, a bipartisan initiative launched in february 2015.

brookings foreign policy has been proud to contribute to the task force project through the security and public order working group whose report was offered last year by our -- authored last year by our brookings colleague kenneth pollack. the report you have before you today is informed by tomorrow's many discussions of the working group and reflects your own analysis. it helps explain the collapse of the middle east states system, take stock of where we are now, and offers recommendations for tackling the crisis of governance in the middle east in the post arab spring environment. with years of deterioration state society relations. tomorrow argues that for the region to develop societies that are resilient to terrorism and institutions that are effective and responsive for the long-term, there must be a concerted effort to repair trust between governments and their citizens. dialogue is needed, as his patients and to stand up

for some of the regional actors including the united states. these are words of wisdom that echo broadly in washington here today. as the title of this event suggests, real security and stability in the arab world will be determined by the quality of governance that takes hold there. i encourage you all to read the report and to share your thoughts on the report and on today's discussion the at twitter, using the #governance. the report was cochaired by two of our panelists, former secretary of state madeleine albright and former national security adviser stephen hadley, two individuals who need no introductions, individuals who know a little more about individual security. we are delighted to have them on our program. we will speak with tomorrow about the report. secretary albright will present some introductory remarks and then we will turn it over to

the panel. finally, we will invite the audience to contribute and ask your questions and engage in the discussion. thank you so much, and welcome, secretary albright. ms. albright: thank you very ms. albright: thank you very much, suzanne. ms. albright: thank you very much, suzanne. it's a pleasure to be here to have the opportunity to share this with brookings, thank you very much for hosting this. i think, as you pointed out, one of the things that really distinguished the atlantic council's middle east strategy task force. it truly is a collaborative effort and i think that as we talk about it today, i think that will become even clearer. but it really was terrific in terms of just working

together. i enjoyed it very much. i think also, just as we engaged a multitude of institutions in the project, we also tackled a multitude of issues in the working groups that we established. the working groups did produce the papers, so today we are releasing the fifth and final one on governance. lest you think this completes our work, i want to announce that after we all take a break for turkey eating, and cooking in my case, steve hadley and i will be publishing our final cochairs report next wednesday. that report is going to attempt to knit together the topics tackled by each of the working groups and enter a new long-term approach for the region based largely on ideas from the region is dealt. our sense has been that we

have all spent a lot of time looking at the region, but a lot of it has been kind of fire drills and band-aids and that basis of what were doing is taking a much deeper and longer look. while we have time next week to address our broader strategy, today's discussion really involved one of its most important components. we will be talking specifically about how, in order to find a way out of the crisis in the middle east, the states in the region will need to address failures of governance. and of course the problems brought about by the lack of accountable, responsive, and effective state institutions in the middle east as is so well known to people in this audience. the role has been downplayed and what you will hear is that governance is in fact a central cause of the turmoil in the middle east, something with which i heartily agree. as she puts it, the amending of the region doesn't come from outside intervention, nor does it come from the top. it really did come from

below, for millions of frustrated people whose expectations far exceeded the opportunities that were available to them. as we have seen over the past five years, it's far easier to identify the cause of turmoil than to find a solution, and not for lack of trying, but i really do think we have to keep that in mind. the first challenge in any journey is to have a destination in mind. for the people of the region, i've convinced that this destination is governance built on the foundation brought in stable enough to last, and that by definition, governments that have the trust of their citizens respect their rights and respond to their needs. as suzanne mentioned, tammy's paper offers a framework or how the region can begin building toward such a model of sustainable

governance and argues that this work has to begin now, no matter what else is going on. there are many in the region and in the united states who have a different view, and they argue that these questions of political development can only be addressed after nations achieve security and prosperity. i happen to believe that political development and economic development need to go together. i know that all of us in very as forms of graduate school would argue which came first and which came second. the reason i say that is because people want to vote and eat, so the governments have to deliver. and they also want to live in peace. one of tammy's main arguments is that the security depends on responsive and accountable governance, and this raises some tough questions about u.s. policy, including whether we still have the ability and responsibility to exert leverage on these issues. with the transition underway in washington, the answers are more uncertain than they have been

in the past, and it are pointing out that for more than a century, stability in the middle east has been understood to be the responsibility of an external power, where there was the british empire or the united states of america. yet according to the president of the united states, until stable governments are set up and supported locally, the middle east will never call down. that pronouncement came from the white house, not barack obama, but of dwight eisenhower in 1956. over the decades, we've learned not to expect miracles, even though that is where they are supposed to come from in the middle east. we have also learned not to give up. while the united states remains, in my mind, the indispensable nation to the security of the region, i'm always quick to point out that there's nothing in the word indispensable that means alone. so after a time in which

the u.s. has been accused of doing too much and into little, we need an honest discussion about our role and relationships and responsibilities, and that's why i'm so pleased to be part of this middle east strategy task force with my very good friend, steve hadley. it's been an extraordinary learning experience for both of us an opportunity to work with some truly wonderful people. one of them is tammy, and it's now my pleasure to invite her and the rest of her and the rest of our panel to come up on stage. [applause]

>> thank you for being here. let me begin by thanking my fantastic cochairs, steve hadley and madeleine albright. when we started this project, steve and madeleine told each of us working group chairs not to be afraid to ask the questions and to challenge our assumptions. i think recognizing that in the middle east, this is a moment of truly historic transition, and

i think the questions of for the region and for those of us outside who care about the region and have a stake in the region, that questioning of assumptions is even more important today than it was when we started the project, so i really want to thank you both for a fantastic process. i want to thank my fellow working group members in the region and all over the u.s. and europe, we managed to meet virtually and in person and i learned a great deal from all of them. they are listed in the report, so i hope you will take a look and share my appreciation. it may seem as though today's topic is an odd choice for focus, maybe it's not a propitious time to talk about governance in the middle east, after all, we are dealing with the region in violent turmoil, beset by vicious civil war.

the u.s. and its allies is invested in new military conflicts in iraq and yria, fighting isis. i just came back from an international security mission up in halifax, where the only discussion of the middle east there was framed around terrorism, isis, civil war, and refugees. these are the urgent problems seen by many governments around the world as a threat to international security, deservedly so, and that are drawing attention to the region. but it's precisely because of those urgent challenges that i think it is valuable to focus in this report on governance in the region, because to my mind, isis and the civil wars are symptoms of something bigger. they are symptoms of a broader breakdown in the region. they are not the disease. what we have seen beginning in late 2010 was the breakdown both of individual states and the state system in the middle east that had lasted since the eisenhower administration.

the state system that had advantaged american interests and those of our regional partners, the system that the united states sought to defend. it's that breakdown of the middle east order that has led to the civil wars in libya and yemen and syria and the rise of isis. so understanding why and how this regional order broke down i think is necessary to understand how we effectively deal not just with the symptoms of that breakdown, but with the challenge of restoring lasting stability to this region, and that is the premise and the driving question of the report that we are releasing today. so let me focus on just three things about that breakdown that i think it is important for us to understand, and what they suggest about the task ahead. the first thing to understand is the regional order broke down because of things that

happened inside states, inside societies, because of the pressures that built up over many years. the first part of that story is the story i told in the book that i published in 2008. it's the story of how the bureaucratic authoritarian model in the arab world began to weaken, the ideology that the states relied on to survive were becoming less and less effective in a globalized world. they rested on a certain kind of social contract, a patronage-based contract. over time, these systems became more and more efficient and then they were challenged both from within and without from a demographic bulge of young people on the cusp of adulthood, from the effects of the globalized economy, and from a radically

new information environment prompted first by satellite television and then by the world wide web 1.0 and 2.0. and so the effect on citizens in these countries was that the expectations created under the old social contracts could not be fulfilled in these changed conditions. just to give you a couple of indicators of this, the egyptian government had promised that university graduates would be able to get a civil service job. by the early to thousands, the weight time for those university graduates to get those civil ervice job was on average, eight years. that's eight years of pushing a food cart or driving a taxi or

twiddling your thumbs, waiting for your life to begin. and in the meantime, you can't afford an apartment, you can afford to get married, you can't afford to become a full adult participant in society. the second thing to understand about the why and how of the breakdown in the middle east is that no one in the run-up to the arab uprising was unaware of these challenges. that is a very important thing to understand, how governments dealt with these challenges actually ended up in many cases exacerbating the problem, rather than resolving them. we had a lot of talk and many efforts in the 1990's and to -- and 2000's to promote reform of governments and reform of economies in the middle east. but when many arab governments sought to adjust that social contract, they ended up,

instead of developing a more inclusive social contract, negotiating adjustments for political and economic elites, whether within their own country or external institutions like the world bank and the imf. they reduced government hiring without really liberating the private sector to create growth. they brought new business cronies into the ruling parties instead of opening up politics more broadly, and result of these kind of adjustments exacerbated inequality, further empowered some at the expense of others and really increased the grievances rather than resolving them. and so dissent increased, government moves to manage politics were weaker, and the protests row cap it would this brings me to the third thing we have to understand about how this all happen. the consequences of how certain states broke down. when the protests came, many governments responded poorly, in ways that exacerbated divisions, collapsed state institutions,

and some governments responded with violence, in ways that generated demand for more violence. so syria and libya are the places in the region that are most violent and most disorder. these are the places where leaders ruled in the most personalized manner, where the destruction of civil society and community institutions were the making of those same and where the state was most complete. so having failed to act in a manner that could've prevented these uprisings, the leaders sought to impose their will to gain power. when the state's power against its citizens, it created a market for others with guns to defend them against the state,

and that allowed the emergence of identity-based sectarian militias, extremist groups with orrific agendas. by the time these governments had broken down, the social contract had broken down and social trust, the basic trust between people in communities had eroded. there is very little left to manage peaceful politics. this is the challenge we confront today in the middle east. beyond the political competition between iran and saudi arabia, beyond the threat by extremist terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, this is the biggest challenge in rebuilding a stable order in the region, it's the breakdown of trust within society. it's a consequence both of the way they were governed and the way they broke down. the paper goes into detail on all these subjects and

offers specific priorities and approaches on a way forward to tackled a problem. let me just give you a few highlights here. first, the future of the region will be determined not by the mere existence of government, although that's what many are focused on, but on the quality of that governance, because if we don't have more accountable, responsive, transparent and effective governance, it will not be sustainable governance. it will face more challenge and breakdown again. conflicts that are suppressed will reemerge. so we have to think about the quality of governance, not just the fact of governance. it's probably no surprise to any of you that i think democracy is far more likely than it -- any other regime type to generate the effective governorates, but where the region is today and liberal democracy is neither swift nor linear. the ambassador can testify

to that. the paper lays out a few practical ways to begin rebuilding the basis for that kind of sustainable governance. let me just mention two tea insights. first, i don't think the uestion regarding how to build this new order is about territory or state borders or where lines are drawn on a map. t's about what happens within those lines. remember, it is about social trust. there is no line you can draw between shia and sunni in iraq that will not be fought over. just as the creation of south sudan did not magically resolve the conflict inside sudan. it's also not about institution building. after our military victories in iraq and afghanistan, our

allies and the u.s. spent a lot of time setting up new institutions, central banks, and the idea is that you build a machine of government and populated and you start the gears turning and it should go. but i think we learned from the last 15 years that building institutions is not enough. it matters how those institutions are populated and by whom. are they inclusive of everyone with a stake in the process? do they have a process that people think is fair and transparent? that brings me to the other insight that i want to leave you with before we have a broader conversation, which is that what is most important to effective, sustainable governments, to effective, sustainable institutions in the middle east today is dialogue and conflict resolution.

it seems like an obvious thing to say, the old line that war is a continuation of politics by other means, but it is true. and i think it's a basic beginning aspiration for the future of the middle east to shift conflicts that are now underway in a violent channel into a nonviolent channel, and also to pay special attention to take ack the assumptions to those places where political conflict is being suppressed, where dialogue is being sue prest, or fear that those -- is being sue prest, -- is being suppressed, for fear that both places may become violent if there is no room or no capacity or institution and forums for people's dialogue and peaceful politics. finally, it suggests to me that

sustainable governance in the middle east in the future will be much more decentralized than it has been in the past. because you don't rebuild social trust from the top down, you rebuild it from the bottom up. there is a broader need to build governance in a way that citizens can see and feel and buy into. i think we already see a number of experiments across the region in more decentralized governance, whether it's the empowerment of elected councils in morocco or the way the lebanese have managed in the absence of a president until very recently. or where the government in baghdad is struggling with conditions for locally effective government in the areas that are about to be liberated from isis. so, i think local governance is what we need to focus on if we want to replace violence and mistrust with something more sustainable. with that, let me stop and i look forward to our conversation.

>> let me just say it a word. thank you, tammy, very much. it's a great paper and i really do urge you to read it. here's what we're going to do or the rest of the time. we will have a reaction to the paper giving you a little sense of what is in it and then we will have a conversation up here with some broad questions, and we will go probably until about five minutes of 4:00 or 4:00, then we will throw it open for questions and comments from the audience, and we will end promptly at 4:30. that's how we plan to use the time available to us. >> thank you very much, steve. it's a pleasure to be here. thank you very much, tammy, for having me on the panel. it's a pleasure to join the panel today. it's a good paper, i would like to congratulate you and the working group on a spot on analysis and great insight

in how to look at middle east politics and political dynamics as they are today. i am going to follow steve's recommendations and recommend everyone to take a look at the paper. it offers a detailed analysis. it does not stop where tammy stopped merely because of time and engages you, of course. it gives us a great overview of what is been happening since the 1960's all the way to 2011 and beyond 2011. in that spirit, i'm going to underline three points which i feel are relevant in building on the insights and recommendations. number one, and with regard to lost trust between state institutions and settlements in the region.

it covers a very wide spectrum. all the way from republics to monarchies. some that have been doing better economically and some that have been suffering from poverty, unemployment, corruption and so forth. clearly we had not been having a lot of popular trust in state institutions and that had been happening and unfolding in the background in middle eastern society. rather than alternative institutions, we did see fashion alternative institutions. between religious-based visions and secular visions. we did see a bit of political

confrontation based on political and socioeconomic preferences which you offer a great analysis of an conflict between the haves and have-nots. but this did not add up to an alternative vision for state society relations. an alternative vision for a new social contract. so what we were looking at were social contracts which were collapsing and social contracts which have yet to be fleshed out. and i believe the picture is not changed in the last five years. and the very fact that we are still looking at a talker sees, devising autocracies, or limited liberal experiments as we've seen in morocco and elsewhere. the very fact that we're still

at the region, the dynamics of the last five years where we do not have genuine social contracts to attest to that. the very fact we are still looking at the region and the dynamics for the last five ears, we have a new social contract attached to that. number one is how to bridge the gap between populations and citizens groups who have lost us. first, a question of social capital. look at how society accumulates social capital. t is never top-down. it has to be bottom up. we look at the fabric of eastern societies -- i'm not an expert on iran, when we look at arab society, the only way to imagine it is leading to new social contracts. it is the focus on society. if we are looking at state institutions where trust has been lost. if we do not have a person who can ask, offer visions, we will not have viable movements in most arab countries. tunisia is unfolding in a different manner. that has been one of the leading forces pushing the

country forward in a true experience of democratic overnance. what are the conditions available? here i would like to highlight two key points. in most arab countries, we are still looking at constitutional frameworks which do not safeguard the economy of civil ociety acts.

which undermines the autonomy and independence of citizens. there is a great deal of state control, and secondly, you can see that constituency building

is not well regarded in most arab countries. there is not a comparable outreach with any democracy, either western or non-western democracy. we will not get to real security if we do not fix government issues. the two key issues we have to look at our how to put in place the right conditions for civil society organization to represent people's interests, different segments of the population, and a new social contract which is needed in most arab countries. secondly, how to safeguard key freedoms, which it is no longer fashionable -- in spite of the fact that this is one of the regions which suffers most from violations of freedom. the second point i would like to underline is, once again oing to a great insight that

tammy offered in the paper with the working group, one of the recommendations that tammy articulates toward the end of the paper, the way i understand the report, it's forming security sectors, judicial institutions as well as the aradigm of low importance. it's not the great political

mpact, it's about citizens and have a look at state institutions, state security institutions, police stations, olice officers, at the military security institution governing the country. nd to build on the analysis in the paper, number one, and here the internal actors can help, those outside the middle east can offer some help. number one is to look at arab institutions and those in place

governing, security sectors, military establishments, and getting them to reflect the key values of what democracy is all about. accountability and transparency. if you follow egyptian events, for example, we've been hearing about -- this is not a new phenomenon. -- citizens, at least two, who lost of their lives in police custody. this is not a new phenomenon. in egypt, it keeps happening. there are two cases in the last 48 hours or 72 hours. this want again is a testimony to -- as long as were going to lack accountability and ransparency, citizens will continue to have no trust in government, even if they are emocratically elected. to push lawmaking in the direction of ccountability.

once again, civil society ctors need help. we sometimes see a complete ollapse. it's not only a domestic set of actors, it's the actors and europe and elsewhere. it can be a nongovernmental rganization. these actors facing evacuation -- the final point, i believe t will stay fashionable in the

.s. for some time. civilian and non-civilian olitics. when looking at questions of governance in the region, white is important to differentiate and spend some time comparing indonesia to egypt or morocco, omparing different countries where we have civilian politicians and civilian elites with all the different political arenas. pushing forward consensus building, ideological advances, where citizens can hold the overnment accountable.

one key distinction when you look at arab countries in 2016 is a difference between countries where the military security establishment is the dominant force in politics and those with civilian political ynamics. we have a track record of civilian groups accepting more compromise, so this has to be a focus when you look at governance and how to push forward democratic government nd your paper says that. i will stop here. >> thank you. mr. hadley: thank you very much, i want to ask one technical question because i

think i was misled by that. i want to make sure the audience isn't as well. you use the phrase privatizing justice. of course, i had the notion of, you know, the private sector taking over the police, but i think what you mean is a transparency and accountability that allows citizens to hold those institutions to account. >> exactly. we've talked about --, and i want to pick up on something amr said, you talked about the failures of states to govern effectively led to the collapse or civil war in iraq, syria, and libya. our -- our -- are other states in the region at risk? have we seen the last of the dominoes, or are there other dominoes that potentially could fall, and if so, what will ring that about?

tammy: that is a crucial question, because for all that are international attention is focused on the eggs that have already fallen off the wall, others are up there wobbling, and there have been another of analytical attempts to sketch out what those broken neck have in common you seen some arguments about republics being more vulnerable than monarchies, for example. what i see in the places that i would say today are still vulnerable, it's those places where, as we saw in egypt, you have an aging leader with no lear secession plan, and certainly no transparent, accountable, responsive mechanism for determining succession. those are potential crisis points for any government, and

we've just been undergoing our regular exercise in the peaceful transition of power ere. it is always a delicate moment, even for the most established democracies, but in those places that don't have established tradition, it can be a very dangerous moment. so i would look for example at algeria, where you have an aging leader who has been in place for a long time, and no evident successor and no evident process for a way forward. you could say the same about the palestinian authority today. so you have a looming succession crisis and no connection between citizens and government, where they don't feel like there is any channel to weigh in. that is a boiling pot. >> would you agree with that question work >> yes, very much. tammy is right in pointing out he historical precedent.

egypt was in a succession crisis with salt of the country being who's going to succeed ormer president mubarak? steve, when you look at that, what is missing is not only who the establishment is putting forward as a succession plan of sort, but what's missing as well is how to tackled the loss confidence between government nd citizens. in tunisia, confidences undermined because they managed to put institutions in place. you still have a constitution framework that makes sense. what is missing in egypt once democracy was back in, this was attempted after 2011 and was

blown away. we're between 2011 and going back to many dark moments in lection history. -- in egyptian history. in places like algeria, no one knows what will happen. mr. hadley: it's interesting because the places you picked were algeria and the palestinian authority. those are not traditional monarchical societies. one of the things you may remember when we started this project, we said this is about a crisis of legitimacy in the middle east and we said legitimacy comes from consent of the governed. this is not sophisticated enough. there are other forms of legitimacy in the region based on religious affiliations, revolutionary ideology.

there are a range of forms of legitimacy. how do you square that? as we look at the middle east going forward, past 2011, what do we say about legitimacy, and what do we say to these regimes that may be teetering on the shelf but have not fallen off. what in the post-2011 world, what would you recommend to leaders as to how to enhance the legitimacy of their regimes before they go through what these other countries have gone through? ms. albright: i think we have to remember what it is. tammy mentioned social contract a lot. i think people think of it as a western concept, but basically people gave up individual rights in order to get protection and security in some form. obviously that is different with a monarchy.

but still, there is that same responsibility of what is it that the leader owes his people? when you were asking about different countries, i think those are interesting ones that were picked, but i would say that this is almost like a virus, and one of the things we have not talked about enough is the influence of technology. one of the things that really did -- it starts with a man in tunisia who immolates himself, and the news gets out and all of a sudden it's spread. clearly what happened in tahrir square was social media. hate to finger any country, but when you look at a country, like jordan, for instance, that is a monarchy, frontline state in one of the most difficult

refugee situations, not a rich place, and a king who is trying to figure out the various coalitions and kind of a transit point, and it goes to the very point of whether the state is providing a livelihood to the people. i think that one of the things, and you write about this a lot, tammy, in terms of what is it that the state owes the people? initially, in all of these countries, they were the employer of first resort. where that is not possible anymore, then it becomes a trust issue. so legitimacy, to a great extent, in this day and age depends on whether the old leader, the new leader, the king, the deputy crown prince or whatever, actually is delivering, because technology has made it possible for people to know what people in other places have.

and especially what you said about the younger generation, they are technologically adept. i have been talking about, this is been a peculiar 10 days, but basically in addition to the hing you think i'm talking about, i just spent time with a roup of former foreign ministers in silicon valley, talking about technology and governance. and what it has done in terms of providing people information as the weather they have a legitimate government. and it has disaggregated voices in a way that makes some of the organizational things you are talking about hard. some of you heard me say this, and i always admit that i stole this line, but the thing that is interesting is people are talking to their governments on 21st century technology. the government listens to them

on 20th century technology, or hears them but may not be listening, actually. and provides 19th century responses. so that disconnect is what we're dealing with. it's very evident in egypt, and i think anyplace could be subject to this, despite the fact that the ones you chose our very specifically so. legitimacy is what is the government supposed to be doing, whether it is a king or dictator. mr. hadley: just one more, tammy, clearly, what is a government supposed to be doing and what is it delivering for he citizens? does encouraging states to move in those directions, in fact, is it complementary to or supplementary to other traditional forms of legitimacy, that for example the monarchical states are

dependent on? or does it undermine those other sources of legitimacy? it seems you have to be able to answer those questions if you go to a monarch and say you need to move in the direction of legitimate, transparent, responsive government. then you have some understanding that that they can be supplemental and doesn't undermine the traditional sources of legitimacy to which regime is dependent. tammy: there is an important switch i and language i would recommend to answer this question. it's not about what government owes its citizens. it's really about what citizens expect from their government. not what they need, but what they expect. that is part of what is changed and that's part of the impact of technology that madeleine was describing. one of our other cochairs put

his finger on this in his paper, which is that part of what's happened in the arab world and around the world among this younger generation is what he calls a participation revolution, that citizens, because of technology, and because this generation of arabs, more highly educated, healthier, more engaged than any generation before, and you must remember that parts of the region two or three generations ago didn't even have secondary schools. so the developmental leaks here are tremendous. and this rising generation has a different set of xpectations. it's not just about making sure they have a job. they expect to be able to participate, to set their own path in life and not just have it directed for them by their monarch or their father or their uncle or anybody else. in essence, what they expect is

the thing that liberal societies are best structured to provide, which is the opportunity for every opportunity to find their own path to human flourishing. governments cannot get away with just offering enough jobs or enough health care or enough free education. check the box and they are legitimate. they have to meet that set of expectations. they have to give people opportunities to find for themselves a pathway. that means a have to be more open and responsive. to the point of congruence or tension, if you are a very traditional leader who believes that the only way you can help your society grow besides directing it from the top down, that's not the only form even

for a monarch. the traditional pathway may be i am the source of social good, i distribute them, but it can also be the source of opportunity. you can be the source of dynamism. that is an interesting mentality, but it is entirely possible. ms. albright: one other thing that has to be put in the mixture, and egypt is a perfect example, the way it stands is the freedom of this aggregated voices in tahrir square, the young people were all having an incredibly interesting time, having been gotten there by social media. and the older man who cannot et to his stall in the marketplace as i cannot stand this anymore, i need some order.

so i think one could actually be persuaded that there was really a movement to have that happen, because people are fed up with the chaos. i think the hard part is how inclusivity and getting participation, whether people are tolerant enough to go through the chaos time until they get to the proper time. mr. hadley: i want to go toamr, and then we will go to the audience. lawrence of arabia said i am a river to my people. you are saying a legitimacy based on satisfying what the people expect from their government and increasingly that includes participation in a role in fashioning their own uture. get that.

i've spent three three-hour sessions in the last 14 months and i tried to make this argument that this is a source of legitimacy. this is what he must do if over the long-term he's going to bring stability and prosperity. and i have not yet made the sale. what you hear is what you would expect, given the trauma that egypt has been through, i understand what you are saying, but you need to understand this is a difficult time, there is extremism at the door, and the middle east cannot stand a breakdown in order of a country of 90 million people. if you think refugee flows are bad now, you just wait until egypt breaks down. so what is the argument you make to one who sincerely believes, and which he is

risking his life, how do you make the argument to him that actually this is where he's got to go, if he is going to bring long-term stability to his country? amr: this is basically the debate we are having in tunisia. not just since 2011, but even arlier on. we do have enough cases to push orward very clearly, it cannot provide for long-term stability. before 2011, what happened after 2011 did not began in

2011. we had years of young people protesting and demanding that their voices should be heard, their concerns should be addressed. people took to the streets. these were not only young eople. i beg to differ. aybe in the beginning they were young people.

but increasingly, people with grievances. which, we did a great job in the paper highlighting social, economic grievances. unemployment among young people, over 40%. young female citizens, over 45% and more. people taking to the streets to go to to rear square and elsewhere. they never managed to provide long-term stability. yes, there are challenges. there are security challenges in the region that need to be accounted for. the question is how to get overnments, and the only way to get them is to listen to society. we need an organization of citizens to listen how to do it right. offer some solutions. not by imprisoning citizens and ot providing enough social and economic solutions to improve living conditions. they live if governments live to their own constituents. they do exist. they will find solutions.

and there are more state. it is a creation of the 1950's or 1960's. nd in a way, there are leaps in education and health care and elsewhere. yes, it is the healthiest and most connected generation of young arabs we are looking at. but they no longer are addressing concerns. >> one last comment in them we will go to the audience. >> i think it is a false hoice.

i would think of the leader not only as a river for his people, but the people are a river. so, the challenge is whether you can create channels and mechanisms and pathways for people to have the influence they want to have over their own lives and their communities or rather, left with no alternative, they will spill into the streets. and the failure of reforms in the time leading up to the uprising is what compels that mass mobilization. there is something that troubles me very much and which i think is quite destabilizing and dangerous. a leader who believes by putting a lid on it, he has lowered the boiling pot.

that is what i think we have in egypt. we have no civil society channels. because the parliament and the party system are so tightly managed. we have no free speech channels. that is boiling very fast in a way that i think is far more dangerous than the situation in egypt before the uprising. >> i love your phrase that the leader is not a river to his people. the people are the river. not a bad way to summarize. >> try it. >> i will wait until madeline s with me.

do we have microphones? right here in the front. fourth row. please identify yourself so we can get a lot of questions in, -- please notify yourself. so we can get a lot of answers and, if you will keep the questions short, we will keep the answers short. >> short questions come along answers. my research is civil relations between turkey, egypt, and israel. i think, listening to you, it's fascinating how you are describing analytically the arab world, but a lot of what you're saying applies to other cases on the periphery of the arab world or the core of the arab countries and turkey in particular, i argue it is going through a regime turned where it is turning into the making of the mubarak machine -- regime. ivil society and places of expression and all that.

there is a ping-pong regional order, imitating one another. i guess, i wonder, because we have the report on that, is there a center for middle east policies. is there periphery to the egion, including turkey, including israel, of course, and the crackdown on society and israel as well? that you have to account for who is funding you internationally. a lot of what you have been escribing seems to me like a conversation everywhere in the region at large. and if that is the part of framework you would encourage adopting? >> tammy, do you want to take that one? >> sure. yes, i would say politics is politics. while every region has its own history and culture, there are certain common features, right? and, yes, there are demonstration effects both positive and negative and in

the paper i talk about models for governance in the middle ast today, the fragile democratic experiment of tunisia, the effort at renewed authoritarianism, the brutal, savage order of isis, which is also a model competing in the region today. what are people going to embrace in the midst of this turmoil? i do think it is having an effect on those in on the periphery of the region, but i also think some of those dynamics -- for example the global push back against civil society and freedom did not start in the middle east. we see it in russia. we see it in india. >> we do indeed. >> congratulations to the task force and the working group for completing this. my government finds a lot to

agree with in this report. and we think it addresses a key, key aspect. implementing it is going to be hard work because i do think that someone who has worked in the region until recently, a lot of people are afraid of challenging the order because hey are afraid of chaos. that is something that needs to be looked at. i would step back and i wonder if you address it in the eport. are we doing enough as government to take an interest in the region, but not part of the region to stress human rights? for example, bringing out arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, these things that come way he before freedom of association. freedom of association is very mportant, but human rights and

the rule of law is absolutely fundamental, and that is where we see such grave misbehavior and violations around the egion. >> i believe we do, or at least we tried, but the problem, having tried it -- i will not say in which country -- we can't help you unless you do something about your laws and human rights. that was kind of mind your own usiness. but i do think we have to do that, even if it is not received well, and it is argued by those who do not want to do it that it adds to the chaotic situation. the question is, and this has come up over and over again -- our human rights a western concept or is it a global concept. i have argued it is global.

people want to make decisions about their own lives and they want to have absence of arbitrariness. but it's not an easy message to deliver. and frankly, if it's not delivered alongside practical assistance, whether their security or aid programs, but it does have to go together and if we do not do it, your country and ours, we are not fulfilling our responsibilities. but it's not happily received. >> if i can say one important oint -- the countries making steps in the direction of what tammy has talked about? you see it in the uae -- you are beginning to see it in saudi arabia. certainly tunisia. it is hard to do that and keep your society together in a

benign security and regional environment. think about the environment in the middle east today, and to say to the leader we need you to take a risk of reform moving this direction in a region -- his is a hard thing we are asking leaders, and we have to recognize it. one of the things we say though, the attitude of the international community ought to be, if you are willing to make those hard decisions, we in the international community will support you financially, diplomatically. if you don't, we won't, not because we are being punitive, because in our judgment, it would be a bad investment. the good investment will be those states willing to make those steps on behalf of their people because we think they are most likely to result in prosperity and stability. i think we have to recognize

the difficulty of what we are asking and we have to be engaged and willing to step in and make the right decisions. yes, ma'am. >> hi. janet smith. i was a legislator for senator leahy. i have to dub -- i have two quick comments. one is an issue of trust. my observation, one of the issues to think about is trust among people themselves. they have the freedom to express to each other how they struggle with these issues. not just government people, but that he issue of trust. how are you providing the comfort level with the saudi's, jordanians, egyptians, able to talk to each other without fear. some of the most moving conversations start with the premise of finding the

political philosophy foundation within islam, within the region, within the culture that asks to questions. hat are the values and islam that brings meaning to you. and that is a conversation. and the second part, how do you want to see them expressed in society? when you grounded in the culture and, as you mentioned, things come from the bottom up, the cultural component and the religious component are obviously key to this, but those issues, i think, are a different take on the report. >> thank you. just a quick reflection on that very, very thoughtful comment. absolutely, we talk about trust

within communities, not just citizens and government. if you are thinking about a case like libya and syria where they have truly collapsed into civil war, you have to think about that. and there are things that can be done even now while conflicts are ongoing to build forums and platforms for dialogue, for conflict resolution. there are programs where ommunities came together around dialogues so that the dp's did not have to immediately justify themselves and the communities could feel comfortable with their return. i think there are examples we can build on. one half sentence on the

previous point from our german colleague -- and i wanted to echo something my colleague, general john allen, has set a number of times. which is from his perspective, as someone who spent the last few years of his military and civilian career fighting errorism -- if we external actors who have invested so much in a military fight, if we do not also invest in the governance peace, we will essentially be playing whack him all -- whack-a-mole with extremists on a global scale. >> yes. ther comments? other questions? h >>i. i am -- >> hi. iowa with a private firm that works in the middle east. my question is on social trust. i think you talked about it well, talking about the breakdown in the middle east

and the relationship a government has with its citizens and the expectations of citizen has with its government, that a citizen has with their government. one could argue that we are beginning, to some extent an erosion of social trust with groups that may be feeling more marginalized or uncertain with relationship to their government. i would just ask if you can comment on what can a citizen do rebuilding social trust and how would that be most effective? >> what it would take the early question? >> sure. the two countries which witnessed the emergence and the explosion of tribal conflict, multiethnic conflicts leaving

to civil war are the countries here dictatorships -- there is big difference in a place like tunisia and egypt and syria. we had a partner establishing -- with an established civil society. we act as human rights defenders. but for libya and syria, the dictatorships are these intermediary layers between the citizens and the state. dictators did not feel like departing the same, and they had to listen to radical

militant ideology. there were no other channels. and that is why theories of what is happening in libya should not be happening elsewhere. the key is to enable governments to take government seriously, to enable society to exist. hy is it that morocco, for example -- it is a multiethnic society. we do have established civil society interactions with

citizens. they see that they are listen to. at least it makes sense. >> other questions, comments? gentlemen way in the back and then we will take the two women ere. >> hello. my question is for amr. i really appreciate your omments on civil society and the need for civil society organizations to help those inside the region. as you know, especially in egypt, the government portrays us as a foreign conspiracy and will play up the hyper nationalism. how do you get around that problem, to have civil society in the united states or in

europe helping those on the ground in egypt? inc. you -- thank you. amr: thank you. very briefly, jack, we do not need to submit to the narrative. they should recognize the failures they have been ustaining for a long time. we should push forward -- not only reason the, but also citizens among different segments and groups and populations. here are cases -- tunisia, other countries as opposed to egypt -- once again, this is a question of the narrative. what is it? is it security?

is it democracy? is it enabling societies to exist, to try? to be addressed, to be responded to by and accountable government? >> we are running shy on time. i'm going to take the two i wanted over here and i will take two from this side and we ill go through those questions and we will try to answer those and then we will be out of time, i'm afraid. ann -- ma'am, you had one. the woman, two behind you. >> hi. i'm larissa. i'm a jordanian consultant. going back to the gentleman's comment with civil society, in the absence of the political

will on the space is very limited. e can discuss options beyond for a governess assisting, but also perhaps governmental organizations. i will throw another group into the mix. there have been case studies in economic development. thank you. > and two rows up. >> hi. i'm a concerned citizen from texas. it seems impossible, what is secretary albright was talking about, is it possible without dealing with the corruption. if you can not trust police are judges, how do you trust

anyone? think that is why there is so much discontent. so, how to deal with that. >> yes, ma'am? ight back there. >> hi. allison good, u.s. department of energy. you have done a good job addressing political governance issues, but it seems that there are bigger macro issues that cannot be solved by countries alone. ow can the rest of the international community, how can they best bridge that gap to foster better governance? >> very good question. one more from this side? es, sir. >> i'm elliott hurwitz. ormer world bank, intelligence

person. i have not had time to read the report. on the periphery of the arab world, the only arab country i have been to is human, and it is particularly pertinent to u.s. policy. i would like anyone on the panel to comment. >> ok, we have corruption issues and yemen -- any akers? > i think amr. >> good. let's do it quickly. one-minute answers. amr: yes, this is one of the key spaces which we still have available in countries where the public space has been done. how do we do this in a way that

does not undermine the egitimacy. the question is how to do it away from government relations? it is more powerful if it is done with nongovernmental actors. again, how to justify, not from the minority perspective, but how to get interested in what is happening in domestic countries. you need analysis. the analysis cannot be opposition. we need editors to push it forward. this is one of the key spaces. >> sure. the headline out of the report -- sunshine is the best disinfectant. ore broadly, it exists typically because those in power are trying to grease the

wheels of their own lives. o you have to look at how to fix the political dysfunctions that create incentives for corruption. rather than higher salaries or making sure there are expectations from outside as well as inside and just to highlight for you, there is a sidebar in the report. it is a problem for every state, but there is a reason why arab states were and are in positions to deal with the effects. ms. albright: i'm not an expert on yemen. in many ways, it is a country that is the victim of all kinds of meddling. north and south human, they were not very excited about it

with measure coming from the neighbors, and then the fact that it was on its way in terms of looking through some government work when it became the playground of a proxy war between iran and saudi arabia. that is what is going on now. it is a victim in the country. that is the only way it can be described. there are powers that would ike to do some good there. it is not big enough and it is absorbing a lot of the problems that cannot be dealt with somewhere else. >> i'm going to thank you, tammy, for a great paper. please join me in thanking the panel.

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we run 2.5 million songs through and we're going to get more. facing bene on issues congress and the music industry, including copy right laws ticket price inflation and concert tickets. interviewed by technology reporter for politico. >> they do buy tickets. but they -- what they do is they keep other fans out of the market. what we are finding is that some fans really want to go see

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$100,000 in cash prizes will be awarded and shared between 150 students and 53 teachers. this year's deadline is january 20, 2017. that's inauguration day. for more information go to our website student cam.org. >> coming up next q&a with author and historian edward larson followed by "washington journal" live at 7:00 with your phone calls and a look at today's headlines. ♪ >> this week on "q&a," pepperdine university professor edward j larson. professor larson discusses his book "george washington, nationalist."

brian: edward j. larson, author of "george washington, nationalist." if george washington were alive today and he saw the full run of this campaign, no matter who the victor is, what would he say? prof. larson: i think he would be appalled. he really did not believe in politics. he had this vision the people would run hard-fought campaigns. he worked on campaigns with others, hard-fought. but once you got there you were not supposed to be part of a party process. you were supposed to call each one as you saw t