>> some discussion in this panel for the homeland security plans for the upcoming inauguration. plans are falling into place for 115th congress. darrell issa tweets -- winning the final outstanding house upe, the democrats picked

six seats the cycle. the new breakdown will be to 41 republicans to 194 democrats in the house. the democratic leadership election for the 115th congress is coming up wednesday. pelosi tells her caucus she is making further changes to the leadership structure after hearing concerns. look for live coverage of those wednesday on c-span. and a look at our primetime special on c-span networks this evening starting at 8 p.m. eastern. her defense and state department officials discuss the future of u.s. alliances. on c-span2, it is "the looking atrs" digital music services, and on c-span3, or senator tom harkin talks about healthy eating and the rise of childhood obesity in the u.s. >> c-span's "washington

journal," live every day with policy issues that affect you. coming up, congressman jim mcdermott on the future of the affordable care act under president-elect trump, as well as his opinions on trump administration of appointment so far. then president of americans for tax reform, grover norquist, talks about present and -- president-elect trump's fiscal policies and the upcoming gop-controlled congress. the sure to watch "washington eastern" live at 7 a.m. . join the discussion. today'sow, part of white house reefing with press secretary josh earnest. he started by discussing the dictatorformer cuban fidel castro and u.s. relations with that country. >> good afternoon, everybody.

nice to see you all. hope you had a pleasant thanks giving holiday with your families. thank you. i do not have any comments at the top. so i will take your questions. >> thank you, josh. i wanted to ask, how does the administration view fidel impacts passing on the on the normalization of relations between the u.s. and cuba. does it delay, does it hasten normalization of relations with cuba? standpoint, is. would not expect any impact on the progress we are committed to toing on our end, to begin normalize relations with cuba. as you know, and president obama announcement almost two years ago now, this was rooted in the present's conclusion that

thelicy of isolation that united states had pursued for more than five decades had failed to bring about the improved human rights climate that i think just about every american citizen would like to see in cuba. what we have seen is greater freedom for american citizens to visit cuba, to send money to family members and cuba to engage in business and seek business opportunities in cuba. it also enhances the ability of the united states government to maintain an embassy in cuba only officials can not

engage with government officials, but also those societies that are working to build greater freedom. those are all good things. those are all benefits enjoyed by americans. they also facilitate the kind of people to people ties that we believe will be more effective andringing freedom opportunity to be cuban people, something they have long sought and been denied by the cuban government, and after five decades of not seeing any results, the president believes it's time for something different. we clearly have not seen all of the results we would like to see . it certainly has benefited the american people in a tangible way. and cubans, when they are asked in policy,hange

something that is warmly welcomed by the cuban people, i think that should be a good indication of the kind of success this policy can have. >> what about on our and, with his passing -- two you believe they would be more receptive to the changes the u.s. has been going for as far as opening up the private sector, things along those lines? secretary earnest: time will tell. i will let the cuban government speak for the plans they will pursue. obviously we welcome hastening of the kinds of changes we would like to see. i will let my cuban counterpart speak to any plans they may have and whether or not they are changed by the death of mr. castro. >> just one more question along those lines. presidentoes the

[indiscernible] -- secretary earnest: well, again, i think he is a towering figure. on the a profound impact history of, not just his country, but the western hemisphere. this is certainly no whitewashing. activities that he ordered and that his government that go against the very values that this country, that our country has .ong defended i think the question for the president in terms of making policy, are we going to be rooted in the past, or are we going to look to the future? does not mean we should ignore the past, but it does mean we the pastt let

interfere with our ability to make progress. i think some of the changes we have seen on cuba already are an indication that progress is possible. of that has been the focus the president's policy direction over the past several years and opportunityly be an for historians to take stock of fidel castro's legacy and what it means in his country. >> can you comment on president-elect trump's claims of massive fraud during the election question mark is there any truth whatsoever to what he is saying? secretary earnest: well, kevin, i -- i would defer to the president-elect's team for

commentary on his tweets. anhink what i can say is objective fact that there has been no evidence produced to substantiate the claim like that . the reaction or an explanation, i refer you to the president-elect. >> thank you. a little more on cuba. can you tell us anything about what the thoughts are on an official delegation going to castro's funeral, what the plans are on that? secretary earnest: if there is a willto -- delegation, we have that released the same way as other u.s. delegations, but i don't have any information on that. >> you talked about how you

can't whitewash some of castro's actions. criticize the did president's statement for not directly mentioning castro's human rights abuses. can you talk about or responded to that, why was that decision made not to address those concerns secretary earnest:? this could -- to address those concerns? those criticsest: of the statements are also critics of the policy and have been scrambling to justify their loyalty to an obviously failed policy of isolation that did not bring about any results for the cuban. i think the president's statement quite clearly speaks for itself, and it makes clear the president's desire to look

toward the future and the responsibility he has to look out for the interest of the american people moving forward. it is the campaign slogan of his reelection, and that is what he has been focused on, and to issue some sort of list during statement and engage in the kind of mutual recriminations that are tied to the past does not advance freedom or democracy in cuba. it does not expand economic opportunity or cultural opportunities for the american people. it does not advance further these success we have had in removing the cuba issue as an impediment in our relationship with countries throughout the western hemisphere. the president made the observation when he was in latin about thest week

thength and health of relationship between the nine states and countries throughout the western hemisphere and latin america in particular. they are as strong as they have ever been. some of that because of the commitment this administration has made to reach out and engage with countries in the western hemisphere, but some of it is also attributable to the fact , the u.s.ecades policy of isolating cuba was not just an irritant in the between the united states and cuba, but also an irritant in the relationships with united states and the countries that had the relationship with cuba. the consequence was there was discussion about the human rights conditions in cuba. there was extended discussion though about the wisdom of the

cuba.osition toward now that that has been removed, there is been much more scrutiny of the way the cuban government treats the cuban people and it has allowed the united states to andhall national opinion sign a brighter light on those policies in a way that has increased pressure on the cuban government. i think this was on full, vivid display during the president's trip to cuba earlier this spring where the cuban leader faced a direct probing question about the treatment of citizens in cuba. so, i think this is all part of that is strongly supported by the cuban people, and has already yielded important benefits to the cuban people.

it has yielded important benefits to the american people. i know many of the president's critics would like to suggest somehow the united eights has toe a bunch of concessions the cuban government. that's wrong. it's not a concession to allow cuban-americans to send more money to their families. to securea concession the release of alan gross, a usaid contractor wrongly detained in cuba. it is not a concession to open cuba.assy in it is not a concession to have daily flights between the united states and cuba that makes it easier for americans to visit cuba. it is not a concession to allow american cruise operators to stop in cuba. it is not a concession to give american agricultural interests

the opportunity to do more .usiness in cuba all of those things are strongly supported by the cuban people and have interest for the american people. i think it's very dreaded -- difficult for critics of this policy to make any coherent argument that somehow the united states has been disadvantaged by this policy. things iall of the have laid out, those are all benefits to the american people we have enjoyed. moving forward, it only stands to enhance the benefits for the cuban people and the american people. >> there was an attack on ohio state this morning. i assume the president has been briefed on that. you have anything further on the investigation? secretary earnest: the president was briefed this morning by his top homeland security advisor.

he has to be updated. i know local law enforcement officials have indicated the situation in columbus is no longer active. the site has been secured. officials in columbus are assisting local authorities as they conduct this investigation. but we will obviously defer to local law enforcement to aboutse information exactly what occurred. there is still a lot of andrmation to review collect. obviously this is a difficult situation and our thoughts and prayers are with the people of columbus and the immunity of ohio's -- community of ohio state. >> about david petraeus, you talked previously about how he stayed in touch with the administration. [indiscernible]

i wonder if that continues to be true, and if so that lessons criticism offered by some democrats of his candidacy for secretary of state? acretary earnest: let me say couple things about that. i have in the plastic knowledge there were senior officials in the obama administration who consulted with general petronas raeus.eral pet i'm not aware when that was to the so i cannot speak last time he had a conversation with a senior u.s. official. obviously, maintaining any sort of informal outside advisory thanis a lot different being nominated to serve as secretary of state for the .nited states

i recognize there's a lot of speculation right now about who the president-elect will choose to serve in his administration, and i spent the better part of the last two half years avoiding on rumors about who may serve in the obama administration, so i'm certainly not going to comment on speculation of whom i serve in the trump administration. >> just as a guiding principle, president believe that someone with severe classification issues should continue to have positions in the united states government? secretary earnest: i think every president is going to have to decide for themselves what kind .f person can best serve president obama assembled a team he is quite proud of to serve him and the country and the president has spoken at some length about how proud he is there is not been a major

personal scandal in his administration. that is the kind of people he has chosen to serve in a high profile influential positions in .is administration they have done so with a focus on the country's best interest, and the president is quite proud of that. obviously future presidents will think, will understandably be measured against that high standard, but they will eventually have to decide on their own who they believe can best serve the country and best serve them in a range of important positions. >> you are not going to say if the president has -- [indiscernible] secretary earnest: i can't speak to what sort of advise the president may or may not have offered to the president-elect as he is waiting some of these issues. >> the last time we did this, money for flint was

going into the lame duck session with republicans promising that they would find funding. that seems to have somewhat stalled out on capitol hill right now. knowing that you and i could perhaps negotiate a bill more easily than congress could -- secretary earnest: are you here? my lining is that what we are going to do here at the end? >> just one for you. [laughter] wondering if funding is going to be a redline for the president? secretary earnest: obviously, the president feels quite passionately about the need for congress to play their role in providing funding for the community a plant that has been dealing with the contamination of their water supply. the administration has mobilized to respond resources

to the urgent need of the people there. but it will require congressional resources to address the longer-term infrastructure challenge that exists. there is a role for congress to play. there were promises made by republicans on the president expect them to keep that promise. >> kellyanne conway said that president obama -- [indiscernible] personal discussion on saturday that lasted about 45 minutes. [indiscernible] i am going to ask you about that. secretary earnest: ok. you discuss the nature of the call? did he want to talk about nominations or what his opinion on a potential nominee or international relations --

can you add, embellish, rule out, anything? secretary i can certainly confirm for you that the president did have a cell phone conversation with the president-elect on saturday. they spoke for 45 minutes or so. when the president-elect was in the oval office with president thea, 36 hours after election results were tabulated, the president-elect indicated the desire to seek president's --ma advice and counsel president obama's device counsel repeatedly and president obama though ready to offer that counsel due to his commitment for a smooth, effective transition from the obama presidency to the next. i did not for see a scenario in when ae would announce call had taken place, but i am certainly going to protect the ability of the president-elect to confidentially seek the

,dvice of the sitting president so i'm not going to get into the content of the call. but i can certainly confirm for you that the call to take place, even if i'm not willing to promise that i will announce when future calls have been placed. my understanding is the president-elect reached out to president obama. >> can you say whether this is the first time since they met in the oval office -- secretary earnest: i can confirm for you that it's not, but i will not be in the position to detail all of the conversations. >> can you give us an idea of how often this has happened? secretary earnest: there have been a handful of times. [indiscernible] >> secretary earnest: handful is intentionally vague. >> five or fewer? secretary earnest: i think i have said all i am going to say.

you guys can clear that up at the briefing. >> can you add -- secretary earnest: i can't. i will spare you. >> there is no way to add to what we were talking about? secretary earnest: i'm not going to get into the content of the conversation. ok? >> what was the tone? were you in the room? not.tary earnest: i was >> are they best pals on the phone together. is it tends? can you say anything about the tone or the mood? aside from the content? secretary earnest: i am going to protect the ability of the president-elect to consult confidentially with the president of the united states. to the extent that i am willing it, i think that is how i would do, a

consultation. the president-elect indicated publicly he intended to seek out the advice and counsel of the sitting president and that is something he has done a couple of times. threaten to terminate the deal with cuba today if cuba is unwilling to make a better deal for the cuban people. you have talked about this before. how worried is the president he will terminate this deal? i will letarnest: the president-elect and his team items.o any i have made a case in this briefing for the ways that the american people and the cuban people have benefited from the obamaon that president made to begin normalizing relations between our countries. that policy has brought about significant changes, including immigrants -- a decision to

permissions. there are licensing agreements signed by at least one u.s. hotel company to begin operating a facility in cuba. that would be difficult to unwind. >> is president obama fretting over the possibility that it would all be reversed? no.etary earnest: it there are up to 110 daily flight scheduled to take off from the united states and land in cuba on a daily basis. in fact, today, the very first flight in several decades took off from the united states and landed in havana. i don't know how many people purchased tickets, but there will be daily flights between

the united states and havana and unwinding that is not as easy as the stroke of a pen because there are significant consequences. there will be economic impact in the united states and in cuba for unraveling that policy. again. harshest are the critics of the president's policies say part of their concern is the plight of the cuban people. first of all, the cuban people overwhelmingly support this policy. support this policy. they are staying and properties that are advertised on airbnb. some 50,000 americans have availed themselves of this opportunity. $250 on spending that average and that money benefits

the cuban people, to say nothing of the cabdrivers and the restauranteurs. so, again, to cancel all of that would be a significant economic blow for those citizens. critics ofard for this policy to reconcile their opposition to this policy and their claim -- their claimed desire to advance the interest of the cuban people. this does advance the interest of the cuban people. to take it away does not achieve the goal that they claim to have in mind. >> tonight on "the communicators" -- >> i hope the copyright rewrite will put data in a central repository where people will have access to it where it can be researched on an item by item basis, but also on a scale

basis. million songs through. we will get more. onpandora general counsel digital music services, including copyright laws, ticket price inflation, and the competition between humans and bought. he is interviewed by the for lit ago.porter >> they keep other fans out of the market. some fans really want to go see a concert and they can mash the buttons on the computer all day long, but you cannot beat a bought. so, they are not able to get ticket in the first run at the list price. so they only have the opportunity of buying this tickets on the secondary market.

>> c-span's "washington journal" live every day with news and policy issues that impact your. coming up tuesday morning, congressman jim mcdermott on the future of the affordable care act under president-elect trump, as well as his opinions on the trump administration appointments so far. then president of americans for tax reform grover norquist talks about president-elect donald trump's tax, fiscal, and economic proposals. he will also discuss fiscal policy of the upcoming gop controlled congress. buser to watch -- be sure to watch "washington journal". join the discussion. >> coming up tonight, look at america's leadership around the against hiv,ght

and domestic security and age of isis. we will also hear from former nato security general. in new york city today, president-elect donald trump and his physician team continued working to assign key posts in his administration. today he met with former cia director and was tired four-star general david petraeus, thought be under consideration to be secretary of state. there is what general petraeus said after the meeting. >> the meeting went pretty well. about an hour. he basically walked us around the world, showed a great grasp of a variety of the challenges out there and do some of the opportunities as well. a very good conversation.

we will see where it goes from here. i have got to teach this afternoon, so that is all i can do today. >> any advice for him? announcer: further reporting from the hill this afternoon said that trump and mitt romney had a private meeting today amid secretary of state talks. also today, mike pence saying to reporters tomorrow there will be "a number of important announcements, one of those perhaps could be health and human services secretary." there was a tweet reporting that tom price is close to being named the top help -- top health official in the cabinet.

we will take you now live to that event today from the center for strategic and international studies on america's alliances around the world, including nato. >> hope everyone had a good thanksgiving break. appreciate you getting back to work with ernest and joining us for this discussion today. i am mike green, senior vice president for asia at csis. it is a real delight to hold this rollout for a new project at csis being led by andrew shearer, former national security advisor to tony abbott with a long record of distinguished service in the us trillion government, -- in the australian government. he joined us here at csis and ,ogether with myself and others we designed this project, which is to look at american

leadership and alliances. togetherof course, go and are at a point of some transition, turbulence, questioning, given events around the world, given the pressures of globalization and other things like the domestic support of alliances here and abroad, even our own presidential transition, and it seems a good time to get back to some of the fundamentals of why we built this alliance system over 50 years ago, what sustains it, what is in it for us, what is in it for our allies. what are the things that we have to do to make it more effective for all of us. andrew is going to do this, and i will introduce him now, looking at the fundamentals, mechanics, and strategy, beginning with this event today and this distinct panel. i am turning it over now to the director of this project and let andrew tell us about the discussion for today. thank you.

andrew: thank you, mike. thank you, everyone, for coming. in particular, i would like to -- mike, in particular, i would like to thank you for your support in this project, which i think is important and comes at an important time. mike has been not only a great colleague, but as we like to say, a good mate, and i am very grateful for that. i would also like to knowledge this afternoon the support for the project by the president of the csis, the excellent advisory board we have been able to pull together to support this project, and my colleagues who are helping me out on the project team. following the catastrophe of the second world war, farsighted american statesman worked with counterparts around the world to build and maintain a global

network of regional and bilateral alliances, unsurpassed in human history. starting with nato in europe, rimming the western pacific and encompassing the most powerful arab states in the middle east, for 70 years these alliances liberalported the international order and made possible an unprecedented stability and prosperity and contributed measurably to american security. states' treatyed alliances have been augmented by formal security platforms. none of this, however, was preordained. isolationism and the urge to withdraw from conflict and commitment abroad have been a strand in american politics and foreign policies since the earliest days of the republic, coming to the surface in the 1930's, early 1950's, and mid-1970's.

and of course, at a different times over the same period, it was domestic politics and -- in allied countries rather than america that roiled alliances across europe, asia, and the middle east. despite these periods of contention and significant cost of the alliances, they have enjoyed bipartisan political support in united states and a solid public backing for decades. notwithstanding, a bitterly contested election campaign in which president-elect trump openly questioned the value of nato and the united states' most important alliances in asia, and sitting president barack obama publicly criticize some allies, a recent survey by the chicago council of global affairs shows that the american public overwhelmingly supported

alliances and american leadership in the world. 90% of americans, including many trump supporters, consider maintaining existing alliances and effective way of achieving -- an effective way to achieving american foreign-policy goals. nearly as many support building new alliances with other countries. nurturing and renewing this support is vital because today, the united states and its allies face an unprecedented range of threats. these include russian aggression in eastern europe and adventurism in the middle east. north korea's rapidly developing nuclear and ballistic missile programs. china's increasing assertiveness in the western pacific. iran's missile development, continuing support for terrorism, and spreading influence and metastasizing of the threat posed by isil and other terror networks around the world. yet the united states and its allies are neither psychologically nor materially

prepared for these threats. there is an element of complacency in our societies about the threats that we face loss of perspective about the real underpinnings of our freedom of choice and prosperity. alliances require sustained hard work, investment, and give-and-take on both sides. former u.s. secretary of state george shultz used to call this the alliance in the garden. today, however, our alliances are not keeping pace a link --rtia, resource constraints the sequester in united states -- and internal challenges. in europe, these popular forces that unleashed brexit are present today in many other nato countries. in asia, the u.s. alliance with thailand remains in danger following that country's most recent military takeover. president duterte has declared

the country's separation from the united states euro -- united states. the implications of the political crisis engulfing the administration in south korea is not clear. the future alignment of turkey, long a critical partner of the crossroads between europe, the middle east, and asia, is also unclear, while israel and traditional arab allies in the middle east are alienated by the u.s. nuclear deal with iran. america's credibility as a security guarantor has been damaged by the failure to inform president -- failure to enforce president obama's syria redline and by president-elect donald trump's threat to revoke alliances unless they pay more for their defense. everywhere there is a sense that the west is in retreat and that the liberal international order is fraying. this is the jumping off point for the project, to go back to first principles and examine the role and relevance of these

alliances that date back to the earliest days of the cold war. whether the cost will offset the benefits today and how they can adapt to meet the very different challenges that we face. the key to alliances is that the sum is more than the part. alliances enhance security by combining ally's military power and increasing their cooperation. they also play an important role in supporting the international order and in restraining allies in relationships that work in both directions. alliances build interoperability , relationships, and mutual trust over time that ad hoc coalitions simply cannot replicate. the incoming trump administration's foreign-policy team and policy direction are a work in progress. but allies should welcome some of the early signs. the president-elect has spoken with many allied leaders. his administration is likely to work with congress to restore

u.s. defense spending, build a larger navy, and modernize the u.s. nuclear arsenal. all important fits that will increase deterrence and should reassure america's allies. for the first time in decades, america's alliance and the future of that system is at issue. for decades, the united states was so dominant globally that allies and even american policymakers often tended to see the alliance system as some sort of free international public good. particularly for allies, to an extent it was. today seems very different. the united states is still the world's dominant military power, but rivals like china are closing the economic gap. in this environment, the united states will be instinctively tempted to flirt with unilateralism and deals of convenience with regional powers

and perhaps a more transactional approach to alliances. but for all the costs and challenges posed by alliances and managing allies, america needs to think hard today about how attractive a world without allies really would be. after all, there is nothing that russia, china, and iran would like more than to see the dismantling of america's alliances in europe, asia, and the middle east. that reality alone should give serious pause. percy spender, the former australian foreign minister , along with john foster dallas, observed that it is difficult to at times exceedingly so understand precisely what the united states thinking is. i have no doubt that many diplomatic representatives here are struggling over there

reporting cables will agree that this is certainly one of those times. the purpose of this project is to provide answers to some of these questions, based around three research themes. the first theme is alliance, institution, leadership. what role do alliances play today in deterring threats, supporting the international order, and restraining allies? is this still a viable concept in the west? and if so, what part do alliances play in upholding it? how do alliances advance u.s. interests today? do alliances institutions need to be overhauled? how can they inform the security partnership? what is the role of u.s. leadership at home and abroad -- in building support for alliances? the second theme is about alliances in operation. their day-to-day management.

which allies are pulling their weight and in which areas do allies need to lift their game? how can they build military interoperability and address certain capability gaps? how can they boost security in a world where nuclear weapons are making an unfortunate come back. what approaches should alliances take in combating co-version, -- combating corruption, threats, and cyber attacks, expanding intelligence and increasing intense industrial collaborations. what challenges are we likely to confront and how could we overcome them? the third and in some ways most important research theme is about understanding and engage in public opinion. notwithstanding the positive polling i stated earlier, we cannot take continuing public support for alliances for granted. in the united states or in allied countries. in a recent interview with the atlantic, henry kissinger pointed to a gap in

foreign-policy perception between the american public and others. polls in a number of countries, including australia, suggested a degree of anxiety about the future direction of american policy and alliance. we have to do a better job of understanding public opinion and making the case for alliances, not just here in washington, d.c.. it's time that we rediscovered what a former secretary of state used to call our duty to explain. this brings us full circle, back to the crucial importance of leadership. today's event is the first in a program of public events, policy roundtables, and publications that will examine these important questions and seek to provide answers that will stimulate discussion and guide american and allied policymakers to navigate the challenging international environment. we hope you will stay involved in this project and in particular, the input and

engagement of allied governments will be essential. ladies and gentlemen, it is now my pleasure and honor to introduce our guest speaker today. roughead.ary admiral roughead is a distinguished military fellow and one of the united states' most distinguished senior officers. he is the recipient of numerous u.s. and foreign awards. he led important organizational reforms and introduced numerous technological innovations. previously and perhaps most relevant today, he held six operational commands and operated closely with american allies in the pacific, europe, and the middle east. he is one of the only two officers in the navy history to have commanded both atlantic and pacific fleets, which makes him the ideal person to talk today about the role of alliances in

america's global military strategy. after his remarks, we will briefly reconfigure the podium experts isel of csis going to drill down into alliance dynamics in more detail. now, i would like to invite admiral roughead. [applause] admiral roughead: well, thank you, andrew. thanks to csis for the opportunity to share some thoughts on alliances and american leadership. i particularly look forward to the panelists that are going to be up here later, because i think it is going to be a great discussion. my interest in this topic is not simply because of recent campaign rhetoric that has raised questions regarding the relevance and efficacy of our alliance relationships, nor is it about all of the speculations swirling about as our new administration begins to take form.

like so many here, i served in a military that shaped by alliance relationships and objectives. for the entire time that i spent. i cut my teeth on very large nato naval exercises and operations, and i continued throughout my career to operate in our alliances, both in the east and west. i also had the privilege of commanding large allied commands. but those consequential alliances were forged decades ago, as andrew mentioned. and time has moved on. the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscapes are changing rapidly, particularly in europe, the middle east, and asia. thatrder in those regions grounded our alliances is slipping away. the decade plus war in the middle east has generated an

intervention wariness and weariness and much of the population and a move towards isolationism by some. in a way, it's ironic that america's most globally connected generation in history appears to want to step away from the hard work and the cost that global influence and responsibility demands. that's across the political spectrum. i find that this is an uncomfortable and regrettable and even perilous trend. whether in uniform or civilian policy positions, those of us who have been there have seen the strength and mutual benefit that comes from alliance relationships. we have experienced the necessary attention that is needed, and at times, the frustration that is experienced in nurturing those relationships. as we ponder the state of our alliances and their future, those of us who have been in the

arena and in the policy community bear responsibility for the alliance question that is taking place today. most here value our alliances. whether nato or those with our asian allies, yet we have not caused a national conversation on how broader security interest conversation into how alliances can enhance those interests. within our policy circles in the u.s., we have a vibrant, thoughtful conversation going on, and that's good. but in many ways, it is a very close self talk that can be drowned out or negated by a handful of tweets and posts that provide a very different point of view to thousands and even millions. the public's field of view in the u.s. regarding national security has narrowed. it is about isis and the violence in the middle east and avoiding another 9/11. and that's understandable.

great -- for over a decade, this has been the american fixation. the view of security is also formed by events and not trends. we think about the ukraine and maybe some rattling up in the baltics. the east china sea, the south china sea, north korea. or it's often about people, leaders. it is about putin or aside -- or assad or kim jong-un. it is not about the values that bind alliances together. we have also been cavalier, blurring the distinction of the word ally. we have allowed it to apply to others who perhaps are aligned with us, who fortunately fight with us, and they are all seemingly equal in our security lexicon.

we have not made clear that there are allies, with the associated commitments and obligations, and there are others -- valued, to be sure -- but without the status of allies. we have not articulated the common cause based on the interests and values and qualities. the coverage and discussion is too often about what allies are not doing rather than what they are doing. and what we do to help allies as opposed to how our relationship with them enables and facilitates shaping the environment consistent with our interests and to our advantage. toa wider context, we fail address the broader dimensions of national security and fixate on the military, neglecting economics, important trade relationships, and the industrial benefits that can accrue with those who are in these special alliance relationships.

even the terms we use, in my opinion you the discussion. we do not talk about the beneficial obligatory contributions fundamental to the capability and capacity of credibility. we are simple in our math, highlighting how much or how little the host nation is spending. we now go -- we neglect the costs saved by being able to maintain american forces forward. in the case of the navy, we calculate capital and personnel costs through place forward deployed forces in japan. the rule of thumb is four or five to one. if you consider that caused as -- that cost as something that needs to be factored in, it changes the equation. we prefer to focus and grade on the aggregate budget numbers and percentages and are not exact or critical enough in defining the real contribution in a military

capability capacity. we have not thoughtfully adjusted command and control structures for increased integration in this fast-paced world in which we live. the operational command and control models are essentially the same as they were when i was an ensign in the navy. related to that, we have been neglectful in emphasizing personnel integration and embedding among allies. this, too, was largely due to the exchanges that i experienced when i was a young officer. have not optimized our foreign area officer programs to our alliance interests. how many chinese born area officers have been produced , compared to foreign area officers focused on japan, korea, thailand, the philippines, in turkey? could they have made a difference in the case of the

latter three countries that are drifting of it? -- drifting a bit? while recognizing respective national interests, we have not made our alliance structures the nuclei around which others can operate easily. such integration is challenging because of the information space in which we live and operate. there are rational concerns affecting sensitive national information. there are complexities regarding the security of integrated networks. all of this becomes more complex as other nations join in, but we must be able to do this -- reshape our alliances for a new time. there are personnel factors. the cost of posting more servicemen and women and their families and other countries, the cultural adjustments that may be initially awkward in those assignments, but overwhelmingly lead to greater respect, affinity, and affection. there are realities in the numbers -- where do you get people if you want to have a more robust interaction?

where are they to be drawn from? although i think this is a good opportunity to bleed some of the excess people from our in -- overinflated headquarters, and that would be a good place to start. these are some details and how the garden of the alliances are attended. we must not forget that alliances are really about the fundamental values of the like-minded, collectively, and the shared obligations of those particular nations that they undertake together to ensure that those values define our future. i applied csis -- i applaud csis and mike green forcing the importance of alliances in our future. -- for seeing the importance of

alliances in our future. but as andrew mentioned, above all, we have to keep in mind that we in the policy world are not really the audience. there is a far more broad conversation that must be continued. thank you very much. [applause]

[no audio] [inaudible] andrew: thank you, admiral, for that terrific presentation to kick things off. you have brought an invaluable perspective to this very important issue to kick off our project. now, i'm delighted to introduce the all-star csis panel. what we are going to look to do now is really drill down into alliance dynamics in different regions. defense some of the mentions of alliances. i'm going to briefly introduce

panelists, then asked them to speak, then open up for questions toward the end. the first panelist is dr. michael green, senior vice president here at csi s -- here at csis. he served on the staff of the national security council from 2001 to 2005 as the director of asian affairs, when i met him the first time, then as special assistant to the president of national security affairs and senior director for asia. is senior vice president for europe, eurasia, and the arctic and director of the europe program here at csis. from 2001 to 2005, he was a deputy secretary of state at the bureau for european and eurasian affairs. jon alterman, on my left, another senior vice president, holds the chair and global

security ngo strategy and is the director of the middle east program here at csis. before joining csis, he was a member of the policy planning staff for the u.s. department of state. finally, a kissing her chair and director -- finally, a kissinger kathleen director, served as the deputy undersecretary for planning and forces. we have got a terrific lineup and we look forward to hearing your remarks. >> ok, we are still using the hand mic. thank you, andrew. congratulations on launching this project. it is both overdue and extremely timely, given her rents around the world and events here at home. , john is notion

here because we had to hide him in a disclosed location, but he will be heavily involved and has given us great guidance. let me talk about our allies in the asia-pacific region. generally, because of the rise of china and the north korean nuclear threat, the return of 19th and 20th century style geopolitics to that region, there is a clarity of thought about alliances in asia and about our alliances from asia that has generally made the alliances stronger over the past few years. but still, there are big questions, and over the last few months, some of the developments in the region, as andrew mentioned, have made things seem more acute. first, the good news, though. japan, our largest ally in the region, measured by defense , budget, or hosting of u.s. forces or gdp -- this year is

introducing the highest defense budget in its postwar history. it pays over $4 billion in host nation support. the japan maritime self-defense courses are measured by budget or tonnage. [no audio] [inaudible] >> the light was on. thejapan, as i said when electronics failed us, has a navy now that by most measurements is larger -- with

different kinds of firepower, of course -- but larger than the royal or french navy. the prime minister has now introduced changes to the definition of what the japanese forces can do that are historic, that increase not only japan's role but frankly there with -- their width. we should not be measuring just dollars and cents. we should also consider the enormous savings to us and also the risks that our allies incur by doing more with us, which i think is how one could define what prime minister abe is doing. korea has also introduced their largest defense budget. it pays 40% of u.s. costs, and like japan, korea is tightening our alliance with more joint planning for different contingencies, more interoperability and more

joining. in australia, recent poll showed that close to 90% of us trillions are strongly or australians90% of are strongly or somewhat in favor. in our partnership with india, our strategic framework agreement with singapore, reconnecting with new zealand and the new partners of southeast asia, all demonstrate that our security relationships and core alliances have been strengthening over the past decade or so. public opinion toward the u.s. and all these countries is quite high and pulling in the u.s. about alliances is high. polling that shows significant majorities in all these countries much prefer a us-led system in asia than a d or some other version of events. a lot of tailwind and support for an alliance structure that, as we heard, was essentially designed during the korean war. there are also some troubling

developments. whether these are systemic, one offs, fault of the u.s., internal politics, that can be debated. one factor is that all of our allies everywhere -- i? one source of uncertainty constantly in our alliances everywhere, particularly in asia with the bilateral allowances, is the old dilemma that allies have with larger partners. they don't want to get so close to the big ally that they get trapped in conflicts they don't want. but they don't want to be so independent that they risk being abandoned by the larger partner , the u.s., in the face of a dangerous threat or rising power. all of our allies -- japan, a stroke yet -- all of them are --

all of our allies -- japan, australia -- all of them are constantly negotiating this dilemma on how tight to be while still maintaining some autonomy, but not so independent that they risk being left alone. that is complicated in asia by the fact that none of our allies want to choose between the u.s. and china. so you see constant hedging and positioning. the question is, how much do we make of that? how much does it matter? is it deep systemic or just the adjustment that a deep bilateral network of alliances will have? there is great turbulence in our alliances over the past few months in asia. fundamental support for the u.s.-korea alliance is still strong, but weak political leadership is usually a recipe for difficulty coordinating strategy and managing burden sharing.

in the philippines -- support for the alliance is very high, but the president clearly has a different hymnal from which he is singing. malaysia and vietnam has both taken significant steps to invite us back in. was it too much? were they uncertain about the commitment? something that came before the election? with questions about our commitment on the south china and east china sea. why did the election or the difficulty of tpp -- i think there is no single answer. it is a combination of internal politics, external questions about the u.s., in some cases, confidence in the u.s. when an ally is confident, that is more room for the opposition to challenge and question american leadership. but it does all occur right now in a way that needs fundamental

re-examination of the basis for our alliances, what our allies get, what we get, and how to make them more effective. i would conclude by saying that at least in the asia-pacific region, there are six brief things, guidelines we should focus on. i learned is largely from admiral roughead, but it bears repeating. the answer to all these challenges we face is not distancing from allies, not controlling our allies, not any of those things. if we want to deter aggressive action by other actors, reassure our allies, and ensure that we have significant say over the strategies our allies take, then the common denominator for these is more joint operability. it occurs against the multiplier effect for your effort, it gives you more tightness as you work together.

the saying goes, we go together, -- in 1953 or 1954 when that came up, meant that we go together and don't go alone. we do this together. the second, the measure of the alliance contribution should be the effectiveness of the alliance. the carter administration tried under congressional pressure to emphasize with other allies in the pacific, a burden sharing matrix. in the 1970's and 1980's, legislation required frequent reporting on how much allies were paying. it was very counterproductive because to our allies it look ed like we were seeking economic gains. it looks like we were seeking advantage for ourselves in terms of dollars. dollars matter, but what the reagan administration found was that joint interoperability and measuring the deterrent effect that we want and then building

alliance where both sides contribute significantly, which in many cases means our allies do more. we need to think more with australia about how we deal with chinese encroachment in the south china sea. the debate is not fully developed yet. korea has to do more to have a sustainable command and control infrastructure. there are a lot of things we have to do. some of it will cost money, but not all of it. the third principle is, as we approach allies and partners in the asia-pacific region, we need to remember that we do not have a collective security organization like nato. these were created as bilateral alliances because there was such diversity of political systems, levels of development, levels of contribution, particularly since all of these countries invested in china, we were not going to get a collective security system. we need to embrace a certain

amount of diversity in our alliances. some will be highly valuable. some are important, but perhaps getting the right answers out of our allies is not as important as keeping generally aligned in a larger goal of stabilizing the system, shoring up the existing rules and norms. --course, we don't do enough heather i hope will speak on this -- to connect our key alliances in europe and asia. there is time for the kind of williamsburg summit, where thatcher and reagan and others got together and agreed without debate about what values we were trying to protect in the west. we can't call it the west anymore. there is too much of the east in there is something we stand for, the first principle, and it's global. fifth, as admiral roughead said,

history of alliances in asia and europe is a history of economic policy. beentiations have blown off the rails by this election, but i don't think there is a single governor in this country that doesn't want free trade agreements. finally, the education process of the american public, which goes beyond think tanks, congress, governors across the country. they will have to be critical partners. heather: thanks, andrew. congratulations on this great initiative. i love the dean acheson quote -- our duty to explain. i think that needs to be the mission statement. it is an opportunity. i know during the campaign, nato does not often crop up as a top

issue for discussion. we talk about the hot spots in the world, but not necessarily alliances. it was with great shop -- i was sitting at my desk, and my phone rang and it was a reporter. the question was, how would the united states withdraw from nato? i said, i beg your pardon? i got out the washington treaty and looked at it and went -- well -- it was never -- it was never a thought i thought we would ever have. president-elect trump introduced a conversation about nato. it would not be the one that i would choose, but i'm going to take the opportunity. i think in some ways we have, for a long time, been confusing price with value. that is i think what mike, you are talking about, and the burden sharing -- it is always about, how much have you paid? what is your fair share? you are a free rider. it comes down to the price. for far too long, we have not

talked about the value of our alliances. what the united states gets out of it, how it serves our u.s. interests. i like the fact that in your remarks, andrew, instead of burden sharing, we talk about our obligation, our duty to alliance. that is what sharing the duty is all about. i think we have also confused valuectionalism with the of a long-standing relationship and partnership. for this, there is bipartisan guilt. we have always been going to our alliances -- we need this for afghanistan. we need this for iraq, this for libya. but we have not done very much -- we have not attended the the garden.nded we haven't talked about the long

relationships and the values that we share. what's important? why are you participating in operations in afghanistan if you don't have national interest? why? because you are supporting the values of this alliance. when we speak only on the transactional, we erode credibility, trust, and the foundations of the relationship. what's so important about our duty to explain is why we created nato in the first place. in some ways, this is world history and civics rolled into one -- why did 12 countries gather in washington dc in 1949 to sign the washington treaty? very much as it is today, the y came together for a unifying ideal of collective dissent. that is what they are doing today. but instead of 12, there are 28, almost 29 members of nato. and so exactly, we have to put this context, these same

principles, into a 21st century context. again, it is so important to underscore -- nato was designed for and by u.s. leadership. that is why it was signed here. that's why we are the repository. it was designed for u.s. national interest and u.s. engagement. many say, after the cold war, why did nato exist? it's reason ended. but curiously, they have always found so many more operational missions to do. immediately after welcoming new it went to war, in kosovo. it has served in afghanistan and continues to serve after 15 years. ask any expert in the first time in article five, an attack against one is an attack against all. obligation was the support of the united states. that was on thought of,

unheard-of, yet it was invoked, and today, nato forces -- over 1000 nato forces have lost their lives in afghanistan supporting u.s. activities and interests. then came 2014. the russian annexation of crimea and its incursion into eastern ukraine. this is where nato's founding principles became very clear in 2014 and continue through to today. but this is not your grandfather's nato. this is a nato focusing on cyber security, missile defense, looking at hybrid activities. its operations are in the aegean sea helping to prevent access to the sea because of migration. it's got a robust agenda, militarily. but i will offer some notes of caution, as mike did as well. this is not an easy alliance.

at 12, 8 sure is not easy at 28, soon 29. there are group dynamics in such a large alliance that there is no shared threat assessment or perception. if you live on nato's eastern flank, you have one threat, russia. if you live on the southern flank, you have one threat -- migration, isis, terrorism, the instability from the middle east. miraculously, this large, cumbersome alliance has found a balance and has been able to respond to the east as well as the south. the problem with nato is that it has been so focused on the operational and the military, it has forgotten that it is a political military alliance. my hope for nato in the future would be that it tends its own garden, it's own health. as we see a rise of populism,

nationalism, and extremism in europe, that is as much of a threat to alliance solidarity and unity as a resurgent russia or attacks by isis. that is what we have to start focusing on. it is shocking to me that after the events on july 15 in turkey that there has been no discussion of the north atlantic council, about the coup, what happened and what is happening inside one of nato's most vibrant and vital members. it is surprising that at a very successful nato summit in warsaw, poland, president obama had to raise bilaterally very uncomfortable questions about colons constitutional court -- about poland's constitutional court and its internal democracy and health. those are the issues that are so tough for an alliance. it's going to mean that the alliance cannot be as strong as possible. i will close on a note that goes back to the public knowledge and

public support. nato is not the most popular. -- the most popular in many nato countries. what i find in the u.s., we talk about the united states and nato. no, it is always a we. we are nato. the u.s. air man, soldier, sailor, marine is a nato soldier, sailor, marine. we have to start talking about this as it gets inside that lives inside of us. what i found so interesting in public support -- i was involved at the state department during the 2002-2004 nato enlargement, when we brought in seven countries in central and eastern europe. we went across the country. -- across the country explaining why that was important to build support. we need to do that everyday. not just build up for when an

important ratification happens. we have to start talking to the american people about why nato is important. its values, its role. colleagues, its role is as important today as it was in 1949. mr. putin is reminding us of that everyday. thank you. jon: europe seems clean and easy compared to the middle east. quite frankly, we have not had the same kind of partnership europe ande had in asia. the middle east has had external security guarantors for half of a millennium, 500 years. we have been the most recent of them. the u.s. came into the middle east after world war ii with a deep sense that we would do external security guaranteeing right. we would protect the region from communism, doing it in part not

by directly governing but by encouraging these states to adopt more democratic modes of government. whereas democratic governance was the anti-communism of 1950's, 1960's, 1970's, it became human rights, and then it became the way we are fighting radicalism, by promoting more democratic governance. there has always been this difficult balance from the u.s. perspective of how to guarantee security for a place that does not do a good job promoting its own security. for more than half of the century, we have seen a government component to that. it has always been an element of tension because we have developed very good relationships with virtually every government in the middle east -- we have positive relationships with every government except syria and iran. we are not protecting governments from each other. there were a few bad actors in part,gion, for the most we are trying to promote more security and by doing that, we

are getting into the domestic governance of all these countries and in many cases, not winning over the population. but we are very popular among the government. it's a very strange situation we have gotten ourselves into. turkey, in the csis context, is another problem to work out. as we think about the middle used to states, it seems to me we have three different kinds of alliance relationships in the middle east. on the one hand, we have this very generous relationship with israel, which is in many ways our closest relationship, but also the most complicated. we work intimately with israel in military intelligence, but regional hostility means we don't operate publicly on regional security matters. we don't base in israel or use forward position equipment, though israel can use equipment and its own situations. israel has not taken part in the

broad regional alliances. israel also is not part of the way that the u.s. thinks about the middle east, militarily. the u.s. supplies about 20% to 25% of israel's defense fund. for an alliance, that is an interesting relationship. the u.s. is also bound by law to ensure israel maintains a qualitative military edge over any potential enemy or collection of enemies in the region. you could argue that this is a good relationship or that israel is milking the united states. i've have heard both arguments made in washington. it seems to me that this is a complicated relationship not replicated anywhere else in the world. and it is an important part of how the u.s. thinks about alliance relationships in the middle east. israel's also a major non-nato ally. but in point of fact, we have a lot of major non-nato allies the middle east.

most of them are distinguished by not being very major. really, you do have egypt, a big country, but our other major non-nato allies are jordan, andain, kuwait, morocco, tunisia, none of which are the military powers. we fight together, we do some cooperative training, basing their, but our major non-nato allies are not really major in any way. the major relationships are countries with whom we don't have formal alliance relationships, principally the u .e. and saudi arabia. we sell them tens of billions of dollars in military equipment, we do training, logistics, support. we have sold them some of our most capable equipment. the block systems, the battle tank, guided missiles. we have spent tens of billions of dollars ourselves, we have committed troops. we have done all kinds of things.

but it is not under the rubric of the formal kinds of relationships that we think about when we think about alliances. in the middle east context, this complicates your perimeter, andrew. we have a relationship with israel that doesn't fit anything we do anywhere else in the world. we have treaty relationships which are not our biggest relationships in the middle east, and we have non-treaty relationships that are the biggest relationships we have in the middle east. as a commercial venture, this works. we sell tens of billions of dollars in equipment. sales have helped to keep production lines for u.s. jets open, because we're not buying so many jets ourselves, but our gulf allies are. that keeps production lines open. but also perpetuates a certain dependency, that these days rely on united states to provide security, arguably perpetuating

conflict in the region. pete -- people say, well, these states are armed to the teeth, letting them be more adventurous than they would otherwise be, creating a need for more u.s. weapons and that the u.s., rather than contribute ing to security is contributing to tension. this comes out to be a sort of moral hazard argument of the u.s. creating the very problem it is aiming to address. the fact is that while the obama administration made an effort to allow the middle east to reach its own new equilibrium between the sunni states and iran, there is no new equilibrium to be found at all. for more than two decades, the u.s. has tried to take a set of bilateral relationships in the middle east and make them more multilateral. this has roots in the 1950's. it did not work in the 1990's

and 2000. we have tried to do things like shared missile defense, which makes a lot of sense. theou have small states in gulf, close to each other, it makes sense to share the information. but they don't trust each other to do what they want. they want a close bilateral relationship with the united states, not a broader multilateral relationship where they think the united states would be less committed to them. that creates all kinds of problems for the u.s. for what does the u.s. commitment need to be. how many are the normal u.s. troop commitment? is it what it was at the time we deposed saddam hussein? is it was what it was five years after? what is the right level? i think we have lost sight and the gulf sites -- and the gulf states have certainly lost sight of what the norms should be.

we can't avoid giving them a sense of while president-elect is coming talking about burden sharing, it is especially complicated by what we see her gulf allies in the least doing -- in the middle east doing. in many cases, the u.s. has not been directly in the fight. they had acted in ways using u.s. equipment that the u.s. objected to. how does the u.s. maintain leverage in this relationship? do you want to maintain leverage? can you avoid having responsibility? , ifhe u.s. does act itself it doesn't act