>> c-span's washington journal, live with news and policy issues that impact you. growth president discusses opposition to the republican health care plan and other growthcenter for the publn items. integrity on questions for the nonprofit organization formed to handle president trump's. transition center for korean history discusses the launch of 4 ballistic missiles on north korea. watch c-span -- join the discussion. james comey was the featured speaker at the first annual boston college conference on cyber security. the event was cosponsored by his

agency and boston college. this is just under one hour. [applause] dir. comey: this is the perfect place to have this conference. this is the perfect place for the reasons that hank shot said, not just because of the opportunities in this city and region, but because boston college is a leader in educating on these important issues. this is a great place to have it. you are stuck with me for another 6.5 years. i would love to be back again. any place called irish hall is a neat place to have this given my background.

what i want to do this morning is share with you thoughts about how the fbi thinks about the threat we all face and how the fbi has been trying to address that threat. a key part of that approach is going to involve the partnerships that special agent shaw referred to. and after i am done talking, i would love to be quiet and take your questions. you can as the about anything, i am very slippery and i will avoid things i don't want to talk about. [laughter] dir. comey: the questions have to come from the audience, not our partners in the back. let me begin by talking about the threats. to state the obvious, the threats are too fast, too big and too widespread for any of us to address them alone. the way we think about fighting terrorism is very similar. the threats are hard to see and moving quickly. we need to work together to address them. that is every bit as true when it comes to cyber threats. let me start with who we think

of as bad actors. i think of it as a stack, kind of like an evil layer cake. at the top of the stack, from the fbi's perspective, are nation states. think china, north korea, russia. that is the top of the stack that we focus on. just below that are multinational syndicates that are involved in increasingly specialized roles to steal information, money, innovation through the cyber vector and often times doing it on behalf of nationstates and often times doing it on behalf of anyone else that is willing to pay for it. nationstates, international cyber syndicates, the next layer down, the group of people we would lump together under the insider threat. that is employees, contractors, people who for any number of motivations might be moved to

penetrate a network that is well defended by the outside by penetrating it from the inside. it could be motivated by personal grudges, by ideological beliefs or money. next down the step is hacktivists. ofs is a motley crew different motivations, some financial, some political, some emotional. the bottom of the stack is terrorists. the reason i put them at the bottom of the stack is because -- deft atare at using the internet to communicate and proselize, but have not yet turned to using the internet as a tool of destruction, as logic tells us will certainly come in the future. those are the threat actors. how do they operate? they are looking to exploit the weakest link, human beings.

as strong as we make our intrusion detection systems, as good as we become at patching and firewalls we are only as , good as the cyber security of individual employees, so the whole stack of actors is focused on social engineering to find out how our people think and work and operate, and see if there isn't, through that expanded attack surface, a way into a network. what are they after? information, access, advantage. it is not just about the loss of data. increasingly we are worried about the corruption of data. think about the harm someone can do by an intrusion at a blood bank and changing blood types. an intrusion on a financial institution and changing a few digits in the holdings of an institution. and of course we are worried about the lack of access to data that shuts a business down. , which i will talk

about more in a second. the impact is obvious, as well. these are more than just attacks on our infrastructure, they are taxed on employees and customers, they are taxed on reputation, they are attacks on our economy and our security, and they are increasingly attacks on our fundamental rights, the right guaranteed to us as free people in this great country. what can we do? what can we do? we cannot prevent every attack. the attack surface is too big, the weakness of systems and people too pronounced and ubiquitous, but this behavior is subject to deterrence. people conducting cyber intrusions are not high on crack. they are not motivated and inflamed by passion that often motivates people to bad acts. there is a lot of thinking that goes into cyber intrusions, and we believe there is a way to influence behavior, to impose some thoughtfulness on people.

to do that, we believe we have to be more predictive and less reactive. we think there are three things that we can do together to address this threat. first, reduce of vulnerabilities overall, and that involves us in the fbi helping you in the private sector and our partners in the government understand what are the bad guys doing, how are they coming after us, what are their tactics, what are their techniques, what are their fingerprints? by sharing that information, we allow you to harden your target against the bad guys. we also think part of this is making cyber security a priority at all levels. am talking to a group of people who did it, but it is very important that cyber security not be one risk assigned to some guy in the basement of your enterprise to focus on. because the threat threatens the

entire enterprise, so it must be thought of as an enterprise risk. in must be thought of at the board level, and it is something that has to be embedded in every single thing and enterprise does. second, we have to work together to try and reduce the threat. i will hit that little bit more when i explained what the fbi is doing. we need to find people responsible for the intrusions and hold them accountable in order to force some reflection on that actors before they act. and we have to be better at mitigating the damage. we think we have a role to play there and helping victims understand just what as happened to them so they can get back on their feet. that is what we think we can do together, but i want to focus exactly on what the fbi strategy is here. so when you ask questions, you can poke at it and give me

feedback. there are five parts to the fbi strategy to address all things cyber. first, we are trying to focus. by that, we mean focus ourselves in a better way. we are doing that in a number of different ways inside the fbi that may not be apparent from the outside. where did the bank robbery occur? it occurred in the boston division, so boston division will work it. when it comes to cyber, that framework breaks down. he gets where it happened, if that is all you ask, you may end up with some random manifestation of a threat that is coming from someplace on the other side of the earth that is hitting many places in the

united states and around the world and just happens to pop in a particular place. we think if we find a work based on that often random manifestation of the threat, we may not be at our best. we have developed the cyber threat team model and are doing something new. we are assigning cyber intrusion based on who shows the chops. which office has shown the greatest ability to respond, detect and respond to and thwart a sophisticated adversary. and whoever is best, we give it to that office. and because physical manifestation is a real thing and there are executives that have to be talked to, victims of

have to be interviewed, physical machines have to be examined in a particular place, we allow up to four other offices to help. we call those attack offices. and to make sure it does not become chaotic, air traffic control is run from the cyber division headquarters. a field office that has shown itself to be excellent at this could be little rock, but the intrusion could be somewhere else. this has the consequence of generating competition in the fbi. we want people to try and steal ownership of a threat from other parts of the enterprise. i don't mean by being sneaky, i mean by showing you have the chops. we have shown we can work it in a great way. we think that will have the effect of lifting the entire

cyber program a good way. second, we've come up with a concept we borrowed from the world of counterterrorism, because counterterrorism requires response a moments notice to incidents that are horrific and maybe anywhere around the country or world. we have flight teams when it comes to counterterrorism, experts who have a go back with them at all times. when something happens in the united states or around the world, the team goes to that spot. we are going with the same sort of things with cyber. we have something called the cyber action team, where we have experts who know at a moments notice they have to be prepared, even though it is a virtual world, they have to be prepared to be physically present at the site of a cyber intrusion at an emergency event. these people are all over the country and know that this is one of their responsibilities.

last, in every field office, we have cyber task forces. as you heard from hank shaw, we live on the concept that we do nothing alone. we bring together great talent to form a cyber task force so we have the chops in each field office to respond to threats, collect evidence, to think in a great way about how his threat is moving. most important, to share information with the private sector and get appropriate information from the private sector. that is one way we are trying to focus ourselves. the second way is by stealing your talents. by stealing the great people who work for you, and you can see our interests are not entirely aligned here. by attracting great talent to work for the fbi, to respond to the sophisticated threat. we all face the same challenge, a shortage of cyber trained talent.

here is the challenge we face. we cannot compete with you on dough. you have more than we do. you do not come to the fbi for a living. if you did, we lied to you in the recruiting process. [laughter] dir. comey: we bad mouth you. the pitch we make is come be part of this mission, come be part of something that is really hard and stressful, that does not pay a lot of money or offer a lot of sleep, how often does that sound? the good news is that a whole lot of young people want to be part of that kind of mission and want to be part of doing good for a living. "the new york times" did a survey last year of over 50,000 young people and ask them to name their ideal employer.

50,000. the fbi was number five. apple was number four, which is a painful thing to contemplate. [laughter] dir. comey: we have to be ahead of them in terms of attracting people to be part of this mission. one of our major challenges, summed up by one of my daughters, she said to me the problem is that you are the man. i took it as a compliment. she said, "no, i don't mean that as a complement. the problem is, who would want to work for the man?" i said, you are right, but you are wrong. if people knew what this was really about, they would want to be part of this mission.

we are trying to show people what this is like your the fbi is an addictive life. most no one leaves. matter what you look like or your background, if you become a special agent, our turnover is about the same, about .5%. it is addictive work. we are trying to show people what it is like to be part of this mission. part of avoiding this you are the man trap is to be cooler than i may appear. we are not going to have beanbag chairs and granola, but close to that. we want young people to understand their opportunities in the fbi they may not realize. no opportunities will come to them. something else we face, we need integrity, we need physicality.

if you are going to carry a weapon on behalf of the united states of america, you have to be able to run, fight and shoot. and we need high intelligence and specialized intelligence. those are rare attributes. we find people who are high in integrity and cannot do a push-up. then there are the people who are great behind a computer but might want to smoke weed on the way to the interview. one of the things we're considering is can we grow more of our own? attract those great people of integrity, physicality and intelligence and grow our own specialization inside the fbi to meet the need for the talent we have today. i don't want to give away too many more of our secrets about

how we will approach this, but among the things we're trying to think about is, are there better ways to offer an interchange between public and private? one of the parts of our fbi culture is you come and never leave. we want to make it easier for agents to work in the private sector and then come back to the fbi. we are going to take great ideas from the young people we hire. we are trying to focus on talent and focus ourselves in a better way. second, we are trying to shrink the world. the cyber threat has made everyone a next-door neighbor to everyone else. belarus and boston are next-door neighbors on the internet. the bad guys have made it small. the way we have to respond is shrink back on behalf of the good people. we have to make sure we have to make sure we're clear inside the

government on who has what responsibilities. at the end of president obama's administration, he offered us the clarity that so many of us have wanted. the lanes in the road -- the fbi responsibility is threat response. to figure out what the bad guys are doing and to respond. homeland security is responsible for mitigation. being great at helping people get back on their feet. national intelligence is responsible for making sure we all have the intelligence we need to understand the threat and mitigated responsibility. but here is the deal, it should not matter who you call. one of the things we have gotten better at since september 11 is it does not matter to whom you report a terrorism threat. if you have a tip in to walk up to a sheriff's officer or an fbi

agent, it does not matter. the information will get to the joint terrorism task force almost instantly. we have to get to the same place with cyber. i think we have clarity, but you don't need to remember that. we have to get to a place and we are pretty close, that where no matter who you offer information to come a gets to the people who can act on it. that needs to be our responsibility, not yours. and we won't make the world smaller by forward deploying our people. more cyber attaches, special agents embedded in industries around the world and intelligence agents that specialize in cyber. even though intelligence moves at the speed of light, and relies on human intelligence to shrink the world against the bad people. third, we want to make sure that when a bad actor sits at a keyboard, they feel our breath

their neck. we have the literally lock people up who engage in cyber intrusions to impose cost. people often say, they are halfway around the world, how will you find them? they vacation, as well. they go on honeymoons, to visit friends, and by knitting together the good people of law enforcement and national security, we are able to lay hands on those people much more often than before. that imposes a cost that makes others think about us. even if we can't lock people up, we think it is to call out the conduct. we did that two years ago by indicting people from the people's liberation army in

china, by indicting people in iran in 2013. we believe that has a wanted poster with your face on it, even if you said halfway around the world working for another government, get your attention. even if you're working for another government halfway around the world, you to dream of traveling and your children going abroad to be educated. we have many flaws, but we are dogged people. we just gave up on db cooper recently. [laughter] dir. comey: it took us over 50 years to give that one appeared the man jumped out of an aircraft over the cascades. we don't give up. we are dog people who don't forget and we think that impacts people. we think it changes behavior. part of this is grappling as a community of nations towards norms. cyberspace is relatively new to all of us and we are, bit by bit, trying to establish norms of behavior.

among the key norms we have had discussions with our counterparts in china about our and understanding of a framework like this -- nationstates engage in intelligence gathering. they always have and always will. our job at the fbi is to stop them from stealing information for their advantage as a nation. that goes on and will always go on. what nationstates do not do and cannot do is steal stuff to make money. to steal innovation, formulas, plant seeds in order to benefit commercial enterprise. that is criminal behavior. that is different from the actions of a nationstate engaged in espionage. since the indictment of the pla actors, we have seen positive steps from china toward embracing that framework and

understanding the difference between nations they conduct an criminal activity and helping us investigate the criminal activity. we are working very hard, whether it is through indictment, arrest, prosecution or simply naming, calling it out, and making people think about us before they put their fingers on the keyboard. the fourth thing we're trying to do is help state and local partners deal with the fact that almost every criminal investigation state requires digital literacy. in the good old days, for those of you who have been around a while, you can execute a search warrant on a drug location and find one of those black composition notebooks where people would have written how many kilos and how it was split up and who would do what, who were the runners, who were the

enforcers. today, that same search warrant requires you to take it exploit lawfully thumb drives, laptops, tablets, all manner of digital devices. to do anything in the criminal investigative world requires computer literacy. one of the things we're trying to do is add better training, better partnership and lift the tide of digital literacy across the united states. the fbi, as big as we are, simply cannot get to all frauds and all intrusions coming through the internet. i'm told people get him mills from me saying i'm in nigeria and need you to wire me money. i'm never in nigeria and need you to wire me money. but that rips off old people. we think we can help our

partners of state and local law enforcement help that. and last, we have to get better in working with the private sector. you in the private sector of the primary targets of cyber intrusions because the data, the innovation, the money, every thing sits on your networks. because that is where it sits, that is where the bad guys go, whether they are a nationstate, a fraudster or the functional equivalent of a bank robber. here is a depressing facts. the majority of intrusions in this country are not reported to us. they are kept from us by companies who think, "we just need to take care of this thing and get on with their business. we don't need to get entangled with the feds, it will be such a hassle. we need to remediate this thread and pay this ransom and move on

with our operations." that is a terrible place to be. it is a great thing to hire the excellent private sector companies that are available to do remediation, but if the information is not shared with us, we will all be sorry, because you're kidding yourself if you think, i will just remediate this thing and it will go away. it will never go away. it will be back to hit you, your neighbors and your family. it is shortsighted to conclude that our interests are not aligned when it comes to this. a lot of times people think the fbi interest is long-term and mine are short term. but they are the same. how are we going to get you to talk to us more? do explain you how we operate in why we are practiced and expert at treating you like the victims that you are.

we have gotten very good over the last 100 years at treating victims of a filing crime like the victims they are and making sure they are not the victimized by a legal process, by the disclosure of personal information, so they are not retraumatized by our engagement. a company that suffers an intrusion is also a victim and they will be treated that way by the fbi. we know that one of our obstacles that we need conservative general councils. i was one of those general councils. you worry whether it will violate an obligation and a different place, what will it mean with regulators, how will this all work? this is too much risk, let's remediate and move on.

we think we have a compelling case to make based on a track record of hundreds and hundreds of investigations that we will protect your privacy, we will not share data about your employees and operations, and we will have an adult conversation at the beginning to explain, here is what we will do with the information you share with us so that you, as a counselor or ceo, can make a judgment about risks and benefits. maybe after the conversation you decide you do not want to cooperate, but i think it is highly likely that after you understand how we operate, you will. germane questioned as when your victim is, what do you need from us? i would suggest to you, what we need from you is for you to get to know us before there is an intrusion. i guarantee that all of you have significant facilities, have a

relationship with the fire department. they know your layout, your generator, your setup, your pipes. they don't know any of your proprietary information but they know enough so that if in the midst of a crisis with smoke all around, they can find their way in and save lives of people who work with you. i think we need to get to a similar place. we were able to respond to the attack on sony very quickly and were able to stop the bleeding because we knew sunny. we did not know their secrets, we were not reading their emails, but we knew there security officer and the basic contours of their network, their physical locations, and we knew enough to be on the ground within hours, probably, maybe even minutes, to begin dork that. because sony had taken the time to get to know us.

we had to make our way through a lot of smoke to do good for sony, which was a victim of an attack. if you're a security officer of a private enterprise and you don't know someone as every, single fbi office you have a facility, you're not doing their job. no you are pushing on an open door. we are not looking to know your proprietary information that we need to know you so we can help in a difficult circumstance. part of building the relationship of trust is conversations beyond the formal framework. since the 1980's, there has been a statute on the books called the classified information procedures act. one of the cia's worries in working with the fbi for many

years was, if we give you people information and you end up using a criminal prosecution to disrupt terrorists or spies, will you jeopardize our sources and methods? and we set for years, no, there is a statute that provides we can protect your information. but that did not get it done. it took case after case after case over 20 years for the fbi to show the cia that that actually will work, that we will protect your information, we will not burn your sources and methods. that built a culture of trust and understanding. i think we have to do something similar when it comes to cyber intrusion. i can talk all day about how we can protect your information, but we have to show it to you case-by-case i case to build a reservoir of trust. we are all about that right now i hope you will engage in those conversations to help us get to

that place where it is a majority of cyber intrusions, and i hope it will be close to all that are discussed was law-enforcement to we can figure out who is coming after you and how we can stop it from happening again. those are the five parts of the fbi's strategy to address cyber intrusions of all kinds. i want to hit a topic that is front of mind even though we have not talked about it a lot publicly in the last few months. i want to talk about the impact of ubiquitous encryption on our work. i want to urge you to continue to engage in what is a difficult and complicated subject. the advent of default, ubiquitous am a strong encryption is making more and

more of the room in which the fbi investigates dark. i use a room metaphor. there has always been a corner of the room where the fbi operates. just one i was getting exciting. [laughter] dir. comey: that is all the time we have, thank you. [laughter] dir. comey: picture of the room. there is always been a corner of the room that has been dark to us. this is nation states, spies, the most sophisticated criminals who would find ways to encrypt their data, find ways to encrypt, mostly the nation states, their communications in motion passing over a wire. what has happened to us since edward snowden, is that more and more of that room has gotten dark.

as encryption has become the default, no longer just the province of a sophisticated actor, but because it is sold on devices and available through huge numbers of applications, it becomes the work of the less sophisticated, of drug dealers and armed robbers and terrorists, of pedophiles and that people of all sorts. what is happening to us now, that shadow is spreading from the corner across more and more of our work. i will give you a statistic. in october, november and december, the fbi received to our examiners 2800 devices for which we have lawful authority to open. these were devices seized by state and local law enforcement or the fbi. 1200 of those devices, about 43%, we could not open with any

technique, any technique. these are devices recovered in career criminal investigations, and gang investigations, pedophile investigations. with any tool, we cannot open 43% of those devices. that is a big deal. the question we have to ask ourselves is, what do we want? we all value privacy, i hope. we all value security. we should never have to sacrifice one for the other. our founders struck a bargain that is at the center of this amazing country of ours and has been for over two centuries, and the bargain goes like this. in our great country, all of us have a reasonable expectation of privacy in our homes, cars and devices.

it is a vital part of being an american. the government cannot invade our privacy without good reason reviewable in court. but that also means that with good reason reviewable in court, the government through one enforcement can invade our private spaces. that is the bargain of ordered liberty. the most common example is if one enforcement has probable cause to believe that there is evidence of a crime in some space that you control, whether it is your house safe deposit box or car, law-enforcement goes to a judge, makes a showing of probable cause and gets a warrant. then law enforcement can search

ever the judge told them they could search and can seize whatever the judge told them they can seize. even our memories are not absolutely private in america. any of us can be compelled under appropriate circumstances to say what we remember or saw. even communications with our spouses, clergy members or attorneys are not absolutely private in america. in appropriate circumstances, i just can compel anyone of us to testify in court about this private communications. there are important constraints on law-enforcement, as there should be. that there is no such thing as absolute privacy in america. there is no place outside of judicial reach. that is the bargain. we may that bargain over two centuries ago to achieve two goals. to achieve the goal of privacy and the very important goal of security. widespread default encryption changes that bargain. in my view, it shatters the bargain.

there is something seductive about the notion of absolute privacy. i love privacy, i have an instagram account with mine followers. they are all immediate relatives and one daughter has a serious boyfriend i let in because of think it will work out. [laughter] dir. comey: i don't want anybody looking at my pictures. they're not inappropriate that they are pictures of my life. i don't want anybody seeing them. i love privacy. but i also love and live by the bargain i talked about at the heart of ordered liberty. if we are going to move to a place where wide parts of america are off limits to ordered liberty, it affects criminal cases, it is something we have to talk about. maybe it is a good thing, maybe it is a bad thing. but it is not something in my view that we should drift too. i don't want to get to a place where people say to me someday, why didn't you tell us that the room was going dark?

i'm not going to let that happen. i am keen to force a conversation about this. that people understand the impact so we can have an adult conversation. i've had lots of great conversations with people who see it differently than i do. i might not be right. people have said, you can get metadata or do lawful hacking or develope in secret the techniques -- an obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a burden i love and accept, but metadata alone is unlikely to get you there in a case against the pedophile, gangster or terrorist. and while having other technical tools can be useful, it is incredibly expensive and it does

not scale. you may be able to develop a tool that we have a search warrant to take a device to quantico and open it, but it cannot he used broadly because it is perishable. it does not solve the challenge that state and local law enforcement talk about me all over. some folks have said, rg suggesting we weaken encryption? you want backdoors. i want neither of those things. it is not a question of whether we like strong or weak encryption. i love strong encryption. we use it to protect the fbi's information. we believe it is in central to protect against the kind of cyber intrusions i talked about. strong encryption is a great thing, it allows us to protect people. though we also believe that user control of data is not a

requirement for strong encryption. an example, we issue personal electronic devices to our workforce. but we still retain some control over those devices, and we have the ability to produce, to access those devices and access information on those devices under lawful authority to it does not require weak encryption, but requires we design the system in a different way. i guarantee every business in the united states who gets their employee devices is doing this. it is not so much a technical issue as a business model issue. that does not solve the problem but i think it frames it in a way that makes more sense. here is the deal, it is not the fbi's job to tell the american people how to live. our job is to investigate. i think our job is to tell folks that would our tools are less effective, you ought to know

about it. i also don't think it is the job of tech companies to tell people how to live. their job is to innovate and sell great stuff. it is not our job or their job to decide a question at the heart of how we govern ourselves. i think it is the american people's job to figure out how we want to live and governor self. to have that conversation which is really hard, we need to do is using speared we need to stop bumper stickering each other. there are no evil people in this. it was all this effort to pick the fbi against apple, even though they are number four and we are number five. [laughter] dir. comey: maybe they don't see it as dark as i do because you live where it is sunny. there are not evil people in this conversation, they are people who share the same

values. we need to find a space to have a really hard conversation about how we want to be. we need time, space and information. and we need an understanding that everyone is approaching this debate with an open mind and genuine respect for the rule of law and for privacy and public safety. my hope is that we do not drift, that we use the opportunity of a new year to have a fresh conversation about what can we do, what might we do that helps optimize both of those values? the cyber threats we face are enormous. i don't know if we can say ahead of them. i think to say otherwise would be hubris. we are standing in the middle of the greatest transformation in human history. all of our lives are changing in

credible ways. i think it requires a humility on the part of the fbi and all of us who care about this issue to understand we may not know enough or be smart enough or fast enough, but starting from humility allows us to make better decisions. we have to be humble enough to know we are pretty good but we can be a lot better. we need to ensure that severs security is a priority for every enterprise in the united states at all levels. we need to get better and faster at sharing formation appropriate ways. need to make sure we have the right people on board fight the threat. and we need to build trust between the government and private sector. and most of all, we need to work on this together, because that makes us all neighbors, as well. thank you for being part of that conversation and the solution and thank you for your willingness. [applause]

dir. comey: i have 10 minutes, asked me tricky questions. >> [indiscernible] dir. comey: the fbi's business is not cyber offensive capabilities, so i'm not expert enough, foolish enough to start answering that part of the question. [laughter] dir. comey: i can answer the question about how companies should think about self-help in that regard. don't do it, it is a crime.

don't do it. not only is it against the law, but he runs a risk of tremendous confusion in a crowded space. i know that is a frustrating answer, maybe someday our country will change the law, but hacking back could cause all kinds of complications. before you consider it, you should talk to us and see what we might be able to do to help you. sir? >> [indiscernible]

dir. comey: that is a great question, especially the question about what can you do for small and medium-sized enterprises? find a way to be part of an information sharing alliance in your sector and find a way to build a relationship with us, even if you are a small enterprise. to become part of, for example, and effort we run that you will receive information that is

useful to you, i hope. we are trying to default to share. that requires a cultural change for us, because why would we want to share things with you? you are outside of us. you worry about sources and methods, but what we come to realize is whether it is a small company or become become a you don't need to know our sources and methods just as we don't need to know what is in your memos. we need indicators of compromise. we need the figure prints of the bad guys. that is what you need from us. we are trying to work hard to default to share. you don't need to know where he got it from, you need to know look for these ip ranges or indicators. it is more complicated the people may realize because often the information we get is another agencies information. it comes to us with an originator controlled obligation

attached to it, where the fbi is not allowed to share with anyone else without asking. it is bigger than just the fbi changing, but i think we're getting that are at it. connected to invoke guard, start an alliance in your sector, get to know our cyber attack force people and we will find ways to get to the indicators you need. >> about two years ago i heard the former director talk about the changing culture and how he thought it was reactive.

dir. comey: that is a great question. it is a challenge given the tyranny of the urgent, it is difficult to think about what may be coming over the hill. one of the things we can do is talk about it and make sure we have a focus on strategic intelligence in every part of the fbi. we rewrote our vision statement recently to caption this notion. we want to be head of the threat through leadership, agility and integration. everybody in the organization has been forced to watch me say this, and they are probably groaning to hear me say it again. the way the bad guys are trying to hurt people today, they are using different techniques and we need to adjust, but as

importantly, we need to be ahead of the threats we are not facing it. something is coming over the hill to hurt the american people that we cannot see from our side of the hill. we have to have the space and time and people to climb the hill to look out over and anticipate what is coming next. i won't bore you with the details, but a big part of that is people. deploying people and saying, your job is not to work a case. your job is not to be an intelligence analyst supporting today's issue. your job is to think deep thoughts. to me with a private sector and academia and think about what is coming over the hill. we have gotten better at that and have great talent in the organization and kind of walled them off so we don't bug them, but we need to get better. ma'am? >> [indiscernible]

dir. comey: that is a great question. health care enterprises face all the same challenges that the rest of us do, but a recent plague is important for them to focus on, and that is the ransomware plague. we have discovered that a lot of hospitals and health care agencies often don't have adequate backups for the systems and and when their files are locked up, the reaction is, we have to pay this ransom or we

cannot deliver care to our patients. as think there is a special need in the health-care sector to focus on preparing for that day, because it is disastrous to pay the ransom. when you pay the plague which is spread to more of us. we are trying to find the people behind this and physically lock them up, we have to make it unprofitable for them. they have hit a few small hospital chains around the country, and we have had circumstances where people paid the ransom and it just led to more and more attacks, because they suddenly see the health care sector as a piggy bank. all of the normal hygiene things i would talk about, patching and all that, but focus on your ability to recover from an attack if today all of your system was locked up, what would you do? i hope your answer would be, we go to the backup because we back

up multiple times a day and have everything there. in too many places, that is not true and it is a recipe for a problem. i have run out of time. thank you for this, i hope i will see you again. thank you for helping us fight this scourge. [applause] >> the u.s. attorney for the southern district of new york tweeted he had been fired. a washington post article said the firing occurred after he refused to request to resign. the move left some confusion in its wake because president trump had met with the prosecutor soon after the election and asked him to stay on. here is a look at the tweet.

a reaction to from senator chuck schumer who says, his relentless drive to root out public corruption, lockup terrorists, take on wall street, and stand up for what is right should serve as a model for all u.s. attorneys across the country. he will be sorely missed. , council on foreign relations president examines challenges to foreign policy in disarray." world in >> the thesis you put forward, you say there is considerable

continuity and how the world works during this period. describe that. >> a lot of the structure was based on this idea of sovereignty, the idea that borders were significant, they define nationstates, countries, and there was a deal out there that we will not fight -- try to change your rders you do not try to cnge hrs >>uny ghat 90 m. eaer t psintal authe opedeah-reepcent giatn. chiuss lirshe moat rpoe. esenru: mchwe leatwon'hioron, nongheonibio wen