people pay to work in academia. there's another angle to it which is i would strongly whether youeryone are an artist or politician or journalists, you should try to learn programming. programming is actually fun. building toys. we are leaving a few minutes rightso discuss human issues in the democratic republic of congo. adoptionsrnational -- sight activities, and over the years, many members of

congress have paid particular attention to human rights violations in eastern congo. u.s. president since the 1990's have appointed special envoys in the region, most eachtly russ feingold who held a special post the obama administration. about thenal concerns rc's democratic trajectory. congressional committees and policies.on and u.s.

today's conversation follows the hearing before this commission last november. despite the finding of a political agreement and the opposition, the electoral calendar has yet to be issued and the security situation has badly deteriorated. we have an opportunity today to hear from a panel of true drc on how to address these challenges.

my job ends will discuss several locations. -- will discuss challenges facing the peacekeeping over u.s. support for peacekeeping. andill go to q&a after that i would like to make sure there's an opportunity for congressional staff to ask questions if they have any. please prepare your question for the first round. >> thank you for holding this

briefing. here.a pleasure to be in line with the request of today's moderator, i will focus the globalremarks on inclusive agreement as well as highlight some of the diminished legitimacy and how it has influence a broader security. catholicd of 2006, the bishop conference sefton for process combined with a national dialogue initiative which had initially establish agreement leaders with the government. those commodities efforts did not necessarily hold the there what is often --

the earlier agreements, inosition coalition around the mlc agreed broadly to the following, a transition of 12 months, the maintenance of president kabila and other institutions in the interest of preserving continuity for prepared elections, the creation of a national unity government which would be given equal treatment throughout that period. of a committeent overseeing the implementation of the agreement known as csa. and finally, the prohibition of

whilenstitutional change the agreement has received nearly eightrt months from its achievements has -- he or enforce a nonexistent. was the first and most important shock. the chief himself was supposed to lead the csa. it would eventually lead to an application agreement on april

27. earlier, toonth move forward with the application. sadly, the goodwill built up has disappeared towards a more confrontational relationship. -- -- toiety has been justify further delays in the electoral process. nevertheless, the discretionary power of the presidency seems to

be driving the process more than the actual implementation. there was viewed as nonconsensual at the time. furthermore, mutual control and balance of power of national unity had not been achieved and the transitional government remained. the establishment of the cns a for its part was severely delayed and nonconsensual. it took nearly eight months before its members were named on july 22nd.

his position was vehemently and society for its -- an incredible sticking point has been the failure of the publication of the electoral calendar which has been a point of contention for many the process, though the head asserted in may i calendar would be publicized and nothing has followed. unfortunately, there needs to be clear benchmarks and this would be very critical to clarifying who it represent the majority as well as the opposition coalition. there have been several important challenges.

-- also there have been certain challenges regard to payment of staff. a moment -- now, enrollment has not been completed. with regards to the opening of political space, it appears there has been selected application of key provisions major cases including opposition leader have been completely blocked. only certain tv channels as well have been reopened and there is

not necessarily equal access. cash appears to be nevertheless, the majority has surprisingly emerged stronger. the ruling coalition does not suffer any further desertions to has not -- has been able others see their own future as a candidate for the presidency in contrast to aspirationst's

furthermore, although a long time ally, angola has been increasingly -- in the eyes of some, the instability is much more andrable to the short-term long-term political objectives. for their part, there are no visible signs of cracking within .he security services the relative strength is overdue to the weakest of political opposition which remains deeply divided.

-- was proposed as the prime -- has not seem to reemerge under his leadership as strong as it was prior to the agreement. part, he remains in exile. his ability to mobilize for support remains to be seen. halt theme and able to son-in-law who could have been a major player. terms, most of the -- now theyeaders to --lling for him

intercept down. with perceptions remaining, areursts of violence increasing in likelihood. one of these has been carried out which is carried out a number of attacks on police post, prisons, supermarkets is religious colt of k.uty k -- bd or -- back to the 1960's, nearly 200 buildings were burned leaderleast 200 -- its

created the political party in to0, which eventually led his election in the 2011 elections. enforcement, it has been dormant in recent years. in conclusion, the publication of a realistic consensual calendar is more crucial than ever. rejected by the opposition, the recent -- aration of the community given the potential perception that conditions of the landscape for the majority are likely more the presidenthem

himself could establish a committee within the majority and senior leadership prepare to win them. all haveonal partners -- in which all candidates can participate and compete. thank you for your attention this morning. >> thank you very much. to youk you and thanks for calling this together when you're after a hearing that are a lot of attention to the crisis in congo. to keep my remarks focused primarily on the local

dynamics of violence east of the country, recognizing that is a large area. i have summit my written statement which will be online. i will touch on some of the big issues here. three things we are looking for from the u.s. congress and where we are looking for u.s. leadership to address some of the issues. of civilians have been killed, hundreds of thousands displaced. as result, we have seen polio breakouts for the first time in three years. we now see a risk of a cholera epidemic.

in central kasai, violence broke -- in political competition over leadership. -- the region was strongly the as an opposition -- where there in been a strong history communities in the same

resolving them. i would say a moment although there has been a relative decrease in violence, there's very little reason to think anything is resolved. difficultency is very and the other -- contained in the gut, about a year or more to a great

awakening of political consciousness. that is why rarely have access to political power. interrupt into violence and inlay 2016 and we see now half a million displaced. efforts atromising the beginning of this year, just this earlier, ben nelson the military campaign to resolve as a new strategy to address the situation in all of the humanitarian consequences.

, although itfly down to tanganyika, we see -- whether that is spillover from central african, airville the immigrationreceive -- -- militia group community how i'm into what we see were for food -- and fiction between communities as we gear up for local competition in the

and armed groups. -- between other groups. there are four points on to make of that. the result is of clinical and's. local mechanisms to conflict. the fact that this competition is letting the genie out of the bottle does not mean once there is a political transition that these conflicts will go away. the things that are driving the

violence are linked to decades of trauma, mistrust between communities and existential competition in the coveted best context of extreme poverty. things deeply rooted by the same dividing lines we have seen for decades in congo which is andland, political power the legacy and mistrust across identity lines. ultimately, regardless of what happened at ae national level, these are lingering problem's that will need a sensible solution. secondly, it is very difficult they could provide a military solution to any of these conflicts.

the things that lead a pygmy to are not things met any military force is well-suited to respond to. therefore, we need to recognize that ultimately the solution is civilian and we need to put support in the hands of ordinary citizens, religious leaders, society groups will be involved in the the one to ultimately cane the solution that we hope to see. although today we ,re talking about new conflicts a possible resurgence of all conflicts, which could be talking about anywhere. system and thege

capacity to use weapons characterizes many communities. we talked about the bd k challenges. this could be anywhere until we adopt and there is a change in how the community accepts the complex, but also the political culture that is railing about how local disputes are managed in the country. finally, i think would be a mistake -- it is time to put aside the notion the idea that the country is governed by big men and has been covered by big men have big plans writing on the backs of a passive citizenry , but incapable of driving real change. the conflict we see today -- you though we talk about the historical roots and legacies that have led to them, they are

driven by frustration and , theation for change chance and desire to participate in manage their lives in a different way. the great awakening in tanganyika is driven in large part by cell phones. some of the risks in north kivu are being played out over whatsapp groups. this is something we need to recognize. this is not politics as usual even though some of the -- without, i think i would like to close with a couple of cost we see in congress. first of all, thank you for keeping the attention on this country. we still need your support.

although there is no military windown in all the humanitarian solutions will end of suffering, acting as a, because of the vast majority of resources we. that is what is the point in essential african republic. that is also being zeroed out in the budget proposal as well as some of the early drafts making their way through congress. that is a mistake and it strips us and or citizens of the best tools to prevent these from getting on a hand. secondly, we need to recognize that after the war started, millions of dollars have been spent while think everyone would

acknowledge the tremendous itorts that have been made, is not enough to me to take a different approach and a different approach to how acrosd civil society. end by sayinge although the situation we layout is perhaps in some ways bleak and perhaps some ways old, i was talking to a congolese friend yesterday who was telling me his nephew just graduated college with a degree in criminology and is moving to become a police detective. i was talking a couple of other kidsto some young pygmy the became frustrated with the conflict in tanganyika, began arming a local association is setting up these committees throughout tanganyika province. even as much as some of these seem like some of the same old challenges and problems, we need to recognize there is a

different aspiration, probably the best outline that friends of congo, whether in america or congo itself have come is aspiration of young people to make a change and to start fresh. there will be a generational change in congo and there is every reason to try to make that the moment for a new partnership between our country and the democratic republic of congo. thank you. >> thank you, mike. >> i would like to thank the commission for organizing these hearings, more important, refocusing attention on the crisis in the drc. i would like to build on what mike just said, which is that the human rights issues in the drc are not just -- were not triggered by this particular crisis. they go back, sadly, decades. some can argue back to the 1960's. i mention this because it is important to realize that much of the human rights violations and the suffering and the crises

were created over decades of bad governance or poor governance. the lack of rule of law, accountability, and the inability of external actors to help the country charter course forward and probably, in many cases, the engagement of regional powers that destabilized whatever political momentum there was towards improving governance. this has led to a number of areas of human rights concerns where there is quite broad consensus. there has been fairly consistent violent repression of protests and to mr. nations. -- demonstrations. in 2014 and police and secret forces have regularly used extraordinary violence to crack protest disrupt organized by the political opposition and human rights activists. the country has been wracked by armed conflict, both steve and and mentioned the kivus

others were the level of abuse has been fairly appalling. extrajudicial executions, summary executions, objections, and president level of gender-based violence, looting of property and distraction of livelihood has constricted does contribute it to humanitarian crises. there has also been, despite their presence and their funny, the inability of the peacekeeping force to protect civilians adequately. 2017 has only brought more of the same. , the right to freedom of expression and the right to receive information. we are aware of radio france internationale being suspended from broadcasting. two owned by an opposition leader closed. there has been eye level of threats against journalists and efforts to limit the public's access to information. including social media shutdowns

in december 2016 and 2017. i have already mentioned the use of excessive force against demonstrators. in addition to what was done on the streets, there has been the use of the courts. the harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders. the arbitrary arrest and youthion of pro-democracy these crises or these tactics have further been exacerbated by the lack of any sense of a plan to address the power transition, which i think steve mentioned. in other words, as they are being arrested, there is no alternative for the way to go are the opportunity to move the country forward. protesters that amnesty did research on were met by brutal actions by the security forces in both amnesty in the joint human rights office of the u.n. document and disproportionate

and excessive use of force. to date, there is been no conference of investigation and no one has been held accountable. , authoritiesties have been an crushed protest organized by the opposition and civil society. measures have prevented many congolese from expressing their grievances over the electoral process. public meetings and demonstrations organized by the presidential majority were facilitated. it was clearly biased toward the ruling party. the government, as i mentioned, used the justice system -- and this has been applied against members of the opposition as well as members of the mp who left the party over president ever to seek a third term. failure to atacks investigate human rights violations by the security forces. armed groups have formed new coalitions and increased the recruitment using explicit

rhetoric to justify their actions in question the legitimacy of the current government. steve mention the reports of the krugman of child soldiers. conflicts, something mike mentioned, is on the rise in different parts of the country. the government, seems to have lost its will or capacity to react to local in several areas. i think we have already mentioned the conflict that was leading to the assassinating of the traditional authority. but there are also reports of the rights or the return of the adf begin an armed group that is killed over 700 since 2014 and continues to grow in strength. we cannot talk about human rights violations in the region without talking about the deaths of the martyrs of the two u.n. experts who were found dead in

march. they've been investigating allegations of the use of mass graves by the government owned secure a forces in an effort to conceal some of the violations they had committed. the drc is on the verge of another major humanitarian crisis as armed conflict is on the rise. adf has killede more than 700, despite the robust presence in the drc of .he u.n. ethnic tensions between the groups have cost the lives of hundreds of civilians, destruction of property. there have been reports of political interference in the conflict -- it seems to be fueling attention. attacks against civilians from both communities. 150,000 people, according to u.n. can have been displaced in the north kivu. the joint verification mechanism

, international conference of the great lakes region, confirmed that m23 has resurfaced in the region. cityroup took control of a and surrounding districts in 2012 and besieged the area for about 18 months. despite allegedly being defeated and being put into camp's that were well guarded, it is said to be operating again. according to unocha, about three point 8 million people have been internally displaced in the democratic republic of the congo. 1.4 of them in the kasai region alone. this conflict treated by the implementation of the new decentralized which is later has left hundreds if not thousands dead. 600,000tates at least children have been displaced as result of the conflict in the area. 2000 may have been used by armed groups and 4000 have been separated from their families. there have been hundreds of extrajudicial executions.

an estimated -- estimates range from 1000 over 3000 having been killed. i think i would like to turn to the recommendations about what we need from the united states government. clearly, the electoral process that has been discussed already is going to need international intervention. one of the biggest challenges we have now is the vacuum or the absence of the u.s. diplomatic and political presence in addressing any type of potential resolution to the crisis. congress has a history of having paid attention to the drc and other lesser-known conflicts and of being consistently engaged by virtue of its oversight of the budget. that means that international affairs budget needs to be maintained and robustly maintain. the u.s. cannot be an actor without any influence or any resources to help bring along international consensus, more important, to help push regional

forward on amoving political settlement, which i think i would agree with is the way forward. also have an absence of leadership in the state department and the absence of an assistant secretary of state. while there are incredibly talented and committed u.s. diplomats, nothing can replace having the most senior diplomat for the region in place and engaged. as long as that absence continues, there is going to be, i think i'm a noticeable lack of political will to do that if local -- difficult things. there have been references to december 31 agreement. as a human rights organization, i would stress some of the things such as confidence building measures are incredibly important. the release of political prisoners, the investigations of human rights violations, as well as the improved protection of the u.n. he's keeping force and the national forces in protecting civilians.

i would probably and abide joining mike in saying the situation, for all intensive purposes, appears bleak, but the energy and the energy desk commitment we see from our colleagues in the drc and by the effect they are still fighting for this transition to happen is probably the most important indicator that there is hope and there are ways forward, they just need the partners to do it. thank you. >> thank you so much. last but not least, adotei akwei . >> thank you to thelantos mission for inviting me to speak to you today. i'm grateful for congress continued interest in the drc of this very troubling time for the country as we see the government using repression to maintain its unconstitutional hold on power. as we see at the violence continued to grow and spread. i have been asked to focus my remarks on recent challenges for the u.n. peacekeeping mission in the drc.

this bite its limited track record of success in many areas, it plays a vital role in monitoring and reporting on human rights file a shed's, ensuring public access to unbiased permission through its radio station, maintaining infrastructure that enables physical access to many parts of the country and reducing instability and eastern provinces. the missions role as a human rights monitor is becoming even more critical now as the congolese government continues to imprison of these and expel journalists and human rights activists. minas go faces two challenges in managing the human rights challenges described by my colleagues. first, the stalled framework of december 31 and not equipped support from the u.n. member states. on the framework, supporting the implementation of the december 31 framework is now the central menus ghost strategy. however, the government has strongly resisted efforts to move forward on implementation

and there's very little confidence in the framework among national stakeholders. if the framework fails, it will be put in an externally difficult position as a peacekeeping mission that is mandated to provide support to an illegitimate government support. sees threecretary possible scenarios. each of those poses its own challenges. the best case in error, the parties make a good faith progress toward implementation of the agreement in 2017 and credible elections -- credible elections are held in 2018 and meniscal would have to provide security for free essay collections and then reorient its activities toward stabilization and support to the new government. i think most of the members of this panel would agree that likelyo is the least one. the second scenario is the status quo. the government continues to use stalling tactics will making no real progress for the implementation of the framework. elections are not held in no realistic prospects in the

future. third is the worst case. is december 31 framework explicitly abandoned. protests break out around the country met with even more severe human race relations by the government. the country becomes extremely unstable where they cannot manage it. the most difficult aspects of the status quo scenario is determining at what point the government file asia and of the december 31 agreement are so eager he just and so unlikely to -- agree just an unlikely to change the frame work should be abandoned. the government appears to be trying to use token gestures towards implementation and it tends to strip and security as a pretext for delayed elections. in order to disguise its efforts to stall implementation. that makes it very difficult for the mission to pinpoint the moment at which the government should be considered illegitimate and when it needs to hold the government accountable for that. the second challenge i wanted to talk about is inadequate support

from u.n. member states. the drc government knows it holds the trump card. missionsekeeping cannot apply without the consent of the host state government. the president has used the threat of expulsion of the mission many times since taking office, trying to control monusco's actions. only the international community can diffuse that threat by sending strong political messages to the government that this behavior will not be tolerated. that has not happened. on the contrary, in march this year, the u.s. excessively pushed for monusco troops to be reduced by 3600, which to be intruded -- internet a bite a symbolic victory. last year, the kabila government unsuccessfully try to reduce does demand a cut of 1700 troops . the security council pushed back against that. this recent troop cut seems to roll back that progress. the budget cut of $100 million

for the 2017-2018 financial year, despite increased activities, will also be interrupted as a sign that the u.n. security counsel is not invested in monusco's success. for many years, u.n. member states have looked at how to which is made little progress toward lasting peace. the president, looking at u.n. member states to wrap up monusco and the reluctance to invest more in the drc made believe he can wait out the crisis, block effective action by the mission, and not face any real consequences from the international community. regional neighbors which can provide critical support to monusco for pressuring the government to comply with the december 31 framework have done too little. on the contrary, the drc government recently made progress in shoring up regional support. thanks to a diplomatic outreach to import neighbors, it is secured condemnations of u.s. and eu sections, statements echoing the idea that elections may need to be delayed because

of insecurity in the area, and announcement of non-african interference in the drc's domestic affairs. these actions legitimize the government's noncompliance and make it more difficult for monusco to use its good offices for the implementation of the agreement. i want to turn to a few recommendations. is there iss evidence that strong political support from the u.s. and its partners can help to improve peacekeeping missions, negotiating positions with similarly obstructive or hostile host state governments. the obama administration announced its decision in jr to lift trade sanctions against sudan and july of the sudanese government met several --ditions, including reduce and are for. during that period, the darfur mission has found -- found its freedom of movement and political influence on the sudanese government complete. -- improved.

first, the u.s. government should continue to refuse things is targeting individuals involved in actions that undermine democratic processes in the drc as well as their business interests. the decision on june 1 by the sent a powerful message. the u.s. government should expand the strategy of targeting business interests of serious human rights violators. it should consider placing under sanctions the family business that enabled the congolese government to undermine democratic processes. second, the u.s. government should put pressure on the drc government over its alleged role in the killings of michael sharp for aida and call thorough investigation. this will reinforce the drc government u.s. will not tolerate attempts to silence and intimidate you and workers. the u.n.s. mission to together with the rest of the un security council should give monusco k their guidance on when

theabila government will be deemed legitimate with the response should be. one option may be to establish a redline for noncompliance for the december 31 framework and if that line is crossed, should the newmonusco with mandates is spinning in activities that provide support to the congolese government. also.s. mission should engage in discussions with the security council about alternative strategies that could be pursued at the december 31 framework fails. for example, supporting a new interim authority while preparing for elections as was done in the central african republic or even replacing monusco with an african union mission which does not require the consent of the hosted government. fourth, the us government should engage diplomatic we with neighbor states to ensure they do not legitimize presidentkabila and put pressure on him to abide by the december 31 agreement. in addition, the white house should as soon as possible nominate an effective u.s. ambassador to the drc and

appoint assistant secretary of state for the bureau of african affairs. without u.s. leadership on those issues, it is unlikely we will going to see change. fit and finally, the u.s. government cannot advocate for support further cuts to monusco 's budget or reducing troops. unrealistic assessments of what it wants the mission to achieve and what resources it will require. thank you. thank you, everyone. i think we touched on the white horizon of important issues in drc. like i said up front, i would like to make sure any congressional staff in the audience get a chance to ask questions if you have any. if you're from a congressional office and you have a question, please raise your hand now. don't all speak at once. all right. i just wanted to make sure. in that case, i will leave my

moderator prerogatives ask a question and then we will open it up to the audience. kim, just to clarify our cut off time? >> [inaudible] >> excellent. first and my question we can go to open q&a. a lot of important terrain was covered here. i think the panelists, he did a great job of highlighting how, in a short period of time come the situation in drc and the security situation in drc has migrated away from the framework of international committee that has been used for decades of primarily looked at the kivu are arguably the expense of other important issues, but this was free much the framework in place for a long time come into a more complex, more diffuse and arguably harder to address in some ways sort of burgeoning

security situation that we really have not seen in quite some time. i wonder if i could ask you briefly to elaborate a little groups that wee in washington spend less time talking about. stephen, image and bdk -- you mentioned bdk. mike, you touched on armed groups. without going into a tie in of details due to time constraints, could you talk about how these emergent actors sort of posed new challenges to international community tools that we sort of have relied on for a long time to address issues in drc? yes, thank you, alexis. i will quickly address bdk and potentially some of the parallels that one could drop the phenomenon,

if we can call it a phenomenon of sorts, as a collaborator a malicious expanding -- conglomerate of militias expanding. they draw on mystical, religious cult-like powers. the attached from a real political movement or political aspirations other than the idea of drawing -- driving president kabila out. that vacuum of political legitimacy -- we have decentralization process that created new institutions where there was really no support for the new institutions, new governors, this sort of -- the same thing elsewhere where you have institutions that could potentially manage and have several years managed some of these local conflict that have not been able to respond and have not been seen with jenna missy needed to respond to sort of provide a voice or channels of expression of discontent by

different groups. i think there is a broad malaise with political institutions given a lack of legitimacy, but also political parties. a strong social network within the kasais decades. largely keeping the region will generally peaceful -- relatively peaceful. the same elsewhere with other political parties. institutions are no longer representative of the aspirations of people and see the attractiveness of a violent actions and now does i think that is a big challenge as you set for international action. the attractiveness of a bdk movement that comes to a central marketing and is able to commit violent acts. as horrible as that is, in the absence of real mobilization, all of the challenges of getting people in the streets to move forward, there's a certain level and otherss of youth

to see that as at least putting words into action. i think that is certainly disconcerting. thank you. just to touch briefly, alexis, the point i would make about the conflict in tanganyika and it's horrible she manager and consequences, ultimately, there are deep reservoirs of just thorny blockages to addressing legacies of. things that involve indigenous peoples and pygmies are among the most thorny and deep-seated inequalities in the country. my grandmother's lifetime come these to keep a pygmy in the bronx zoo. very historic reservoirs. some that day to colonialism and before and the slave trade. others think more recently to the more recent wars. there's a whole set of social issues that are not addressed

and don't have a channel in the moment to address them. people to take things into their own hands. that is what is happening with a militia, a primary pygmy militia group that emerged. peoplelso to extend, why turn to bdk and others for leadership. that is part of the appeal of mystic mse on it logic around some of these armed groups. i think i would highlight that, bizarrely happy to sell more -- address more off-line regarding tanganyika. >> we will go to the audience. please go to the microphone and identify ourselves before asking a question and we may take a couple of front. yes. >> you mention the u.s.

sanctions and some recommendations along those lines. i was wondering if steve and some of the others could comment on some of the impact of the sanctions so far and what impact further covenantal pressures might have -- financial pressures might have on getting electoral calendar published on time and making sure moving ahead with the political process and not toward further violence and instability. thank you. >> thank you. nyone else? >> could you comment on the decision to hold back from the mediation, whether there is any prospect for them stepping back bodyd/or is there another that could play the kind of mediating role that turned out to be so effective last year .hanks

is there a sensitive nature to the lack of u.s. diplomatic leadership? since dust does the u.s. risk losing in a region that desperately needs some kind is a pressure that clearly are not currently in place, just one other thing, mike come i was for interested in what you were saying about grassroots peace building. it seems like you are referring to some budgeting that goes into that. is that in important element and should that kind of work be expanded? thank you. >> i think we will go in order, if that makes sense, i just pick and choose which

elements you want to comment on. it has impacted calculations from the government side, impacted some shifting of positions. commanders,ecurity to hesitate a bit more, about more oppressive measures led to some shifting of command positions. -- on the other hand, it has also hardened other actors. that certainly cannot be discarded. but there are certainly some value to having that as a tool of diplomatic engagement, which doesn't necessarily exist without an abbasid or another senior leadership -- ambassador another senior leadership. with the mediation, absolutely, the fact they were brought in and that person accepted them as a mediator was extremely important giving them

credibility with a hat with a broad population and the stances they had taken about the respect to constitution. the agreement and of itself, the major provision of the agreement i think generally approved by the population. disappointment of their which role, but i think the calculations from their end with regards to the credibility of implementation process and whether they want to be seen as being too closely associated with some of the shortfalls of that process, so there are institutional regulations that are to be taken into account fromcenco's site. it would be wonderful for them to take up a strong position -- that doesn't necessarily have to be within the framework of the agreement, but it can be with consistent calls for the publication of the state of electoral calendar. once we move to that, they have a huge role to play in ensuring amongr playing field all actors.

cenco's role in society in general. ascan be a traditional rule moral authority for congolese throughout the country. >> maybe i will take up the question of peace building. one of the challenges we see an, congoans and-- elsewhere around the world, is the international community in particular, the u.s., has two very good tools at its disposal. one dealing with emerging crisis. one is the point committed to an assistance, or effective than ever before and better coordinated. of second is the deployment peacekeepers. both of those deal with the symptoms of these crises, but they are not particularly well suited to addressing the crisis like the kind we see in tanganyika. it is hard to see how diplomatic efforts or just creating political will are keeping more political pressure on the situation will resolve this kind

of grassroots issues. is work he's building steps in. the burden of pacifying tanganyika will first and foremost be led by tanganyikans threat working together, which we are receipt coming, but they need international support. -- that needscome to be part of the international strategy. that is why we look to the complex crises fund, u.s. aid conference management and mitigation, usaid human rights support mechanism to provide some of that support to civilians. those are the same accounts that are most under threat. at the same time, the ones most needed to prevent the next wave of humanitarian suffering. we are concerned as both people who work closely with these funds, but people who care about congo, that cutting these are really a penny wise and a pound foolish. otherwise, we will see these needs continue to melt if we

don't invest in more problem solving, we'll just have more problems to pick up afterward. on athink i will touch little bit on the question about sanctions. i will start by talking about of transparency and accountability. i think the decisions to weaken the transparency provisions of. frank as well as the potential threat to the conflict minerals legislation are all going to hurt not only efforts to bring better governance and accountability and potentially weaken or stop the use of resources illicitly gained in arming armed groups and facilitating the abuses of armed groups. congress does not benefit from that, not there does any of the friends of the country who want to put pressure on political actors doing bad things.

amnesty does that have a position on personal sanctions, factne cannot dismiss the that is now a consideration and i think steve mentioned that, that the calculus now has to include the potential for actually being impacted by the global rules. that is something that has to be -- i would suspect be a tool the state department would not want to lose. i think the question, denmark, you mentioned is actually a bigger one. so we talking about the current hiding in the region going back 20 years. in other words, there's been conflict in the drc a political crisis for well over 50 years. there may not be an explosion

point at the end of this, but there certainly and erosion that is more hard to fight against. i think that is what mike is stressing, that there's only a certain amount of capacity that can sustain people in their struggle for justice and governance. we are losing that. we're expending that with no real outcome at the end of it. i think that is dangerous. when you combine that with the cuts we're talking about two capacity building and sustaining civil society groups that are going to be key to this, you are looking potentially at a very, very damaging and weekend country-- weakend coming to the end of 2017 and still in political crisis. >> one more thing on the question of time pressure. i think there is some time sensitivity here. we have all been talking of a

december 31 framework. we only a few months away from that framework drawing to a close. without diplomatic presence in the region, we're going to lose the chance to take advantage of that framework. the best case scenario i laid out earlier is for the framework to be salvaged, to be pulled back from the brink of defeat. ever elections to be held. if we have that opportunity by placing diplomats in the region and appointing key state department officials, then we're losing the opportunity. quickly on sanctions, i think a lot of the evidence is anecdotal so far. to share one anecdote from an analyst in the congo who i spoke the travel ban. senior congolese

officials view brussels as a second home. just the idea that option is closed off to them really puts a big metal strain on them. they can make a big psychological impact. i think we should not neglect that psychological affect. i think there is an opportunity to use sanctions as a tool to get -- to get members of the it isment to see that more in their interest to abide by the december 31 framework than to abandon it. so whatever tools the us government can use to put pressure on them to shake those interests of would help the situation. >> thank you very much. we're slightly over our time, so thank you very much to the whole panel and please join me and thanking everyone up here for a fruitful discussion today. [applause]

kim, did you have any closing remarks? ok, thanks, everyone.