property with many individuals on nelson's behalf. we wonder why it happened. the government is alleging it was because of this corrupt relationship they had come so this was acting in exchange with these gifts. the senator claimed they were friends. >> something that on -- sunday night on q and a, randall ongoing talks about the trial of democratic senator bob menendez. sunday night at 8:00 eastern, on c-span's, q and a. the brookings institution held a discussion on the state of u.s. transatlantic relationships, and how different european countries are addressing issues, including russian aggression, trade, and immigration. this is an hour and a half.

good morning, everybody. thank you for joining us here. my name is rick jones, vice-president and director of the program here a the brookings. it's my pleasure to welcome you for today's event hosted by the brookings center. this event is part of expanding with our partnership with the brookings transatlantic initiative. this is a multi-year platform that will spur a range of new activities not only on global issues, but that the transatlantic partners can get together. we're grateful they recognize that the value that

brookings brings to this is our in depth high quality and independent research. we're pleased to be able to announce a fellow that will be joining us and add capacity to our team in answering questions in the relationship and as you see in today's discussions those are substantial. challenges faced in europe are numerous from an upsurge in nationalism and populism to turmoil following the brexit decision and concerns after the financial crisis and great exit crisis, slow growth, high unemployment. russia efforts to destabilize eastern europe and the ongoing refugee crisis. of course, the united states has a variety of its own issues to be working through which adds to the complexity of the challenge. we're approaching a pivotal european election in germany. and these issues are shaping up not only to be central to those politics, but to the broader european debate as a whole and would i say in both cases, both in the united states and europe, these debates are con straining in the way we're working in the world and tackling global issues. so i think the discussion today is extraordinarily timely and underscored the need for this expanded efforts on the transatlantic relationship and on the work we can do together. we are going to be building on that effort here at brookings. as you know, our team has had changes. fiona hill, director for center for europe and the united states, joined the white house for senator -- senior development. i'm pleased they found new leadership in tom wright and he has a book in which the transatlantic relationship is located. and we the discussion today -- is

extraordinarily timely and underscores the need for this effort on the transatlantic relationship, and the work we can do together. we will build on those efforts. as you know, we have had changes. this director for the center of europe has joined the white house, she is on leave. while she is away, i'm pleased that we have found capable new leadership in tom wright, who recently authored an important think is the best account of the changing geopolitics of the moment. have a couple of other folks joining our team, which is terrific. victoria newland, who until recently was assistant secretary of state for europe, will be joining the team. so will our current president, he sits down later in the fall and jamie and nicole have joined the team and our french visiting fellow who

joins the team now. so as you can see, we're adding considerable intellectual and power to power power-- now i am i'll turn it over to my friend and partner who will say a few remarks and we'll get under way with the meat of the day. christian. >>. [applause] [applause]

>> it is a pleasure to see so many guests, members, and people i like to thank the transatlantic community for hosting this event. -- when, the bbt i asked, the president and recently foreign minister -- we can be told the press, there has been no uncertainty this great in the history of the german-american relationship. whether or not we agree with this statement, it's beyond doubt we are facing one of the most difficult times for transatlantic relations in decades. this is among the many reasons that there is a standard of our

corporations, and under the roof of the bbt i ended to pillars, high-quality research -- and announces itars -- on the most pressing transatlantic issues and challenges of our time. nextthe course of the year, we will host events on both sides of the atlantic, to build and expand the transit market -- atlantic network. thetopic of today's panel challenges we face are enormous.

and the policies fear of external actors like the increasingly awful authoritarian government of turkey and russia, as well as transnational terrorism -- on this day, another sad note with this event unfolding in the city of london's. all of these challenges test the european union. one of europe's biggest concerns is the large flow of refugees and migrants from africa and the middle east. since 2011 civil war sent the implosion of the europe's neighborhoods, with a massive refugee crisis with several

million people headed to the european union. one dimensional populous politics, of fear as well as tendency of national isolation slovakia, looked at the fair distribution of refugees among the eu countries and ultimate contributed to brexit and other parties some of which harbor strong anti-eu and xenophobic sentiments. in germany current polls show the right wing alternative for germany to possibly rank third in the upcoming federal election

later this month. but, i mean, giving the somewhat uncertainty of polls these days, fifth or sixth place would be possible as well. these forces continue to challenge the european project from within. long-time assumptions from the benefit of open borders, the significance of a deeper and wider european union, and even the relevance of the transatlantic relationship are being contested. it's therefore only consequential that the topic of 2017 is the resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia and politics with a comparison in the u.s. and the current dynamics behind them as well as the constraints and transatlantic relations. and i will not stop without hope and optimism even though i'm german. [laughter] we can be very optimistic. this year's elections in austria and france proof that people believe in the european promise for a better future and very much i'm looking forward to you-- the german elections in a week from now, because even though they might come in as third place, by the way, finally have to face

the democratic parties on the platform, of the established platforms of the democratic system which i think will be something to look forward to. we still have the luxury in dpaerm germany. and maybe some compatriots disagree, but we have the luxury in germany the choice is between two real europeans and two democrats who run for chancellor. so, i'm looking forward to today's insight from the panel discussion on future of europe as well as the following keynote conversations between talbert and victoria knewland. new without further adieuo, i look forward to this. thanks. [applause]

>> we have a very terrific panel on the future of europe, i'm looking forward to many conversations after this. we have a really terrific line up. aisles,y has very long though i won't get into them, because we will be here all day, particularly of these two, this person here to our immediate left. she's our new visiting fellow in the center for the u.s. and europe and was previously on the policy planning staff in france. so we're delighted to have her join us for your first public event, first of many in the next

few years. william brozdiak is a nonresident senior fellow at brookings and also senior advisor, mccarty associate bubbles and poorly he is -- is a new book out that just came out this week which is titled factual continent. the subtitle is europe's crisis in the fate of the west. i haven't read it yet but i have it. i heard bill speak about this week and it's terrific look at the state of the eu, and we look forward to hearing his thoughts on that in a few minutes. constanze stelzenmuller is the senior fellow here at brookings and is our resident expert on germany and all things european and transatlantic. and kemal kirisci is a senior fellow and director of the turkey project here at brookings. let's just dive into come if i could start with you because you do have this important new book out this

week. he spent the last two years really talking to me at the senior leaders in europe, many officials and others in europe about this really remarkable set of crisis that affected the eu over the last five years. look back five years ago there were many people here who said in washington that europe wasn't an issue anymore because all the problems have been solved. how do you think about it today in terms of the optimism and pessimism? is europe in the process of unraveling or have we seen a rebound this year that it might be about to sort of turn the corner? >> thank you, tom. is a slight mood of optimism permeating europe today, but thanks to an economic recovery that's been taking

place over the last few months. i think that the landscape is more fragmented than ever. the income gap between north and south is worse than ever, exacerbated by the economic crisis over the past ten years. there's also a split between east and west as we've seen the worsening relations between poland and germany, with poland asking for war reparations which is very raw emotional subject. and also the battles that poland and hungary have been having with brussels, that they seem to be turning their back on democratic values in terms of cracking down on the free press, and the judiciary. and so there is going to be a continuing struggle to sort this out, even after the german election and the perception chancellor merkel get a fourth term. and as tom alluded to the recent crises of the refugee flows have been stopped from turkey into greece, what they've continued from north africa into italy and spain, which is creating a lot of xenophobia and tension. and

the battle to get russia to play a more cooperative role is still continuing. there's a newly

resurgent and belligerent russia, this week conducting wargames in and around belarus which has trouble a lot of people at nato. because the president the four years ago it was a prelude to what the military involvement in eastern ukraine and before that, the incursion into georgia. and beyond that there is of course the very difficult negotiations over the next couple of years with britain on the exit from european union. there's been some buyers remorse in britain, but i don't think it has reached the level word that would be the political decision by either major party to hold a new referendum and possibly stop the removal of britain from the eu. so all these problems are continuing. and i might add as poland chose which is the fastest growing economy in europe over the past ten years, the wave of population is not really -- populism is not diminishing because of economic recovery. large justice is the very populist nationalist movement and it still remains are entrenched in power. i think the classic division between right and left are being replaced in europe, the between populist nationalist and globalists, and just as it is in a way in the united states. so this is the big challenge i think over the coming years for

the west. this is what the fate of the west is at stake here and it's going to take great political courage to get this resolved. >> thank you. constanze, if we can get your perspective. people say germany is blessed with incredibly boring elections with very few excitement, which i think everyone in britain of use would probably trade for a

heartbeat and was looking at beyond that and the question mark to really about what chancellor merkel, presuming she is reelected, will do in the next sort of four years, ticket with france. but could you talk to us and the livid about how you sort of to germany's role and also the wider context in europe in the post election of our? -- >> sure. thank you very much. glad to see everybody here with a full room. i take that as a complement in europe. and the transatlantic relationship obviously. i think you can say it's boring on the surface, but i suppose germans are always a little nervous about their own country. i am certainly feeding a little nervous. the mere fact that the safety, the alternative for germany, a party that is only four years old and start out as an anti-euroanti-euro party and is not explicitly at the immigrant in some ways quite utterly at the somatic party, racist certainly and has made no effort whatsoever, a in fact, has refused all calls to distance itself from the more openly right-wing extremist elements of its movement, the fact that it's even about to enter the bundestag with dozens of members is, frankly, deeply disturbing to me although i agree with you that having them exposed to the glut of public scrutiny and having them working in the bundestag with others is probably going to reveal a lot of the weaknesses. certainly in

the course of the last four years they have made into 11 at 16 state legislators, and where that is the case their performance as legislators has been mostly abysmal. there are also members, often forgotten, some of the most egregious figures, also members of the european parliament, like many

other european pompous movements and parties, and there again they've collected hefty salaries, made rockist statements, and other words contributed very little or nothing at all to the business of governance. i don't think the world is coming to an end because of that but it will change the nature of german politics. and if they come right now they've been going from single digits where they been in the polls throughout the summer and, in fact, german polls could almost be said to be rock solid until quite recently. now the spd is plummeting to 20 and i've got friends taking bets they could go down as first 18 which would be sort of a national disaster for a party that is 150 years old. and the afd has been moving upwards to ten and even 12%, and as we know only half of the voters are not decided yet so there's room therefore surprises i fear. i think under the circumstances because with a multiparty system, it's highly unlikely the next chance will not be called angela merkel, but, of course, the succession debate begins on september 24 at 6 p.m. and one minute, right?

and that is of course intense concern to her own party, to what he wants to a successor and to germans generally but every -- whatever he also like to know is what is germany going to do on the front of european and transit letter politics? there is a huge edge and which has been more or less in suspension over the summer and both the introductory speaker here, i do want to take up all the panel times a suspect will get into some of those, but yes. i mean, the job of restarting the european project and the transatlantic at some degree begin next sunday afternoon. >> just on the succession, is it assumed merkel will stay the entire term, not just write again by which he step down before -- germany doesn't have term limits in its constitution, but it would be the only other chancellor was ever tried for a fifth term with conrad, then you said the position of the german president had been completely underrated, had have far more power than he is going to run for that. since he was already a think well into his 80s at that time, i think his party told him in no uncertain terms that wasn't going to happen. so i

doubt that merkel is susceptible to the kind of delusion that conrad adenauer at the time was i think subject you. something she's not going to do that. i doubt come distance pixelation about her jumping off to some of the position. i don't think she would do that actually. i think she would serve to the infamous something -- something stopped her. what differentia turf from a career politicians in the world is she's not needy. i think she does is out of a sense of obligation. i don't think she really needs the spotlight to exist as it were. i don't think there is some switch into that gets flipped by the spotlight of public attention and that sort of feels her up with meaning and purpose. and i think she generally thinks she has a job to do. so will be looking at the big succession of it at a think the key question before germany is, what happens to the centerleft social democrats take

the kind of counting appears denouncing itself now? does the very successful triangulation that angela merkel did come moving it to the middle of the model of what clinton did in the '90s and that tony blair did after him? the sort of, it's kind of a third way which is not on the left but on the right, and will the elements of the cdu the want to do that prevail or will the more conservative elements that want to occupy the place that's now been occupied in part by the afd, was to try and regain that and refashion a much more angular, much more shall we say ideological conservative movement?

>> the fate of the spd is a silver to the fate of other centerleft parties in europe. across the board. kemal, if we can come to you. turkey, turkeys relation with the germany of not been in great shape over the last year and it's sort of fraud relationship between erdogan and chancellor merkel. but broader than that there's also the question about turkey's roll. ten years ago people were talking about, five years even pathways the eu membership. what's your perspective on this debate and how to sort of turkey fit into sort of europe hanging in this question of europe hanging in the balance about which way it will go? well, not a day goes by without some excitement developing from turkey. the german turkish relations have been a center of it for some time. but i'd like to draw some parallels. if we were to go back just about 20,

22 years into the mid-1990s, there was a very similar situation then, too. relations between turkey, germany were terrible to do with arms purchases. germany was reluctant to did because human rights record of turkey was terrible. there was a question, the situation in the southeast. there was a member of the cabinet at the time even referring to european member of parliament from germany couple of ladies with a word that one shouldn't employ about women. this was the state of relations. but the difference between then and now is that at the time there was a transatlantic community, and including the united states, the clinton

administration. that had a big agenda for turkey and engaging turkey and anchoring it into the transatlantic community to the european union. this is a time when the customs union was adopted. this is the time when the clinton administration turn over the leader of the pkk. clearly there'd been some bargaining behind closed doors, which opened turkey to introduce

some reforms that eventually to become a candidate and then the successful negotiations started. the difference now, there are two differences. one, the commitment to anchoring turkey has been weakened. and what was shocking for me from the debate between schultz and angela merkel was that a social democrat could be dumping turkey. and the two of them reducing turkey just to one person, for relations with one person while half the country had actually voted in the constitutional, almost half of it had voted against those amendments in referendum that encountered quite a few questions about it's free and fairness. that's one important difference, the lack of commitment, both in europe and on the side of the atlantic as well. the second one is that turkey of the time had still a western vocation. very critical using very bitter language towards the eu, the west. but at

the same time still this was a turkey that was part and parcel of the project of moving along into the western world. this is where the difference lies right now. turkey is led by a leader and it's very difficult to talk about who is around him, because -- not anymore the party that he had founded with his colleagues back in 2001 and 2002 is not anymore the party that it was. the party of what was then called muslim democrats. it's not there anymore. it's a very strange political party that has in some way, excuse my language, in a stalin matter, purged the founders of our cape may, muslim founders of our cape may to the extent of removing from photographs and list appellate district this is significant. but at the same time there's also a turkey that is i think resisting the drift away from the west. in turkey we often use this analogy of a train that is

moving towards the west. but the people inside is rushing towards the east. that depiction is a good reflection. institutionally, institutionally in terms of consular europe, european human rights, wto, imf, nato, et cetera. turkey is slowly in the west. economy suspicion the last couple of years its trade with the eu has been expanding and the only area to which its exports are growing is the eu and its the united states. not the middle east, not russia. foreign direct investments are still coming into turkey, overwhelmingly from the west. and interestingly, turkey is going in the other direction as well. that is a recognition of it in the ranks of the turkish residents cabinet as well. where whenever -- president candidate whenever there's a flip from the side of the turkish leader you hear cabinet ministers meekly, meekly pointing out the importance of the vocation towards the

european union and its relations with the west. but right now the picture is one where clearly turkey's trotting away from the west, and its leader is burning with anti-western is him, and feels itself comfortable in the company of the russian leader and russia. so from the pages of europe, there is a serious challenge in there, and i think it would be great if the west, the eu and the united states were able to pull up its socks

and kind of bring back that agenda of the 1990s. and i think there would be people prepared to play that ball. thank you, kemal. celia, turned you. at beginning of year i've been almost petrified about lepen being president of france and thrilled by macron, seen as a rock star, a lot of people pinning hopes on him and turning your future fate around. but you have just come from serving in the french government, and the policy planning staff. how does it look from france? what are people sort of expectations in macron? when you look at the relationship between him and chancellor merkel, after the german election, assuming she's reelected, how realistic is sort of a grand bargain between the two of them acceptance or the -- achieve his objectives?

a happy ending. >> these two parties were utterly destroyed. >> what happened >> thank you. i'm delighted to be here for this first event. well, actually he mentioned the

campaign and it was very exciting campaign, quite differently from the german campaign. with a happy ending. happy ending, depending for whom, because the two main parties were utterly destroyed, special of the socialist party from which macron was coming from. and what happened is that macron really run a campaign on a pro-european base, and many people have pointed out that he was waving european flags during the meetings. we famously remember that he walked on the european anthem of the night of his victory. so we did something that french politicians have not done for decades, which is running a really pro-european campaign. a sort of european pride, if you want. before hand, for years now, french politicians as many of european politicians were just too happy to ask band all the difficulties would come from brussels at all the success of some of national capitals. macron just decided not to do that. after this very impressive when and the following weeks where he got a huge majority in the parliament during elections, and once again crushed the other parties, he had a rough summer and he's now facing difficulties at home. he's down 22 points in appreciation falls, and he is now i think down to 40% of favorability ratings in france, which is quite low. it's not

terrible. it could be much lower, but mainly because he's now facing a tough challenges picky wants to reform the labor laws. he's getting into the very difficulty of the governing, and governing from the center. so making obviously everybody unhappy come on the left is not on the right, so it's easier to have a general opposition to his policies. but what's interesting is that at the same time that he's doing that he's running a very i'm still running a very ambitious campaign on the front of europe, on relaunching europe. there's a sort of macron moment at the moment, at the moment -- on the european stage may because of someone to really put forward a really european narrative to put forward a vision for europe. most because the germans are busy with our own elections because the brits are busy with brexit. because if you talk about transatlantic relationship, trump is not putting for any sort of global narrative. so we can be the one really putting out new ideas. he just did several times, last week in athens in particular when he talked about european sovereignty. and this concept is

quite interesting to european sovereignty is, he's rejecting my tongue but european sovereignty is rejecting nationalism and national sovereignty, and he's basically, once again confronting populists and nationalists, and putting everything at the european level. so this concept of european sovereignty comes with some ideas around europe that should be proud of itself, a europe that protects its models and its citizens. and yes specific ideas on that. for example, he's proposing across state lift for european parliamentarian elections. when the brits will exit you will have seats opening and he wants

to do a cross europe list of parliamentarians. he's also talking about a europe of cultural heritage where he's providing answers on the identity fronts as well. he has put forward ideas on the euro zone, euros on budget, a euro zone finance minister. so all sorts of new ideas out there and now it's the turn of others to say what they think of it. they have a close relationship with merkel who seems to be warming up a little bit on these ideas. she knows that because of the fractured europe she needed to do more especially on the euro zone topic. just launched a vision, talked about the euro zone budget but he's indeed talking about the convergence of the monitor and economic front as well. i guess macron at the moment has the possibility of being heard on this topic. but

let's see if that works out. >> thank you. what of the interesting things i think about what macron is proposing, what people expect chancellor merkel to do maybe looted after the election is to try to deepen european immigration in certain areas. some are more difficult than others. but europe is not united on that. many people point to the uk obviously as the country that was sort of objecting to that but they're not the only ones. we see in central and eastern europe the very different narrative of europe what you want to see maybe less integration at the

very least sort of stagnant, they don't want to deepen integration on immigration and border controls and other issues. and with president trump's recent visit that highlight of this distinction between the polish vision baby of europe and more western european visions, if we could come back to you, i think you addressed this in the book, but how significant is the divide that is emerging between central and eastern european countries in western europe? doesn't have like real implications for where europe is headed? should we be worried about the future of democratic institutions in parts of the eu? >> well, i think that's right. after the german election we are likely to see an effort by chancellor merkel and president macron to relaunch the effort toward greater integration of europe. that would involve some very difficult decisions about how to complete the banking eugen, strengthen the eurozone, whether name a new finance minister. so you're going to see the 19 members of the eurozone attempting to move faster, and

those that are left out, the other countries, the remaining eight after britain, will feel that they are being left behind. so this idea of a multispeed europe has been kicking around for quite some time but i think once this becomes more and more evident you are going to see a lot of resistance from central and eastern european countries who feel that they will be demoted to second class, third class. and this again is going to lead to paralysis of the european process, because only decisions have to be taken on a basis of unanimity such as if they tried to come up with a new treaty, this would be stalled for years and years to come. so i think there's a recognition that this is going to be a very difficult nut to crack in terms of how you keep central and eastern european countries on

board in terms of the european project. i might add that while 70% of europeans say they want the european union, they want to remain members of the european union, only 34% of them think that europe is going in the right direction. this is across the board in eastern and western europe. so there are a lot of challenges facing the leadership, and i think this is where chancellor merkel recognizes that. the next phase of her tenure and power is going to be her most difficult. >> thank you. constanze, you wanted to come in? .. that had a nationally >> i take all of these very seriously. realay, there is also some enthusiasm in some cases for further integration.

that is what we shall say -- there are national austerity measures to do so. they obviously have a larger political background, which is the threat they saw from russia. had a lot of political -- anytime you see a spanish person who comes to washington in this -- they work the integration game more than the french. >> people in their own country -- >> yeah. it's possible. it's not impossible that that would happen. i think the spanish have really

benefited from this. significantave the interest -- interestingly. they never quite came up to this think that the independence movement is seen in of rest of spain with a lot distance. i'm not sure they would get a lot of joy out of it. i say this because the spanish federalism provides more autonomy for spanish providences than other forms of government in europe, but we will see. the other thing is a lot of europeans know that

there are problems we have that can't be solved otherwise. whether you do that they kicking the can up to the european level or you do it on a governmental level, i don't think it's really the kind of ideological issue that once was. i think most people are willing to tackle that and the seniormost pragmatic in europe is the union method which was code for let's make europe more intergovernmental. i honestly, i actually with wish the french project well. i think there are a lot of good ideas. i think the germans may apply a break on some of them. i'm hoping we find a reasonable compromise print at the end of the day, my guess is. [inaudible] one of the predictions people have had about europe is there would be more exit movements. that hasn't come to pass so far. i don't really see that happening right now. did you want to comment on the. yes, i just wanted to reflect a

bit on what bill said. we, meaning pro- european integrationist people, we sort of assumed this was simply a process that would go on to the point of even turkey becoming a member of the european union in this assumption collapsed with the financial crisis. i'm not very sure that we still have a good grasp of why it collapsed and what the implications or the consequences are out there. the reason why i wanted to come in, the way in which bill described how this europe can be destructive on itself, it made me think the dynamics in turkey. today i wanted them to explain how we came this far and of course it's based on many, many

factors but one of the critical factors wasn't 2006 the european council decided to suspend negotiations on a set of chapters. i will go into the details of this. but looking back at this coming you can see how politicians began to play on it and also public opinion sort of dropping their shoulders, beginning to look for alternatives. it is a point that i think needs to be addressed and taken up, precisely at the time, when we see europe putting projects forward including the upcoming elections in germany. i think it is not going to be an easy exercise and may be on the shoulders of the younger generation to think about and to come up with the kinds of ideas that the others in the european

union came up with just after the second european war. in terms of how, since president macron has been teaching this integration line, how does he think about it? he must be aware of the division between eastern and western europe. is he worried about a new europe or old europe divide and the big difference there or does he basically believe that the eurozone can push on ahead regardless of what others think. >> the french have always had the idea that there's a core of

europe that would move forward may be quicker, as long as it included the french. obviously, that goes without saying they were never really into. -- it was always this -- the competition between the deepening of europe in which the french were always deepening integration of europe. i'm not sure exactly what president macron thanks, but what i can see is he seems to want to replicate his message for confronting french nationalists on the french stage and the european stage meaning what he did during the campaign was really confronting the

national friends, and by pushing against her and by really demonstrating that she was mistaken, by going.by.and showing her incompetence and by putting forward a positive pro- european message, the european pride that nobody has done before and that seems to have worked. he wants to replicate that so he seems to be doing that at the moment on the european stage. it's fantastic, it's very impressive, he is very charismatic, but i think there is a risk there and i call it the obama trap. the obama trap is believing that because your election was so symbolic, because it was so strong and powerful that your words were really be meaningful to other people and by your own charisma

really take people and have them follow you in the direction you want to go. he did this several great speeches on europe, and he did this several great speeches on europe, and you can see already there is a risk of wishful thinking, exactly like obama did in 2009, putting forward a very ambitious new plan for europe but then not necessarily having the people on the other side responding to that. >> in some ways trump believed the same thing, the other should follow suit. i think it's follows the parallel that every president comes in having one in election. if i may, on the obama thing, the idea of having democratic conventions in the first half of 2018 in france on the future of europe, but he is proposing that other countries do so at the same time.

he is saying there should be more transparency over the discussion of the future of europe that it should not be discussed behind closed doors, et cetera. that's a fantastic ideas but it sounds a lot like the town hall that obama organized around obamacare idea which actually was moments for the opposition could go together and strengthened together and you had the emergence of the tea party. by being so ambitious he could solidify in opposition against him. if i met democratic conventions to be a little bit weird because i thought that's what parliament was. to have the conventions were people will come and be represented and talk about the issues of the day and policy that's where the parliament.

i just wanted to point out, i think the most frightening similarity to trump selection and the rise of the populace nationalists are these angry disenchanted voters who feel they been left behind by globalization, and that in europe, particularly among young people, it's striking that 40% of young people under 25 had voted for maureen le pen. there is a lot of worry that if president macron's policy doesn't succeed, who will be next. you mentioned earlier the central left, the social democrats have been swept away not just in france but their message has been diminished in many other countries as a result of their success. everybody accepts universal healthcare, the role of the

state and in a way andrea merkel has stolen a lot of ideas of the social democrats for her own such as gay marriage. that's right. i think the mainstream ruling parties seem to be in a state of political bankruptcy. nobody seems to have a compelling message to move forward and this opens up the space for populace on both the far right in the far left. >> i know you want to comment on this, but also this, just pivoting to brexit because i was going to come to you next about that, obviously british politics is on a very unexpected state following the election.

the negotiations seem to be running into trouble and most people believe ultimately this could be a deal between the leaders. there hasn't been much space to do this before the german election. the question is how bad is this going to get after september when people really get down to talking about the details, in germany from chancellor merkel, what's the probability of a reasonable outcome and are we likely to see it being dominated by negotiations and a real possibility with no deal. >> okay, brexit. i don't know how many of you have seen the recent editorial, the british tabloid, the sun had a great idea of publishing a pro

brexit editorial in what they thought was german. german commentators have said this is worse than google translate. it describes it as a cognac -soaked something or other and the chief negotiator has a puffed up d&d --. it's actually extremely funny. the germans have a sense of humor. in this case it's a pun. i think it's a tragedy for europe.

i expected to be a tragedy for britain and specifically those people who voted for because they thought their lives were going to become better and i think the fiscal data we are seeing from britain paints a very different picture. honestly, i deeply regret that. in my ideal world are beastly brexit would have never happened but i don't think there is an exit from brexit. i don't see that happening despite the fact that some people seem to be hoping that. i think there would be a public revolt if anyone tries that in britain so we are going to see on the european side, and attempt to get this done as cleanly as possible. i am not sure we have yet seen the outlines of a persuasive dual from britain.

if you want to divorce, just go ahead and do it, we have a household to run in a family to raise, but the one ray of light that i have seen last week, which i thought was quite interesting was this new british proposal on contributing more than 5 million pounds to the european defense fund which has just been created as part of the defense integration. that when i think is really good news. the idea around that is good news because they can become the basis for british eu defense and security corporations in ways that are both pragmatic and effective. i think we have more of that on other topics we would be a lot better off. how can we expend this attitude of pragmatism and trying to solve problems together while we are pursuing this negotiation

which we understand is final and is going to happen. that would be my take on this. the larger point i wanted to make is that i think what were looking at in europe, after this last election is over, is a series of structural changes in european politics which has been touched on with reference to democratic conventions. i think we are seeing the demise of the party system as we know it and possibly the demise of democratic republican structures. also those are dangerous. elected politicians will go along the around the structures of democracy and use social media and other forms of appeal to the electorate without going through what the institution provided for.

i think in doing so, i understand the temptation that social media provides and certainly the possible example of how to use it successfully, but therein lies a huge danger to our constitutional orders in europe and thereby to the stability of democracy and the stability of the european project and so that is something worth discussing in greater depth. >> let's comment on this. we're going to go to the audience in about ten minutes. i also want to touch briefly on vladimir putin, trump and iran. a quick follow-up on brexit, as

a point out, there was a remarkable meeting three weeks before the referendum when angela merkel met with david cameron. is there some kind of package of concessions or attractive ideas that would perhaps sway the vote in favor of remaining and she said there can be no jury rigging, we can't do this. by the way, why did you schedule the referendum thursday in the week of the final exams for university students, and on the eve of the biggest pop music festival at glastonbury which meant young people were either going to go out partying or they were studying for their exams.

sure enough, the turnout of young people who had the most at stake in this referendum was down around 30%, and that's what cost the votes. i think this is a succession of tactical blunders, and the tragedy is that the people who will pay the most are young people who avoid this. whether there is a small chance that this can be reversed, perhaps a second referendum, and on the question of whether they have leverage, given the fact that they are the strongest military power, i think they need to be very careful in how they play that card because that could be something that could generate. from the european partner. so we haven't mentioned yet which is quite interesting since they are masters of social media

and russia has played a very active role in the politics of the u.s., sort of looking ahead over the four or five year period, is there a possibility of sort of leveling off european russia relations or are we likely to see a continuation of tension and sort of a cold war of sorts between the two. what does the geopolitical picture look like? what is vladimir putin role and how does turkey play into that. we just mentioned there event that we are going to have between turkey and russia. papers had come out. >> the way i look at it is that theoretically you would think that turkey would be deeply

uncomfortable with the policies that vladimir putin has been following in its neighborhood including the annexation of crimea and what's going on in syria. the reason for it is that turkey is a country to traditionally deeply at attached to integrity yet what we see is 2 liters are getting closer and closer to each other and one of them is more enthusiastic than the other as reflected in the purchase deal, it's very difficult to take into the traditional

turkish statecraft could i think this may be the opportunity to vladimir putin's agility and flexibility that lacks on the western side. he used the coup attempt very successfully. the very issue that played to the heart of the president of turkey, at a time when they had just started to build bridges over the fighter plane. while the united states, the obama administration and the eu remained absolutely paralyzed, partly because they were unable to cash in on the way in which the public hit the streets and defended democracy. i remaining paralyzed, the west has allowed them to hijack the whole thing and even refer to the cool as a gift from god, and that's where we are here. this aspect of pollutant frightens me, the way in which he successfully swaying a whole country, if you wish, but it's government and public opinion. there is a turkish university

who has been running poles regularly over the past couple of years and is using it to see how public opinion perceptions from russia is lower than the united states. when the plane was down and sanctions came up, it peaked and it has come down. the united states is hovering at frightening levels. [inaudible] the mismanagement of the coup attempt, my point in this is that vladimir putin has this ability to cash in on what

occurred in their neighborhood and they enjoy that they play along with him and it will remain a challenge to managing it. >> thank you. one more question before we go to the audience part we have about 15 or 20 minutes. i wanted to talk about iran deal because president trump has said he is determined not to certify and we'll see if that transpires transpires. nikki haley made a speech next door on aei a week or two ago about how the u.s. may pull out of the deal. others have been speculating how that might happen. france has obviously been a leading player on the koran deal. how would europe react and what problems might arise if there was a fundamental split over iran nuclear issue? >> on iran deal, the first thing

we have to say is we have a double gain here. it's as much ideological gain around iran, letting go of the iran deal, he wants to do it. he will in a way, try to do it in one way or another. like he pulled out of the climate change. the court, he will want to find a way to show intellectual base that he has done something on the matter. at the same time, there's another game playing between the white house and congress where leaders are in a game of chicken where nikki haley is saying we are going to be on the right side and say that iran is not complying and then push congress to make a decision, whether they continue sanctions or reinstate sanctions. and so, congress is trying to not do that, to not be in a

position of being the one continuing waving the sanctions or being the one destroying the deal. that's on the american side. it's still very uncertain and i think we will see it play out over the next few weeks. they are always mentioning this sanction and that sanction might not be waived and then it is waived so it still quite uncertain. the reality is that it's going to be a big bone of contention between the u.s. and france and the u.s. and europe in general. not only because france was at the table during the negotiations, but also because france and other european countries consider it important deal for middle east and also for regional stability, thinking of the case of syria, he said several times he wants to open the door to discussions, possible discussions with the

iranians on the future of syria, and this cannot happen if you have destruction of iran. it would put all of that into question. it will be as much as climate change deal is a big bone of contention. thank you. >> i just wanted to add, following what they said on vladimir putin because i think relations going forward are going to be one of the biggest parts of contention in europe. they met or spoke about 70 times. the principal message she was trying to deliver said one of

the great diplomatic achievements of postwar germany was to build peaceful relations with all mine of its neighbors. why can't you, russia, realize that building a similar kind of peaceful and prox prosper but you do seem to be destabilizing your neighbors and you need the west because it's your strategic challenge that's come from the east. islamic radicalism from the south. she said one of the most frustrating was that she could never get vladimir putin to engage or respond to that question. it basically, as we all know, in using the hostility toward the west as a way of whipping up support for the islam regime. >> let's go to the audience to take questions. keep it short and make sure it's a question.

let's go here and then on down. >> i'm peggy yorke, the correspondent for the hispanic outlet. it seems clear that i'm behind brexit and almost all of these difficult these, the migration problem you have not mention that at all, italy is dying right now with all their immigrants, and i don't know, there's some talk about italian exit because of not recognizing the national sovereignties, the natural right to decide who can come in and who can't. what do you think about that? >> one of the european storylines is that france loved the european community and the eu as long as it can run it, but now it's the junior partner has alluded to germany having the

keys, both in terms of influence of authority and money to potentially put the brakes on some of my crowns ideas so how is this german, french partnership going to work. >> good morning. the explanation you have delivered, be it economic inequality or migration are all similarly hitting the country. the one that seems distinguishing to me is the level of hyper bipartisanship in the media and i wonder if that's in the case of france comparing it to germany or my own country austria which is way more extreme. thank you.

>> [laughter] >> you want to come in first. >> so many jokes about austrian germany. all right. on the france german mortar, i think it's up to france and if i've ever seen a french president willing and determined to take up that challenge i think it's the crown. i say goodbye to him but i would really like this to be a more balanced partnership and i like not all of his ideas but i like a lot of them and i suspect a lot of my fellow germans including german policymakers think the same thing and would love to have an excuse from some of the more rigid policies of

the german finance ministry. i actually, i think he can give us cover. the austrian problem is actually a real one. i agree with you. austria has been flirting with russia and had a really close in the last election. i worry about that. it's not to say there isn't an austrian civil society on the other side of all that, there is, but i think that austrian commitment to western-style democracy is looking a little tenuous these days. it appears to be closer to the thinking. i would like to say a word on vladimir putin. i think we upsets too much about him. i think what we should really be worried about is the fact of the

aggression in this internal affairs of western democracy, hours and yours and europe. it is not going to stop until russia becomes a different kind of country. and because it is, that is a very difficult and perhaps impossible proposition that that kind of action by russia is going to remain a challenge for us for the foreseeable future and because we no longer have an iron curtain between russia and us, the impact of these actions and their direct effect on us is going to be much more tangible. it already is much more tangible and has been for the past ten decades than ever could have been during the cold war which is why i think this metaphor is also very unhelpful. i think that it prevents the single biggest coherence, trust and resilience challenge to the

european project and indeed to independent european states that we currently have on the agenda. that's a challenge our generation needs to rise to and it will occupy us for the restaurant working lives. thank you. >> i would like to take up the? migration in italy because i think it relates nicely to some of the themes we were discussing and brought up. moving forward, this is the issue i think is even more important than the banking union union, in the sense that the european union seems to be trying to divvy up common integration. it's kind of becoming marginally deeper and deeper but it hasn't crossed the threshold and because it hasn't crossed the threshold and there's no central

authority that can take asylum-seekers and process the application from the center and then implement the decisions that have been taken up by the central body, countries on the edge of the european union, like greece and spain end up carrying the burden more and more, and it really single eyes as the tension between the desire to expand deeply integration and domestic politics that are also at the center of this area. i'm afraid they will continue to bear the brunt for a while to come. >> i'd like to point out, europe's neighborhood policy was

supposed to be a great leap forward in terms of making europe a more strategic minded entity and one of the focuses was on a developed in north africa, the way to stop immigration was to build up industries and sources of income so that people would be willing to stay home rather than across the mediterranean. when they tried to do this, it was the agricultural lobbies in europe. you have morocco, tunisia, luscious tomatoes that they were willing to export into europe in january and february, were blocked by the european union because the farm lobby in the netherlands where they grow these tomatoes as hard as baseballs wanted to keep the

market for themselves and so this shows you, look, we know all about lobbies in this country. the same thing has gone on in europe. morocco and tunisia became the two biggest sources of recruitment for isis which. a lot of the terrorists that went to the middle east came from there and just as we saw the terrorist attack in catalonia was carried out by syrian that went to spain. it was even more the case of striking right after brexit where it seems friends had to face germany on a one-on-one basis, but i still think there are a few elements that makes this relationship possible to involve with an equal relationship because france made

an interesting historical role in the construction of europe and also because it has a few elements that germany doesn't have any more. a few advantages. one of them is to be extremely credible on the security side. we know that in all the reform area, the relaunching area that wants to be put forward for the european union, one of them is defensive europe security and there you have france taking the lead on all of those. the other point is that it plays the role, sort of a bridge between germany and south of europe. at least that's what's macron is trying to do when he went to greece. there was a message there, i understand the greeks, i understand your problems with

germany and he is taking the mantle of the one being able to reconcile europe or make a bridge between these two sides of europe. on the migration question, i just want to point out that it's not only a question of all these people arriving and link to unemployment, there's a question of prosperity, will they take my job, et cetera, but it's also very much a question of identity. from the french perspective, it's harder to understand, even if we have a very high extreme right and xenophobic movement, we still are a very diverse country with waves of immigrant dating from the 60s, and decades of society, it's changing very much with 12 or 15% muslim

population, integrated to the highest level of society and i understand that it's not the case for other european country. it's different ethnic backgrounds and different immigration, so this will create a divide between east and west and different countries, and this will not be solved overnight. you have behind it all cultural and identity question. >> will do one lightning round. gentlemen here, two rows in the back and the lady appear. very quickly. >> thank you very much. in light of the fact that somebody said 34% of europe feel

that they are headed in the wrong direction, what does that say for liberal democracy overall, especially in light of migration, income inequality and social media impacts. is liberal democracy threatened? >> thank you. the lady appear. thank you. >> i would like to mention briefly the transatlantic relationship and most specifically the relationship between the u.s. and the eu. we know the situation is quite difficult these days and i have an equation. over the summer we saw macron was able to build some sort of good relationship with france. he came to the still day so do you think that he could be some

kind of bridge builder between the eu and the u.s. to allow the europeans may be to bring their messages to the white house thanks to the french president. thank you. >> the final question, yes, there on the other side, and then the panel has about 30 seconds each to answer all of the question. >> thank you very much. i was curious, can we see ratification of the european patent court and why germany seems to be holding it up. the common patent court. >> we have about four minutes. the panelist can answer any of those you choose and any other reflections.

you sort of see the glasses helpful or half empty in terms, it would be nicely to see if the corner has been turned. when we go in reverse order, if that's okay. >> yes, take this one question regarding macron trump and the state of the transatlantic relationship in general. there are many things that are pretty obviously ideologically in the way they behave in the way they talk, but when they met twice already, there was no personality clash. on the contrary. they are both new animals in the political sphere, they have never been elected to any elected office before winning the presidency, they both came in one and destroyed either their party or the system where they come from.

in a way, they saw each other in each other and their personality clicked. i think when macron. it served a purpose for both of them but it was very good for trump's image that he would be valued enough to be invited there, he appreciated that very much and was very solemn. at the same time from her crown it shows that he can talk to anybody, he's taking on the biggest challenges, even donald trump. but more generally, on the french, how the french see the transatlantic relationship, i think in a way the french had thought of donald trump before donald trump even existed. i think they realized the american guarantees would not always be there.

they would have a restricted vision of their strategic interest and will not care about the safety of europe. they had integrated this idea and had been saying for years that you are up should have its own defense, u.s. [inaudible] so now donald trump is just embodying this idea and is living proof that the french were right all along, and we love to be right so it's wonderful. the climate change and the iran deal are still going to be tense over there. >> i would like to reflect on the first question and the challenges of liberal democracy faces. i think we danced around this issue and came out in the context of brexit. you have two types of politics. one politics that takes place around the constitution, and the way in which society, for almost centuries democratic politics,

and what i am seeing in the last decade or so is that we need to reach more and more majority and populism. i personally am a little bit familiar with european history. i get very nervous and very scared of referendums. turkey was not a country accustomed to referendums and now we have a president that's pushing them, one after the other and we are seeing the consequences of that in a very creative manner. moving forward, it will be important that the establishment against which it seems there is revolt, institutions are still able to maintain that

relationship and hopefully defend that liberal democratic project that took off right after the second world war and brought us the kind of prosperity and security that we were once accustomed to and took it for granted. >> thank you. >> although i am a lawyer, i know nothing about. i will say one thing, patents are just about that it's about biotech and medical technology. huge amounts of money are involved in this. there is something of a world war going on between the american legal system and european laws on regulations. american law firms have been

ruthless in trying to impose their standards on the european markets for these things. that's a really interesting topic. let me put it that way. it's one that isn't generally discussed. whatever is established there is going to be really important. one sentence because we're just about out of time. there are many enemies out there, most of them are in our countries and that's what we have to when chancellor merkel >> when chancellor merkel returned home after her last meeting with donald trump, she said she told the political audience it's time for we europeans to take destiny in our own hands. she pointed out that for the first time in seven years, she's dealing with a president who sees europe as a commercial rival rather than a strategic

ally. i think in terms of the big picture story, going forward, we could well be at a hinge moment in history where europe feels the need to move forward to find its own way and remove itself from the strategic umbrella and security protections of the united states. >> thank you very much but i would like to thank our panel for the terrific conversation on the future of europe and we look forward to our keynote conversations in ten minutes. while we convene here on stage, i would like to thank all of you. please join me. [applause]

guestshe same event discuss the areas in which the u.s. and europe are cooperating, including nato and intelligence gathering. this is an hour. >> good morning, everybody. let me start if i can with a isy personal note, and that for a little-- more than a quarter of a century, which means we got

together in what was another millennium, it sure feels like another millennium. she was an extraordinary friend and colleague, and i, along with my colleagues here at brookings and foreign-policy, are so glad that once again she will be a colleague. and i think the timing of this part of the program fits very well with the panel that we have just heard from. and perhaps you were there for although close to about half of it and you heard a number of observations about what's going on in europe, in the eu particularly. my sense is that there was a

feeling that may be the troubles of the eu are bottoming out, and the eu is getting its act together again with, of course, the leadership of two countries in particular, and that is germany and france. how did you react to the conversation which we just heard? >> thanks, strobe. i am so delighted to be at brookings in this next chapter of my life. america's number one think tank for the last decade or more under the leadership of -- the last millennium. exactly, exactly. we will see how we do in this millennium. before i jump into your questions, stroke, i want to start on a a personal note. as strobe has said we'd been colleagues and collaborators in government and outside of

government for a very, very long time, and i'm grateful to strobe for many things including his friendship and his decency and his integrity out there in the world. but one of the things i am most grateful to strobe is that i met him, he came into government having been a journalist, when i was a young diplomat. i was just coming out of moscow. and i was trained in the very strict conformity of ways of foreign service training. and along comes a strobe with his personal relationship with the president at an enormously important moment in history as the soviet union was breaking up in russia was trying to find itself. and he taught me so many things about u.s. leadership that were different from the tight constraints that we learned in diplomatic school, but among them to start from u.s. values, to start from u.s. interests, but that it's about people,,

it's about human beings and relationships that we form with them. but it's also about taking risks for the right thing and not just doing the expected thing. and that inform everything that i try to do in government after, so thank you, strobe. in terms of the conversation today, i was glad to hear most of the big issues teased out in the conversation, whether it is how brexit gets managed, how the eu now at 27 adjusts, and how it addresses the structural issues that are holding back the and other things. i actually think that for europe, and for the uk, it may not be, it can be an exciting and positive plastic moment. my only regret is that the u.s.

is not playing its role as the third leg of the stool if you will in trying to ensure that we come out of this time now with economic growth on both sides of the atlantic, in a stronger place as a liberal democratic family. so from the eu perspective, we touched on it in the last panel in talking about the issues of migration. i think there's a great challenge now in doing the same thing with schengen that the eu has begun with monetary union, namely, fixing the holes in the boat that make it leaky. so when eu countries pull sovereignty around a bunch of schengen borders but don't address the issues of a border security force, a shared intelligence service to know

what's happening in that common space and collaborate, a common approach to refugees and the burden sharing, then you end up with a kind of explications and difficulties that we've seen. but i think these problems have been now identified. the question is whether in the context of what an eu in 27 looks like, those countries countries who are in schengen can really work strongly together to make that schengen space fair and tolerant and open to the appropriate kind of emigration with the burden sharing among them, and really make it a no go space for terrorists, and can collaborate in citizen security, please, intelligence sharing, etc. i think that is possible but it's going to take a lot more work. on the brexit side, obviously the united states benefited enormously from the fact that the uk was in the eu.

i don't think it needs to be an existential crisis on either side of the channel, that the relationship will change but only if both sides of the channel are responsible in the way they handle it. so from the eu side, while i appreciate that the rules are that you break relationship first and then you rebuild it, i don't understand how even in a divorce context you would never sort of just walk out if they get later what happens to the children and the money at that this and that that. i really think that it is in the interest of both sides, and, frankly, in the interest of the united states to talk about that simply how the crack up happen but we want to be were posted to the channel want to be on the end of this and work backwards. on the uk side, the uk is making that case strongly, but has not

yet put forward a vision of the in-state that it once the transition period that it needs, what it's willing to pay for, what aspects of the relationship and wants to keep. so i frankly think there is a positive way forward here, but both sides will have to do a lot more work. and again i just wish that the united states was playing a larger good offices role in the context because it matters to us fundamentally. you can make america great again if our greatest allies are not getting stronger and if we don't create that affirmative three-legged stool, or four-legged if you include canada on trade come on security, all of it going forward. >> let me pick up on the last thing that you said. you said the united states,, if i can put it this way, is more a part of the problem than the solution. i think you are referring to the policies of the united states government particularly, the executive branch.

but the united states is a lot more than the government. this beating today of course is -- meeting -- is part of our partnership. you guys are part of the international civil society. we are part of civil society, and we can do stuff together. you mentioned just a very quickly before we came in here that you have some thoughts about the digital age and cyber. do you want to say a little bit about that group? >> sure, but before we do that i'm not letting off the hook here as just a question or someone to turn it back on you and then we will come to digital. how about that? >> okay. >> all right. >> see what it's been like for the last 25 years? [laughter] and what is going to be for like the next i hope some period of

time. >> strobe, you have throughout the time i've known you and i think probably for your whole life been the embodiment of global integration, somebody who has believed that the more we work together, the more we depend on multilateral institutions, the stronger we will all be. i don't want to use the global governance word, but -- but you did. i did, i did. i said that i was saddened to see brexit but not existentially panicked. do you think that there's a way to go forward in the context of brexit? >> well, i think speedy i mean

come in the sense that this is this is a trend with regard to global governance rather than an integrated one. i am very, i have many, many friends in the uk. and some by the way who were levers. but both seem overwhelmingly convinced that there's no stopping brexit itself. i cling, and it's probably wishful thinking but i can also imagine ways for practical reasons that might come into stop it before it goes all the way. we all know paradox. you get halfway through a goal and then halfway and halfway and have come but you never cross the line. i would like to think that as

this extraordinarily complicated process, and dangerous process in some ways, goes forward, there might be a way of putting brexit as a bad idea in the past, that wiser heads have decided not to do. however, if that happens, and going back to the conversation we heard in the last panel, there's going to be a difficulty with europe itself. because i can't imagine the uk being passionate about more europe, i would think that the uk position would probably be less europe, while the continentals would be, would

want more. and that will be a very tough compromise. >> but isn't it the case that not all the continentals want all, the some of want the flexibility to not join the euro, i i guess they're all part of schengen, but this larger question of multispeed or variable geometry within europe and interlocking sets? to me that strikes as a way to balance the benefits of state sovereignty and the benefits of unity if countries can opt into those pool sovereignty clubs, whether it's monitored unit, whether it's shaken or whatever comes next, a higher degree of security, integration and those that -- schengen -- those the want to be in the family but not sitting at every single meal table could choose a different way. >> may be when we open up to the

audience, celia and constanze in particular might carry a a little further some of the points that they made in the course of the panel. so digital, cyber. >> well, as strobe nose and as many of you know, one of the last huge issues that we tackled in the obama administration at the very end was the russian states hacking of the u.s. electoral process and its efforts to put its finger on the scale of u.s. politics. so that combined with my going concern about tensions between the big u.s. high-tech companies, and the eu, both the commission and the member

states, has led me to do quite a bit of thinking about how the liberal democratic world can lead in this new era. and there are so many issues here from the deterrence and protection of our free spaces from malign actors. state sponsors or nonstate sponsored, to the issue of processes of services, to how you maintain privacy while allowing governments and companies the ability to chase bad guys and malign actors within the network. so there's been quite a lot of thinking in the community and i been learning quite a bit about the sense of that government but i'm increasingly convinced that if those of us in the free world

don't now start collaborating on setting some floor standards in these areas, that those who want to abuse the internet, either to control their own societies forward to invade privacy or to create security threats, will set the rules. so the question i've been asking is whether there's a way we can gather, there been efforts at global governance on this issue, but they always run across these different interests between the liberal democracies and the autocracies on these issues. so is a a time for those of us in our open free community to take the lead in what i like to call sort of a bretton woods in the digital sphere, in which others are calling a digital geneva convention? and gather ourselves, we could do this not necessarily as

committee as a whole, that interested governments and companies could start in the others to join like we did with the proliferation security initiative. microsoft and its ceo brad smith the start to think about this. we will be having some beatings with governments have been -- governors next week and i'll be excited to file a low brainpower and hope we can apply some brookings and some bosch brainpower to it as well. >> governments. i doubt that the russian government would be in the vanguard of this enterprise. >> on the contrary. theriot in the vanguard of making the world safe for digital auto charissa. we want to get ahead of that rather than have it swamp us or set the standards. and then in china of course, they are in the process of monopolizing control over their

own citizens' information because they are the alliance between the companies and the government that a, blocks out demands , and b, citizens share as much with government as they do with each other. that is a standard i don't think we want to set. >> in so far as you are comfortable in sharing with not only the group, but the public, when you were in the government, which was not that long ago, you had a lot of contacts with the russians. what is their line, if i can t it, on cyber, that obviously protects what they are doing and what all the world knows that they have been doing? >> well, in terms of this question of whether we should have a cyber compact, the

russian government has said of course, but they want to set the rules that maintains kremlin control over their own citizenry, but is less in keeping with the bargain that we would set between citizens and government. but on the question of did they do it, and what did they do, and awful those things, the president of russia has said show us some proof. by the way, some russians are very talented on this subject. so as he did in the early days in ukraine, when he was admiring of the little green men, but not taking responsibility for them, and as he did in the early days in syria when he was admiring of -- assad ad strengthenings without taking responsibility, he is nicely having his cake and eating it, too. but that takes us to russia and

the question that we have been asking each other and that was asked by the russians themselves of themselves for more than a century. as you look at where we are in relationship with both sides saying it is now at an all-time low, which we can take a little professional comfort in because we were accused of it being at an all-time low, and now it seems to be even lower. who do you hold responsible? what is to be done? what can we now move forward? is there a role for europe to play? and is there a difference between what the russian government and the kremlin are proposing and where the russian eople want to be themselves? >> the very few people in the

room who don't know russian, i will translate the first two words. the first word means who/whom. it was actually coined by stalin from a slightly longer i would say imperative for russian, and that is who is able to prevail over whom? as any government or any leader would feel, he or that government wants to be the who nd not the whom. and gloria also added two other favorite russian questions. one is who is to blame, and it is of course never themselves. and third, what is to be done? i think in all three categories

, russia has lost its way. i am sort of preempting another question, which is who lost russia? i think nobody has ever lost russia. russia sets its own course. it has its own dynamics. the last a point in two decades of the last millennium when russian leaders reformist leaders, with significant support from much of the population, felt that the system, the soviet communist system, was simply not getting the job done in

erms of this great country's ability to integrate with the rest of the world and to take care of its own people. and we all know who started that. it was a fluke, a miraculous uke, that in march of 1985 e politbureau said we just can't have funerals in red square every year or half year, and they took a chance on somebody who was convinced that he, with other reformers could reform the system. , gorbachev, failed in a

number of respects, but succeeded in a number of respects, and that was to open up to the rest of the world -- drozdiak at bill right now. bill in the previous conversation made two very, very important points. ne, russia through the ages, czars, commisars, and up until now again, they have a unique ability to make their neighbors frightened, and therefore, in a way, very vulnerable enemies, hich is tough on russia itself . it has often been said that

russia doesn't feel completely secure unless everybody else is insecure, and that blows back into their own interests. bill also pointed out what i think is an objective fact. there is a geopolitical threat to the russian state, it is not coming from the north pole, it is not coming from the west. it is coming from the south, and it is coming, over the decades to come, from the east, . d in particular in china of russia, if he had a map of his giant country and had to look at it every day

and say what do we really have to worry about down the road, it would be the strength in rms of people power of china nd the poverty of people power in the eastern part of the russian federation. but that is just not the mindset there. on my own hope -- my own hope is that the reformist period of the late 80's, up until -- actually it went into the early putin years -- will turn out to have been the new russia, and

what we are going through now adavistic on, an return to a system that didn't . rk before and one work now picking on something that you said in the context of europe, i wish the united states government had a set of policies that would from the outside create an international context for russia's continuing evolution more than it is doing right now. >> so what would that look like? strode, you are king of the world. if the u.s. were to try to improve it now, what would the elements be? >> i think the elements would -- because of the adavism or the return to the past that

russia is now -- that is the characteristic of russian policy both internally and externally, it is going to require us to go back to the remedies and the protections of our own interests, and i'm here talking about those of the olitical west. i guess ideal just preempt and say -- or give my own answer to the question. is this a new cold war? yes, it is a new cold war. it has got different characterics, and we have to character sticks, and we are going to have to use things. one is containment and deterrents and other is

engagement on those issues where there are genuinely shared interests on the part of hese contesting countries. i am thinking particularly on non-proliferation and arms control. just one point, and you know it very well. even in the really dark period the cold war, going back to the aftermath of the cuban missile crisis, the united states and the u.s.s.r. made in beating progress ack the danger of therm nuke -- therm nuclear war. that edifice and that process is in very bad shape.

while we strengthen nato, and i hope you well come back on that, having been our ambassador to nato, that despite the fact that we are going to have to beat back a lot of russian policies, we also need to return to arms control diplomacy. >> i certainly won't disagree with that. i think my -- without getting into who's guilty and all those questions, my concern -- and i ow you have a lot of fascination with and have spent your life studying the russian people, history and culture, as i have. my concern is that in this effort to close russia down gain and re-establish the zero sum principles if others around us are doing well, we must be

losing rather than seeking win-wins, is that the russian people themselves are the biggest losers, and that we are seeing that in the economic fragility. partly as a result of sanctions, partly as a result of isolation, and largely as a result of a lack of reform, that great nest egg of vereign wealth that had been built up in the sovereign years has been cut in half. for most russians, food prices are 30% higher than they used to be, and the general standard of living prices is 15% higher, while no attention has been made internally to improving health care and education. i am worried we have lots of external adventures which are really expensive and violating of the standard principles of international law and comedy, but no attention to the russian people itself. i think it is becoming

increasingly fragile in the sense that in those protests in the winter in 80 russian cities . they were small, but the protestors themselves were the 20 to 35-year-olds. they were the putin generation. they were young people who grew up not remembering the soviet union, but expecting that they were going to do better than their parents, expecting that they were going to be able to travel and go to school externally, and they were protesting the fact that they are now denied that while they see leaders ripping off the country for personal gain. i think if those issues are not addressed, all the rest of it in terms of whether we can get back to win-wins with russia are going to be difficult. >> let me just pick up on one phrase you used.

those issues have to be addressed. including the brittleness, the fragility of russian society, which is very, very different the early s of leaders, including stalin. we can't address those issues. russia is going to have to -- , we would hope russian would n its -- the degree of pluralism that has been part of the last 25 years, that there will be a critical mass including in powerful circles as well as in the population, to get back on the right path. >> i mean i think we as a country, when we base our

relationship with russia on values, on dissent of the rules of the road of the system which russia benefits from immensely from their entry into the w.t.o., the fact that we use the security council for every major thing, and we should come to iran. >> before we do, the current russia is making inroads into what we hoped would be part of the political west. i'm thinking in particular, turkey came up in the earlier conversation. turkey is now sort of dinging us by buying or at least considering buying russian arms . and then there is hungary. do you have any thoughts on that? >> just continuing the previous thought on linking them together, this notion of

standing on the side of those russians who want a more european, open, trading russia that is a positive contributor to the growing west, i think that is something we have to do at the same time that we stand very firmly, call it what you want, deterrence i think is a better word than containment, against violations of the basic rules of the road of the special system, whether it is or eizing countries ddling in elections or owe violations of the i.n.f. treaty, which is very dangerous. we could wake up one day and have medium range missiles pointing at our allies if we don't address this. we did those with consent. but i think it is incumbent on

us, whether it is in our relationship with turkey, whether it is in our relationship with hungary, or even as poland flirts with constraining the democratic checks and balances in its system, to make the case that this is not, as you said at the beginning, been good for russia. they are not getting richer by adopting this tighter more autocratic model, but not having rule of law. people don't want to invest there. when a government is essentially afraid of its own citizens, which is the net of closing space for media, closing space for democratic competition, it lives in a permanent state of tension, not a state where it can focus on prosperity, and integration and growth and opportunity for its citizens. so i think we have got to be firmer -- particularly i have

some issue with the e.u., that it sets standards of admissions for country like hungary and poland, and it needs to enforce them when you lose the checks and balances of the justice system, and free media and et cetera, if they want to benefit from the club. but similarly with turkey. turkey is a hugely important country on the land mass to us as a hinge to a more stable middle east. it is also a country that is eply divided in terms of support for a more global open turkey and support for a tighter more internal system. we have to get in there and be in that conversation with citizens. that is why i hope for a more activist transatlantic policy out of the administration. >> you wanted to say something about iran, which is important. >> yes.

>> and then we will open it up to the audience. >> yes. i think we had -- i was grad gratified that -- to see that the administration today i think, or was it esterday, made it a decision -- may the decision to preserve fundamental tenant of the jikpoa. here are plenty of existential issues that the transatlantic community need to be working on. we f we throw that out, may re-nuclearize those with a fresh wind in their sails. they should be focused with the transatlantic community on other things, including this creation of a radical dress ant

in iran's neighborhood. it's exporting of tearist policy, its effort to dominate politics in iran, iraq and et cetera. this takes you to why we need not simply a military policy in cleaninging isis out of caca, but we no ensure that we are turning territories that we free of isis into experimental zones for a more liberal, open, tolerant syria, iraq, et cetera. otherwise, those, like russia, like iran, who don't want a liberal government chosen by the people in either place, are just going to rush into the breach, and the net effect is that we will put our own blood and treasure into creating a syria that is safe for iran, russia, et cetera, rather than safe for the syrian people and

stable. >> over to you folks? es, sir? please identify yourself. >> john hudson. great to be here. just a question for ambassador nuland. ambassador, you probably will go down as one of the more influential assistant secretaries in recent years. i was hoping that you could sort of talk a little bit about, in hindsight. do you think -- do you maybe have any regrets about so openly backing the ukrainian revolutionaries and perhaps feeding the notion that this was an american-backed coup even if that is an unfair assumption, which a lot of us would agree. do you ever think about those moments that came up or have any regrets at all? i would love to hear your perspective on that? >> well, we can obviously thank

you for the compliment that was then not a compliment. [laughter] just a to remind -- just to remind where we were in december of 2013, january of 2014 and february, we had a anian government under jayakovic and people that has chosen to associate with the e.u. not to join the e.u., but to have free travel, free trade, et cetera. that was the choice of the ukrainian people, the ukrainian president at the time and the ukrainian rata. then you had this effort at financial blackmail because ukraine was also there fragile and had not succeeded in what we were pushing at the time, re-establishing its relationship with the i.m.f. so

that it could have financial stability and financial freedom of choice even as it did this. and you had russia throwing a spanner in and saying we don't like any of this and essentially bribing janakovic with a $20 billion gift, lone, whatever not to do it. then the ukrainian people exploded yunt neither the government. what we were doing, what the united states was doing in december and january was not backing a revolution. e were trying to mediate own en janakovic and his people to have ukraine not have to choose between a reasonable relationship with russia rather than a relation of economic dependence, and a europe pass. we were working on whether technocratic a government that could be a

win-win for everybody. in fact, the deal that ee americaned on february 21 of 14, that janakovic chose not to implement and flee fwra stead, that they midwifed, things that the united states had been planting the seats for and working on for many months. what happened on that famous day of the sand wimps, not cookies. i was in ukraine with kathy ashton. we were working together trying to negotiate just this. whether we could get ukraine back on the path of european integration in a way that would be a win-win, and potentially a win-win for russia itself. if ukraine could have been a pass-through to europe for russia products, and we were making that point to moskow. i had on -- i think it was the 10th of december, been working

with the opposition, the street, the leaders. kathy had been working with janakovic, and the next day we were going to switch and see if we can bring something together. that night we were awoken at 1:00 in the morning because that was the night that he took foreign advice and put militia on the streak and encircle the protestors and start squeezing. it was a very, very scary night. in the end, the maidong protestors were able to push back. and these poor 18-year-old paratroopers who were following orders were traumatized as well. i went down to the square to see both sides, both the storm troopers and the protestors, to express empathy for the position that that leadership had put both of them. there are pictures of me

actually giving sandwiches to the berkut. russia of course in its own rewriting of history made much of this and used that little symbol to sort of declare that we had always had a secret plot, that this was a counterrevolution, but it is not true what happened, and not true to the desires of the canian -- of the ukrainian people. [inaudible question] >> absolutely. and there are pictures to prove it, yes. but i do think it speaks to the power of russian propaganda and the ability to pervert narratives, that that sort of narrative has really stuck. that it was all about me and i was on some road policy, yes. >> in the back? > thank you.

i am from the netherlands. you mentioned poland and hungary, and you said you took issue for not doing more to uphold the rule of law in these countries. i am all for that, but i am wondering what else could be done? the union was throwing everything that could be done, sugita them in court. there is a difference to the u.s. despite was read in maybe there, is no ds secret e.u. army to send in there. what else could be done? what could european institutions do? what solutions are there? > well, i am not in favor of sending in a militia. that wasn't what i was intending. i do note that both countries continue to benefit from massive amounts of financial trance ter from central e.u. cohesion funds, et cetera. and there has been no effort to

link those to democratic standards. now you are going to tell me that e.u. rules don't allow that. perhaps they should. >> bill? >> thank you. i would like to hear you elaborate a bit more did not >> nobody wants to ask a question to strobe? >> you can't deflect it. you mentioned technology and democracy, which i also find a fascinating subject. a decade ago the interpret was seen as a powerful tool to spread democracy around the world, help populations, ciroc event censorship of their government, et cetera, and yet autocracies like have used the internet much more effectively, the great fire wall in china, et cetera. this is one area where europe seems to be taking the policy lead. germany and the e.u. have ssed laws saying that unless

facebook or other social media giants remove hate speech and other objectable things from the internet within 24 hours, they will be subject to huge fines. do you think this is some direction where the united states should go? that is, imposing the onus of sponsibility on these social media giants? cebook, amazon, to respect democracy and to work for government, or do you think this would be as thee companies argue, that this would hinder or violate american laws and hinder their own freedom of action? how do you work

>> thanks for that, bill. look, there are two things here. the first is that one of the great powers of our democracy, and you saw it in the original bretton woods was that we had this very flexible ability to have dialogue between government, policymakers, and business, and industry when we are at our best. on this set of subjects, whether it's on the european side or whether it's on the u.s. side, we need more of that. we need a single conversation about how you come on the one hand, protect privacy but on the other hand, allow law enforcement to operate. what's the responsibility of companies to police their platforms against abuse by state actors or tears or criminals? what can government do to help them?

what should the legal standards be? we can have that conversation as compared to what's happening in russia and china where governments are setting the standard in a very illiberal way. i think we need to have it. i felt in watching the hacking thing mushroom in 2016, that what we needed was a u.s. unified in her agency that was inviting all of the majors and some of the innovators in the international site to address the problem together. that's point number one that i think we can take the lead on. the second thing is with that getting into putting the government sort of down without the conversation, i am very admiring, particularly of what france did to blunt, neutralize, deter hacking in the context of the presidential election. they did far better than we did because they attributed in real time, because they exposed in real time and i think germany is doing a better job as well, particularly after the garbage campaign about the young girl. so we need to learn from that,

and part of that goes to making, again, if you had that constant conversation between industry, governments, by government i mean both policy and intelligence, and the legal regulators, you can move much more quickly than we were able to move and we will have to. that takes the back to this bretton woods or digital geneva convention of us, let's set the standard with industry, not impose them on industry and met as show the world that liberal democracies can get the best out of the stivers technologies, which have put us together. i can tell a maidan story from this, that is a positive. so on that very night when they were encircling and trying to squeeze the protesters, the bells ring and the snow is coming down and the protesters were singing to try to create some moral authority to push

back the police, we, the united states, at about 1:30 a.m. in in secretary kerry's name, but at a very strong statement calling what's happening on thesquare disgusting, and we had it translate into both russian and ukrainian in real time. i literally sat in my hotel room in kiev having worked on this statement. the minute we push the button, within five minutes, all across maidan on tv could see them hold up their phones reading this statement and gaining strength from it. so without their cell phones that would not have happened. it was a direct relationship between us and the people. >> last question, and very quick one. >> thank you. ambassador nuland, i would like to ask you first of all if you take a stance making an are assessment about the past? do you recognize the mistakes

that you may have done in monitoring the european affairs ? and also, what is the biggest disappointment that you had in collaboration with the europeans europeans? what is the biggest disappointment from the europeans that you had while working with them? and last question for the president, and you also. what is the greatest fear and the greatest hope that you have in regards to the european union for the next 10 years? thank you so much. >> i would have liked to react much more speedily to the annexation or effort to annex donbass than we were able to. recognizing what those green men were, getting more pictures out, more support out of various kinds. i think we could have blunted it earlier.

i think the greatest mistake that we made together, the community, is when we began negotiating the implementation of the minsk agreements. we did it in parallel rather than doing it as a single negotiating structure, u.s. and europe. we had pushed for that as you know but for a variety of reasons it didn't come together and that just allowed space for those who didn't want to deal to get out of the way. i think the biggest, the thing that my heart still believes about was syria. as you know i was spokesperson of the state department in the first obama term under secretary clinton and i had to from the state department podium every day in 11:00 and 12:00 get up and justify what was going on, and i am certainly on the team that thinks that we should have done more in 11, 12, 13, 14.

we should have done more together with your and that we might have prevented the refugee crisis. we might have, a whole bunch of dominoes fell from that of most importantly it matters to usthe transatlantic community that the middle east has a chance to organize itself liberally. and its citizens in the middle east have right to have a say in how their governed and have opportunities that we have. it's not good to be stable and good for us without that, and syria is the linchpin strobe. >> my biggest fear, i'm sure shared by many, leaving the north korean issue aside, i do worry about miscalculations on the part of russia as it probes and bullies and sends its military assets into the sovereign territory, and

particularly maritime areas in the nordic region. i can see putin testing of the article v issue, and he might do so in a way that could either really undermine nato, or it could bring us to a very serious conflict.

as for my hopes, i have always felt, even during these troubled years of the last five or so, since the recession, that the european project, as such, with goes beyond the eu, is the single most bold and successful in many, many ways, an experiement in transnational if not supranational governance, which i think is absolutely imperative if we are going to have a good century. i was heartened by much of what was said in the previous panel, and i hope that we can get to a point where there is a constituency both in the populations of these countries as well as the leaderships, that the big slogan should be let's make globalization great again. >> thanks. >> thank you. you.anks to all of

[applause] tori coming to brookings is a great boom to us in a great boom to the other institutions. i do think your idea about a cyberproject could be one that not only you will find colleagues here at brookings eager to work with you but other institutions and one thing. the washington think tank is reaching out in many ways to get out beyond the beltway, but particularly in the puget sound silicon valley area.

perhaps with our friends, we can find some partners on the other side of the atlantic. >> ok, go forth and be transatlantic. good to see you. thanks. [indiscernible] >> saturday night at 10:00

eastern on afterwards, david was born on his book, reinventing america's schools, treating the 21st century education system. he is interviewed by chester finn, president of the fordham institute. >> my argument in the book is that the places in the country that have embraced charters the most systematically are also the fastest improving cities in the country.

make everyying school public school charter, i am saying if we look at the data , we want something that works for kids, but treat every public school like a charter. we can call it something else, a district school, innovation school, renaissance school, whatever. let's give it the autonomy so that people who run the school and make the decisions. and create the school model that can work for the kids they have to teach. and let's hold them accountable for their performance. if they do a great job, let's let them open another school. terrible job, let's replace them with a stronger operator. saturdayoperators at at 10:00 eastern on book tv. sundays at 7:00 p.m. on oral histories, a series of six interviews with prominent

photojournalist. this sunday, a conversation with frank johnston about his photos and career. out,en they brought oswald he was within three feet of me when jack ruby, who lead out from behind me and went between bob jackson and i, fired the gun. we were all thrown to the floor because there must have been 100 police in that basement that sunday morning. >> watch ever photojournalist interviews on oral histories sundays at 7:00 eastern on american history tv c-span3. next, suspense profile interview with housing and urban develop secretary ben carson. he talks about the challenges he faced in his childhood, what made him want to become a doctor, and the future of his department. this is