will be given the same recognition as those in national or state veteran cemeteries. i reserve the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman reserves. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. takano: thank you, mr. speaker. i yield myself such time as i may consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. takano: i rise in support of h.r. 3657 which would provide headstones and markers for spouses and children buried in tribal cemeteries. the v.a. provides a headstone or marker for eligible spouses or children who are buried or inturned in a national military post or state veteran cemetery. however, they are not eligible for a government furnished headstone or marker if they are buried in a private or tribal cemetery.

this bill would resolve this inequity to make sure that veteran spouses and children who are buried at tribal cemeteries are provided government headstones or markers which would be the same at national or state cemeteries received. h.r. 3657, as amended, does -- amended does enjoys brought from members port of the house veterans' committee. mr. poliquin and the memorial subcommittee for bringing it to the floor. native americans have deserved the same rights, honors and privileges others receive. i strongly support h.r. 3657 as amended and urine my colleagues to join me and i reserve the balance of my time, mr. speaker.

the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman reserves. the gentleman from tennessee is recognized. mr. roe: thank you, mr. speaker. i now three yield minutes to mr. bruce poliquin of maine. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from maine is recognized. mr. poliquin: thank you very much, mr. speaker. i appreciate it. i am very grateful that the house will be voting on this commonsense piece of legislation tonight. i am very proud to represent the holden band in holten, maine, who created the first, mr. speaker, the first tribal veteran cemetery, not only in maine, sir, but along the entire east coast. this past summer, mr. speaker, i was very surprised to learn family members of veterans buried at tribal cemeteries are not provided the same treatment as those buried at state and national veteran cemeteries.

h.r. 3657 fixes this permanently. it would ensure the family members of veterans who are buried at tribal cemeteries such as at the indian tribal cemetery in holton are provided with government furnished headstones. the same treatment as those buried at national state veteran cemeteries. you know, mr. speaker, we are all americans. folks put on the uniform, whether a man or woman, whoever they are, wherever they live, whatever cemetery they are buried in. they deserve the same respect, the same honor and same treatment. i am thrilled to tell everybody listening here this moved out of committee, this commonsense fix, this bill moved out of committee with unanimous support. mr. speaker, mr. chairman, i am asking for that to happen tonight when it appears on the floor. with that, mr. speaker, i yield back my time and i am grateful for our chairman to bring this up tonight. thank you, sir.

the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from maine yields back, and the gentleman from tennessee is recognized. mr. roe: i reserve the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from tennessee reserves. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. takano: mr. speaker, i have no further speakers and, again, i strongly support h.r. 3657 as amended and urned my colleagues to do the same and mr. speaker, i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from california yields back his time. the gentleman from tennessee is recognized. mr. roe: thank you, mr. speaker. i want to thank both sides of the aisle for these great bills we are passing this afternoon. it may seem like a small bill to the american public but to the individual that's affected in maine or wherever it may be, this is a huge deal and i want to thank our -- my colleagues on the democratic side for all of the work they've done on the committee in a bipartisan way. it's a great committee to work on. this is a very important week for all of us as we go home this friday to begin celebrating veterans day. two very important days on the committee are memorial day and veterans day. to honor those who passed and those who are still with us.

and i just want to thank both the republicans and democrats. we put that at the door's edge. this week we'll be voting on some very important pieces of legislation. we have seven more bills on the floor tomorrow, and i just -- i want to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for the support they have given the veterans in our country. i once again urge members to support this legislation and i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from tennessee yields back his time. the question is will the house suspend the rules and pass the bill h.r. 3657 as amended. those in favor say aye. hose opposed, no. in the opinion of the chair, 2/3 being in the affirmative, the bill is passed and without objection the motion to reconsider is laid on the table. without objection, the title amended.

pursuant to clause 12 of rule 1, the chair declares the house in recess until approximately 6:30 today. tonight on "the communicators," a look at russian sponsored political ads and the effect they had on the 2016 election. we're joined by reporters. >> we have an idea of what

happened, we know of a number of ad purchased, it's possible there were more. we know of fake accounts that purchased ads on twitter and some action on google. what we don't yet know is whether there was collusion with the trump campaign buying ads on social media and we don't know if it swayed the election one way or the other. >> we picked up some wider ranging concerns lawmakers had such as the lack of accountability in the law for them. you had john kennedy from louisiana not particularly active on tech issues grilling them on data privacy. data privacy is not something that has a huge part of this russian investigation but it was clearly worrying him and i think a lot of americans were worry. while we understood that russia was the foe coufs the hearings and the urgent matter, there's a brder set of concerns that maybe is fueling some of this

distrust on big tech platforms. >> watch "the communicators" tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span . -- on c-span2. >> tomorrow we're live in baton rouge, louisiana, for the next stopen the c-span bus 50 capitals tour. the louisiana secretary of state and attorney general will be our guests on the bus during "washington journal" starting at 9:20 a.m. eastern. >> earlier today the house ways and means committee began going over the house republican tax reform bill. tomorrow that work continues, being led by committee chair kevin brady of texas and raking member, richard neal of massachusetts. live coverage resumes tuesday and wednesday at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span3. you can also watch online at c-span.org or listen on the free c-span radio app. tomorrow virginia and new jersey are electing new governments.

in new jersey, ed gillespie is running against ralph northam. new jersey, it's lieutenant govern kim guadagno facing off against phil martin. earl for the tonight georgetown university held a symposium on the impact of former president clinton. this is an hour and 10 minutes, a look at the clinton foreign policy agenda. >> good morning. thank you for being here. i want to thank mike bailey, for moderating the last panel and the mccord school for

public policy for hosting the last panel on bill clinton's vision of america. looking forward now to continuing the conversation as we go a little bit more global. i'm the executive director of the institute of politics an public service at georgetown's mccord school and we couldn't be more proud to be organizing this clinton 25 symposium. before we begin the next conversation, much has been hoya bout our first president and his decision to come to georgetown to be -- to enter the school of foreign service, the only school he pplied to. as a high school student. in part because he wanted to expand his horizons and get a more global view than some other schools would allow him to. as we prepare to have a conversation about his global vision we thought it would be fun to reflect for a few minutes on bill clinton and his ime at georgetown.

enjoy this walk down memory lane and we'll continue the conversation right afterwards. >> 200,000 people converge on the nation's capital. >> there was a lot of political and cultural movement, we were involved. it was just a very intellectually fascinating time. >> and then you've got those deep fiss yours that began to emerge -- fissures that began to emerge in the last dwhreefers vietnam war with ivil rights.

>> i met bill clinton the first night i was at georgetown. >> i think everybody was meeting each other, meeting bill clinton because he was an jut going guy. >> this arkansas accent, he'd be speaking, and people would be laughing. he's having a good time. things haven't changed in 50 years. >> he was very bright, very articulate. >> he was very well known at georgetown. very affable, friendly. >> he has an uncanny ability to remember your families, friends, names, your dates, when i would hear him talk or sit on the stoop and expand about something i was convinced his was a guy going someplace.

>> he was a person who knew what he wanted to do. he said would you nominate me for freshman class president? i said sure. you had a sense he was a natural. >> the ethos of this place, the women and men for other the public service. this is very much bill clinton. >> after martin luther king was assassinated, washington blew up. he just took a piece of paper and drew a red cross and put it on the side of his car and drove down into the burning, he wasn't affiliated, he didn't call the red cross or anything he just went. >> i always -- always reaching out with that southern people skills that he possessed. >> so help me god. >> so help me god. >> congratulations. >> i don't think anybody ever expects a friend to be president of the united states. >> and of course once he was

elected, in the back of everybody's head was, oh, will we have the reunion at the white house? he was so generous as a friend that he invited all of us to the white house for the 259 and 30th reunions while he was president. >> i had the time of my life. it's been wonderful to see all of you. >> i think he is as proud of georgetown as georgetown is proud of him. he has always felt that georgetown made him in many ways. >> he has a deep affection for it. i served in his white house for eight years and it was always clear, from time to time we would talk about some influence of this place. >> he could have gone any place, he's so bright. he could have gone to arkansas and just been, surrounded by people from the south but he chose to go. and go to georgetown and meet totally different people. experience different things. >> he always presented himself as a kid from arkansas.

i mean, that's who he is. who he was. and he was -- he felt that was as good as it got. >> president bill clinton has remained the same. from the days that i met him at niversity until today. [applause] >> that story about him taping a red cross to the side of his car gets me every time i hear it. let me start with housekeeping. georgetown university is committed to standards promoting speech and expression that foster the exchange of ideas and opinions. while it's recognized that not everyone may share the same views as the speakers it is expected that everyone in attendance respect the right of the speakers andering nicing group to share their perspectives and ideas by not causing disruption to the event's activities. at the conclusion of the event

there will be a question and answer sess session in which you may ask questions and engage in dialogue. please be sure to phrase your comments as a question and we ask each person to only ask one question. while it's heart warming to see so many people from president clinton's class and journalists here that we, during the event itself limit the questions to questions from students and the eorgetown community. we are excited to partner with the walden school of foreign service on this next panel on how bill clinton viewed the world, what his role is, what role it could take, how that impacted america's foreign policy and national security in the eight years he was president and beyond. to kick off the discussion and to to make the proper introductions of those who will be participating, i'd like to

invite annie a sophomore in the school of foreign service from portland, maine, to introduce our panelists. annie? [applause] annie: welcome, everyone. my name is annie fwmbings ott. it is my distinct pleasure to welcome you all to today's event and introduce our incredibly distinguished guests. i became involved with the institute of politics and public service my first semester at georgetown and have been a part of the g.u. politics family ever since. working with g.u. politics has been an incredible way to get involved with some of the best events georgetown has to offer. you certainly don't get opportunities like this at a lot of other schools. but now for the guests we're all here for. madeleine albright was secretary of state in the clinton administration from 199 to 2001. she was the first woman to hold the position and at the time buzz the highest ranking woman in the history of u.s. government. she restheaved presidential

medal of freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor from president obama in 2012. today, she is chair of albright turnbridge group and is a professor in the practice of diplomacy in the school of foreign service here at georgetown, author of five "new york times" best sellers she's working on her next book, " fascism: a warning" that will be published next spring. earnesto zedillo was the 54th president of mexico from 1994 to 2000. he's served on various boards and commissions focused on the environment, drug policy and elections and democracy. currently he's the director of the yale center for the study of globalization at yale university. president cedillo has received many hon no, sir include egg recognitions from the governments of 32 countries and the franklin d. roosevelt

freedom from fear award. he's published four edited volumes over the last 10 years, including his latest "africa: at a fork in the road." strobe talbot was in the administration from 1994 to 2001. he worked at "time" magazine for 21 years where he served as washington bureau chief, white house correspondent and state department correspondent. while at time he was twice awarded the prize for distinguished diplomatic reporting. he was the founding director of the yale study -- yale center for is the study of globalization and served at the brookings institute from 2002 to 2017. oour moderate is joel he willman, dean of the school of foreign service here. prior to assuming his current position, he served at the world bank in many senior roles including as chief institutional economist and director of the center for

conflict, security, and development in nairobi, kenya. he's worked for the european bank for reconstruction and taught at harvard university and columbia university. i'd like to thank dean hellman and the school for foreign service for serving on this panel. don't forget to engage with us on social media in the event using the hash tall #clinton25. 're on all social media as @goe -- @geopolitics. please give our panel a warm welcome. [applause] >> thank you, annie, far great introduction. it's wonderful to have you all here. we have a short time and a lot to cover. i'll get right into the question, then we'll leave plenty of time for students and members of the community to ask questions.

let me start, mo set the stage for what we're trying to do here. although it's wonderful that president clinton graduated from the school of foreign service, we know that when he took office as president, he took office largely focused on a nestic agenda. it's the economy stupid. a real focus on domestic issues. can you give us a sense, did he come into office for those of you who worked with him from the start work a fully formed view about america's role in the world? or did his world view evolve over time and how did you see that evolution? maybe we can start with madam secretary. ms. albright: he had a formed view because he had studied foreign policy a lot here but also because he had kept up with things that were going on. but i think you have to think about the 1990's as a very different phase where

institutions were changing, the world situation was changing. and therefore his views evolved. but i was ambassador at the united nations at the beginning and he was very clear about the fact that he wanted action through the united nations and he said, it's hard to believe but he actually said this, that if he were not president of the united states he would have been very happy to be ambassador to the united nations and so he recognized the importance of looking at the world through multilateral pectacles. >> how about you? mr. talbot: it's great to be here. i remember the first time i met bill clinton. it was at the time that the 32 rhodes scholars of that year the oing to sail over to united kingdom and he stood out

from the very beginning. and i got to know him particularly well when i was there. we shared a house together. his interest in the world was absolutely exhilarating to hear him talk about it. i made a trip, my first trip to the soviet union, there was once upon a time a very large country by that name. during a christmas break. and he, when i got back to oxford, he just pumped me with questions. he was full of curiosity. i might just jump ahead to his coming to the presidency. he was very aware that his chances of being a rather unknown political figure and still be able to ascend to the white house, especially after having to defeat one of the best foreign policy presidents

we've had in a long time, george h.w. bush, that would only happen because, well maybe not only happen, but he thought it gave him a huge advantage that the cold war was over. and he came into office wanting to do everything he could to make sure that the cold war was over and that russia, post-soviet russia was -- would be able to succeed. more to that story later, aybe, perhaps. >> i think i have a general comment. when he sident clinton had already been president for two years. the time i was elected. but from day one that we met i had the idea that he did have a vision. and he did have a vision in which diplomacy, engagement,

to ct to others, active solve problems was in the national interest of the united states. which is i think the right way to think about this. you do diplomacy you do international cooperation. not because you want to do international philanthropy. every president in the world has to be absolutely convinced that his country is first. that's almost stupid to say, cause it's obvious, but bill clinton would practice that. and would practice that with the instruments that the united states had left to create for the international community. so i agree with madeleine, he did have a vision and that vision, you know, working with

the multilateral institutions and using diplomacy was extremely important. and working with the neighbors. i hope i can get into the tapes later on. >> i'd like to get into some actual examples of him implementing that vision. maybe we can start with the end of the cold war. nato enlargement. you know, one of the interesting things, by the end of the cold war, it did create the possibility of a bipartisan moment in u.s. foreign policy. i wonder if you can give us some sense of how clinton reacted to that, how he fostered bipartisanship and how he thought through the strategy of american engagement to ensure an effective russian integration into the broader international system, how he moved toward a bipartisan approach to that and worked with our allies to effectively

nlarge nato. >> he was convinced early on that it was important to expand and deepen international institutions as earnesto just aid. mr. talbott: there was controversy over whether nato had done its thing and should kind of go into history with a good record of not getting us nto world war iii. remember that there was a horrific war in the balkans which was a warning that just because russia and the other post-soviet states were no

longer evil empire and the warsaw pact was no longer the evil empire there was stale role for nato. and one of the things that he did from the very beginning and madeleine can tell you more about this, was that he was absolutely committed to the proposition that now that russia was no longer the evil empire, it should be part of a new world order and it would have to have hard power and soft power and nato was the source and most capable of hard power. there was one other point he came to talk to a number of us about, that was if we did not enlarge nato, kun countries

like the one that madam secretary knows so well, a country that also doesn't exist in its current name, that was check slow walka, if those uldn't -- that was czechoslovakia, if those countries were caught between europe and the old soviet union if they didn't have a commitment from nato and the united states to help them as they go forward a lot of bad things would happen there and he kept pointing to yugoslavia as a lesson we had to learn. ms. albright: i think what was very interesting is that he had in fact studied how nato had been, well, what happened after the end of world war ii, when half of europe was against its will put behind the iron curtain and the creation of nato and all the various

aspects. so he did not come into this not knowing the background. what i think is interesting is that he also appreciated something that a lot of people haven't thought of, which is that at the end of the cold war, the u.s. was asked to do something that hasn't been done before which is how to devolve the power of your major adversary without a land war. so the question was how to bring russia into the system and what i found very interesting at the time was -- and strobe was in charge of our relationship with russia then. i was up in new york. but basically it was building on what president bush had done in terms of reunification of germany and then looking at what steps had to be taken to respect russia and bring it into a system. the whole issue of expansion of nato began in a very step-by-step process with something called the partnership for peace where

various countries that had been either part of nato or later part of what had been the soviet union could begin to see how the system works and play a role in cooperative action. and i now urge people to -- there have been some memos that have been declassified by the clinton library which describe how president clinton was talking to president yeltsin at the time about how to do all this in a very staged approach and in a way that russia would be respected and become part of something and began to have russia-nato dialogue. so i admire, first of all, the goal of it. but then also the carefulness with which president clinton directed that we all take steps to do this in some way that was organized and that in fact respected what was going on in russia. and these memos are so worth

reading because it's where president clinton is talking to president yeltsin and they recognize each other's politics in addition to recognizing the issues they were dealing with. >> one point because -- what madeleine just said brings back a vivid memory. mr. talbott: the russians were -- hated the idea of nato bombing serbia. but president yeltsin, because f his close tie with president clinton, was absolutely essential in getting the serbian dictator, genocidal dictator milosevic out of office and thereby made it possible for us to bring an end to the balkan wars without strog go into a land war. and that i think was a huge

accomplishment and a very heroic one on yeltsin's part. and it was based on his relationship with president clinton. mr. hellman: we're going to talk in a little bit about him as an individual and how he built relationships but if i could ask president zedillo to talk about his vision toward mexico and latin america and how he moved that relationship toward? mr. zedillo: i think i'd have to start obviously with the case of my country. where i think president clinton gave repeated proofs of his vision of a good relationship with mexico was very important for the interest of the united states. i think the first test was or nst what he had hinted ometimes said, he became a

champion of nafta. you remember nafta was really at the cted by congress beginning of the clinton administration. nd he knew that he would pay high political cost for being so proactive in his own party and also the other major party would punish him for that and yet he went ahead and nafta was approved. so that was first thing. fact big test was the at in late 1994, there was a new president of mexico , my country faced an incredibly ifficult financial crisis. practically unprecedented in northern mexican history. this was only a few day into my

administration. and i called president clinton and said you know, the country is literally bankrupt. i uldn't call you except have two powerful visions, one, i need the support of the a.m.f. which we already had commitment because we had put in place immediately a very strong organization and reform program but we need to put together more resources. and the second reason why i called you is because in my view if we don't control this situation, it will not be only a mexican crisis. it will be more systemic, certainly it will affect the rest of latin america and as we saw in 1982, with the debt crisis, it could be systemic to the entire international financial system. he was a little bit surprised and said, i didn't know things

were so bad. let me talk to bob and larry, you know. and then he called me back two days later and said, you know, bob and larry say you may be right. i said yes, of course i'm right. i have a ph.d. in economics. ou only have a law degree. but anyway he again tried to go one way to congress. he worked with the bipartisan leadership with the full leaders in the two parties. the thing could not get through congress. and at the end i think he did a great act of statesmanship, he used an old facility that existed since the 1930's in the treasury to lend mexico the

money. and of course this was not popular because if nafta wasn't popular, who supports lending money to mexico? and the argument he used over and over again, he said this is in the interest of my country. and he had these very nice ways to explain things, you know. ld the leaders that your neighbor's house is burning you better help your neighbor otherwise your house can also get a fire. very proactive, very simple argument. at the end of the day, could not go through congress but we got the resources and he was always very confident that it would be all right. and it was very all right. pay him three to years in advance. he said how did you do that? i said you were charging too

high interest. at the end i think it was a good story of cooperation. an act of statesmanship. mr. hellman: so all your stories are starting to get at clinton as a decisionmaker, clinton as a negotiator, clinton as a deliberator. i wonder if you can give us some sense, a moment or story, that gives an insight into how clinton handled a particularly difficult negotiation, a difficult decision. secretary albright in your memoir you describe him as that it was absolutely impossible for anyone to outtalk him. can you give us a sense of how he used his personal style to negotiate around difficult issues and to engage in decisionmaker as president? ms. albright: he was, or is, a complete extrovert he really does like people. and what he always did was to

begin in some way, especially in bilateral negotiations with foreigners, is to do something that he knew was important was to put himself into their shoes. and to understand what it is they needed. and that was very clear in just the way that the conversations went. he also knew an awful lot about the country and the persons -- and the person before he began the discussion. but he also was dogged and he knew that when he went into a meeting, that there were certain things that needed to be accomplished. so in between kind of charm and, you know, i like your tie, opening, and how are your children? he would in fact then press the case very carefully. and he knew his facts. and he always used them. and you know, he was criticized for always being late. he was late because he was so interested in what he was doing at the time. the meeting. he didn't want it to end. i do think there was kind of

this sense that he liked the subject, he really learned what it was about, and then what was interesting, for instance, at camp david, he made it a point of sitting down, both with chairman arafat and then with prime minister barack and made them put themselves into the shoes of the other party. and so that was kind of his way of saying, we need to solve this together, it had to be win-win, not zero-sum. he also loved to have us argue in front of him. when there was disagreement in the principle -- principals meeting and we'd go into the oval office or the cabinet room he wanted to know where we had differed, why we had differed. he would sit there with an ice cold tab can to his head and a yellow pad and take notes in columns and then kind of left what he was going to say. so he was very organized and yet at the same time very open

and friendly. mr. hellman: can you tell us, as a followup, perhaps what was the most difficult personal relationship that he had with other foreign leaders in terms of his engagement? ms. albright: well, i think that -- talking about milosevic and people that were really disgusting that he didn't want to meet with. but i think on the whole he tried to find something to deal with with everybody. i think that there were people that were difficult to deal with. prime minister netanyahu, for instance. and one of the things that, what happened at the time was that president clinton tried to deal with him in a way that was understanding of what he wanted and president -- and prime minister netanyahu would in fact talk about, he was, you know, spoke in idiommatic english and was able to frame things in terms of politics, so

even though it was difficult i think they were able to work their way through it. mr. talbott: madeleine will remember this very well. there was a summit between president clinton, who had injured himself and was on a -- in a wheelchair and he was -- it was one of the most important meetings with boris yeltsin. boris yeltsin had already reluctantly accepted the fact that nato was going to move into central europe. what he couldn't stand was the hought that three of the former republics of the ussr, the baltic states, would also be in nato. and i can remember madeleine and i were shoed out of the room -- shooed out of the room, leaving only the two leaders, yeltsin and clinton. d yeltsin, who asked for the

one-of -- asked for the one-on-one, he said, bill, i want to do the following. i want to find a closet somewhere in this house you come into the closet with me and whisper in my ear, don't worry, boris, we will never bring in the baltic states and then what madeleine was talking about kicked in. i call it empathy. putting himself in the other person's shoe. and he made the following argument. he said, boris, it'll -- it won't be secret and by the way we are going to do it. but you do not want to be caught in trying to stop these now independent states for taking advantage of an international institution that will help them have a better future. and if you are -- can think of that -- think of it in this way, if you try to stop it,

your neighbors, all around your periphery, are going to fear you and if you open it up, and proceed with russia being part of a new europe and a new world because of what you've done, you will go down in history. this is what madeleine and i heard from president clinton afterwards. with that argument, yeltsin basically melted and said, ok. you win. mr. zedillo: i think president clinton is an optimal combination of charm, intellectual curiosity, and diplomat. whone you put those three things together, it is very hard to see him in an awkward

situation. i was, in addition to our bilateral relationship, we orked together with the u.n. and also the meetings which he would attend practically every -- they newt gingrich sent al gore. i would see him interacting ith the prime ministers most of the time -- yeltsin did not go, but the prime minister, putin at the end was attending as prime minister and i could see president clinton, you know, how he would move things around to, you know, to engage and to get things decided. a very difficult moment of course was the asian financial crisis. we were having the meeting in

canada and -- in vancouver, i guess. and the prime minister of japan, hash moto, was extremely -- hashimoto, was extremely concerned about the whole situation. already japan had been in for a few years and their willingness o cooperate and to be more accommodating to get all the votes needed was not particularly good. and i could see you know, president clinton, not by pushing but by, you know by providing arguments, by everybody has to put some part, you know, got things moving in the right direction. mr. hellman: we're going to go to questions in a minute. before we do, i want to go across the panel and ask you if you could identify perhaps the most exhilarating high point in your engagement and relationship with clinton and

also the most difficult or lowest point, most difficult aspect of the engagement you had with clinton on foreign policy issues at least, during your period. ms. albright: for -- mine, i have to say is very personal. it did take place while i was at the u.n., it was to do with partnership for peace. we were, president clinton was to meet me in prague. the e meeting with czechoslovaks at that time. the meeting was shortly after his mother had died and the czechs had prepared for taking -- for giving him a saxophone and for taking him a jazz club but the white house advance had decided that that was inappropriate. and i had gone to prague first and so i said to president havel, i had to go to brussels to pick president clinton up, i

would ask him what he wanted to do. we had a signal, when we got he would give me a kiss and i'd whisper the decision. i asked president clinton, he said of course he wanted to do it. so that's what we did. the most moving for me was that particular time coming back to the place of my birth, standing with president clinton and president havel in the courtyard of the castle as they played the czech national anthem which is "where is my home" and the american national anthem, sang the land of the free, the home of the brave. we went in to have a meeting and president havel said we're glad to have you here. president clinton said it's ruly not fair. czechoslovakia has two representatives at the u.n. but the moving time to have

him. we actually that evening walk aid cross charles bridge ogether and then president havel, president clinton and i went to the jazz club, they gave him the saxophone, he said, you have no idea how hard it is to play a brand new saxophone. mr. hellman: and the most difficult? ms. albright: the most difficult with him. i'll tell you what was most difficult was camp david and what happened was nobody was allowed to leave camp david except for him to go to okinawa for the g8 meeting. toward, just as he was about to leave, prime minister ehud barack had a very, very important suggestion about thousand resolve it and president clinton took toyota chairman arafat and what happened was president clinton came back and he said, madeleine, i think we've got an agreement. i have to leave. get rid of the underbrush.

when i come back it'll be done. it wasn't done. i think he was not so happy with me. but one i do have to tell, another one, is we were in moscow and i was known for my pins that i wore. and we we walk in and president putin turns to president clinton and says, we always notice what pins secretary albright wears. why are you wearing those three monkeys? and so i actually said, because i think your policy in chechnya is evil. and putin -- [laughter] putin was furious at me. for good reason. and president clinton looked at me like, are you an idiot? you are our chief diplomatic. you just screwed up the summit. [laughter]

>> important things for my country, this relationship we developed at these very difficult moment for mexico. financial crisis was, you know, extremely important. mr. zedillo: we shared ideas about not only commitment, and i always am grateful to him for what he did. in many as expect, not only in relationship to my country. we had a moment where it was not easy, where the u.s. was hosting a meeting in seattle. and he called me, he called me actually from the plane because he had been told that mexico was not supporting the launching of the millennium summit and that was true. on the basis that the united

states wanted it to be laurged, we said, not right. so he called me but of course i knew already that other country, other important emerging countries will oppose it. it would have been very easy for know say, ok, we'll not -- will not be a problem. but he's my friend, i respect him totally. and he listened to arguments. so we in this -- had this rather long conversation where asically i went to review my advantage and tried to explain why the way in which, you know, they were trying to push for a labor chapter into the w.t.o. was not a good idea. and all my, you know, arguments -- and i said, i'm for all of these. i cannot say that mexico will support launching of the round.

i said, i understand. but i was of course very worried . in no moment during that conversation he invoked that he was a very good friend of mexico and that he had been for mexico at their toughest time. he never used that argument. he tried to argue but i was a hh -- ph.d. in economics. at the end we closed the conversation, you know how seattle happened. but what's not really about demonstrations, that is fiction, that's a legend, seattle didn't happen because the time was not ripe. and the conditions were not prepared. and i guess for political reasons. domestic -- the u.s. was pushing for topics that had no way to be adopted. but in any case, i was very worried personally. i want you to come to washington in a few weeks, official visit

again. and my congress, i had lost the ajority in congress. now congress, you know, could do many things. one of the things they did during those days, the mexican president needed explicit permission from congress to travel outside the country. this was a politically a very complex moment in my country. one of the nasty things that congress did, they never knew that they did a favor to me, was to say, no, you're not traveling abroad. that's good. [laughter] thank you. thank you. actually i did see him, you know, at the apec meeting and then we met again in davos in january. and he was so gracious, again in davos i think he said, you know, ernesto, maybe you were right.

maybe you were right. i said, ok. about saying no. ok, thank you. and that again shows the kind of person he is. the president of the united states. come on, i lend you money and now you are --, no he never invoked that. he listened very carefully to the ph.d. in economics. [laughter] mr. talbott: i think one of the most fraught and dangerous incidents brought both a real crisis that he took very seriously and also a real triumph of diplomacy. one of the perennial hot spots, , is r points on the planet the disputed frontier between india and pakistan. and, boy, does madeleine know about this one. she grew up with it. her father was working on that

very dangerous issue early on for the united nations. in 1999, pakistan sent some of its soldiers over the so-called line of control, into indian territory. nd it was a very, very hairy situation which could have gone to not just war between the two countries, but a nuclear war. because both countries had nuclear weapons. the prime minister of pakistan, who is now the prime minister of caught again, was his own military and the looming prospect of war with india. and he asked for an invitation to come to washington and have

bill clinton fix this matter. and before we could even decide to invite him, he was in the air. and it really ruined the fourth of july weekend that year. [laughter] because president clinton spent basically the whole weekend in blair house talking to sharif, with this combination of hard-headedness and empathy. and at the end of it, he actually convinced him that he ad to order that the pakistani troops move back into pakistan and that saved something really terrible. it wasn't the best career move for sharif because he was then thrown overboard or thrown into jail. and by the way, the military was going to hang him and bill

clinton got on the phone and convinced them to let him go to saudi arabia. so we had, at the beginning of the weekend we had the prospect of the first real nuclear war with both sides having nuclear weapons. and by sunday night we were ok. i was just in india last week. that's the second largest country in the world and he's revered there. mr. hellman: that's great. we now have time for questions. we're taking questions from students and faculty. i believe we have mics on either side. is that right? mics on both left and right. i'd ask you a couple of things. first, please identify yourself. your name and where you are here at the school. and if you can have a brief question, please. o the panel.

wait for the mic. thanks. questioner: hi. i'm joseph and i'm from queens, new york, here at the college at georgetown. my question is, what did president clinton do to curb north korea effectively from gaining a nuclear weapon. it's a pressing issue here today and they've known that north korea was an issue since 1994, when they signed the nonproliferation treaty that didn't actually work for north korea. should they have done more and should they be held accountable for doing more? thanks. mr. talbott: madeleine's the only one on this panel who has been to pyongyang. ms. albright: i'm still the highest level sitting official who went to pyongyang to meet with the leader. on inn instructions from president clinton -- on instructions from president clinton. the story with north korea is a long, complicated one and i won't go through all of that.

but what did happen was that president clinton sent me there and we had discussions at that time and i met with kim jong il, in order to talk about issues to do with their missile limits. and also to make sure that they would get rid of their nuclear capabilities. they were very interesting meetings. we knew very little about kim jong il. but i had excellent discussions with him on very technical matters. and we were in the middle of negotiations and this was like in october, 2000. we began the negotiations, they were going to go on at kuala lumpur. and i had with me some name that is now well known, wendy sherman, but she was my counselor. we were together in south africa and she was prepared to go to those discussions.

then the election of 2000 happened. and americans were confused about the election of 2000. certainly the north koreans were. so what happened was that i briefed colin powell, the incoming secretary of state, on where the negotiations were. colin powell was prepared to continue with what we were doing . and then there was a headline in the "the washington post" that said, powell to continue clinton policies with north korea. he was hauled into the white house and told, no way. so i hold no brief for the north koreans. but -- grief for the north koreans. but at the time -- we were the ones who did not continue the negotiations. at the time the north koreans could have done maybe two nuclear weapons, they did not. they had no fissile material. they had no icbm's. and so i think that it was a mistake in terms of not continuing with those particular talks. but they are hard to deal with. there's no question.

and this has been something that's been going on since 1953, the end of the korean war. there is no peace treaty. there is an armistice. i had also signed an agreement called a no hostile intent with vice marichal cho that was also be a are a gate. so i think that we bear some responsibility. the north koreans bear most of the responsibility. then there is really the issue i find interesting. kim jong il had said that he -- it was ok with him if we kept our forces in south korea. so, there were a number of different things that were on the table. but we now don't know what his son is like. and how things are going to go. the demilitarized zone is one of the most dangerous places i've ever seen. mr. zedillo: i think the axis of evil speech was also a turning point. when you tell a country that the

at tence of the regime is play, you should expect a change of behavior. mr. talbott: a threat of that kind has been issued recently. melissa: i do think one other -- ms. albright: i do think one other thing just in terms of how difficult decision making is. president clinton devoted an incredible amount of time to the middle east peace talks. and even after camp david there were all kind of talks and here we were toward the end of his term and the number two guy from north korea had come in order to invite president clinton to go to north korea. and he'd said, well, i can't just show up, i need somebody to go prepare the trip, which is what i was doing. but at the end the choice was whether to continue the middle east talks or go to north korea. and it was one of those truly difficult issues for any president of the united states. and he chose to do the middle east.

mr. hellman: ok. right here in the front. questioner: good morning. thank you so much for picking on me. my name is dinas and i'm a dual degree candidate with the m.b.a. and school of foreign service. my question is, with regard to the last 25 years, the fact of 25 years of russian relations and the prime minister's comments at the munich security conference within this past year, stating that the west and russia sliding into a new cold war. does president clinton look back on these last 25 years of u.s.-russia relations and are there any decisions that he would ultimately have done differently? thank you. mr. talbott: i think about that every day. i suspect madeleine does too.

i'm going too to give you a simplistic answer because we don't have -- i'm going to give you a similaristic answer because we don't have time for a sophisticated one. . no i don't think there was something we could have done or something that we should not have done that would have changed this. i think that personalities, individuals really matter in this world. boris jeltsen did many good things -- yeltsin citizen did many good things. he had huge problems to deal with. his motives were good. he wanted russia to be a true open democracy. and to be accepted into a globalized world. he made one horrendous mistake. and he -- actually confessed to it, to his family, just before he died. and that is the man he put in his place at the turn of the

century. ms. albright: i agree. and i do think that there is no y to reiterate how much time president clinton spent in terms of paying respect to russia, working, understanding the fact that we had this peculiar duty to devolve the power of our adversary. and trying to put himself into president yeltsin citizen's shoes. and i do think that -- yeltsin's shoes. and i do believe there are those who believe nato expansion was a big mistake. i happen to think the opposite. so does strobe and president clinton. and i think that had we not done that, then, first of all, those countries were entitled to -- they had been, quote, lynn are a -- liberated by the soviet union against their will. and we had in fact offered russia ultimately to come into

nato if they were prepared and wanted to. so there have been a lot of myths connected with this that i think are definitely myths. i do think -- and what was i resting, both strobe and was allowed to stay for that similarity, despite my earlier point. but it was interesting to watch because president putin is very smart. he spoke without notes and took notes but already you could see he was stiff as a board and unfriendly in so many different ways. he has clearly evolved into something like that even more so. so i think we did what we could, iven what we knew at the time. mr. hellman: in the back there. yeah. blue shirt. questioner: [inaudible]

my question is, was there also a national security rationale on president clinton's decision to let china join the w.t.o. or to push for china joining the w.t.o.? ms. albright: let me -- from what i know about this, is first of all, we were generally trying to figure out an improved relationship with the chinese. i am the oldest person signature up here. and was part of the carter administration. and one of the issues there was in fact the normalization of relations with china and trying to figure out, again, how to bring them into the system. most of the time that we dealt with china, we had to look at the most favored nation clause and also judge their human rights activity and it was -- made the chinese crazy and really it was like pulling up a plant to see if it was growing. and it really made for a lot of problems. so one of the things that the

clinton administration did first was to go for permanent trading relations. and that was the beginning. and then the w.t.o., in order rankly to make the chinese abide by the rules, not only because we were saying so, but because an international organization would be able to also go with the same kinds of points in terms what have it was like to joint international trading system. mr. zedillo: i think it's always in the interest of any country, and certainly the united states, ,o have others abiding by rules which is what the w.t.o. is. having china, already an important economic power in the 1990's, not as much as today, outside the system would have been crazy. a little known fact is that the

last country that closed the negotiation with china was not the united states. it was mexico. mexico. because we're very aware that they will be terrible competitors for mexico. not only in the u.s. market, but in what we thought we had comparative advantage. of course china had to be part of the w.t.o. because it was in the interest certainly of china. but also of the others. even mexico. mr. hellman: another question. let's see. here. just right here. questioner: hi, good morning. my name is adam. so my question is, not to be too more owes -- morose, besides the lack of intervention in the tragic rwanda genocide, what would you say was clinton's

largest regret? thank you. ms. albright: that he didn't go o north korea. mr. talbott: i would say also his -- if -- regret that he didn't feel he was responsible for, but he sure regretted that he couldn't get the peace process over the line. we've heard him on a number of occasions --, yeah. i've heard him say -- the middle east, yeah. i've heard him say many times that just as the life of a statesman can make huge differences, good or bad, in the world, so can the death of a statesman. nd that means rabin.

mr. hellman: yes. questioner: thank you. school of foreign service. my question is that given nuclear proliferation in south asia and the taiwan states crisis, do you think president clinton anticipated the extent to which china would rise militarily? the military modernization and the extent of the u.s. in defense engagement? mr. talbott: i think i got it. and if i didn't, my colleagues will help or maybe you can put the question again. one reason that president linton was extremely concerned about the indian test of a nuclear weapon was not that he felt india was going to be an rresponsible player on the

global stage. it was because it would be opening up the sluse gate of other countries and we knew exactly who would be the next. 20 we would have as many as nuclear armed countries over the course of the next couple of decades. and that has -- did happen. and he tried everything he could to bring the indians into the comprehensive test ban treaty. talk about a mission impossible, right after the indians tested their weapons, he sent me off ith a team to pakistan and the pakistanis were gracious enough , to blow up their own bomb just as our plane was getting off into the air after we were

trying to persuade them not to do it. and of course now we have north korea and madeleine has given you a very good idea of what we tried to do there. ms. albright: i do think that one of the things, if -- it goes back a little bit to your first question, is president clinton -- a lot of people kidded him about this. but he always kept talking about building bridges to the 21st century. and i was the last secretary of state of the 20th century and the first of the twefrpbl. the only problem with that statement -- twefrpbl. the only problem with that statement is i made it six months after i'd been named which was presump white house to think that he would keep me the four years. did he and so i am. -- he did and so i am. [laughter] but the bottom line is that he was -- it was interesting to listen to him think about the various agreements that had to be made. how you really set the stage for having some kind of an organized international system.

how to use the united nations, the summit of the americas, any number of kind of institutional things, he was trying to solve immediate problems but at the same time he would push us to think about what were the institutional structures that had to be put into place. very deliberately. and also that meant we were try -- where china was going to be and just generally the relationship. mr. hellman: i'm going ask the last question which is, we hope that presidents learn from each other. and their experience. if you had to crystallize one lesson from the clinton presidency and foreign affairs, to give the to the current president, what would it be? mr. talbott: i was expecting a much tougher question. [laughter] it goes back to something ernesto said i think pretty much in the first round. bill clinton came into office

convinced that because the cold war was over, because that great skis much was passing into -- schism was passing into history, we thought, he wanted to use his presidency to make the united ates a leader in a collaborative world. and make the united states a leader in international institutions. the ones, of course, that madeleine and ernesto know so well. he was member once when trying to formulate a doctrine for his administration. i think madeleine was in the room at the time. and when he talked privately with us it was clear that that

was the clinton doctrine. to have a collaborative world. and he, if you read the several books that he has written since, i think he's particularly proud of that. nd i know what his advice to the present president of the united states would be. mr. zedillo: oh, don't ask that to a hombre. [laughter] [applause] hings here at georgetown, an event on president clinton, i feel like what some of my students were demanding at some demonstrations a couple of years ago in campus said we want a safe space.

i now feel a safe space. then you come with your questions. [laughter] no. think i would say that what strobe said is slootly -- is absolutely right. if anybody could explain to the present president of the united in es that the world is not economics insecurity, a zero-sum game, you know, that somebody has to lose so that the other wins, that will be great. i think he means that until school he went, which by the way i'll be visiting tomorrow. give a lecture. not on that, of course. but i think that's so important. and this question of the national interest, you know, cooperation is in the national interest. respect to others is in the national interest. of the united states. you really believe, he should

believe that his country, the u.s. is first, then practice in diplomacy and respect other countries should be first too, because it's in the interest of the united states. mr. talbott: put it this way. america should be first in leadership of the world. mr. zedillo: i don't know about that. [laughter] you know, that's a point of difference. you do that by doing things, not by telling people. and that's another very distinct thing about bill clinton. he will sometimes speak for the domestic audiences. but he was very careful not to say something that will backfire to him by hurting or robbing the power. remember, this is the unilateral -- president clinton was the president of the unilateral moment of the world. which is over by the way.

and he could have been termy pet lent and arrogant -- petulent and arrogant and he wasn't. and i think that's the big lesson that should be talked about. ms. albright: well, it's interesting. we have a similar theme. and i think that what happened when president clinton came into office, and you started this also, by saying, you know, that he came in and started talking about the economy. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017] >> we're going to sneak away from the last couple of minutes of this and take you live to the floor of the house. ordered. the motion to suspend the rules and pass h.r. 3562, motion to suspend the rules and pass h.r. 1066 and agreeing to the speaker's approval of the journal of the the unfinished business -- first electronic vote will be conducted as a 15-minute vote andhe