backpage.com and a whole host of others that have been blossoming, sadly, over the last handful of years to make sure they cannot hide behind the communications decency act and its immunity. >> when it comes to sex trafficking, we've been told a lot of this is encoded language, it's a lot harder to identify. so one of the things we suggested is something of a clearing-house where if a website or civil society identifies certain types of code, certain language, certain i.p. addresses, certain email addresses or phone numbers that are known with sex trafficking, you kind of put that -- sex traffickers you kind of put that in a certain repository so they can scan and go against those coded languages. >> watch "the communicators" tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. >> as the trump administration

tightens travel and economic policy with cuba, latin american academics discussed future relations between the two countries as part of an event hosted by the inner -- interamerica dialogue in washington, d.c. the discussion ran about an hour and a half. michael c.: good morning. welcome to the inter-american dialogue. my name is michael camilleri. almost three years ago, president obama and castro embarked on a historic opening in terms of the relations between the u.s. and cuba. two days ago, the trump administration announced a series of regulatory changes designed to roll back the obama administration strategy of maximizing engagement with the people of cuba. a few months from now, cuba will undergo a historic leadership transition while reckoning with a moribund economy, demographic challenges and a relationship with the

u.s. that is rapidly deteriorating as a result of president trump's policy changes and still unresolved sonic attacks against u.s. diplomats. in fact the diplomatic drawdown in havana had a direct impact on this event as the suspension of visa services in havana prevented us from bringing a speaker from cuba to participate in today's discussion. nonetheless, to help us make sense of what has happened and to assess what the future might bring for u.s. and cuba, we are privileged to welcome to the dialogue three distinguished friends and colleagues with decades of experience working on cuba. to my immediate left, emily mendrala is the executive director of the center for democracy in the americas. emily served in the obama administration at the national security council and at the cuban affairs office in the state department. previously a professional staff member on the senate foreign

relations committee. mike bustamante is an assistant professor of latin american history at florida international university specializing in modern cuba, cuba americans and the caribbean. he is a coeditor of a new volume of the cuban revolution. and jorge dominguez is a antonio madero professor for the study of mexico at harvard university and chair of the studies. he is the author or editor of various books. and he is a member of the -- president of the latin american studies association and inter-american dialogue. before diving into the conversation, i would like to acknowledge our partners at the world press photo exhibition. for more than 60 years, more than 4 million people around the globe have enjoyed the work of award-winning photographers. today we are fortunate to enjoy tomas' new series.

it is evocative and visually stunning of everyday life in cuba. you will see the cycling through, throughout the discussion today. we also want to acknowledge the support of the ford administration. particularly mario. without whom this event would not have been possible. i'd like to acknowledge two of my colleagues at the dialogue, president emeritus peter hickam, and carlos bautista who provides invaluable support to the rule of law program. finally, if anyone from ofac is here, rest assure the coffee and donuts were not provided by gaieso. with that, we will dive into the discussion. each of the panelists will talk for about 10 minutes. and then we will open it up for discussion and we have plenty of time for your questions and comments. emily, we will start with you. emily: great. thanks. if you were to put u.s.-cuba

relations on a line graph, if you were to plot it with engagement on the y access, it would be a jagged line for sure. we have taken two steps forward, one step back, one step forward, two steps back over several decades. but, the long-term trendline is decidedly in the upward direction. this time last year, october, 2016, the obama administration released the sixth of six rounds of regulatory regulations governing u.s.-cuba sanctions. each round of regulatory changes were designed to increase the flow of people, goods, and information to and from cuba. these were couched in a larger policy of engagement. over two years, during the final two years of the obama administration. the u.s. and cuban governments met regularly and engaged in dialogue on a number of issues

and ultimately signed almost two dozen bilateral agreements and these agreements touched on issues such as law enforcement information sharing, cooperation on health, designating sister marine protected areas. these wide-ranging discussions on a number of issues. i would say this time last ear, we were on a pretty steep part of the line graph in the upward direction. more than anything, the two years of rapid progress toward normalization proved that the u.s. and cuban governments can cooperate and the cooperation can bear fruit. i think that is really important. after decades of not cooperating, it was not a sure thing that this cooperation could bear fruit. in fact, if you look at the

last three years, we have seen that in fact it did. this week, everyone is aware and michael just mentioned that we have had a downward tick on the line graph with the release of new regulations governing cuba sanctions. the treasury department and commerce department govern the implementation of sanctions towards cuba. they released some new rules that will in part roll back and in part change travel to cuba and the financial transactions with which u.s. entities can participate in cuba. at the state department, in concert with this, it released a list of 180 prohibited entities with whom u.s. persons cannot engage in direct financial transactions. this announcement was the fulfillment of a june announcement that president trump made in miami where he directed departments and

agencies to begin to draft these rules. we have been expecting them for some time. in fact, i would argue that the downward tick we have seen this week is not very severe. and i'll get into why. but the specific changes that were announced this week with regard to travel, individuals were previously able to travel under the people-to-people category and now are no longer able to do so. however, they are allowed to travel as individuals under support for the cuban people category and there is a new definition for the support of the cuban people category which allows for people to stay at private bed and breakfasts, eat at private restaurants, and there's a requirement that individuals do a little something else to constitute a full-time itinerary under this category. individuals can still travel to cuba.

i think that's the big takeaway. there's also -- most notably i think the state department's list of 180 prohibited entities are a number of hotels where individuals cannot stay, a number of stores in old havana where individuals cannot shop, a number of government entities with whom u.s. businesses cannot do business. and in the coming days and weeks -- i know it's already happened in many respects lawyers will be pouring over these new rules to determine what are the avenues for continued engagement but it's important to know engagement can continue. and a lot of the progress over the last three years has been preserved. we still have u.s. embassy in havana. the cubans have an embassy in washington. americans or u.s. travelers can still travel to cuba and can enjoy a lot of the flexibility that was -- that was

implemented during the obama administration. general licenses, for example. oftentimes -- now, travelers do not need to seek specific permission from the treasury department to travel. they can self-certify that rules avel meets the for governing sanctions. that remains in place. dialogue will continue. the u.s. and cuban governments have indicated they will continue to dialogue on areas of mutual interest. and so, it is not by any means even close to a full reversal of the gains towards engagement we have seen in recent years. all of this comes at a time where there is considerable momentum. u.s. travelers are continuing to travel to cuba. in may, this year, we already reached the mark of the number of u.s. travelers to cuba for the entire calendar year of 2016. this comes at a time where there is congressional,

bipartisan congressional momentum. representative rick crawford has introduced a bill to allow for the financing -- for the use of financing on agricultural sales. there are 44 republicans and he house on that bill. and in the senate, a lift -- a bill to lift the travel ban has a majority. i think that it is important to realize that there is a path, a steady path of momentum from travelers, congress, and the private sector. just last week we saw john sign some aterpillar pretty big deals at the trade fair in havana. it demonstrates that there is -- that there may be some negative news and rhetoric coming out of the u.s. government, but it cannot quite put back in the bottle what was

unleashed in the last 2 1/2 years. but there are challenges, and i think we will hear more about those in a little bit from other panelists. for example, there is a leadership transition in cuba coming up in february. we do not yet know what that will bring. also, we are operating currently at skeleton staff. the u.s. embassy in havana and the cuban embassy in washington and this comes as the result of mysterious symptoms experienced by u.s. diplomats and canadian diplomats and ongoing investigations into those symptoms. the u.s. has drawn down our diplomats from havana and it is important to understand -- it issued a travel warning alongside it but in many respects is triggered bureaucratically by the drawing down of our diplomats. the next step though that the u.s. took to expel cuban

diplomats from washington, or to request that 60% of the cuban diplomats from washington leave, seems to be a bit of a step too far or at least a step that begs the question why in the midst of an ongoing investigation did the u.s. government ask the cuban embassy to drawn down their diplomats and to do so in a way where they reportedly handed a list of 15 specific names to the cuban embassy. names that gutted the commercial section and the consular section of the cuban embassy in washington. and i mention that the investigation into the arguably serious symptoms experienced by our diplomats is ongoing and we do not know what it will turn out. i say that to note that what we have taken -- while we have taken a step back or are on a downward path of the line graph right now, it is not quite as

bad as it could be. there are some challenges on the horizon. michael c.: that is terrific. thanks, emably. mike, let's go to you. michael b.:thanks so much. good morning. thank you to the dialogue for having me and organizing this event. i was asked to focus my opening remarks on the cuban-american community. how they, we, i should say, fit into the present picture of u.s.-cuban relations, how we're responding or being affected by some of the developments just mentioned. it's no secret there are vocal voices in the cuban community that are behind the recent changes in u.s.-cuba policies that were announced yesterday so it begs the question -- is there a constituency there that supports these efforts or are there other voices? let me just start with some context. for the past i think approaching 20 years, if i'm not mistaken, the university where i work, florida

international university, has conducted a rigorous poll every year on cuban-american political attitudes and opinions. what the poll shows is there is steady trend line of shifting cuban die sass practice opinion matters of ra cuban-american opinion on policy. there is strong majority support in the cuban-american community for the right of all americans to travel to the island. there is majority support for ending the embargo. but there's particularly strong support, you know, almost universal, i would say, for the right of cuban americans to travel to the island to see family whenever they wish. and so it's not surprising of all the changes that have been implemented in u.s.-cuban relations and u.s.-cuba policy since june, this is one that hasn't been touched. and i don't think that is a mistake or a coincidence. before the obama administration, one of the

other real estate -- other real restrictions in place was a severe limit on the ability of cuban-americans to visit the island and see their families. the obama administration got rid of that early on. i think those against engagement in miami have recognized that it is a political loser for them to start telling their constituents when they can go see mom. and so there's a key way in which the cuban american community is not affected by some of the recent changes. there were ability to travel to the island in theory it remains free and unfettered. i think that contributes to a dynamic sometimes in which many folks in miami, who are by no means single issue voters, the broader noise in u.s.-cuba relations may not register as much in so far as their own ability to go back and forth is not impacted. but there are other clear ways in which the community is affected by recent developments.

to the extent that there are less u.s. visitors overall, a kind of rich transnational economy, flow of people, goods, money may also be impacted. . extent that there are less u.s. visitors overall, a kind of bridge transnational economy, a flow of people, goods and money may also be impacted. cuban-americans that travel to the island do not only go to hug mom, they go to bring cash. on the order of several billion dollars a year. remittances to help support their relatives on the island. there is also a supply chain by suitcase for many sectors of the cuban economy and the black market. i think, well cuban americans can continue to travel in theory and bring all of the things that they do on airplanes that they

do, if we see u.s. airlines cutting back on flights, fewer u.s. visitors having an impact on the small business sector, that might slow some of that transnational motion insofar as it is connected to the tourist sector. consequenceortant that i would argue that the cuban-american community is going to feel is a reflection of the reduction of staff both at the u.s. embassy in havana and the cuban embassy here in washington. the end of the wet foot and dry foot policy in the waning days of the obama administration was a tough pill to swallow for the cuban the aspera in general although everyone saw it coming. it was a self-fulfilling prophecy. as soon as a process of normalization began, a nonnormal immigration policy was perhaps destined to eventually fade away.

and so, cubans began to leave the island in record numbers. the highest numbers we have seen in 30 years. the attitude was -- if you're going to go, you have to go now and that accelerated the speed with which the wet foot and dry foot policy came to an end. cubans had a hard time swallowing that pill though they understood where it was coming from. what has happened now with the production of the staff at the u.s. embassy, it closes yet another avenue of migration. and travel. cubansber of visitors were getting was not unsubstantial. this has left a lot of people in limbo. i am forgetting the exact statistic but i think i read that the u.s. consulate in havana had one of the largest numbers of pending leases. maybe something like 100,000.

and now, it is unclear what will happen there. the state department has said the issuing of immigrant visas will be moved to bogota, colombia which is not a very practical solution for reasons of cost and for reasons that cubans need a visa to get to colombia. and the fact that when you apply for a visa and go for the interview, you do not get a decision right away. do? is a cuban supposed to sharp declinesto in the number of cubans coming to the u.s. this has implications for what is still an important electoral agreement. dating back to the 1990's.

the u.s. is supposed to issue a minimum of 20,000 travel documents. i have a hard time trying to figure out how they will meet that mark. also still not made clear if there is going to be any process for issuing visitor visas. that also slows down the transnational flow. this does have serious impacts. political area of vulnerability for representatives from my yummy who are defending this policy change. are defendingwho this policy change. in miami, it is completely possible to be a member of any political party, to have voted for the current president or not , and still believe that you want to bring your sister over to live with you. to the extent that this drags on , this will be a real problem and something that constituents i hope will tell their representatives about. with ajust conclude

question and a tentative answer or set of answers. i have argued that cuban-american opinion on matters of u.s. policy has shifted. and yet, we still have a scenario in which the cuban-american community's elected representatives cobra select a different -- so reflect a different point of view. there is a difference between the cuban-american community in general, everybody, regardless of your citizenship status and those who are u.s. citizens and have the right to vote. i have often thought that as much effort and resources put into courting support for engagement in washington, i would like the folks do a registration drive. i think it would help the cause. as i said already, cubans are not single issue voters. it is possible to support from

and not support his policy on cuba. this electoral picture may be changing. 2018 will be interesting in miami. the longtime representative, ileana ros-lehtinen, is retiring. that race is shifting to become a dynamic one. democrats think they can flip this and the field is already crowded. hard to predict where that will end up. if that seat flips, that could have significant consequences. , last thought, that the rollback we have seen under the trump administration is significant and it will have real affects but it is also nothing close to a complete , quoteation of the deal unquote. for those of us that believe in the value of engagement, there is still space to work and push and advocate for that agenda. michael c.: thank you.

jorge, please. jorge: i am delighted to be back at the inter-american dialogue once again. to chat about a topic that is familiar in many ways. the conversations of this sort have been going on for a very long time. idea wasught emily's particularly helpful in that sense. to presentould like not my usual mode, but i think it is helpful. policieshe president's advance his goals? will, i hope, be clear to you along the way that it seems to me that is a good way to frame it. of the the president

united states, and we are thinking of his goals and his policies. with the things he has said. he has said, including in the last few days, that he cares about the value, the utility and the importance and the right of the u.s. base near the cuban city of guantánamo. whether the role of the base as a prison will expand is a little unclear to me but it almost certainly will continue as a prison for some indefinite period of time. and for that purpose, beginning with bush 41 and continuing under clinton and bush 43 and obama and continuing now, there effectiven collaboration between the u.s. and cuba's armed forces. the reason for that is both sides have a similar interest. the u.s. does not want the prisoners to get out.

and the -- and cuba does not want the prisoners to get in. to advance the goals of the president, with regard to guantánamo, it makes sense to maintain the policies that the president inherited. take a different topic. which of the president has continued to emphasize over the last several months. it is migration. and, as you have heard, therefore, the agreement signed perfectly, 2017 fits his migration goals and therefore the continuation of those inherited policies -- they fit admirably well his goals. it issiest way to put that cubans would be treated in the same way as everybody else under u.s. immigration law when they seek to enter the u.s.

important-- the more point is that there are bilateral agreements indicating the joint interest and consent of the government's that include not only treating cubans in that way, that also for the u.s. to return cubans who have attempted to enter the u.s. without proper documentation. whether they are crossing the straits of florida or the u.s. mexican border and that cuba would agree to accept them. that is a better agreement than the u.s. has with any other country in the world. it is a lot more effective. a is much more professional treatment for the u.s. coast guard and other u.s. migration personal involved in these issues. to advance the goals of the president, the policies he inherited on this issue area work very well also. law enforcement. with regard to a variety of

including violent crime, and drug trafficking. the president has made it clear during the campaign and at various times during this first year of his presidency, that he cares about the basket of issues one would associate with law enforcement. cuba and the u.s. began to cooperate informally but steadily online forstmann issues through -- on law enforcement issues through the 1990's and through the summer of 2016. agreementlized an allowing security forces in each country to be effective. for anyone who reads through the u.s. government reports with regard to whether other governments in other countries do or do not cooperate and advance the policies with regard interdiction and

punishment of criminals associated with that line of work, cuba shows up amazingly well. it is not just the policy commitment of the cuban government but the effectiveness of the cuban government in doing exactly what president trump's goals indicate cuban government policy and goals ought to be. in this issue area as well, affirming the inherited policies that the trump administration has received, serve best the goals of the president. onto a different topic. the president has indicated at various times that he thinks, with regard to international trade, the u.s. should enjoy surpluses. and, if you apply that to cuba, beginning at the start of the 21st century, early in the bush administration, authorized by congress, the u.s. became an agricultural exporter to cuba.

by almost anyed calculation of percent and standards, a sensational, albeit in terms of monetary worth only a few billion dollars, but a sensational trade surplus for the u.s. those policies of agricultural exports continued under the obama presidency and have continued into 2017 under the trump administration. the numbers were in the neighborhood of $245 million. and a civil aviation agreement negotiated during the obama administration also fits well with the preference of the president for asymmetric agreement. -- that advances the economic interests of the united states. the agreement on paper looks

like any normal civil aviation agreement where there is the established for both sides. and practice, cuba has only one airline and it does not fly to the u.s. so, that all of the traffic between the u.s. and cuba, necessarily adds to the one-sided economic advantage of the united states. even the regulations that went into effect yesterday, the closer you get to a u.s. business interests, the less adversely they are affected. mind important to bear in that even this element of asymmetric economic relations has the consent of the cuban government. for the cuban government, this is not an optimal deal, what a much editor deal and not having this. it is what makes this possible to increase the number of visitors, as a mentally

indicated,- as emily it makes it possible to develop other economic activity. love economy.e what that also tells you is that on all of the issues that i am touching, the cuban government may not like some of the new regulations that have gone into affect, or the words that accompany the regulations, but it does not really have a better alternative. what is interesting about the cuban governments response -- ,uban government's response particularly since june, is how remarkably tame it is and how remarkably moderate it is. it does not have a better response. and this is what makes the continuation of these policies

possible. the president indicated in his remarks in june that he also cared about fostering market economy openings in cuba. and there are various ways in not. they may or may includelars of it visitors, flights, remittances, and permitting the kinds of economic activity like airbnb to which u.s. visitors may go. one of the things that is noteworthy about the regulations that went to in -- that went into effect yesterday is that they affirm all four pillars. the sisters can visit. flights may continue. remittances may be sent. people are being steered into private bed-and-breakfast agreements whether managed or

not by airbnb, it does not matter in this case. the human -- the cuban private economy, especially in havana, thrives under these arrangements, will function better under these arrangements, and to the extent that the president really does believe in the goal he has articulated, to support a market economy in cuba, then the policies that yesterday's regulations reaffirmed, advances his goals as well. bear in mind that the cuban government may be somewhat unhappy about elements of how it's private sector economy has been growing. there is some public evidence of that but the cuban government does not have a better alternative to grow its economy than to permit these activities. once again, in this area, it consents to its evolution. theh remembering, that

budget proposal from the president to congress, it may be dead on arrival because ileana has not stepped down but they the proposed to zero out money from helms-burton and that is consistent with the preferences of the cuban government. political changes. they have been alluded to already. the president, by his words and actions, and the secretary of state, even more explicit in his words to career foreign service personnel, have indicated that a regime change is not a top priority in general for the foreign policy of the united states. the secretary of state, in particular, has described it quite clearly. with regard to cuba, that seems to be different. that ifinteresting is

one follows the logic of the remarks of the president and the secretary of state, it is because there is not that much at stake in u.s. cuban relations that the administration believes it can afford to follow a policy that has the current components of regime change. even in that context, not pushing it and up to undermine or even to undercut the other presidential goals and policies. that i have summarized. to the extent that monitoring ,he presidential succession scheduled to take place in cuba at the end of the month of february, it does make sense to astinue diplomatic relations the trump administration continues to affirm. to monitor the process of succession which may include president raul castro and other members of the leadership. it includes affirming cuban-american travel. it includes affirming study

abroad programs and the like. they are among the instruments tot the u.s. has to try facilitate, encourage, and motivate possibilities of clinical change in cuba. as does that segment of the president's remarks in june, 2017 where president trump he would like to continue to negotiate with cuba. particular, with regard to fugitives of justice. regardingally, providing a variety of motivations on topics to be confirmed. the issue with the regulations -- nearly allrday of which were anticipated by the president's remarks in june -- could be put in the following way. the political news from yesterday, as opposed to the regulatory news from yesterday, the political news is how much

of the inherited policies has been affirmed. down to the credit cards that you and i know we cannot use. but, they were part of the old regulations and have remained in the new regulations. it is noteworthy that some of michael's representatives in congress found the decisions yesterday not to have gone as far as they would have liked. if you follow the line of argument i am trying to present to you, it is because this more modest version of the regulations injures less the stated goals of the president. and that is my take on the regulations. regulations yesterday, for the most part, advance none of his goals. of marketn the way opening activities could they make it more difficult to advance the kinds of practical

objectives that are an element of the component of a presidential statement in june by fostering entrepreneurship in cuba in the private sector. they are, for the most part, annoying. the impact on the cuban government will require some relatively modest readjustments at the margins. more annoying they will be to u.s. travelers and to student groups or universities and colleges that wish to establish there. what is most adverse to the goals of the president, what is truly counterproductive to almost every view of his goals as he has articulated them, is consulates in havana and washington. people need to move. to accomplish the kinds of

objectives that the president has articulated. preventing the issuance of these increases is a gross mistake -- of these visas is a gross mistake. the sooner it is corrected, the better. i think we are better off if we try to think through and argue the kinds of lines that i have tried to sketch to you. me,those that, like disagree with the regulations that went into effect yesterday, formulate it in a way that tells the administration that we do understand a lot of what you are doing and a lot of what you're not doing. i will stop there. michael c.: terrific. thank you. so, we have a rich set of issues on the table. take emily's line graph

metaphor and try to extend that out into the future, i think i heard from all of you that we are on a downward slope at the moment. the relations at the moment are going through a rocky period. . reasons for cautious optimism. some factors that point to underlying strength or risk -- or resilience in the relationship. whether emily's references to congressional support for trade and travel. discussion of the attitudes of the cuban-american community, especially as it pertains to strong operating consulates in both countries that allow the movement of people that the community has become accustomed to. or jorge's salient discussion of narrowly interpreted u.s. interests and how those are best advanced in many cases i the

policy of continuity rather than one of change from the prior administration. being a little provocative, does that mean that that in atimistic couple of years, we will look at at this as a low point and these underlying factors will, over time, put us in a better place in the bilateral relationship? of theou see a deepening current freeze? if i could ask you all in answering to make reference to what is happening in cuba, especially the leadership change. many of us saw the video of the vice president that circulated pointing to no immediate change and some -- in some of the more hardline policies of the cuban government. if you could point to a way that

evens in cuba itself will shape the timeline if we extend it out 24 months. let us start with jorge and work backwards. where yourme take question and comment just ended. if you dial back to president inma's visit to havana, retrospect, it was too successful. it scared the cuban leaders. and beginning with fidel castro's last public act of defiance, he publicly criticized his brother for how the obama invitation was handled. period which had not ended by the time of the u.s. presidential election and that has continued since that

time. it has constrained what might have been further consequences of an opening of u.s. cuban relations in terms of domestic politics and the freedom of expression. the kinds of concerns the vice president articulated in that set of remarks in the video. there is a cuban election coming up. not just a presidential succession that has been scheduled. cuban elections have not received a vast amount of attention from the international press. because, in the national assembly elections, it is an ideal electoral law if you are a politician, the number of seats is equal to the number of candidates and so, you will win. the interesting feature, less well-known about cuban electoral

law, is that it has nevertheless retained three rights for the voter. i am not counting abstentions. blank.you can vote second, you can annul your ballot. and the third is you can vote selectively. for reasons i have never understood, the cuban government -- government decided to cluster candidates. in any district, you are 2-5ting to-five -- candidates. nevertheless, it is also clear that what the cuban communist party and the mass organizations want you, dear voter to do is to vote for the united slate. votesuld sum those three

and call them -- not dissident but nonconforming. assembly13 national election, there were many nonconforming votes. 1.8 million cubans choosing to were at oddsthat with the preferences of the established political organizations. that is not a small matter. it was not a tiny number. it is one of the reasons why the municipal election process that is now underway, the government is more alarmed about who might be candidates then they were before. lawose the cuban electoral said something such as this -- in a district with 2-5 candidates, the candidate with the fewest votes would be defeated.

not a radical idea. five candidates. four get elected. one loses. role had been applied in the 2013 national assembly elections, one third of the political bureau would be defeated. that is part of the political issue. it is not just a change of names. if i were the vice president trying to become president of cuba, i would do what politicians in any country does. assume those who would like an opening are already forming. ones who i need to win, 1000 people or so who will have an opinion so maybe in the team of the next president of cuba -- those are the ones afraid of the opening. if i were advising the vice

president, i would have advised him to do exactly what he did. estrangementike -- or engagement? michael b.: i am not particularly optimistic at the moment about this dip being a temporary thing. it depends on how we define temporary. certainly, over the course of this administration, i do not see any real strong incentives for this administration to try to figure out the consular issue in particular. i think there is an element of the administration that would as manysoon not issue visas to everybody, to be frank. and so, there is an element of --s that kind of results

whatever we think about the measures taken to reduce the personal and whether they were justified or not -- the result is even more consistent with the policy on immigration and the wet foot and the dry foot is. think that is particularly encouraging. that, in termsy of cuba's internal dynamic, i think some of what jorge has just described predates the trump administration coming in. there was a way in which -- the manner in which the obama opening was framed, at times wrangled the other side. there is an argument where if the old policy did not work, let us try something else. the problem is -- to what end? in a waydefines it

that the cuban government did not like and it still feels that way. the notion that a nicer u.s. policy would be a trojan horse -- that is something that was in the rhetoric and that cuban authorities had begun to react to. maybe counterintuitively, the policy, even if it is mostly rhetorically aggressive and the engagement remains, the harsher rhetoric is something that is easier to deal with on the other side. i think there may be an element of the cuban political society that knows how to deal with this. i would say there is a new variable. and that -- there are several. is not doingy great. they have not been able to meet their projected turgut's regrowth. there was some positive news this week about foreign investment.

the demographic problem is real. the stalling of the internal economic agenda, things have not moved. was a freezing of new licenses for small business people. toe of this was a reaction what was happening under obama and do not help the scenario going forward. thei don't know what relationship is between the internal and the extra no. a complicated question. i am not particularly optimistic. there are important avenues to keep the travel going. this will not be like falling off of a cliff. i think we will be in for some inertia in the next year or two. michael c.: emily? period, ir a 10 year think the trend line will be isitive but, over two years,

don't know. i would like to be positive. in my remarks, i have said there were is a lotta momentum on travel, business ties, and government dialogue. i do think that will continue. mentioned,have all cuba is getting ready to head into a leadership transition. we, right now, are acutely aware that during leadership transitions, there is a lot of rhetoric, uncertainty, and posturing. it is unclear how that will affect the bilateral relationship. focus a second on congress. it is remarkable that, despite the negative rhetoric from the trump administration, and announcementune and the departments and agencies spending the last few months drafting new rules to restrict trade and travel, that there has been a concerted effort in

congress to gather cosponsors to bills folks, and it's not just senator flake who has positioned himself publicly at odds with the administration, but some in the house who were among the first supporters of candidate trump during the primary are the leaders on these bills to promote engagement. and they are the ones you are advocating to their colleagues they need to change our policy, and they have, over the last six months, gathered more republican cosponsors and i think that bodes well for a continued positive trendline. i think we are ready for your questions and comments.

we will take 3 at a time, and then hopefully have time for a few rounds. i see a couple hands here. start with you. >> thank you. dan erickson with star strategy. -- blue star strategies. i want to come back to the point of cuban entrepreneurs. it is possible, listening to the panel, as interpreting this as good for cuba's automobile sector because it will push more of the visitors into that sector, or it could be really negative. i want to know what you have seen or heard from entrepreneurs on the ground. how are they interpreting this? just the second question, cuban society and what's the society reaction to this? our people in favor or not -- are people in favor not? thank you. michael c.: thanks. right here. >> good morning. alex sanchez, i'm a defense analyst. one question for emily. do you think in a worst-case scenario -- this goes back to

intersection, or if it is a redline? for something that could happen after [indiscernible] and another question, i think michael can talk about it, when you talk about -- in cuba, can you talk about which ones they are. you talked about airbnb, but are there restaurants and stores they cannot go to? michael c.: and a question up here. >> i am timothy, foreign foreign -- former foreign officer. when68 on the cuban desk, che died, poor fellow, number two in the intersection of 79 and 80, i would like to ask a leadership question. castro was the guy that opened

up the cubans to the 20th century. in my day, the old days, he was the bad guy. he did not give 8 hour speeches, but he ran the army, the thatligent service, and intelligence service, and the police. he protected his brother from the bad guys, probably kill it f uegos, sent che on great missions out of the country to keep them away. sent -- to angola. and --so he is a bad guy [indiscernible] which we have been talking about, to make money for the army, the police, and the intelligence service. in my book, and i am old-fashioned, he is a bad guy.

so you know -- michael c.: question? >> has he changed? is he going to heaven? what happened to him. ? [laughter] emily: i was in havana in june during the president announcement, and i was on, my itinerary was to meet with a number of cuban entrepreneurs to get their assessment of the u.s. -- u.s. policy debate and advancement announcement. i happened to be there when the announcement was made. president trump in his remarks said that his policy towards cuba was designed to support the cuban private sector and it was designed to divert funds away from government, certain government coffers and into the cuban private sector. and the folks i was meeting with were pretty clear that that was

not the -- they did not think the policy would have that effect. and a month later, we brought a number of them up to washington so that they could make their voices heard in the d.c. debate. they met with state department , with commerce, with a number of members of congress, and presented some policy recommendations as to how u.s. policy can best support the cuban private sector. but in that month interim between the announcement and the advocacy tour, they had all experienced a number of cancellations. and their overarching sentiment was that negative rhetoric and ambiguity in our policy deters travel and deters engagement. and in the short term had seen the impact of that. and now, fast-forward to present day in the wake of the travel warning, they have seen a further reduction in cancellations.

the cuban private sector, it's not all hospitality focus. we had a couple of folks on the advocacy delegation who served cuban clients, but the cuban clients who they serve are, many of them in the hospitality sector have extra resources , because of the increased travel primarily of u.s. travelers, increased resources to be able to contract an event planner to plan their wedding, or to post ads in a private magazine or to hire a fancy photographer to come and do some ads for their hospitality business. the hospitality sector had experienced acutely the short-term impact of the ambiguity of the policy and the negative rhetoric. but the secondary market, i'll call it that, was starting to feel the impact and i fear that's going to be felt more in

the coming months. that said, i've also heard from the travel industry that there's a sense of relief that the rules have finally come out. what was really hurting the travel industry from the ir perspective was the months long drafting process and the fear of what was coming and the uncertainty and the rules that stated if you bought your ticket before the announcement, or was it before the implementation of the rules, or was it, you know, before president trump was elected, what were the different goalposts. and the average traveler from the united states would just as soon wait until the dust settles before traveling. and i think from the travel industry's perspective yesterday , the dust began to settle and

view onll be a clearer the path, on the ways to travel still to cuba legally and that will have an impact supporting the cuba private sector down the road. michael b.: i don't have much to add to emily's response on the small business side. i would just say that one of the weird regulatory things that we have to figure out, what i think the travel industry will have to figure out, is if individual possibleravel is not and you may have to go in a big group again -- this expanded definition of support for the cuban people, which looked a lot like what people to people was. whether there is enough momentum to sort of funnel people into that and convince people it's ok

or people can get on board the train i think that's to be seen. , in addition to the fear of leading up to the regulations, the other thing that may impact things going forward is just this negative noose around this. i think people often are not as into the weeds reading regulations as i was, and they just here -- hear i cannot go anymore. and that's the end of it and they decide to go somewhere else. there may be further ends, small business sector certainly i've interacted with and a concerned -- and are concerned about increasing the overall numbers of u.s. travelers, i think there is confusion, and it helps that sector. so to the question on enforcement, it's a good question. the list of banned enterprises i think is 180-ish. most of that list is comprised of various hotels that are joint ventures between, not all but many are joint ventures between a foreign company and another branch of the cuban or state

company that is linked or is at least accused of being linked to the cuban armed forces. but there is also some really strange things on there. you cannot engage i think with a producer of soda, but it does not list another brand of soda that is also made. so we are now in the business of telling americans which brands of soda they can drink. rum, too. there are some brands listed and not others. so as far as getting rid of if mantra this administration is stripping away has listless regulations this seems to fly in , the face of that. but enforcement is a keeping. cuba's economy is basically a cash economy, especially from a tourist perspective or least the u.s. tourist perspective. so how to figure out, how to audit the receipt of which brand

of coke i drink, i do not know if that is -- i just do not know. i think the point is just to create sort of regulatory mark to this incentivize people from potentially going for a doctorate of any dramatic increase budget. i would like to think that more important things to worry about , but we will have to wait and see about really the enforcement and the follow-through greater , auditing. i do think the enforcement peace might fall disproportionately on some kinds of folks. there's new wording i'm still trying to parse and forgot about educational travel, about study abroad programs. jorge, i know as express would you do with the bureaucracy of on those matters, and i think u.s. university study abroad programs may be an easily identifiable and conspicuous target. in terms of civil society, and i will end with this, that's a loaded term and i know it is a complicated one. what i would say is if there is a sector of civil society that is on board with the trump administration policies, i don't

think, they don't speak for the vast majority. i would include civil society as everyday people. this is not being seen favorably. i think there's an incredible, the normalization process had its ups and downs. i think they were overinflated expectations of what it would bring or how quickly an average cuban's perspective. they were clear winners in the process and others, not so much. but the idea that we go back even if just, still get back on later, that is an incredibly disappointing thing, particularly for young people who have made a conscious decision to say -- stay, and when some had the decision to leave and they see where their in the have showed up upper area of miami or elsewhere. and so did not be going back to

this kind of old story i think , it's a tough pill to swallow. i hope it doesn't last long. michael c.: jorge, do you want to take on the question of legacy? jorge: it's a very good question and you're quite right to ask this. there is, it's noteworthy that there are many and have long been many biographies of fidel castro but not one good one of raul castro. but moreover, it is analytically important still today, given that he will remain in the head of the cuban communist party, after the transition, it remains pertinent to think about it. so first point is the contrast. if one takes a long time span of raul castro's life, he first appears in the public arena, when troops under his command, rebel troops under his command kidnap a whole bunch of your -- u.s. citizens. and subsequently available archival information made it clear that at the time his

brother fidel castro thought that raul was an extremist and nearly crazy. and so there was a real difference of opinion between the two brothers. and jump forward to the mid-1960's, it is his ministry that is responsible for, and it is him as minister who most resists ending the program known as the -- [speaking spanish] military units that were in effect, forced labor camps where a variety of people were sent, most notably thousands of those accused to be homosexuals. castro who is raul invites obama to his van a. -- havana. his daughter is the advocate of affirming that being gay is not a crime under the laws of the republic of cuba and adopting

another a practical -- a number of practical policies, including police training, to make sure this is affirmed. in 1968, cuba's small version of a revolution, called the affirmse, raul publicly we did not make a revolution to protect the right to trade and leads to the expiration of -- x appropriation of these things like beauty shops and hot dog stand and plumbers, all of which become state enterprises. and then it is raul castro in 2010 who announces the policy to update the cuban economy. it opens up a significant growth for all of these small, private business activities. two very different kinds of behavior. the first time i noticed a split between the two brothers is in

the early 1990's. in the middle of a severe economic crisis, raul castro publicly gives an interview and he had his favorite journalist give him a planted question, what is the greatest threat to cuban national security today? raul's answer was beans. cubans have to eat and it is only after that that you have fidel castro offering policy changes from the private sector. so there are interesting ruaul'ss, where today views, which he had suppressed them which other people have been known to suppress of their own views in that moment of time, i do not think so. that is fine mentioned the decision to kidnap a bunch of u.s. citizens. i think this is a man that generally learned. who generally -- learning,

meaning he changed his views on important questions. he changes his views not just from deeper reading,, but because the world had changed and he unlike his brother was prepared to add just to these changes -- adjust to these changes, and that might not get him to heaven, but at least out of purgatory. [laughter] michael c.: ok. heard so far is what the u.s. reaction to donald trump is going to be, how the u.s. may or may not perform, what kind of relationship -- the cubans have a role in this, i presume. they have to make choices about policyeaction to the new agenda of the trump administration.

now we see some countries have gotten angry, some politicians in latin america have gotten angry at the united states and have called for resistance. and others, perhaps the wide majority are ready to accommodate the trump presidency and try to find ways of continuing. is there any debate or question oughthow when government to respond to this, to the trump say?ies but say? -- let's >> good morning. i am from howard university, adjunct faculty on global strategy. my questions revolve around macrolevel. as a policy continues to shift, there was a conversation about eliminating the 10% tax on u.s.

dollars at the state level. how is that impacting the moving forward? secondly, the question around the currency, and how is it going to impact things moving forward? lastly, maybe four months ago there was a dialogue on both sides of the aisle about a serious discussion about the elimination of the blockade, has that died completely or do we see some of that continuing to happen behind the scenes and we expect something to happen in the future with that? michael c.: mark schneider? >> mark schneider. this goes to the question, jorge, the view linking trump goals and policy decisions, and it also goes to the question of where raul is. it relates to venezuela. from the standpoint of the trip

administration, it is one of the few areas where he has been outspoken and clearly opposed to the direction of events in venezuela toward a more dictatorial regime. in that context one of the few nations that seems to have influence there is cuba. the question is, does the recent policy decisions, one -- have any effect on cuba's willingness to please full role? ands it simply unrelated there is unlikely to be any shift in cuban policy with respect to venezuela? michael c.: thank you, mark. let's start there. jorge, if you want to take that question and we will move backwards. peter's question. i would say that the cuban government has by its actions

and more recently by its words, signaled very clearly how it is thinking about this. it is prepared to continue to go down the list, guantanamo, migration, civil litigation and the like. the cuban government is all set with that. the response to whether it was a response of the new regulations, or to the speech in june, the self-discipline with which the cuban government officials have responded is noteworthy at a minimum, to put it modestly. this is a highly professional theme. raul castroce from all the way down. this is their view. i think honestly the reason is they do not have a better alternative, it is not better for them to tear up some of

these things, to retaliate against the united states. assumption is as much as they dislike having to accommodate and adjust to the trump administration, that they have and it they will likely to continue to do so. mark, to your question on of an ezeula, a -- on ventas will let me say, my first conversation about -- in just a few months we will have exchanged -- with the vent economy minister, who thought that this was the way to go. you know come a this is the 20th anniversary of that conversation . uela, i haves wilez

thought for some time that the would beernment willing to be part of some international arrangement with them. i do not think this takes an enormous amount of mental effort. cubans who come back from service in venezuela, the tens of thousands who have done so, they keep saying that this is not a -- government. >> we have this discussion archived in our video lay brarery at c-span.org. search cuba on the homepage. we leave it now. the house is about to gavel back n they are expected to go back out after any speeches and start legislative work at 4:00 p.m. eastern. four bills on the agenda today in the house. including one seeking to reduce the allowance given to former u.s. presidents for staff and other expenses. and also a nonbinding resolution expressing the sense of the house for the quote,

urgent need for a political solution in yemen. the speaker pro tempore: the house will be in order. the prayer will be offered by our chaplain, father conroy. chaplain conroy: let us pray, loving and gracious god we give you thanks for giving us another day. help us this day to draw closer to you so that with your spirit and aware of your presence among us we may all face the tasks of this day. bless the members of the people's house. help them to think clearly, speak confidently and act cower age usly in the pleff that all noble service is based upon patience, truth and love. may they be great enough to be humble