collectn, requires the exutive branch to require explicit approval from the fisa courfor collecti. it further subjects collection to the 30-day congressional review process. i know seenbrenner id nobody can do anything 3 days, but ihink we can. and the bill strengthens the privacy and civil liberties oversit board. that'something i was strumental in establiing when i w on e intelligence committee. i know it importance but i als knoit h to be stngthened and it s to be respected as a watchdo so, i mean, t list goes on. reqring public reporting on the use of 702 data. just saying to the inteigence communy, don't tr to minimize any violations tt ay have occurred. want the fas, we the truth. and that's why i am excited it expanded histblower protections briefings to

the oversight commiee which have required. unlikehe original house intellience bill, which i oppose, this bill ds not include language that would have likely >> leaving the last few minutes of this, you can find it online at c-span.org. live now on c-span from the center for strategic and international studies, a discussion with security secretary ernest moniz. we'll be hearing from the former secretary shortly. >> we're lucky to have him in town, staying active. he's become the co-chair of the nuclear threat initiative, my old boss, senator sam nun is the co-chair with him, i'm delighted, senator, that you're back today, i asked if he wanted to say any remarks, he said hell, no, i'll let ernie do

that. charlie curtis, thank you for being here. charlie and deb, thank you for being -- they've been partners with us in raising so many important issues of our day. just as a bit of a safety announcement first, in case, we may hear a voice that says we have an emergency. if that happens, please follow my instructions. we've got an exit right there and one over there that will take us down to the street. we'll go down, take two left there, go once we get to "national geographic," i'll have hot chocolate waiting for everybody. nothing will happen but just in case. i don't think we ever had a more qualified individual to be secretary of energy than ernie moniz. he was -- if you could design someone who was perfect for that job, it was ernie he knew

government well. he knew the private sector very well. he had the honesty and objectivity of being in academia where he could reflect on what he saw, both in government and in the private sector. and he brought to the job just enormous energy. i look back, those were golden years for us. and he was working through a series of tough issues at the time, those issues haven't gone away. i hope today we may have an opportunity to hear a little bit about iran, maybe about north korea, with any luck at all you're going to find this a fascinating afternoon. let me say welcome, we're delighted to have brent here, any time brent comes we have a great meeting. now add a little more of that applause and welcome ernie moniz.

rnie: thank you, john. i thought you might say the emergency announcement would be coming tomorrow. but i thank you. it's great to be back here at csis which is such a respected organization, recognized here and globally in that way. and of course csis has had very close ties with sam, sam nun, who you already introduced and sam obviously an enormous leader in nuclear security but a great friend and colleague and i now have the privilege of partnering with him on a routine basis that at n.t.i. and work with him in trying to reduce nuclear and other global security threats. at nti. which he founded in 2001 along with ted turner.

and sam, i can assure you, remains an extraordinary source of wisdom, so that's great. i have to add, brent scowcroft, since you mentioned being a d.u.e., he was one of the introducers for my nomination, apparently with great sway in the senate given the results. but i really -- he's another great friend. i have the pleasure in a different role of roaming around the same floor with brent scowcroft also quite a few times each week. i will mention charlie curtis, with whom, again, very, very long association in government and charlie is -- has dragged himself out of retirement to help us in this -- these first periods at n.t.i. so you know, last month, i had the pleasure of speaking at the university of chicago. was the 75th anniversary of enrico fermi's first controlled

chain reaction. that was the launching of the nuclear age and the precursor to the manhattan project which had already started technically but his work was critical for the manhattan project that of course developed the first nuclear weapons. at that time, as people in this audience almost certainly know, it was already recognized at that time the dual nature of this technology. that on the one hand the potential that was realized of course to make weapons that quite different from other instruments of war in their destructive power. but also technology that could have many beneficial applications, energy was clearly there from the very beginning but then medicine, industrial applications, etc. so this duality is something we've been facing right from the beginning of the nuclear age and it's that duality, the fact that

those, both of those applications really draw from a common technology base that has challenged both governments and international institutions. so i've been focusing on this for about four decades and certainly am committed to extending what i think has been n.t.i.'s outstanding work along with sam and a terrific staff and the broader national security community, john, brent, and others who aren't in this room. now if judged only by the metrics that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, that nuclear energy provides about a sixth of global electricity that nuclear medicine saves countless live, we can say that we've enjoyed the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear technology, while avoiding the use of a nuclear weapon since world war ii. but that said, i think we've had too many close calls with nuclear weapons and the number

of nuclear weapon states has of course grown. so today, now in the 21st century, we're challenged by a different nuclear age and there are so many dimension of that. first i want to say that miscalculation, and i will be using miscalculation throughout this speech as a brd bucket for accident, mistake, miscalculation, catastrophic terrorism, miscalculation in my view is the most likely catalyst of nuclear use even though deterrence remains paramount, it's not enough. secondly, the sophistication of north korea's nuclear weapons program cannot be deny. third there are advocates in both russia and the united states for using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in a number of scenarios, the concept of escalate or de-est ka -- escalate to de-escalate continues to make the rounds in moscow and last month's strategy

expand the role of nuclear weapons, deeming them, quote, eensrble -- essential to prevent nuclear attacks, nonnuclear attacks and aggression. 9/11 heralded an age of global reach unconstrained by deterrents and nuclear capabilities are spreading, including in regions rife with rivalries and conflicts. it's a different set of issues we have to think about going forward which calls for re-examining strategic policies and near-term decisions on the u.s. nuclear arsenal, forced posture -- force postures doctrine, and the like. we also need to examine our response to international challenges like iran and north korea, as well as the dangerous state of u.s.-russia relations. we must not unnecessarily convert significant diplomatic challenges into security crises as seems to be happening today with iran and north korea.

we will post a version of these remarks, a longer version of these remarks, at n.t.i. but so today i'm just going to start the conversation that we will be having with john and with you with five broad messages and then a few remarks on the issues du jour, iran, and north korea. so these five points i'd like to make, first, the combination of advances in technology, tensions between nations, terrorism and cyberdangers, must challenge traditional thinking about nuclear weapons policies, the risk of nuclear weapons use, the configuration and deployment of our forces and the priorities of our investments. maintaining safe, secure, and reliable deterrent is necessary in today's world but is not sufficient. the risks of miscalculation should be at the forefront of our thinking and an important driver of ourage cease.

second, preventing nuclear use is the core objective of our nuclear policy. specifically, when the nuclear posture review surfaces, presumably in a few week, we need to asays its recommendations in part by considering whether they lessen the dangers of miscalculation and thereby increase stabble and reduce risk of nuclear use or not. if the recently released national security strategy is a guide as i said earlier, we could be heading in the wrong direction. i think school is out, we'll see what the npr says but expanding the types of threats against which nuclear weapons might be used under the banner of deterrence likely will make the risk and miscalculations, not less. for those who argue the u.s. needs more usable nuclear options for deterrence, they have a high burden to explain why the present options are insufficient. the president already has options for flexibly employing

the nuclear deterrent. by what logic should we stress that deploying more usable weapons against the backdrop of our current flexbility capabilities and our abilities that make it second to none make it less likely that they will be used? by what logic can we count on nuclear remaining limited? in what way is it being addressed in ways that provide confidence in scenarios with short decision time? are we about to join those in russia who declare we need to be prepared to escalate to de-escalate? what happens if the world's nuclear superpowers start down this road? these are question the kinds of questions i think we need to be ard-nosed in examining the n.p.r. third, the united states and russia have divergent interests in many areas. russia's boosk the genocidal

regime in sir ark tampering with our election have increased tensions. the uncertain outcome of the mueller information is also a factor. nevertheless, we remain convince wed must find a way to resume a strategic relationship and regularalize dialogue with russia on matters of exiss ten rble common interest to include nuclear and traditional forces, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons and more. not as a favor to russia. we did this at the height of the kelled war and must do it again. to support this national security imperative, we must forge a bipartisan, joint congress-administration approach to secure issues with russia. especially now that last year's sanctions legislation puts in place shared executive branch and congressional decision making. sam and i have specifically recommended a liaison group of condition gregsal, state department, and department of defense leadership similar in

spirit to that formed around arms control issues during the reagan administration. fourth. he international atomic energy agencies safeguards architecture need strengthening in the 21st century. iaea is doing a good job monitoring iran's compliance with the jcpoa using an array of knew verification tools provided by that agreement. verification is the heart of the jcpoa and it does not sunset. over time we may be able to consider involving the jcpoa verification regime to more nearly universal application. fifth, we must make worldwide progress in developing comprehensive, commercially-based advanced nuclear fuel services, including fuel supply, waste storage and disposition. without this progress, are onal courts, iran's,

likely to present themselves in the future. let me make a few comments about iran and then a few on north korea. on iran, we're on the precipice of a new crisis in iran if the president refuses to approve the sanctions waivers and if the united states, not iran, that fails to meet its commitments under the deal. the iran nuclear deal puts a straitjacket on iran's nuclear activities, discussion of the jcpoa, however, typically misses its most important features. uch as the 15-year limitation,ling in january, 2031, during which iran can have no more than 300 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 3.67%. this is a very, very tight constraint. then the enduring verification measures covering every stable of iran's nuclear activities.

that is what is often missed and it deserved repeating. the real heart of the jcpoa is in its unprecedented international verification provisions. it's based on verification, not trust. it's ironic that with the jcpoa iran has the toughest constraints on its nuclear program of any nation on the planet and the most demanding verification regime. yet the president may take action imminently to remove these constraints with no viable alternative. opoventse the deal are fixated on the provisions that sunset. they underplay or ignore the importance of the commit. s that don't expire. a permanent prohibition of iran having a nuclear weapon or weaponization program which is unique. permanent adheeshes to protocol with a unique time window to respond to iaea inspection requests for undeclared sites.

again, unique. and the requirement to ship out all spent fuel for the life of the redesigned iraq reactor, which i remind you was the heart of the plutonium pathway that caused a lot of consternation. yet we hear that 15 years is, and i'm derided at n.t.i. for this, epsilon, compared to the history of the persian empire. that's a fact. but it's entirely manufactured as an objection to the agreement. 15 years is a significant period in the political life of a country and iran, in fact, is demonstrating that with these widespread protests that shine light on the government's failure to adequately serve the people's needs. the nuclear deal was never meant to be the end of the road in our engagement with iran. we, along with our partners in the jcpoa, should be using this time to build on the agreement to help shape the outcome when the nuclear constraints lift

which so far we have done very little of as we approach in five days the two-year mark of the agreement implementation. our european partners are stressing this, the foundational nature of the jcpoa and with the nuclear agreement this place, we can and should be taking action to address iran's support for terrorism, the syrian regime, and its regional proxy the human rights record and other troubling aspects of iranian policy without the complications of the nuclear issue. we should keep the spotlight on the failings of iranian govern withance and the country's economic situation. indeed, turning up the heat on these issues with our european and regional friends and allies is essential and reinforces the failings pointed out in the recent protests. iran needs to respond to popular demands for more rapid modernization. with the jcpoa, iran's leadership cannot easily blame their governance and economic

shortcomings on the united states and external forces. we should not give leverage to the most extreme elements in iran by withdrawing from the jcpoa. we must draw lessons from the jcpoa for broader fuel cycle considerations. as we look ahead a few years, we are likely to confront more iran-like circumstances unless we can build verification enhancements to fuel cycle management globally and development better solutions for fuel and waste services. advances in technologies, or in technology, are making weapons capabilities easier to acquire under a safeguards regime that can and should be strengthened to fully meet its purpose. the slope of steady expansion of interest in nuclear reactors internationally and the uncertainty surrounding the future of u.s. nuclear power are making it more important than ever to identify, incentivize and implement an approach to

fuel services that reinforces key nonproliferation and nuclear security principles. such an approach supports reliable and economical commercial fuel market, minimize the spread of ouranium enrichment capacity and address the management of irradiated fuel in ways that don't lead to steadily increasing stockpiles of separated plutonium. most important, all these approaches must be back stopped with international safeguards and monitoring systems that take advantage of technological progress and have the political and financial resources to back them up. at n.t.i., we are expanding substantially our efforts in this area and will be seeking to work with public and private partners to operationalize such an approach so that countries can have the benefits of peaceful nuclear technologies without increasing proliferation dangers. l.e.u. bankthe ieae is a foundational step in that

direction. as a csis commission concluded several years ago, and my colleagues and i affirmed and expanded on last year a diminishing united states supply chain is a national security concern both for our standing and maintaining and expanding nonproliferation norms and for meeting our own national security requirements. so it's a big effort here on the fuel psych that will will be critical if we want to reach our ultimate goals in the nuclear security arena. finally, let me just add a few words on north korea. while the threat has been growing, the president's war of words has managed to unsettle our allies and alarm the rest of the world. blurring the historic recognition that nuclear weapons have destructive power of a different order of magnitude than the most powerful conventional whens. in fact, i might just add, i'd like to make a comparison, the oklahoma city bomb, a big ryder

truck, was about two tons of tnt equivalent versus the four orders of magnitude larger blasts of the world war ii bombs, not to mention the additional radiation issues involved with nuclear weapons. so this cannot be talked about in anything resembling the same way. of course kim jong un has taken the diplomatic initiative with his outreach to the south and pyongyang's participation in the upcoming winter olympics. we've been living for some time with the threat of a nuclear north korea. that could strike u.s. allies and forces in the asia pacific region. under kim jong un, the nuclear and missile threat has become more acute as north korea has systematically advanced its nuclear and missile technology. we have to stop thinking about that -- those tests as provocations as opposed to a

systematic and increasingly successful development of those technologies. there would be a significant benefit to our security, the u.s. and our allies, and a reduction in regional tensions, if we can convince the north of course to pause an then perhaps forego any further testing. of weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. but there's not a long time to capture the benefits of such a pause. more likely than not, achieving that outcome will require direct talks with the north koreans on the path to negotiations. whether there is now an opening for such talks is not clear. some believe kim jong un's knewier -- new year's day claim that the ballistic missiles have been proved to the full, close quote, opens the door to a freeze on nuclear and long range

ballistic mice tile -- missile test. we need to find a way to probe the north koreans on that point and exploit it if in% that there -- if in fact there is one. it's also imperative we focus on additional steps to reduce the risk of miscalculation on the korean peninsula, including nuclear use but also the use of devastating conventional forces on both sides of the 38th parallel. unlike in iran where it made sense to keep negotiations confined to the nuclear program in order to prevent nuclear weapons development, negotiations with pyongyang must address broader issues beyond their declared nuclear deterrent. for talks to succeed, the united states and china must first share a vision of the ultimate goal, the political, economic, and security arrangements that can form the foundation of a more stable korean peninsula. that shared vision with beijing must be built on a strong foundation and framework of

consultations between the united states, south korea, and japan and other key parties like russia. we must be prepared to engage beijing on its real security concerns. and there are tough questions. reunification of the korean peninsula is not an attainable goal for the foreseeable future. how does that play in? the future regional posture of u.s. military forces is a critical piece of the puzzle. there's little public ed, at least, that sufficiently encompassing discussions of this type have taken place. in concluding, there's no doubt the united states continues with a unique responsibility and imperative to lead and set the right course. the nuclear policy and posture washington sets in the coming weeks, actually days and weeks, will determine america's path for the next years and decisions dprk sia, iran, and the potentially for decades.

the nuclear nonproliferated treaty entered into force, eight american potts, both parties, have reaffirmed our legal obligation to work with other nuclear weapons states to divest themselveses of nuclear weapons over time. it's it's essential that the n.p.r. back that up with practical, concrete steps toward achieving that goal. the best way to reduce and eliminate the risk of miscalculation and nuclear use is to work steadily to define and then walk the long, tortuous path of nuclear weapons and there's a lot of head room for diplomacy. thank you. [applause] john: ernie, you've given us a lot of wonderful material to kind of guide us.

comparable weapons for deterrence, what do you think about that question? ernie: first of all, let me repeat the four orders of magnitude. micro in this context has to be remembered as still a nuclear eapon. number one. number two, as i said, i think -- i don't know

what's in the n.p.r. but if there's something that goes in that direction, i hope there's sufficient analysis, analysis-backed statement as to why this contributes to stability, why it reduces the possibility of use. i have not seen that argument ade convincingly at all. we have a flexible deterrent, as i've emphasized. there are ways of repositioning it, perhaps. so john, my answer is, i'm open to hearing an argument that i have not yet heard to convince e that that's a positive path. john. traditionally you said in this country we don't want to build a

warhead that we don't want to use. but what if we think our opponent is building a warhead that's usable? i think that's a debate we're going to have in the country. like you, i think we need to see the proposal, the analysis. ernie: it has to be made very, very clear. we have a deterrent against the use of any nuclear weapon against us or our allies. john: you said something that i -- i must admit, i have to admit my failing to not have appreciated this before which is that the verification agreement with iran in jcpoa is eternal. that's interesting. would you -- ernie: on verification. john: on verification. would you amplify on that? i don't think many americans caught that. ernie: first of all, there's a lay everyday set of verification measures. for example, all of which are completely unique to iran.

let me preface that by saying that in the negotiation, well, at least when dr. salahy, head of their nuclear program and i, were brought into the negotiation parallel with the foreign ministers, john kerry and sarif, that really early on we had to establish, there's no argument over whether or not the international community has a high degree of distrust of the iranian nuclear program. the facts on the ground tell you that. the fact that the u.s. and russia, post-ukraine, were negotiating together, tells you that. the point of that is, therefore, right up front, it was -- it has to -- had to be made clear, there would need to be extraordinary verification measures for there to be any hope of an acceptable agreement, ok. so then there are a bhole variety of things, i mentioned,

for example, 20 years of surveillance of the manufacture of critical centrifuge parts. supply chainranium verification. but now getting to some forever commits to - iran the additional protocol for those who are not familiar, probably few in this audience, but the initial protocol is what gives the iaea the opportunity to inspect undeclared nuclear sites that -- for which they have reason to be suspicious. that is a voluntary agreement with various countries. iran is required to be in the additional protocol forever. but there's even more.

with the additional protocol, the voluntary additional protocol, as it is exercised now, with any other country, there's no time limit. e iaea says i think that facility, let me make it clear, which could be a military facility, gives us pause and we have some reasons. great. there's no time limit for when the access is actually granted. in the iran agreement, there is. there's a 14-day period in which iran and the iaea must work out the terms of the access. if they cannot reach those terms in 14 days, there's 10 more days for the access to happen or they are in violation. of the jcpoa. this is a very, very powerful

constraint. and it's almost never mentioned in the discussion. number one. and number two, imagine that's the kind of constraint we would give up if we were to unilaterally walk away from this agreement while iran is complying. john: if we were to talk a-- to walk away from jcpoa, what will the other negotiating parties do? ernie: i don't know, john, it's hard to speculate but i think the -- obviously -- let's say two different example scenarios. one scenario obviously is iran says, ok. deal is done. and we will resume our nuclear activities. as we wish. no 300 kilogram limit new york centrifuge limit, etc.

then the question would become, would we be able, having been the ones to precipitate the failure, would we be able to once again marshal in its national -- marshal the international community for sanctions on the regime. i doubt we'd reach the one we had before but that would be the issue. the other scenario, there are others, obviously, but the other scenario is iran and the three european country, e.u., china, and russia, all agree to proceed with the agreement but recognizing that this is voluntary. ok. we will voluntarily do this with our friends. well, one thing is of course we managed to isolate ourselves completely, to have no seat at the table. no seat with the joint commission. no seat with the -- another thing which is unique a procurement channel so any dual-use items have to go

through a process with the p-5 plus one. ie -- we're isolated and then think there is a real issue how religiously would a voluntary agreement be pursued or followed over time. as erosion could be setting in. especially because the verification measures are unique. and as an aside, if i may answer a question you didn't ask, but i alluded to it obliquely, is one reason why one of the many threads that we want to pursue in looking at the nuclear fuel cycle globally is a thread of can we get some of those verification measures adopted voluntarily by other countries? they would greatly strengthen the global safeguards regime and

would frankly put some pressure on iran in fact to continue, continue with its program. john: several times in your speech and just now, you talked about the role that commercial nuclear energy plays as an indispensable kind of dimension of proliferation control regime. and russia has become such a major supplier, participant in this global system you mentioned that we've got to find ways to work together. things are tough right now where there's such hostility. is there a window or -- from your conversations with ssians, is there a window of possibility to discuss nuclear safeguards, nuclear control, fuel cycle? that at all in the rem of a

-- rem of something we could -- a realm of something we could talk to russia about these days? ernie: it would be very, very difficult. there are many things we can and should discuss with russia, i'll give you an example of something that occurred last may, with n.t.i., it was a catalyst for a meeting with department of , iaea and the central asian republics and a group from russia to discuss dirty bombs, how one might identify, secure and eventually replace things like medical sources that could be used as dirty bomb materials. that's something of clear mutual interest in a part of the world for which one should be concerned about this kind of thing. there's a whole string of things that we can be discussing right now with them that involve nuclear security.

think right now frankly until we get past our significant problems between u.s. and russia right no, i -- right now, i think commercial power would be very tough. but going back to, frankly, when i was undersecretary, in the clinton years, and all the way through up to ukraine, that was the area the russians really wanted to collaborate with us on. the commercial fuel cycle. d we certainly had lots of complementary skill sets and capabilities we could draw on. frankly, this is one of those things that is an irrelevant footnote of history. but i can again use epsilon, we were within epsilon of getting a terrific agreement done. got it again.

done at the end of the clinton administration. anyway, it didn't work. and it's unfortunate. it would have had all these elements of fuel cycle and fuel services that we been trying to advocate for. join we're going to en-- john: we're going to spin the globe and put our finger on the korean peninsula. this is obviously a dangerous situation. north korea has had nuclear weapons for 10 years. they're developing much more sophisticated delivery capabilities. candidly, our ally, south korea and japan are questioning whether extended deterrence represents a real guarantee any longer. they won't say it during the first round of drinks, it usually takes several rounds of drinks before they get to it but at some point they say we need to have our own retaliatory capability.

what -- put you back in office, what are -- what would you be saying to our allies about the confidence they ought to have in us? ernie: first of all, what i would not be saying is that the, especially at the current level of development of long range intercontinental ballistic missile technology and i mean, by what i mean right now at least is i'm certainly one of those who does not believe that there is the capability for an integrated system to actually deliver the package effectively over long distances. but what i would not be saying is that this is the game changer because they have to be -- we have to assume they have the capability right now, they've

had the capability, to deliver those weapons in much shorter range, missiles that certainly threaten south korea and japan, not to mention all of our own military families and the like who are there. so i can't say that i find the dialogue, having been terribly well thought through up to now. then with regard to what one ould say, i think it's the framework that i again alluded o briefly that we need to have much broader security discussions with korea, japan and south -- with south korea, japan, an china in particular, to scope out what is the kind of acceptable security structure for them and then presumably for

north korea, because i think that we're going to have to have a real step by step march through talks before we get to negotiations which will have to be multilateral and i don't hink we have that security posture mapped out for the entire region. john: do you think we can count on deterrence to handle north korea? ernie: well, look. we are -- whether we want to say it or not, we are in a deterrence posture. and i certainly do not think we should give up on the vision of a nuclear-free peninsula. but that's going to be a long haul and so we better get used to thinking about how we're going to manage, certainly military solution, quote, solution, at the moment, looks

like, in fact, secretary mattis said that, it looks to be a horrible, horrible option. so i think it's a question of first of all, really enforcing sanctions that are already on the books which again i think can happen without that bigger condominium in terms of the security architecture and and then that's how one moves forward, i think. john: ok, colleagues -- ernie: and another thing i'll say, steve hekker, a lot of people in this room know, a great expert in this, and just ad a discussion recently and he's working up some interesting analytics, reinforced this case that the buildup of the north korean nuclear weapons and

missile capabilities has been a quarter century pretty much steady march toward these capabilities with maybe some acceleration under the current national leader and the corollary to that is, you don't unwind that very quickly either. so we've -- i think we need to think of a long game here with no nuclear use and no major conventional use, of course, at long h parallel, as the game going through deterrence to eventual hopefully rejoining of north korea with the international community and denuclearization. john: i'm going to ask, identify yourself, no long questions, i'll cut you off ruthlessly and make fun of you if you do a long question. right here, third from the back.

identify yourself, stand up so we can see. >> thank you for your remarks and your work. my question is about the iaea and you mentioned its important role with the jcpoa. could you assess its capability to fulfill that role and also as an international organization how vulnerable it is to po lit si tissue po litization. - to politicization. ernie: first, i think the iaea is doing a very good job in iran. it's a heavy load for the organization. they have had to -- they have a lot more boots on the ground than they ever had, supplemented by the additional technologies that the jcpoa allowed them to employ, cameras and seals and all kinds of things. in terms of capabilities, i feel, i always have felt and

feel today quite confident in their abilities. there is part of that confidence stems from the fact that our, i an, our national, the d.u.e. national laboratories, are very significant participants in the trainers of -- training of inspectors in terms of the technologies. so i think it's a question of staining support for the agency. in fact, whether it's the agency or whether it is the employment of national means, trying to understand what's going on, what i've sometimes said is, as an example, i've got great news for you. we just got you 25 years of surveillance of the uranium supply chain. the bad news is, you've got to stick to it for 25 years. i mean, so -- there's also

frankly leadership issues of making sure that these issues of verification, transparency in iran over a long time period, that the commitment is sustained. and that's not -- that's financially but it goes beyond financially. it has to remain a priority, otherwise those verification tools will not have the intended effect over time. ohn: forgive me for jumping on this answer but iaea is one of the most important assets we have. department of defense fails to recognize how important they are. this row here. > right now, i am working at u.s.-korean institute of science. my question is about the

difference between framework and the jcpoa. t seems to me that the framework in terms of verifications and give and take and others. but my sense is that, you know, iranian sophisticated, you mentioned today verification process is multilayered. and -- but technically very advanced than the other. my question is, how do you think the role of nuclear scientist groups role in nuclear negotiation? i mean my understanding is that you know scientists led by you made the control in iranian --

played a significant role in iranian negotiation. ernie: well, actually, my friend graham ellison at the harvard kennedy school, is trying to develop a theme that's relevant to your question of so-called science, or scientists as diplomats. and so first let me say that i think the role of science in negotiations has always been very important. and in fact, on the jcpoa, for example, i mean, i became a negotiator in parallel with secretary of state in february, 2015. but the department of energy was involved in those negotiations all the time. because there had to be constant

analysis of options, etc. so you know, to be honest, you know, the rather unique situation that developed in jcpoa put more of a spotlight on it. but -- and it was different to actually be the -- be a negotiator as opposed to a supporter for the negotiations. in this particular case, it proved to be, first of all, fortuitous. that the quote, heads of the nuclear programs in the two countries both had the requisite technical background not to mention both having m.i.t. connections was extremely helpful as well. and -- but what i don't know and with graham, graham will be following this and thinking rough, are there other major

negotiations where actually having appropriately trained and high enough political level people, scientists, doing the negotiation itself, it's not obvious. i frankly just don't know whether it is a one-off or something that can be much more important in other domains, climate negotiations or things of the like. john: i thought gigahertz was a french car rental company. i think defense guys need scientists. >> hi. there seems to be a lot of focus on missile technology but what's to say north korea hasn't already smuggled a weapon in? ernie: that's really important and my colleague, sam nun, may want to respond to that, it's a favorite theme of his, there are much more crude delivery systems and the crude delivery systems can also develop -- can also

deliver cruder weapons. because you don't have the same kind of constraints that you have for a long-range missile. that's correct and furthermore, a -- yopt to get carried away crude is but certainly a delivery system may allow one to at least provide more ambiguity s to the return address. john: would you like to comment on this? know this is something you spent a lot of time on. bring a microphone to senator nunn. >> i don't have any rebuttal to ernie's excellent speech, but i've been concerned about delivery systems where you don't have a return address for a long time.

i think we've moved into an era where catastrophic nuclear weapons are possible and all the nuclear powers, no matter how much we disagree on a lot of things have a similar box we're. in i think deterrence, even if it's safe, secure, and reliable, and that's what it's got to be, and survivable, as ernie said is not nearly enough. we are in a different era now. you've got attributions problems, cyberproblems, possibility of simulated attacks, that are false. you've got the whole question of protecting nuclear materials because the scientific knowledge is out there. not a piece of cake but to make a crude weapon. and just imagine the dilemma if the -- if the north koreans announced, or any other nuclear country announced in great tension that they had a crude weapon on a ship, guess which port it's in, or they have a knew leer weapon in a tunnel or

basement. it may not be true but how do you disprove it? and what's the reaction wherever the basement is allegedly located? those are things we've got to consider. i think i've said a lot of times we're in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. when i say we, i mean even those under considerable strains like u.s. and russia. there are a lot of interests. camera. ht next to the please stand up and identify ourself. >> we can't hear you. >> i'm a visiting fellow. and i would like to draw your comments on the current nuclear development. and do you think that pakistan has the fastest nuclear program

in the world and what are your comments on the nuclear development in india. >> talking about nuclear power development in southeast asia? [inaudible] >> pakistan and india in particular? one of a situation that the clear cases of concern about this miscalculation, again broadly defined miscalculation s a move to a bad outcome. of now about the deployment badly misnamed of tactical nuclear weapons, which is a

misnoemer. ut the idea that battlefield use could escalate that we were talking about. i might just add that that's not the only case. but in many of the cases that re of concern. and that ends up providing a lot of the impet us. and i might add that the height of the cold war, the shoe was on the other foot as we had our curtain ith the iron and units rolling over. that reinforces the point made in the korea context. but i think a lot of these discussions focus too much only

on the nuclear threat and not on the overall security context ich is often driving the prospect. >> you are going to get it. >> maybe shifting over to the middle east, what are your houghts on a potential u.s.-saudi bilateral cooperation without the gold standard with the prohibition on enrichment and reprocessing particularly in light that the u.s. is competing in the international markets chinese.he >> thank you for the question. >> we have seen the reports that there are discussions going on for a one, two, three agreement that will not have all of the

features. number one, i think we have to first of all give great credit to the emirates and their posture. and the bank that i mentioned the emirates were one of the countries that provided funds to build the bank. they have the gold standard. . ey deserve a

they have said we have no tention for developing these fuel cycle facilities but not prepared to write this off. so my argument would be, why don't we focus on what we are trying to get at and think creatively about how to do that. a paper that was an author on some years ago with dan, who was a member of the scaw kroft group and arne and john deutsche. we said look, one way to look at this, you could provide special fuel cycle services to a country for a contracted period of time during which period they would

not do enrichment or reprocessing. hat is just one example. it was a time limited gold standard. but it gets around some of the issues of quote permanently rejecting opportunities. with that, i think comes other .ncentives that one could advanced nuclear reactor program. not enrichment, not reprocessing. ut that would be find.

even if it is not a quote gold standard. and i would end by saying what i said earlier and 2012, 2013, did that and we published a paper last year that i do believe it is very important for the united states to try to rebuild, certainly preserve and rebuild our nuclear supply chain. that was the foundation of being able to shape our proliferation regime so effectively. let's face it, we are not in great shape already. it's going to get a lot worse if we are frozen out of enormous regions of the world like the middle east where russia has at least tentative or some form of with saudi th

arabia, egypt, jordan, turkey. so i think you have to look at this in a multi dimensional way to achieve our overall security objectives. > we have 210 nuclear reactors in america. half of them on american navy ships. going to be hard to support our navy if it goes down. >> i think the key issue on the supply chain is the nonproliferation position. but as john said, there are a areety of national security either hard to sustain like the the small modular reactors that

are deployed on ships, on the water and under the water, but not we cannot meet -- we do have the capability today to meet our need for fuel for those whators, nor for producing we need in our stockpile. we are living off of stockpiles that are sitting in the closet right now. that cannot go on forever. we should be -- and for these purposes, for national security purposes, we need american echnology. the clock is ticking. >> i'm going to ask one last uestion.

the reference for cross-domain deterrence. is it plausible to deter nuclear weapons by threatening a cyberattack on somebody? nd conversely, is it plausible nuclear retaliation if someone does a cyberattack on us? s any of that plausible. >> cyber has its own special

challenges. and must say and cyber first of all, having read only the unclassified defense cyber border reports, did not leave one feeling comfortable about hat might be in the classified -- i haven't read it. nuclear nk the idea of -- that's where we need to have discussions and could be very, very tough. because this is really dangerous

and the real concern is between u.s. and russia, it could be a third party doing the cyber deception. we have been gearing up the problem.critical everyone's speech will be available tomorrow. tomorrow will be up. and you have first rights. go -- i couldn't take notes fast enough. go look at it tomorrow. ernie, thank you for this.

we have a reception. [applause] . [captions copyright national satellite corp. 2018] captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org

>> and coming up later here on c-span tomorrow fight, the former governor of texas, rick perry, on his decision to serve as energy secretary and talk about his childhood and military service and 14 years in the governor's mansion tomorrow at 8:00 p.m. eastern. and coming up later here on c-span, a discussion of american constitution society about president trump's judicial nominees and senate confirmation f his appointments to start at 6:15. we will have that live here on c-span. >> this week, the supreme court heard oral argument in voting rights of ohio secretary of state versus randolph institute.

hear the argument friday night at 9:00 eastern on c-span, online at c-span.org or listen with the radio app and hear the court's schedule. you will see the court's schedule for this term and list of current justices and search their appearances on c-span. you can watch all of the oral rguments that we've aired at c-span.org/supremecourt. >> the heritage foundation hosted a discussion about the way forward on an yeley-palestinian peace agreement and the impact of president trump's decision to recognize jerusalem as israel's capital. e will hear from ron desantis, deputy national security adviser and scholars from the heritage foundation. >> welcome those who join us on