with a look at 12 new supreme court cases. each week, historians join us to discuss the constitutional issues and personal stories behind a significant supreme court decisions. on monday, figure 26, live at 9:00 eastern. to help you better understand each case we have a companion guide written by a veteran journalist. landmark cases, volume 2. plus shipping, and handling. to get your copy, go to c-span.org. ♪ announcer: the atlantic council hosted a discussion about vladimir putin. we heard from the former u.s. ambassador to russia and nato, a russian journalist, and russia's first foreign minister. ais is about an hour and half.

john: good morning. my name is john herbst. i run the eurasian center here at the atlantic council. thank you all for coming. we have a wonderful program for you this morning. and i should mention that this is part of our series on internal developments in russia. we began with a session in october on demography in russia. and this of course is on politics. next month, we are doing a session on the russian economy, followed by a session a session probably in april on energy sector in russia. we have a real treat for you this morning. we have a wonderful line of speakers.

i will not describe them except to say yevgenia albats, a top-notch journalist from moscow, who has written a very provocative and a fascinating paper on russia politically. foreign minister kozyrev will comment on that, as will eugene rumer from carnegie. and ambassador and former deputy secretary nato, sandy vershbow will bat cleanup for us this morning. and with that i will turn it over to dr. albats. yevgenia: thank you very much. i would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the ambassador, who invited me and asked me to write a paper to the council and the center. forthank you very much all coming for this event. the main topic of the tape her -- the main topic of the paper, i argue that we have been

witnessing the transformation of the regime in russia from the person listed regime to a corporative type of regime, history,now in comparable to mussolini, franco in spain, and also in portugal. sure, there is no conspiracy in the story that i am outlining. whenjust arguing that vladimir putin became president of the russian federation in 2000, he brought with himself a whole range of people from his own job, the kgb. over the years, they staffed all layers of the russian government the upper levels of the , government and the

presidential administration and as a result, by 2008 almost 60% or 70% of all positions in the top layer of the russian government were occupied by the kgb. it was also occupied by people from the military intelligence group. by 2015, it became clear in the public sphere that the country is run by the people who grew up inside, or by their sons and daughters. we have been witnessing the formation of the whole plan of the all who are united by their common background, common

and by the special code of ethics and understanding of what is right and what is wrong, and even the inferior complex that they developed after the soviet union collapsed. result, just to put it into comparison, some factors, in 1999, the last year that boris yeltsin was president of the russian federation, he pronounced his successor, prime minister pruden. -- from minister vladimir putin.

the kgb in grew into an army at and as i said, 10 years later, the number went to 66.7%. -- then the people from the soviet union's kgb had in 1989, when mick calgary was the-- gorbachev leader of the country. obviously, when you have this overrepresentation of people in the topstitution,

layer of the government, they bring with themselves or institutional culture. they bring with themselves, their understanding of what is wrong and right in internal and external politics. themselves, the usefulents that were back in the times when they were young and brave, strong and everything was pretty much good for them in terms of their career. besides the numbers, there is line in the-cut success of the kgb the, their

intent to influence the politics by using oppression and repression. there was nothing special about russia and about respect once again, i argue that this printer to call -- this political culture motto that argues that russia sees it self is a special entity, with a special mission in the world, and therefore there's something special about russia -- from the political side, there is nothing special about russia. in fact, from a political point of view, this kind of regime is very well known in south and it was the argentinian political scientist -- first created the term bureaucratic authoritarianism. it is the path of the regime dust on the coalition of

in the case of latin america and south america -- military. in russia, it is people from the kgb and technocrats and bureaucrats who run the every day operations. respect, nothing special, nothing new. what we are witnessing right now in russia. . we saw the rise of fs the fsbvities in terms of -- violence. in terms of that was a feature of that type of regime, where the notion of part ofde the military the coalition, and the used

violence over the rule of law. it was a very distinguishable feature of that regime and it is exactly what you see in russia. 2012, there has been an eightfold rise of terror , which are investigated and prosecuted by the fsb in russia -- a threefold rise of cases on asked tourism -- extra extremism. paper, done by nikolai petrov formally with and also a well-known columnist and writer in russia. they wrote a paper for the university of economics, and it

was never published there as they were unable to publish it there. they were unable to publish it anywhere but in my magazine "the new times. ." most vividly, the rise of the of activities as a vehicle violence is seen in all of the cases against the nomenclature --nomenklatura. number,ult, the overall governors are under criminal investigation. for governors are in jail awaiting trial. mayors and deputy mayors are also under investigation from the side of the fsb.

inside the department of internal security of the fs be, they have created what is coined --the russian media, [indiscernible] head, when he was the last prime minister, he helped to finance and create this special the fsb, tonside conduct investigations against russian nomenklatura. corruption inse the russian federation, and probably many of those under investigation have been involved in all kinds of illegal activities. not the factis

that they are being investigated, the question is, t that they are being investigated, the question is, how those who are investigated were chosen. because, there was not just a random choice, all those who were appointed -- by the one-time substitute of putin, dmitry medvedev, all of them are under criminal investigation right now. government of the poorest area of the russian federation, he went to grovel to the local fsb, and is now awaiting a 10 year sends to jail. -- a ten-year sentence. the future of russia, it is a long talk. i just want to point out to you,

that there is good and bad news. the good news is that through personal mistake government, it tends to be more unpredictable and more prone to all types of neighbors,e with the like in the case of the annexation of crimea, or the war in eastern ukraine. cooperatives are the types of regimes where there are more -- more persistent and unfortunately more consolidated. therefore, it is much difficult change inpositive russia. i would be happy to answer your questions with respect to this issue. here, let me just say that there is one very interesting feature

that we observe now among the nomenklatura. obviously, those who were there in the soviet times, there already in the mid 60's and some of them older than that, and they have their children, who have already joined the ranks of the russian nomenklatura. we call them hereditary captives, the children of the they work in banks, state-owned banks. state-owned the banks are led by the greatest of

the kgb. 25 heads of it governmental agencies -- 25 heads of governmental agencies, are led kgb.e greatest of the when talking about the children, what is interesting about that is that many of them went to boarding schools in the west, and some of them went through the education in the universities in the west. i do not want to imply they observed the values of western democracy, they were aware that the disc peters from different --ts of the world, [indiscernible] however, what is important is my hypothesis is that, these children who got their

education in the west, they were in thelly want to live russia.ell named i think they would like their children to be educated in the west because it is pretty much where they got the best level of education. the level of education in russia is unfortunately not are good. they would like to have their children to go through boarding schools in switzerland and the united kingdom. -- theyld like acknowledge that they are making money inside russia but they russia.o live out outside union --o the soviet

when children of the nome nklatura -- i believe it can be a vehicle of change, bringing change and democratic in russia. again, i will stop here. --ould just like to briefly there is a book that i love very much, and i think that political scientist at large overlooked this book by alexis the tocqueville. it is called "the old regime and the french revolution."

it talks about the problem of institutional persistence in other countries. 'sbelieve that tocqueville study of the failure of the french revolution is explicable with thetuation failure of the democratic revolution in russia. i am convinced that although they had no inkling of this, they took over from the old regime, not only most of its customs, conventions, but even those ideas which prompted our revolutionaries to destroy it. that in fact, although nothing was further from their intentions, they used the old order to build up the new one." that is exactly what happened in russia in the 1990's.

they used the debris of the old order, to build up the new one. now, we are dealing with the consequences. thank you. vehicle.re was your we will talk about that later. mr. minister, your comments please? >> thank you. was known for being soft-spoken and criticized by the opposition for that. if you expect agreements and you will probably be disappointed because when i entered the room this morning, i said, i like your research to her. usn, everyone who joined gave the same opening quote --

and like your research. so, it will probably a mutual admiration of society. -- in a society of admirers of yevgenia's research and writings. first started her writings 30 years ago, she was almost a child. it was when we were working in the moscow news. from then on, for 30 years, i have agreed with everything that she writes and says. exhaust myost comments. the only thing which i could add

of --t, is this notion bureaucratic -- bureaucratic military and security forces. that it could be earlier,least 30 years maybe 100 years earlier, or maybe hundreds of years earlier in russia. but that is probably to generation -- to general of an observation. i think it was also the same in the soviet union, -- even stalin a singlesed to be dictator, which he was, on one

hand. that on the other hand, he promoted bye was any class, which is actually heir to the old ways and old bureaucracies, not necessarily the top level of the bureaucracy, but at least peasants brought to the capitals to work. waysscow, a lot of their the sovietaffected union. my impression is that this kind is coming in a

vicious sid circle. repetitious, even after major upheavals and revolutionary events, which look on the surface at least, as a major revolutionary event, such 1917, or 1918 -- that is my little bit of history. poetic, it just so anyway,that history -- as the what i can offer debris of both the soviet and

the failed democratic regime in russia. thank you. host: let me ask a specific question, perhaps a should of before, what this do you think of the corporatist thesis in the paper, and what is formeaning of that developments going forward in russia? your take them up these? first of all, am very glad to be here. thank you for the lead. eminentrd to argue with personalities and people who really know firsthand the development of the russian system. i think there is a certain thesisof tensions in the , in that corporate systems to my mind imply a degree of competition, among various cooperatives and entities. it is not an authoritarian

regime. i think he described them both in the paper and in your presentation -- your pain so much more authoritarian -- it is really one corporation, or one clan that is in charge. paper, andading the thinking about my own very brief remarks, i could not help but think that one record of analysis and predictions is really -- our record of analysis is pretty poor in the last 30 years. we have been there multiple times to predict the nature of pivotal points in the revolution or revolutions in russian domestic politics. forward to the next six years, because i think of

movement in russian domestic politics in terms of presidential terms, and we are little more than a month away from the next presidential election. really do not i see much of a possibility of to my in the system, that mind came into being probably in the late to mid 90's. i think some have described it as the clan basis, and i think it will still survive by that time. distinctions, the are there, russian traditional society went away and what was left was the competition for power among various clans. in our political science, there's a greater degree of fuller's them in the system. continues to the present day, facilitated to a large extent by the 1993 constitution, which created this presidency, that in the 1990's

was very weekend and basically reduced to one clan, the family. centered in the kremlin. a number of other clans rose to prominence, and justify the name of being oligarchs. since then, we have seen considerable change in the balance of power, between the kremlin and these clans. the kremlin perhaps as was , theyd out, by dr. albats the upper hand. in the time that vladimir putin has been in office, it has inserted in self into much more than "first among equals." the competition among various interest the upper hand. in the time that still survives. add in a think it has been completely eliminated, and at the system feels

uncertainty or weakness as was 2007-2008, in the time of president putin's second -- i think we may be coming up on something similar in the years to come. this is not to say by any means, that we are approaching a major transition in domestic politics. all signs point to a pretty stable arrangement with very few internal or external challenges. but this uncertainty about what will happen post 2024, post iadimir putin's next term, think it is part of a conversation that has not been opened up until now. years, iext six

emphasize that the system of years quite able to handle the uncertainty and any sources of domestic discontent. certainly, we are seeing elements of domestic discontent now. verybats has been prominent in describing the presidency of olexander volney -- the candidate and see of ale navolny. he is not a major political challenge to the system, but i think there is a degree of uncertainty there. the system that we ought to be thinking about is areas ways. i do not think he will be a really systemic change, but really an alignment. myquestion to both colleagues who spoke before me,

i would say, what do you make of this very strange residential campaign? navolny being marginalized in terms of the process, but still playing a huge role of a voice for many in the young generation, and then there is the other candidate at -- who isared to be going to be washington apparently, since -- it raises a very uncomfortable question i think, for the system, how to handle it. and the sheer presence raising of questions in the public sphere, it seems to make the kremlin uncomfortable. the same goes for the commonest party candidate,the same goes ft party -- the

communist party candidate who also seems to be pushing the boundaries of the conversation with up to now has been quite stilted. follow-up to our prepared remarks, we ought to consider the next six years, i think. inm tempted to say that conclusion, the direction of russian domestic politics, i think it is going in circles, but maybe it is a movement along a spiral, and i will leave it at that. >> sandy, any comment on the corporatist thesis, specifically on the foreign policy side of this, if any? >> ok. thank you very much, it is great to be on a panel with yevgeny. ambassador days, he taught me a lot about the system as it was beginning to emerge back then. i am quite convinced by the case in your paper that the regime has become more than a corporation. than a personal dictatorship. , although it obviously has elements of both.

i think some of the statistics you marshaled have been quite impressive and also extremely depressing, -- steady growth and dominance of all levels of the system, with the kgb, f is the, veterans. i was intrigued by the addict notes there, and i would encourage everyone read the paper when it is issued, which highlights the role of key institutions -- best service for the protection of the council order, which are under different names under the soviet. and have been -- under the soviet period and were instrumental in protecting the strength of the regime. anecdotes about how vladimir putin's order seems to have been overridden, which creates more evidence behind this idea of a corporatist

structure, rather than a single strongman calling all the shots. youne point though, suggested that the corporation was dictating to him, all but i think that is wrong, i think they still need him as the dispenser of the illicit wealth. of course, he is one of them, so it is not like they have a different agenda. but i think the rest of the corporation needs his popularity, some of which is genuine, in the sense of the antivirus yelled in, who brought a certain degree of -- an anti-boris yeltsin, who in some ways, brought stability to russia. he were to get run over by a bus tomorrow, like-minded people would be poised to take his place, at least in the short term. they would maintain the cohesion among themselves, -- if they were to do so, that is an open question.

if the young generation are going to be a force for liberalization, he might be in the short term, but that is something that we can hope pans out on the road. this is clearly something which , today's kgb incorporated or whatever you want to call it, is the culmination of trends which began in vladimir putin's first term. increasing intolerance of real opposition, the shift to a rubberstamp parliament, repression of the human ngos engaged in rights activities, and of course, the hostel and is in a phobic attitude to where the foreign backers of civil society. -- xenophobic attitude toward the backers of civil society. virtually all exchange programs and systems have been shut down.

it is quite startling to hear a justification of the repressions of the 1930's. every call when i had the meetings with the ex fsb director, i equally remember him saying those things, and private, and now he is the head --the security council veterans trends were clear at the beginning of letting your movements time but now they seem to have become stuck to my 18 years later. mech vladimir putin's time. it was interesting to watch, the protests which were significant over the weekend. regime hasink the been relatively successful in pushing opposition to the margins and containing it, without having to use excessive

force. they are being careful not to -- alex enabled only into alexei navolny into a martyr. it is worth remembering that the assassination of boris nemtsov has to have been signed off from the top of the regime. i believe the party that the leaders of this cooperation i attached to a strong state and repression of western opposition, will translate into a continued confrontational policy to where the west, whether it is by vladimir putin or anyone of his successors. the leaders of this corporation really believe their own

propaganda, that the united states is bent on regime change in russia. that they support civil society and democratic values, and be think it is responsible for any progress turn movements which -- pro-western movements which develop either in ukraine or russia. and of course, the fear that there is successful liberation abroad which could infect russia is else. i think it is a main driver of increasing crackdowns at home, and also of more aggressive foreign policy. pretraining -- for training russia as circled by a hostile nato, makes it easier to justify the economic stagnation that russia is now experiencing, declining living standards, this would create new pressures to

resist, but i do not think they would be anything beyond cosmetic steps in the next few years. the annexation of crimea, all of the rhetoric about defending the russian world -- put in or any other leader would be very about entering into deals that would have to be defended against nationalist at home, such as the ofl to genuinely move out the eastern european republics and out of ukraine. there are current discussions about a possible you and force, but at the end of the day, the leaders of this kgb-led system may see little payoff in making the kinds of confessions needed to rebuild cooperation with the

west. rather, they will up for efforts -- they will opt for west, and weaken the they will pitch russia's wagon to others days been which also rejects the u.s.-led international order, such as countries like china. or iran. .- hitch russia's work. either states which also rejects the u.s.-led international order such as china and iran. going back to the cold war, in terms of trying to manage the

competition using arms control, complex building measures and to -- we haveeed a duty to our own people to try to limit this competition as best as can. >> that was a rather gloomy analysis. [laughter] be i forgot to mention when i started, that this series of sponsor ofowe our the foundation for sponsoring this, and we are grateful to them for it. dr. albats, i was wondering if you could take up on the question that eugene raised, on alexei navolny. >> thank you very much. i would definitely respond to this very interesting question. however, i think it is important out -- if i may,

respond to what the minister said -- it is true that parties in russia historically have had a very prominent role. it is true that in sourced rist russia, there .as a particular department in soviet times, it was the political policy of the kgb -- a department born in 1918, set up as a political police. we have documents and we know this. that, i having said would say that never before in -- have theyistory been in charge.

it has always been under the >> from moscow to the smallest towns in the country, the same was true of the kgb. competing institutions. in the history of russia, medical police and has been in charge -- medical police -- initical policing has been charge.

to give you an example, there is a changing face, but when you scrape you always find the same background. it became my hobby. 2015, many people in his administration were former members of the kgb. heads of the corporations, agencies and the department -- and the government, all of them. it was a very new reality in a way, and they asked you not to underestimate -- i ask you don't underestimate that. when i say it is unpredictable, i would is agree with you because from my perspective, it is more predictable, then the one-man rule.

we know the rules of the game instance, kgb -- for the sides of enemies that instance,existed in the soviete can more or less predict how these tools and instruments will be used in the old new order, and we see it. you know, the recreation of the ambassador reminded us -- the recreation of the department to protect the constitution, in soviet times, it was the same department but with a different name -- that piece directorate. peace directorate. this department that destroyed the best political science

school in the country, the european university of st. petersburg. the same department which was in -- forof the case of who lost mye me life in russia, in the way i feel almost nostalgic. it brings big back to the time when i was my now -- russia, in the young -- [laughter] totalitarian -- no, i do not think it will be a totalitarian state. one of the reasons for that is one of the reasons for that is that it is a market economy, and if you may or may now remember, in 1980 -- in the 1980's, or earlier than that, when sergei andropov was the head of now the he created a kgb

department, groups of people who created the concept of the day did notmy, he use the term "market economy, market basically -- economy, but they were toying with elements of private corporatism for a that existed in poland, etc.. these kgb people are all involved in the market economy. we have already seen the competition between different groups inside the same operation you may for instance -- be aware of the men who served putin in germany, he is

company of the consisting of 400 different industrial enterprises. are morepanies interested in closing the russian global market from other countries. instance, the head of an energy company, he has trouble because of the sanctions approved by the united states, stopped them from drilling arein antarctica -- these competing forces and they are doomed to compete, so it will not offer any totalitarian state. number two, there is not ideology. they're trying to promote

russian orthodoxy as a substitute for the communist ideology, but it will not work -- itn the country where will not work. in a country where there are arest 80% of citizens who russian orthodox, the absence of ideology is a prerequisite for each utilitarian state. -- for aputin totalitarian state. vladimir putin is a front for the corporation, and i think you made a crucial mistake when he got carried away by the notion 2014, with the success of my desk in ukraine. ansk in ukraine, and the

annexation of crimea. as a result of that, he gave up on the other forces inside his own government which were more liberal to a certain extent. he became the hostage of the information coming out of the fs the. -- the fsb. they are totally re-creating the structure of the week, totally. that,became a hostage of the analysis, is done by an department that was made in the kgb.

he himself made the us may be a hostage of the situation, and i it will work for him. navolny, whom i have known for the last 14 years, is a very talented politician, and he is capable of a lot. he was under house arrest for a year, and he read so many looks. jail, iisited him in always saw him at books. -- with books. extremely devoted and a talented politician.

he created the whole structure fromthe last year, stalingrad to that evolve stock stock, -- vladivostock of a organization, and all of a sudden they realized that opposition was not only in the big cities but also out in the russian provinces as well. as a result of that, thousands of people came out in the rallies conducted by he and the others. the citiesof involved, people have not heard about. now, there is the problem of turnout. .hat is the biggest problem

it is not a question of whether he will be elected or not, it is a question of legitimacy. it is a very big idea in political science area it it is we can talk about , in constitutions, legal institutions, legitimacy -- thething which people majority of people in a particular territory recognize -- all of the country. the latest parliamentary elections, this bodes well for the party in power area -- our.

figures bode well for the party in power. turnout was big in cities across russia area the problem is that the way that the united russia and put in back in 2012, getting this these large approval numbers, it is through so-called electoral super max. in 2012, i believe vladimir 106% of the vote in some places, all of us were

laughing at this. [laughter] so, for these electoral territories which are under strong control of the assidential administration, it was obvious in 2012, when vladimir putin did not get the majority, he got less than 50% in moscow, and a less than 50% order forersburg, in him to be a legitimate president, for him not to be president of the territory and not the president of the country, he has to get votes from the people in the russian industrial cities.

and that is precisely why the -- they chose someone else as a substitute, as a desirable get the tone out. when the central when theyommission -- denied a like fate of only -- alexa and of all the --alexei navolny registration for the election, all of a sudden the young people all over russia

went out on the streets when he called them for these anti-corruption actions and protests. wow.as whil not just for the kremlin, but even for us. forhat became a nightmare the administration. but really was going to, on the streets. by russian law, those who are trying to get registered as candidates, they have to be in differenteople cities. 50,000 young people came out in different cities and said they wanted navalny to be their candidate.

so they decided that they need somebody who is going to grab part of navalny's electoral base. and they picked someone who is extremely talented, smart, and let us give her credit, the kind of things she is a lot to say on channel one and channel two, these up again the channels, get to overhannels 90% of households across the russia time zones -- they have never heard the word "annexation of crimea." they have never heard of what happened in march, 18th 2014. this is important, words have meaning. it is important. idea idearse, the major

behind the candidacy, of course, is an attempt to increase the turnout in the big cities. it is as simple as that. but she is very talented, but does gifford credit, she is very talented. >> that was a tour de force. i would give our panels one minute for any, they would like to make. >> i agree with everything. [applause] host: sandy? questions? >> that was wonderful. host: please wait for the microphone, and identify yourself? >> thank you very much, for your explanation which a mostly agree with. what strikes me is your aboutence of assessment

vladimir putin's role. you call him a hostage, and the ambassador is a -- for example was killing of dissidents assigned from a senior level. i personally do not agree with it. >> we did not say that. >> the question for you is to what extent is vladimir putin a hostage, and if he gets fed up with this, can he on his next term, which is at least six would he choose to not be the front company for all the different interests that are competing now? to the ambassador, what that many ofyou

, the major decisions invasion of crimea, are made by vladimir putin himself? control in thein foreign policy? albats: thank you for the question. let us put it this way, he is a willing hostage. it the outcome of institutional design. he is going to be the face of corporation, -- and never met him, but i follow what he says and what he does very closely. i would say that he is pretty smart, and there is no way that he does not understand, the dire

situation he finds himself in now. stalin remind you, that in a way found himself in the same situation, when he kicked out everybody around him. there was a tool that allen had, he was killing layer after layer of chechens. he appointed new people and their task was to kill everybody chechnya. the opposition.

his duty, he was sacked and killed, and the whole layer of interrogators -- i spent quite some time in my election years investigating that is the kind of instrument that you have when there is a did leadership, and and you -- it dictatorship and you deal with the corporation. i doubt that putin is anywhere .lose to being stalin he does not have the resources and the diligence to do this, therefore, he is doomed to become a hostage to the corporation. speaker: it does mean the competition will develop then? generation wise, interest

wise and it that iraq, these are different kinds of competition inside the corporation and they are unavoidable. which is nice, that's nice because when they compete with each other they have less resources to kill us. i'm sorry. i have some personal stakes after all. ambassador vershbow: i agree. there are cleavages divisions. there is competition within the elite. i'm uncomfortable with treating him as a hostage, even a willing hostage. i think putin does have many advantages. he is a very big part vis-a-vis the other parts. he's able to maintain his primacy in a number of ways in terms of how he doles out the economic assets. i think particularly what's interesting the last few years is how he's replacing a lot of the regional elites, governors,

with younger, technocratic k.g.b. people. but people more likely though their loyalty to him than anybody else. so i think he's finding a number of ways to ensure his position. we don't know a lot about the inner workings of political decision making, including on big issues like the invasion of ukraine and the annexation of crimea. i think there is enough of a record of putin's statements, dismissing ukraine as being a real country, and his gut belief that all these people are actively promoting revolutions in the former soviet republics. i think suggests this was a very personal issue for him. he felt that he was being personally betrayed and undermined.

i think there is a lot of evidence that the decision to go and to annex crimea, the step he didn't need to take, he could have done another frozen conflict, i think that was very much putin. did he have supporters, did he consult with people and make sure he wasn't going against the consensus? i'm sure that was the case. the other thing, putin, unlike a lot of these faceless members of this new nomenclature, does have a personal standing with the people. he maintains that. he cultivates it with the big tv interview every year with the staged outreach events to the public, as we're seeing during his so-called election campaign. he can bank on a bit of popular support, even if it will be inflated in terms of the actual vote count, that some these other characters don't have. the question for me is he going to become a lame duck? the next six years is going to be interesting.

he could, as he could have done after his second term, changed the constitution to allow himself to run, or they could create some new honorific super presidency that could allow him to stay in power until he dies. at the moment, that's an open question. so, there could be more jockeying after this election, after the dust settles among other members of the elite, as they try to get the upper hand before they get purged and replaced by someone more identified with putin. >> thanks. i'm a recovering sovietologist. i want to ask my question sort of tongue in cheek with two observations. listening to what you're saying suggested to me that you could have been talking about america as well as russia.

dr. albats: would you want us to change places? [laughter] i give you my apartment in moscow. >> senior politicians come in with their own teams. bill clinton brought the rose law firm and his cronies from little rock. w. brought his father's team with him. obama brought his chicago mafia, and donald trump has brought his businesspeople from new york largely. i think that there's something here. second, i would make the observation, i think putin is getting bored, because dealing with the west is too easy. we spend 20 times on defense than he does. he takes these small, little steps, and we overreact. so my question is, what do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of russia today? and how is the west and united states best postured to deal with them in more sensible policies? because right now, i think putin is running circles around us. i think that we're awkward and we're clumsy. and to the degree that we need

to be smarter, perhaps we need to focus on the obvious strengths and weaknesses of russia to design better policies. the current ones, to me, don't seem to be working. dr. albats: may i ask you. when was the last time were you at moscow? >> i go every year to the moscow security conference. i meet with a lot of heavy hitters. dr. albats: then you know. you have such great conversations. no need for me to explain the simple things they can do this, right. all this rhetoric about the comparison between the united states and russia is just -- >> i think you missed my point. that's not what i was saying. i was being slightly tongue in cheek in terms of leaders bring their teams with them, and it should be no shock that the k.g.b., which was where putin was raised, he was going to bring his colleagues just as american presidents bring their teams with them, too.

dr. albats: how many political appointees in washington, d.c.? >> i missed your question. dr. albats: how many political appointees in washington, d.c.? >> there should be around 4,000. of which only a handful really count. dr. albats: so we're talking about the numbers. i would say probably hundred times more than 4,000. we're talking about people who are trying very hard to control not just decision making fear in moscow, but all across the country. we're talking about the people who are tempting with the statistical data in the regions in order to influence decision making in moscow.

we're talking about people who make wise deputy governments to present documents with respect -- just impossible even to compare. either you really don't understand the way russian government, russia's governed, or i really have no idea the way the system existed in the united states, even though i have a minor in american politics from harvard university. so i'm unable to answer your , question. i'm sorry. >> i take your point and all. we do have competitive elections.

let's just say that. and move on to the question that i think is far more important that you raise for how we can position ourselves to deal with russia. i think that's a key question for us to answer, because for the past 30 years, we have pursued the same policy toward russia. inevitably with every new administration coming in, promising to make things better and inevitably finding -- leaving a relationship to its successor in a much more shape than it found it in. it's also important to recognize that the successive administrations, despite the ideological differences, have approached russia with basically the same mindset. you can call it the end of history. you can call it, whatever. but the expectation was russia would change and become like us. that clearly hasn't happened. i think we need to go back to really rethinking our russia

policy. something that in the russian multiple sanctions on russia we have not done. sanctions are not a policy. it's a tool. but we have not really answered the question of what it is we want from russia. what our interests is in russia, around russia, in the territories that are currently being contested. and i think that's the first step. then the rest will flow from that. ambassador herbst: question over here. >> i have a question for our guest from russia. i wanted to -- i'm sure you believe in the future of your country. i can see you are both great patriots. i wanted to ask if -- when do you think that better future will come for russia? when do you think russia could

really emerge as a democracy and not be a threat to its neighbors? do you think this is a matter of decades? 50 years? 100 years? i would love to hear your thoughts. dr. albats: me? i really not -- i don't know how to read the crystal ball. that's my problem. i'm a journalist. i am 59-year-old. i hate to think that i'm going to die under putin. [laughter] that's it. that's all i have to answer for that. [laughter] >> crystal ball. i left it in my home, unfortunately. i did not know you would come with this question. actually, it's connected to the previous discussion. i think it was actually very, very cute observation and very

good question. i think america is inching slowly to better understanding and better reacting to russia. first of all, it started under obama. i like obama. i think he was one of the greatest american presidents. but he was a little slow, timid, kind of in moving on some issues like syria or russia. but anyway, however slowly, but america is approaching today even probably with reluctant white house, but the congress definitely seems to be on the

right track. especially with this last law, which was passed overwhelmingly, if i remember correctly. it was 80 -- it was 98 senators. 98 senators. and almost 400 members of the house. that law, along with previously adopted laws, that is more accurate. it does not speak of russia actually. this is misuse of words. the better way is to speak of the regime like exemplary yevgenia, i told you you will hear everything you need to know

from her. it's the regime. it's not even necessarily only putin himself, but the regime, which is not only different from russia, should be taken differently. but interest of this regime, of this corporation, whatever it is, is contrary to fundamental national interests of russia. so as long as america and the west tries to talk to russian diplomats, or whatever, political class, arguing for national interests of russia, of course it is contrary to russian national interests to fight with ukraine, who are our brothers. it is even farther from national

interests to take a military adventure somewhere, nowhere in syria. where there are no interests for russia. so -- but the regime is different. so now, they started from the last legislation, and the least however you evaluate this, but the least was published just few days, might be two days ago, one day ago, but that is much more closer to addressing the regime and dealing with the regime. and finding yourself something about strong and weak points in russia. yes.

that's the achilles heel of the regime, of the political class. the rules, the interests of this regime was -- simplistically. still in russia, spent in the west. keep russian people under this k.g.b. legacy so that they sit calm and keep them under propaganda. but spend in the west, in democracy, in legal system. if you deprive them from that second part or threaten them considerably, ability to spend

time, money, and have their favors and everything in the western side, on the western side, then you will start addressing the achilles' heel, and that's what is happening. and i hope that on this road they start to heed not only to bravado like they are playing. take it easy. it's just a bravado. but in fact, it never was in the cards for this political class in russia to be sitting in the small soviet union, called putin's russia, whatever, and that was for the people, not for them. so that's the game changer.

and how they react, there are many ways how they can react. they are politically powerful, financially powerful. they know each other quite well. there is potential for all kind of tricks, all kind of interpretations. i feel rather optimistic for the -- for america as usual. trying older approaches but finally do the right one. so i'm probably in the right place. ambassador herbst: we have time for one more question. this gentleman over here. >> would you explain one interesting phenomenon? in latvia, we have hundreds of

tv stations, hundreds of radio stations. but, the last parliamentary elections, russian citizens reside in latvia, 75% of them voted for nicea. if you take russian, ethnic russians leaving latvia, latvian citizens, noncitizens, those deprived of voting even in municipal elections support of them for personal would go at least 90. -- at least 90%. how do you explain that? >> i would like to ask how the russian adventure in syria fits into what you have been describing. has the motivation changed? does this add or detract from legitimacy?

and has the weakness of western response, u.s. response, fed an appetite for a new russian adventurism abroad? >> we have two questions. do you want to take the first shot? ambassador vershbow: i leave to colleagues why putin is getting so many votes among russians in latvia. on the second one, i think the original russian objective was limited to saving the regime from collapse. this is because russia viewed it as yet another example of u.s. promotion of regime change. saddam hussein, gaddafi, assad would be next. i think the agenda got more ambitious after the initial success in russia realized in part because of the incoherence of the u.s. and western policy that it could make deeper inroads. and become more of the arbiters of the future direction of

syria. getting it across the finish line may prove more difficult in terms of any kind of diplomatic outcome that could stitch the country back together, even in a loose configuration. the russians may have bitten off more than they could chew. so far, i don't think they think it was a mistake. will this fuel the russian appetite? you can see it already has in terms of their expanding their relations with other long-standing u.s. allies, like egypt. playing around with libya. they will push on as many open doors like the thief in the hotel. we need to do a better job locking the doors. dr. rumer: i think it's a misnomer to call it an adventure. i think it was a calculated move. they have long-standing interest in the middle east. they have been dealing with the assad family for over 40 years.

this was their last outpost in the middle east. and they felt they had the means, the necessary interests, and the opportunity to walk in and do what they felt was important. i think it's not a question of them sort of feeling emboldened, but i think we're dealing with a very different russian foreign policy post 2014 or post 2012. 2012 was the return of mr. putin to the kremlin as president. they have been acting with newfound confidence, i would say. the number of places you could say that a lot of these are really opportunities for bottom feeding, so to speak. such as billing out the madura regime in venezuela. these opportunities come up, they'll take advantage of them,

because they can. ambassador herbst: any comments? minister kozyrev: the interest in syria probably i was invited as a former minister to tell an anecdote. i will do that. i flew to syria in i think it was 1993. i met his father, the assad father, the old friend of the soviet union, and i was thinking of our interests of course and my main interest was to persuade him to behave.

to say at least more moderately like moderate also by the way dictatorships around there in the larger area. for the interest of -- general interest of stability in the middle east. but my special interest was to ask, especially due to the very, very low price of oil, which we suffered from economically in our time, our government, our interest was to see whether he would pay at least some of the debt which we count as a debt to the soviet union and we inherited the debt. and our count was around 12 or something, billion dollars at

that time it would be dream world to have even have half of that or a quarter of that. when i said that, mr. president, we're old friends, like moscow and damascus, and what about the debt? he was mesmerized. sincerely, he was an old man. but he looked at me and said, you know, it's unbelievable, for 30 years, i don't remember how many, but decades, i am dictator here. 20-something. i used to entertain andre from moscow, that is andre graminko, who were coming to me and telling me to stay firm against american imperialism and israeli

zionism, and he was giving me weapons for that. so i was standing there like a soldier with a weapon, given to me to stand against the enemy. now here comes another andre, younger andre from moscow. -- now here comes another andrei, younger andrei from moscow. he tells me that service for 20 years was totally misguided. he has no responsibility for my service. not only -- i mean, a degree of respect. but he tells me that i have to reverse the service, and more of

them, that they have to pay for the weapon which were given to me on my duty. i mean, it's mind-boggling. and when i was listening to him, i thought, jesus christ, there is a reason in what he says. later on, i was reluctant to do that, but later on, i think they just kind of -- there was a shenanigans like always. so somebody probably got rich on this transaction, but mostly he never paid anything. for real. anyway, his son -- i mean, yes. it's probably the same interests

which had the previous andrei. looking from kremlin in their eyes and i think the -- they exhaled when he saw my successor. so as early as mid 1990's, the old interest came into the assad family. stand against american. it's not imperialism. it's hegemony. one country domination. whatever. whatever the word is. but the essence is the same. dr. albats: with the minister, i will answer with an anecdote.

i was trying -- the estonian, latvia last summer in august. people from some organization, estonian, wanted me to give a talk, i was happy to do that because it was long time since i was in the former republic of the soviet union. anyway, so there was some party afterwards which ended up with somebody saying quote, good russian, dead russian. at which point i said thank you so much. no more. and left the party.

so it is -- with all due respect i understand the suffering of the latvia and estonia as a result of the soviet occupation. and so many hundreds of thousands of latvians, estonians, they perished in siberia. however, it's not an easy thing to be a russian speaker in estonia, latvia nowadays. you probably know this better than do i. that's my explanation to the fact that those who -- that russian population, russian speakers in this countries, they do vote united russia, or they love putin. however, when there was a research conducted with respect

to whether those russian speakers would love to leave the european union and go back to russia, the absolute majority said no. and especially after the ruble collapsed in -- at the end of 2014, it turned out that medical insurance in the european union turned out to be much better than the one they could get in russia. and that was one of the reason -- therefore, i think we should be very careful with all this polls, and we shouldn't take it to face value what people say to the pollsters. i also want to say we never touched this question, but i

really believe that if you -- if we come -- it is my hypothesis about the corporation which has taken over our russian internal and external politics, i would say we should expect the type of foreign policy which will be based on -- clandestine operations, very pragmatic, very different from what existed in the -- during the soviet times. don't try to figure out the russian foreign policy out of what existed under soviets. for instance, my understanding -- i don't want -- my understanding of this whole syria, an act of desperation that putin admitted.

he saw the success of the crimea annexation in russia. he was looking for something that would prolong this effect. apparently russians give lip service to what's happening in syria. so it didn't work. i think that will be another kind of thing that we should expect. thank you so much. ambassador herbst: thank you. all our panelists, thank you. thank you to the foundation. thank you, all the audience. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> c-span's washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up friday morning, max

talks about the federal workforce under the trump administration. also, alex explains immigration reform and so cold chain migration and the foreign intelligence surveillance act and wiretapping of u.s. citizens. be sure to watch washington journal, live at 7:00 eastern friday morning. join the discussion. kevin hassett is the chair of the council of economic advisers. he will be talking about the corporate tax rate at georgetown university law school at 12:45 p.m. eastern on c-span. rose mcgowan will talk about her and her on c-span2 experiences working in the entertainment industry, live at 7:00 p.m..