it's about 50,000 visas every year that are allocated in a random way today that makes no sense, in a way that actually makes sure >> we will leave this debate at this point, but you can watch all of our coverage of congress life on the c-span networks and online at www.c-span.org. we go live now to a panel discussion involving the syria situation. live coverage on c-span should start in just a moment. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

>> good morning, everyone, and

welcome to the foundation for defense of democracies. i am the senior vice president for research, and it is terrific to see familiar faces in the room. we are looking forward to our event this morning as we address the syrian impasse, what is turkey's and game, and how does this impact washington's policy? i will keep it short so we can jump right in. first, a few housekeeping items. being livent is streams, video recorder, and also being broadcast on c-span. i encourage guests in the audience in attendance and viewing at home to join in on the conversation via twitter @f dd. this is the time where i ask you to set your telephones to stun.

we do not want our guests to be interrupted. now i am very pleased to hand over the conversation to my colleague, a research analyst, merve tahiroglu. this is her first moderated event, so we are pleased to have you do this, and take it away. thatarcus: thank you for -- ms. tahiroglu: thank you for that. three weeks ago the turkish army launched an operation across the border in northern syria. turkey is fighting the group ypg partner inhe u.s.' syria. can everybody hear me? ok. and ypg isgroup

partnered with the united states elsewhere in the fight against isis, so this causes all sorts of competition for turkey, the u.s., and policy in general. we have three great panelists with us today to talk about this. i will introduce them. the author ofs "blood and belief." she is a well-known effort on the kurdish national movement. --n we have merve tahiroglu gonul tol, who serves as an adjunct professor at g.w. and then we have amberin zaman, one of the best journalists from turkey.

i want to start the conversation. i want to first ask you a question, because part of the problem with the operation and what we have been hearing here is that turkey says it is fighting the ypg because the ypg poses the number one security threat to turkey. it is saying that because the ag isn't offshoot of the pkk, group that has been fighting inside turkey for the last few decades. you know the movement very well and you know northern syria as well as the pkk. given that this corn between turkey -- the discord between turkey, saying any american cooperation to the ypg amounts to cooperation with the pkk, and

the united states insisting it is different enough that they can continue to work with the ypg and tell turkey it will aid turkey's fight against the pkk. this is a complex picture and puts the conundrum all over the place. i was hoping you might be able to walk us through. >> that is a great question, and everything you said can exist and be true and at the same time be somewhat nuanced simultaneously. and given at the ypg all the different acronyms what we can say is the dominant kurdish organization in syria right now. clearly, and this is something if you go back to the pkk's own literature, it was formed as a subsidiary of the pkk. the idea was the pkk was no longer going to be the vanguard

of the movement, but each part of the region would have its own party that would operate to bring kurds democracy, autonomy, and gender freedom and of things , but they were part of the pkk nonetheless. what is an important distinction and what the u.s. focuses on is the fact in syria the pyd operates according to the specific conditions of syria. they have autonomy in their decision-making processes. they make their decisions on what is good at the moment. they trained people in syria. they are focused on syria. i do not think this nuance is not of great interest to turkey, but it is important when looking and ypg. at the same time, these operations have not encountered in the military way against

turkey. there have not been attacks on turkey from syrian territory. they have not -- they have tried to keep the past few years their senior commanders in syria. so the problem is for the united states is that by denying any somethingen the two, that is necessary for u.s. policy, they make it difficult for the u.s. to acknowledge some of turkey's concern or try to explain why the pyg is not a real threat -- ypg is not a real threat. when we look at them, we see they are operating according to syrian conditions for the situation in syria. >> thank you for that. i should note there is a legal distinction that the united states risks the -- lists the pkk as a terrorist organization.

turn to gonul for a minute. it is a state of warfare. , turkey underrent a state of emergency. is the restriction on the media and on civil society is growing, and already more than 500 people have been arrested in turkey he for speaking out against the war. what is the view in turkey, and what are the turkish government's objectives here with this offensive? ms. tol: i think a large segment of turkish society is behind the operation, and that is the main driver of the incursion and the

mythic politics. referendum -- and he wants to boost his popularity ahead of elections. so he wanted to tap into the very strong anti-kurdish and anti-american sentiments in the country. is behind,osition supports the operation, and i'm not sure about the exact numbers, but i believe they are around 80%, according to recent polls, 80% of turkish society supports the operation. was think the main driver domestic politics. two dynamics, the

anti-kurdish and anti-american sentiment, they are important and they feed each other. but have always been there, i think we can talk about in detail what i think there are new dynamics in terms of turkey's anti-americanism and the anti-kurdish sentiment. those ando tap into basically boost his popularity. so one thing -- because i think the operation is as much against the kurds as it is against the u.s. --the proclaimed aim was to the cooperation between the ypg and the u.s., that has nothing to do with the ypg, but the toestic narrative is distrust this relationship between the u.s. and the ypg. so i think that makes the

situation very complicated, and thesure -- will touch on operation on the ground. domestically, if you look at from the turkish perspective, the anti-americanism we're seeing now is different is because it is much more widespread. there has always been anti-americanism in turkey, but the we see now is the atp, former islamist military, they have all found common ground in something, and that is the anti-kurdish and anti-americanism, and that is what makes it difficult to resolve the tension between turkey and the u.s., and i think that is also a recipe for disaster, because i think turkey

has long lost its strategic direction in for policy, and that domestic concern became the backbone of turkish foreign policy. that,a follow up with that was very explanatory from turkey's point of view, but i wonder why this operation is taking place now? is there a reason to consolidate this nationalism and anti-americanism and anti-kurdish sentiment that is widespread, because the war is helping consolidate that? i'm curious if you think why he might be doing that now. >> because the elections are coming up, and some even talk about a call for early elections in 2018. that explains the timing of the operation. but also there are other factors as well. turkey has been threatening a military operation for over a year now, but until now, it has

been delayed mainly because russians -- they control the troops and they control the thes, and what prompted russian green light was the u.s. decision to stay longer in syria. and that is something that makes the regime, the iranians and the russians, really nervous. it was part of the russian ,trategy to both we can the ypg and indirectly curb u.s. influence in syria. also a signal to the kurds that in fact russians call the shots and cautioned them against closer ties with united states. this is what russia had in mind. urgedgime in iran recently turkey to stop the

operation. for them it is nerve-racking to hear from u.s. officials that america is willing to stay longer and will work closely with the ypg. the timing is something both to do with domestic dynamics that is the elections, but also the russian concerns and russian change in russian strategy. you who may not know turkish politics, by election we are referring to thatpresidential election, will be the first election before the new constitution will take effect in turkey, which will add on more powers and it will make it more of a legal case. i want to get into the geopolitical concerns that you mentioned. nowu.s. policy -- we have mathis and tillerson are headed to turkey. they are going to be having

talks with their turkish counterparts. turkishous, this --ration, there has not been from the united states or concern that has been voiced about this operation, that the u.s. is working with the ypg and more broadly with this group -- in syria, and it has recently indicated it is planning in the post-isis world to have a longer presence there. but its only allies there are the sds, made up primarily of the ypg. does this was a conundrum for the u.s. in syria, and also how is the ypg reacting? >> i think the united states has registered quite a bit of concern, and we have heard that from the state department. we heard that in the trump phone call with erdogan that he anticipated concern with his operation and how it might be

undermining the anti-isis campaign in syria, and also concerned articulated about the and civilian casualties, these are obviously mounting as the operation continues. yes, the united states is very concerned. but have the same time, it also part of the is not zone of influence, as it were, so they are not in a position to intervene. the kurds disagree come and feel like the united states should be doing much more to end this campaign. in fact, the united states on the one hand expresses concern, but has not actually said stop, of course. this has sharpened kurdish anxieties about commitments of the united states to their security. sayingthe united states

-- well, secretary tillerson pointed out at stanford recently that they are going to be staying on for a number of reasons, and my colleague just ran through some of them. i think saying that, but actually not matching that with any real action and particularly set against what we just witnessed in kurdistan would seem to flight in the face of u.s. claims of wanting to counter iranian influence. it raises questions in kurdish minds and put them in a difficult position, because by presenting them as allies against iran come against the regime, talking about regime providinghout resources to do that, really makes the kurds extremely vulnerable. more not just talking any about turkish and u.s. conflicts of interests here, but

increasingly one of the russians and americans with a sort of i guess beginning to knock their thes against each other, battle lines draw closer and closer, particularly in that area. yeah, it is getting extremely sticky. and i think the russians are playing a sort of finely calibrated game of sort of turning that cap on and off for the turks. and what we are beginning to that the more the kurds are perceived as allies of the united states and parts of this alleged effort to get rid of assad to counter iranian influence will be seeing the

russians more and more allowing more turkish aggression against the ypg. >> right, one of the reports that came out of the sds when turkey's operations began is a said they believe this was happening because russia had offered the ypg to strike a deal local autonomy and that they had rejected it. the statement came from the sds, but it was in reference to the ypg. it looks like russia might be trying to maybe split the kurdish ruminant -- movement in syria. >> i think the russians are trying to do several things at the same time. on the one hand, they would like to see that regime reestablish control. i think this whole offering thing is part of that, and we have seen it happen already before in that area, but not on

this scale, obviously, with russia sort of dangling the turkish bogeyman and saying, if you do not let the regime set up here, the turks are going to come. buthis is a replay of that, on a far bigger scale. but i think we also tend to underestimate the degree to russian relations with bykey in syria also driven russia's own security concerns. the presence of all the -- from the caucuses is radicalized fighters come and the fact 000's in thehe 2 1990's, these people found a haven in turkey. it is incredibly important for russia to be able to cooperate with turkey to try to contain this threat. there is that aspect of this. which in turn puts russia at

iran,ith the regime and because i do not believe it or the regime or iran are terribly happy about this turkish incursion in the fact that they are moving further south into the de-escalation zones, because from the shooting'desk from the regime -- from the regime's point of view, with the help of the rebels, which turkey initially allied itself to overthrow the regime. it is getting incredibly complicated. >> i think for russia it is important to keep turkey part of the -- as well to make the entire process more legitimate. that is why turkish security concerns to a certain degree is important for russia. >> this is important for russia to have any representatives from the kurdish movement, do you think, or is it more important to have turkey represented, because in the last round of meetings after turkey started the operations, there was talk

between whether the kurds were going to get invited to the next round of talks and whether they were not at the end of it after turkey's operations began. the conclusion was that they were not invited. attend under the -- umbrella come about umbrella, but we heard about people who were posted he pyd were there. at the end of the day compacting russia would like to see them at the table because it does not seem realistic not to include pkyd.

the idea was that the russians would give a limited -- and that sad's popularity, so he good reflect the fact that the pyd -- >> the pyd had hoped to be therely there -- formally . they said we do not want to take part given what is happening with turkey, but they have always sort of scene russia as being more accommodating to the u.s., which has never wanted to bring them in as a formal partner despite support for the ypg. >> it is not to assume that the united states and russia are planning for some sort of settlement to this now seven-year conflict. and if they are both planning for this feature post-isis, how

do we settle the question of the syrian civil war situation, both of these actors are going to think, including the kurds in some sort of a settlement is necessary. let me just ask you about the pyd's relationships with the united states and the kurds, both historically and since the civil war, and i am curious what kind of a settlement do you think would best accommodate the pyd's interests? >> i am not as optimistic as you are that there are plans resettlement for what is happening in syria. let me just put it out, i am not optimistic. , ypg and itsd various structures have made

clear that they want in some form or another to be able to control their territory. they talk and big terms about democracy and gender equality, and they have gone, compared with other groups and countries in the region, they have done quite well with the gender equality. they would like to see that. whether they are going to get that is difficult, but at the end of the day, this is something they are going to demand. this is something they would not back down very easily from. they do not want to see their instant editions this band. they do not -- there institutions disbanded. this as their final protections, and the events and the u.s. inability to take a clear stand on this and stand up for the kurds only is another message to the kurdish movement relyit ultimately needs to on itself, that it cannot rely on other countries to protect its security. the thing is that the kurds, the

control of the territory depends quite a bit on american support. and if they came to a decision of the u.s. to withdraw that support, there are many different areas were battles could break at. so it is important for the kurds to try to maintain this, obviously, and keep the u.s. kind of them. but for the kurds in syria and pkk as well, what is happening is important. when operations of the political movement in turkey and the military movement, the kurdish movement him in turkey has been really put under pressure. politicians are arrested. pretty much any sort of kurdish or many democratic expressions seen as a crime now and reason to be detained. the pkk needs to show again --

thousand gain and again it has is in the area. itsill explain some of inability to operate in turkey rayna. if you recall in 2015, the pkk launched a war in the cities in southeast turkey, and this led to turkish counterattacks that pretty much leveled large parts of different cities in southeast turkey and led to a number of desperate and the -- a number of deaths. we were concerned there was going to be a turkish operation, that would attempt to turn attention away. pkk at this time really needs -- they see it as their subsidiary, a critical part of their overall success. but having said that, i want to reemphasize again that the movement in syria is not -- has

not post a threat to syria. the operation was not preceded by a the pkk. turkey has constructed a huge wall now along the eastern part of the border with syria. this is making it more difficult for there to be attacks. the fact that the ypg is an affiliate of the pkk is of great concern for turkey to have this on its border. >> you just hearkened that to a couple years ago, and i want to do the same, because turkey's relationship with the pkk has in relation to one another. just a few years ago, turkey was in a piece process with the pkk, and then you mentioned that from view, theus point of turkey's point of view, statements have indicated

that turkey has been unnerved now, that, since 2012 the kurds in northern syria along the turkish order have been gaining more and more international support and self-rule, so they view the rise of kurdish politics in syria as a threat as well. in your affected turkey's calculations in terms of the peace process with the pkk or were there other domestic considerations as well? >> absolutely, yes. n fact arab whole i spring came at an unfortunate time, just as turkey had relaunched this peace process. ground the kurds gaining

as of 2014 with the assistance of the united states, and that really freaked out the turkish government. regardless of who would have been in power, we keep talking about erdogan, but i think this is a typical reaction of the turkish state whenever they see kurds gaining influence. it is certainly across their borders, and particularly with the help of the west. this takes them straight back to -- and the total panic immediate goal is to deflect that. and i think part of what went on in the talks was a set of that i made by turkey think were frankly impossible for the pkk-ypg to accept,

including throwing support for regime change, in support of regime change alongside the rebels, withdrawing completely from turkey and the sort of pkk becoming the ypg, which in turn became part of the anti-assad force. while the talks were ongoing, we see a single constitutional change that instilled confidence on the kurdish side, encourage t hem to think anything would fulfill concrete results for their demand for greater political autonomy, etc. yeah, is the short answer to your question.

and what happened in syria, the syrian conflict and their rise of the ypg in the u.s.-ypg partnership, it also transformed the -- it was a huge factor in changing turkish nationalism in a way that from the pkk first came to power in 2002, they embraced something that some scholars called modern nationalism. and modern nationalism is -- nationalism is it paid less attention to ethnic identity. it was a main marker in the pkk 's ideology. that partly explains why erdogan

embrace -- and i am not saying this was the only thing that kurdished that -- a opening. he had a different mindset. and at the time in 2003 right after american invasion of iraq, we had the -- in the military that were very anti-american. d the atp was the only actor that promoted pro-western identities. they were criticized for being defensive, inward looking, and they had a different outlook and different vision. but now they are all on the same page. back, and thatis is never good news for the kurds. what happened in syria and the rise of the ypg had a lasting

impact on turkish politics. i think that anti-americanism in the anti-kurdish sentiment might not be something contextual that we can always explain what the u.s. is doing with the ypg or what the ypg is doing in northern syria. so that is concerning. >> there is also you mentioned the predominant kurdish political parties in turkey, the second largest opposition party in parliament, the leader has been in jail. that summer when turkey's government talks with a pkk failed, we had an election where hdp had gotten 13% in the election. this is a year, year and a half after the americans first cooperated with the ypg in syria because of kobbani, so this is after this.

so the turkish society and government were not as nationalist as you described it right now. factor there?dp became the think hdp victim of it. other than what happened in syria, there are domestic considerations. but i think the hdp has become a non-actor since 2015. i don't think it has played in that transformation, and it was impacted by that transformation. >> this is the conundrum for ogan, if hent for erd were to continue the peace process in 2015, that maybe he could have gained support electoral early, but ironically

it hurts him electorally because it strengthen the hdp and strengthen nationalist opposition to what he was doing. -- i do not think this is the decisions erdogan were making were index to any election because there are much bigger issues for him. >> i agree, plus i would add we talk about elections in this incredibly optimistic tone, presuming they will be free and fair. and i think a big question now before us is recited that -- will they be? if we just judge by what unfolded during the referendum, the irregularities, to put it politely, that were documented, depending on how desperate erdogan feels to hold on to

power, he may carry that actively even further to the extent where sort of winning kurdish votes or nationalist votes or whatever will not really the that great factor in his calculation, shall i say. so the future trajectory of turkish politics i think will very much in form -- infor howm erdogan approaches the kurdish issue as well. >> given where we are now, how do you think -- i >> am not terribly optimistic, i have to say. the only instance where i can imagine a return to the peace process is one where erdogan would regarded being vital for his survival. >> right, ok. so with that, let me -- we have a good picture of where turkey is at and the complications this

is posing for u.s. policy and --.-kurdish nation's, also relations, also all over the place in syria. i'm sure we have lots of questions about this. whichl wait for the mic, is coming. please introduce yourself. question, now we have seen all the syrian groups allied with turkey inside syria. di videos a lot of jiha threatening the people which was rozny andmilar to g chechnya. how does the secular kurdish opposition view that? >> who would like to take that question, or from all of you? --joe we take two others

shall we take two others? >> if you criticize the operation, it will land you in jail in turkey. that is what i do not think there is a healthy debate on the moment. i the opposition, the chp, cannot call them in opposition party anymore, but an overwhelming majority of the country is behind the operation. it is that they are not very concerned, although the chp raised the question of who the people in the free syrian army are. nationalalled them army, but they do not really look like a national army. debate, therliament question was raised, but i do not think the majority of --

find that, and that does not change the conception and support that the operation received. all so, i think first of [indiscernible] i am not sure that everyone thinks that the turkish public is convinced that all of these free syrian army and other groups fighting along side turkish forces fit that description. the narrative increasingly is that these people are shedding the blood to help defend turkey. so this is all happening for a greater cause. and also there is the other more cynical approach of viewing these people as cannon fodder, sadly. we have not had any casualty figures for these groups fighting alongside turkey, which i find quite dehumanizing as well as tragic. and i think characterizing these

people, attaching labels to them in that way, does not serve any useful purpose, friendly. the free syrian army is fighting turkey's war. i believe that probably whatever turkey and the turkey-backed forces capturing -- will be handed over to the regime. the situation that would put the free syrian army in, that they will be fighting and dying for that terry curry, and eventually they will be handed over to the regime. i >> we will take another question from the front and please state your affiliation. given what you described about the seriousness of which in syriasuing the ypg

and how it is linked to domestic politics and how important it is to him, what do you think the chances are of a clash between turkey and the united states over mandates. is that a remote possibility or a real possibility? in, becausehimself he said publicly -- is going to back, butlt to go secretary tillerson will be holding talks with turkish officials. for turkey to walk back, it needs to get something tangible from the u.s., and i don't know what that is. i know after the turkish meeting, they talked about a security zone. i wasn't clear about what he was

thinking because i heard in it is not the-- u.s. call, it is russia, so the u.s. cannot promise anything there, so the only thing the u.s. can offer to make it easier is to push the ypg to with draw -- and that is difficult. recently the new strategy in syria is to stay there for stabilization and the ypg is the main ally. i think it hurt the feelings of when they said it is not in our area of operation, so if they push the ypg to withdraw, that will send the wrong signal

to the turks. but the question is do the turks have any other options? while it is a risky decision, that will certainly be a breaking point in turkey and u.s. relations. will he do that? that the jury is still open. the u.s. it still using the air pace, so the logical thing for , and heas to close down didn't do that. but thedn't do that, other side of the argument is that it is going to be difficult for him, so we have to wait and see what american officials

visiting will go towards. >> i do think it is possible for him to walk back on his rhetoric and switch this around. he controls the media and conversations there and he can come up with a new sort of line for success, and he has to show something, most likely something like setting up security out host -- outposts. back away from that if he can come up with another gain he can show, and he can rationalize it in a number of different ways, he is good at that. >> the united states promised turkey that the ypg will pull back and the local administration will be removed from ypg influenced, and that is not what happened.

i had the opportunity to see some of that firsthand. to answer your question about the possibility of a clash between turkey and united states, i don't believe the united states will ever attack its nato ally, and equally i don't believe turkey will ever open fire on its nato ally, the united states. that is almost inconceivable, and it is more of a pink than a redline. the message is more about do anything -- don't go in and just do something without consulting us. that is what i am taking away from this. ask, do yount to think that turkey will never -- there have been a number of threats from the turkish government officials that they -- dotrike on americans

you think they will? >> i think it is possible, but on the other hand, you remember when turkey launched the operation, they said, they would only withdraw the operation and it what and after capturing -- and they never did that. but they said they were successfully ending the operation, but you are right, this context is different. people are talking about early elections, as early as this summer. i think this is the key. what turkey is doing in syria is important for the local situation, so it is a difficult context to walk back from what he said. thet also depends of military instability -- and

stability, and it doesn't appear to be a simple operation for the turkish military and they will be aware that they do not want to be ultimately humiliated on the battlefield. >> that is true, and i have argued that it is a military operation pushing to the outskirts, and this morning i learned that they are in fact going -- unwise, but ite is a majority town, let's not forget that. -- i think they will be talking about that though, rather than killing each other. >> we hope some. -- we hope so. >> will take a question from the back. woman this ish

difficult to listen to all this analyzing, ial respect, but civilians are being bumped by the turkish f-16s, it is difficult to listen -- but it is very simple. it is a cleaning operation, so i want to mention that, and my question -- what is your expecting from the turks in syria syria, in turkey, in iran? what should kurds do and what should their position be?

thank you. --i will make that question do you think that because of this operation that there might be a split or change within kurds and their relationship with the united states given -- first, yes, civilians are being killed and that is one of the main reasons people are concerned and horrified and seven by was going on there. it is hard to say that it is not about kurdish demonstration in germany or marching in iraqi kurdistan, it is about other issues that we have been talking about. unfortunately there isn't any

clear answer right now about this. the syrian kurds and the white -- it is next to the united able tothe kurds were hold on, and the vanguard of defeating isis in that area, so the kurds and the u.s. need each other. wouldt see that the ypg see any reason to change its american it's probably position, positions willing to be the lead fighters against isis and stop further infiltration. what sort of negotiations will go on between them to try to defuse a possible situation, the it has made it clear that

remains firmly on the side of the united states despite what is happening. for liza a question marquez, mainly on the relationship with the pyd and ypg and the iranian regime and militia operating in syria, how do you assess those relationships. there has been evidence of collaboration and tolerance and suggestion that perhaps that iranians will lay off a little bit on the northeast in the conflict, and leslie, the last -- and lastly,he the comment about the operation,

comments were made at the first thing we should do is pick americans out, and that died out. she the only voice and that? relationships have been complicated and sometimes they fight and don't fight depending on what issues are going on between the pkk and iran and other countries in the region, so i think the situation is similar to how the u.s. has been able to separate the pkk from they're able to separate its own ongoing dialogue going on with iran. whatever demand or and that isiran, one thing the kurdish movement is, putting its own interests

first to an extent and trying to stay focused on what its goals are. if its goals are to provide security and economy for kurds and arabs and others living in that region under its control, it will focus on that. by try not to be diverted other issues, and to take whatever hit may come along because of that. iran, this is a perfect scenario for iranians because after turkey launched the incursion, the regime east --the ypg in the northeast syria to send recently thes, and pro-iran malicious attack a alopo,h convoy in a l

and it shows how complicated the relationship is between russia, iran, and the regime, and maybe russia does not have much leverage with the run, and turkey deployed operation points and set a convoy, and it is part of the agreement -- russia allowed turkey to do that. attend the regime forces attacked the turkish convoy, because what i think turkey was trying to do is to prevent iran and the regime to support the they would like to see a week and ypg and a weakened turkish military, and that is why iran is shifting its because towards the ypg

after the conflict started, the regime turned a blind eye to what ever ypg was doing, and then they got too close and iranians were anxious about th at. now changed their tune, and the turks are fleeing and iran is playing a double game. a question on elections, i do think she is alone. asking the government to close down -- that it is not a decision, and i think you'll come to that. it is one of few leverages turkey has over washington. was the first point in

turkey, and even then they did not slow down -- close down the airbase. so i don't think, people are saying that are they trying to close down the airbase, and the airbase --ng the that puts the government in a difficult spot. think he will do that because that will cost him an important and very few leverages he has. he has actually talked about shutting that down, and that is important, if you are doing and tight iran stuff, that is -iran stuff, anti that is important.

thank you. i am an intern at the turkey program here, and my question was, could you comment on the situation acing young people in turkey in the context of how turkey is internalized with its conflict and search and nationalism and tents political environment -- tense environment. >> we can also talk about the context is being built around in turkey'sn neighbors in syria. it is a difficult question because you are talking about a huge population, the youth in turkey, to kurdish youth who don't support what is

happening. you have to break it down in terms of the activism -- young people who want to be active and are interested in democratic movements in difficult times. just speaking out and criticizing the war is reason for arrest -- i happen to know many young people, and they do too, and the rest of the country has moved on. [indiscernible] >> i think there is a tectonic --nge occurring faithhink they lost their in peaceful change.

my students were 19 and 20-year-olds and they are not political and are not interested in politics. but theyopinionated don't think change is possible, they don't know much. is --ly thing they know in recent studies, it is polarizing. it is terrifying, but what i can say about the change in kurdish as a result of twitter among other things, fewer and a commonthem see future insight turkey, and what i hear often is that great, i hope no one stays and ruins the country and totally destroys it

so we can go our way with much more ease. and maybe even america will come and innovate -- or not invade, liberate. that is what they are thinking. going back to the university calls conducted, the idea of politics is really important, but i think it is more important now. i think my explanation is that societies like turkey or institutions are not strong, other than family and ethnic the ethnic lines are hardened. >> thank you for all of that. we will take another question.

thank you. i am from the embassy of romania and my question is for the entire panel. what political lessons to the from selfiestake turkey and the independence from th iraq? certainly from the referendum of iraq, and the u.s. refusal to ofk somehow, act on behalf of the iraqi kurds and conflict that corrupted in other places toi think they take a lesson trust in themselves. i think for the pkk and ypg, that is a long-standing , i don't think

they learned that differently from that experience in the iraqi kurdistan. the pkkd argue that based on their experience that they would be more successful in the urban battles that were launched in 2015, and that proved not to be true. i am not sure they learn anything back. experienced,w very getting training and support from americans, which is a lot more than anything they can learn on the ground. battlese failed urban in 2015, the pkk has moved act into classic guerrilla warfare in the mountains, and that doesn't match with the terrain in syria. >> i think the layson have drawn from all of that -- the lesson they have realized this they

under estimated the degree of the 2015 urban battles, and we are witnessing -- >> exactly. >> maybe this might be a good sum up question for the panel. at turkey anding statements from senior officials, most recently, i think it was the foreign minister talking about the invasion into the offering region as jihad kurds, and a year ago we heard a senior official talk about reestablishing a dominance over former ottoman territories, namely in the balkans.

alikew that ak party are closely with hamas, the palestinian branch of the muslim brotherhood and we know that ak party is working with the muslim brotherhood in this country, and to what extent, and is the strategic look if you back off a bit, to what extent are we looking at something larger? arhaps the reemergence of ottoman state in turkey? questions --lot of i wouldn't begin to agree with a lot of that. don't recall ever talking about a jihad against the kurds, in fact, the president has repeatedly said that this is not against the kurds, it is against terrorists, meaning the pkk.

by the way, trade relations with israel are booming for this country. >> what turkey can do in the power,as a new ottoman look at work turkey is in the region. egypt,e relations with and now there's tension twin saudi's and turkey, tension with the gulf countries. especially, iranian forces are attacking turkish troops, although they are becoming close partners in syria, so i think turkey is not what it was in 2009, and that was when more people in the

region talked about the ottoman agenda, and i think that is the key anymore. >> of course the problem with turkey getting involved with opposition, there are reports and concerns coming out of the united states about turkey's -- grow inping isis northern syria, all over the region, so it is not that clear of a picture. states cooperated with jihadi groups in afghanistan -- >> m singh there are a lot of problems with the united states and turkey and why we caused this panel, the u.s. and turkey and the kurds in syria -- while it is not black and white and having a choice between partnering with the ypg versus

nato, and we have addressed this fact --n't ignore the >> [indiscernible] we will take a question from the back. directed --on is since you mentioned you run as a player in syria, i wanted to know your take of u.s. efforts. iran as a player in syria. what is their role in the syrian conflict? >> that is a hard question, given everything that is going

on. that't have any advice on --. willing toe is not work from the ground, iran influence in iraq is a different matter -- it is not just an issue they support. a strong soft power presence in iraq, and in syria, i think what makes them an important actor is that they support the regime, and they support militias, and if you don't counter that -- formalunited states has relations of the government and him as a close ally,

and perhaps somebody who could help them counter uranian influence,-- iranian and that makes things a lot more complicated in terms of exercising their influence, even if it is to promote kurdish whites or help the kurdish get recognition. >> i think we have time for a last few questions. >> i know there are a lot of political variables in determining whether or not an organization is listed as a terrorist group or not, the pkk is listed as one, the ypg is not, but i want to look at what

is going on on the ground, they target innocent civilians and is there justification that angle for the pkk in the ypg is not, should they both be terrorist groups? formerlyhe pkk was it came outthink after 9/11, i think there were reasons to include, we saw it as a terrorist group, and europe sympathetic, and whether or not the pkk targets civilians, you have to look historically. there were times civilians were killed, and the pkk will argue they were village guards and pkk,by turkey to fight the or they were accidentally killed along the way, but for turkey to announce that their police have been targeted and civilians have

died in some bombings, whether the pkk was targeting them or up, the organization took urban centers to reinforce the idea for turkey that they deserve to be on a terrorism list. given the relations between turkey and the united states, it is hard to imagine the united ortes would at some point immediately remove the pkk from the list. obviously it is a different side, they have been targeting turkish civilians -- they haven't targeted civilians inside syria, although the kurdish opposition will argue that some of their members, kurdish groups and opposition to the ypg in syria will argue and give examples of their members have been unlawfully arrested or sent into exile in some cases and claim murder.

that is not something that has concerned the united states. at this point united states needs to continue to see this as a distinction. setting aside the label, turkey has a very big problem with the kurds that is not solved, and at some point i realizationo that and began talking to the pkk. at some point they're going to have to do that again. it is inevitable. if they want turkey to prosper and become a full-fledged democracy. i am getting the signal that we need to end. thank you all for coming. [applause]

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>> you can hear this conversation again i going to our website, www.c-span.org. the look at the role of congress and a renegotiation of the nafta agreement. this was the by the school of john hopkins advanced international studies. and be with us tonight for the discussion of several andcan-american journalists their experiences covering the trump administration. george washington university hosted the event earlier this week.

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