policy issues that impact you. up friday morning, and light of the recent school shooting in florida, a number of experts will weigh in on gun control legislation and school safety. join the conversation all morning. be sure to watch washington journal live at 7:00 eastern friday morning. join the discussion. >> the institution for research and the american educational trust hosted the daylong conference in u.s. israel relations and for policy. much that live starting at 9:00 eastern on c-span two. >> mark warner is the vice chair of the senate intelligence committe. he looked at russia's use of cyber warfare and disinformation as a strategy to attack western democracies. following his comments, a panel of analysts will discuss the strategies and how western

governments can respond. the carnegie endowment for international peace hosted the event. this is an hour and a half. >> good morning, everyone. my name is bill burns and i am the president of the carnegie endowment and i'm pleased to welcome all of you today to the launch of our new global russia project. our objective is to bring together a network to take a fresh, sober look at the why and how of russia's foreign policy and the implications for us in washington and around the world. as all of you know, this is not an academic issue. every day with every new indictment and headline, we are reminded of the ongoing meddling in our democracy and the domestic divisions the kremlin seeks to highlight and exploit and every day we see russia

playing its hand in ways few of us could have imagined even a decade ago. like many things in washington, the reaction to putin can be erratic, with some people focused and others retreating behind denial of inconvenient truths. we will not cure that syndrome or weigh in on the political drama. what we will do and what is important to do is to help policymakers here and around the world develop an understanding of russia's aims and objectives and a more nuanced response. that is easier said than done. i learned that the hard way. i served twice as a diplomat in russia. that was a long exercise in humility, not only about what is possible in relationships, but

also about my powers of prediction about russian behavior. it is a safe bet putin will be reelected in a couple of weeks. as his speech makes clear, it is a safe bet russia's foreign policy will continue to be a combustible combination of grievance and insecurity and ambition. it's a safe bet our challenge will be to manage a largely adversarial relationship to read it is not that russia is 10 feet tall. it is handicapped by a one-dimensional economy, overdependence on hydrocarbons. in putin, you see a leader who is agile, who has been willing to play rough and intends to see a target rich environment around him. the kremlin is asserting itself as a player that can't be ignored in an expanding array of regions and countries and by

exploiting western divisions, it threatens the international system we have worked hard to cultivate for over 70 years. the stakes are real and they demand the very best from all of us. that is why we are fortunate to have senator mark warner here. he has called the russia investigation he is leading the most serious undertaking of his public life, an extraordinary career from the governor's mansion to the u.s. senate. indeed no one knows more about russia's meddling in the pre-16 elections, or has worked harder to study the strategy behind that operation, and the implications at home and abroad. no one has demonstrated a greater sense of purpose, courage, or commitment to sustaining the bipartisan foundations of our foreign policy in these hyper partisan times. him and senator burr, the chair

of the intelligence committee, a debt of gratitude at this moment of testing. following his remarks, we will move to our panel. so please remain seated. now, i want to congratulate my colleagues for putting together this timely and important endeavor and join me in giving senator warner a warm welcome. [applause] sen. warner: thank you for that very kind introduction. it is great to see everyone here this morning. i recall a number of times in the last few weeks, few months, that people have been kind enough to say to me or richard

burr, gosh, we are so happy you are the adults in the room. what a low bar we have struck. [laughter] again, thank you for that introduction. we could use your steady hand in the state department these days more than ever. i'm glad you are still engaged in the fight here through this great platform you have it carnegie. you have always been a clear and strategic thinker and on behalf of all of us who continue to serve in the day job, thank you for what you're doing. as bill mentioned, a timely time to have this presentation. i'm going to acknowledge my age and put on my glasses. the speech that mr. putin made indicates his current status quo approach, being aggressive and

bellicose is not going to disappear. again, my initial kudos to carnegie for their informative work to decipher this extraordinarily complex u.s.-russian relationship. again, this is not a newsflash. too often those of us who are caught up in the day to day, we are caught up in the latest new cycle and i am concerned that we can miss, this failure to step back how all of these events actually form a context and are basically presenting themselves alarming picture of the new

russia and how it is emerging as a threat to the united states and our allies. the chance for me to come here today and take a step back and sort through some of the strategic and policy implications is very important. i thank you for that opportunity. thinking about the terminology, let me go down the litany, bots, little green men, distributed denial of service. in the last couple of years, national security leaders have been forced to learn a new language in terms of dealing with 21st-century threats. our long-standing rival, russia, has reimagined in the world and with a new playbook to exploit our open society, to the divide us from within and cut us off from our allies.

some commentators have tried to define this as a new phase of the cold war. what we are experiencing now does not resemble the cold war i recall growing up with. back then, we had a sense of who our adversary was and i think americans across the board understand that threat. it even had a physical form, the berlin wall. which divided east from west, capitalism from communism, freedom from oppression. we know who the bad guys were. where they stood. our national security, because of those divisions, emanated from that. today's conflict is much more amorphous. in addition to the traditional

tool of the cold war, mr. putin also has nonconventional weapons and tools, like cyber attacks, energy deals, hacking, selective leaking, and a bot army to spread disinformation. these tools are designed to help russia undermine its enemies in the west. they are often deployed and this is one of the distinctions between now and the traditional the west. cold war, many of these tools are deployed by nonstate surrogates, thereby giving russia the ability to claim deniability when their agents are caught taking these actions. the bottom line, i believe rather than a framework of an old cold war, we are now engaged

in a fight in the shadows and i'm not sure the fight we are currently winning. let me take a moment to give my perspective on how we got here and what we need to do going forward. after the berlin wall fell, the united states reached out to the new russia and attempted to bring it into the western community of nations. we perhaps naively assumed russia's integration into the g7 and eu was natural and inevitable. many of us imagined after the failure of communism the success of western free market democracy would spread eastward. at the same time, we watch russia's military atrophy and its economy stagnated.

frankly i think most across the of the establishment, we assumed the russia threat was reduced. facing these times, we declared the cold war was over and that we had won. we turned our focus from superpower rivalry to counterterrorism. obviously the wars in iraq and afghanistan. the challenges emanating from failed states. we worked to track down and finally kill terrorists around the world. this was a logical and understandable transformation given the 9/11 attack and other threats to our security emanating from the number of failed states around the world. however, there was a cost to these decisions and we took our

eyes off the reemerging threat posed by russia. what they did not imagine at the have and perhaps we should , was the resentment that many russians felt at the economic uncertainties of the new free market. the chaos and inflation. it wiped out many russians' permanent savings. we failed to recognize and predict the corruption of a small group of oligarchs and we fail to understand the kind of hit most russians felt with the loss of the superpower status the soviet union had. these feelings led to ordinary russians desiring stability. frankly, their disenchantment with that short-term russian experiment with democracy. all this ultimately led to a

further enhancement and entrenchment of president putin's power. meanwhile, as we saw yesterday and as we have seen throughout his comments over the last few years, putin continued to nurse a grudge against the west. he called the demise of the soviet union the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. he used his growing control of television, film, and other organs of propaganda as a way to stoke popular discontent and to encourage ordinary russians ' disillusionment. he relied on these powers to boost his standing with the russian public and replace the old notion of a russian-led,

communism-based philosophy of russian nationalism. and with that backing of the majority of his public, he began a program of rearmament with the aim of challenging the united states and our allies. while our days shifted away from russia, which we began to write off and dismiss as a regional power, russia really never lost its focus on us. its aim remains targeted on western liberal order and on what its kgb-trained leadership views as the enemy, the united states. russia diligently honed and updated its toolkit for a different kind of great power rivalry.

they could not match us in the old cold war paradigm, so russian needed a strategy that would allow them to compete with us on a new emerging battlefield. the chief of general staff gave putin when he needed. he outlined a new strategy doctrine that the kremlin was more suited to fight and strategy they believed they could win and bring russia back on par as a superpower with the west. he recognized in a way that very few within our government did, a blurring of the lines between war and peace, between direct conflict and in direct conflict in the 21st century. he emphasized nonmilitary means to advance this doctrine.

informational conflict. and using the measures of what he would call conceal character. valery gerasimov outlined a doctor and relying on conventional weaponry and also on a system of asymmetric means. his vision of hacking, cyber attacks, informational warfare and propaganda would be the weapons of choice. he painted a picture of the fight in the shadows, a type of hybrid warfare. it is a fight, and from all of the comments made by putin and his allies, the kremlin is actually intent not only in bringing parity, but intent on winning.

putin put to work implementing this doctrine. first across the border in ukraine, employed in little green men and information warfare to create a state of instability. he also targeted estonia and georgia and other countries within the former sphere of the soviet union. he invested in this type of deniable tools that would help him overcome the west's traditional advantages. he has turned those weapons on the united states and i believe that at this moment in time we are inadequately prepared to take on this new challenge. in recent months, senator cardin and the democrats on the foreign relations committee, delivered a well researched report on russia's asymmetric assault on european democracies.

they outlined a comprehensive array of weapons in the kremlin toolkit, including the use of organized crime, corruption, energy security, and even the russian orthodox church to increase russia's influence throughout the region. we don't have time to get into all of those today. i recommend everyone takes a review of senator cardin's work. what i do want to address are the three major avenues of attack russia used during the 2016 campaign. first, the targeting of our infrastructure. second, the hacking and recognizing of information and use of those leaks. third, a new realm of information warfare, particularly as it affects social media.

the senate intelligence community, on a bipartisan basis, is focused on each of these items. first, the truth is our election system has strength. the beauty and curse of our system is that it is fragmented and decentralized. that thought is less comforting than it might seem when we step back and think how an outside power can use this system of elections in ways to attack us. we know non-national elections are decided by a few thousand votes. it would be typical for any foreign power to attack each and every system in a national election, what we need to understand is that a presidential election can actually be swung by a few thousand votes in a single jurisdiction in a single state. the ability for the russians to

target that to a level of specificity is remarkable. even the threat of potential russian incursion undermines our public's confidence in our election processes and that undermining can have devastating effects. the russians have tremendous cyber capabilities. we have much work to do to ensure our election infrastructure can withstand anything the russians will try. the truth is where we stand in the beginning of march, we are not prepared across the nation for the 2018 election cycle, which begins in a few days in terms of the primaries. we have primaries in illinois and texas this month and we are not prepared.

the kremlin has gone to great lengths for malicious cyber activity. including hacking and weaponize in information. while putin maintains some of the most prolific state-sponsored cyber capabilities, much of his measures have not been state-led. the kremlin has been able to employ and co-op assistance from a detached corps of nongovernmental hackers that russia has nurtured and harbors from international law enforcement. rather than always being government-led, these hackers are generally free to engage in criminal activity and moneymaking endeavors around the globe as long as they keep their activities away from any of the russian oligarch's.

when it suits them, putin and his allies are able to utilize these capabilities to further their own active measure campaigns while allowing the kremlin to deny involvement. putin has trolled the u.s. by denying meddling in u.s. elections and allowing patriotic hackers, he says, i can't control them. i think there is a little more controlled than he has been willing to admit. hacking is not unique to the kremlin. however, weaponize thing that information is a growing part of the russian playbook. the truth is, we should have seen this coming. and himhim

this was an area we should have predicted better and we are not prepared for today. -- the kremlin is also making unprecedented investments in 21st century information warfare. during the cold war, we recall the soviets tried to spread fake news before that term was popular. they spread theories the u.s. government was involved in assassination of martin luther king jr. or that the american

military had created the aids disease. much like today, these efforts were geared at trying to undermine basic americans faith in our governments. the widespread use of social media has allowed russia to supercharge information efforts. before, the kgb would have to go newspapertting up a in a neutral country for using tools to create a dubious -- through the newspaper or the forgery, would only had a very small targeted group of individuals. now, with social media, they have instantaneous access to hundreds of millions of social media accounts where propaganda

and fake news can spread like wildfire. while we all recognize the power and value of these social media platforms, if we step back and my daybout this, from job on the intel committee, in , an intelligence organization was trying to create a network where they could do the most damage, spreading false information and undermining people's confidence, and they can sit back and imagine what that might look like. it would look like the social media platforms that exist in terms of how we gain our news and information. platforms likese facebook, twitter, youtube, have andaped our entire culture the ways we communicate and access information. while we marveled at the new opportunities offered by this technology, i believe our

government and the technology companies themselves have not fully understood the ramifications of these giant communities they have created. and how these communities on , the darkia underbelly, can be abused and misused our crime terms of interactions with americans. tracking the impact of the disinformation is obviously inherently difficult. at 2011, there was a russian operation manual that suggested this information -- disinformation acts like an invisible radiation, covertly pushing you in the direction you kremlin wants area -- the kremlin wants. you don't even know you are being attacked.

that's how russia was able to target and co-opt unwitting americans into spreading their content outline. the even succeeded in --nsferring these efforts this is one of the things that was most described in our hearings -- from facebook into the real world. the example we like to cite was back in be followed 2016 where two russian-created sites created out of st. petersburg, one that catered to a far right group in texas, the other which aboutto a group that was the muslim community in texas, half a world away they created an event where these two groups came into near conflict at a mosque in houston. think about that. the ability to manipulate americans onto the street. that goodness for the police presence or we could have had an

event similar to what happened in my state in charlottesville, all being driven from half a world away. the truth is, this threat continues and expands. these active measures have two things in common. first, they are effective. second, they are cheap. we are spending hundreds of billions of dollars on national security. at least in this area in terms of misinformation, our country is often being walked back on our heels. the kremlin is spending pennies on the dollar. pennies on the dollar. wreaking havoc. worse yet, they have not stopped. this threat did not go away on election day in 2016. russian operatives remained active today, stoking hate and discord online. we have seen russian linked hashtags onhing

both sides of the nfl national anthem debate. we have seen russian organized hashtags and thoughts attack the president's national security advisor. listing them push for a #released a memo -- release the memo. have even seen evidence of stoking anger on both sides of begun debate after the tragedy in the parkland shooting. now this playbook is out in the open. we have to worry about more than russia. these tools can be used by other actors, nonstate actors and others, to try and influence and so discord within our nation. what can we do? unfortunately, there is no simple answer in this space.

no single countermeasure that will stop the wave of attacks from russia. the premise of what carnegie's global russian project means is that we have to take advantage and look at what russia seeks to take advantage of and amplify these divisions in our country. it is focused on boosting cynicism and tearing down western institutions from the inside. in response, i believe we need to start here at home. we need to recognize the threat, expose putin's game plan and inoculate our society against these efforts. in order to do that, we need to understand the russian playbook and deliver a thorough accounting of what they did in 2016. this is why i believe our committee's investigation is so important. it's why i believe the mueller inquiry is so critical. we need to get to the bottom of

what happened, and do it in a bipartisan fashion. this is not a threat against republicans versus democrats, but it is a threat versus our nation as a whole. a question about whether any americans knew or assisted in 2016 is vital. more important, and more critical is making sure that we make clear that this threat did not end on election day, and what vladimir putin's aims are not to favor one political party over another, but to simply so discord and distrust within our country. the truth is, what we experienced was an attack from a foreign nation. next, we have to recognize we have much to do to strengthen

our security and systems against these asymmetric threats. our strategies have not shifted aggressively enough to address these new threats in cyberspace and in social media. the truth is, if you step back and look at how we spend -- russia spent last year's budget, defense wise, it was about $68 billion. the united states of america spends 10 times that much, yet, i believe, we are often spending on weapons that were well-suited for 20th century conflict. we buy arms and materials to fight war, on land, in the air, and in the sea. i do not believe we shifted near enough resources to take on, where often times the 21st century conflicts will take

place, in cyberspace or in terms of misinformation and disinformation. until we do that, i believe the russians will continue to get a lot more bang for their security buck. no one questions america's superior technological advantages. but ironically, that technological advantage and the dependence that comes with that advantage actually makes us more vulnerable in the asymmetric battlefield in terms of cyber and technology dependence that russia has chosen to attack us in. we must spell out a deterrence doctrine so that our adversaries don't see cyber attacks or misinformation attacks against us as a free lunch. the united states, has often done too little to respond to cyber attacks against us and our allies. when we do respond, it has often

been done extraordinarily quietly and on a one-off basis. that has clearly not been enough to deter our adversaries. we may need to make clear to russia, and for that matter to other nations, that if you go about using cyber warfare or disinformation against us, we will call you out and we will punch back. we need to more quickly attribute cyber attacks, we need to increase the cost of these cyber attacks against our nation, we need to use robust sanctions and other tools. that should include the sanctions against russia passed overwhelmingly by congress for -- i congress which the president has still refused to implement.

the sad truth is, we are handicapped in our response by lack of presidential leadership. we need a president who recognizes this problem, and not one who sees that any discussion of russian election interference as a personal affront. we need a president who will lead, not just a whole of government, but a sense of a whole of society efforts to take on these challenges. we need someone that will actually unify our nation against this growing asymmetric threat. we can't let putin and his allies succeed. we have to, as a nation, learn to fight back and shine a light on this shadow conflict. we have to get our act together at home. otherwise, we will still be shooting blindly into the shadows. thank you all very much. [applause]

now i have to go back to my day job and save democracy. thank you all. >> that was fascinating to hear from the senator. i'm with cbs news. we will spend the next torsion -- portion of our time having a conversation with the panel and with q&a. i want to thank carnegie for having us here area every day is a timely day on the subject. this is livestreamed, so if anybody is blogging this on twitter, snapchat, please use #globalrussia. with that, let me introduce my panel. this is the vice president for

, where heie endowment oversees research on russia and eurasia. to his right is the former director of central intelligence . to my left is a russian journalist and media manager. she is notable as the former oftor-in-chief of -- and rbc. i want to thank you all for joining us. i want to delve deeper into what the senator mentioned. putin's statedent of the nation today and the two-hour speech he gave about bragging on the investment in nuclear technology saying he has invincible nukes. my question to you, what do you make of what he said 17 days of the election? where he is most likely going to win. was that a direct message to donald trump? >> i think it is a direct message to the russian voters. whereas you say, we are just a days away from what is

expected to be the election for his fourth and final term. he has very little to run on except for that russia is back in a major force in the world again. that it is better to be feared than loved. for him to play to a joe sixpack view in russia, that life may be tough right now going through difficult economic times, but at least, we are strong. whether that will be enough to create excitement is another story. basically, the election has unfolded without a serious competition. self-selected opponents in the race are lackluster and not serious. what he has ended up doing is presiding over a political system that is being asphyxiated. whether he can engage with the russian people is unclear. >> lisa, while he dedicated the large portion of his speech to revamping rush's nuclear program and military, i'm curious to get

your take as a russian national. your reaction to his speech because, blanketed in there, he did talk about investing in russian infrastructure and cutting poverty by half. what is your take away as a russian to his message today? lisa: first of all, thank you for having me here. i hundred percent agree on what andrew was saying about the major focus of this information effort. for russians, it is extremely important to feel that russia is the superpower and also, as the leader, you can be judged by the strength of your opponent.

given that, vladimir putin addressed his speech to opponents, basically the united but itas i am guessing, is important to have strong opponents. that was a very specific and strong message. also he delivered that russia has a weapon that nobody else in the whole world has. that means russia is technically so advanced and this is so important, and that you guys need to be patient and invest in it. that means all russians are stronger than the rest of the world, despite olympic games and other things. [laughter] i think that message was completely and 100% addressed to the national ordinance before elections. it was also hard to revive the

audience for this election because the result is very predictable. the result is more than 100% predictable. that is very hard to engage people to vote. >> but they do want a significant turnout, right? lisa: of course. if you're elected by more than 50% of the population, not just the voters that went to the election places. >> which is why you hear people urging people not to vote because that can send a message to vladimir putin and embarrass him. john, something that lisa picked up on, when vladimir putin is bragging about a weapon that no one else has, in my mind, i think of how our president will react to that news. specifically since he has been pushing for greater investment in nuclear technology and calls for more nukes.

my initial question, saying he is speaking to an audience of russian voters, but, is he also speaking to the u.s. as well and waiting from a reaction from trump? john: i'm sure he is. i expect a tweet tomorrow morning that says my missile is bigger than yours. [laughter] or something like that. in truth, i think having just the united states issue a nuclear posture review, we will have to look and i've only taken a cursory look at what he has said about the weaponry. we will have to look at the characteristics of the weapons he is talking about here. one of the things going on in the world of nuclear weaponry is, the technology is changing in ways and doctrine is changing in ways that that begin to erode some of the ways we typically have thought about the turns. and the way we have typically thought about arms control, and

about the potential use of nuclear weapons. which i have posed on any grounds. people are starting to think in parts of the world, and russia two, there are circumstances in which it might be permissible to break the nuclear taboo and use these weapons in some circumstances where you can control the impact. i think that is a grave mistake. but that thought is out there. when vladimir putin starts talking about new kinds of weaponry, it is bound to play into that debate. >> does it support president trump's call to spend more money, specifically on our nuclear technology? john: i think he will interpret it that way, for sure. i would be astonished if that wasn't the reaction we have out of the white house, yeah. >> some of your peers in the intelligence community have likened what russia did in the 2016 election to a political

9/11. would you go as far in saying that? john: it is always dangerous to use 9/11 and comparisons because that is an extraordinary event in our history that will hopefully never be repeated. in a sense of it being a surprise, and a sense of it being novel, in the sense of it being something that we typically have not done very well, in all of those respects, i believe it is. it also underlines something the senator said. which is, -- i think i heard him say it this way. we shouldn't think of this as a new cold war. i think cold war metaphor gives us too much comfort.

in a sense that we understood that. also, it could be seen as something that could have an end, and it did have an end. there were two sides, one had to lose, and they lost. that is how we have seen it. that is not the circumstance we are in with russia. russia will not go away like the soviet union did. so, to me, we have to figure out how to deal with it and i'm sure we will talk about it. that is the real significance of what they did in 2016. echo ofn at go of -- techniques we saw during the cold war, but it advances so far into the modern era that in moves us into a different strategic role. >> andrew, we have not been right this far in figuring out how to deal with russia and vladimir putin. president obama called russia a regional power. lindsey graham called russia oil

and gas a company masquerading as a country. it has an economy the size of italy. yet, mitt romney is now giving praise to what he said back in 2012 following vladimir -- calling vladimir putin the greatest foe the u.s. faced. you can say both sides are right. what is the approach to addressing that conundrum then? andrew: first of all, we need to assess what is real and what is inflated. today's speech is nothing else. it's students wave showing he likes to be talked about. all of the fixation on vladimir putin, that is political gravy for him. what we need to do is step back and think, as john said this is , not a cold war, this is a different level of russian risk-taking, tactic, and it is a bigger target. we have at assumptions for the

past 25 years that we assumed -- that turned out to be wrong. we assumed russia would focus on internal rebirth. that turned out to not be true. we assumed that traditional elements of caution would be very important for russian foreign policy, we have seen the opposite is true. risk is a way of seeing your -- doubling down on issues and putting your opponent on the spot. the other assumption, they would focus largely on their neighborhood. and russian's priorities would in places like ukraine and estonia. but no, russia wants to mess with the united states. part of this has to do with the events of 2011, 2012, when we had big demonstrations in moscow after a murky set of shenanigans in the russian parliamentary election. since then, and going into 2014, the russian government, i don't

sincere that his stated goal of united states is to overthrow them and to pose an existential threat to their regime. >> lisa, as the journalist, you have seen firsthand this evolution in russia and in vladimir putin's russia. you've uncovered many stories there. most recently, putin's chef and his affiliation with russia's involvement in syria. none of this is a surprise to you, yet when you and i were talking, you will said you were surprised by what you saw in mueller's indictment. can you explain that? lisa: i was not surprised by the actions described that happened in 2016, but i was really surprised that all of those actions were planned in 2014.

when, for example, as a journalist, i had no clue, working in this media company, what is going on in some people's mind. i still believe that the whole threat is in some way overestimated and in some way underestimated. is the factis clear of putin's actions, the actions had for elections outcome. i think that was just one of the minor factors of the whole result. i don't believe it was the only factor. the way it is presented now, in media, in some ways scares me because i can't believe russians

completely changed the story line of american elections. in another way, from another point of view, i see underestimation of, let's say, smartness of people in russia in power. >> in determination. lisa: in determination in the -- who planned certain things in the very early stages. thethey planned soon after russian elections of 2011, that were considered by many of american involvement in russian elections. frankly speaking, when you were saying that hopefully you'll not face the same situations with election in the future, i don't believe in that. i think you will. now it is important to try to understand what does putin have now, not what has happened

previously. the kremlin has a certain agenda something for the future. >> how emboldened was this victory or success for vladimir putin given that he most likely, like everyone else, assumed hillary clinton would win the election. he most likely assumed that, in some way shape or form, the u.s. would retaliate. that investment was still worth it. we have not yet seen much of a retaliation. has that now emboldened putin to go on to bigger and even bolder initiatives? lisa: in the sense that you want me to answer a question, what is in putin's mind, but i don't know. [laughter] that is the problem. i think the goal was to weaken democrats and hillary clinton if

she wins. how they turned the situation, another side won they didn't . expect this outcome, i think for, i don't know, at least 70%. i think they found the techniques they used could be very efficient and, frankly speaking, it is very hard to fight with these techniques. and to defend from using social networks because social media is something in our psychology. it is injection of propaganda into human brains. that is a way how people think. in this this social media or other social media, you can't this or regulate it.

that is very hard. >> john, this begs the question of what the u.s. will do going forward. as the senator said, we are weeks or months away from elections in the u.s.. we heard from intelligence chiefs a few weeks ago testifying they had not been directed by the president to do anything and rich for the 2016 -- in retaliation for the 2016 meddling. trumpa chief said donald had not told him to confront russian cyber activities. how important is it for the president to speak out and give that order? john: i think it is extraordinarily important. my time in government left me with a lot of impressions. one of them is, the u.s. government, on something like this doesn't mobilize a fully

until the president of the united states says mobilize. until there is that signal from the top, that is just our system. until the executive branch here -- here's that clearly from the leader of the executive branch, people may do what they think they are supposed to do. a lot of people in the department of homeland security are working on this and doing important things, but the forceful application of all of our intelligence capabilities does not come about unless the president gives that push. that is one aspect of this. i thought about this recently i think there really are a couple of aspects of our failures to respond aggressively. that is one, the other is, i suspect that we do not yet have a cyber strategy that we can all unite on. in part because, and i say we

all as in all of the agencies and the whole of government to use that expression, in part because i don't think we have an accurate understanding of what happens when you engage in a cyber exchange. for example, rogers was pressed to do more aggressive counter activity against russian cyber. he said something to the effect that he is doing something that is authorities permit him to do. without knowing what that means, we can't judge the extent to which he is acting. i suspect he is doing more than we know. that said, those who think this is -- should turn into an all-out pitched battle, i think one of the problems is that we have not yet gamed out how this escalation works in cyber. as with any conflict when you

are inflicting let's say violence in this sense, a different kind of violence, you always have to have some thought about where is it going? where are we two or three moves down the chessboard. this is a frontier for us. that combined with a lack of push from the president, i think leaves us floating in the water here and quite vulnerable to what the russians will attempt to do as lisa so persuasively says they will continue to do. >> and andrew, i want to get to what russia is doing around the world. you did a piece on russia's involvement in other elections as well. john, but if we can stick on this topic for one minute. i was listening to general michael hayden earlier this week, the former director of the cia. he took the blame from the intelligence side saying, we

dropped the ball in the sense that our intelligence community was focused on counterterrorism, post 9/11, al qaeda and he should of picked up on the warning signs even when russia invaded georgia. he gave an example of getting a phone call from stephen hadley asking about that. the national security adviser at the time. michael hayden said, give me our georgia guys. he didn't have any idea who they were. they were good guys but he had no idea who the people were. in hindsight, we should have picked up, our intelligence community should have picked up on what putin was thinking and doing as early as a decade or so ago. how important, first of all, do you agree with him? and how important would that be? -- was that missed opportunity as far as playing catch-up?

andrew: i have to agree with the general who is a good friend of mine. at least half a great -- agree in the sense that clearly, i don't think anyone in our national a security established on this coming. that said, people were quite aware there had been a serious cyber operation in georgia. people were aware of the doctrine and were talking in the intelligence world about the danger of hybrid warfare. i find a phenomenon here, i don't know whether mike hayden would agree, a phenomenon i noticed is that even though the intelligence community may be talking about something, and writing about it and testifying on it, people don't become seized with the threat until there is a very crystallized demonstration of that threat. this was true on terrorism. in the months before the years before 9/11, the committees and

congress only held one hearing on counterterrorism. it is at the moments where people see clearly, that could have been the georgia event. had we tried to imagine where that could go and linked it to the doctrine. i have to agree with him. in other words, we could have sounded the alarm forcibly. i'm not sure people would have mobilized in response to the threat without the demonstration we have had. >> andrew, going back to your piece about russia's involvement in mexico and not just mexico, latin america, we have other elections coming up this year. you break down russia's involvement, but focus specifically on mexico. while we have had administration

figures allude to it and talk about the significance of what russia is doing, why are we not hearing more about it? andrew: it is one of those ironies where you have a whispering campaign that has seemed to initiate with the trump white house. with had secretary tillerson starting to drop these hints that we are seeing the beginnings or initial signs of a campaign of fake news in the run-up to the mexican presidential election. there is a political environment in mexico, as a result of the failures in the fight against corruption, dealing with the drug war, and all of the anger brewing toward the united states and the trump era. it is a very dynamic political environment. there is a populist leader who speaks in a traditional, fiery praise for mexicans. that is the person known as an

-- amlow. the former populist mayor of mexico city. we see on social media and outreach, efforts by russian government to embrace this. whether that tips political environment in one direction or another is very unclear. on social media, mexicans are increasingly active, and we're seeing a disproportionate number of the discussion coming from abroad. upwards of about 30% from the last month of activities in the social media discussion is coming from abroad. of that 30%, 80% of the traffic that is coming from russia, that is odd. >> you see similarities to our buildup in our election here. rt has a heavy presence in mexico as well. what about russia's role in venezuela? and russia's role in the middle east. i talk about venezuela but i want to get to syria and some of

the news you where able to break as well. andrew: the situation in venezuela is a terrible human tragedy. we are seeing a country that is imploding. at various stages, there was this embrace, this bromance between him and hugo chavez. -- vladimir putin and hugo chavez. they were buying expensive and significant weapons systems from russia. when the venezuelans had trouble to paying for those, it switched to a relationship focused on energy. we had one man basically launched a pet project to embrace the government of venezuela and to expand the -- russia's commercial activity there. in recent years, as the government has gone through the political crisis and economic crisis, the russians have become a key source of balance with financing, food, and the

government is in a desperate battle for survival. the russians are helping them keep afloat. where this is interesting is when donald trump came into office, he is talking about a military option to throw the maduro government and oppose -- impose sanctions. they now say, you have to talk about that with us and have inserted themselves. that follows what we see in syria, libya, where basically russia is not fixing problems or own venezuela or own the reconstruction of syria, but it is basically saying we are at , the table and the united states cannot boss other countries around anymore. that goes back decades in terms of what russia has been striving for. they wanted to create what they call a world where the united states no longer sits at the top of the global pyramid. they want voice in how the world 's key decisions are made. that is the world we have. >> you talk about syria.

there had been concern from day one about a potential proxy war from the u.s. your piece that we talked about earlier, about his role in the russian forces in syria, he talk -- can you talk about the significance of that when it comes to u.s. russia relations? lisa: first of all, let me disagree with you about russian role in syria. this is my incentives is -- i -- this is just my guess is, i don't have facts, i just have a few facts about the role in the oil industry and recovery of the country. we reported recently that just before the recent bombing of the private army, they signed the roadmap for restoring the oil sector. participation in this administration. i think russia has cleared russian companies, maybe state owned companies have a clear

intention to participate in the syrian restoration. reconstruction after abusive syria, the part controlled by assad. it could be, again, i don't have facts, but i think it is plausible and possible that they will apply the same strategy as in chechnya, using certain resources to be able to rebuild the infrastructure there. this is a way how to gain something, from this operation. i was surprised, it is kind of a joke that you didn't mention the argentinian story with the cocaine. [laughter] >> the so many jewels to discuss here. two want to give us a brief account? lisa: it is about 400 kilograms of cocaine that somehow ended up

in the russian embassy. that was reported from the ambassador -- russian ambassador in argentina. that supposedly came at the -- with the airplane that belongs to a state air company that organizes flights for senior officials in russia. that is an interesting story that is developing. we still don't know. >> it says a lot that that is the last story we are talking about. i want to spend the last few minutes opening it up to questions. before we do that, lisa, i want to ask you about what life is like as a journalist in russia. it is one of the most dangerous jobs in the country. you're now spending the majority of your time in the u.s.. we spend a lot of time talking about journalists in the u.s., we are fortunate at the end of

the day to be able to have our civil liberties in america. it is not the same in russia. talk about the in's and out's of covering vladimir putin's kremlin. >> the paradox of being a journalist in russia is finally you are able to work in the united states. that is a joke. [laughter] sarcastic. but a few explanatory words about my story. i'm currently at uc berkeley in journalism school, but i found -- founded a news organization which is a website where we have a team in russia working in moscow. we have a little bureau that investigates and produces news mixed with our own scoops. our focus is following the

-- we have english language sources by friday and we translate some of our stories, the most significant ones in english so we can put it on our website. i think, again, talking about trolls, in some ways, the dangers are highly exaggerated. free journalists are still able to work in russia freely. the only thing is that, what defines it as a percentage of risk. anytime you work and developing -- in emerging companies -- countries, developing worlds, you have a certain amount of risk. working in russia, being a journalist in 2005, working as a business journalist, i used to -- it was very low risk. let's say was less than 5%.

now the risk is increasing because the government puts more attention on independent journalists. there are very few of us, fewer than we had before but, still, there are some people, if you are on state owned radio stations in moscow, and those people speak very openly about problems that we have, let's say, journalists have. journalists have the opposition tvder who comes from state and promotes the liberal balance. it is a regime for journalists as well. at some point, you face threats and harassment and any type of harassment. that is a risk that comes with this profession nowadays in

russia. >> that says a lot that these independent journalists are primarily based outside of russia. some of the bigger no names including you. thank you for everything that you do in dissecting what happens in russia as a russian yourself. i want to thank you both for helping us guide us through the next chapter in our relations with russia. we have 10 minutes left. we will take one here. >> [indiscernible] -- from latvia. latvia is the country with the biggest proportion of russians. give howce would you to deal with the local russian population? whether to stay confrontational or to take into consideration concerns of russian speaking population like closing down russian language schools and language issues. what advice would you give to elected government?

thank you. >> who wants to take that, and are -- andrew? andrew: this is a situation in which a lot of people spend a lot of time looking at. i think they are try to manage competing situations, making sure there are people that are prosperous, feel connection to europe, and feel the embrace of the united states and our nato allies which have guaranteed their security and the nato charter. for me, the challenge will be resisting the temptation to overreact and provocation. there were instances in the last couple of years where groups inside latvia tried to stir up trouble. it is a balancing act of the government to make sure it is firm and does not invite the kind of trouble we have seen in other parts of the former soviet union. the situation in the baltics is probably by comparison more

manageable than a place like ukraine that has a russian war going on. in terms of keeping ukraine dysfunctional. through --lomacy, are there things western governments can do to make the situation more stable? there is a target rich environment along russia's periphery. much of the focus has to be on exposing the russian toolkit and providing support diplomatically, politically, to countries in the neighborhood without overextending and sticking our hand in the propeller. that is a really constant and challenging issue. the administration is in a difficult spot given the rhetoric president trump used on the campaign trail where he disparaged nato. we've seen senior members of his

team try to reestablish credibility around u.s. defense commitment. we hope their voice continues to be what is persuasive at the end of the day. we are only the beginning of this drama with a more audacious risk-taking russia. these are not issues that will go away by any stretch. >> you in the second row. >> mary louise kelly, npr. i'm headed to russia next week to cover the election, which is a challenging assignment because it is difficult to drum up excitement in the newsroom about an election in which there is zero suspense for the outcome. my mind turns to another six years of vladimir putin. what are you watching for internally for russians living through another six years and externally as russia exerts power on the world stage?

john: i was thinking about this earlier when we were discussing things. looking six years ahead, it isn't that hard to figure out actually. what his basic emphasis will be. i think he has -- and we were also talking backstage about whether we have a danger of overestimating putin and seeing him as more than 10 feet tall. that is always a danger, but really he is rather good at strategy. it is not that hard to be good at strategy when you have absolute power. when we put together a strategy document in our country, it is weeks and weeks of bureaucratic discussion and then everyone is exhausted before you implement the strategy. were told during a visit to moscow, basically people get together once a week with putin and decide what to do.

you're looking ahead to the next six years, i would say his goals are to be first, further consolidate his power at home, second, to increase his strength in the neighborhood, the areas of the former soviet union. third, to weaken western institutions, primarily nato and the eu. and fourth, to increase russia's role in the world and and or has -- andrew has talked about that. whether it is latin america, africa, the netherlands. i would take those three are for ideas and just wait for him to fill them in or think about how he might fill them in. that is how i would see the next two years unfolding. -- few years unfolding. lisa: as a journalist, i feel more comfortable to ask questions then answer questions.

let me figure this out in the shape or form of a question. the things i would follow for the next six years, first, will -- will -- be blocked in russia? youtube is now concentrating about 50 million users with some video blogs having about 5 million subscribers for it. that means russia has, in some way, a free speech on youtube using western media organizations. that is the first thing i would look at. the second thing i would look at is, will the kremlin follow the chinese example of changing the power, and the system of reelection.

the third thing that is extremely important for all russian population, russian people, that is a key factor of success of my previous company. russian people follow the rate. rate. dollar ruble look at the predictions. that give you sudden thoughts about russian economy predictability. as i remember, today, the most recent prediction was about 60 rubles for dollars. that is about the current situation. it says something about economy, economy can be on the same, approximately, the same level. it can be changed, but we will see. >> what is the likelihood we would be that she would be inspired over that? lisa: it is very likely.

>> he saw what president xi did and -- >> yeah. >> let's go back. the gentleman on the right. yes, right to there. you. yes. >> thank you very much. i'm james from gilead sciences. i want to ask about soft power and maybe where this falls on the continuum. in the soviet union, we had doctors from cuba and they did a lot of good work in the smallpox eradication. as russia gets back on the global stage, is there a soft power component to this, particularly interested in global health if that is relevant. andrew: there are two aspects that i think are relevant. russia did not invent donald trump. there's a populist term unleased in western societies and they are pushing on every available door to amplify and expand that.

italy is having expenses this -- elections this weekend. there are reports, i've seen fragments about the ways russia amplifying the anti-immigrant sentiment and playing on the stirring of nationalism which will make a complicated political environment much more complicated. is real. of soft power that's what we are seeing on a global scale. in pop-culture, russia excels right now in its neighborhood, the use of video, movies, tv to sell narratives to russia's neighbors is very potent. you see this in eastern ukraine. we are dealing with a russia that has gotten a at spinning perceptions around the world in ways that are favorable. costr as things that money, russia is not carrying a giant checkbook.

most of the money is going for things that vladimir putin talked about today like like expensive weapon systems. the available resources to do things like deliver things in a crisis situation, venezuela remain circumscribed. when they do stuff, even small, it is the collection of those things that amplifies that russia is back and russia matters. they have played that fantastic ways in syria which is by all measures a modest footprint on -- for their military operation has had a dramatic impact on the country steering the civil war. also, showing russia can mount a meaningful expeditionary force. >> i think we have time for one more. let's go to the woman on the left. yes, you. >> we have not gamed out how the warfare escalates in cyberspace.

is that you, andrew said that? yes. can you not hear me? >> yes. >> my question is, do we have a skill set to accomplish that and, if so, how are they deployed? andrew: everyone who works on cyber in the u.s. government says we don't have enough people working on that, nor do we have enough people who are technically qualified to do it. we have a lot of good people, but we don't have bot farms to give you an example. say, we are at the point of needing to acquire those skills. in terms of what i said earlier, about understanding and escalate -- escalahylus torry

tory latter in something like cyber, my real analogy there is looking act of the nuclear era. the only way we came to understand that, was through arms control discussions, and through a lot of work on strategy and through concentration on capabilities of those weapons and so forth. yet, this world is more complicated, the cyber world because we are not talking about just a world in which we are dealing with nationstates, we are also dealing with nonstate actors, as senator warner pointed out. my answer to your question would be, on a scale from one to 10, if 10 is perfect preparation and resources, we are at about a six in terms of strategy for the problem. because i know, during my time in government, people were working on strategy. it has moved along somewhat, but we are not at the point where we

have a highly confident understanding of how this all >> of course the u.s. and russia do not have a monopoly on cyber tactics. >> exactly. we have built a record over many years in arms control with nuclear weapons. this is a weapon that is not nuclear. certainly nuclear in terms of its capacity to influence things, change things, and inflict pain on populations, short of physical pain. -- iimagine, for example, referred earlier to the need for something that crystallizes a problem. you would think that the interference in our election does that. i am not sure that is the cyber pearl harbor or cyber 9/11.

we are sensitive to the here in washington, in the beltway. this is all that we talk about. i talk -- i go out and talk to people around the country. people are not as focused on this as they are in washington. there is not a consensus, to my knowledge come about the seriousness of the problem -- knowledge, about the seriousness of the problem. >> how much of that rides with presidentent and the -- administration to act on? if fdr had not responded the way he did to pearl harbor -- >> i am reading fdr's biography. one of the striking things was particularly930's, very1935 on, fdr was focused on and where that

trouble was coming -- and aware that trouble was coming from the -- for the united states. he had a very deliberate strategy of moving the united states to an understanding of that come against the backdrop of some very serious opposition that had broad public support. he managed to get us there, eventually, but it did take pearl harbor to move everyone over to that side of the spectrum. so, the long wait to answer your question, but i think until a president speaks to the country in a convincing way about the nature and seriousness of this problem, and what we need to do about it, will not take that seriously. then you have to ask the of whether this particular president has the moral standing and persuasive power to actually do that, if he

decided to do it. so houston, we have a problem. [laughter] >> i hate to say that we are going to and on that note, but i on thatthank -- end note, but i want to thank my panel. andave learned a lot hopefully this conversation will continue. [laughter] -- [applause] thank you. [indiscernible] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2017]

[captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> c-span's washington journal, live everyday with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up up friday morning, in light of the recent school shooting in florida, a number of experts will weigh in on gun control legislation. join the conversation all morning with your phone calls, emails, facebook comments, and tweets. be sure to watch live at 7:00 eastern friday morning. join the discussion. >> limit friday on the c-span networks at noon eastern, the funeral for billy graham at his home in north carolina. on c-span2 at 9:00 am eastern, a forum on u.s. and israel relations and foreign policy.

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