talking about immigration. the backlash against immigration, and the fate of western democracy. watch our live coverage of the 10th annual tucson the stubble two's book c-span tv. trumpt, look at the administration's use of sanctions. react to this week's announcement of a potential meeting between president trump and north korean leader kim jong-il and. from the atlantic council, this is one hour and 15 minutes. good morning everybody. welcome all. real people and virtual people and whoever else may be listening in. if you are following the conversation on twitter, please use #shapingsanctions.

as last night's announcement on dprk suggests, sanctions are both a hot foreign-policy tool, to top the news, central issues like russia, iran, dprk. sanctions are much used, much talked about, and often misunderstood. given the importance of sanctions, symbolic and substantive, the atlantic council has established a new sanctions program which aims to bring together key stakeholders from the administration, congress, policy communities, it and businesses to improve the sanctions tool. i would like to thank the , press water cooper,

david mentzer, and some of our partners in the sanctions program. many thanks. i would also like to thank georgetown university's institute of economic law which has been a partner for this event. council sanctions team includes some of the best in the business. professionals with hands-on experience in designing actions programs. andrans of treasury, state, regional experts. all part of the team here which aims to provide the best analysis on sanctions available. i have been working with the global business program at the atlantic council so we're pleased to launch today's event and this program. we have two panels today, focused on policy perspectives

from current and former practitioners including some on our team. novak colleague and a friend in policy. there are others on our team in ,his panel, michael greenwalt and the other panel will include is this people -- will include business people. finally, under secretary of the treasury the administration willr person on sanctions deliver what i suspect will be a serious they spent of this administration approached his actions. i look forward to an in-depth, likely, and maybe more than likely discussion. let's get started. i was like the first panel to come to the stage.

>> good morning everyone. my name is andrew keller. it is a true privilege to have the opportunity to moderate this panel. there are five exceptional individuals who i am proud to call former colleagues. say i can think of a better time for this panel, which is entitled best actresses, past errors, and the

future of sanctions. given the incredible change that we've seen over the last year, including as a result of the change in administrations and clearly as a result of congressional action. i have given these panelists the very small task of walking through how these changes will impact the use of sanctions as a foreign-policy and national security tool and what those changes will mean for the private sector and for our allies going forward. of course, they have to do all of this within an hour. easy task. i would like to introduce each of our panelists. i would ask them to give a brief opening statement. i will start with our government

colleagues. sitting immediately to my left, we have andrea. she is currently the deputy ofac.or at oh fax -- at she is held almost every critical position at the agency. she previously served contemporaneously as the acting deputy director of the agency and the associate director for compliance and enforcement from 2014 to 2017. she was also assistant director of licensing from 2010 to 2014. prior to that, she served as a senior sanctions of riser for policy and implementation. was a trial she attorney and the civil division at the department of justice.

including, as a senior member of the justice department's terrorism designation team. andrea, thank you for joining us. david tessler. he is the deputy director of policy planning at the state department. you can tell how important and valued his work is because there has been a decades long interagency struggle between state and treasury from where he is going to work. thatarted his career in times of the late 90's as a foreign service officer. he was stationed in baghdad, the u.s. missions to the nations, and health various visions in washington, d.c.. he spentt to that, several years at the treasury department as a senior advisory to the director and following

that has the senior adviser to the undersecretary for terrorism finance. , quite you are here as well. fellow hereesident at the atlantic council. immediately prior to that, he was serving as the senior advisor to the director of ofac. he is a recognized expert on sanctions. i will just note that prior to his time at treasury, he also served as an analyst in treasuries -- prior to his time at ofac he served in the treasury office and international affairs.

he also served at the cia. freed needs no introduction. i will simply say that prior to joining the atlantic council, in his current capacity he served in the foreign service for 40 years. he played a key role in designing and implementing american policy in europe. asserved as an assistant -- an assistant to the president and senior director for presidents clinton and bush. he was the ambassador to poland and he also was the assistant secretary for european affairs from 2005 two 2009 at the state department. least, we have elizabeth rosenberg. she is a senior fellow at the senior -- at the center for new

american security. she is the director of the energy economics and security program there. publishes, speaks regularly, and is a recognized expert on the intersection of energy, sanctions, and economic statecraft. significant experience at senior levels of the treasury department where she served as senior advisor for four years for the assistant secretary for terrorist dancing and financial crimes. also as the senior adviser to the undersecretary for terrorism finance. government,ning the at argus correspondent media in washington. stopl stop what -- i will talking now. unless andrea to kick things off. andrea, you can speak from the podium or stay in your chair.

>> i will speak from the podium. thank you so much, andrew. thank you to everyone. to kick offsure today's exciting program and to be on the stage with so many runs and former colleagues. great ande so many familiar faces in the audience. i think we all know, because we , thatactice in this area sanctions can be extremely powerful tools especially when used strategically and with precision. they restrict the ability to interface with the international financial system. to protecting the u.s. financial system from abuse, sanctions are intended to increase treasure with the goals of changing behavior.

sanctions can be structured in scope to achieve those objectives and modulate that pressure. for example, we can limit access to certain types of financing or prohibit certain transactions. without a full freezing of all transactions. support of a in clearly defined objective, and utilized in conjunction with other national security tools, including diplomacy, sanctions can be key to achieving our foreign-policy goals. additionally, domestic sanctions can be even more effective when paired with multilateral action. whether that is through the european union or the united nations to help increase pressure and change behavior. we always worked to carefully evaluate how are sanctions can be limited by the private sector. we seek as much is possible to provide clear guidance and respond to questions through

guidance and, toning up a variety of ways approach the agency for guidance. we stand ready to listen to your concerns, to your issues as we continue to adapt and structure sanctions to make them the most effective, understandable, and implement a full tool that we can achieve to serve the important national security aims they are designed to a published. sanctions are not the solution to every foreign-policy issue. they can have to, a significant impact. specifically, we have focused so much of our recent efforts dedicated to the threat of the north korean regime. we have restricted their ability to move money through the

international financial system. when aggressively ramped up our actions, and by targeting certain schemes, we've seen the north korean regime growth more isolated and now indicate they are ready to come to the table. otherl continue to target actors that threaten our national security. but only with respect to north korea, but also threats like iran, russia, and venezuela. i thinkto the future, we can all agree here in this room that you will continue to see sanctions as a primary tool of foreign-policy. to beill continue deployed in ever more targeted, specific, and impactful ways. i would like to turn it over to my colleague and say that i look forward to the discussion today.

david:. i will speak from the chair because i was told that's what i should do. i wanted to use these five minutes to lay out a few principles for the effective use of sanctions. saidla much of what andrea . we think alike. the first principle, this seems that sanctions are a tool of foreign-policy. is anason why this important principle, although it may seem obvious, with the liberation of the use of sanctions come i think it is important to remember that. it is designed to advance specific foreign-policy goals and defend our national security. when looking at a foreign-policy set of issues, it is important

to think holistically about where we want to go, what the strategic arc that will get us to the states and how sanctions as a tool in the foreign-policy toolbox fit into that. that is principle one. physical number two is, if you will you sanctions understand the target, how the target things and designed the sanction in a targeted and creative way to effect the change you want. .wo examples andrew mentioned one. north korea. over the last year the administration has focused quite a bit of energy and time into energy sanctions, looking at coal, oil refined petroleum because of an analysis and assessment of how energy sanctions would actually impact the target and the calculus,

here the target is kim jong-un in venezuela, the creative use of sanctions to target them and to impact behavior change. to look at sanctions and use them creatively and in a targeted way. that is principle number two. hezbollah number three, building coalitions of allies and partners to help leverage the united states power in sanctions and to be a force multiplier. you've seen over the past year this administration highlight the importance of coalition and allies across the board. our" nations in only ukrainenot and crimea, but the broad spectrum of russia's malign

activity. or working with all allies to combat iran and destabilizing activities. or working with asian partners toe japan and south korea target north korea and to help augment our maximum pressure campaign. you see that with this administration across the board here it that is where i spend a lot of my time. and is the third principle looking at how to effectively implement sanctions programs. >> as the other panelists have said, it is great to be here. are former colleagues and friends. thank you for being here. i will focus my remarks from the atlantic council perspective on the mechanics of sanctions. i let dan talk about the policy

-- and i say let him, he is much more qualified than i. it makes sense. from a mechanical standpoint, one of the hallmarks of this administration is that you can really see the work of the professionals behind the actions that have happened. this is especially true -- you have cut through the noise in the media. this administration, for better or worse has a much louder media presence in a much more chaotic media presence them the first one. it is kind of the same stuff we were doing when i was in government. and the obama administration and before, there is a technical aspect and i will highlight the north korea action from two weeks ago. was billed as the biggest action ever on north korea, which is true if you go by numbers, but from a sleeping standpoint, probably not exactly

accurate. that doesn't matter. it was a significant action. one of the things it showed is that it is the action that drives a knife deeper into someone's side. you had an action going after the shipping networks the north uses. there has been a big focus on shipping because that is what facilitates the energy to karen. that drives their nuclear program. it was a technical and competent action. the administration is to be applauded for that. one of the things that i have noticed, more from the treasury but because i'm familiar, the senior officials are letting the professionals people like david and andrea, they have given them the running room to do the job and do it right. that is encouraging. said, i think there are

some cracks that have shown a little bit in the implementation and, to be frank i don't talk it -- i a lack of expertise think they are resource related. sanctions are a tool that everybody turns to now. every time there's a crisis, congress is what will we impose sanctions on? we return to this tool more often than we should. there is not been a corresponding investment in these tools. , i think this is a -- youe related issue are going through a chaotic process and certain things slip through the cracks, especially if you don't have the amount of people you need. with the venezuela eeo that came thatthere was a provision targeted venezuelan government owns. the issue with the

implementation is that it targeted all venezuelan bonds, but then at the same time, they had you issue a license if it exempt in everything but one bond. and thenndex target this one is everything you are letting go. that cost a lot of reaction, especially in the financial industry where people were scrambling to figure out, do i hold bonds. that didn't need to happen. those resources in the government that were answering these questions from financial industry and the financial industry itself could have been better used. it is critical that the administration and congress get together and figure out a well to fund this appropriately. is a 50% budget increase. is the there

administration taking a solid first step in putting on a significant increase in the budget proposal. congress is taking this seriously as well. it is similar to an investment congress made a number of years ago to revolutionize the i.t. infrastructure and the background they rest enforcement on. a similar effort is needed here to make this work as well as we needed to work to confront these freeseas. -- these crises. there are aard, couple things i would like to touch on. the first is, i think we can expect to see the same level of actions the administration will take. especially where there is a consistent policy message and a real focus with the united states and our allies. , and i willhere is

say russia -- a cap on how far the professionalism will extend. i do think this administration has issues with russia -- i don't think we need to get into them much, but what it means is that at some point that professional running room will run into a cap. we need to bear that in mind. finally, i think a lot of us in this room, certainly a lot of us of the atlantic council tend to view foreign policy and national security at the highest level in an analytic rubric focused on what we all learned in school and practiced a long time. international relations is about relations. these long-standing relationships and it is fine from an analytic perspective. if you are trying to prognosticate the top level political issues, i think we

need to start thinking about these things from a predictive standpoint in a transactional manner. that is the hallmark of the president. certainly the key decision-makers who surround him at the most senior levels of the government. i have given up trying to predict these things because i have had trouble myself. we need to start thinking as we predict, what a transactional model looks like your and what that means. you will not always know the decisions, butse it is the correct way to evaluate what these high-level things will come down to. including north korea negotiations that will be starting soon. by request of ambassador freed, you are. >> giving the last word to investor free. with a pleasure to be here you all. thank you all for coming.

i thought i would offer, so as not to be redundant, i thought i would offer if you comments on congress and its role. maybe this is the political or sandbox part of that conversation. in foreign people policy income plans were focus on the administration. i expect that is a real focus for many of you here today. obviously, they are the implementer and enforcer and to the extent there is a component, it is up to the administration and its diplomatic initiative to engage with counterparts and built coalitions and joint actions that can come forward and that have the greatest effect and leverage when they are so joined internationally. also, the administration has been very creative and innovative in the way that it

has and limited these sanctions, i'm thinking of the ssi list and the creation of that. some new ways to go after highlighters of human rights irma for example. thinking of some of the initiatives to try to more closely pair export control measures with law enforcement action with sanctions, could amplify the policy effect. that has attracted a lot of attention and the administrative action catches a lot of news coverage. congress,ss, back to they are very significant in this debate. some of you are keen on that point. i want to make three quick points about the role of congress on sanctions. specifically, they are a very significant originator and innovator in disruptor when it

comes to sanctions. i will tell you what i mean by that. originator, for those of you concerned with the specific authorities and how they organize the way in which the sanctions are implemented, of course you know congress is the originator. they created the backbone, the architecture on which all of these initiatives mentioned so far rest. that means they have the authority and ability to change it and take it away. i don't think we focus on that so often. it is certainly politically difficult for them to do it all of a sudden without quite a lot of coalition building and advanced work. but they've had a couple of cases which have reminded people of that ultimate congressional authority. not to forget, their role as an originator and legit issues -- brian mentioned how significant

they are in giving resources to the execution and enforcement of sanctions. ort is an enabler or disable of this activity we are talking about. as the role of congress as an innovator, i would argue they are at least as important as the administration. toinnovating new approaches sanctions and creating some of the intellectual capital which may not ultimately take the form of the measures implemented, or the enforcement, but in expanding the conversation sometimes, that is scary. innovation is both substantive and strategic. think about what they did in putting together some of the iraq measures from 2012, such as the energy framework for restrictions on iran's export of

petroleum including compelling the revenues of allowed to toll am to be held in accounts of the purchasing country. that is interesting and collaborative creative work they have done. on strategy, you're all familiar with the good cop that cap dynamic that is so characterized much of the sanctions over the last 20 years up and down. the signaling work they do. i think it is appropriate to consider some of the sanctions asls introduced in congress bark and-- as more more fury than they wind up. they are expressions that may be more emotional and may be effective as a signaling tool, much more so than the effort to eventually legislate and create

the authority that will guide what the administration does. we have seen that be incredibly effective. if you are watching the precursor to caps on. 2016. it was much more aggressive than where we wound up. the interact now, i think we should consider also significantly messaging in its character. last come on the issue of covers being a disruptor. this is a way to characterize what they have done to push the envelope on policy and even pushing aside administration priorities. this is not specific to the current administration or party. we saw this in the last administration very sharply. think about congress's major

recent push to take a stronger role in foreign policy, to have greater oversight. trying to constrain president obama's actions in regard to the iran deal. i will close by saying we are still in that moment, looking forward to the may waiver deadline connected to the jcp oa nuclear deal. congressdent has asked -- maybe using ultimatum is a better word. to take actions on issues he finds concerning. congress has the opportunity to be a disruptor and to change the policy course the president has set out. noth is to say he will carry out the sanctions until he is set aside i congress with

policy action in this domain. i will stop there. waiver byse the himself is the way of congress maintaining control. waiver created the deadline and are the only body that can change them. >> thank you, liz. freed.t not least, mr. >> four points. you have examples of the deep professional competence that this administration can draw on in designing and implementing sanctions policy. they know what they're doing and at the treasury especially, andrew represents a deeply competent skilled bureaucracy. having had nothing to do with the building of that bureaucracy, this is not self-serving arid it is of tremendous comfort to know that

there are people who can actually do their job and do what they think they are going to. this is a tool which cannot be taken for granted and needs to be cherished. second point, the competent people in the administration need the resources to work with. brian mentioned funding. that is true. i think treasury as well to fulfill its sanctions role it needs more people and more money. -- fulle department disclosure, the office at the job waspartment my old abolished. closestssler is the think the state department has to the sanctions coordinator. he is a good guy. i know he sitting here. he is a good guy. there is nothing wrong with him. but, he is only one guy.

he is one guy. i had a staff. gotas got himself and he's a day job. he is deputy director of policy planning. is goingdministration to you sanctions, it should remember that sanctions work legal analytic and andcy skills of ofac treasury offices are combined with the diplomatic skills of the department of state. that is a big deal. that needs to be fixed. , david and andrea mentioned this. effective sanctions policy is not a little unilateral action. they said it. but the administration is going to have to mean it. when we go to the europeans or the japanese about russia sanctions, we are asking

governments to tell their businesses to take major hits. we have to decide how much political capital to invest in sanctions policy like tariffs. where the tracks are independent. the tracks have to be integrated, and if we're going to be successful in the implementation of sanctions, we need to do it in tandem with our allies or it's not going to work. then, it becomes exercises in feel-good, which has its uses inside washington. i don't care. feel good is not interesting. results are interesting. you need allies. a fourth point. sections are not a policy.

that -- sanctions are not a policy. they are a tool to advance policy. you'd better know what your policy is. it better be clear, including to your allies. big sanctionsree programs in this administration, kuwait, there are questions about the policy. notran, are we or are we going to use sanctions within the framework of the jcpoa? if not, what is the alternative? sanctions cannot make iran into a much better country. they can and have gotten a run to sign the -- gotten iran to sign the jcpoa and adhere to it.

nextext question -- a question on north korea. sanctions are designed to drive north korea to negotiating. maybe that has been achieved, in which case all power to the administration. there's nothing wrong with playing a high-stakes game. sometimes, you can't do it the way the sort -- the foreign service bureaucracy would prefer you to, which is step-by-step. i'm not knocking the but, the northt, koreans have been down this road before. they've been doing it and switch for 20 years. ask wendy sherman, madeleine albright, anyone who worked in the administration about what it's like when the ruling dynasty gives its word. to make this work, we will need a durable framework. everybody knows what our

strategic, what our strategic choices are and what we are looking for. now, i hope we are there. i'm not going to trash the announcement last night. it might lead to something, but we've been back and forth on whether we would talk to the north koreans et al.. sanctions cannot be turned -- to the north koreans at all. sanctions cannot be turned on and off. it's a question mark. on russia, i think the gap between fictional comp -- professional complements and the implementation of sanctions and questions about the policy is clear. the russia sanctions have been implemented by the trump administration over the past year in a credible fashion. if you follow the details of treasury sections come up -- sanctions, maintenance,

tinkering with russia sanctions, .hey've been good actually pretty clever. the administration prepares section 241 of the so-called kremlin report by all accounts with a high degree of skill, professionalism, analytic judgment. there's a classified report. i haven't seen it. the people who have seen it agreed it is an exemplary job. in the rollouts, the administration first tried to hide the good work it had done, then issued a non-credible public list, then retreated from that and said it was going to draw on the classified sanctions . now, this would be a good thing. but could end well, sanctions policy has to be

implemented -- integrated into the main policy. heat generatedve by friction that does no good. say all of these major sanctions issues, russia, iran, dprk, could be effective. the elements for effective policy is there, but the policy framework needs to be clear, understood. there's nothing wrong with tactical unpredictability. that can be useful. operational unreliability is seldom useful. i hope the administration finds a way to use the assets of tactical unpredictability without falling into the trap of operational unreliability. finally, transparency with congress and the business

community is critical. the way you stay, and this is laura's point but i am making a crude summary because that's what i do. for congress, the way to keep them from going off into crazy-land is to stay ahead of them. you know, be thinking of objections and be able to answer it. you will be pleased by the result. you can't do that unless you have the resources and policy and strategy and you've got the allies lined up. helper,ngress can be a not a disruptor, right? umm, i hope some of the questions i've laid out will be peopled by one of the representing the deep confidence available to this administration. it's not just career people.

it's political appointees also who are skilled, smart, strategic thinkers. i hope to get some of these questions answered today, and have more questions sides. thank you. forhanks to all of you extremely thoughtful and interesting remarks that give fodder for our conversation. accused ofe shamelessly chasing the headline, but i'm going to shamelessly chase the headlines. i think dan mentioned president trump may be meeting with kim .ong-un in the next few months everybody on this stage as you heard seems to agree that sanctions are a tool to incentivize behavior change, a tool to achieve, help achieve foreign policy and national security goals. i'm wondering, umm, if we can

think of ahh, the north korean's willingness to talk as at least the beginning of a sanctions success story. i think this administration has clearly taken a very strong and aggressive position, for sanctions umm against -- four sanctions,, umm, against north korea. we saw a shift from nonproliferation sanctions to broader-based sanctions that targeted most if not all of north korea's revenue sources. dan, you've already alluded to this. maybe i will ask our other colleagues to start off with a. whether this can be thought of of -- thought of as the beginning of a success story, and b. how and whether sanctions can truly, economic sanctions,

a regimepected with that has so long seemed to not have any interest with being part of the international legitimate any commercial activity. similarly, has the chairman any interest in being responsive to its citizens and their needs? if i have any volunteers to kick that off, i -- >> i would say it's too early to sit -- to tell if it's been a success. the shift from strategic patience to a new policy of maximum pressure is having an effect. that's what you've been, you know, you can tell from, you know, ahh, until now. i think it's important to underline the maximum -- the maximum pressure will continue until the north koreans actually .atch these words

we will not let up at all. the campaign is going to continue. the announcement yesterday is a sign that it is starting to work, having an effect. that is through a lot of hard work, coalition building, working with the chinese. you mentioned, questioned whether or not a regime that clearly doesn't care about its people could be impacted by sanctions. they care about their survival. when you target the economic threatenat can umm, its survival like energy for example, and you work to really first adopted a very strong u.s. security council resolution and then work with allies and partners and china to actually robustly implement those strong sanctions, resolutions. then, you start to see we are pushing on the levers that

matter to the regime. i can only really agree with everything david just said. we have shifted our resources. we heard from secretary men daca during her keynote read we have many urgent -- secretary mandelker. we have adapted to north korea. we are building the right notes of pressure, and the right ways to affect the regime. that will continue. welcome, butnt is it's too early to say. the maximum pressure campaign is not going to let up yet. umm, i agree that the ministration deserves credit for ramping up the pressure. i think that the obama policies

strategic patience went on with 7.5 years without serious result. in the last six months about of the obama administration, they decided "hey, this is not working. oh my god, north korea's developing strategic nuclear capabilities." some of us got the running room to do more. the credit for implementing that, making it happen as the u.n. bilaterally goes to this, they ran with it, the strategic assumption of a shift to maximum pressure. i think it's the correct one. i think the question will come out "what will we do when that moment arrives, when the north korean regime is not negotiating?" what will we do them? that's -- then? that's a better problem to have fan where we were. -- van where we were -- than

where we were. one of the cliches of north korea, the regime is so determined for strategic nuclear weapons, so ruthless and ambitious that no pressure will work. so, give it up. i can't tell you how many north korea experts kept telling me " give it up." umm, yeah. kim jong-un will never give up nuclear, his nuclear capacity willingly. the question is, as lenin used to say, how do you sharpen the contradictions? how do you make it tougher for him? hethink that's three -- t strategic basis for maximum pressure. bilateral presence, -- presidents, that's a gift to kim .

he's going to, there will come a moment of truth. y'all know it. look, morning after this is pretty good since it's the kind of signal we were hoping for. some sign of movement. david tessler: he called us make a brief points -- >> i will just make a brief point. i think the a ministration deserves tremendous credit. the campaign has been successful. we will see whether we will -- can call this a successful diplomatic engagement, as david mentioned in his opening remarks. i think one thing that is like to come back to, one of the things stand said his everything is interrelated, right? this is not a novel point. other people have made it, but it's worth saying. what happens on may 12 with the iran-jcpoa removal, is going to be instructive for the north koreans when they try to negotiate with us.

tos administration needs remember those policies are intertwined, regardless of what may have been set on the campaign trail, or whether the jcpoa is the worst deal. the koreans, chinese, russians will be watching. i think it's going to be very important for success of negotiations with koreans, to the extent that the kim regime -- it's not in a ministration if it's a dynasty. [laughter] to the extent that the kim regime is serious about sitting down, and will stick by any commitment that we make. that's going to be something that everybody should pay attention to, but only for iran, issues in that region, but as they apply to northeast asia. >> you have already made all of my complaints. [laughter] intense -- all of my good points. [laughter] i agree with brian. context of the jcp away will be

bekness -- jcpoa will significant for north korea, as well as anyone concerned with international or multilateral cooperation. asiaber, the banquet delta , original heavy hammer for north korea attention became the model on which all of the successful iran pressure was modeled. subsequently, we know the bureaucracy supporting sanctions , and this cultivation of economic leverage is well functioning and well staffed at this point. what matters and what will be the answer to this story is how the capacity and how carefully the administration is able to deliver on a diplomatic, negotiating side. i fear there are inadequate ranks. david, don't get a cold. [laughter]

this economic pressure that has been cultivated, what must be done to advance their diplomatic work towards successful negotiations. david tessler: why don't we shift gears and talk a little bit about casa, russia in particular? i think it's fair to say between , one of the, perhaps the top priority of the -- andrew keller: i think one of -- the top priority of the russian forwardnt was to move with the uber paeans -- with the europeans. that, to a certain extent, has been thrown off balance i think in large part by caps on, which , also, theby catsa

current political dynamic -- which was thrown together by congress. also, the current political dynamic. i'll ask david and andrea to start off. if you can talk about what , engaged thee made europeans as want -- wildcats was under consideration and the implementation phase, especially importance ofolic sharing a community with the europeans over russia sanctions. similarly, the importance with the private sector. i think the original sanctions were rolled out and implemented neveray that they were analogous between united states and the united states and european union. they were sufficiently harmonious to make things somewhat easier on the private sector. perhaps, if either of you could comment on that. david tessler: all caps off get

off. i think, andrew, there was a fear last summer that catsa might impact our close coordination, transatlantic unity. i think we through hard work and a lot of energy and time have proven thatfear wrong. wrong. fear andrea and i will be leaving for europe next week. this is my fifth time there to talk about russia sanctions in september, a lot of time in europe. europeans have come here quite a bit. they, if you ask them, when we first went in september or august and started talking about the fact that we wanted to maintain and strengthen the close coordination, there was skepticism on their side. the proof is in the pudding, right? we worked closely with them through the end of october, when we issued our joint guidance.

we took in two of -- into account he was from europeans, also the private sector which may be can talked about. -- can talk about. i think through the -- maybe andrea can talk about. through the actual work, we can use catsa to strengthen cooperation. it's important to remember that catsa not only articulates the serious threats the russians oppose fees of ukraine and crimea, but catsa lays out the broad spectrum of russia's threats.undermining democratic processes, cyber corruption, human rights, etc.. it's a broader stipulation and strong one. we have shown that we are implementing it robustly and working closely with the europeans. happyk the europeans are with where we are today. andrea gacki: i'd like to echo everything david said.

working with the state department, helped engage with the european governments, also with the private sector not only in the united states but worldwide. after the passage of catsa, many questions came to us. how we might interpret certain terms. we have not only a open-door policy for questions, but also proposed answers. i know folks may have heard me say this time and again, but we welcome, we welcome proposed questions and answers. we may not agree with the answer, and will decide what the answer is at the end of the day, but that was something that we aggressively -- excuse me -- looked at in the implementation of catsa. of catsa issue management -- done a good job

working with europe to limit catsa's more questionable provisions. the draft serve -- the drafters is a mixed bag, some good, some not so good. give the administration credit. to stay ahead of congressional slammed, avoid being it's important for the ministration to show what it's going to do. i hope that what david tessler said is a hint that when treasury comes out with its next sanctions, and i'm not giving i hope iting, addresses this. you nailed it. i agree that there is considerable potential for cooperation with europe to use the sanctions tool in response to a different kind of russia present in the ukraine. their attacks on our western

political systems and use of dense information, and cyber hacking -- disinformation and cyber hacking. the french, spanish, bals, the polls, -- poles, there are -- thethat --the pol pols, they're facing that. i don't think russia has forgotten the last few days of the french election. there are tools including section 241, my personal favorite. i think, i think that the u.s. and europe have the potential to make it clear to the russians that there will becomes a quinces for further interference , and the stars may be aligned. in washington terms, it may be imperative to be seen as doing this, and it's the right policy.

so, go get them. david tessler: i'm going to go to liz. please get your -- two liz. brief.ll be this has been helpful in talking about the history of development and implementation so far. looking forward, the animating issue in the u.s. public discourse that drives attention on pressure related foreign policy is no longer the ukraine. it is and what russia is doing in syria. it's not any of that. what it is is more specifically concern about -- in the u.s. --ctions, melissa's malicious cyber activity. , andeans are concerned there's public -- little potential they will join the united states in sanctions, notwithstanding the fact there is potential to do so. the european approach has been , looking operational

specifically at what they did in the macron case. this is an area for debate and discussion. we will see what happens. this is something to watch. david tessler: there's about 30 other catsa questions. a question right up front. >> thank you. i should remind -- david tessler: i should remind all of our questioners to introduce yourself, affiliation. >> thank you for coming. reagan foundation. mentioned that the sanctions will not work without allies or their cooperation, which is true. regarding north korea, 90% of their trade is with china, and you know that. know there isdo type line going into north korea from china.

i'm talking about oil. is, what can we do about china? what should we do? how can we deal with that? without that, the sanctions may not be working, not as good as we have designed to. that's just my natural question. thank you for coming. daniel fried: umm, all give the trump administration credit for getting china to agree to do far more than they've wanted to. two years ago. ban on imports of north korea coal is not complete, but it's pretty good. it's hitting their money. call, textile, fishery exports, we hit those hard. the chinese have moved a lot,

partly because i think they believe the trump administration to gorious in its efforts even further, go after chinese companies and banks. the potential is still there, that is target the chinese more aggressively. i won't race to it. once you start doing that, you start approaching red zones of retaliation, unintended consequences. you may have to. look. i'm not ruling it out. i tend to be on the push the envelope side. right now, we have sanctions, may have brought us to this moment where there is a direct dialogue. it will either work out, my view is most likely not. we will see. we may be back to these issues. it's on the table. the administration i think has handled it well, hinting for

going to do more but not rushing to slam the chinese. i think they've done ok. >> you've gotten the slamming the chinese parts, too. you got term of her something about china, right? with respect to north korea, china is furious with what the kim regime has done to develop weapons, although launches. from and implementation standpoint of sanctions, there's u.n. sanctions that are almost unprecedented in the world. they'reo'toole: spectacularly good. i think the trump administration deserves credit for pushing those. when you come to -- come to implication -- implementation, there's a trick. people look at china as adversary. too many folks don't realize while there may be pockets of china, areas where they might be trying to undercut sanctions, china has and limitation issues

of its own. they have a demand economy, but not a regulatory environment we have in the united states. make the mistake of projecting our own confidence, folks being able to enforce u.s. financial institutions, exporters, whoever else might be involved, the confidence of our private sector in doing this, the experience we have and assuming china can do that because they are china. i think that's a false assignment -- assumption. going after the chinese, you start going after banks, you need to have those smoking guns. that's -- it's hard to draw that out, get that information. "e folks that might be saying the only way to fix this is by ."acking chinese banks you have top levels of the banks complicit.

i think you can own -- justify that as a prudent sanctions action. >> i think i saw another hand up there. if you could please mention your name. >> thank you very much. sorry but my voice, i'm battling a cold. i'm the ambassador for mozambique. i want to thank the counsel for organizing this discussion. to one point, i want to the panel to elaborate on, the multilateral framework for sanctions. sanctions will always be more effective if you have all countries buying into it, implementing them. for that, they need to understand them. inn you speak about allies terms of sanctions, it will be

very important to understand that when you are fighting something that is best for the world like the north korean regime, the nuclear proliferation, you have more friends than enemies who want to support you in that cause. elaboration of the multilateral framework, u.n., and beyond. >> ambassador, thank you. that's an excellent question. david? david tessler: we could not agree more. in this of ministration, we have focused quite a bit not only on the three main regimes we've been talking about, iran, russ ia, north korea, but also ,enezuela and other regimes counter isis and terrorism at large. we've been focused both in new york but also building

coalitions, regional coalitions , why wein like you said are using sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. where do we want to go?how is that in our common interest ? like you are saying, it's not only explaining where we were coming -- are coming from and where we want to go, but how this is in our common interest. north korea is a great example. iran is another one. we've been working to reestablish strong relationships with our gulf partners, also having conversations in europe to talk about our common interest in combating support of hezbollah, iran's support to proxy destabilizing activity in yemen. these are common interests that we share with many partners around the world. it's building those coalitions

to find more leverage and create force multipliers. andrea gacki: if i could add to what david said, obviously, -- it it the important is important for multilateral cooperation. opec is a singular agency anddwide, a domestic limitation agency. financial intelligence part of the treasury department worked very hard to, if there is multilateral will to try to get the guidance and expertise to make sure there's a way. take steps that are meaningful and implement-full. >> i think we have time for one more question. thank you. i'm dan perlman, -- diane perlman. about, i thinknt

less, more complex about it. as you suggest, it's not only about pressure and coercion, but other dimensions. to not just have one cause brought to the table. there's also the impacts and some softening and some pride -- softening in some pride. the factyou suggested, that they had their own nuclear , they be less dangerous if they feel less insecure. people are dangerous when they are afraid and feel like they have leverage. i think we need to keep in mind that what kim jong-un said about the button was that he didn't intend to use it, unless he felt threatened. the media ignored the last part of his statement. that's legitimate, to not feel threatened. to -- there was

also a study of 100 cases of sanctions. they failed 86 times. they can break down. along with maximum pressure, we need to consider humiliation, a face-saving way out, drastic tension reduction there is an opportunity. we look -- need to look at their psychology, too. >> i'll ask if anyone on the panel wants to comment or agree, disagree? daniel fried: i'll just reiterate. tool in thee one sanctions policy toolkit. -- in the policy toolkit. not appropriate for every case. it's a powerful one, but in a toolbox. >> why do we take, since i think that counts is more of a common thing question, i will thank you. that means we get to work in one more question. i see a hand up.

>> -- with the national council, with my baltic and central and eastern european colleagues. we are on the hill every week advocating for our policy 'prioritiess. implementation of russia sanctions is always -- russia -- imitation of russia's sanctions is at the top. wondering how we can refine our message to appeal to staffers and congress to advance things more effectively. >> umm, i have the highest regard for estonia's ability to resist russian aggression. i think that -- daniel fried: i think that the area to explore is what we have been discussing.

" what should be the content of a transatlantic response to russia's political pressure?" disinformation, cyber hacking, various forms of nonmilitary pressure on all of us. there's a for tile field -- a fertile field. i thought it was terrific that miller's indictment got promotion, right? just what the record so -- show that we got it first. [laughter] a violation of the ukraine sanctions. involved. was we knew at the time he was involved with something for st. peter's. potential.ide it shouldn't be just american. now, it may be that the europeans are not willing to increase sanctions. ask the brits how they're

feeling about the russians these days, and are they interested in options? for the spanish, french? in my experience, the way you work with europe is to not ask an abstract question, but to assemble a coalition of like-minded people, and work with brussels and be honest. be clear about what and why you are doing it. see what can be done. either we can have a transatlantic common approach, or second-best, you get the americans with individual governments doing things. second-best. i like working with the eu, but that's the direction in which we can go. the russian economy is stable on a macro-sense, but it is in a period of stagnation. the russian leadership, putin

doesn't act like a competent guide. he asked -- a confident guy. he acts like he's worried about the future of his talk received. if you are confident, wouldn't be quite so nervous about threats to money abroad. again, their anxiety could be our opportunity. we went after us. we should return the favor. anyway, that's my suggestion. of course, the estonian and cultic americans don't need me to tell -- baltic americans don't need me to tell them that. >> i think that's a perfect note to end on. one housekeeping announcement. we will take a five-minute break. the second panel will begin. volatility ind the trump administration sanctions policy, the private sector's response and the way forward. thank you very much to our panel -- panelists. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

>> the treasury department undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence talks about applying economic pressure on north korea, russia, and venezuela. also from the atlantic council, this is 40 minutes. it is my great pleasure to introduce undersecretary mandelker, the senior sanctions person in the u.s. government. someone who has the good luck to be in charge of a deeply confident organization in