>> c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's television companies, and today, we continue to bring you unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, and public policy events and washington, d.c. and around the country. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. >> next, look at the trump administration's use of economic sanctions. speakers include current and former representatives from the state and treasury department. they react to this week's announcement of a potential meeting between president trump and north korean leader kim jong-un. from the atlantic council, this is one hour and 15 minutes. council, this is one hour and 15 minutes. good morning everybody.

welcome all. real people and virtual people and whoever else may be listening in. if you are following the conversation on twitter, please use #shapingsanctions. as last night's announcement on dprk suggests, sanctions are both a hot foreign-policy tool, to top the news, central issues like russia, iran, dprk. sanctions are much used, much talked about, and often misunderstood. given the importance of sanctions, symbolic and substantive, the atlantic council has established a new sanctions program which aims to bring together key stakeholders from the administration, congress, policy communities, it and businesses to improve the

sanctions tool. i would like to thank the , press water cooper, david mentzer, and some of our partners in the sanctions program. many thanks. i would also like to thank georgetown university's institute of economic law which has been a partner for this event. council sanctions team includes some of the best in the business. professionals with hands-on experience in designing actions programs. andrans of treasury, state, regional experts. all part of the team here which aims to provide the best analysis on sanctions available. i have been working with the

global business program at the atlantic council so we're pleased to launch today's event and this program. we have two panels today, focused on policy perspectives from current and former practitioners including some on our team. novak colleague and a friend in policy. there are others on our team in ,his panel, michael greenwalt and the other panel will include is this people -- will include business people. finally, under secretary of the treasury the administration willr person on sanctions deliver what i suspect will be a serious they spent of this administration approached his actions.

i look forward to an in-depth, likely, and maybe more than likely discussion. let's get started. i was like the first panel to come to the stage. >> good morning everyone. my name is andrew keller. it is a true privilege to have the opportunity to moderate this panel. there are five exceptional individuals who i am proud to call former colleagues.

say i can think of a better time for this panel, which is entitled best actresses, past errors, and the future of sanctions. given the incredible change that we've seen over the last year, including as a result of the change in administrations and clearly as a result of congressional action. i have given these panelists the very small task of walking through how these changes will impact the use of sanctions as a foreign-policy and national security tool and what those changes will mean for the private sector and for our allies going forward. of course, they have to do all of this within an hour.

easy task. i would like to introduce each of our panelists. i would ask them to give a brief opening statement. i will start with our government colleagues. sitting immediately to my left, we have andrea. she is currently the deputy ofac.or at oh fax -- at she is held almost every critical position at the agency. she previously served contemporaneously as the acting deputy director of the agency and the associate director for compliance and enforcement from 2014 to 2017. she was also assistant director of licensing from 2010 to 2014.

prior to that, she served as a senior sanctions of riser for policy and implementation. was a trial she attorney and the civil division at the department of justice. including, as a senior member of the justice department's terrorism designation team. andrea, thank you for joining us. david tessler. he is the deputy director of policy planning at the state department. you can tell how important and valued his work is because there has been a decades long interagency struggle between state and treasury from where he is going to work. thatarted his career in times of the late 90's as a foreign service officer. he was stationed in baghdad, the u.s. missions to the nations, and health various visions in

washington, d.c.. he spentt to that, several years at the treasury department as a senior advisory to the director and following that has the senior adviser to the undersecretary for terrorism finance. , quite you are here as well. fellow hereesident at the atlantic council. immediately prior to that, he was serving as the senior advisor to the director of ofac. he is a recognized expert on sanctions. i will just note that prior to his time at treasury, he also served as an analyst in

treasuries -- prior to his time at ofac he served in the treasury office and international affairs. he also served at the cia. freed needs no introduction. i will simply say that prior to joining the atlantic council, in his current capacity he served in the foreign service for 40 years. he played a key role in designing and implementing american policy in europe. asserved as an assistant -- an assistant to the president and senior director for presidents clinton and bush. he was the ambassador to poland and he also was the assistant secretary for european affairs from 2005 two 2009 at the state

department. least, we have elizabeth rosenberg. she is a senior fellow at the senior -- at the center for new american security. she is the director of the energy economics and security program there. publishes, speaks regularly, and is a recognized expert on the intersection of energy, sanctions, and economic statecraft. significant experience at senior levels of the treasury department where she served as senior advisor for four years for the assistant secretary for terrorist dancing and financial crimes. also as the senior adviser to the undersecretary for terrorism finance. government,ning the at argus correspondent

media in washington. stopl stop what -- i will talking now. unless andrea to kick things off. andrea, you can speak from the podium or stay in your chair. >> i will speak from the podium. thank you so much, andrew. thank you to everyone. to kick offsure today's exciting program and to be on the stage with so many runs and former colleagues. great ande so many familiar faces in the audience. i think we all know, because we , thatactice in this area sanctions can be extremely powerful tools especially when used strategically and with precision. they restrict the ability to

interface with the international financial system. to protecting the u.s. financial system from abuse, sanctions are intended to increase treasure with the goals of changing behavior. sanctions can be structured in scope to achieve those objectives and modulate that pressure. for example, we can limit access to certain types of financing or prohibit certain transactions. without a full freezing of all transactions. support of a in clearly defined objective, and utilized in conjunction with other national security tools, including diplomacy, sanctions can be key to achieving our foreign-policy goals. additionally, domestic sanctions can be even more effective when paired with multilateral action. whether that is through the european union or the united nations to help increase pressure and change behavior.

we always worked to carefully evaluate how are sanctions can be limited by the private sector. we seek as much is possible to provide clear guidance and respond to questions through guidance and, toning up a variety of ways approach the agency for guidance. we stand ready to listen to your concerns, to your issues as we continue to adapt and structure sanctions to make them the most effective, understandable, and implement a full tool that we can achieve to serve the important national security aims they are designed to a published. sanctions are not the solution to every foreign-policy issue. they can have to,

a significant impact. specifically, we have focused so much of our recent efforts dedicated to the threat of the north korean regime. we have restricted their ability to move money through the international financial system. when aggressively ramped up our actions, and by targeting certain schemes, we've seen the north korean regime growth more isolated and now indicate they are ready to come to the table. otherl continue to target actors that threaten our national security. but only with respect to north korea, but also threats like iran, russia, and venezuela. i thinkto the future, we can all agree here in this room that you will continue to see sanctions as a primary tool of foreign-policy.

to beill continue deployed in ever more targeted, specific, and impactful ways. i would like to turn it over to my colleague and say that i look forward to the discussion today. david:. i will speak from the chair because i was told that's what i should do. i wanted to use these five minutes to lay out a few principles for the effective use of sanctions. saidla much of what andrea . we think alike. the first principle, this seems that sanctions are a tool of foreign-policy. is anason why this important principle, although it may seem obvious, with the liberation of the use of

sanctions come i think it is important to remember that. it is designed to advance specific foreign-policy goals and defend our national security. when looking at a foreign-policy set of issues, it is important to think holistically about where we want to go, what the strategic arc that will get us to the states and how sanctions as a tool in the foreign-policy toolbox fit into that. that is principle one. physical number two is, if you will you sanctions understand the target, how the target things and designed the sanction in a targeted and creative way to effect the change you want. .wo examples andrew mentioned one. north korea. over the last year the administration has focused quite a bit of energy and time into energy sanctions, looking at coal, oil refined petroleum

because of an analysis and assessment of how energy sanctions would actually impact the target and the calculus, here the target is kim jong-un in venezuela, the creative use of sanctions to target them and to impact behavior change. to look at sanctions and use them creatively and in a targeted way. that is principle number two. hezbollah number three, building coalitions of allies and partners to help leverage the united states power in sanctions and to be a force multiplier. you've seen over the past year this administration highlight the importance of coalition and allies across the board.

our" nations in only ukrainenot and crimea, but the broad spectrum of russia's malign activity. or working with all allies to combat iran and destabilizing activities. or working with asian partners toe japan and south korea target north korea and to help augment our maximum pressure campaign. you see that with this administration across the board here it that is where i spend a lot of my time. and is the third principle looking at how to effectively implement sanctions programs. >> as the other panelists have said, it is great to be here.

are former colleagues and friends. thank you for being here. i will focus my remarks from the atlantic council perspective on the mechanics of sanctions. i let dan talk about the policy -- and i say let him, he is much more qualified than i. it makes sense. from a mechanical standpoint, one of the hallmarks of this administration is that you can really see the work of the professionals behind the actions that have happened. this is especially true -- you have cut through the noise in the media. this administration, for better or worse has a much louder media presence in a much more chaotic media presence them the first one. it is kind of the same stuff we were doing when i was in government. and the obama administration and

before, there is a technical aspect and i will highlight the north korea action from two weeks ago. was billed as the biggest action ever on north korea, which is true if you go by numbers, but from a sleeping standpoint, probably not exactly accurate. that doesn't matter. it was a significant action. one of the things it showed is that it is the action that drives a knife deeper into someone's side. you had an action going after the shipping networks the north uses. there has been a big focus on shipping because that is what facilitates the energy to karen. that drives their nuclear program. it was a technical and competent action. the administration is to be applauded for that. one of the things that i have noticed, more from the treasury but because i'm familiar, the senior officials are letting the professionals people like

david and andrea, they have given them the running room to do the job and do it right. that is encouraging. said, i think there are some cracks that have shown a little bit in the implementation and, to be frank i don't talk it -- i a lack of expertise think they are resource related. sanctions are a tool that everybody turns to now. every time there's a crisis, congress is what will we impose sanctions on? we return to this tool more often than we should. there is not been a corresponding investment in these tools. , i think this is a resource related one example, i think this is a

resource related issue -- you are going through a chaotic process and certain things slip through the cracks, especially if you don't have the amount of people you need. with the venezuela eeo that came out, there was a provision that targeted venezuelan government bonds. the issue with the implementation is that it targeted all venezuelan bonds, but then at the same time, they had you issue a license if it -- license effectively exempting everything but one bond. you had index target and then this one is everything you are letting go. that cost a lot of reaction, especially in the financial industry where people were scrambling to figure out, do i hold bonds? that didn't need to happen. those resources in the government that were answering these questions from financial industry and the financial industry itself could have been better used to implement the sanctions. i think that it is critical that

the administration and congress -- government get together and figure out a well to fund this way to do this -- fund this appropriately. what they need is a 50% budget increase. i think there is the administration taking a solid first step in putting on a significant increase in the budget proposal in the president's budget. congress is taking this seriously as well. it is similar to an investment congress made a number of years ago to revolutionize the i.t. infrastructure and the backbone that they rest enforcement on. a similar effort is needed here to make this work as well as we need it to work to confront these crisis that we are facing. looking forward, there are a couple things i would like to touch on. the first is, i think we can expect that same level of professionalism in the

administration is going to take. especially where there is a consistent policy message and a real focus with the united states and our allies. i do think there is, and i will think ita, because i needs to be said, a cap on how far the professionalism will extend. hasink this administration issues with russia, but we don't need to get into that. but what it means is that at some point that professional running room will run into a cap. we need to bear that in mind. finally, i think a lot of us in this room, certainly a lot of us of the atlantic council tend to view foreign policy and national security, especially at the highest level in an analytic rubric focused on what we all learned in school and practiced for a long time, which is that international relations is about

relations and these long-standing relationships. it is fine from an analytic perspective. if you are trying to a politicale from perspective, i think the top level political issues, i think we need to start thinking about these things from a predictive standpoint in a transactional manner. i think that is the hallmark of the president. and certainly the key decision-makers who surround him at the most senior levels of the government. i have given up trying to predict some of these things because i have had trouble myself. we need to start thinking as we predict, what a transactional model looks like and what that means. you will not always know the inputs into those decisions, but it is the correct way to evaluate what these high-level things are going to come down to including north korea , negotiations that will be starting soon.

>> by request of ambassador , you are. -- you are up next. >> giving the last word to investor free. it is a pleasure to be here with you all. thank you all for coming. i thought i would offer, so as not to be redundant, i thought i would offer if you comments on offer a few comments on congress and its role. maybe this is the political or sandbox part of that conversation. i know many people in foreign policy and compliance roles tend to focus on the administration. i expect that is a real focus for many of you here today. obviously, they are the implementer and enforcer and to the extent there is a multilateral component to the sanctions it is up to the , administration and its diplomatic initiative to engage with counterparts and built coalitions and joint actions that can come forward and that have the greatest effect and

leverage when they are so joined internationally. also, the administration has been really creative and innovative in the way that it has implemented these sanctions, i'm thinking of the ssi list and the creation of that. some new ways to go after the violators of human rights, for example. thinking of some of the initiatives to try to more closely pair export control measures with law enforcement action with sanctions, could amplify the policy effect. so that has attracted a lot of temption and the off administrative action catches a lot of news coverage. nevertheless, back to congress, is really significant in this debate.

some of you are keen on that point. i want to make three quick points about the role of congress on sanctions. specifically, they are a very significant originator and innovator and disruptor when it comes to sanctions. i will tell you what i mean by that. besides originator for those of , you concerned with the specific authorities and how they organize the way in which the sanctions are implemented, of course you know congress is the originator. they created the backbone, the architecture on which all of these initiatives mentioned so far rest. that means they have the authority and ability to change it and take it away. i don't think we focus on that so often. it is certainly politically difficult for them to do it all of a sudden without quite a lot of coalition building and advanced work. but they've had a couple of

recent cases which have reminded people of that ultimate congressional authority. not to forget, their role as an originator and legit issues -- brian mentioned how significant they are in giving resources to the execution and enforcement of sanctions. that is an enabler or disable or -- disabler of this activity we are talking about. as far as the role of congress as an innovator, i would argue they are at least as important as the administration. in innovating new approaches to sanctions and creating some of the intellectual capital which may not ultimately take the form of the measures implemented, or the enforcement, but in expanding the conversation , sometimes that is scary. this innovation is both

substantive and strategic. substantive, think about what they did in putting together iranof the a run -- measures from 2012, such as the energy framework for restrictions on iran's export of petroleum including compelling the revenues of allowed to toll and to be held in accounts of the purchasing country. that is interesting and collaborative creative work they have done. on strategy, you're all familiar with the good cop and bad cop dynamic that is so characterized much of the sanctions over the last 20 years up and down. the signaling work they do. i think it is appropriate to consider some of the sanctions bills introduced in congress as initially at least more bark and , more fury than they wind up. -- than they ever plan to

originally wind up at. which is to say that they are expressions that may be more emotional and may be effective as a signaling tool, much more so than the effort to eventually legislate and create the authorities that will guide what the administration does. we have seen that be incredibly effective. if you were watching the -- insor to a became 2016. it was much more aggressive than where we wound up. deter act -- now, i think we should consider also significantly messaging in its character. last come on the issue of covers -- congress being a disruptor. this is a way to characterize what they have done to push the envelope on policy and even

pushing aside administration priorities. this is not not specific to the current administration or party. we saw this in the last administration very sharply. think about congress's major recent push to take a stronger role in foreign policy, to have greater oversight. -- to have greater oversight of the administration trying to , constrain president obama's actions in regard to the iran deal. i will close by saying we are -- this administration's actions with regard to implementation in the russia sanctions. i will close by saying we are still in that moment, looking forward to the may waiver deadline connected to the jcp oa nuclear deal. the president has asked congress -- maybe using ultimatum is a better word. as well as european partners to take actions on issues he finds concerning with nuclear deal.

congress has the opportunity to be a disruptor and to change the policy course the president has set out. which is to say he will not remove the sanctions until he is congress with action in this domain.omain. i will stop there. >> of course the waiver by himself is the way of congress maintaining control.

andrew represents a deeply competent skilled bureaucracy. having had nothing to do with the building of that bureaucracy, this is not self-serving. it is of tremendous comfort to know that there are people who can actually do their job and do what they think they are going -- do what they say they are going to do. this is a tool which cannot be taken for granted and needs to be cherished. second point, related, the competent people in the administration need the resources to work with. brian mentioned funding. that is true. i think treasury as well organized to fulfill its sanctions role it needs more people and more money. the state department -- full disclosure, the office at the state department my old job was abolished. david tessler is the closest think the state department has to the sanctions coordinator. he is a good guy. i know he sitting here. he is a good guy. there is nothing wrong with him. but, he is only one guy. he is one guy.

i had a staff. he has got himself and he's got a day job. he is deputy director of policy planning. if this administration is going to use sanctions, it should remember that sanctions work best when the legal analytic and policy skills of ofac and sanctions, other offices are combined with the diplomatic skills of the department of state. that is a big deal. that needs to be fixed. a third point, david and andrea mentioned this.

effective sanctions policy is not a little unilateral action. it requires allies. they said it. but the administration is going to have to mean it. when we go to the europeans or the japanese about russia sanctions, we are asking governments to tell their businesses to take major hits. we have to decide how much political capital to invest in sanctions policy, and how much political capital to spend on other things. like tariffs. we have to figure -- this is not one where the tracks are independent. the tracks have to be integrated, and if we're going to be successful in the implementation of sanctions, we need to do it in tandem with our allies or it's not going to work. then, it becomes exercises in feel-good, which has its uses inside washington.

but really i don't care. , feel good is not interesting. results are interesting. and you need allies. a fourth point. sections are not a policy. they are a tool to advance a policy, which leads to suspicions that you don't note what your policy is. you'd better know what your policy is. it better be clear, including to your allies. now, of the three big sanctions .rograms to the dprk -- big sanctions programs in this administration, russia, iran, kuwait, there are questions about the policy. on iran, are we or are we not going to use sanctions within the framework of the jcpoa? if not, what is the alternative?

i understand sanctions cannot make iran into a much better country. they can and have gotten a run -- iran to sign the jcpoa and adhere to it. that is one question. a next question on north korea. sanctions are designed to drive the negotiating table. maybe that has been achieved, in which case all power to the administration. there's nothing wrong with playing a high-stakes game. sometimes, you can't do it the way the foreign service bureaucracy would prefer you to, which is step-by-step. i'm not knocking the high-stakes, but, but, the north koreans have been down this road before. they've been doing it and switch for 20 years. it and switch for

20 years. ask wendy sherman, madeleine albright, anyone who worked in the administration about what it's like when the ruling dynasty gives its word. to make this work, we will need a durable framework that .verybody knows knows what our strategic, what our strategic choices are and what we are looking for. now, i hope we are there. i'm not going to trash the announcement last night. it might lead to something, but we've been back and forth on whether we would talk to the north koreans at all. sanctions cannot be turned on off instantly, it requires a lot of pushing. so it's a question mark. on russia, i think the gap between professional complements and the implementation of sanctions and questions about the policy is clear.

the russia sanctions have been implemented by the trump administration over the past administration over the past year in a credible fashion. if you follow the details of treasury sections come up -- sanctions, maintenance, tinkering with russia sanctions, they've been good. actually pretty clever. the administration prepares section 241 of the so-called kremlin report by all accounts with a high degree of skill, professionalism, analytic judgment. there's a classified report. i haven't seen it. the people who have seen it, including political opponents of the administration say that -- agreed that it is better than a solid job, it is an exemplary job. in the rollouts, the administration first tried to hide the good work it had done, then issued a non-credible public list, then retreated from that and said it was going to draw on the classified sanctions. now, this would be a good thing. this could end well, but sanctions policy has to be

integrated into the main policy. or else, you have heat generated by friction that does no good. this is to say all of these major sanctions issues, russia, iran, dprk, could be effective. the elements for effective policy is there, but the policy framework needs to be clear, understood. there's nothing wrong with tactical unpredictability. that can be useful. ,- that can be a useful lever but operational unreliability is

seldom useful. i hope the administration finds a way to use the assets of tactical unpredictability without falling into the trap of operational unreliability. and finally, transparency with congress and the business community is critical. the way you stay, and this is laura's point but i am making a crude summary because that's what i do. for congress, the way to keep them from going off into crazy-land is to stay ahead of them. you know, be thinking of all of their objections and be able to answer it. you will be pleased by the result. you can't do that unless you have the resources and policy and strategy and you've got the allies lined up. then, congress can be a helper, not a disruptor, right? umm, i hope some of the questions i've laid out will be

answered by one of the people representing the deep confidence available to this administration. it's not just career people. it's political appointees also who are skilled, smart, strategic thinkers. so i hope to get some of these questions answered today, and have more questions sides. thank you. >> thanks to all of you for extremely thoughtful and interesting remarks that give fodder for our conversation. i hate to be accused of shamelessly chasing the headline, but i'm going to shamelessly chase the headlines. i think dan mentioned president trump may be meeting with kim jong-un in the next few months. everybody on this stage as you heard seems to agree that sanctions are a tool to incentivize behavior change, a tool to achieve, help achieve

foreign policy and national security goals. i'm wondering, umm, if we can think of ahh, the north korean's willingness to talk as at least the beginning of a sanctions success story. i think this administration has clearly taken a very strong and aggressive position, for sanctions against -- four sanctions against north korea. i think the last administration made a shift from nonproliferation sanctions to broader-based sanctions that targeted most if not all of north korea's revenue sources. dan, you've already alluded to this. maybe i will ask our other colleagues to start off with a.

whether this can be thought of as the beginning of a success story, and b. how and whether sanctions can truly, economic be effective truly with a regime that has so long seemed to not have any interest with being part of the international economy, or any legitimate international commercial activity. shown anyrly has not being responsive to its citizens and their needs? if i have any volunteers to kick that off, i -- >> i would say it's too early to sit -- to tell if it's been a success. the shift from strategic patience to a new policy of maximum pressure is having an effect. maximum pressure is having an

effect. that's what you've been, you know, you can tell from, you know, ahh, until now. i think it's important to underline the maximum -- the maximum pressure will continue -- maximum pressure campaign is continue until the north koreans actually match these words. we will not let up at all. the maximum pressure campaign is going to continue. the announcement yesterday is a sign that it is starting to work and it is having an effect. that is through a lot of hard work, coalition building, working with the chinese. you mentioned, questioned whether or not the regime that clearly doesn't care about its people could be impacted by sanctions. they care about their survival. when you really target the economic levers that can really threaten its survival like energy for example, and you work to really first adopted a very -- adopt a very strong u.s. security council resolution and then work with allies and

partners and china to actually robustly implement those strong sanctions, resolutions. then, you start to see we are pushing on the levers that matter to the regime. >> and i, i can only really agree with everything david just said. we have shifted our resources. we heard from secretary men daca during her keynote read we have many urgent -- secretary mandelker. we have adapted to north korea. we are building the right notes of pressure, and the right ways to affect the regime. that will continue. an announcement is welcome, but it's too early to say. the maximum pressure campaign is not going to let up yet.

>> umm, i agree that the ministration deserves credit for ramping up the pressure. i think that the obama policies strategic patience went on with 7.5 years without serious result. in the last six months about of the obama administration, they decided "hey, this is not working. oh my god, north korea's developing strategic nuclear capabilities." some of us got the running room to do more. the credit for implementing that, making it happen as the u.n. bilaterally goes to this, -- this administration. they ran with it, the strategic assumption of a shift to maximum pressure i think is the correct one. i think the question will come out "what will we do when that moment arrives, when the north korean regime is not negotiating?" what will we do them?

that's -- then? that's a better problem to have fan where we were. -- van where we were -- than where we were. one of the cliches of north korea, the regime is so determined for strategic nuclear weapons, so ruthless and ambitious that no pressure will work. so, give it up. i can't tell you how many north korea experts kept telling me "give it up." umm, yeah. kim jong-un will never give up nuclear, his nuclear capacity willingly. the question is, as lenin used to say, how do you sharpen the contradictions? how do you make it tougher for him? i think that is the strategic

basis for maximum pressure. but again, we have issues before bilateral presence, -- presidents, that's a gift to kim. he's going to, there will come a moment of truth. you don't need me to tell you, y'all know it. you, morning after this is y'all know it. look, morning after this is pretty good since it's the kind of signal we were hoping for. some sign of movement. david tessler: he called us make a brief points -- >> i will just make a brief point. i think the a ministration deserves tremendous credit. the campaign has been successful.

we will see whether we will -- can call this a successful diplomatic engagement, as david mentioned in his opening remarks. i think one thing that is like to come back to, one of the things stand said his everything is interrelated, right? this is not a novel point. other people have made it, but it's worth saying. what happens on may 12 with the iran-jcpoa removal, is going to be instructive for the north koreans when they try to negotiate with us. this administration needs to remember those policies are intertwined, regardless of what may have been set on the -- said on the campaign trail, or whether the jcpoa is the worst deal. the koreans, chinese, russians will be watching. i think it's going to be very important for success of negotiations with koreans, to the extent that the kim regime -- it's not in a ministration if -- administration it's a , dynasty. [laughter] to the extent that the kim regime is serious about sitting down, and will stick by any commitment that we make. that's going to be something that everybody should pay attention to, but only for iran, issues in that region, but as they apply to northeast asia. >> you have already made all of

my complaints. [laughter] add0 seconds, i would just -- [laughter] i agree with brian. context of the jcp away will be -- [laughter] i agree with brian. context of the jcp away will be sickness -- jcpoa will be significant for north korea, as well as anyone concerned with international or multilateral cooperation. remember, the banquet delta bureaucracy supporting sanctions, and this cultivation of economic leverage is well functioning and well staffed at this point. what matters and what will be the answer to this story is how the capacity and how carefully the administration is able to deliver on a diplomatic, negotiating side.

i fear there are inadequate ranks. david, don't get a cold. [laughter] to do with this economic pressure that has been cultivated, what must be done to advance their diplomatic work towards successful negotiations. david tessler: why don't we shift gears and talk a little about cap the -- casa, russia in particular? i think it's fair to say between 2014-2016, one of the, perhaps the top priority of the -- andrew keller: i think one of -- the top priority of the russian government was to move forward with the uber paeans -- with the europeans. that, to a certain extent, has been thrown off balance i think

by catsa, also, the current political dynamic -- which was thrown together by congress. also, the current political dynamic. i'll ask david and andrea to start off. if you can talk about what efforts you've made, engaged the -- to engage the well --s as far as -- while -- was under -- underation consideration and the implementation phase, especially given the symbolic importance of sharing a community with the europeans over russia sanctions. similarly, the importance with the private sector. i think the original sanctions were rolled out and implemented in a way that they were never going to be analogous between

united states and the european union, but they were sufficiently harmonious to make things somewhat easier on the private sector. perhaps, if either of you could comment on that. >> of course. i think, andrew, there was a fear last summer that catsa might impact our close coordination, transatlantic unity. i think we through hard work and a lot of energy and time have proven that fear wrong. andrea and i will be leaving for europe next week. this will be my fifth time there to talk about russia sanctions since september, a lot of time -- which is a lot of time in europe. europeans have come here quite a bit. i think they, if you ask them, i think that when we first went in september or august and started talking about the fact that we wanted to maintain and strengthen the close coordination, there was skepticism on their side.

the proof is in the pudding, right? and so we worked closely with them through the end of october, when we issued our joint state.e treasury and took into account he was from europeans, also the private sector which may be can talked about. -- can talk about. i think through the -- maybe andrea can talk about. through the actual work, we can use catsa to strengthen cooperation. it's important to remember that catsa not only articulates the serious threats the russians ukraine andis crimea, but catsa lays out the broad spectrum of russia's threats. including undermining democratic processes, cyber corruption, human rights, etc.. it's a broader stipulation and strong one. we have shown that we are

implementing it robustly and working closely with the europeans. i think the europeans are happy with where we are today. andrea gacki: i'd like to echo everything david said. working with the state department has helped engage with the european governments, also with the private sector not only in the united states but worldwide. after the passage of catsa, many questions came to us. how we might interpret certain terms. we had not only a open-door policy for questions, but also proposed answers. i know folks may have heard me say this time and again, but we welcome, we welcome proposed questions and answers. we may not agree with the answer, and will decide what the answer is at the end of the day, but that was something that we aggressively -- excuse me -- looked at in the implementation of catsa. >> on the issue of catsa

management, i think that administration has done a good job working with europe to limit catsa's more questionable provisions. the drafters of catsa know it is a mixed bag, some good, some not so good. i give the administration credit. but to stay ahead of the hill congressional politics, , avoid being slammed, it's administrationhe to show what it's going to do. i hope that what david tessler said is a hint that when treasury comes out with its next sanctions, and i'm not giving away anything, i hope it addresses this. i think you nailed it. i agree that there is considerable potential for cooperation with europe to use

the sanctions tool in response to a different kind of russia present in the ukraine. an ukraine,threat the which is their attacks on our western political systems and use of dense information, and cyber hacking -- disinformation and cyber hacking. the french, spanish, bals, the polls, -- poles, there are -- the pols, they're facing that. i don't think russia has forgotten the last few days of the french election. there are tools including section 241, my personal favorite. i think that the u.s. and europe have the potential to make it clear to the russians that there will becomes a quinces for consequences for

further interference, and the stars may be aligned. in washington terms, it may be imperative to be seen as doing this, and it's the right policy. so, go get them. david tessler: i'm going to go to liz. >> i will be brief. this has been helpful in talking about the history of development and implementation so far. but looking forward, the animating issue in the u.s. public discourse that drives attention on pressure related -- russia related foreign policy is no longer the ukraine. it is and what russia is doing in syria. it's not any of that. what it is is more specifically concern about -- in the u.s. elections malicious cyber activity. europeans are concerned, and

i see little potential they will join the united states in sanctions, notwithstanding the fact there is potential to do so. the european approach has been much more operational, looking specifically at what they did in the macron case. this is an area for debate and discussion. we will see what happens. this is something to watch. david tessler: there's about 30 other catsa questions. a question right up front. >> thank you. david tessler: i should remind all of our questioners to introduce yourself, affiliation. >> thank you for coming. i am from the reagan foundation. dan, you mentioned that the sanctions will not work without allies or their cooperation, which is true. regarding north korea, 90% of their trade is with china, and you know that.

for a fact, i do know there is type line going into north korea from china. i'm talking about oil. my question is, what can we do about china? what should we do? how can we deal with that? without that, the sanctions may without that, the sanctions may not be working, not as good as we have designed to. that's just my natural question. thank you for coming. daniel fried: i'll give the trump administration credit for getting china to agree to do far more than they've wanted to. two years ago. the chinese ban on imports of

north korean coal is not complete, but it's pretty good. it's hitting their money. call, textile, fishery exports, we hit those hard. the chinese have moved a lot, they have moved partly because i think they believe the trump administration was serious in its efforts to go even further, go after chinese companies and banks. that potential is still there, that is target the chinese more aggressively. i would not race to it. once you start doing that, you start approaching red zones of retaliation, unintended consequences. you may have to. look. i'm not ruling it out. i tend to be on the push the envelope side. right now, we have sanctions, may have brought us to this moment where there is a direct dialogue. it will either work out, my view is most likely not. we will see. we may be back to these issues.

it's on the table. the administration i think has handled it well, hinting for going to do more but not rushing to slam the chinese. i think they've done ok. >> you've gotten the slamming the chinese parts, too. you have got to remember something about china, right? with respect to north korea, china is furious with what the kim regime has done to develop the ballisticf the missile launches have early pitsssed china. from and implementation standpoint of sanctions, there's u.n. sanctions that are almost unprecedented in the world.

--brian o'toole: they're spectacularly good. i think the trump administration deserves credit for pushing those. when you come to -- come to implication -- implementation, there's a trick. people look at china as adversary. too many folks don't realize while there may be pockets of china, areas where they might be trying to undercut sanctions, china has and limitation issues of its own. they have a demand economy, but not a regulatory environment we have in the united states. make the mistake of projecting our own confidence, folks being able to enforce u.s. financial institutions, exporters, whoever else might be involved, the confidence of our private sector in doing this, the experience we have and assuming china can do that because they are china. i think that's a false assumption. if you're going to go after the chinese, i think you really need, especially at any significant level, we start going after banks, you really need to have those smoking guns of complicity. it's hard to draw that out, get

that information. the folks that might be saying "the only way to fix this is by whacking chinese banks." we may get there, we may have to do that, but i think to get there you really need to have the top levels of the banks complicit. i think that is the only way that you can justify that as a prudent sanctions action. >> i saw another hand up over here. and if you could please mention your name and affiliation. affiliation. >> thank you, they could very much -- thank you very much. sorry but my voice, i'm battling a cold. i'm the ambassador for mozambique. one point, i want to the panel to elaborate on, the multilateral framework for sanctions. sanctions will always be more effective if you have all countries buying into it, implementing them. for that, they need to understand them.

when you speak about allies in terms of sanctions, it will be very important to understand that when you are fighting something that is best for the world like the north korean regime, the nuclear proliferation, you have more friends than enemies who want to support you in that cause. i wanted an elaboration of the multilateral framework, u.n., and beyond. >> ambassador, thank you. that's an excellent question. david? david tessler: we could not agree more. in this of ministration, we have -- administration we have

focused quite a bit not only on the three main regimes we've been talking about, iran, russia, north korea, but also venezuela and other regimes, counter isis and terrorism at large. we've been focused both in new york but also building coalitions, regional coalitions to explain like you said, why we are using sanctions as a tool of are using sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. where do we want to go? how is that in our common interest? like you are saying, it's not only explaining where we were coming -- are coming from and where we want to go, but how this is in our common interest. north korea is a great example. iran is another one. we've been working to reestablish strong relationships with our gulf partners, also having conversations in europe to talk about our common interest in combating support of hezbollah, iran's support to proxy destabilizing activity in yemen.

it is support to the assad regime. these are common interests that we share with many partners around the world. it's building those coalitions to find more leverage and create force multipliers. andrea gacki: if i could add to what david said, obviously, david it is important for , multilateral cooperation. ofac is kind of a singular agency worldwide, a domestic and limitation agency. financial intelligence part of the treasury department worked very hard to, if there is multilateral will to try to get the guidance and expertise to make sure there's a way. take steps that are meaningful and implement-full. >> i think we have time for one more question. >> thank you.

i am diane perlman. i am from the george mason school of analysis and conflict resolution. i think the point about, i think we need to be less, more complex about it. as you suggest, it's not only about pressure and coercion, but also diplomacy in other dimensions. to not just have one cause brought to the table. there's also the impacts and some softening and some pride -- softening in some pride. also, as you suggested, the fact that they had their own nuclear deterrent, they be less dangerous if they feel less insecure. people are dangerous when they are afraid and feel like they have leverage. also, i think we need to keep in mind that what kim jong-un said about the button was that he didn't intend to use it, unless he felt threatened. the media ignored the last part

of his statement. that's legitimate, to not feel threatened. i think we need to -- there was also a study of 100 cases of sanctions. they failed 86 times. so they can break down, so i think that along with maximum pressure, we need to consider humiliation, a face-saving way out, drastic tension reduction and there is an opportunity here. we need to look at their psychology, too. >> i'll ask if anyone on the panel wants to comment or agree, disagree? daniel fried: i'll just reiterate. sanctions are one tool in the foreign policy toolkit. us ont think that any of this panel agreed that sanctions are a silver bullet. it's a powerful one, but in a

toolbox of tools. >> why do we take, since i think that counts is more of a common thing question, i will thank you. that means we get to work in one more question. i see a hand up. >> -- with a american national with my baltic and central and eastern european colleagues. we are on the hill every week advocating for our policy'prioritiess. implementation of russia sanctions is always -- russia -- imitation of russia's sanctions is at the top. i'm wondering how we can refine our message to appeal to staffers and congress to advance things more effectively. -- more effectively? >> i have the highest regard for estonia's ability to resist various forms of russian aggression. you are on the front line, like, no kidding.

explorethat the way to -- the area to explore is what we have been discussing, it is: what should be the content of a transatlantic response to russia's political pressure?" disinformation, cyber hacking, various forms of nonmilitary pressure on all of us. there is a fertile field. i thought it was terrific that miller's indictment got promotion, right? that we the record show got it first. [laughter] a violation of the ukraine sanctions. we knew he was involved. we knew at the time that he was involved with funding the st. petersburg --.

there's upside potential. it shouldn't be just american. now, it may be that the europeans are not willing to increase sanctions. but i wonder, ask the brits how they're feeling about the russians these days, and are they interested in options? or the spanish, french? in my experience, the way you work with europe is to not ask an abstract question, but to assemble a coalition of like-minded people, and work with brussels and be honest. be clear about what and why you are doing it. see what can be done. either we can have a transatlantic common approach, or second-best, you get the americans with the eu understanding and the individual governments doing things. second-best. i like working with the eu, but that's the direction in which we can go.

the russian economy is stable on a macro-sense, but it is in a period of stagnation. the russian leadership, putin doesn't act like a competent guide. cts like he is worried about the future of his talk received. -- country. if you are confident, wouldn't be quite so nervous about threats to money abroad. again, their anxiety could be our opportunity. he went after us. we should return the favor. anyway, that's my suggestion. of course, the estonian and baltic americans don't need me to tell -- baltic americans don't need me to tell them that. >> i think that's a perfect note to end on. i have one housekeeping announcement, which is that we are going to take a five-minute break. than the second panel will

begin. uncertainty and volatility in the trump administration sanctions policy, the private sector's response and the way forward. thank you very much to our panel -- panelists. -- panelists for next job this morning. morninglent job this [applause] . [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] the treasury department's undersecretary for terror and -- intelligence talks about economic pressure on north korea, russia, and venezuela. this is 40 minutes. >> it is my great pleasure to introduce undersecretary