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>> good morning. afternoon, excuse me. i want to thank everybody for being here. i want to thank my colleagues especially who with -- are with mark and i this morning. i think it's safe to say that the senate select committee of intelligence has been focused on completing an investigation since its beginning. we haven't set artificial time lines. we haven't made promises to anybody. what we said and the vice chairman and i said the same thing. burr burr we would go wherever -- -- mr. burr: we would go wherever the facts led us. we have wrapped up one piece of our investigation which deals

with selection security. i think it's safe to say that our team has done an unbelievably thorough job. all the to nearly affected states, the white house, the department of homeland security, the f.b.i. and other intelligence community agencies. they've secured and analyzed countless intelligence products, both raw and finished assessments. let me say this with great deal of confidence. it is clear the russian government was looking for the vulnerabilities in our election system, highlighted -- and highlighted some of the key gaps. there's no evidence that any vote was changed. russia attempted to penetrate 21 states. we know they were successful in penetrating at least one voter database. department of homeland security

and the f.b.i. alerted states to the threat. the warnings did not provide enough information or go to the right person in err case. alerts were actionable. they provided malicious internet protocol i.p. address to i.t. professionals. but no clear reason for states to take this threat more seriously were given. russia was trying to undermine the confidence of our election system. we're here to express concerns, but also confidence in our state and local governments. now, i think what's important to understand is that tomorrow we will have an open hearing specifically on election security. and i'll be -- we'll be joined by four of our members who are taking the lead on the recommendations that we will post, i think they have -- maybe in the last five minutes gone out. but they will officially be

public today. let me distinguish. we very much support state control of the election process. we think there are ways the federal government can support those states. but clearly we've got to get some standards in place that assure every state that at the end of the day they can certify their vote totals. so i think what members will share with you today are the recommendations that we will come with. they're not recommendations that you should expect legislative action from our committee. we have no jurisdiction. it just happens to be part of the investigation. jurisdiction within the congress is probably the rules committee in the united states senate and we will work very closely on them sharing all the information that we possibly can so they can process our recommendations, add to it, delete from it. but also with the agencies that are most appropriate, to make sure they bring the resources and the partnerships to the tates and localities and the

individuals that are single most important to the election process. let me draw a few conclusions. we need to be more effective at deterring our adversaries. the federal government should partner with the states to truly secure their systems. that will also be in possible grand funding. d.h.s. and f.b.i. have made great strides, but they must do more. d.h.s. offers a cybersecurity assistance but they heard they did not have the resources to fulfill all the requests. we will work with appropriators and authorizers to see if in fact we can't fill that gap. we need to take a hard look at the equipment that actually records and reports votes. we need to -- we all agree that l votes should have an audible paper trail. and in 2016 five states used only electronic machines with

no paper trails. nine used at least some of these machines. we realize all of this security costs money. and we want to make sure that the federal government not only says we're a partner, that we are a partner. and i hope that will be expressed maybe as early as the omnibus spending bill. with that, let me turn to the vice chairman for any comments he mike make -- he might make. >> thank you. i think it's also an indication of who has better eye sight that you can read this and i have to read off of this. let me thank all of the members for being here. and the way this committee has performed to date and i think will continue to perform. you're going to hear from four members who have worked actively on this issue of election security. mr. warner: but i want to point out as well that senator rubio has some very important legislation with senator van hollen. that i think bears consideration as well. and i want to acknowledge senator klobuchar who has been active in the piece of legislation that we're working n.

i think one of the consensus that we all came up with was we were all disappointed that states, the federal government, and the department of homeland security was not more on their game in advance of the 2016 elections. as the chairman's indicated, there were 21 states that were -- attempted to be an intervention in. at least one state that was full hacking through the protections. and one of the most frustrating things were that in the aftermath of this information coming out, it took the department of homeland security nearly nine months to notify the top election officials that their states had -- systems had been messed with. i want to again thank the chairman and the whole committee. i think our hearing last june

was an impetus to the department, to communicate better with the states. and the reason that somehow the top election officials didn't have appropriate security clearances, i don't believe in an era where we have to communicate more earthquakely, more fullsomely, was an appropriate responls. some of the legislation that's going to be proposed will help deal with that. the truth is in the ensuing months, i think d.h.s. has picked up its game. but there's still much more to do. as the chairman pointed out. there were still 40 states that were operating with election equipment that was more than a decade old and much of that equipment had outdated software that you weren't even able to upgrade, even if you chose to. 14 states used voting equipment

that had no audible paper trail. in the aftermath of our hearing, i discovered that my state, virginia, did not have a full system with every state having a paper trail. now, we had to act quickly because we had state elections last year. we had 23 jurisdictions where we had to change our machines. it took a real scramble but that scramble was appropriate to try to give virginians the confidence that our systems were going to be secure in our state elections last year. the challenge and the problem at this point is that in 2016, it was the russians. and we've seen evidence of russian intervention in other election systems around the west. this is a tool now, the tool kit is available, it's available not only to russians but other potential adversaries as well. so the recommendations of this committee, and i look forward to joining the colleagues who have legislation and

co-sponsorship of their efforts. it's terribly important. i think tomorrow's hearing is terribly important. even with the snow coming. we all ought to be there. because maintaining the integrity of our voting systems and, more important lirks the public's faith that their votes will be counted in a fair and accurate way is extraordinarily critical. so with that let me turn it over to senator collins who will start to outline some of these recommendations. ms. collins: let me begin by commending the chairman and the vice chairman for leading a truly bipartisan investigation into interference in our elections. while our investigation is still ongoing, one conclusion is clear. the russians were relentless in attempting to meddle in the 2016 elections.

and they will continue their efforts to undermine public confidence in western democracies and in the legitimacy of our elections. the leaders shift of the intelligence community is -- leadership in the intelligence community is unanimous in their assessment that the russians continue to undertake sophisticated attacks to exacerbate the divisions in our country. in the 2016 election, the fact is that the russian scanned election-related systems of at least 21 states. we may never know the full extent of the russianmy litsch -- malicious attacks. -- russian malicious attacks. to counter this serious challenge, i want to briefly discuss some what have happened in 2016 and the need for better communication and intelligence sharing between the federal

government and state governments. there were several problems with the approach taken in 2016, as the chairman and the vice chairman have outlined. although the f.b.i. sent out a warning to state officials, the alert was not clear in specifying that vulnerabilities in state election systems were being exploited by a foreign adversary, nor did it specify just how serious the threat was. another problem was that state officials were deeply concerned that public warnings might promote the precise impression that they were trying to dispel, that their voting systems were insecure, thus helping the russians achieve their goal of undermining public confidence in the election results. yet in france and germany, we

have seen that greater public disclosure has had beneficial effects. a third major problem was the lack of security clearances for top state election officials. of june, 2017, nearly eight months after the 2016 elections, not a single chief election official at the state level had received a security clearance. that is clearly unacceptable. and while d.h.s. recently sponsored a one-day classified briefing, it received decidedly mixed reviews from state election officials. we must assist states in hardening their defenses against foreign adversaries, including passing much-needed legislation, providing funding

and authorizing appropriate security clearances to top election officials. e must also immediately ensure robust communication and information sharing in both directions, between the federal government and state election agencies on cybersecurity threats. we are already in an election year. the need to act now is urgent. >> thank you, senator collins. i want to start as well by saying how proud i am of our entire committee and our leadership of chairman burr and vice chairman warner. how they've taken on this task of getting to the bottom of what happened with russia's influence and interference in 2016. mr. heinrich: i think we all recognize that our democracy fundamentally hinges on protecting americans' ability to fairly and accurately choose

their own leaders. and until we set up stronger protections of our own election system and take the necessary steps to prevent future foreign intervention, our nation's democratic institutions will remain vulnerable to attack. i'd like to echo what senator collins just said about the importance of ensuring our state election offices, that they are equip to respond to these threats -- equipped to respond to these threats and keep our voting systems secure. i think all of us are in agreement in the importance of the leadership at the state level with regard to these elections. as we've been working to address election security, one of the things that i found particularly helpful is the consultation that i've had with new mexico's secretary of state, maggie. she runs our state elections but she's also been a national leader in securing local voting systems against cyberthreats. state election officials like her should have the security clearances and the support from

federal agencies that they need so, that they can respond to these threats in realtime. not months later. the federal government also needs to work to attribute cyberattacks more quickly, and with more confidence. foreign adversaries and bad actors engage in cyberattacks, precisely because they are easy to deny. and we cannot allow that deniability to shield those hostile actors from accountability. we have no doubt that russia and other foreign adversaries and malicious actors will continue to target our elections and try to undermine our democracy. we must be able to call them out, we must be able to make this -- it clear that these action are unacceptable. and finally, i believe that states should consider implementing more divide spread systemically sound audits of election results. americans need to be confident that their votes and only their votes are what counts in electing our public leaders.

audits and risk limiting audits in particular go a long way to make sure that our voting systems are working as they should, that the integrity of our elections is protected, and risk-limiting audits also create public confidence in the vote. the very quality that hostile cyber actors like the russian state seek to undermine. as we approach the midterm elections, and the next presidential election cycle, we need to act quickly to pass bipartisan, pragmatic recommendations into law, to protect the integrity of the entire voting process. with that, i'll wrap up my comments and turn it over to senator lankford. mr. lankford: i think what you'll hear from this group is a commitment to several key facts. one of them is there's no question the russians were trying toed me until our elections. and there's also no question that states operate their own elections. this is not a federal responsibility, it requires a partnership between the states and the federal government to be able to get as much nformation as we possibly can.

we've worked on legislation long with other members. to put together some basic recommendations. today and what tomorrow's hear willing focus in on is getting as much of that information out as we to be canned help articulate these issues because -- can and help articulate these issues because the last time it was the russians. it may not be the russians the next time. they've set a pattern others can follow. it could be the north koreans, the iranians, domestic group that uses that same playbook to try to cede chaos. it's protecting our elections period. and to try to be able to work through that process. as vulnerabilities have been identified, it's entirely reasonable to be able to close those vulnerabilities and work with states as they try to be able to determine what weaknesses they may have so they can have those addressed in the days ahead.

>> i want to echo the comments of my colleagues in particular thank the chairman and vice chairman for conducting this committee and its work in such a bipartisan way. i think that it's not only about bipartisanship. we all who have been working on this issue know that certain issues are nonpartisan and this is one of those. harrisers had harris in terms of recommendation -- ms. harris: in terms of recommendations, one is outdated equipment. technology has changed the way the world works. it has upended standing business models a weekend need to be aware of the best practices and the best equipment that's available and we have found that many states have outdated equipment. so one of our recommendations is that we figure out how to audit and figure out which states are using what kind of equipment in a way that is helpful to them when they request that help. and doing what we can to give them the support and the funding that is necessary for them to update their equipment. but what we do know for sure is

that we have to provide this kind of support to states, many of whom cannot afford to update their equipment. and update it in a way that we can assure that they have the ability to audit their elections when necessary and do that through paper trails. so that is one of the best practices that we are also talking about. the other is bringing best practices in terms of making sure that voter registration websites and poll workers and all of the other folks who are negotiating the election process are doing it in way that they have all of the best practices that are available based on the research and the work that we have done. for example, we have talked about the need for a panel of leading experts to establish election cybersecurity guidelines and provide financial assistance to the states so that they can implement these best practices. and i'll just close by saying that the urgency clear. the work that this committee has been doing is certainly

looking at what happened in the past. but it is also about addressing the fact that currently we have an election upon us, states have already started voting. and the past tells us that the future will probably hold another set of threats, if we are not prepared to meet those threats. thank you. >> i thank my colleagues and i'll call them back to the podium to take some of your questions. let me remind you, this press conference and the report we will put out in the hearing is on election security. so i'd ask all of you to limit your questions to election security. we're not prepared to talk about any of the rest of the investigation. once again, reiterate the fact that we do have a schedule and that schedule's to close out those areas of the investigation that we feel we have exhausted both the staff and the members' needs. mr. burr: we've identified four of those areas and we should be

about one month apart as we launch the next three. that's not concluding the entire investigation. but that's taking a lot off of the deck and allowing our staff to finish interviews and to finish more importantly the investigation. but this is one that members have been hands-on and that's why they're taking the lead on this. so if i can i'd like to turn the podium back over to these four and let them take some questions. reporter: -- told your committees and other committees they have the tools to fight back against the interference in the elections. but that they have not been specifically asked to do so by trump. do you have -- what should president trump be doing and what kind of authority should e be giving these officials? [laughter] >> i think there are a inform different committees working -- a number of different

committees on working on these issues. but there is an awareness and a bipartisan awareness that i think we need a more transparent cyberdoctrine -- cyber doctrine so other nation states are on notice and i hink i'll just leave it there. reporter: you talked about trying to be assisting the states to make these changes. especially when it comes to replacing -- [inaudible] distribute number we're talking about right now in the omnibus is around $380 million. and i've heard people tell me that's not enough to do what these recommendations are i wonder if you could lay out where you think the next step is to go for actually finding the money and what the figure is it would take to do the things you're recommending be done. >> let me reiterate again. mr. lankford: elections are state responsibilities. most of the states in the united states have auditable election systems. the concern that we have is some states that have chosen not to have auditable election systems, to help incentivize them. it's not our desire to fully fund the elections within individual states. that is a state responsibility.

if there are incentives we can put in place to help spur them, the people of those states going to their state leaders and saying, we want our election to be secure and to be able to take care of it in their own state. that will be the primary piece. there's not enough funding that we could provide nor should provide to every county, every state in america to be able to oversee all their election equipment. some election equipment, as senator harris mentioned, is very old. but it's still very reliable. and very consistent. and fully auditable. just the age of equipment, just saying we want to update our stuff is not appropriate. we need to find the balance on what cannot be audited and help incentivize em-- intent size them to get it done. -- incentivize them to get it done. reporter: you said it's not about russia. it could be north korea, it could be hackers. do you think the white house gets that sense of urgency? mr. lankford: i do actually think. it's not about russia, it's not only about russia. clearly russia could come back and do this again. i do because the department of homeland security has stepped up significantly in the past

year. working with states, trying to develop security clearances. helping them with critical audits. engaging in every way that they can at this point to be able to help them be better prepared. there's been a lot of back and forth on it and some of it is, as was mentioned before, those states have to be able to say to us as well when they see interference with, it they have to be able to say to homeland security, and trust them enough to be able to get that out, to be able to distribute that to other states as well. there's been a lot of that inner play. when robert murel did the indictments on 13 russian individuals and organizations saying these were individuals that we're targeting, the administration has put sanctions back on those so they seem to be paying attention to that. reporter: we're talking about election integrity here. can you comment on the idea that the president today called vladimir putin to congratulate im on winning his elections?

[inaudible] reporter: you repeatedly stressed the urgent need to act here. given the midterm's right around the corner, today are these systems any safer now han they were in 2016? ms. harris: we're working on that. we just received an update from d.h.s. i do believe that they, through the course of at least this last year, have increasingly prioritized this as an issue that requires their immediate attention and immediate action. so we have witnessed and we've seen improvements in the resources that they're putting into this. and the thought that they're putting into what can be creative work around prevention and also detection. a lot of the work has to be focused on these various pieces. and it's not only about deterrence, which is a part what have we are recommending. we put in systems that will deter any kind of hacking or infiltration. but also detection and then detection leads to another issue, which is if there have been systems that have been

hacked, what can we do in terms of resilience so, we can detect it immediately, share that information, if we have it at the federal level, with the states, so that we can respond as quickly as possible and reduce any or mitigate any possible damage. and a very important part of the work that has happened over the course of thelary year has recognized there needs to be greater communication between the intelligence community and the states. so that's why you've seen a lot of the focus has also been on what we need to do to clear -- to give clearances to state officials so that they can have access to classified information that will allow them to prioritize what they need to do to set up systems to audit and also what they can do around best practices and best machinery. we are talking with them about the fact that it is probably best that you do not have your election system connected to the internet. because that will create greater vulnerabilities. look where we are now in this year of our lord 2018. we're talking about paper

ballots. but that actually might be one of the smartest systems. going back to, you know, a day when we could have something tangible that we can hold on to because russia cannot hack a piece of paper like they can a computer system connected to the internet. reporter: what level of confidence should voters have? ms. collins: first of all, i think it's important to underscore that we have discovered no evidence that votes were changed in the last election. but it is nevertheless troubling that the russians made such efforts to probe the election systems. and there also in the beginning was such mistrust between the states and d.h.s. that information that should have been shared, that would have caused the states to act more

aggressively, was not shared. i agree that that has improved but i think we still have a long ways to go. i do believe, however, there is far greater public awareness and awareness amongst state election officials about the need to be alert to their vulnerabilities, to allow for cyber security hygiene scans of their equipment, and that guidelines need to be established and a common lexicon established as well so that everybody knows what all parties are talking about. >> i gist want to add to that that this is about maintaining the confidence people have in their vote. they should be confident given hat we shared about 2016 the wholet point about what -- the whole point about what you're hear being repeatedly about the paper trail and you

had its is matching up your physical -- audit is matching up your physical record with your record. as long as those thingsen to mauch, you can have every confidence that your -- things match up, you can have every confidence that your vote counted. mr. burr: if you have intent, you have capability, then you have a threat. and as i think senator lankford said, russia's not the only one who has the capabilities and probably not the only one that has intent. but clearly the russians had intent to cause chaos in the u.s. election system. and they had the capabilities to do it. and it's all of the above. it's a good defense that we work with states to try to implement. it's the ability for the federal government to look inside the cyber system and to see when attacks take place. i would remind you that as conscious as the private sector is, of cybersecurity, there are

companies in america, public and private, that are penetrated every day. so i don't know how you can look at the election system and say anything any different other than this is like a company with one mission. so we're trying to get them focused on how they just build around that one thing, which is the voting process. last thing and then i'll turn to the vice chairman. you have a hearing tomorrow. rain or shine or snow. if you can make it in in the snow, i can assure you we are and we're going to have a hearing. so here's an opportunity to hear from secretaries, the technical folks at d.h.s., and other experts that talk about specifically what has happened, what we need to do, what we have done, what we still need. and top state officials. i'm not sure that there's a platform that we could present that would give you a clearer picture of whether our assessment's right and whether our recommendations are right. than the hearing that we're going to have tomorrow. that hearing will be followed

up at some point with the report first as a declassified overview of our report. and depending upon how long it takes for the report to be declassified, then we would make available for the public our entire report with whatever ocumentation we can provide. >> mr. warner: two quick points. i want to thank the four members who spoke because they've been doing a lot of work. so have other senators. this has been kind of an all hands on deck effort. i think tomorrow you will see it's going to be -- we'll have three panels. rarely do we have three panels on a hearing. but we're going to try to go super nuts on this effort. i would echo one of the earlier questions about what level of security. i can tell you in my state, even though it was a scramble, but to make sure that every

voting machine in the 2017 selections elections had that auditable paper trail, i believe lent a lot of credibility and we didn't hear the kind of concerns that could -- that have been raised in the past. good job to everybody. some of these recommendations host: will be turned into legislation and we need to -- i hope will be turned into legislation and we need to act with you are general sifment [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] -- urgency. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] >> tomorrow, the senate intelligence committee holds a hearing on election security issues. we'll hear testimony from homeland security secretary and also jeh johnson, who was secretary during obama administration. the hearing starts live wednesday at 9:30 a.m. eastern on c-span3. tonight, testimony from

education secretary betsy devos on president trump's 2019 budget request for the education department. she spoke earlier today before a house appropriations subcommittee. we'll show that tonight at 9:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. also tonight, a hearing on the drug enforcement administration's role in combating the opioid epidemic. diarra administrator spoke in front of -- d.e.a. administrator spoke in front of a house subcommittee. we'll show that tonight at 9:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. >> c-span's "washington journal" live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. oming up wednesday morning, --

>> it used to be that people on the other side of the political divide are people we disagree with now it's like the people who voted for the other candidate are immoral. they're our enemies. they're not even real americans anymore. and this, because i study really democracies around the world, places like libya, i mean, libya, what's the difference between libya and the united states?

libya is a multiethnic country too. 140 different peoples. it's a failed state. it's disintegrated. why? because it doesn't have that overarching strong libyan identity, strong enough hold it the country together. it was really a colonial construction. but we do. this is what makes us special. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span. >> the senate judiciary committee held a hearing earlier today on re-authorizing the violence against women act which is set to expire in september. this is two hours and 10 minutes.