from members of the house of commons. later, former white house press secretary, sean spicer, on president trump's relationship with the media. announcer: this week on q&a come university of virginia history professor william hitchcock. professor hitchcock discusses his book "the age of eisenhower: america and the world in the 1950's." host: william hitchcock, why did you call your new book "the age of eisenhower"? period of think the the death of roosevelt to john in whichs a period eisenhower's personality, his ideas, and his presidency really

dominate american public life. in that period, i think it is safe to say he was the most popularwn, well-liked, american. because of his record in the warriors. as aas he was emerging presidential candidate and as president, he was overwhelmingly america's favorite public figure. his instincts, his values, his presence became part of american life in the 1940's and 1950's. host: there have been a lot of books written on him. i'm going to ask you about that. first, i want to show you video of a man you have a footnote on, stephen ambrose. he was here in 1994 talking about eisenhower. let's watch this. [video clip] >> what is different about this book that you have done from all the rest and what is new in here? first of all, it was based on a much broader set of interviews than anybody else's.

done 4, 5, 10 times as much interviewing as anyone else. it covers every level. my interviews begin with the supreme commander. i spent five years working with him. interviewing him. in the footnote, let me read it, in 1984, stephen ambrose publish the first major biography that explored the best documentary sources available in kansas where his library as you write, however, in 2010, the eisenhower library reported ambrose had apparently fabricated a number of interviews with the former president and inserted unsubstantiated quotations in his text. ambrose's work has been clouded by controversy ever since. william: yes. the eisenhower library reported this in 2010. it was a big surprise. it is regrettable. it does cast a cloud over his work on eisenhower, which is actually excellent. he did a great deal of archival work, which can be verified.

i want to stress that so much of his work is based in the printed record. i have looked at those documents and many more that of the date -- been declassified. it appears that there are some questions about the interviews. i want to say that stephen ambrose did a lot of good things. his role in the world war ii museum is a huge contribution to american public life. i don't want to overstate the importance of this for eisenhower scholars, the question has been raised. host: what was available to you that was not available to any other scholar so far? william: the most material i saw that was new has been recently declassified, especially by the cia.

the cia has been unlocking its vaults quite openly on the 1950's. they should never have been closed for this period for so long. you're getting around to releasing a great deal of material. i read thousands and thousands of pages of documents that other scholars have looked at. many of them are not working about a book on eisenhower's presidency. the things i saw that were new were related to the u2 spy plane, they were plated -- related to intelligence gathering around the missiles, what soviet capabilities were, and they related to some of the covert operation planning. that happened very late in the eisenhower years. scholars are still trying to get to the bottom of. although these may seem like small findings, to scholars, it opens up the window on what eisenhower knew about covert operations late in his presidency. quick biography, kenyon

college, yale university, currently in virginia, how long have you been there? i have been at the university of virginia for eight years. i taught at a number of universities before that. temple university, wellfleet college, and yale what is your interest in history. host:? on international affairs. i finished teaching a history lecture class on world war ii. in the fall, i will teach a cold war history class. those are the says -- the subjects i like to do. all theith what i say, bad stuff of the 20th century. although terrible global wars. but also figures like eisenhower who tried very hard to bring peace to a difficult century. host: early in your book in the prologue am a you write, eisenhower established a distinctive moderate -- model of presidential leadership. that americans now, more than ever, ought to study. why? william: i call it the

disciplined presidency. eisenhower, in the way he carried himself and the man he was was a disciplined man. a great athlete. everyanized man and respect. that is how he ran the white house. a lot of people, especially the young senator, future president, john kennedy, criticized eisenhower's dodging is for being disciplined an organized and predictable to for eisenhower, it meant when crises came, he had a plan. he knew how to respond. he knew who to turn to. he used to say plans are worthless but planning is everything. what crisis might direct? it.hould be thinking about he was very systematic and the way he governed. he met the press every week. he met congressional leaders every week. he chaired the national security council every week. he had his bum on the government.

mb on thed -- thu government. that is something that i think he still stands as a remodel to us. host: what happened to his health, 1953 through the end of his two terms? william: he had some health issues. he smoked four packs of cigarettes when he was in the army. and in world war ii. host: a day. william: a day. which means he was smoking every moment he was awake. he quit in 1949. i suspected it took a toll on his health. he had a significant heart attack in 1955. hows not altogether clear serious it was. but it was pretty serious. he was out of action for six months. at a time, unfortunately, when there were no great crises. that is a long time though. he had a chronic problem with his intestines. iliad is.

it always gave him all kinds of stomach pain throughout his life. it was finally diagnosed in the operate in on that. that was in 1956. in the summer, he was running for reelection. had a significant abdominal operate -- operation there. he had a minor stroke later in his second term. it slowed him down for a couple days and was a scare. these things, the mounting strain and toll of having been the commander and the president, started to show on him. he lived for 10 years after he left the white house. but these were signs of his constitution, which was strong. his: 55 -- 1950 five was heart attack. here is video at the 1956 when he talked to the public and the press right after he came back. [video clip] >> it is a very critical thing to change governments in this country at a time where it is unexpected. we have custom and ourselves

changing our government every four years. happensys something that is on forward when the government has changed at other times. it is a stifling thing. they tell me that some disturbing's in the stock market the day i got sick. i didn't know it for six weeks later. [laughter] host: how did he govern when he was sick? he was out of pocket for six months? william: he was it he had a heart attack in denver. at the armye hospital there recovering. he came back briefly to washington in the winter. he chaired a couple meetings, went to florida, basically he was out of washington come out of the white house for six months. he governed. this is a topic i'm -- that leads into the question of his relationship with richard nixon. he didn't turn leadership to his vice president. it was his chief of staff who did a great deal of the day to day management of the presidency.

i think it is odd he did that. i don't think he fully was confident that nick's and could manage the government -- nixon could manage the government in his absence. it's an interesting fact that he did not turn things over to him to we didn't have in the sex -- the succession plan. host: tell the story about offering eisenhower richard nixon a cabinet position. william: in 1956, nixon -- eisenhower wanted nixon to step off the ticket. and he didn't like to confront people in this way. he didn't like to fire people. he didn't want to say, you're off the ticket. what he wanted to do was offered nixon a cabinet position, maybe in defense, commerce, and make him feel as if he was getting experience so he could more -- be more of a national figure. he said, i think it's time for you to get real experience running a big executive department.

in 1960, then you will be a better candidate to be president because he will have done something instead of being vice president. nixon thought about this and said, well mr. president, are you asking me to get off the ticket? he said, no, i want you to be president one day. so he couldn't fire next in. he couldn't direct him to do it. he just offered him the opportunity. host: how many times? william: it went on for months. nixon did not want to leave the vice presidency because he knew it would be perceived as a demotion, as having thing -- having been dumped. to accept the cabinet position. he said, i won not go to the cabinet. if you want to -- want me to be the -- be off the ticket, tell me and i will step down. he didn't tell him that. finally, eisenhower gave up and said, all right, you tell me your decision and nixon said, i would like to stay on the ticket. --t: there is president

video of president eisenhower talking about richard nixon march 7, 1956. [video clip] i have not presumed to tell the pratt -- the vice president what he should do with his future p i have told him this. i believe he should be one of the commerce in the republican party. young, ambitious, healthy, and certainly deeply informed on the processes of our government. as far as i know, he is deeply dedicated to the same principles of government that i am. host: why do you think he didn't want him on the ticket for the second go around? william: it is hard to say. i think he genuinely believed nixon needed real leadership experience. he thought managing the defense department would give him practical experience. next in was very young. he had only been in the senate for a couple years. he is been in the house for a

couple terms. he didn't have a great deal of experience. nothing like what eisenhower had running the military. i think he thought it would help them. of thethink he thought vice presidency as a meaningless job. and it's true, in the 1950's, it wasn't common for the vice president to do much. but as president harry truman had been kept at arms length i president franklin roosevelt. it was not a tradition of the vice president doing much. he chaired cabinet meetings when eisenhower was away. that was it. i think you generally wanted him to be more seasoned. eisenhower was concerned the republican party -- that a republican succeed him. he believed nixon would be a stronger candidate in 1960. there is no doubt there was a distance between these two men. distance of age, experience, generational difference. they were not friends. eisenhower never opened his personal family life to nick,

didn't bring him to gettysburg, didn't treat him as an intimate. you can see on the video that that is not exactly a ringing endorsement of your number two man. he was cool about it and nixon took it personally. he talked about -- host: we have done several polls on president. i want to put on the screen the two different polls. one of them is 1962, where lincoln was number one, washington number two, fdr number three, jefferson number four, and dwight eisenhower -- it was 21st in the poll of the most effective president. our recent poll in 2017 has lincoln number one, washington number two, fdr number three, theodore roosevelt number five. what is happening here? william: it's a fascinating outcome. worse than itven looks because there were only 34 presidents -- i think they only

picked from 34. 21 is a low number. i think what is happening in the 1960's is the difference between john kennedy's immense popularity, his youth and charm, and eisenhower's age and his sense that he was a man from an earlier generation. there is a huge gap. although, what is puzzling about the poll is while he was in office, eisenhower's poll numbers were through the roof. his average popularity rating was 65% over eight years. no president comes close to that in the modern era. while he was in office, he was popular. the fact that he sank low reflects who was being polled. arthur lessened her senior, the historian, who is putting that poll together. he polled a great deal of other historians like him, harvard professors, people of whom leaned democratic. i think it might reflect of the bias of the historians that were

polled in that poll. eisenhower was still a popular man in the early 1960's. clearly, the younger candidate also had an effect. the later poll, the way the later poll is very interesting because on all the categories historians were asked to evaluate the president, eisenhower did well in all of them. some of the other presidents, like john kennedy, he started to sink on questions of moral integrity. because of his affairs in the white house. woodrow wilson has become -- begun to decline because of his views on race. andrew jackson come here begun to decline because his views on race and indian removal. that opened the field for eisenhower to rise into the top five. that is a remarkable achievement. it reflects eisenhower's ability to govern from the center, which is an admirable quality. to getnybody who wants online and look at our poll, we went out of our way to balance its politically. thisust have one side as

was back in the 19 -- back in 1962. here is a footnote from your book. golf course, two days after he was nominated, he told jim haggerty, his press secretary to be, that he would "go to korea" but to "just keep that quite." you found that in a coral history -- oral history. why did he want to keep it quiet and did he promise that during the election? william: you want to do drop it at the right moment. he said he would go to korea during the campaign. he wanted that to have the effect that he knew it would have when the former ally commander of world war ii says i'm going to go to korea and see what is going on there, as a candidate, he knew it would be a provocation. it would suggest that harry truman was not running the korean war terribly well. he wanted to have that as a bombshell to drop in the campaign. and he did drop it quite late in

the campaign, in october. he knew truman would be offended. truman was offended. he called it a piece of demagoguery. after the fact, many people debated whose idea it was. and haggerty says at one point members of theer team had suggested it. what that showed is it was eisenhower's idea. he said, keep it quiet, we will use a swimming need to. then he did say it in the campaign. americans responded by saying, the most successful soldier and american history is going to go to korea, figure out why we are not winning this thing, and maybe put an end to it. everybody knew at that moment he had won the election. his: here is 17 seconds of trip to korea. he is dressed in his old army uniform. [video clip] >> it was bitterly cold when the president-elect arrived in korea to keep his campaign promise. it was the beginning of a three wind tour going into its third

year. it was part of the generalization of praise for himself, a problem on which his administration must decide. was december, 1952. you can imagine how cold it was. he hadn't become president. you after a member civil military relations were tense. truman had to fire general in 1951r in korea because macarthur had said truman was not handling the war while. here goes president-elect eisenhower to korea saying the same thing. that something is wrong in korea. i'm going to find out what is the matter. and it did help his choice of policy in korea. he came back, having seen the battlefield, how difficult it was to fight, how mountainous and hilly it was. he came back, determined one way or the other, he was going to to end the war. not necessarily through an arm assist. he thought he would increase the pace of operations in korea.

until there was an opportunity to reach out for the armistice which he was happy to get. he knew the war was not popular. it needed to be brought to an end. host: he says positive things about the united nations and his first inaugural in his farewell address to the nation. why did he think the united nations -- think the united nations was a positive place? william: it was a great internationalist. he believed in the so-called free world, the free nations of the west, working together and working out their problems. in a way, displaying at the united nations to the nonaligned movement, the newly independent nations of the world, all of the states that were getting their independence in the 1950's, but this is how democracy works. great states can work out their problems together. he had been the great coalition builder in world war ii. was enormously effective at listening, hearing other people, working out problems. u.n. for that

reason. it was a projection of american democracy on the world stage. a non-war issue, but before i do this, let me add a follow-up. how much did he have to do with ending the korean war? i know we are in the middle of a continuing discussion 50 years later. but how much did he have to do with it? william: well, he believed he had a great deal to do with it because he believed he had rattled the nuclear saber thing. if we don't get the settlement, we might have to go nuclear. he believed that frighten the chinese into coming -- putting pressure on the north koreans to agree. we now know a great deal about what was going on on the other side. we know the death of joseph stalin in march of 1953 had a big impact on both china and north korea. at that time, stalin was all in favor of the war. when he died in march of 1953, the new leadership in the soviet union said, we would love to bring the korean war to an end.

it's dangerous. it might get worse. it might lead to a nuclear exchange. they urged the chinese and north koreans to agree to an armistice. it was the pressure from the that led to the breakthrough. they came and said, let's have an arm assist. eisenhower accepted the armistice. which he could do because he was a general. he was a republican. who had great tradition -- traditional of being a military man. if you had been a peacenik before that, it might've been more politically awkward for him to embrace the armistice. it's like nixon going to china. eisenhower could agree to peace. and those who could accuse his -- accuse him of appeasement would be kept at host: arms length. host:if you could sit down with him what would you ask them? william: i would ask him what did you learn from world war ii that shape your presidency? i have tried to answer that

question by extrapolating from his world war ii experience. i would like to hear him talk about that. how did it affect his judgment in crises of the presidency? managinghe learn from the world's most complicated war on such a huge scale? how did it shape who he was? host: for those frustrated by the way i'm going on this interview, and that happens, i'm not trying to go from start to finish. ofs is a 600 page biography dwight eisenhower. i'm trying to find the things inherent that are unique to you. this is a footnote you wrote. this is about the bay of pigs. eisenhower later insisted that the cuba plan was still in its infancy when kennedy took office and that kennedy could have canceled it if he wanted. another footnote you wrote, the settling ike with the failed plan rankled and it seemed to suggest kennedy was imprisoned by eisenhower's plan. william: very interesting.

of first, the heart who is responsible for the bay of pigs plan that failed in april of 19 to 21? 1961? kennedy came along and kennedy supporter said, no it is not that way. eisenhower did plan. there is no doubt about it that we have a great deal of evidence showing it was a year-long process, thinking about how to invade cuba with a group of toles from guatemala overthrow castro. but eisenhower did not pull the trigger on the operation. the reason is it was not ready. it was not ready to go. it was not big enough. it wasn't strong enough. eisenhower hadn't done the careful planning. have made itwould potentially successful. when kennedy gets into office, he launches it right away. it fails. he invites eisenhower to camp david the next day.

doenhower's is, did you these things, did you ask the tough questions, did you go through the logistics and planning? kennedy says, i just took the advice of the generals. eisenhower says, that was your first mistake. kennedy always resented that eisenhower gave him this plan but then didn't take responsibility for it. which perhaps he should have done. eisenhower's view was you are the commander-in-chief, it's your job to ask the tough questions. publicly, kennedy took responsibility. host: for those that don't know the bay of pigs story, briefly, what happened? what was the point? toliam: the hope was overthrow fidel castro in 1961. the idea had been hatched in march 1960. eisenhower did not want to invade cuba with american soldiers. that would have been an outrageous act that everyone would have condemned. about 1000 ord

2000 cubans in doing amphibious warfare, landing on ships on the beach of what was called the bay of pigs. the idea was they were going to fight their way into cuba and they were going to set off a rebellion because everyone, they thought, hated castro. it was a scheme to begin with. ,hey were trained in guatemala they were given arms. americans helped them get them on ships and got them to cuba. the thing went from -- went wrong from the beginning. the cubans saw what was happening, responded quickly. they sank a number of their ships. it was a mess. it was a terrible embarrassment to president kennedy. it was obvious the americans have supported this thing from the beginning. host: what would president eisenhower done about the vietnam situation and would he have gotten us in as far as the 550,000 troops?

william: we know what he did do, he kept the united states out of vietnam in 1954 as the french were collapsing in northern vietnam. their colonial war was going badly. the french bank the united states to get in. eisenhower said no. we know he stayed out. we know what he said. wrong war, wrong place for the wrong purposes. we are not going to go to war to help prop up french colonialism. great deal ofed a prestige and money and building south of vietnam -- south vietnam into a democratic asian country. he believed south korea could be a model to the rest of asia. americanthe commitment -- america had made to south vietnam was a significant one. by 196i-5 when lyndon johnson decides to send in hundreds of thousands of troops, the commitment was greater. it's difficult to know if eisenhower would have done the same thing. i think there is a chance he might have. i think he believed when america was doing in south vietnam was the right thing. you talk about the cia

information that was released later on. what did you learn about the cia's involvement during the eisenhower years with the new information? william: the big picture what i will say, and i don't say this exactly in these words on the book, but i have concluded that allen dulles, the cia a director dangerous man. he kept promoting covert operations and to sabotage and operations of that kind to eisenhower. there he enthusiastically. early on, overthrowing government in iran. doing other kind of operations around the world as well. eisenhower came -- he was wary about allen dulles. i don't think a controlled allen dulles efficiently. he gave him too much free reign. the cia became reckless. we would learn later when some of their secret records became available in the late 1970's,

just how far they had gone to overthrow governments, plan assassinations, sabotage, and the like. much of that was known because the congress started investigating the cia in the 1970's. there are concrete specific things about how the cia gathered intelligence, what they knew, especially through intercepts about the soviet missile program that were old -- we are only now beginning to understand. we --what countries did did the cia go in and assassinate a leader? william: well, they tried to assassinate patrice lumumba of the congo. he was a radical. no doubt about it. the cia did come up with an toraordinary scheme to try murder him. from a biological agent, they gave it to the head of the cia station in the congo and they hoped he could get this his bathroomto

kit. and that he would brush his teeth and dropdead. the cia man in the congo said that is the worst thing i am ever -- i've ever heard. it didn't happen. it was on the planning 30 was supposed to be trying to kill him. he was arrested and eventually killed by his internal enemies. lensalso came up with the -- with dozens of goofy schemes to kill the dell castro. some of them were so ridiculous you had to laugh. one involved making an exploding seashell, because they knew he liked to go snorkeling and pick up interesting shells. they figured they have a really interesting seashell, he might pick it up and it would blow up. just goofy stuff. much more concrete, they did try

to get some cubans who were in the underworld to assassinate him. host: did president eisenhower know this? guest: that is a great debate. and one ofs advisors alwayssest advisers insisted that eisenhower did not know about it and he would not have approved it. i am not quite so sure. i think eisenhower did know. i think his national security advisor late in his presidency kept him informed. i think they had an understanding to not talk about it. i think it was a wink and a nod sort of thing. eisenhower was unsentimental about those things. he felt these were bad, bad people, and if national interests required it, he would let it go. , during the campaign, october 11, here is president truman talking about general eisenhower. the republican candidate for

president who has much to learn about these things has begun to catch on to this business. he has been against education, social security. no better than prison. he is against federal action. but in a speech in a los angeles the other day, he said he was for extending social security a little bit. aid in he is for federal education, just a little bit. he said he is for medical care, just a little bit. i can't give him a piece of advice. he need not be so timid. the special interest lobbies will abide him. guest: he offered to step down as president if eisenhower would run. he loved eisenhower. even up to 1948, he thought eisenhower would be a good president. he thought he might be a democrat, that's why. nobody knew what party eisenhower was in when he was in the military.

german thought he could get ike to run, interim and said, i -- and truman said, i will be your vice president. was in berlin, he said, i will do anything i can personally -- possibly do, and that includes you being president. because he admired him so much. that was the time truman just became president.he was still in all of eisenhower . you can tell there is a frosty relationship, because truman had been speaking politically, criticizing the new deal, criticizing truman himself. criticizing the big federal programs of the new deal. he ran as a conservative in 1952, eisenhower did. and there is tremendous saying one day he is a conservative, one day he is a liberal, you cannot trust him. that is what he was trying to say in that campaign dinner speech. host: like a lot of people who run for president. they tend to say something

different to different audiences. guest: the relationship between these two men soured, and it was too bad. host: what was the difference between the day that general eisenhower came to the white to ride with truman to the capital and the day john f. kennedy into the white house to ride up? guest: fortunately, it got better. they could not have been worse with the german relationship, got better.etter -- the relationship was poisoned by the campaign between ike and truman. when truman -- when eisenhower came to the white house to ride together to the capital, he was very frosty. eisenhower almost didn't want to ride in the car together. they didn't have the traditional meeting with coffee and chatter and so on it was very icy. . truman had said some very thatcal things eisenhower that i think were

unnecessary, and eisenhower took it personally. he shouldn't have, but he did. so he was pretty better. eight years later -- so he was pretty bitter. kennedy had criticized eisenhower in the campaign. kennedy has a terrible things about eisenhower. by 1960, eisenhower was a much more seasoned politician. he knew it wasn't personal. what he wanted was a good hand off to the new president. they met twice before the inauguration, and each time they met for a long time, they talked through problems, they discussed what was going on. eisenhower said, it is a tough job, i want to help you anyway i can. here is what i learned on the job, a few pointers, so to speak. kennedy came away very impressed with eisenhower. he realized this man is a serious figure, which is not what he had said on the campaign trail. he said he is such a dunce, he is asleep at the wheel.

but when he met him in person, he realized what a significant figure i was. host: there was a meeting before the inauguration where you had kennedy and president eisenhower. just 22nd. -- that just 20 seconds. >> i spoke with the president about problems for the united states and the undertaking on those problems. >> how was the atmosphere? >> cordial. the famous correspondent from mbc standing beside him. tworeport in your book different things. one, he attended 300 national council meetings -- national security council meetings. and you also say he had a lot of news conferences on a regularly heeduled basis and in 1955,

started television.what does this say about him as far as you are concerned? guest: it shows he was deeply concerned -- engaged in running the government. the figure is 90% of the meetings with the national security council. he set down with his national security team, secretary of state, cia head, military figures, and they talked through world problems. he was deeply engaged in every detail of running the government. the reason that was important was because the press did not see that. they saw ike golfing a lot. they did not know just how deeply involved he was in policymaking, and the detailed nitty-gritty of running the government. it is easy for us to say he was deeply engaged, but it was not always seeming that way. in the press conferences, i think it was remarkable. we have forgotten the president seems to be much more available to the press than they are today. a press conference today with

the president is a highly scripted thing. it is very formal. a lote not going to get of mistakes or goofs for real news out of a press conference these days. the press secretary does it all. for eisenhower's presidency, he get a weekly press conference for about 30 minutes. he stood there and took questions. sometimes he did not know the names and would say, i will look into it. his press secretary was right next to him, occasionally passing him a note. but ike was available to the press. he did not tell them a lot, but he was there. i think he felt that is what the president should do. host: you pointed out it was radio until 1955, and then it was television. clip, because when we first saw it, the question is asked by someone who is no longer alive but worked here at the end of his career, a fellow named bob clark. at the time he was with international news service.

watch this first question on television with eisenhower. >> i think we are trying a new experiment this morning. i think it does not prove to be a disturbing influence. i have no announcements. as you discuss the diplomacy --f [indiscernible] tried tolitary has write a small islands under the smallto rate islands under attack as part of the defense. which we are committed to. host: what was his relationship with the media? guest: can i say one thing about what he was actually saying? did you see how good he was? he thought for a split second, he got thrown a very hard

question. the first question on tv. he got thrown a really delicate question on defending taiwan from communist china, who were threatening to invade taiwan. ondid not want to pour oil the flames, but he also had to say, there is a thing going on that we are sort of in control of and here is the big.he gave a very diplomatic answer. experts, it was impressive feat. his relationship with the press, it was quite good. they admiredough, him privately, but often in writing in their reports tended to condescend a little bit to president eisenhower. i think this is part of the origins of the idea he was not in charge, that he was a light weight. i think they knew better, but it was a good joke. it became almost a punchline to say, here is old eisenhower trying his best.

they could be kind of mean. host: these are your words from a footnote in the back of your book. this comes from -- it says here, i think the dallas papers. and wantedeception, to keep his enemies guessing about just how far he might go to protect non-communist states from asia. admitted tovisor the senate foreign relations committee in february 1954 that the administration had no intent of putting ground soldiers into indochina. he hated having to say so in public. he would rather keep the chinese guessing. guest: it sounds like a cliche, but it is really true that -- itower was actually a is a personal characteristic, but it does influence this. he was a world-class cardplayer.

keep his he loved to enemies guessing, his adversaries guessing. especially the chinese in the cold war, the russians as well. he did not want to go into public and say this is what our policy is. unless it was serving his interests. taiwan, if there is an invasion of taiwan, that will lead to war. he was happy to say those things because it was a signal to the chinese. in general, he wanted to keep his enemies guessing. but that also reflects his leadership in the war years. host: why did you say in a footnote that eisenhower biographer's tent to -- e theaphers tend to muddl u-2 story. eisenhower remained calm and am perturbed of ironclad evidence provided by the cia.

guest: eisenhower did not worry about the missile gap, he did not worry about sputnik. because he knew because of the u-2 spy plane, the soviets did not have any big missile program at all. that is actually not true. in 1955.lane started they started running it over the soviet union. eisenhower was very cautious about using it. he was afraid one might get shot down and it would lead to an international accident, which it did. eisenhower almost shuts down the program. there are very few u-2 overflights in 1957 and into 1959. that is because eisenhower has tried to put the brakes on the program. what they know about the soviet missile program is on complete. it is unclear what they have. clear.ot

to say he kicked back and said, don't worry, there is no soviet missile program, they did not have the evidence to prove that. they were quite an -- anxious that they were building icbm's that could reach america. it was not until quite a bit later that they got the intelligence to prove the russians were way behind the americans. host: i want to ask you about the bias of historians. you write, again in a footnote, , a biographer, cooked analysis of eisenhower's presidency that she confessed was so cloudy by the evidence she discovered of covert operations, secrecy, and counterinsurgency that she had trouble seeing any other dimension of his leadership. saying,sh the quote

eisenhower's legacy is counterinsurgency and political warfare. guest: i think that is a wonderful question. i will say that i tried mike history thatrite toi tried my darndest write my history in a way that no one knew about me. that is not the purpose for me about writing history. it is to try to figure out, why did powerful people make the choices they did? host: what is your take on others? as you went through your research. and you have done several other books. 2 we always evaluate other historians -- guest: we always evaluate other historian's research. the goal is not to be a smarty pants and thank you got that wrong, but to say i have new material and i am taking a slightly different approach. every generation takes in other

-- takes another crack at presidents. host: are we being treated well as a populous by historians? guest: i think we are being treated very well. i hope the public is consuming the wonderful history that is coming out. but readers have to be skeptical, because historians have biases that are built in. often times, they are not overt. but every historian has a different view, a different way of writing about a powerful figure like the president. the advice is read three books on any given elected president or official and make your own judgment. host: when did you start this book? guest: i started it in 2009, 2010. i finished the book on the liberation of europe that focused on 1944-1945. eisenhower was a bit player in that book. it was a difficult book to write

because it was pressing about the war. i wanted to try a biography. i had never tried a biography before. i came across eisenhower in network and thoughts, what an injured -- in that book and thought, what an interesting man. i thought the books of his presidency were not quite as strong. host: where did you go in order to research? of thei spent the bulk time in abilene, kansas. at the presidential library. i also did research here in washington dc, and at the library of congress. goline is where you have to -- abilene is where you have to go because that is his hometown. the more time i spent in kansas, the closer i felt i was getting to this man. he was a very famous, very successful cosmopolitan figure, but he really was from kansas, and he never forgot it and talked about it a lot.

i felt getting to know -- seeing as how so many times walking around the town, viewing the landscape which is so different from the east coast, i just started to feel like i could get a read on this man. host: you write, the assertion made by todd wicker of the new york times that earl warren, the former chief justice, had received no help at all from the eisenhower administration in helping prepare the brown opinion is demonstrably false. guest: oh, yeah. the brown versus board opinion, huge milestone in civil rights. it argued, it told us that segregation by race in public schools was unconstitutional. some people thought maybe this was a bombshell that the eisenhower administration knew nothing about and was maybe hostile to. but there is ample evidence that

the attorney general was working closely with the plaintiffs in the case, shipping the arguments in the courts, and that they knew and filed an amicus brief in favor of desegregation. they felt it was unconstitutional. this was a product of the administration's policies as much as warren. warren shaped the opinion, and opinion.thisimous was a case where eisenhower's reputation has been done wrong. he was often depicted as a person against the civil rights movement, or a day late and a dollar short. but in that early period of his first term, they really helped the cause. they did significant work. host: however, you write this. some scholars have tried to make eisenhower into a hero of the civil rights movement, an argument that surely overstates the case. guest: what is interesting about eisenhower is he is hot and cold

. you see. where he iseriods really pushing. then he pulls back and is saying, i have a lot of friends in the south. and he did. he spent a lot of time in augusta. they should be heard from, too. their views should be taken into consideration. they don't want to go too fast. he would try to cool rings down, and he would pick up again, and there would be a sudden period of activity. we see 1967 was a period of activity. little rock. loatjh to959, he is -- he is loathed to do anything on civil rights. host: i went back and did this itself. i got his inaugural address and his farewell speech. i wanted to get the flavor of

it. the thing that was interesting about it was how much he mentioned god and face in the first -- and faith in the first inaugural address. and freedom. but he starts off by saying, let's pray. in the inaugural address, he opens up with a brief prayer he wrote himself. he said, i am going to write something myself. deeply spiritual man. guest: raised in a family of deeply spiritual parents who were members of the river trethren church, an offshoo of the mennonites. his forbearers came from pennsylvania. they were what we think of as amish. his father read a piece of scripture every night in the family living room. the boys had to sit around and listen. he knew his bible backwards and forwards. he did not enjoy attending church, and when he went into

the army, he steered clear of organized religion. this is so interesting and surprising an important for eisenhower. when he became president, he said, i have to be seen as a public man of faith. i need to go to church. he was a presbyterian, so he went to a reverent of the national presbyterian church here in washington dc and was baptized. a sitting president was baptized .n 1953 he then used religion as an important part of his public personality as president. host: his first inaugural was -- his second was 258 words long. in the third paragraph, he says, before all else, we seek upon our common labor as a nation the blessings of the almighty god. what would the president get if

you spent so much time on religion in an inaugural address? what would happen? guest: i don't know. i think there would be a lot of eyeball rolling and criticism. but eisenhower was unashamed, a fervent believer in god and a higher power. what makes an interesting is that he was not from a high church. this cap alien, for example. episcopalian, for example. he had a reverend brother upbringing. he did not wear it on his sleeve, but he felt it was important to be seen as a prayerful man. it was not an act for him. church membership was going up a lot in the 1950's. it was a spiritual awakening. remember they put "in god we trust" on their currency in this period, and they put "under

god" in the pledge of allegiance. host: let me ask about his farewell address. everyone mentions the industrial complex warning, but there is another paragraph i need your help in understanding. he talked about disarmament. resolvewe must learn to differences not with arms but a decent purpose. this need is so sharp and apparent, i confess that i lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. this is his last speech to the nation. as one who has witnessed the horror and lingering sadness of war, as one who knows another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so painfully built over thousands of years, i wish i could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight. guest: isn't that interesting that a man stepping down wouldn't crp aboutw all of his achievements, but instead say

there is still work to be done. and the tone of that speech is a warning. we have had to build the military-industrial complex to protect our freedoms. he basically said, i regret we had to do that, but we have done it. be created this enormous military power based on nuclear arms. he said, we now need to control it. we would love to get rid of it completely, but the russians will not let us. they are as aggressive and dangerous as ever. he was saying his preference would be total global disarmament. his preference would be peace. what he had achieved was creating a defense system that would help america, but was not the same thing as world peace. when he was president, there were 2.5 billion people in the united states. peoplere now 7.6 billion in the world. there were 150 americans.

what impact has that had alone on the way we are today in our society? guest: certainly, i think one thing i can say about eisenhower , the scale and scope of the u.s. government and the united states was a bit more manageable in the mid-1950's than it is today. while i think eisenhower can't he just basic things about governance in humility and generosity, kindness, moderation, the u.s. government has become so big. it is so difficult for any one president to be in complete command of it. i think it is dangerous to say, this president is exactly what we should do today. but i think we can be inspired by a character. a character of experience, knowing where you come from, the character of generosity, humility. host: where is your hometown

originally? guest: my hometown is chevy chase, maryland. but i was born in japan and lived a number of years in japan and tel aviv, israel, because my father worked for the state department. he was head of the u.s. information agency branches in japan and tel aviv. my mother was and is still an incredibly hard-working helper. i have two children, benjamin and emma. at the university of virginia, and m a will join him next year. host: our guest. has been william hitchcock. thank you very much. -- transcripts, visit us and

q&a.org. >> next week on q&a, our guest is john lewis gaddis, talking about his book "on grand which discusses political strategies to achieve goals. that is next sunday at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> here is a look at our live coverage monday. on c-span, health experts discuss at noon eastern, the house is back for general speeches.

on c-span2, secretary of state month pompeo -- secretary of state mike palin talks about iran after president trump's decision to withdraw from the iran nuclear deal. that's followed by a discussion on the influence of dark money in political campaigns. then at 3:00 p.m. eastern, the senate returns to considered data beyond go to serve on the safety commission. and on c-span3, a forum on voter outreach efforts by state and local officials. next, british prime minister theresa may takes questions from members of the house of commons. then a conversation with former white house press secretary sean spicer. and at 11:00 p.m., another chance to see q&a with history professor william hitchcock talking about his book, the age of eisenhower.