constituents. >> we engineered a sort of a creating process for committee hearing reports and that's a process that's been in many, many decades and e built an app that is compiling and rendering committee hearing reports, web the app and sort of takes process that had been taking weeks really to do and manual data entry to run that. it's just done with essentially a click of a button. "the communicators" tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span 2. >> c-span, where history unfolds daily. 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. today, we continue to bring you unfiltered coverage of congress. the white house. the supreme court. nd public policy events in

washington, d.c. and around the country. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. >> this week on "q&a" university virginia history professor william hicock. e discusses the age of eisenhower, america and the world. >> william hitchcock, why did you call your new book "the age eisenhower"? >> because i think the period from the death of franklin john elt to the death of kennedy, 1945 to 1963 is a which eisenhower's personality, his ideas, his alues and, of course, his presidency really dominate american public life. in that period, i think it's

he was the most well known, well liked, popular merican because, of course, of his record in the war years. emerging as a was presidential candidate and then as president, he was america's gly favorite public figure. and he gave his -- his instincts, his values, his presence really became part of 1940's and fe in the 1950s. >> there's been a lot of books written on him. i'll ask you more about that. you some ant to show video of a man that you have a ambrose. on, steven he was here in 1994 talking about eisenhower. let's watch this.

>> my interviews begin with working with him and interviewing him. it.et me read he published the first major biography that exploited the resources ntary available in handling where his library is. 2010, the "however, in eisenhower library reported that fabricated a number of interviews and inserted unsubstantiated quotes in his text. in as been clouded controversy ever since." >> yes, the eisenhower library reported this in 2010. it was a big surprise and it's regrettable because it does cast work on ver his eisenhower which is actually excellent. of archival t deal work that can be verified. hasten to stress so

much of his work is based on the printed record and i've looked at those documents and actually many, many more that have been declassified but it does appear that there are some questions the interviews and it's a puzzle because, of course, he needt need to -- he didn't to make up any quotations because he had such abundant eisenhower.m but it is an issue so i think it's something we should note. want to stress that steven ambrose did a great deal of good or not just eisenhower's studies but for world war ii studies and his role helping to the world war ii museum, for example, is a huge contribution to american public life. the don't want to overstate importance of this. but for eisenhower scholars, the raised. has been >> so what was available to you that wasn't available to any other scholar so far? >> well, the most material that i saw that was new has been declassified especially by the c.i.a.

the c.i.a. has been, you know, unlocking its vaults now quite openly on the 1950s. never have been closed for this period for so long. but at long last, they're releasing a d to great deal of material. so i read thousands and thousands of pages of documents scholars had looked at, many of them weren't working on a whole book about presidency. just a narrow monograph but the things that i saw that were related to the u2 spy plane, in particular. they related to intelligence athering around the missile question. what do the soviet missiles -- what soviet capabilities were? in particular d to some of the covert operation planning that happened very late eisenhower years. that scholars are still trying to get to the bottom of so although these may seem like findings to scholars, it opens up the window on just what about covert w operations late in his presidency. biography, kenyan college, yale university ph.d. university of e virginia, how long have you been there?

>> i've been at the university f virginia now almost eight years. i taught at a number of universities before that. temple university. wellsley college and taught at ph.d. for i got my eight years. >> what's your broad interest in history? >> i work on the 20th century international affairs. i just finished teaching a history lecture class at u.v.a. world war ii and in the fall, i'll start teaching a cold war history class. subjects that i really like to do. and i deal with what i said is of the 20th tuff century. all the terrible global wars. eisenhowergures like who tried very hard to bring peace to a very difficult century. >> early in your book, you write that he established a model in presidential leadership that more than ever, ought to study. why? > i call it the disciplined presidency and eisenhower in the

way that he carried himself and he man that he was was a disciplined man and a great athlete when he was young. every nized man in respect, very methodical that's how he ran the white house, too, and a extremely organized lot of people especially the oung senator, future president john kennedy kind of criticized eisenhower's dodginess for being andisciplined and organized predictable. but for eisenhower, it meant when crises came, he had a plan. to respond. he knew who to turn to. he used to say plans are worthless but planning is everything. so you're always thinking, hill? over the what crisis might erupt? we should be thinking about it. e was very systemic in the way that he governed. he met the press every week. he met congressional leaders every week. chaired the national security council every week. his thumb -- he had on the government. he trusted the process. he believes the federal work well if it

was well led. that's something that i think he real model to a learn from. >> what happened to his health through the end of his terms? >> he had some health issues, there's no doubt about it, you he smoked four packs of cigarettes when he was in the army. and in world war ii. >> a day? >> a day. four of them which means he basically was smoking every he was awake. he quit in 1949 but i suspect it a toll on his of health. he had a significant -- quite a in 1955ant heart attack and, you know, it's not all together clear how serious it as but it was pretty serious and he was out of action, out of washington anyway for six months. at a time, fortunately, when crises.s no great that was a lot of time to be out of action. he had a chronic problem with intestines, iltis that gave all sort of stomach pain in

his life. it was finally diagnosed and they operated on that and that was in 1956. in the summer, he was actually running for re-election so he abdominal ficant operation then and he had a minor stroke later in his second term. it didn't harm him much but him down for a couple of days and it was a bit of a scare you know, the s, mounting strain, the mounting toll of having been the allied presidentand then the i think started to show on him. for 10 years lived after he left the whose but these were signs of his competition which was very i think, starting to break down a little bit. >> 1955 was his heart attack. some video at 56 when he talked to the public and the press right after he came back. critical thing to change governments in this country at a time that it is unexpected. we have accustomed ourselves to hanging our government every four years.

always something happens. in times of war when the government has changed many times. i didn't know it until six weeks later. they told me it was. govern when he was sick and out for six months? >> he was. so he had the heart attack in denver so he spent a great deal fitzsimmons army hospital there recovering. he came back briefly to washington in the winter and chaired a couple of meetings and florida. basically, he was pretty much out of washington out of the white house for almost six months. he governed so this is a topic that leads us into the question of his relationship with richard nixon. he did not turn over much leadership to richard nixon, his president. in fact, it was his chief of staff sherman adams who did a great deal of the day-to-day of the presidency. i think it's odd that he did that but i don't think he fully nixon could that

manage the government in his absence. an interesting fact that they -- that he didn't turn over things to him and we didn't have the succession plan 25th amendment then in place. this story around president eisenhower offering richard nixon a cabinet position? eisenhower nixon -- wanted nixon to step off the ticket. and he didn't like to confront people in this way. he didn't like to fire people. say you're offto the ticket. what he wanted to do was offer maybe cabinet position in defense, maybe the commerce and make him feel as if he was some experience so he could be more of a national figure. o he said dick, i think it's time for you to go and get some real experience running a big executive department. in 1960, you'll be a better candidate to be president because you'll have actually done something instead of just being vice president.

and nixon thought about this and said, well, mr. president, are get off the to ticket? and he said oh, no, no, i want you to get experience. one t you to be president day. so he couldn't fire nixon. he couldn't direct him to do it. just offered him the opportunity. >> how many times did he offer him the opportunity? >> well, two months, sort of back and forth on it. and didn't want to leave the presidency because he knew it would be perceived as a demotion and it would be been dumped having because he was very offensive by being taken seriously by eisenhower. he refused to take the cabinet position. if you want to be me off the and i'll step down. ike wouldn't do it. they went back and forth in this very curious way. finally, eisenhower kind of gave up and said, all right, well, you tell me your decision, dick. and dick said i would like to tay on the ticket and eisenhower said ok. >> here's some video of president eisenhower talking nixon march 7th,

1956. tell ave not presumed to the vice president what he should do with his own future. this. told him he is young and vigorous, healthy. and informed on the processes of our government. as far as i know, he is deeply to the same principles as i am. >> why do you think he didn't second on the ticket the go around? >> it's to say. needed thatenerally nixon needed clearance and the defense department, for example, would give him practical experience in the department. nixon was very young. senate for a the couple of years and house for a couple of terms. didn't have a great deal of experience.c

nothing like what eisenhower had running the military. he thought it would help him. i think he thought of the vice presidency as a meaningless job. it's true. common 950s, it wasn't for the vice president to do much and harry truman had been length by 's president franklin roosevelt so nixon,

>> that opened the field for to run in the top five. that's a remarkable achievement nd reflects eisenhower's ability to govern from the center which is an admiral quality. > you can get on line and look at our poll. we went out of our way to alance it politically not just have one side as the poll back 1962.

footnote from your book. when he was nominated, he told jim haggerty, his press he would go to korea but to "just keep that quiet." that in an oral history and that was before he became president. hy did he want to keep it quiet? didn't he promise that during the election? >> he did. he wanted to drop that at the moment. he said he would go to korea during the campaign. he wanted that to have the that it at he knew would have when the former allied commander of world war ii says i'm going to go to korea and see what's going on there for myself as a candidate, he knew it would be a provocation because it would suggest and it did suggest that harry truman korean war ng the terribly well. he wanted to have as a bombshell to drop in the campaign and he it quite late in the campaign in october. that it would have when the former allied commander of world war ii

and he knew that truman would be offended, truman was offended. he called it an act of demagoguery. after the fact, many people debated whose idea it was. and hagerty said at one point, other members of the team had suggested it but in fact, what that showed is it was eisenhower's idea and he said just keep it quiet. we'll use this when we need to. course, he did say it in the campaign. and americans responded by aying the most successful soldier in american history is going to go to korea, figure out why we're not winning this thing maybe put an end to it. and everybody knew at that moment, he had won the election. >> 17 seconds of his trip to dressed in his whole army uniform. >> it has been really cold when arrived in t-elect korea to keep his campaign promise and it was the beginning tour ofee day whirlwind a front now going into its third year. it was part of the general's ission to see and appraise for

himself a problem on which his administration must decide. become president yet. that was december 1952. you can imagine how cold it was korea. he hadn't become president. you know, you have to remember civil military relation is this moment.at truman to fire the commander in 1951 because macarthur had said that truman wasn't the korean war well. here comes president-elect isenhower saying the same thing. i'm going to find out what was the matter. he did go and it actually think, his choice of policy in korea. he came back having seen the having seen how difficult it was to fight in korea and how stalemated it was. it wasntainous and hilly and he came back determined one way or the other, he was going to end this war. necessarily through an armistice. for a while, he thought he would pace of operations in korea until there was an the tunity to reach out to

armistice which he was happy to get. he knew that war wasn't popular and needed to be brought to an end. >> he says very positive things about the united nations in his first inaugural. in his farewell address to the nation. why did he think the united nations was a positive place? >> he was a great internationalist. firmly in theally so-called free world, the free nations of the west, working together. problems and eir in a way, displaying at the to the nonaligned movement, newly independent nations of the world, all of the states getting their the 1950s that this is how democracy works. great states can come together and work ted nations out their problems together. he had been the great coalition in world war ii and i think he was enormously effective at listening and hearing other people. problems.t it showed in the coalition in world war ii. he loved the u.s. for that very reason.

it was, in a sense, a projection of american democracy on the world stage. >> i do this, let me or before follow up on one question. how much did he have to do with war?ng that korean i know we're right in the middle of a continuing discussion 50 years later, how much did he with it?o >> well, he would -- he believes deal to do with it because he believe he had the nuclear ed saber saying if we don't get this agreement, we might have to nuclear. he believed that put pressure on an chinese to agree to armistice. we know a great deal of what was going on the other side. e know the death of joseph stalin in 1953 a big impact on both china and north korea. and at that time, stalin was all in favor of the war. and when he died in march of leadership in the soviet union said you know, we would love to bring the korean to an end. it's dangerous. it might get worse and lead to a nuclear exchange. we don't want that. the chinese and north

koreans to agree to an armistice o it was the pressure from the communist side, the changes going on in the communist bloc breakthrough.he and they came and said let's have an armistice. eisenhower ay accepted the armistice which he could do because he was a general. he was a republican who had great credentials as being a military man. if he had been a peacenik before been more ght have politically awkward to embrace that. to china.nixon going eisenhower could agree to peace accuse him o could of appeasement would be kept at arm's length. >> if you could sit down with ask him? would you >> i'd ask him the question that a lot of people have asked me. what did you learn from world war ii that really shaped your presidency? tried to answer that question by extrapolating from his world war ii experience. i would like to hear him talk about that.

how did it affect his judgment in crises of the presidency? from managing rn the world's most complicated war on such a huge scale. did it shape who he was as president? >> for those frustrated by the way i'm going on this interview i'm not tryings, to go from start to finish. biography of page dwight eisenhower. we've talked about him many the past. i was trying to find the things that are unique to you. this is a footnote that you wrote. about the bay of pigs. eisenhower later insisted that still in its was infancy when kennedy took office could have kennedy canceled it if he wanted and then another footnote that you soren sen attempts of nd sclessinger to saddle ike wrankled asiled plan it seemed that kennedy was imprisoned by eisenhower's plan. >> very interesting.

it gets to the heart of who was responsible for the bay of pigs plan but who writes the history presidencies? eisenhower said this is my story and it's accurate and kennedy kennedy's and some of supports saying no, it wasn't quite that way. eisenhower did plan what became of pigs operation. there's no doubt about it. we have a great deal of evidence showing that it was a year long process. thinking about how to invade cuba with a group of exiles, exiles from guatemala and overthrow castro. but eisenhower didn't pull the on the operation. and the reason is that it wasn't ready. to go.'t ready it wasn't big enough. it wasn't strong enough and eisenhower himself hadn't really planning that i think would have made it potentially successful. when kennedy gets into office, he launches it right away. it fails. he invites eisenhower to office the next day. did you do all these things and questions?gh

did you go through the logistics and planning? took thedy says i just advice of the generals. says that was your first mistake. kennedy always resented that eisenhower gave him this plan in didn't take responsibility for it. which, perhaps, he should have done but eisenhower's view was commander in chief. it's your job to ask the tough questions. your watch, it's your responsibility and publicly kennedy took responsibility for it. >> for those who don't know the of pigs story, briefly what happened? what was the point? >> the hope was to overthrow 1961 and the in idea had been hatched a whole eisenhower but didn't want to invade cuba with america soldiers. that would have been an everyone act that would have condemned. so the c.i.a. trained about ,000 or 2,000 cubans in doing

am fib with us warfare landing on ships on the beach of what was called the bay of pigs and they were going to fight their way into cuba and they were going to set off a everyone, theyuse thought, hated castro. it was kind of a scheme to begin with. but they were trained in guatemala. they were given arms. the americans helped get them on ships and got them to cuba. the thing went wrong from the very beginning. the cubans saw what was happening very quickly responded very quickly. they sank a number of their ships. a mess. and then it was a terrible mbarrassment to president kennedy because it was obvious that americans had supported beginning. from the >> what would president eisenhower have done about the ietnam situation and would he have gotten us in as far as we -- 550,000 troops? well, we know what he did do. he kept the united states out of the french 954 as were collapsing in northern vietnam. their colonial war there was the french and

begged the united states to get in and eisenhower said no, we're not going to do it. he stayed out and we know what he said at the time. war in the wrong place for the wrong purposes. we're not going to go to war to help prop up french colonialism. he then, though, invested a prestige and money in building south vietnam into a democratic asian country and he that south vietnam could be a model to the rest of asia. so by 1961, the commitment america had made to south vietnam was a very significant one. by 1965 when lyndon johnson ecides to send in hundreds of thousands of troops, the commitment was even greater. so it's difficult to know if done the would have same thing. i think there's a good chance he might have because i think he was doing at america in south vietnam was the right thing. talk about the c.i.a. information that was released ater on, what did you learn

about the c.i.a.'s involvement during the eisenhower years with the new information? >> well, big ticket what i will this exactly't say in these words in the book. but i have concluded that the director for the entire time that eisenhower was president was a pretty dangerous man. and he kept promoting covert and tions and sabotage operations of that kind to eisenhower very enthusiastically. early on, overthrowing government in iran and uatemala, 1953 and 1954 but later doing all kinds of operations around the world. eisenhower came to -- he was i y about alan dulles but don't think that he controlled him sufficiently. he gave him a little bit of free c.i.a. became quite reckless and we would learn later, later when some of their secret records became available late 1970s just how far they had gone to overthrow governments, plan sabotage and the

like. much of that was known because the congress started the tigating the c.i.a. in 1970s but there are a lot of concrete specific things about the c.i.a. gathered intelligence, what they knew especially through intercepts missile program we're now beginning to understand. >> what countries did the c.i.a. leader?nd assassinate a >> well, they tried to the leader of the congo. he was a radical, no doubt about it. come up with did an extraordinary scheme to try to -- to murder him. they secreted a terrible sort f, you know, biological agent in a toothpaste tube and gave it to the head of the c.i.a. station in the congo and hoped hat he could get this toothpaste tube into his, you bathroom kit and he would

brush his teeth and drop dead. congo saidman in the that's the worst thing that i've ever heard. i'm never going to do that. planning.the he was supposed to be trying to kill him. as it turned out, he had plenty enemies in the congo and he was arrested and he was his ually killed by internal enemies. but it's just an indication that the c.i.a. was trying to. hey also, of course, came up with dozens of goofy schemes to fidel castro. and some of them were really so strange and comical that you have to laugh. of of them involved the idea making a -- making an exploding seashell because they knew that go snorkling and pick up interesting shells. figured they have an interesting seashell. he might dive down for it, pick it up and it would blow up. stuff. but much more concretely, they did try to get some cubans who underworld to assassinate. >> did president eisenhower know this? >> that's a great debate.

advisors, one of advisors always, always insisted that eisenhower did not know about it and he would not have approved it. i'm not quite so sure. eisenhower did know. i think that his national his ity advisor late in presidency gordon gray kept him informed. i think they had an nderstanding not to talk about it. i think it was a kind of wink and a nod sort of thing. but eisenhower was unsentimental matters.se life long military man. he felt these were bad, bad people. if national interests required it, he would let it go. 1952 during the campaign, october 11th here's president talking about general eisenhower. >> the republican candidate for who has much to learn about these things has begun to this business of me

too. against social security, no better than prison he called it. he is against federal action in of health but in a speech in los angeles just the day, he said he was for extending social security a little bit. he said he is for federal aid to education. just a little bit. he is for medical care, just a little bit. i can give him a piece of advice. he need not be so timid. the special interest lobbies won't bite him now. >> so he offered to step down as eisenhower dwight would run. >> he loved eisenhower in 1945 nd even up to 1948, he thought that eisenhower would be a good president. he thought he might be a democrat. that's why. nobody knew what party eisenhower was in when he was in truman thought maybe he could get ike to run your uman said i'll be

vice president. in 1945, he really did say to eisenhower while they were berlin, actually truman was in berlin for the meeting. general, i'll get you -- i will that i can possibly do to help your career and that includes your being president. admired him so much and that was a time truman had i thinkome president so he was still in awe of eisenhower. this is in 1952 you can tell relationship ty and that's because eisenhower had been speaking out politically in 1951 and 1952 new deal.g the criticizing roosevelt and criticizing truman himself. riticizing the big federal programs of the new deal. he ran as a conservative in did and there's truman saying, well, one day e's a conservative, one day he's a liberal. you can't trust him. that's what he's trying to say in that campaign dinner speech. and that's like a lot of people who run for president. they tend to say different audiences.ifferent eisenhower was just as good a politician as anyone. the relationship between the two soured.

it's really too bad. >> you paint this picture but what's the difference between that general eisenhower came to the white house to ride capitol an up to the and the day that john f. kennedy to ride he white house up -- >> it got better. it couldn't have been worse with relationship and it got better. the relationship with kennedy better. the relationship was poisoned in the campaign between ike and truman. when eisenhower came to the white house to ride together to the capitol, it was very frosty. eisenhower almost didn't want to ride in a car together. the traditional sort of meeting of coffee and and so on. it was very, very icy. truman had said some really very eisenhowerings about during the campaign which i think were unnecessary. and eisenhower took it personally. he shouldn't have. but he did. so he was pretty bitter. later, it's a

very different relationship. isenhower was very angry that john kennedy won the 1960 election. no doubt about it. nd kennedy had criticized eisenhower in the campaign. kennedy had said terrible things about eisenhower. was a much enhower more seasoned politician. he knew it wasn't personal. and what he wanted was a good handoff. good handoff to the new president and so they met twice before the inauguration, two occasions and each time, they met for a long time. through world problems. they really discussed what was going on. eisenhower said look, it's a i want to help you anyway that i can. here's what i learned on the job few pointers so to speak. kennedy came away very impressed with eisenhower every time he met him. he realized this man is a serious figure which is not what he had said on the campaign trail. he said oh, he's such a dummy. he's such a dunce. at the wheel. when he met him in person, he realized what a significant was.re ike >> this was one of their

meetings the day before the inauguration where you have resident kennedy and president eisenhower just 20 seconds? the president and his responsible offices on some f the major problems that host the obligations abroad and up to date on those problems as of today. >> what was the atmosphere in there? >> very cordial. >> famous correspondent of nbc there a next to him long, long time ago. you report in your book two different things. is that he attended 300 and some national security council meetings. out of 300 and some. and you also say that he had a ot of news conferences on a regular scheduled basis. and that in 1955, he started television. >> yeah. say about him as

far as you're concerned? >> it shows that he was deeply encased in running the government. the figure is 90% of the meetings of the national security council. almost every week, he sat down his top national security team. secretary of state, c.i.a. head, and us military figures they talked through the world problems. he was deeply engaged in every etail of running the government. and the reason that's important is because the press didn't see that. saw was ike out golfing a lot. they saw him on vacation a lot. know just how deeply involved he was in the policy making and in the detailed nitty-gritty of running the government and we know that now. it's easy for us to say that he engaged.y it wasn't always perceived that way. i think it shows how disciplined he was. conferences, i think it's quite remarkable, we've sort of forgotten that the presidents used to be much more available to the press than they are today. a press conference nowadays with the president is highly scripted thing. very formal. to get a lot ng

f, you know, mistakes or goofs or real news out of the press conference with the president nowadays. the press secretary does it all. throughout eisenhower's residency, he gave a weekly press conference for about 30 minutes. stood there and he took questions. sometimes he didn't know the he would say i'll look into it. i'll get back to you. his press secretary was right all this.m doing occasionally he would pass him a note or two. but ike was available to the press. didn't tell him a lot but he was there. and i think that's -- that he elt that's what the president should do. >> you point out that it was radio until 1955 and then it was television. i have to say this is a fun clip because when we first saw it, first question is asked by somebody that he's no longer alive but he worked here at the career.is fella named bob clark with abc for years. and as time, he was with the service.ional news let's watch the first question on television of eisenhower.

>> i see we're trying a new experiment this morning. i hope that it doesn't prove to be a disturbing influence. >> i have no announcements. we'll go directly to questions. latest comments on -- in the light of our commitment. military that i know of as tried to rate these small that are under attack or themselves. part of the al defense people. we are committed. >> what was his relationship with the media? i just say one thing about what he was actually saying there? >> sure. yeah. see how good he was? he thought for a split second -- a very hard question. the first question on tv. e got thrown a really delicate

question, that was a question of defending taiwan from communist hina who at that point were threatening to invade taiwan? pour oil n't want to on the flames. but he also had to say well, there's a thing going on there that we're sort of in control of. here's the big picture. and he gave a very diplomatic answer to those who are experts impressive how good he was on his feet. ow, his relationship with the press was actually quite good. though, they admired him privately but they often in their reports tended to condescend a little bit to eisenhower and i think this is part of the origins of the idea that he wasn't in charge. that he was a lightweight. i think that they knew better. joke. think it was a good it became kind of almost a punch line to say, well, here's old his best but ing look at how he stumbles over his syntax and so forth. kind of mean.

>> here are your words from a footnote in the back of your book. this comes from the -- actually, here, i think the dallas papers. say ike liked deception and wanted to keep his nemies guessing about how far he may go to protect noncommunist states in asia. is close advisor, general walter smith admitted to the senate foreign relations 1954 ttee in february of that the administration had no intention of putting ground indo china and he hated having to say so in public. he would rather keep the chinese guessing. >> yeah. like aou know, it sounds cliche but it's really true that a -- your was actually know, it's a personal characteristic but it does influence this. he was a world class card player. not just poker player, bridge player. he loved to now,

keep his enemies guessing. guessing, ries chinese especially in the cold war but russian as well. he didn't want to go into public and say this is exactly what our policy is unless it served his interests. sometimes it served his interest to say as in taiwan, if there is willvasion of taiwan, that lead to war. he was very happy to say those kinds of things because it was a to the chinese. in general, he wanted to keep his enemies guessing and who wouldn't? that also reflects his leadership in the war years. e didn't want to tell the germans what he was doing also. you, ey tend to muddle the too, story according to gene eisenhower h, remained calm and unperturbed evidence provided by extensive c.i.a. surveillance flights over the soviet union. >> so the conventional wisdom before me was that eisenhower didn't worry about the missile gap. the russians hat

might have had a lot of missiles. didn't worry about sputnik he knew because of the u-2 spy plane, he knew that the soviets didn't have any big missile program at all. not true.ually the u-2 spy plane had started in running it over the soviet union in 1956. eisenhower was always very autious about using it because he was afraid one might get shot down and that would lead to an which it nal incident did in 1960. eisenhower 1959, almost shuts down the program. so there are no or very, very overflights in 1957 and 1958 and even into 1959 and because eisenhower has tried to put the brakes on the program. soviet y know about the missile program is incomplete. and it's unclear what they have. it's not clear. well, he just kicked back and said, i know. don't worry. here's no soviet missile

program, they didn't have the evidence to prove that. they were quite anxious that the some ns were building major, you know, icbms that could reach america. until quite a bit later that they got the ntelligence that proved the russians were way behind the americans. > i want to ask you about the bias of historians. another rite, again, the chief at biographer of eleanor roosevelt, series.three book cooks analysis of eisenhower's presidency was so clouded by the of ence she discovered covert operations secrecy, dirty counterinsurgency in his administration that she had trouble seeing any other of his leadership. she also -- your quote saying legacy is s counterinsurgency and political

warfare. >> you know, i think that's a wonderful question. nd i will say that i tried my darndest to write history in a reading this e book would know anything about me an author about my politics. there is no effort here to shape of ntemporary reading eisenhower to say he was good at this. bad at that or i condemn him for all of these things. not purpose for me for writing history. to try to figure out why did the choicesple make that they did? >> what's your take on others? through your research and you've done several other books. >> yes. e always evaluate other historians' work and the goal is sayto be a smarty pants and you got that wrong but rather, i have some new material that i can bring or i'm taking a different approach in some way to shed new light on it. think, takestion, i another crack at presidents -- at presidential -- we'll keep writing presidential

biographies. >> let me ask you differently. are we being treated well as a populous from historians? i think we're being treated very well. i hope that the public is consuming the wonderful history is coming out. ut readers have to be skeptical. historians have biases that are built in. ones and olitical often not covert but every historian has a different view and different way about writing figure like a president. so my advice is read three books on a given individual like the figure andr a public then make your own judgment about where you think the truth may lie. you start this book? 2009-2010.ed it in i had finished a book on the liberation of europe that 1944, 1945 and was a military and social history of europe at the end of world war ii. in nhower was a big player that book. it was a difficult book to write because it was depressing about the war. biography. try

i had never written a biography before and i come across work and in that thought what an interesting man. a lot has been written about his leadership and i felt the books on presidency were not quite as strong. there was an opportunity there. where did you go in order to research it? >> i spent the bulk of the time researching this book in abiline, kansas at our library.ial i did research here in washington, d.c., member of national archives and library of congress as well. but it is really where you have o go not just that's where eisenhower's papers are located, but that's papers, his hometown. the more time i spent in kansas the closer i felt i was getting to this man. he was a very famous, very worldly cosmopolitan figure but he really was from kansas. he never forgot it and he talked about it a lot. i felt getting to know -- seeing walkinge so many times,

around the town, feeling the different hich is so from the east coast. i just started to feel like i started to get a read on this man. the assertion made by tom wicker who is formerly of the "new york times" that arren, earl warren, former chief justice had "received no help at all from the eisenhower in helping on prepare the brown opinion" is demonstrably false. >> oh, yeah. no, the brown vs. board opinion may 1954, huge, huge milestone of civil rights. t showed that, you know, it argued, it told us that segregation by race of public schools was unconstitutional. some people thought maybe this bombshell that the eisenhower administration knew nothing about it and maybe to.hostile there's ample evidence that the attorney general herbert closely was working

with the plaintiffs in the case, shaping the arguments in the court. and that they knew. that they, in fact, favored, favor of a brief in desegregation. they felt, too, it was unconstitutional. of the was a product administration's policies as much as warren. now, warren shaped the opinion which was so important and it was a unanimous opinion. but this is a case where reputation has been done wrong. he was often depicted as someone who was against the civil rights movement or in some ways a day late, dollar short. but in that early period of his term, he and herbert brownell really helped the cause. hey did significant work pushing the ball forward. >> however, you write this. some scholars have recently to make eisenhower into a hero of the civil rights movement, an argument that overstates the case. >> well, what's interesting this eisenhower is you get -- he blows hot and cold and we ee periods of significant

activity in 1953 and 1954 is probably the best period where and he pullsushing back and says wait a minute, i have a lot of friends in the south. and he did. loft time in augusta. and they should be heard from, too. they should be -- their views should be taken into consideration. they don't want to go too fast. so he would then try to -- try to cool things down and then he would pick up again and there a sudden period of activity and we see the 1957 is uch a period of activity, passing the civil rights act of 1957. the intervention at little rock. again, after that, 1958, 1959, he's quite loathe to onanything really aggressive civil rights. so it's a picture of a pendulum swinging back and forth, i think. >> i went back -- this is not your book. myself.back and did this i got his inaugural addresses and his farewell speech. just wanted to get the, you know, the flavor of it. the thing that was interesting bout it is how much he

entioned god and faith in the first inaugural address and freedom. he starts off right away by saying, let's pray. his inaugural address, he opens up with a brief prayer that he himself wrote. he didn't pull it out of the scripture. he said i'm going to write something myself. deeply spiritual man. deeply n a family of spiritual parents who were members of the river brethren offshoot of the menonites, you know, his long -- had come from pennsylvania. they had been essentially what we think of as amish. his father read a piece of in the e every night family living room. all boys had to sit around and listen. e knew his bible backwards and forwards. he did not enjoy attending the h and when he went in army, kind of steered clear of organized religion. and he's the only -- this is so interesting, so surprising, so

important for eisenhower. when he became president, he seen as a to be public man of faith. i have to go to church every a regular church. and maime was a presbyterian. of the the reverend national presbyterian church here in washington, d.c. and he baptized. a sitting president was baptized then used 53 and he religion as a very important art of his public personality as president. 2159 first inaugural was words long and his second was 1658. third ht there in the paragraph or fourth paragraph, we ays, before all else, seek upon our common labor as a nation the blessings of almighty god. >> yeah. >> what would a president get if time today on ch religion in an inaugural address? think?ould happen do you

>> well, i don't know. i think there would be a lot of eyeball rolling and some criticism. but eisenhower was an unashamed believer in god and in a higher power. very much who he was. interesting is that he was not from a high background.know he had this nonconformist background as a very humble earth river brethren upbringing. so he didn't wear it on his to speak. but as president, he felt it was really important to be seen as a prayerful man. and it wasn't an act for him. definitely was not an act for him. and, ow, he was thrilled of course, church leaders -- membership was going up a lot in the 1950s. americans were in a bit of a awakening in that decade. remember, they put in god we on our currency in that period and under god in the was added during his

years. >> there's another paragraph in here that i need your help in understanding. talked about disarmament and he said together we must learn how to compose difference. with arms. but with intellect and decent is so because this need sharp and apparent i confess that i lay down my official responsibilities in this field sense of inite disappointment. as one who has witnessed -- this is his last speech to the nation president. as one who has witnessed the sadness of ingering war, of one that knows it, nother war could destroy this civilization that's been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years, i wish i lastingy tonight that a peace is in sight. > yes, isn't that interesting that a man stepping down wouldn't crow about all of his achievements? but instead, say there's still work to be done. i've left one big thing undone. is ahe tone of that speech

warning which is we've had to build the military industrial omplex in order to protect our freedoms and he said i -- he basically said i regret we had but we have done it. we've created this enormous nuclear power based on arms. and he said we now have to control it. we would love to get rid of it unfortunately, the russians won't let us. they're just as aggressive and ever.ous as he was saying essentially his preference would be total global disarmament. his preference would be peace. but he hadn't achieved that. what he had achieved was defense system that would protect america, but it the same thing as world peace. >> when he was president, there 1/2 billion people in the united states. 7.6 billion people in the world. absolutely. in the world. million americans and now there are 325 million. hat is that -- you know, what

impact has that had alone on the way we are today in our society? well, certainly, i think one hing i can say about eisenhower, the scale and scope government and indeed of the united states was a bit more manageable in the mid 1950s than it is today. while i think eisenhower can teach us basic things about answer and about humility and generosity, kindness, moderation, the u.s. government has just become so big and it's one fficult for any president, no matter how gifted to be in complete command of. so i think that it's dangerous say, well, this president is today. what we should do i think we can be inspired by a character. character of experience. where you f knowing come from. character of generosity and humility are things that eisenhower had. we talked about you being at the university of virginia teaching. where is your hometown originally? chevy chase, is

maryland. but i was born in japan and i lived a number of years in japan also in tel aviv israel because my dad worked for the u.s. state department. he do? did >> he was a foreign service officer and head of the u.s. in rmation agency branches the u.s. embassy and japan and in tel aviv. >> how about your mom? his loyal and as incredibly hard working helper as a diplomatic couple. family?have a you have children? >> i have two children. benjamin and emma. at the is a junior university of virginia and my daughter emma is going to join him next year. has been william hitchcock and the name of the eisenhower, age of merica and the world in the 1950s." thank you very much. >> thank you. >> for free transcripts or to give us your comments about this q&a.org. visit us at programs are also available as

c-span podcasts. >> next week on "q&a" our guest professor john lewis gaddis talking about his book ways the country has used military, economic and political strategies to achieve their goals. that's next sunday at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. here's a look at our live coverage today. c-span, health experts discuss the threat of infectious iseases and the u.s. response to potential outbreaks. hen at noon eastern, the house is back for general speeches with legislative business starting at 2:00. on c-span 2, secretary of state mike pompeo talks about u.s.

toward iran after president trump's decision to withdraw from the iran nuclear deal. that's followed by a discussion on the influence of dark money in political campaigns. then at 3:00 p.m. eastern, the to consider the omination of dana biaco to serve on the consumer products safety commission. 3, a forum on voter outreach efforts by state and local officials. >> tonight, on "the communicators" the second part coverage of the congressional hack-a-thon conference. mccarthy for leader and myself with steven dwyer, our goal is to bring together on off the ill and people hill in order to sort of improve government and make government the people able to and use the tool that, you know, come here to be able to better constituents.

>> we engineered sort of a whole creating s for committee hearing reports and that's a process that's been in ande for many, many decades we developed an app that utomates the process of compiling and rendering committee hearing reports. the web based app and sort of the process that had been taking weeks really to do and a lot of anual and data entry to one that is just done with essentially a click of a button. communicators" tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span 2. >> this morning, a reporters roundtable on the week ahead in washington. with the national political correspondent for the hill and shutt with c.q. roll call. and later as part of c-span's 50 capitals tour, minnesota brenda n commissioner

cassellius discusses the top her tion issues facing state. as always, we'll take your calls and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. "washington journal" is next. host: mr. trump: he will demand the justice department -- key members of the house intelligence committee, as well as members of the intelligence community. we are going to tell you about the request by the president and get your thoughts on it. if you want to give us a