-- they are talking about innovation and the marine air ground task force coming up in just a moment here on c-span. we will see you back here tomorrow morning on "washington journal," at 7:00 a.m. eastern. have areat monday. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> . >> welcome. this is part of an ongoing dialogue. to highlightpes current thinking and issues facing the naval services, the marine corps, the coast guard. our event today is our first one of 2018 and we look forward to having you join us for future events. we thank huntingtoningles industry for their support of the series and making it possible.

simplehave to make a administrative announcement. i will give instructions about what we will do. nour panel. we are fortunate in having a distinguished panel with a broad sense of responsibilities. we have the commanding general , the command corps out up quantico. we have general brian boudreau, an infantry officer, and no operationsandant for at the headquarters. pilot andhelicopter deputy commandant for policies and operations. those were wrong and i

apologize. and dr. merrin lee, formerf and an analyst at johns hopkins university. program will be as follows. we will have discussion here on the panel and then we will open it to questions from the audience. let me start. as we were talking a little behind the scenes here beforehand, we have a new national defense strategy out. have a new national security strategy. this highlights high-end competition, talks about competition, particularly with russia and .hina

we will start with general walsh, start there and mov do >> i think the challenge, as we , after many years of fighting counter insurgency in iraq and afghanistan, the national defense strategy russia andused on china as major strategic competitors, not just from a military standpoint. b nss also focused on it strategically. wh dor us, part of the naval force, it really grounded with our title x responsibilities and how we would look at long-term strategic competition as of the globe.

i think that the opportunity there is to get back to our navy roots. we are working with the navy and partnership. that has been very exciting forces.he i am also cochair of the naval board. onre's a lot of things going cno and the commandant to bring the forces together. be i would say that would the main part. i would say the excitement of that opportunity. the other opportunity -- and it is a challenge -- is where we have been with our investments over the last 16, 17 years. that has been a real challenge. when you start to look at the capabilities that we, in fact, used to have. we used to have light antiaircraft missile battalions.

when i talk to our young captains, they look at me like i have three eyes when i talk about, yes, the marine corps used to have missile battalions, antiaircraft missile battalions. those are the challenges. we now have to look at the person go, how do we meet and paste the threat so we have the overmatched that we need across the force? they overmatched -- overmatch that we need across the first? . a it is always great to be visitor in d.c.. it's great to be up from camp lejeune. reemerginged this -- reallyt we have used as a option for building readiness. , we just example

our formationned of the last several years for many things that general wash already talked about, the marine expeditionary brigade was the largest war fighting organization on the east coast. the expeditionary force was not going to be assigned missions to go fight at that level. this really reenergized a thel 2 -- with a novel to -- with a nod to the nss and the india us, this enables us to rebuild the capability on the east coast to have a war fighting organization. it, again, create some challenges, but i think there are far more oniti to reinvigorate that war fighting focus out of the camp lejeune

complex. are very excited about the opportunities to rediscover some a -- we three in particular, grew up within the marine corps, have been and now wedormant are having to plan again. we are having to look beyond the next deployment. we are having to think about how do we recoup time for marines and families and equipment to be beer prepared for a larger fight should that come. challenges and then we have these challenges bridge there and how to the two? i think that will be one of the exciting things we have to work with. with that, i will turn it over

to the general. >> thanks. good morning, everybody. it is a pleasure to be here. thanyou for the invitation. i think the nds, the nss, and importantly for us, the planning guidance that followed gives us a focus we have not had for a long time. institution to plan for that threat. what do we not know about those competitors, let's say? this is a re-focus on high-end war fighting and all that comes with it. with a good strategy comes good resourcing and we are very plead th the budget we had an 18 and 19 to be able to modernize the force, to maintain

our competitive advantage that we do not want to lose against china or russia. studentsg from how our should we hing a resiliecitint atitn in high-end warfare. we have the ability to generate a force. things like recruitment. that a smalls percentage of the mac and population are able to come into the military. we need to replace and generated capability should there be losses. madcapit gives the a thrust in a way we have not had, and it really shows the brilliance of the procurement of the f-35 and what it can do, anticipating this fight that's to come in the future -- let's the conflict short of conflict -- means too have the

carry on a fight against an adversary that has the means to deny us. threat-based strategy, not a capability based strategy, and our intelligence is laser focused on that. the training infrastructure that has to support preparation for a high-end fight is an investment we will have to make. if we are going to get extended weapons fire systems, we need ranges that support us and the ability to put a sensor and shooter together to operate with those kinds of ranges. so, something even as seemingly simple as a rifle with hier caliber weapon at extended rages , those ranges at camp lejeune or camp pendleton in some cases

are only designed to support training to some degree. and again, with that strategy came the lethality task force. the secretary is committed to adding lethality into the force. and we have already benefited osd money that comes into under the lithology task force. we are able to speed up procurement of things like andlder launched rockets night vision, and there has been a galvanizing aspect to this. it has already been mentioned -- our institutional war fighter talks with the air force that went dormant for 10 years. we have are invigorated the naval force to talk about the challenges in the pacific with the pacing threat that is out there. so, again, it has been a galvanizing effort for future development and capability, and with the army, it has been about

procurement. munitions, long munitions, ground systems, so we get economies inside our budget by working close with the army. it has been a huge amount of opportunity built into this defense strateg the force can fight today, we can win today. have no doubt in anybody's mind about that. this will enables less to make untilhis does not change xi jinping's 100th anniversary of what china has been after. we know what path they are on in terms of their own tip ability. we will not cede in the ground in that regard. rest assured of that i will turn it back over to you. >> thanks. it is great to be back at cs -- csis.

i have to put the disclaimer on, saying whatever i say today are my own personal views, not apl. i think i will take a slightly contrary view. to me, one of the biggest challenges for t corps is how they institutionally come grips with what i think is an interesting challenge. a focus on aink is dynamic force employment, or deliberate approach in increased suggestsacity, which we will be less of a more persistent-- presence that we have worked so hard in recent years to sustain, and you couple that with the .ccess challenges acute for the

mooring, because their challenges -- for the marine corps, because their challenges that would enable the access -- and they are working hard on concepts to exploit that -- and how you do that is the navy is not as present on a sustained basis as they might have been in i think is something that is going to require program, toto the take more deliberative actions. i think so come -- i think so -- socom, if the marines are going to be in the bubble, which to some degree would be expected, how do they work with that, not enable

the access from the other services? so, i think while i am a big advocate of strengthening the , i think the marine corps needs to think about conceptsg that a new because i think that dynamics suggests it is changing a little bit, or it should change. and i don't think the f-35, while useful, solves that problem to the degree that is required. it will be interesting to see how th guidance gets implanted . but again, i think it creates the biggest tensions for the core. so, i look forward to seeing more answers. question build on your here and give the generals a moment to think about their response, which is to pick up on

this dynamic force employment which is the nds, and not a lot of description, but the outlines of that appear to be -- the idea deployeding as forward as much so the force can husband some of its capability for surge requirements. panel -- howsk the is that playing out? i realize this is still in the very early stages. do we expect to see deploying in a different way as a result of this concept? gen. walsh: thank you. i will start with that. -- gen. beaudreault: thank you, i

will start with that. it tells us what to focus on. it also tells us what not to focus on. forareas of increased risk major combat operations rather than just solely a cpl fight. the whole point is to remain operationally unpredictable, so we will not say a whole lot about that to maintain our degree of unpredictability. one might be able today to know exactly when the marriott -- when the next carrie strike group is going to go. those days are going to change and they will change by year and by focus area. they very much will be a tool at the secretary of of defense in consultation with the joint chiefs on how those dynamic force deployments are

scheduled and where they will go. they will be -- it will come from forward deployed forces as well as surge forces. essenceat iwhat we are trng to t after, to be very strategically predictable to our allies and partners and germane operationally unpredictable to those who take .nterest any other comments? toi guess one thing, just add to what gen. beaudreault said, we have been a very busy force. but with these strategic guidance we have gotten, focused, like you said on dpg, where the marine corps is focused, much more than the

pacific where we have other alr 's, that allows us to have space there to reset the force to focus much more so -- you talked earlier on higher-end a clipng, higher-end training, higher and manning to go towards in ds isnce the telling us to move towards. i think it is -- i agree that focuses very helpful. i think the question now becomes there is also language in the strategy is about more dynamic , ways ofnd posture approaching that challenge, how the core executes that. it's easy to talk about and a lot harder to do. you know better than i do. what does that end up looking like.

again, if you assume that that is going to be most of what you start with, the bubble goes up, the balloon goes up, how tho you maximize the flexibility and the combat power of that force around the theater to create conditions for others to come in , i think, it's a significantly different way of thinking about i had tond of course think about it for a while. so the degree to which you're going to be able to leverage the navy to do that, at least in the short term is sort of an open question in my mind. picking up on another thing that maren had --sed, there's a lot of talk especially with their ability to build defensive bubbles around

her homeland, and i know cno 280 -- a2ade a recause it seems a little the training,rations, organization, and dr. -- a operating in that kind of environment, as opposed to the permissive kinds of environments we have been in the last really two decades? of your remarks have touched on that, but let's start with general walsh and work our way down. gen. walsh: i will just start said,as gen. beaudreault, the strategy is the most clear strategy i have seen since 1980 nine, the reagan administration, clear strategy. the department is clearly turned in that direction. so clear strategy is telling us to move in that direction. i will start with concepts.

our training, our equipping, our manning, how we organize. with the clear guidance from in operationslike the in a contested environment gned b the commandant -- getting very close to being signed from the commandant and mainno, and another one, a battle that we are working on with the army, another concept, so the concepts will drive very much where we drive our , where we put our s&t. that is driving everything we do. the concepts are unifying, socom on the main battle site, but certainly in base operations,

driving everything we are doing in the department all the way down to the operating forces. so, i would just hope the concepts, as a piece, are a major driver, and the operating concept that the commandant signed in the fall of 2016 really put us on the road to march down this path looking at the higher and conflict. yes, so none of this happens overnight, where we have been, where we aspire to, certainly secretary mattis would like the first to get there more quickly -- we are incremental, i will not say incremental change. but certainly we all wait for cdni to handoff a vertically formed concept -- we don't wait to handoff a perfectly

.ormed concept around the globe, how would that look if we had to do it. how would we look at it as a force to force competition? we have these slices of the work that we can put to work immediately and learn from them now, rather than waiting for everything to be perfected. we know it will take some time. it is the same thing with the force presentation. we have a lot of folks on the road around the world doing the nation's bidding, and i would like to have more of them at home preparing them for a higher-end confrontation.

we are working on all of that. but you cannot flip the switch and say, ok, everybody, come home. we will retool you for a high-end fig and nextear we will be good to go. that is certainly not the way it will happen. it takes a change in mindset, a change in culture almost to arecus on the things that going to matter should we have to fight inside the bubble as an inside force. mr. cancian: i will come back to the inside force and name -- i will comeault: back to the inside force in a minute. we may have to fight to get to the fight. the fact that we have sea control and air superiority is an assumption we're not making any more. we look at not just the expeditionary advanced phase operations or the operations of

the contested environment. we are working with the air force on a base in concept and with the navy on maritime operations. so, when you take the marine operating concept and start to merge it with the joint concepts, we all start to recognize that if you can be seen is to be targeted is to be killed. pacific,lace like the it is and the distribution of your force. it is the ability to rapidly aggregate in a time of your choosing. it is about decoys and deception. it is about low observable properties with modernization of equipment. it's all of those things. and about all domain acces ensuring ourselves across all of the domains -- space, cyber, surface, undersea, land -- it is about a fleet in being that can be a land-based fleet to support flee -- support sea control.

it does not have to be naval against naval. when we look at missile strike ability or high mobility any multiplekets, rocket system we might be looking at at extended ranges, we can support a campaign we have not been able to do in the past. capability,nned unmanned sensor, unmanned --oter, arknd net force we are talking about a very sophisticated high-end fight where we need to maintain dominance first of all in the informational space. if we can do that, that will underpin everything we can do for command and control, from the ship talking to a land-based system, from a manned sensor being able to relay through an unmanned sensor back to whatever command and control apparatus might be in charge of the time to incorporate artificial intelligence into our systems, watson-like capabilities. it has to move as quickly as the

opportunities reveal themselves. there will be a lot of machine learning. there will be a lot of movement. of investment in artificial intelligence. we know the chinese have made a lot of investments in that area and have great capabilities. those are the things that will enable this force to be able to .ight in a high-end fight lastly, on the inside force -- we may see two different forces emerging in the same marine corps. there's the constantly forward deployed aspect ofhearine corps on navy ships. it's going to be inside the adversary's area, if they decide to light up the systems one day. contact.o be the someone has to do the job for those marines on amphibious forces or subsurface navy and air. is going to deny the adversary the initial capabilities. disrupt their plans.

we will by time and space for decision-makers to search the force. so, you will see us operating inside the contact and block layer. you'll seehe trd layer of these surge fce coming in and of course, the fourth layer is homeland defense, more geared northcomrth column, -- , norad. it has to be survivable and lee full. destructive, denying force, and the rest is coming in from places like camp pendleton or camp lejeune, a canal, assembling at the right place. to them, to serve as part of the search layer, the war winning force the army will be deploying. mr. cancian: i want to turn to fornavy and the navy's plan -- i5-ship battle fleet

think that would build the amphibious forces of 238. 38.p to i want to ask about the navy shipbuilding program and how the meets the needs -- and challenges that may behere. but the second part is about the use of auxiliaries and non-amphibious ships, particularly as done in the pacific. to me, some of these amphibious demands, when there are not enough ships to go around -- gen. walsh: i will go first. certainly the navy is aware of

the force structure assessment, determining that greater than 355 ships is the plan and how long is that funding going to be consistent? so if you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, we have capacity at our shipyards where weincrease capacity, were can build warships if we get more money to accelerate at a faster rate. congress can help accelerate that. that would certainly -- we would be fully in support of that. we are on a path now where we are shipg to the lha class with america, tripoli coming on -- coming on line now. we have our led's alex are. all of this to get us to that 38-ship requirement we are looking for. with thefew years

modernization money we have had, we have been focused on readiness. the marines have been operating very hard. they are focusing on readiness, getting the readiness of the ships as the first focus. now it is capacity and the number of ships we need and close behind that, part of the equation is the capability on the ships. we talk about distributing maritime operations. part of that is the amphibious ships being part of that from a projection standpoint, but also a control standpoint. we talk about dynamic force employment. in do we use auxiliary ships different ways? i will give you one example out in sicily, that i thought was very exciting out there. in the fifth fleet, we actually have a marine general who is in charge of that task force.

they take the expeditionary .taging base that is along with the etf. they put that in the equation with the other naval ships we have got out there in the fleets. so that was, i think, the first time i have really seen an operational commander bring those new auxiliary ships in and use them in different ways for operational missions in the fifth fleet, which i think is a dynamic we are watching very closely and how that will operate in the pacific and also the mediterranean. gen. hedelund: i think i will

take that auxiliary idea a little bit longer. we should be careful how we rely on the ships o operationalize them. weill spena lot of time in norfolk looking at these platforms. because just because that is the flight deck does not necessarily mean it is capable of doing the things and amphibious ship can do. the options is the exciting part, i think and the opportunities are that are available when you have more options are always a good thing. i would be careful not to ships as morehese than they are or less than they .re any time you can spend more time with your navy brothers and sisters and learn more about their capabilities is good. i would plea my remarks in this series of relationships, but this is the strongest time that

the navy -- that brothers and sisters in norfolk have not been beng,tt i ng time. we look forward to continuing that you they want to enable the force. so given the things that general walsh is talked about and some options, we look at a great opportunity going forward. gen. beaudreault: so it seems with a 355-ship navy, we have a tough time breaking a 10% threshold of amphibious craft for the fleet. i am confident we will get there .

then it is a matter of what is on them? we need to build them in the future differently than we have done in the past. we cannot always count that there's going to be a number of destroyers and cruisers to escort amphibs or to tuck in. they need to have defense of systems,nd offensive vertical launch systems that we in the place on them future is important, to make sure they have resilient command-and-control systems on board, that they have all of that that is required. everything is something that we will look at. it is necessary, but not preferred, right? mphib -- it is best suited for a low-end operation rather

than high-end war fighting. they are wonderful for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, perhaps you have a force bring a vacuumase time.or a -- if vacuum he's for time. but they are not in oee or oha. we will use them for command-and-control, at the russians and was looking at the connectors that operate with the ships. -- at some point, looking at the connectors that operate with these ships. do differently aboard cruisers and destroyers? what capabilities can we put aboard an lcs that we have not fully explored? if we have small craft and cruisers, is not always high-end, but just enough

to give the adversary something different to think about when they see marines on the deck of a ship a are not used to seeing in the past. we will get creative with everything that floats. continue to explore and innovate with the navy anyway wn. completely agree with what the other three have said. i think it is certainly -- and all the work i have done on the combination of command-and-control on the platforms, you can get bits and pieces and other platforms, but that unique combination has a role to play. so, i think the navy's commitment to distributing command operations goes exactly where gen. beaudreault was talking about, talking about how you optimize across the fleet those capabilities and the flexibility you get as the fleet gets built out.

it implies a lot of change for both forces and thinking about how they can get the most leverage out of the facilities they offer. i would say another major inponent is the increase ,aval capacity around the world right? many of our friends are their fleet substantially in response to the same challenges that we see. i was able to do some work a couple years ago with the australians as they started building amphibs. there are lots of opportunities for other platforms as well that i think and bring real synergies with -- armoringourse of core. i know the core is looking at that as well. corps.marine is looking atps

that as well. newcancian: people look at systems. analysts have indicated that is too narrow way of thinking of it, but it is an important component, new weapons, new systems coming into the fleet. i was wondering if analysts might wa to comment on what is geckoto be in the future -- future? i will start with the capabilities we have as we start to build out in 20 -- if you look at the marine corps concept, a lot of this is on the marine corps side. that is the priority. that is where we see the having all domains. we try to maneuver in all the. we see lots of advantages in that area.

the funding increase, how do we operate in a degraded area? along with the organizational change, our big organizational change was standing up as gen. talk, in those information groups. that we have changed the maneuver significantly with that operating concept. when it comes down to our canon, , looking aty everything from a midterm, near-term, and long-term perspective to -- per perspective -- perspective. going out and procuring something that is available right now that we can integrate into our command and control

places-- a lot of secure that we have got, our aviation command-and-control systems, we have the 50 generation systems. we are integrating into the joint force. we have systems like that. we do not have the shooters that we need. those are the things we will focus, air defense being our third priority. degraded environment is where we are putting investment. we see the intellectual capital we have with the marines, our high-end capability, tying that together with technology is where the radvante is and that advantage has allowed us to operate in sometimes autonomous and a more independent manner than we ever have before. it could be a reconnaissance unit, but it has the capability

to maneuver on its own, to since the battle space on its own, so something like an advanced reconnaissance vehicle we are now putting money into to develop the next reconnaissance vehicle that will be the future, to finally i'm ability conduct protected abilities and enhanced maneuvers and how do we have protection systems just like the aircraft out today, with the generation systems we have? we need those capabilities to maneuver and enhance our protection from ability systems. i would say that those are the capabilities we are really going after in the defense budget. just this year, we got a 7% increase in funding. so the money shows where our investments are going and we have long-range precision fire.

gen. hedelund: a little bit more -- our proximity to camp lejeune is quite useful in our ability to play with some of all of the toys. have the ability to put these ideas to work. but they had previously to putied other concerns those gether. so when they go down range, they have everything they need. the transition to the still retainsoup most of those capabilities, but

as a component that is pretty important. to sorthave been able out with day-to-day learning is you cannot take a leal capability and a nonlethal capability and expect them to play well with each other just by being in close proximity. the planning that goes into an information environments with -- and information barnett with behal adversary's has to baked into the fabric. we are looking forward to opportunities in the fall to .ontinue to build on this work just one small example, the signature management, we will be doing a segment for -- a signature management wargame

that is really with it -- worth it. we used to be pretty good as signature management. with the resources we were up -- theyin the cold war were real. i would not say we were lazy, but we have not had to worry about that in recent years. dow signature management is going to be a big deal. relearning or coming up with new s is an important parts of what the expertise will be able to help us with going forward. mr. cancian: maybe just the last parts on -- maybe just thet: last parts on this one. any technology has to be sustainable. we have to make sure that the parts are there, the spares are there, we can maintain it.

and it is about the people at the end of the day. it is always about the people who put that technology into action. we know how long it takes to develop a cyber warrior. there are clearance backlogs. capability is coming. there are a couple things we're looking at that general walsh had in his subsets of priorities. one of those would be operating from a ship. there are very few that can effectively operate from a ship. and then we have the focus intot for the rest of 18 19 will be logistics modernization. if we have this concept of the expeditionary forces, how do we sustain that force? what do we need for the future?

what will be manned? what will be unmanned? asset coming into the flt an incredible machine that can lift 1000 pounds gross weight. it can lift and upwards of pounds. it has sling loads it can resupply and sustain it over 12,000 pounds each. that's ammunition, that's fuel, that's what ever we need. there are several things we are looking at to get through the challenges, breaking --n and setting up what will what we will have. maybe you break down and move every 72 hours. operational unpredictability is how we are building this.

ok, to wrap this last question of, i will ask maren's work at the think tank -- what should the marine corps be thinking more about? ms. leed: i think i completely thee with the things generals of talked about this morning. informationfocus on andare and the spectrum spectrum warfare, i think is overdue and well warranted. that is the critical enabling capability that has to be considered. i don't think they are not -- i think the marine corps faces some fundamental

that bble in leverage the resources more, that also in him's u.n. to a certain extent in that you do not have a lot of money to go pursue a lot of new capabilities. i also think you are inherently dependent on the others. think one of the challenges the marine corps has had is they have a lot of good concepts and they have not had as much an impact as they might've had if they were one of the bigger services. within the constraints that you face, i think the focus has been the right areas. arguably, itsay -- is relatively unchanged for some number of decades. people can debate how many

be,des, what you want x to but it is a lot, i think. to me, that is the fundamental question, is that is that given thed i think dependence on other services, i it gets you anywhere differently, necessarily. i think there is more of a general consensus. joinou collectively answers and program to them? i guess we will see. the proof will be in the pudding. mr. cancian: thank you. we will open it up to questions.

the microphone will come down gop rid. i would also ask that a question mark be at the end of your question. -- the microphone will come down to you. >> hey. do we run a risk, if we go to this dynamic force deployment, , we willbeaudreault have a more higher and grew back home that is able to train at a higher level -- do we run the risk we will have to compete for andts to move those marines be more dependent on land bases forward under that concept? and does that blur the brand? question,for the admiral. i would say no.

i do not think we will have to rely on lift because the dynamic forces of the marines will be tied to the navy. is global force management being looked at as we speak. in terms of the drivers will be the readiness for those forces. back in the u.s. and those that are forward deployed, we know, are already most ready. the key is combat credibility. are they combat edle? we have all kinds of marines deployed, butard a small unit in south america doing security cooperation at the tune level is not combat credible. they are there for a specific reason and purpose. you might have the 31st platoon and you might have a west coast that together, you combine the arrangement out of oaken à la --

okinawa. now you have a significant combat credible force to do part of this dynamic force employment i mentioned. it's about readiness. it's about readiness that meiko of forward. it is about credibility in the formation. mr. cancian: sydney? >> [indiscernible] >> hi, gentleman. sidney freberg from breaking defense. there be a difference between the surge force, a blunt contact force he echoed the blunt contact force will be able to operate wendy bloom goes up, as it were -- a blood contact force? force will beact able to operate whenhe bloom

goes up, as it were. a three-waye's even bifurcation by those guys on those missions who may not have the same level of hardware or mass. to what degree are you creating different flavors oflene -- marine. -- marine? to what degree can you maintain the capability you have now? >> [indiscernible] not to try to make this too simple because it's not -- the marine corps is a one mco force. if something breaks around the , the forces you describe are the ones that are going to go. , in the korean theater, there are forces that have trained specifically for that mission.

camp lejeuneces at today, if it comes to a full-blown conflict, have not trained specifically for that mission. now, they have obviously done very well training for the essential tasks that are within notr mission, but they may be as steve in the knowledge of the peninsula as the ones who work there every day. same goes for that force that is almost every conflict i can think of in recent history the marine corps has been associated with. we did windows on the way to or back from the conflict. --ther it was desert storm it seems like library a was always a stopping point to or from a conflict that was always a little more serious. solutionhat a perfect would be those three forces you

have all known each other, trained together, have the ability to combine arms. that is optimum. we don't always have that luxury, i think. things like a well-known eratin concept that has dried out and then experimented with is valuable. if you have to put these forces together to do it, at least you have a common ground to work , with the knowledge that being able to do that with the exact forces who are called to do it, it can be very, very difficult. that may need some in bellus when, if you will, from the other panel members. -- some embellishment, if you will, from the other panel members. gen. beaudreault: on the training focus, it does very much get you the forces on the

assignment. it could be very much focused on ct support. it might be a flood to do personnel recovery, quick reaction force, primary missions. it's going to be combat credible, but it could be marine expeditionary, which itself may not be enough to do what is necessary. it really gets to the training focus, and the training focus for those back at home versus those who were forward deployed should be on combat operations. that is a different kind of training for folks than it is for 10 expeditionary getting rate to go and do 19 different things in support of a combatant commander. we talked about the surge force. we cannot just think about the marine corps or the navy itself. at the nation is going to go to if we are searching from the homeland, is not just

marines. there's going to be bomber presence. unitswill be army mobilizing who knows if it requires reserve mobilization are not. it depends on the crisis of the day. it but this is much bigger. where does the marine corps formation fit in that is the level of capability we are talking about. that bothnsion questions alluded to is one that i tried to raise at the beginning of the session. in my mind, the other implication of that is that the, -- that contact and blunt force has to be able to leverage the other elements of the joint force that are also there. there will likely be some. had you do that to some extent? depending on geography, that is

going to very. i think it is a very -- it is a different way of thinking aut where -- i will not call it a gap, but if there is a greater seamen forrd and surge or at least a different nature, what does that imply for the seams we have allowed to present within that forward force? getting those together more closely. the faster that contact and blunt force can be effective, the quicker the surge forces can reinforce. it is a different way of -- it requires a different lens. not fundamentally different. we have to think our way through that. >> another question. right there. thank you.

i am a think tank focus on nuclear policy and strategic defense issues. t month mayly, 24, national defense operatn act. --re are three presented there are three provisions in maritime defense. mandate, a new program to develo and intercept capability including kinetic interceptor while continuing efforts to develop energy solutions. my question is how important is that -- would you please elaborate that?

it is not an area directly for the marine corps. what i would say is when you get into great power competition, you have to have a credible force. today, we are just focused on a piece of that. for our national capability, you have to have a credible capability. . looking at the nuclear force, we have not put in a lot of effort or funding into that for many years. to have a credible deterrent capability, you have to have a credible nuclear capability. looking at that capability along with things like energy weapons which can be -- all those capabilities will come into play. it is things we have not put our resources against. we have not been focused on any type of strategic competition or threat. the threat is driving us to new capabilities.

we have to increase our conventional trading against our higher ed capability. i do not know if you want to touch on anymore. >> i think you are referencing space. is that correct? it goes to the strategic investment we are making. some comes off the top for every service pay for the common good. i will not get into any of the things we are looking at. it has rea been recognition in the last couple of years that space is now a war fighting domain. we need to protect our assets that are up there. eee cognizt wt thadversary has. we to look at what commercially available things can augment our own efforts of their. -- thethe later focus laser focus of the united states air force. the investments will be well made. i would just out there.

-- i will just stop there. the fact that we recognize it as a worth fighting domain and that everything is going to be peaceful in terms of exploration , i think those days are behind us in terms of enring our ability to operate. >> good morning. that was a great segue into my question. to kind of built on space a little bit. space is not only a worth fighting domain, but in the last few years, we recognize it is competitive. it is can just it best -- it is congested and competitive. my field is in commercial satellite communications. there are a lot of commercial systems that are coming online.

we are starting to look at other orbits. we have already got a constellation in medium earth orbit. the systems are inherently more resilient to both kinetic attacks and to jamming tof that nature. my question is, just some thoughts on incorporating that for ship to shore communications. the marine corps is good it recognizing that space is a contested environment. thank you. >> across the joint force, we are looking at that. one of our top modernization priorities is c2. space is going to be contested. if it is going to be contested or potentially a small number of military satellites, the way to

become more resilient is to leverage commercial capability or put lots more of them up there. we are looki a developing mesh networks of our own capabilities. we cannot rely on the current structure. we have to move in a new direction. in space, there are a lot of opportunities. a lot of the smaller commercial satellites should be able to leverage them. along with being able to put up more satellites ourselves. a lot of the technologies we are putting up, we can use with balloon capabilities. >> by chance, i had an opportunity to talk with general bolden. just saturday night about the manner in which the commercial space industry is taking off right now. it is hard to envision today

what may be available in three or five years. where space x and others are going to take us. part of this is a aining issue. ability tose our have satellite communications or something along those lines, is the force prepared for that? do we force a unit to operate in a degraded environment? figure out what the workarounds are. how do we work around those things? some of this is inducing friction into our training and try to overcome it. have a better realization of how dependent we are or not in certain areas. is there still some use of radios or manual workarounds? they. on the end -- there. >> first of all, thank you all.

youd a question -- mentioned multi-domain battle. i wondered about the joint force. what role the army plays in that force? thank you. >> i find it interesting. the concepts we are working on when i takey -- that across to multi-domain battle with the army, a lot of the conpts across both. they are almost identical. as you look at that, what we are trying to do is try to have the ability to maneuver where and when we want. be able to have overmatch when we want.

it may be in a much more distributed fashion than we have today. our work with the army is that we may be the contact or blunt force. they are going to be right there with us because they bring a lot of joint capabilities that we would not have. how do we enable them to come in more quickly and interface with us? as you start to drive the joint concepts and you start to develop things like multi-domain battle, it is bringing in a lot of the joint staff to make this more of a joint capability. how all these different capabilities come together. >> third try. gentlemen on that end of the second row there. >> good morning. the marine corps is doing a lot of reorganizing. what you are doing with the infantry squads. the higher-level information

groups. ops,g the kind of inside are you looking at other reorganizations? will you have to change the kind of units that you are ready to deploy? the experiments with the company landing team rather than working on battalion for those kinds of inside ops and low visibility. are you going to have to look at different organizational levels? >> i will start on that one. i think the comment earlier had not changed in decades is only part of the sty. -- they are constantly evolving. the marine expeditionary unit is

not the marine expeditionary unit of the past. the capabilities they have with operations,ation intelligence signals -- all of the -- at the appropriate level deploymentnges each because the world changes each deployment. that is one thing that is important. the other part of that is that we do believe that how we concepts.hese other almost as big or small as you can envision it to accomplish a certain mission. are going to task organized to accomplish that mission. bugsnnot kill all of the with a sledgehammer.

we have to be a little bit more precision and more specific about how we get after certain problems. wile always have done, we experiment with different organizational structures to see which one might be best to get after a particular mission. we rely heavily on the tactical commander. the guy that is down there on the leading edge to put together a great team. that should not be wed to a specific block turn. -- block chart. >> the lady at the end of the first row there. >> thank you. i have a related question. within the context of dynamic force employment, we have heard about new technology pushed down to the lower end. i was wondering if you are also seeing where specific mission sets are being pushed down?

can platoons and companies use that technology to use their old missions better or are they using that technology to take on new missions they cannot boot -- they cannot do before? it is new methods to execute many of the same missions. for infantrymen, it is about destroying the enemy. how we find them and how we close. with what we close. it may not be a human at all. it may not be a human that even sees the enemy. there is something that is going to locate. there is something that is going to close with. there is something that has the ability to finish. the types of things that we are going to enable marines and soldiers and special operators to have an cross plinate all the good tactics, techniques,

and procedures to go with that. i do not know if the mission changes. the manner in which we can execute that mission at less cost to the human is what we are after. give two examples that are maybe a little bit different. had been trying to give our and retreat more capability and am electromagnetic spectrum -- electronic spectrum. the battalion fourth marines a lot of electronic attack capability. what we noticed with them is that they absorbed it very quickly. it was a new mission for the. this would be something that even back in the cold war where we had a lot of electronic attack capabilities, it would be to a specific unit. in this case, we pushed that down to the infantry marines. they used it incredibly

different than i could have imagined. how they embraced the technology. they were in fact maneuvering and electronic magnetic spectrum. they were operating non-kinetically. we started talking about putting up walls at different phase lines. this is not something i had seen infantry do in the past. they used it effectively. that was down at the small unit level. question, to otto's it is kind of reversed. had over the years become more decentralized with more direct capability down detached units down to lower levels. we have kind of actually brought that marbach and got that more functionally -- more back and got that more functionally organized. how the air with

combat unit -- that was kind of a reversal. to push those detachments back down, which is a lot of the weight we are going to be doing it. if you look at the information capability, our air officers down at lower levels being able to augment those capabilities at a higher end with the electronic magnetic's vector -- electronic magnetic spectrum. there.ill go to the back one of our own. >> good morning. i am a flow here. there has been a lot of -- where are those discussions? moved, whatr is not

are you doing to mitigate those? >> the discussions on the 10th r is going to be -- there is a common desire to do it. it is the year in which we can execute. we wanted to start sooner. there are valid reasons the united states navy would like to postpone that by a few years. that is where it is. we want to get the laydown. we want to do it in conjunction with the navy's overarching plan. i think that is probably not going to happen within the next year or two. the idea of why we want to do it, which would increase reduce thed would

number of days required to aggregate a force against one of our major plans is there. waffling too much, we finally have a agreement between -- that yes we would like to do it. realistically, it is probably going to have to wait a few years. what was the second part of the question? [indiscernible] >> it was really driven by trying to posture the force and give them the optimal trans regional effectiveness from any single deployment. servicethat you can from the eastern med. i think we are able to do that

based on where we are headed on dynamic worse -- dynamic force deployment. though we would like to see the r come to the east coast, we will get much of it raised on what the secretary is thinking about on dynamic force employment. it is not going to happen immediately. >> we have time for one last question. the lady there who has her hand up first. >> good morning. a lot abouted multiple aspects that are changing. do you feel the department's current readiness metric serves u wellith this change or do you think they need to evolve and modernize? first, we would -- we like

the current trend in our readiness profile. across the board. . it has taken us a while. both aviation ground equipment, personnel -- isoing iright dire. thatr as the metric whether or not they are useful and helpful in a way we describe our readiness posture, there are challenges with any -- the change of a flag from one hand to another can change a readiness profile from one day to another and move your readiness needle in a direction that may be good or bad. entertaingoing to readiness metrics or readiness reporting or readiness discussions, we have to

acknowledge it is the commander's assessment piece that we need to pay attention to. the overtime trends and what that commucates to the institution about need. confidence that my readiness reporting is being received and acted upon by the institution, then i am pretty happy with that readiness reporting regime. the point at was that no longer helps me communicate my readiness concerns, then we need to talk about whether or not we need to change it. at the service level and above, there is lots of potential concern or challenges with readiness reporting. from our perspective, it is the discussion it generates that is really important. my opportunity to engage with my commanders about where the readiness is is one thing.

where it is going and the direction it is going is the more important discussion. responsibley who is and the commandant for the secretary of defense, for reporting, it has been very collaborative. particularly working with shanahan. we had a lot of say in the metric that has been viewed for the marine corps in terms of the our -- what are obstacles that are out there? in terms of where do we want to apply our funding to move the needle? once we have made the declaration of here is the best way we can use the funding, then we are accountable to that. it has been very collaborative. it has been very fair. we have had a very -- we have had a huge say.

preparation for combat operations or how are our major defense acquisition programs are going in accordance with the funding that is there. and are we on schedule and on cost? it has been very collaborative. i think they have the right metrics. we have had a huge met -- a huge say and what those metrics are. one last question from one of the midshipmen who have been patiently waiting. the gentleman in the middle has been trying to get his question and. -- his question in. i have a question from a currently deployed marine. where do you see the future of land-based special service -- who well states as quickly active forces and up becoming a menu of capabilities that take

on a day's forces thus degrading the aspects of the unit? is it realistic to contain the whole unit? question.ed that [laughter] that really is a great question that was covered broadly earlier on about how we deploy the force. how we posture the force. and what for. at the time, the idea that we inld need a special purpose order to tackle problems. still fulfills a great capability and function for the cocom that happens to be allocated to.

overtime you vault the to bel-purpose mag tax -- fine-tuned to what they are signed to do with a kenai toward guarding against mission. haveoint to which you prepared a force for somebody else's use and the mission begins to change. you are always going to be a little bit disappointed with what the end result is. even just what the unit is really doing. as long as they are useful to the nation, and as long as the marine corps is able to put them out, then they are important. if you look at the nds and the nss, those types of things are being deemphasized. you might need to recoup equipment, aircraft, and people to build readiness for a higher

priority mission in the nds and the nss. they are place i'm going to go. i'm going to talk about how we get those back and prepare a different force for a different conflict or different crisis. >> will thank you very much. -- well thank you very much. >> can i add one thing? we have three. we have one that we put down. a different focus in its training. one in the central command. one that we have in europe. support in africa is also different in its own right in terms of organization and focus. challenge in terms of time distance. primarily, i just want to reinforce the point that general hedlund had. yes, we worked these elements up. the one down in south america is

not designed to be combat credible. it is for humanitarian purposes. the one in the central command region is combat credible. the one in europe is also combat credible but would need some augmentati from the joint force in terms of fixed wing support. then, it is the real world. the idea that we would need to employ it in total would be desirable. the way world gets in of having to provide small elements to protect u.s. personnel and facilities. they are making an enormous difference in all three locations. the one just got down to south america recently. conversely, to ensure we do not ,ave any additional benghazi's it is vitally important to our navy support who has been

supporting for some time. there is the ideal and there had -- and there is the real. the real has -- thank ain. please join me in thanking our panelists. [applause]

>> the supreme court is announcing it is setting aside a colorado ruling against a bigger to refuse to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. the limited ruling dealt with what the court described as anti-religious bias by the colorado civil rights commission. when it ruled against the bigger, -- against the baker. justice anthony kennedy said in

his majority opinion that the issue must await further elaboration. appeals in similar situations are pending including one at the supreme court from a florist who did not want to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding. -- here on set c-span, a look at the state of u.s. and north korean relations. we will have that discussion hosted by the foundation for defense of democracies live in abt 45 minutes you're on c-span. also today, white house press secretary sarah sanders will break reporters at 2:00 eastern time. tonight at 8:00, a look at foreign policy since the cold war at harvard's radcliffe institute with former state and defense department officials. you can watch that discussion live or online at c-span.org or listen live using the free c-span radio app.

communicators,he american cable association president and ceo matthew poca and tedious book comes and you petersen talk about the issues facing rural and suburban broadbent providers -- broadband's written -- broadband providers. >> very role and scope. in many instances, gds is the only provider in those areas. we worked very closely with the federal government and the fcc on programs that make partnership investments tou the federal universal service program to bring broadband to customers who did not previously have it. bring them more rich, robust broadband. >> i do think it is important that as the administration, the fcc, and congress considers

infrastructure like the proceedings, that broadband is and has been determined to be a matter of important infrastructure to our country and our national picy. that is a change because typically we think of infrastructure as roads and bridges and railways, which are alimportant. you cannot survive today as a business or individual as someone working from home without having a robust broadband experience. >> watch the communicators tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span two. >> it has been a busy week on trade. that is why newsmakers is pleased to welcome the u.s. chamber of commerce's top expert, john murphy. he is senior vice president for international policy. he has been the point man since 1999. glad to have you. >> great to be here.