the north american iranian council hosted this discussion. this is one hour. >> thank you for joining us. i'm device president for policy of the national iranian cancel. thank theke to sponsors of today's event. jcpoa two, iran, trump, and the future of the iran deal. we have kelsey devonport who is one of the top experts on the iran deal, nuclear

non-proliferation. andjoined the association 2011 as the junior piece fellow. previously worked for a think tank researching security issues and she is a term member on the council on foreign relations. and we have the director of foreign policies at cato. his interest include grand strategy, facing posture, the rise of china, and the role of status and prestige motivation in international politics. then we will have a research director joining us who formally served with the department.

shortly before -- who has openly spoken and advocated for military strikes on the koran. he nominated mike abbe are to be secretary of state. a pale was one of the most fervent critics on the hill of the iran nuclear deal. since then, the administration has withdrawn from the iran deal lot and announced the u.s. would impose sanctions not just on around but secondary sanctions on u.s. allies and other parties to the jcpoa if they continue to uphold the terms of the agreement. the sanctions will come online in august. there are already announcements from europe about how they plan to stand up against sanctions. how that plays out remains to be

seen. our experts will have commentary. we also see the administration coordinating closely with u.s. regional partners who happen to be around's chief rivals -- who chief to be iran's rivals. there is also an open question about, is the trump administration policy towards the around regime changing? regimerds the iran changing? iranian the aspirin group that has been accused of terrorism which seeks to overturn the iranian government. trump's lawyer rudy giuliani spoke and said the next gathering would be held in tehran. despite this, they say regime

change is not there policy but with everything going on, we are trying to deduce what exactly the policy is. secretary pompeo is speaking before a group of iranian americans on the topic of raising iranian voices. it is an open question what he is actually going to call for at that speech, which is this weekend. to help us unpack this and talk a little bit about where to go from here, how does europe and russia and china respond to what andtrump administration mr. regarding the sanctions, and are we headed toward confrontation or is there another strategy at play we should be aware. ask kelsey's take on john.ut i will start with what is the trump administration strategy on iran? >> it is more of a lack of

strategy. some of the things you mentioned about finding the voice of the iranian people and sort of economic warfare against iran, these are all tropes that officials kind of fall back on when they do not have the creative new strategy of their own. trump's opposition to iran and come from al do not russian assessment of the u.s. interest and threats to security. i think he has an intense hatred of the jcpoa because it was a notess of his predecessor, because of the details. i'm sure to this day has never read it and he could not explain to anyone in the room about what was in the deal. so there is a lot of incoherence. think of these policies towards iran and how they blend with what u.s. interest might be.

is it in our interest to d stabilize with one of the most important countries in the region? fomentn our interest to internal unrest, which is essentially the default policy of the administration? is it in the trump administration's interest to put sanctions on the iranian government while at the same time claiming their primary and concern is the voice of the american -- iranian people. this will hurt them far more than it will hurt the government itself. government associates our meeting with the mek and behalf. on their an iranian exile group that has close to zero support among the iranian population. so this nation that they are concerned about democracy in iran is bunk. it is silly. based on nothing except for a

lack of policy at the top that has its origins in trumps opposition to the jcpoa for political and not substantive reasons. >> you of the president on the one hand to you saying and others say is motivated politically to unravel this deal. cousin of his predecessor. -- because of his predecessor and things like that. what about the rest of the administration? is there a coherent policy being put together outside of the purview of trump? whoever wants to answer. >> one point of incoherence before he handed off. it is kind of almost a perfect laboratory test to see whether or not trumps opposition to the substance.sed on he has gone to negotiate directly face-to-face with north korean leader kim jong-il and he

is praised himself for those discussions. he says there is no longer north korean threat. they have made certain commitments to denuclearize and so on. criticism ofw, the the jcpoa prior to this opening with north korea was that it only focused on nuclear weapons and not human rights violations and not on the regime's nuclear policy. no part of the joint communique i could discern focuses on north korea's human abuses which are in order of magnitude worse than what iran does. there was no commendation planned for that aspect. .t is only focused on nukes which goes against the administration's own rhetoric will stop so this is a bunch of incoherence. me tonk you for inviting be here today.

thank you also are coming. i know there is another meeting going on in health inky which might -- in helsinki which might be of interest to some of you. i do not think there is a strategy towards around. at least not a coherent one. one thing i want to dive more deeply into because i think there is some coherence around it is the onus of the trump administration putting sanctions on as a tool that they think will get iran back to the negotiating table that will achieve the sort of mythical deal. this is where i think the confusion comes and. the trump administration is aaming sanctions are not strategy. sanctions are told they can be used as part of a broader strategy. how the obamat

administration used sanctions in the lead up to negotiations up to the jcp poa, does i'd what the officials say, think sanctions played a role. they played a role because the united states put a great deal of effort into it sanctions diplomacy, mania got states like russia and china on board with enforcing the sanctions that were not necessarily in the economic interest of those countries. the obama administration managed to persuade putin not to sell certain armaments that were not even covered by u.s. security resolutions to a ran. security resolutions to a ran. now, fast forward to 2018. trump has essentially alienated key u.s. allies.

-- you still see the administration continuing to talk about building the strongest sanctions regime in history and that will sort of -- a strategy. is not i think what we have done is the reverse. we are harmed our ability to use sanctions as a toll of statecraft in the future. by we imposing sanctions on europe now, while they are still supporting the deal and trying to sustain it, is inviting them to take steps to circumvent u.s. sanctions. we have played into a deep-seated frustration in europe that secondary euros sanctions violate sovereignty.

now that they have been reimposed in an area where the uae -- you we has specifically asked the u.s. to refrain i , even wheners along the u.s. does not want to impose secondary sanctions the ua might agree with, we could up problems freeing them along even when our goals are the same. deal have imperiled the and shot ourselves in the foot when it comes to using sanctions down the road. want to ask you, if we take it at face value, there has been of we are going to bring them back to the table. i don't know how credible that is given how difficult it will be to reestablish those sanctions. as far as theink administration strategy or elements within the

administration goes, what do they want here? >> they want capitulation. plain and simple. they want regime change. just by different means this time than during the george w. bush administration. make no mistake, it is less than honest to assert anything other than they are trying to collapse the iranian economy. they are trying to overthrow the iranian.0 government. they don't care about the iranian people. the sanctions disproportionately punish citizens. thateates black markets disempower the private sector and average iranian's on the street and empower the worst aspect of the country. they do nottry, view geopolitics, they do not view foreign policy the same as

any of its predecessor. it is the crudest, sharpest, bluntest example of american hegemony. they view the world is very black and white. they divide things into good and evil. the definition of good is not how you treat your own people, democracy, freedom of press, freedom of religion. if it was, we would not be best friends with saudi arabia right now. perfect example. the metric is, do you accept american hegemony? do you agree that america's closest partners, israel, arabia, and the yulee, is going to set the rules? if you accept those rules, we let you treat your people however you want. saudi arabia, prime example. but if you do not accept those roles, we do everything we can to weaken, destabilize,

overthrow. so is our policy? is our strategy? no. don't take i word for it. career u.s. government officials tell me there is no policy coherence. there is no strategy. they are throwing jell-o at the wall to see what will fit in stick. there is dissension about what the policy will be. it is dangerous on all of the levels mike steamed colleagues were outlining and it is going to be incredibly difficult for any successor to the trump administration to put humpty dumpty back together. i'm deeply skeptical as to whether or not they can. there will be a tremendous andnt of damage inside iran the results of this needless and unnecessary abandonment of diplomacy, all right? we are back to this paradigm where instead of talking to a .an we are talking about iran

that produces no positive results whether it is republicans or democrats. that paradigm has no tangible benefits whatsoever. >> to pick up on a couple of those points, this is exactly right. what the trump administration is after is capitulation. the fact that the arabians know this is the core reason none of this will reach a deal. nobody wants to engage in negotiations of their understanding of success is going to be full surrender on my side. diplomacy is about mutually anded-upon concessions compromise to reach a better and at the hole. you're not going to get that at not going -- you are to get that with the policy of capitulation. -- donaldhe world trump sees the world as a machine for confirmation bias.

when it was said through south korean counterparts, we like to meet, entrance mind that was a pitch relation. scaring the koreans so much they are willing to come'twas and capitulate and now he is all buddy-buddy with them. that is actually not what occurred. there are other factors outside of that bilateral context which brought the north koreans to the table, namely that they completed to their satisfaction a viable nuclear deterrence of they could sit more satisfactorily across the table from us. us seeing capitulation on their side is not going to make successful diplomacy. when they see us make a absurd comments like what we said about iran versus yemen, they are actually claiming what no human that looks at the issue thinks,

that the humanitarian problem is a ransom fault. supporting the disease -- supporting the 20's -- houtis.ining the it is suffering because it has been bombing for years with u.s. help. it approaches deliberate starvation. this is our fault. and the golf arab faults. yemen is a bit player at best. this kind of absurd politicking accusations crazy around is not going to lead to some sort of jcpoa 2.0 or diplomacy down the line. that just signals to tehran that it cap is not interested in negotiations.

>> i think there is a question, is an effective sanctions regime necessary for the united states to pursue whatever this goal actually is? what is the mood among european broadens and we should and and say china and russia. what is the mood, what is the reaction? i know it was just reported that blocking mechanisms were approved to attempt to protect european companies from u.s. sanctions snapping back. what is the move? be?effective will europe how effective will the united states be in actually ramming these through? how will that be felt in iran? kelsey: i think the policy community here in washington has to be very careful not to

therestimate just how upset europeans, particularly the british, the french, and the gemzar over the u.s. move with sanctions. one thing that became abundantly clear in the manner with which trump pulled out of the deal on may 8 by three imposing all sanctions when there was no legitimate reason for him to impose sanctions was that it did i think incentivize and build momentum in europe to take steps that were not really on the table for europeans prior to trumps actions. that includes steps like this blocking regulation just mentioned that the foreign affairs council endorsed today. this is an important step because essentially what it does unionhin the european regulations, if for bentz companies from cooperating with u.s. secondary sanctions so it

essentially provides a more secure channel for them to continue to do business with iran. the european have also taken steps to try to change the mandate of the european investment bank so that could facilitate some loan activity to transactions. the europeans have taken these steps and it sends an important political message by will it be enough? if you look at how the united states has pursued sanctions in the past, it has been very half generalizations. as a result, that has created a culture of fear and threat waiting, companies are companies may be steered away.

those questions have reputational consent. even now the europeans are taking these steps, you know, i don't think it is sufficient at this time to actually provide a ran was some of the vision under the deal to kind of sustain the agreement and the long time. i think the europeans are going to need to be more creative as well as the russians and chinese to find more secure banking transactions can be facilitated in a way that does not touch the financial system because that is a real target for u.s. sanctions. so the businesses willing to go into a ran can continue -- iran canto go into continue to do so. crabs i don't want to build on that because here we have a

situation. i spent a couple months in europe and to say they are livid is an understatement. to say this is in any way, shape, or form good for american to trash or irreparably damaged transatlantic relations at a been constructed since world war ii, to say that is anything less than a calamity would be foolish. the europeans are actively discussing things they would never even think they would have to consider. once you construct something, when she build political and economic infrastructure outside of america's domain, outside of what america has built, controlled, in enforced for the have zeroars, you incentive to destroy it, to deconstruct it when trump comes along. so this is not a situation

ladies and gentlemen when we can just go back to normal one trumps successor comes. no, it is not. the scary thing is, the europeans do not know how to do this because since the end of world war ii, no political and europe, mind you, political official, not bureaucrat, has had to consider what it is like pursuing and achieving both as a continent and in individual states outside of the construct of american hegemony. they don't know how to do it. they are figuring it out as they go. , don't take mye word for google it, is we are going to punish you. do this, how dare you try to keep this nuclear deal alive. yes, we will punish or companies and government. we are actively destabilizing right now.vernments

actively destabilizing european governments and cozying up to the most reprehensible leaders, especially the hunt gary and leadership. if people sit there until you with a straight face that we are on the same page with the thiseans and all is well, is a disaster. let's be crystal clear about that. in terms of what is going on inside iran, it is not good. the situation was not good priority. a reimposition of sanctions, even if the russians, the indians, krantz, etc., even if they find ways to create workarounds that did not previously exist, the expectation is that will continue to be bad. what is the goal? what is the metric for policy success that the united states

has together with the israelis and saudi's? if it is regime change, that is unlikely. powerss not have magic his predecessors did not have in the pursuit of regime change in iran, which literally all of his predecessors since 1979 have tried. can they collapse the arabian economy? it -- the iranian economy? interest, other interest? i would say no. you have situation in iran right now where mike pompeo will come out or trump will come out or bolton will come out of they will say -- the people are sick of the regime. ok? this is something that has been set every year since 1979. i would like to think the iran people are smart enough to think two things simultaneously. yes, our political, economic,

social expectations have been long the unmet by our government will stop however, when we look at the country around us, at least we're not that. at least we're not iraq, syria, afghanistan. at least we are not these countries that the united states has directly or indirectly helped destroy political, economic, and social fabric of these countries. they just did a poll, the arab center in washington, d.c., they pulled the broader airport -- the broader arab world about popular and unpopular. guess who was number one unpopular? us. iran was number four. us. oftentimes we say, and the arabian people of them is pro-american people in the middle east. i would say it differently. . would say they were the least you can like the government and

still simultaneously not appreciate the united states of america trying to strangle you economically. value your currency and destroyed the fabric, political, economical, and social and side the country. >> so what is the iranian response? if the sanctions go online and august? if the european and other countries pullout? whether on the nuclear side or other fronts, what do we expect a ran to do? so far they have remained within the jcpoa. what do we expect as a recourse?

kelsey: given what a ran can do do,- given what iran can expressing an interest in naval nuclear propulsion. they can do some preliminary research on that, it's not a violation of the deal. we saw iran announced that was going to construct a new facility. again, as long as they are not actually building centrifuges, it is not a violation. i think iran is reminding the community how they can revamp. also, we have heard about what it ran will do if the vision does not come through. if they are not happy with the european package. this includes returning to higher levels of enrichment.

they are sent to a low level. 6.7 percent. they say they will go back up to 20%. that is short of a bomb, but still concerning. they have talked about bringing more online to enrich uranium. that would be a concern. if a ran decides to -- if iran decides to pull out, i do not think we will see a quick -- to a nuclear weapon. ranink we're will see a start to move -- i think we will see iran start to move against the edges. disagree with interpretations. produce a little bit more heavy water the in they should. then maybe take steps towards again.ng the program i want to underscore what a difficult position the international community would be in if iran starts to take steps.

we negotiated this deal to begin with because i ran had violated -- because a ran had violated its agreement. pathway blocked iran's to nuclear weapons. if we get back into that gray zone where there are questions and we have no established international consensus on how the u.s.d to it, and has alienated key allies. there's does support for sanctions. we would be in a very damaging plays from a nonproliferation perspective. when you have that question about iran's nuclear and , it isons hanging over like the nonproliferation writ large. >> anything else?

plausible is the most scenario. , under the worst circumstances, they will push up against the edges of the jcpoa without making a mad -- for the bomb. but let's -- without making a mad run for the bomb. trump withdrew from a successful and robust nonproliferation agreement. if we expect the result to be --ething other than a ran increasing, we would be remiss. it was successful according to the joint commission and the rest of the p5 plus one according to u.s. intelligence, according to the leadership of the military and this country. most of trumps cap that. this is why it took him so long

to back out of the deal, he had to fire high-level officials to get to a mini-consensus with his cabinet. the international community all was compliant. if we punish them for complying with a program that significantly rolled back there nuclear program, we should not expect compliance into the future. i think right now in iran and the five plus one are waiting to see what happens. waiting to see if the u.s. makes any big moves. unless something changes, unless a new route is taken or unless in 2.5 years we have new are going toou continue to see a proliferation iran because -- in of what we did. >> i want to start with congressional staff. hand -- raise your hand

and give a short name and affiliation. any question? >> can i make a point? i think this is a particular critical point. this is often gone overlooked. jcpoa ispurpose of the to block the pathway to nuclear weapons, we imposing u.s. secondary sanctions may put us in a position where we are sanctioning the chinese and russian firms that are doing some of the modifications that would prevent a ran -- that would prevent a ran bang from being able to produce nuclear weapons down the road. the company the distilling the modifications and they are unable to complete that conversion, the unfinished reactor hoses far more of a proliferation threat. so taking about how proliferation is and how applied, there are

actually nonproliferation consequences for how these sanctions are imposed. whether or not the u.s. will actually sanction these entities will stop i think it is critical we try to waive sanctions here so these nonproliferation projects can go forward. >> my name is william. i'm an intern. this is a question for all three of you, i suppose. assuming the administration were to write now drop its current policies and listen to your advice, what would be the optimal strategy from this day going forward on how to deal with the proliferation, social, in iran and how do you

think the administration policy will differ from what you see as the most optimal plan? >> can we put the trump toothpaste back in the tube? fromis a great question the great state of new hampshire. there are couple think so. let me try to unpack and for you as best i can, ok? this is not just a trump administration problem. this is a republican party foreign policy establishment problem, because his line of thinking, the way the trump administration sees the world is really not that different on were doing.h guys this is a republican party thing. old-school, realist republican. significanteep and minority in the republican foreign policy establishment. the policy we see now probably would not be that different of

donald trump were never born and there was a different republican president. yes, there is a personal disdain for anything that resembles barack obama and his achievements. there is an affinity for the israeli societies and ameron be that borders on uncomfortable, frankly. i don't think it is good to become a mercenary for our client states. but for all intents and purposes, you can do with the obama administration did, go down that path of dialogue and diplomacy on points of contention and if that does not bear fruit you can use other tools from the toolkit of the most powerful country in the world or up front, you can disregard common throughout the window, critical components and tools in our national security toolkit and only at the site which is a military aspect.

war, all ofyber these are just stalling tactic that kicks the can down the road and delays the choice between war and diplomacy. but with the books don't tell you is that everything that happens before diplomacy including wars for leverage to try to stack up as many bargaining chips as possible for the inevitable date when you sit down and negotiate. >> i have a genetically different preference and terms of u.s. policy toward the middle east. in there to turn it midst of a trump official willing to hear me out, it would surely fall on deaf ears. we are way overextended in the middle east. betweenomewhere 30,000-40,000, maybe approaching 50,000 troops there on the ground that all times. it is hard to cut because some are in constant rotation. we have military bases peppered throughout the region. we constantly police the area

with naval warships. the trump administration is double dumb with traditional alliances. we are subordinating our own interest to their perceived interest in the region. we need to stop meddling. stop pretending we can pull the strings of the entire region and yield outcomes that are preferable. tomorrow, if i had my say, we would come back into compliance and work onoa lifting sanctions and effective way, making sure ran sees the economic benefits. -- making sure ran things easy making sure ap -- making sure ran bank sees the economic benefits. lost, syria, iraq, the quagmire in afghanistan. i can go on and on.

kelsey: i will take a simpler approach. of the trump administration said tomorrow they would get back into compliance, who would believe them? given that statement trump has made against the deal, given his animosity toward the country, toward the government, and given his long history of broken promises and the foreign policy space, i do not think you would have business entities that would be willing to trust the trump administration was going to stay the course. this agreement comes back to the fact it was a transactional deal. increased monitoring, strong proliferation standards, in exchange for sanctions relief. is not feeling the relief because countries don't trust the u.s. would keep those in place, you cannot sustain that. even before the trump

announcement he was going to violate the deal, you already had countries hesitant to go in. you had countries cutting back their oil supplies. before even seeing that package, countries were winding down in a ran. i've never tried to put the toothpaste back in the tube, but i do not think it is possible in this case. >> i'm an intern for congressman frank malone representing new jersey. in termsu touched upon of saudi arabia, but just to, you know, make sure what your thoughts are in the matter of this, how effective you think the united states relationship with saudi arabia plays against iran? i know you have mentioned specific things president

trump's during the previous administrations may not of been doing but i feel like a lot of things from the travel ban focused on iran and syria to the a harshertes having approach towards iran but not necessarily saudi arabia who has violated a lot of human rights, do you think the united states, you know, the current administration, puts pressure on iran but turns the other i to saudi arabia and is currently making all of these moves simply to do a better relationship with saudi arabia? thank you. >> a good question. let me be very clear. it is actually in the united states interest on the functional, working relationship with saudi arabia. a with saudi arabia. a what the trump administration is joined as far beyond. frankly, all the predecessors to the trump administration have gone far beyond of functional

working relationship with saudi arabia. saudi arabia is one of the most powerful countries in the middle east so it makes sense for the united states of functional working relationship i guess what the other power is? a ran -- iran. aat is why they try to have functional working relationship with both. seeds all ofates its leverage and as a result has none except to become overly reliant on a set of countries that repeatedly take steps that damage american security interest. it does not make sense. nobody can look you in the eye and tell you any different and now we have reached an absurd level and u.s.-saudi relations where we have essentially become a mercenary for saudi arabia. there telling us what to do rather than the other way around. who is the superpower here? it does not make sense.

you could be critical of saudi arabia while still having a working relationship of them. what should that look like going forward? look, i think having a powerful political economic dialogue with the saudi says is important but there has to be a cost imposed when any regional entity takes steps the damages american security. i'm aware of no such steps. no such steps. we are rewarding bad behavior. we are conditioning countries like saudi arabia and the uae to believe this kind of behavior delivers this kind of result. >> thank you so much for a great and frank and direct conversation. i've question about what will happen if the europeans failed to keep the deal in place both from a non-proliferation as well

as a geopolitical stance. what if we end up in a situation in which the europeans fail? they do not manage to uphold their end of the bargain money comes to sanctions really but instead, china and russia do? under those circumstances, iran goes even deeper into the influence of russia and china. what would that do geopolitically in the region and what would it do to any effort to put nonproliferation back on the agenda because the chinese and russians were never as concerned about iran's nuclear program as your fiance americans. to would a radiance need scale back if the russians and chinese don't care that much? how do you see that scenario?

>> looking at you, kelsey. kelsey: i think the scenario we could very likely see comment part because if you look at china and china is one of the few countries that has the toking sector and finances facilitate transactions into investments and a brand that does not touch the u.s. dollar system. the way the chinese financial sector has been set up as caused a huge proliferation problem writ large not only in iran but in other places because of the andthe sector is isolated insulated from the u.s. banking system and penalties. so there is a real concern given the chinese and russian investment in a ran things that we could and up and that scenario where we are aligned with russia and china.

neither of these countries are studying the same proliferation standards. -- excuse me the same standard for nonproliferation. so essentially, the united states is giving up influence to the chinese and russians. i want to complicate that by adding into the fact that the united states is also now agreementg a nuclear with saudi arabia. i bring this up particularly because congress has the prerogative to review these agreements and i think it is something congress needs to pay attention to. saudi arabia has the barest minimum. they do not abide by the more intrusive measures of protocol. saudi arabia is negotiating to allow enrichment and reprocessing kind of in the

country. in a scenariop where we have a ran pushed into the arms of russia and china. i do not think we are going to see a sprint to the bomb by either country. the proliferation of enrichment capabilities in the middle east can be deeply destabilizing both because it could spur competition, it raises the risk of proliferation to other countries, and the question that we might see states try to grow up and match those capabilities. i think for the congressional staffers here closely watching ensurereement, trying to it does not allow saudi arabia enrichment and reprocessing, and sharing nonproliferation is high, that is critical for stemming any further proliferation concerns in the

region. slightlyd word it differently. i agree with the substance for kelsey said something about if iran would tilt toward russia and china because of incompetence. ceding leadership is a problem. i think pretension of that has been a problem. the united states is remarkably this.espite one of the things we have trouble doing is sitting around, something called prospect there he. giving up something you have hurts much worse than future gains. we have conditions of unipolar

the. we are the world's sole hegemon. that this tillse toward china and russia happens, i think it is going to create a region that is going to be an arena for a proxy war. it will fuel excessive devotion to maket and resources sure whatever perceived gains on the russia and china signed are pushed back against. that is a recipe for a decades-long kind of cold war with russia and china with the middle east, one of the most unstable regions in the world. we don't want to get pulled into that mess. it is far better, especially on matters not as important to just cooperate with russia, china,

iran, and the europeans. the threats are miniscule compared to what is taught about. if you take an arms length approach and emphasize the value of diplomacy and deemphasize the military commitment. will push back and say my specific point is about u.s. nonproliferation leadership not just in the region but in the broader nuclear policy regime. >> where is u.s. nonproliferation vis-a-vis israel? kelsey: i would say that was a huge mistake and israel now at this point i think is an arms control and disarmament question. >> the point is we've always been hypocritical on this point. kelsey: i absolutely agree but when it comes to actually trying stronger nonproliferation

standards and guidelines, here i think the u.s. has played a much more critical role than countries like russia and china when we a push for not only the additional article but the more intrusive than better-regulated concept.tate-level looking beyond the nonproliferation, will we look at nuclear security and safety we have a lot of countries in the region right now looking to expand their power programs. because of the situation, is going to be looking to russia and china to expand its nuclear power reactors. do we trust russian and chinese nuclear safety and security? i mean, china has taken some important steps but they lied far behind the united states and iner european countries terms of following the standards and getting iran to the place they could be to better abide by

ondelines and treaties nuclear security. that is something that nuclear deal could have and should have facilitated if we had actually implemented it. i would say in negotiating the nuclear deal with iran, trying to ensure that sort of the future of iran's civil program met national guidelines, think the united states played a very important role and the loss of leadership could be a deficit going forward. host: i'm going to ask one last question. >> what is a viable best case scenario for the rest of 2018 and what is a worst-case scenario? best case scenario is remake it through 2018 without starting a war and with the jcpoa kept alive by some

by otherl degree countries that aren't party to the agreement but see it in their interests for this nuclear deal to remain alive. that is the best case scenario. the worst-case scenario is that the europeans are unable or unwilling to step up the plate and keep this deal alive. by the a slow death and way, i agree with the approach you outlined. the trump administration will try to frame that as iran dashing towards a bomb even though that will be factually inaccurate. urgency a push for war. -- we are going to see a push for war. i think we already are. not on the diplomatic track, you are on the only other tracks that there is which is a confrontational track. these guys feel like the second

term bush and minister nation and the obama ministries and ruin what they were doing in the region. ruin their good efforts in iraq. ruin their good efforts in afghanistan and they saw a ron is the big price. jc iran as their big prize -- they see i ran their big prize. >> i would agree that the isst-case scenario particularly the influence of boulton coming in and convincing the administration that the pressure policy has not worked and preventative wars the only outcome. less available to actually ensure iran cannot pursue nuclear weapons. that's a worst-case scenario that's not unrealistic. the best case scenario, i think a lot of what they may decide to do and what -- and how this will

play out will come down to oil sales. looking at where their economic sectors have rebounded, a lot of it comes down to being able to dramatically ramp up oil sales. if it is possible for you ron to -- four iran to sell oil to these other countries, that my provide enough economic incentive for the agreement to win through. and for iran to claim enough benefits that it stays within the foundries of the deal. actions will see some in the nuclear space that don't violate the deal. we might see some new centrifuge production. more neighbor -- naval nuclear research. short of anstopping actual violation i think that will be the best case scenario.

>> quickly because i cannot help was also.s. leadership with iraq. that massively incentivized rogue actors to gain nuclear weapons. also libya, taking out the could -- the regime massively taking out the gaddafi regime massively incentivized people. abandoned u.s. leadership is the if theenario but europeans get the gumption and the precision and or to set up backations that will push and let us not forget, it's not just europe that trump is trying to wrangle. south korea gets an enormous share of its oil imports from

iran. japan as well. it isse countries decide better to pursue our own economic and security interests ,eparate from the united states therefore sustaining at least some salvageable core of the jcpoa, that is the best scenario. and yes, the worst is war which is possible. >> thank you all. please join me with a round of applause to our panelists. thanks to our sponsors and thanks to -- to all of you for coming. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

>> as part of our year-long 60 capitals tour, the c-span bus made the long journey to juneau, alaska, capital of the 49th state. this weekend on c-span, we will feature our stops across alaska, showing you the states natural beauty and delving into their unique history and literary culture. >> juneau is the capital city of alaska. we visited mount roberts and octave for well watching.

>> see that? >> there we go.

>> now join us on our 50 states capital, from juneau, alaska is the lieutenant governor of that state. byron a lot. mallott. what are the duties of the lieutenant governor of alaska? lt. gov. mallott: the statutory duties are similar to many others.