>> i want to thank everybody for being here. we need 11 people to vote. we are going to give opening statements to give opening statements the start as soon as we get to 11 folks, we will stop. i want to thank everybody for their cooperation. i want to thank our witnesses for being here with us. we are fortunate to have such an experience and distinguished panel. this is the fourth in a searing searing -- -- on a on russia.earing the current situation is not encouraging. out of four agreements, the inf treaty, the open skies treaty weapons convention, we

have problems with russian compliance on three of them. it's a come as no surprise that russia has been cheating on his treaties. vladimir putin's government has annexed crimea, interfered with elections, used chemical weapons and reportedly hacked u.s. utilities. given that record, he is not likely to let the commitments get in his way either. the question we need to ask is -- what are we going to do? some argue we should walk away from the inf treaty because russia has been in blatant violation for several years. something that is exactly what putin hopes for. the last time we deployed range missiles to west germany in 1983, a million people protested. that is the kind of division russian operators are designed to exploit. meeting, it isur

crucial we remain unified and defense and deterrence issues. we areopen skies treaty, at an impasse with russians. we have not had a flight all year. we can live without that, but it hurts that 32 other countries do not have the same resources we do. even with new start, which has succeeded in its objectives so far. we should be realistic about our expectations where we will be in russia 2020 one when the treaty expires and last extended. we need to be thinking carefully about the effects of new weapons and technology on strategic stability between the u.s., russia and nations. putin has posted about hypersonic life vehicles, nuclear torpedoes and russia's advances in cyber warfare and

artificial intelligence. these developments introduces new uncertainties in deterrence calculations of adversaries and none of them is easy to address from an arms control verification and compliance perspective. ande devote our on research development in these areas, we must consider their potential to encourage risk-taking by any country with access to them. i hope our witnesses cannot only provide an assessment of the status of current agreements, but also authorize some assurance that the state and defense department's consider these emergency arms control challenges. i hope leaking gain a better -- i hope we can gain a better understanding that took place at the helsinki summit. with that, i want to thank you for being here. i still do not think we have 11 so i will turn to our distinguished member. >> thank you for convening

today's hearing. arms-control efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war and's limited russia forces are vital for maintaining national security. despite inquiries to the secretary and others, more than two months after president trump's helsinki meeting, we remain in the dark as to what the latest discussed during their two-hour closed session. we know russian investor to the united states told reporters that verbal agreements were reached at the helsinki summit on arms control issues, including preservation of the new start and inf treaty. we continue to find ourselves in an incredible situation. the american people, elected officials in this body and members of the president's administration here more from russian officials about agreements that the president is

making about national security issues. what constitutes an important verbal agreement? reachedpresident decisions with russia on key arms control treaties? why hasn't congress been informed about this decision? along with others in this body, i have supported policies to its multipleia for and ongoing transgressions, including military aggression, malign influence and oppressive policies. develop comprehensive strategies to confront our adversaries that prioritize the safety of the united states. this requires being clear about the threats we face and all tools are adversary can wield. constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be a core component. given the reality of russia's nuclear capacity, we must use every diplomatic tool in our

arsenal to achieve our goals. the stakes could not be higher. turned togotiated and agreements with her adversaries, recognizing we are dealing with hostile powers. we build and metrics that i cap for a probability of efforts to deceive and dodge. provisions outlining u.s. intelligence and compliance are essential. with russia, we conduct on-site inspections of military bases and facilities. we require data exchanges to track the status and make above the nuclear forces. we know russian is violating the intermediate range and nuclear force treaty. if we have evidence our country is violating international commitments, we must be unequivocal and working through the construction of our agreement to bring it back into compliance. we must never lose sight of our objectives to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and to constrain our adversaries'

ability to threaten us. in assessing the value of an arms control agreement, we must consider if our agreement advances our goals. strengthen aning agreement in our hand or leave us without a seat at the table? safer or less secure? i want to remind him members of the history surrounding the of thes ratification start treaty. when the senate deliberated in 2010, some colleagues, including our chairman made it clear they were willing to vote for the treaty but only as part of a deal that modernized our nuclear forces in infrastructure. neither an unconstrained nuclear arms race, nor blind faith in arms control agreement served security interest. america is best served with a strong arm controlled environment. i hope the trump administration

appreciates this. diminishing the value of arms control and placing all faith in one-dimensional conceptions of increasing nuclear strength to bring the russians and chinese to hill will result in a more dangerous environment. i want to my the administration bipartisan support for nuclear modernization is tied to maintaining an arms control process that controls and six to reduce russian nuclear forces, which means promoting military and fiscal responsible policies. we are not interested in writing blank checks. we do not want to step off our current path of stability to wander down and uncertain road filled with dire consequences. i hopeal note i make is that is part of our oversight, which i applaud you for having conducted with these hearings, that we will also get an a similary to mock up

related bill. it is important for congress to speak about russia's violations of the international order, certainly the undermining of our election and since we have very often, this committee taken up sanctions as part of our overall foreign-policy tool, one of the critical tools of peaceful diplomacy, i urge the chairman to make sure we keep a jurisdictional opportunity as it relates to that end we can have a markup that sends a united message to the russians that we will not tolerate their actions at home and abroad. thank you for that statement. i think everyone understands that depending on how you write a bill, and what key phrases you use, it determines what committee it goes to. every committee member has to understand if they want to come to foreign relations, they have to write it in a certain way.

bill. you did on your i thank you for referring to that. i think everyone for their cooperation in being here. what i like to do is recess are hearing and moved to quick business meeting if we could and thank all of you. i know it does not mean much to many of us to confirm these nominees. it means a lot to them. it means a tremendous amount to the countries that are going to. the business meeting, the senate foreign relations can -- committee will come to order. our nine nominees, senator would you like to make comments? >> i will introduce my remarks. i support all the nominees. letter theeceived a hold over the nomination, and mr. francisco louis, the ambassador todd torres summit he just his written answers did

come in but another of our members was not able to read those yet. we were now consider all the other items on the agenda, including the following: ms. linda blanchard to be ambassador to pennsylvania, earl robert miller to be ambassador to bangladesh, mr. daniel rosenblum to be ambassador to zach is done , -- to be represented to the united nations agencies for food and agriculture, ms. karen williams to be ambassador to the -- toic of sarah phnom, be ambassador to somalia, kevin sullivan to be ambassador to be u.s.a, mark rosen to executive director of the international. so moved and seconded.

nominations, all in favor will say aye. the eyes --ayes have it. mick technical and conforming changes. that, without objection, the business meeting will adjourn and we will begin and end with that hearing. i think i'll of those for being here. part. move to another our first witness is andrea thompson for arms control and international security. we had a chance to speak in the back. thank you for being here.

david, undersecretary of defense for policy, thank you both. if you could summarize in five minutes any written materials you have without objection, will be entered into the record. we thank you for being here. it is an important hearing. in the orderbegin introduced, i appreciate it. >> good morning distinguished members. thank you for hosting this hearing to discuss arms control. a topic center dot our security and the world. the 2018 nuclear review states progress in arms control is not in and of itself and depends on the security environment and dissipation of partners. the value of arms control agreement is arrive from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with obligations and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the potential for miscalculation. pressure continues to violate a

series of arms control obligations that undermine the trust united states complacent treaties, including some that have secured allied interests for years. as reflected in the administration's national security strategy and echoed, great power competition is reemerging. we can no longer be complacent in the face of challenges by competitors. we need to be creative and flexible in how we approach and manage competition with russia. that includes and a violation of where we stand with respect to our arms control agreement and there in a relationship with their deterrence and defense requirements. i will begin with the start treaty. both countries confirmed compliance with slb m's and heavy bombers. we are committed to implementing the treaty and russia stays in compliance. this committee has set the administration's view of extending the treaty.

persisted russia has in its violation of the inf treaty. utilizednistration has new diplomatic, economic and military measures to pressure russia to return to compliance. the lack of meaningful steps by russia to do so diminishes our hope it was to preserve the inet treaty. as we have said, the status quo is unsustainable and our patience is not unlimited. on chemical weapons, russia has blocked every effort to compel the assad regime to stop using chemical weapons. russia is a perpetrator of chemical weapons used with a attempt inssination march, using a chemical agent. we imposed the first round of sanctions on russia required by an elimination act. we have been cleared we will continue to execute our mandate under this law. the united states and our nato

in as has reinforced declaration to remain committed to serving, strengthening and modernizing the existing arms-control regime and confidence and security building mechanisms. the department of state's continues to lead others to push back against russia's behavior in space. of particular concern, russia has launched experimental satellite that connects activities, some of which are intended to advance cankeep abilities. i would also note our sanctions policy is an important tour in maintaining pressure on moscow to abandon its malign activities. we assess our global campaign to implement section 231 of a sanctions act of 2017, has denied russia's several billion dollars as states abandon deals of moscow. the department of state remains committed to the ongoing implementation of section 231.

russia's destabilizing actions include transgressions, namely arms-control treaties and agreements. this has created a trust deficit that leads the united states to question russia's commitment to arms control as a way to manage our relationship and promote transparency. russia must take its commitments seriously if we are to find ways to ship our relationship to a stable path. thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues and look forward to questions. thank you. thank you. >> chairman corker, and distinguished members thank you for the opportunity to testify on the state of arms control with russia. i will not repeat much of what secretary thompson has discussed. bottom line is arms-control with russia is troubled because the russian federation believes it

need only abide by the agreements that suit it. the credibility of all international agreements with russia is at risk. the united states is committed to his long-held arms-control, nonproliferation and security objectives, particularly our commitment to the goals of nuclear weapons. arms-control can contribute to u.s. security by helping to manage strategic competition among states and we are committed to meaningful arms-control that decreases the chance of misperception, miscalculation and conflict. the nuclear posture review knowledge is the progress in arms-control is not an end in and of itself. the security environment makes arms-control challenging in the near term. any future arms-control arrangement must be pursued with context of the broader security environment and must include the participation of willing partners. it is difficult to envision progress in a security environment that is threatened by russia's noncompliance with

existing arm control obligations. in this regard, russia poses a series of challenges that do not in themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust necessary to engage in a prudent arms-control agenda. it would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and not hold russia responsible for its violations. as a reliable ally, the united states must advocate for arms control agreements that make the world secure and include the dissipation of all parties. with respect to new start, the united states assesses russia's in compliance with the start treaty, both sides met the limits in february this year and i assure you the united states will implement and verified russian compliance for the treaty. the united states will consider whether to extend new start treaty beyond its february expiration. any decision on extending the

-- based onld be on linesr this -- the treaty interests. the russian federation remains in violation of its obligation under the inet treaty. we have been more than patient and provided russia with opportunities to come back in the compliance to no avail. this administration's determination of russia's violation is no different than the one announced in july 2014. we reviewed the intelligence and came to the same conclusion. the evidence is conclusive, the violation is real and it goes against the purpose and restrictions of the inf treaty. this administration has sought to preserve the treaty by applying pressure on russia to return to compliance with its obligations. we believed it was in the security interests of the united states and in our allies and partners' interest to preserve

the treaty but we recognize russia would determine whether the treaty remains a viable. one thing is certain. we cannot allow our treaty partner to continue to violate the treaty indefinitely and we will not let our actions or inaction occur at the expense of our security or that of our allies. for the last year, the department of defense has evaluated systems it could develop if not constrained by the inet treaty. the identification of these capabilities seeks to remind russia of wyatt entered in the treaty in the first place. we appreciate the efforts of congress to help the department of defense implement research efforts. regardless of whether russia returns to compliance with the treaty, there are broader implications due to the lack of trust that has been created by russia. it is difficult to envision a way forward for the united states and russia to rebuild that trust and achieve a level

of transparency that could lead to a brighter future for arms control. the onus to create the conditions falls on the united states and russia but moscow will bear the burden as russia's actions created the situation. mr. chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testify the attention of this committee and congress to these issues and we will keep you informed of developments. thank you again i look forward to your questions. >> thank you for your opening comments and service as the norm. i am going to turn to the ranking member. >> i want to make a comment. the question of how we wrote was not just for traditional purposes. it was written in a way to become rancid enough to do with all of russia's activities. ask both of you, on

the topic of arms control, can you tell us what was discussed during the meeting with president trump and president putin? >> thank you. i cannot tell you specifics of what was discussed. i can tell you arms-control was a topic of conversation. we have had dialogue with our russian counterparts last month in august. -- met with his counterpart. and he hadike pompeo multiple discussions. arms-control remains a dialogue. as the russian and bass that are said, did verbal agreements get entered into? >> am not aware of any other than continuing to dialogue. >> it was discussed and you know this by virtue of what? >> i know it was discussed based on feedback through senior representatives in the state department. >> can you define that? >> discussions of those that were in attendance to the

debrief with ambassador huntsman. >> let me ask, is there anything different you can enter? >> i am unaware of any agreements that were reached. >> do you agree congress was given a directive with maintaining a strategic arms-control process? >> i agree both are important. is setou agree congress forth as a link? >> i agree that was part of the discussion in the ratification debate over the new start treaty. disappears, what with the implications be for that of our allies? >> i'm sorry. >> if neustar disappears, what would be the implications for u.s. national security and that of our allies? >> from the department of defense perspective, that is one of the issues we are considering

in the agency and with our allies and partners. >> you do not -- you cannot give this committee any sense of the consequences? >> i would say senator, that the issue of neustar which runs till 2021, is an issue which we are very much engaged in terms of consultations and in terms of implications. require more expensive force? >> i cannot say that at this time. >> this worries me. the department of defense is the one that supposedly plans ahead. they do not wait for a situation to happen and figure out what you are going to do. you must be thinking as a contingency that if you start lapses and there is no follow on, clearly to say that what do

we do then? you do not believe we require a larger and more expensive nuclear force? >> the applications of whether the start or -- continues or lapses are still under discussion. the department of defense plans for all kinds of contingencies and considers -- you find it incredible cannot tell this committee what the possibilities would mean. i do not think it takes a rocket scientist to figure that out. that me ask you mrs. thompson, senior military officials such as air force generals, demand responsible for all nuclear forces, and vice-chairman of the chief of staff -- enthusiastic support. let me go through a series of questions. can the united states need all actdeterrence with a force of the new start treaty? >> we are meeting our obligation

senator. meeting -- wely are currently meeting our obligations. >> so the answer is yes. senator, we have met our central limits. have witnessese is to give us answers to the questions we posed. it is not the question i posed. does the new start treaty force the united states to cut back any of our current efforts? >> i would say no. >> does this treaty limit our missile defenses? >> i would defer to the department of defense. >> do you agree the new start treaty meets the standard for arms control treaties in that it fosters transparency, predictability in relation with russia, reducing the risk of

calculation? >> the transparency and verification requirements are neustar benefits. >> ok. believe it meets the standard, the new start treaty meets the standard port in a nuclear posture review? >> i believe it meets the requirements we have today. let me use the first minute of my time to say having written the two amendments myself, with both missile defense and modernization, that there was a resolution forhe ratification. we made sure while we were going to reduce the amount of warheads in our ability to deliver them, we wanted to modernize because it was a huge savings and not

keeping this massive inventory and not knowing whether they actually operate or not, huge savings. the two works -- worked hand-in-hand. andassed those amendments give other people's names on them, trying to draw them onto the treaty. there was no doubt a tie between the two and it has been important. it has been very important, the essence is the modernization peace and reduction in warheads peace though hand-in-hand. i think that is self-evident and has been central to the agreement. >> thank you. their ongoing atcussions with russians your level and the level of national security council as well as secretary of state.

do we have some sort of permanent organization to the treaty? some sortreaty set up of structure where each side can express their contention the other side is in violation of the treaty? is there a next will body of people who need? -- meet? >> there are, senator. during my time, one experts meeting there has been to express meetings. we have the bilateral consultant commission gets together. each treaty has an organization. >> when we brought forward, are these separate agencies? new start has one? how does it work? >> representatives come under butew in different bureaus there experts reside within the state department, also with partners of deal we.

-- doe. >> there will be another meeting coming up that is scheduled? >> fairly regular come a regular in the sense some of the treaties are annually, some are by annually. we have an open line of communication. >> we believe them to be in file asian of the imf treaty. violationsme of our -- launchers are in violation as well. outhink this can be worked where there could be a resolution of these things, if both sides might have to give a little or to be a college there is no way we are in violation of anything? >> we have an inter-agency process that is looking into some of the options we have available. it seems like an openness to having the -- a discussion is important. both of you ignore list the new

start treaty we are in compliance with, and yet both of you seem to be the tenure is we are concerned we are in violation of so many other treaties. with theoncern is that iran agreement, everybody kept saying they are in compliance with the iran agreement. we were unhappy by other things iran was doing. there are similarities that many of us think the treaty was an advantage and brought down the threat of nuclear weapons. there were good things that came from new start. my concern is we could be throwing that out and saying they are violating the inf or this or all these treaties and we do not like the stuff they are doing. i worry we throw the new start treaty out and i hope people will think about, we try to get the best we can and negotiate from a position of strength. i am concerned we would say, just start over and it is not

that easy. i think the iran agreement will be difficult to start from the beginning. instead of starting with what are we complying on, let's start with what we are complying on. maybe we look at the inf. that is the only caution i would have in looking at this and to say we are interested in what goes on with these and we want to have you come in and talk to us about how the meetings are going, what the differences are and possibilities for resolving things are. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you. let me think our witnesses. mrs. thompson -- ms. thompson, i think your written statement that russia has taken action of the past few years have opposed real challenges to our bilateral relationship and widened the deficit of trust, we have russia. i think all of us would say that

and we lookoncern at our relationship with russia on the nuclear front and we recognize neustar gives us the opportunity to do the inspections, not only on active sites but sites that are not active. we get to see with our own people what is going on in russia, which is valuable. we also have the fact russia is in compliance with the new start treaty. we know and inf that russia is in violation with its own land-based missiles. the enforcement mechanisms under the iran if -- the inf and diplomacy, which i agree. throwing the inf what isolate us more from what russia is doing and we have taken countermeasures through a

submarine-based defense system with regard to what russia is doing on land. we have taken steps in compliance with the inf in order to make sure we are secure. my point is, in response to question, i was surprised i did not hear a stronger statement as to national security importance above the new start in inf. we know north korea has a nuclear program. what we do not know is specifics. we do not have inspections. we do not have eyes on the ground. we do not know what is going on. yes, we have with chiron but not in united states participation. we are limited. with russia, we have that capacity to understand their program because of the new start treaty. and we know this administration has a way of

surprising us at times with statements made by the president. that is one of the reasons we have this hearing. i would like to get your views as to national security .mportance to the united states in these tough times with russia, to be able to get our inspectors in russia working with there's, understanding the nuclear program. the importance of that to the united states national security. senator, as i stated, i believe the verification and monitoring and on-site inspection provisions provide a level of openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial, not just to the united states but to our allies as well. troubling what i find is the overall nature of russian arms control behavior and what the russians seem to be doing in terms of selectively complying

with various provisions of treaties and selectively noncomplying with others when they feel it is not in their interest. it is that kind of behavior that from a national securities perspective we need to consider. >> i agree with what you are saying. my concern is sometimes we need -- do knee-jerk reactions in this administration and if we give up our ability to be able to have our inspectors in russia, because of a violation of the nine f leads to the end of neustar, i think it is not international security interest to do that. i was hoping to get a broader response from you as to the importance of our current relationship with russia on nuclear as it relates to transparency you referred to, which is in our interest. we can counter violations without pulling out of the agreement. we have done that. we can still do that.

we can do our missile defense and are not in violation. we can stay in compliance with treaties without pulling out. we are not satisfied where russia is today. we have mechanisms to counter that through direct enforcement and mechanisms within the agreements as well as our own nuclear program and around defense programs in order to counter what russia is doing. isn't that a fair statement? >> i think you are correct we have mechanisms and deed. i believe we are taking a deliberate approach to our assessment of all these treaties, including the new start treaty. i do not see this as a judgment on the part of the administration's perspective on this. appropriatemate and for us to weigh all potential

implications. have aree but we specific responsibility as an independent branch of government on foreign policy and people need to understand how important these treaties are to our security. i respect you are going through a deliberative process. i do but we have seen this administration do things that have not been under deliberative process. decisions made by our president and it is important we have a publicly established record as to the importance of treaties as it relates to america's security. >> thank you. >> i want to follow up on what senator cardin said. --hink this and is important this is an important point. when i came to the foreign

relations committee, the first legislation was the new start treaty. i got involved because the responsibility put on me because of everything us we dealt with, that was the most important. arms control, limitation of arms, with us on russia. -- and russia. i finally voted for it. i did so because it was evident there was no other agreement with any other adversary or potential adversary or ally in the world that had better verification, better mandated access for better access for them. my right on that? -- am i right on that? we did this, with iran, did not have any verification.

it had gaping holes, which is wired voted against it. once to vote against it because it did not add anything to our country's security. my point is, and i understand you do not want to give away negotiations with russia. when he answered your question or my question about the start treaty, you do not want to say anything that would see the point, you might have to negotiate. i agree with what he is saying. the treaty, i think knowledge and access is tremendous. russia and the united states have access to sites in russia. we have a hologram system so we can cap the war has and what they can do. we can catch them and they can catch us.

if we insisted at the table with the iranians, we have a treaty on nuclear weapons, with russia, the two largest nuclear powers in the world, we want to put those verifications in our agreement with iran. we want to come in and expect yours. it was the perfect predicate to do that. secretary kerry decided not to but it would have been a great way. when you get worried about compromising your future by talking about what you might get not like it, do you run the risk of letting them think they can get out from under responsibility and they would be more willing to take it manage of it than we would. point, both of you asked this question. when the vice president announced the space force and the president announced the

space force, and experiment stations the russians have done, the defensive nature but potentially offensive, would you equalize the space force enthusiasm you have seen so far thee equal to what was mitchell defense system of the reagan administration? >> i do not think we are considering a missile defense to what was proposed during the reagan administration. in terms of the space force, the department of defense is committed to going forward and and lamenting the vision -- implementing the vision expressed by the president and vice president in terms of moving out expeditiously and appropriately to develop capabilities, given the importance of space to our defense. >> i was hoping that was going to be your answer because when

you addressed it in your remarks, the space force is the modern-day answer to the missile defense system. reagan used missile defense is an idea for the future. it scared the russians. defense, spending on which put them into the difficulty they fell into in the early 1990's. , think having the space force recognized as a future addition to our defense or offense isitarily and diplomatically a good potential to the missile of defense was. i applaud the administration's boldness in doing that. >> thank you. both for being here to testify this morning.

i want to go back to the inf treaty. you both pointed out russia's violation. i agree with senator cardin's point, it is not in our interest to withdraw from the treaty. i do not think that helps solve the russia problem. what other options are being russiansd to push the to comply, to again comply with the inf treaty? are there things you can talk about that have been looked at, that we might not yet have tried? >> thank you, senator. we have used diplomatic means. we have used military means to pull them back in the compliance. can you discuss the specifics of what those diplomatic means are? >> i would prefer to tell you we are entering a process now and

looking at it holistically throughout the russia strategy. i would not want to get into specifics because we're in developmental stages. we are take from that considering options that have not been tried yet? >> yes, ma'am. that would be fair. >> the nuclear posture review, i guess this is for you. it claims the other states have optionsed the nuclear far more extensively than the united states and russia have. do you share that view and what do we need to do in order to be able to catch up to both of them if we are behind? >> i do, senator. certainly in the case of russia, which is the focus of our discussion today, the russians have been engaged in a very extensive strategic

commoditization program not only in their nuclear forces, but nonstrategic nuclear weapons and systems as well. that is, i would argue far outpaced what the united states has done today. i agree with the earlier comments made in terms of the importance of the u.s. modernization program. we have reduced the levels of nuclear stop file by 80 -- stockpile by 85% since the cold war. we need to pursue the modernization program referred to earlier. has not built a nuclear weapon in many years. russia has. china has. other nuclear weapons states have. i see discrepancy and i would completely agree. things senator pointed out was part of the

agreement around you start was the modernization peace, but the idea was we would continue to modernize and i think there is signing in the current appropriations and authorization in the bill passed that would allow us to look at other modernization capabilities. they were also supposed to go hand-in-hand with efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. can you talk about what has been done in the last 20 months of this administration that would point to efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons? >> i content you have reduced to the point where we are in compliance with all of our arm'' central obligations, and particular neustar totals which have put limitations on systems, the number of deployed weapons and the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery

vehicles as well as the total number of deployed systems. we have taken those obligations seriously. >> can you talk about how much has been done since the current administration took office? >> i do not have the figures in front of me. i would be happy to take that for the record and get back to you. >> that would be great. if you would share it with the committee, that would be helpful. last week it was reported the united states refused to certify the new russian aircraft for flights under the treaty on open skies. we were the only of 23 nations to vote no. can you talk about why -- i think this is for you, ms. thompson -- can you talk about why we took that position? guest: >> we had technical experts along with 20 other countries. we do not fail to certify.

we came back and had to consult additional experts and have a decision on that in the next 24 hours. we have not certified and we will have a decision and it 24 hours. next 24 hours. >> would we not argue with other allies and 23 nations? >> there is a set process on deliberations that within the next 24 hours, you will have an answer for the certification. >> thank you. >> thank both of you. i think it has been said several times today. what you do is some of the most important work our country does as far as our national security in keeping us safe. having said that, trying to negotiate with people who were not negotiating in good faith is a problem. you both have a heavy lift ahead

of you. i was one of the ones, indeed i read the effort to not ratified new --.ied the i think we have to deal with the russians. i think a lot of us today to not have any confidence that they are dealing with good faith. liars.e serial cheaters, you have to look at the other things they are doing in the world to judge what kind of mind these people have as far as whether they are acting in good faith. having said that, the reason i start ise original new because i believed it did not give us the inspections, the confidence we needed to get to where we wanted to be. i thought there was more we could do. we cannot talk about here. there are things we can do to

verify, and addition to the things included in the treaty and they did the same thing. having said that, as we look forward to renegotiating the -- when itof expires expires, other preparations being made as to how we could ratchet up our game as far as verify things we suspect and probably no in some instances they are doing we cannot even tell we know because it would disclose methods and sources? process goingught into this as to how we are going to up our game, ms. thompson? >> there is a process ongoing. all options are on the table as we bring in technical expertise on what we know, how we can fill gaps.

diplomatically, militarily, of the defense department, economically from our agencies as well, what are things that have not been tried before? what our options? that process is ongoing. >> i would agree with that. i would also agree with your earlier comments in terms of the new start treaty. i would make this point. if the treaty was negotiated in 2010 at the time, we had hoped it would represent a new relationship with the russian federation and would lead to broader cooperation on a number of fronts. since that time, what we have seen as -- is a clear deterioration with russia. the we would like the situation to be different, we are i

believe words earlier, we must be clear right about the threats we face. this administration has tried to be that in looking at our arms control in the context of our overall relationship with russia. >> i am glad to hear that is the view. you are right about the deterioration and that deterioration should make us think about how we're going to approach this as we go forward in trying to renegotiate. in addition to the other things they have done, the poisonings and everything else, watching them manufacture excuses as to why they are not complying manufacture accusations against us, that we are not complying on certain things, really cries out game and how our we are going to approach this on the new start treaty. thank you for your work.

i hope we will approach it differently this time than we did last time. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you both for being here. secretary, part of the support for ratifying the neustar, i want to focus on that that others have talked about. it allowed weapons to be updated while loss of achieving overall reduction in the number of arms, both the states and russia possess. the national labs located in my home state of new mexico play a vital role in fulfilling these updates or life extension programs. president trump has said he wants to strengthen and expand the u.s. nuclear arsenal. while certain life extension programs are allowed under new start, building new weapons and not drawing down the overall number of weapons in our arsenal would go against the treaty.

can you clarify the president's position on what he means by strengthen and expand? i blew the best articulation of our policy with respect to our nuclear arsenal going forward can be found in the nuclear posture review released in january. think what we are talking about -- >> could you focus on the strengthen and expand? if it was in the nuclear posture review? what we are looking to do is to have a modern resilience and capable nuclear force that is capable of effectively returning -- deterring attack against the u.s. or our interests. what we are looking at in connection with our nuclear

forces is to preserve the efficacy of our deterrent capability. efforts related to modernization of our capabilities while we proceed with the necessary reductions of all of our systems, are done with the view toward maintaining the efficacy of our overall nuclear deterrent. that is job number one. >> we talked earlier about the meeting in helsinki between president trump and russian president putin. specific arms control issues were discussed? >> i know that the topic was raised. my belief, as i have been briefed, the specifics were not discussed. of twothe importance nuclear companies that we need

to remain open to dialogue between our respective teams to ensure obligations are met. >> in august, a russian document at the july sides between president trump and president putin was leaked to the press. according to the document, putin spoke with president trump about extending new start for five years and reaffirming commitment to the inf treaty. can you confirm whether or not putin raised to these topics with president trump? >> i cannot. >> can you? >> know, senator i cannot. washe knowledge you had from a briefing the ambassador had where you weren't given any instructions with regard to those? >> correct. >> were there any tasks that fromout from the meeting the ambassador to say these are the things we have to do?

>> i didn't receive any specific taskings. >> what is the status of dod's research and development? >> we are continuing to work on the research and development based on the congressional guidance we received, which we very much appreciate. i believe there is about $48 million that has been set aside for research and development of a conventional ground launch missile. the research and development portion of that is entirely compliant with the inf treaty. if we were to go forward and that would a system, be noncompliant with the inf treaty. no decision has been made at this time. >> at how much money has dod spent on this effort? >> i would have to get you the exact figures. ?> could you do that, please

putinubio: vladimir referred to these new weapons over a dozen times as strategic. these new kinds of nuclear arms include hypersonic nuclear cruise missions, nuclear power drones and submarines. i'm glad you recognize that the u.s. has to reckon with whether or not russia's recently announced nuclear strategic weapons will be held accountable under the new treaty. the positions at of the u.s. that we consider the weapons that were previewed in the speech under development , do were announced in march we consider those to be strategic nuclear weapons covered under the start treaty?

>> i would defer to my technical experts for the firm answer on that. my initial read is that they would count as strategic weapons. have the russians notified any of these featured in that speech to the bilateral commission? have we asked them to do so? >> not to my knowledge. i read the results from the inf technical experts meeting. that wasn't raised. you know,: as far as no one has raised with the russians from our side. we believe that needs to be notified. >> the only way we would have seen those was in the open press issue. has anyone from our government expressed our belief

that it is their obligation to notify based on what we saw the described? >> i have not done so. we have not had the engagement on new start with my counterpart. i will take that back. you are saying there has been no engagement whatsoever. there are no other channels this could be raised? >> we have had engagement, but because it was not through official channels, we still have intelligence to gather to confirm or deny. sen. rubio: a speech is pretty official. seen before from the rhetoric that what he says is not necessarily ground truth. rubio: my point is, he gave a speech and described these weapons, you would think someone would say hey, we saw the speech, if that is true, you need to notify that, that would

notify start. it doesn't sell mike any action has been taken yet. action throughn our own community and not for the formal process. sen.: rubio you mean you talk to each other about it? >> the former intelligence officer of 28 years, we have a practice that information is not necessarily intelligence unless it is confirmed. we are working to confirm that information. all i am saying is that he gave his speech, he described a series of weapons. if they were developed at any point in the future would fall under the start treaty as a strategic weapon. you would think someone would say hey, we saw your speech. if that israel, you understand that that needs to be notified. you are saying we haven't done that. >> i'm saying we have done it

internally. the treaty puts limits on us. with other competitors, especially china not covered by it, i don't know who this to,tion is appropriately but does it put us at a disadvantage to china? >> senator, you raise a good point. that is one of the questions we are looking at in terms of overall implications of the treaty of which the russians are in clear violation of. officialo: it is our position that they are in violation of the inf treaty. has a not been widely reported that the russians have openly displayed in exercises and statements made a doctrine of

escalate to deescalate, including the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield in order to elevate or in order to exacerbate the crisis in order to escalated in order to then de-escalate it. treatylation of the inf and the use of weapons would be consistent with the new doctrine, would it not? >> i believe it would be. that is why i believe it is important we consider why the russians are formulating the inf treaty in the way they are because there must be some advantage to doing it militarily or politically or otherwise. thank you both for being here today. following national security meetingjohn bolton's

with his russian counterpart in geneva at the end of august, he stated the administration was in the very early stages of review. he further commented that there were several options available. one was extending the treaty and another was renegotiating it. a third was jetta seeing it and pursuing a different kind of approach. he made a specific reference to the 2002 moscow treaty. the moscow treaty only limits deployed warheads and does not include verification provisions. us, there is a concern about the specific reference to the moscow treaty given that it doesn't have verification. why did the administration suggest the moscow treaty may be an option for the path forward on renewing new start? as then assure you

undersecretary and one of my bureaus, that whatever treaty we engage in with our counterparts has the verification within it. i would never want to speak for ambassador bolton, but integration is in the treaties. on the importance of verification, i would say that i was in the defense department at the time of the moscow treaty. the reason why that treaty did not contain verification measures like most arms control treaties is because we were still operating under the verification provisions in the original start treaty which did not expire until the end of 2009. they were still fully in effect. i wanted to come

back to the issue of open skies. shaheen'ste senator questions. secretary mattis wrote a letter to senator fischer here indicating that open skies compliance with it is still in the u.s. national security interests. the statement,th despite the fact that we have these ongoing russian compliance issues, even with the russian issues,t -- compliance is this treaty still for the u.s. to remain an active part of? certainly because of the transparency it provides, the openness, the level of visibility of what other states are doing that it provides not only to us, but to our allies as well, we would much prefer to see the russians get back into

compliance with its provisions. asked the question because this administration has been in the business of pulling out of several important multilateral agreements. tohink it is important understand that even given these russian compliance programs -- problems, we can work through them within the construct of the existing treaty. >> i would agree that we would hope to be able to work with russia to work through these compliance issues we have. what i do find disturbing and troubling is the fact that as i mentioned, there does seem to be a pattern of behavior here that does not bode well in terms of our desire to take arms control to the next level. until russian behavior changes, or even if it doesn't, we need to factor that into our overall

consideration of all of these treaties as we look at them to determine what the u.s. should do going forward. back to you, the trump administration began talks with saudi arabia. i wondered if you would give us an update on the progress with these negotiations, including the last time the two sides met and a confirmation that the administration continues to seek an agreement that contains the gold standard this committee passed a resolution a few weeks ago expressing our interests that those standards be met that we eventually reach an agreement with the saudi's. >> i can confirm there are ongoing negotiations between the u.s. and saudi arabia. i can't address the specific negotiations since those are youing, but i can assure

that the undersecretary always seeks the strongest -- sen. murphy: kenny just confirmed that that remains the bottom line for the administration? >> yes, sir. the strongest standard possible. a sense of: we had what a gold standard is an we have passed resolution making sure that there are no enrichment or reprocessing abilities for the saudi's. is the gold standard still the bottom line? >> yes, sir. committed to ensure that the technologies do not get proliferated. in this conversation with senator murphy, you are talking about taking days to the next level and what i was happening and the relationship. i might not have heard you

clearly, but if the start treaty is being complied with and is yielding the benefits to us of not having to have som -- so many nuclear armaments, focusing on the ones we have and making sure they do so they are reliable, if it is working for us, we would not consider undoing the start treaty because other treaties are not being adhered to, would we? i think wherever something is of benefit to u.s. interest, then the u.s. should continue to adhere to it or seek to move forward in that respect. the point that i was trying to make was that when looking at the individual treaties, there does appear to be a pattern of russian behavior overall in terms of its arms control and compliance and russia's willingness to abide by agreements that have already been signed that i think speaks

view theirrussians approach to arms control in general. to argue is that in our consideration of what is or is not in our interest, we should at least take into account how the russians are viewing arms control and how they're looking at our responses to their violations. in terms of determining the overall future for arms control moving forward. >> you talk about russian behavior. my concern is can they or can't they rather than will they or won't they. i want to make sure they don't have the capacity to do something.

i read about it in march, they includen said a hypersonic missile, the headline and one of the papers said high-tech weaponry, russia's new nuclear weapons are technically plausible. this is something they could potentially have. pouputin did his boasting. i'm concerned, what is our assessment as to the truth of these? i cannothtenberg: speak specifically to the individual systems president clinton announced. there are probably some of those -- president putin announced. e do think it is a worrisom

development that he made such a presentation of this, which has led us to wonder why the russians believe they need to do this given the fact that i have already extensively modernized their strategic nuclear arsenal. i would look at this in the context of, to some degree it may be aspirational, to some degree that may be a practical element to some of these. systems i do find it troubling from the standpoint of arms but alsospecifically from the standpoint of our overall relationship with russia, which i think we would all like to see improved. can weg the same line, or can't we defend against such things? the question is do we have a defenseor respective system to intercept the possibility of these weapons? sec. trachtenberg: we do not have a missile defense system

capable of defending against the arsenal, nor has it been our policy to do that. the russians have a tremendous number of nuclear weapons systems. reasons,riety of we have not pursued an active defense against a full range of russian strategic weapons. we prefer to rely on our deterrence capability when it comes to russia. >> at this point, we do not have any specific actions we are taking in response to what they are doing as opposed to a deterrence? sec. trachtenberg: we do believe that proceeding with the nuclear modernization program we have by modernizing all three legs of andnuclear triad, land, sea air base components, is critical in order to continue the deterrent effect that we rely on. >> as the country continues to

face threats from around the , i think we should not take any action that is quick to hinder our own missile defense systems. we need to always remain in charge of our own missile defense, not russia or anyone else telling us what we can put up in terms of defense.i have concerns about the efforts of russia to limit our missile defense. can you commit to me that in any arms control discussions with russia for which you are responsible, that the u.s. will not agree to limiting our on missile defense programs? i can assure you i will stand up for what is in the best interest of the united states people and our partners and allies as appropriate. anything you would like to add? sec. trachtenberg: i would agree with that statement.

i was also president of the department of defense when president bush made the decision the abm treatym because the world had changed. we faced a variety of ballistic missile threats and felt the need to move forward with at least an initial deployment of missile defense. i very much believe that missile defenses can not only defend viewed as devaluing. sen. coons: something we haven't talked about as chemical weapons. i'm wondering whether this is an area in which you expect that to reemerge.

the state department has long claimed that russia has not yet declared all its chemical weapons and production facilities to the organization for their prohibition of chemical weapons. russia continues supporting or defending the murders regime of al-assad and the repeated use of chemical weapons. does the administration believe in unilateral measures are the best way to counteract russian, chemical use or should we work through international institutions. sec. thompson: i think both are appropriate. we have worked hand in glove with opcw with our partners and allies of late. we had a rigorous engagement to ensure it is not only a u.s. voice, but a voice of the global partnership. we look forward to continued

emphasis both bilaterally and through the multilateral engagements when it comes to kim. into the reference of my statement where we stand with russia's actions in syria with the assad regime. you see russia could -- or do you think it's going to the smaller scale program that allows it to carry out attacks like the one that recently happened in the u.k.? i wouldmpson: anticipate they would continue to build on their program. saw, i would expect them to expand as well. sen. coons: would you agree there is a connection between the large-scale production as opposed to the ability to carry out small-scale attacks? sec. thompson: i would agree with that assessment. sec. trachtenberg: i would also think that anything the russians do in the area of chemical weapons, they will do with the clear intent to try to hide what

they are doing from detection. i think the result of the attack in salisbury earlier this year was an absolutely atrocious demonstration, regardless of whether they have large or small arsenals, the willingness to really anh weapons is atrocity. sen. coons: i will just ago what senator isaacson said about the importance of having robust verification regimes in the ways in which his support was one over because of the breath and signification of the verification regimes involved. i want to revisit the question senator murphy asked earlier about comments made by the national security adviser, john bolton back in august after

meeting with his russian counterpart where he was suggesting in the early stages of the review that one option in consideration of new start was pursuing a different type of approach, such as the moscow treaty, which only limits deployed warheads and does not include verification. you gave an answer about there being a continuing verification regime that made that not necessary. let me just ask directly. is the administration considering a new arms control agreement that does not include verification provisions? sec. thompson: no, sir. sec. trachtenberg: not to my knowledge. would you support or recommend arms control agreements or reductions that didn't include verification procedures at least as robust as new start? sec. thompson: i would not. coons: it is my view given public statements by putin and others that russia is seeking

strategic weapons that would allow them to restart a great power competition with us. it is my hope you would consider congress a partner and seek our input and assistance as we try to put russia back in compliance with the inf treaty and consider how and when to restart the treaty. thank you both for your testimony. booker: i know some of this ground has already been covered with senator shaheen. i would just like to go through a little bit again. there is obviously dispute over the compliance with the russians on the line of treaty. a collapse of the inf treaty would open the doors toward further development of arms in terms of the intermediate range missiles and the negative repercussions. kenny just help me, briefly restate the benefits of the inf treaty not just for the u.s.,

but also for our nato allies? sec. trachtenberg: i think the inf treaty, when it was negotiated was a major arms control accomplishment and it has completely eliminated an entire class of nuclear systems. there was great value to the treaty at the time. i would also note that the russians were initially callednt when they were to engage in any negotiations along those lines until the u.s. had demonstrated a willingness to at least counter what they were doing with the deployment of their ss 20's in europe. that point isace to make it clear that the russian behavior occasionally is determined by how they view the u.s. reacting to their behavior.

sen. booker: they are in violation, clearly right now. in terms of our allies, what would it mean if we declared a breach and pulled out? what was the implications be? sec. thompson: the implications of the breach have been laid out in the treaty. there are various options with the treaty. tose discussions would have be in collaboration with our technical experts here and partners and allies. we are not there yet. sen. booker: there's obviously importance in- an continuing that dialogue. the bombast of the, my yours, of some

of the statements on behalf of the administration seem to make me worry about the willingness to go forward and continue strategic stability talks. can you give me any understanding of what the administration intends to do to continue that important dialogue? sec. thompson: yes. the dialogue is incredibly important, that was an example the president and president putin in helsinki, that was one example. discussions, senator pompeo. despite the rhetoric, we continue to keep that door open. sen. booker: is there going to fallout fromof helsinki? are we going to have efforts to have more formal discussions coming up? sec. thompson: we have had formal discussions.there are a

nerd agency -- interagency discussions. we have i enough technical experts meetings. it doesn't get as much press, .ut there are lines of dialogue we continue to have those discussions. sen. booker: is the disagreement in the white house over whether they will resume talks? sec. thompson: not to my knowledge. sen.: booker lastly, what with the goals be for those continued conversations? sec. thompson: it depends on the treaty. we have showed them example of example of how they are not in compliance. as the president addressed in july, the fact that we are both nuclear capable countries, we have an obligation to maintain that open line of dialogue. thank you very

much both for continuing to keep ed on these important nuclear conversations. u.s. new start, does the have access only to declared facilities or to also undeclared facilities that we suspect? to my knowledge, it is both. but i will have to take that back to my experts and confirm. jcpoa,rkley: under the to iaea has the power request access to suspect facilities and mandates i believe a 24-hour response period. is that correct? sec. trachtenberg: i believe we could request access.

sen. merkley: at this time, we feared report after report that iran is in compliance. is that your understanding in your examination of all the issues? sec. thompson: they are in compliance as the iaea report, not in compliance with the additional line activities. not merkley: those are jcpoa activities you are talking about. they are in compliance with jcpoa? in your opinion? sec. thompson: the technical portion, they are in compliance. merkley: we have the challenge between a vision and the details of an arms control agreement. this is the new start agreement. pretty hefty package. it has been a career studying it.

jcpoa, which is also a pretty have to package. this is the press release regarding the u.s. and north korea for denuclearization, and this is all we have. am i wrong? is there any packets like this, plans yet detailed between the u.s. and north korea regarding the north curry and program? -- north korean program? these are public agreements. these are treaties. there is no such treaty worked out. am i correct that there is no detailed inventory of north that has been examined and developed with agreement on both sides? sec. thompson: that is correct. am i correct that there is no schedule for

eliminating these nuclear assets that is been agreed to by both sides? sec. thompson: not yet. sen. merkley: am i correct that there is no regime. while it is hard to have a ,omplete verification regime you haven't worked out what you're actually eliminating. sec. thompson: that is correct. this particular statement says the united states and dprk commit to work toward the complete denuclearization of the korean peninsula. ist wording, to work toward, a far cry from what the standard that secretary pompeo set out for which was, i believe he used the words, complete irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. why wouldn't north korea agreed

to language, or did we insist and try to push language that would be a commitment to complete, irreversible illumination rather than simply to work toward denuclearization? sec. thompson: the administration stands firm for final denuclearization. those discussions are ongoing. the time of: at this statement, north korea was unwilling to reach the language we wanted? sec. thompson: they have committed to denuclearize the peninsula. sne. merkley: i'm just reading from a document. they have committed to work toward. that is quite different. language wheref the large nuclear capable, or nuclear states pledge to, and they use very similar language,

undertake to pursue negotiations on complete disarmament. in other words, it is those inserted words that say we don't really have a commitment yet. north korea is just saying it will work toward that effort. i stress this because quite a bit of time has passed. legon't even have the first of the journey. is getting to a complete inventory of their program. north korea hasn't even agreed to that. there wasn't actually any language in this one page document that committed them to it. it is a real concern. the other thing is that one thing we set in this document, which was a little unusual, is we specifically called out that we were committed to hold follow-up negotiations led by

the u.s. secretary state pompeo and irrelevant high-level north korean official to implement the outcomes. the outcome is only to work toward something because there is no verification regime to implement, there is no inventory andheir nuclear program, there is no schedule or plan for how that will be eliminated. what is there exactly to implement? sec. thompson: when we talk final and fully verified, i would say that is the last step. i know you are aware, that once we get the agreement, we get access to the country, and and there is a series of steps. we have got the technical expertise within the ranks of the state department, doe and partners of allies. i'm confident when secretary pompeo reaches the agreement on behalf of the president, that we have the steps necessary to

final and fully verify. merkley: i was just trying to understand but there is to implement. i'm just a little puzzled by what that meant. given that it says that we were fully committed to having a secretary pompeo do these follow-up negotiations, why was his second trip to hold those negotiations canceled by the u.s.? the north koreans had not taken the appropriate action to justify a visit. that said, the discussions are ongoing with secretary pompeo, our envoy and senior leadership. sen. menendez: has the u.s. russia's to verify meeting limitations of the

treaty? sec. thompson: both countries have. u.s.menendez: assuming the continues to verify the russians are in compliance, can the u.s. --t a la bower deterrence meet all of our deterrence? sec. thompson: i would refer to the department. sec. trachtenberg: for the next five years, it is a bit speculative. i know we can meet the butirements today, decisions have had to sometimes change quite rapidly. i would be reluctant to say whether we could or couldn't five years hence. the question is if russia continues to meet its obligations and is in compliance, you can tell me whether we can meet our deterrence requirements under the new start treaty? sec. trachtenberg: our deterrence requirements may be variable. not only directly related to the

russian federation. there are other countries out there with nuclear weapons. again, that would be speculative on my part. sen. menendez: the more i hear the answers to your questions, i don't understand if we can meet all of our deterrence requirements with the force at or below the levels of the new start treaty. if we are not forced to caulk efforts or if we are not limited in any way, if this meets the standard of the review for arms control, if we have been able to verify russia's meeting the limitations of the treaty, it seems to me that all of the foundational building blocks aspiring to a follow-up on the treaty would be in place. as i listen to your answers, i get a sense that maybe the administration is headed a different way. i'm notchtenberg: intending to imply that the

administration takes a different view of that. you may be absolutely correct in what you say. all i am suggesting is that five years, much can happen in five years. sen. menendez: let me turn to the chemical weapons question. -- thel is very violates.attack has the russian federation taken steps to avoid additional sanctions under the chemical and biological act? sec. thompson: not that we have seen as yet. assuming that goes unabated, there should be more consequences.is that a fair statement ? sec. thompson: that is a fair statement. sen. menendez: it appears that the russians have consistently said they value the inf treaty

and like to preserve it. we will see. in addition, it appears that russia and the u.s. have at missile,eed on the which we have identified as violating the treaty. on the other hand, in march, at the congressional testimony, the commander of the u.s. strategic command identified russia had increased production of these muscles compounding their violations. let me ask you a few questions about the next steps and our efforts to bring russia back into compliance. has the u.s. asked russia to halt compliance of these missiles so the military situation does not further deteriorate during our discussions? sec. thompson: we have had discussions with our russian counterparts on what is their obligations and how they are violating the treaties. sne. menendez: has we

specifically asked them to halt production? told themson: we have to get back into compliance and so them examples of what that looks like. wouldn't halting production get them back into compliance? sec. thompson: i would prefer not to talk about open discussions in a public setting. hiding behind things that are not classified and calling them classified are beyond the pale. has the u.s. asked russia to provide an exhibition of the missile so u.s. experts can review the technical characteristics and determine whether it can fly more than 500 kilometers, which would violate the treaty? sec. thompson: i do not know any. what steps has russia taken to bring themselves back into the compliance. sec. thompson: for fill obligations set forth in the inf treaty.

41, they would have to get -- for one, they would have to get rid of that missile. they have battalions of them. they would have to stop production, among other things. you mentioned section 231 in your opening statement. year 19 included a provision which requires the administration to submit a report that significant transactions have taken place with the russian report and intelligence sectors. can we have your commitment that this report will be submitted on or before that date? sec. thompson: you have my commitment, yes. corker: i just want to ask a final question. sometimes that is information are not reality.

, you have leftrg yourself a lot of room as it relates to some of these treaties. are there things out there right now that calls either one of you concerns about strategic ability? sec. trachtenberg: i'm concerned about the overall state of the overall u.s.-russian relationship to the extent it affects stability. absolutely. i'm concerned not just from an arms control perspective, but my concern goes beyond the arms control realm looking into some of the other things that the russian federation is doing. that sort ofctions span a range of activities that i would find counterproductive to american interests across the board. sen. corker: those are all things we can reasonably see and are aware of. are there other things you are aware that they are developing

that cause you to feel concern about the strategic ability. either one of you? i may,ompson: if particularly to russia but to other countries as well, as one that oversees the arms control and treaties a large, is emerging technologies. i talked to some of the staff as of late. those are the types of technologies that we need to get our arms around with responsible nationstates. corker: are you sensing that we are losing an edge in those future technologies are that someone is gaining advantage? sec. thompson: i'm confident in our technologies. we will have to work both in international forms as well and for adherences

and arms control as well as the technologies developed. i would agreeerg: with that and say with the support of the congress, that the department of defense has had for which we thank you very much, we believe going forward and investing in these types of technologies are essential to maintaining the u.s. military advantages going forward. oferwise, we do run the risk and having that negatively impact our overall national security objectives. sen. corker: we thank you both. if you could respond to those fairly quickly, we would appreciate it. we thank you both for being here and sharing your knowledge and insights. with that, the committee is adjourned.

>> we will have more live coverage of this afternoon at 1:00 eastern time. emily will be discussing the democratic female candidates to watch in the midterm elections. you can watch that at 1:00 eastern right here on c-span. at 2:10 eastern, we will take you live to the white house for a news conference with president trump and poland's president who are meeting today.

live coverage starts at 2:30 eastern here on c-span. you can watch on c-span.org and by using the free c-span radio app. q&a, cbs newst on chief white house correspondent major garrett talks about his book. >> is not just a bipartisanship. i think it transcends party. i describe donald trump as. proto-partisan he is bigger than partisanship because there is as emotional dynamo that he spends within people. intentionally. sometimes he doesn't even know he is doing it. but that it happens is influencing every aspect of american life, culture, economics, and in ways you have detected. the way journalists and rocked with this ongoing story. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern

on c-span's q&a. >> what does it mean to be american? that is this year's studentcam question.n we are asking middle and high school questions to answer it by producing a short documentary about a constitutional right, national characteristic or historical event, and explain how it defines the american experience. we are awarding $100,000 in total cash prizes, including a grand prize of $5,000. this year's deadline is january 20, 2019. for more information, go to our website. studenctcam.org. the un security council held a meeting yesterday at the request of the u.s. on the latest efforts to denuclearize the korean peninsula. in this portion of the meeting, the u.s. ambassador to the u.n. rebukes russia for what she says were