you are going to say it is harder in some circumstances to make good decisions. this is as much is sociology book as it is economics and political science. guest: i am a journalist. i am steeped in the american enterprise too. vance's billability elegy. my experience a look at china's model of governance and how it is changed under the

leadership of xi jinping. tcu and the department of partners ands are we are sad that the horned frogs did not make march madness. it is baseball season anyway, so who cares. ]laughter right lik ado, theurther strongest name in news. [applause] one.ll, this is a big we have one of the strongest groups of experts anyone has put together. the title is rise of china. as it is in every country, we have our creation

story. we have some people call it a myth. force i was in the air in vietnam, the creation myth in laos is that they believe they came out of the giant pumpkin. everybody has their own myth. china, ason story of henry kissinger has pointed out, is different than any other in that -- unlike any other creation story. china was already here when the world was created. [laughter] how china got here is still unknown. we should not be surprised when we talk about the rise of china, the chinese do not see it the way that we do. to them what is happening is china's return to the center stage. most of theee it,

foreign-policy community would tell you how we manage this relationship, and how they isage this relationship, perhaps the greatest challenge facing the leadership of both countries. we also know that in the long history of the world, when a country rises to the challenge -- rises to challenge the existing sole superpower it results in war. there have been 16 such junctures, starting with the rise of athens which challenged sparta. the2 of those 16 junctures, result was war. that is where we are heading today. we find ourselves in great competition with china. is it leading us closer to war, or towards a more stable world?

that is what we want to talk about. may i say, as i already said, this panel was one of the best we have ever assembled. i encourage you to read their full biographies in your programs. let me introduce each of them briefly. the deputyollins is director of the cia east asia and pacific mission center. care served in the cia since 1996 as an analyst at various times on east asia, the middle east, north africa, and the arabian peninsula. who isoined by johnson, senior adviser at csi s and holder of the premier chair of china studies. a long time analyst and china watcher. on the end, holes in the korea chair at csi s. after leaving the

national security council in 2007. acknowledge by most people is one of the most knowledgeable korean scholars in america today. must say has the best job in journalism. the moderator of "face the nation." she was a fulbright scholar and graduated with distinction from the university of virginia, where she majored in middle east studies and minored in arabic. and she is a new mom. congratulations. let's set the stage. where are we right now at this juncture? how would each of you describe the relationship between china and and the united states -- china and the united states? what is the threat being posed by china, or is it a threat? michael, you are the active, not a former.

you are the active part of the government. how would you compare this juncture? thank you for the question and you are in the question more generally. csis, thank you for the opportunity. often.t do these when we do a hope it confirms the importance of what is being discussed. what the threat is and what the threat isn't. the challenge that we see stemming from china's rise, is no longer a traditional military security or intelligence feature. it is, increasingly so and more seriously so and more broadly, it represents the most serious challenge to the international order our government and like-minded partners have stood behind for the last several decades. why do i say this?

i see this in the open aspirations that the communist party under xi jinping enunciated in defining their influence ons leadership around the world at the expense of the norms and institutions of the liberal international order as we currently know it. understanding of how the communist party of china is defining how they want their country governed, and the norms and institutions that enable that, are in direct conflict with what our country stands behind. itsa is proactively using power in more assertive ways to establish greater influence around the world in governments and within countries and with media to advance that objective. i say this because when you look at the standards that the

communist party of china requires in its international engagement and the terms that it requires in trade arrangements, they are in direct conflict with many of the standards we have required in international financial institutions that have advocated transparency and corruption free assistance. the last thing i want to say is what the threat is not. and i'm saying this as dispassionately as possible, we see a difference of view on how governments should be governed, how countries should be governed. challenge is not necessarily coming from china's rise alone, the rise of the chinese economy, the chinese people, those are very positive forces for change.

the challenges coming from the communist party of china under xi jinping that defines its aspirations by how it desires to define government and society at home. that is the greatest challenge for the united states and our partners around the world to wrestle with. >> you are the korea expert. how is this situation where we find ourselves being viewed in asia? >> thanks for the question. it is viewed as the most important question out there when we think about the future across any metric by which we define great power status. there's only one actor beside the united states that equates with that great power status. that is china. countries in the region, china, korea, vietnam, australia

understand that this is the next big challenge for the postwar liberal international order that michael was describing. the unanswered question in international relations going forward. how is china going to accommodate this postwar liberal order, or to what extent they are going to try to revise it. if they seek neither to accommodate or revise it, but seek simply to destroy it, there is no other model to follow. many would argue that is a worse situation. i think many allies in asia, they are transitioning. in the past, many of them said i don't want to choose. don't make me choose between the united states and china. i would like to have my cake and too.it i would like to have security benefits from the united states and economic benefits from china. areeasingly, many countries realizing it is going to be

harder in the future to have o.eir cake and eat it to whether it is china or the united states, there are choices countries did not want to make before. whether it is joining the u.s. missile defense system in asia or not joining.there are choices that are being that theyto be made are having a difficult time with. >> chris, what is your take? >> i agree with most of what has been said. i would maybe try to sharpen the point a little by saying in my mind, china's for surgeons on the world stage, the emerging aseprint that is referred to how they want to execute the ambitions they have, been there for the challenge that presents to the global international is the dominant strategic narrative for the 21st century.

that is about as tight of a bumper sticker as i can put on it. i would emphasize as well that the change, the challenge, is one likely have never seen before. that is why i don't like the model because i think it is bad technology hase fundamentally changed the game. it has turned out, for example, technology has been an enabler for authoritarian regimes, much of people around the world. if you have a market that is big enough and enough determination, you can use the internet in a coercive way. i would highlight that i think it is important that we understand, and we will get into this, these policies did not arrival.h xi jinping's if you understand the communist party of china as an

organization and its history, m much o what they'r doing now should not be a surprise. whatnderlying -- much of they are doing now should not be a surprise. the underlying tensions, we are in a situation where xi jinping is an accelerant for those challenges, and so is donald trump. that is making things more robust. for two underscore is what worked in the cold war was soviet isolation. china is not isolated. the ability to engage in unrestricted competition across all domains. that is either not existent with china or seriously challenged, especially given the intertwining of our economies. >> i would say two things. these are great big picture items. i know that for every day viewers and consumers it is like, how does this affect me?

president trump was at a rally in ohio talking about china in terms of this trade deal that he expects to strike. he keeps talking about it like it is about to happen, going to happen. we have seen the date for a potential meeting with xi jinping pushed from the end of march to the end of april. nothing is on the calendar the white house says because they don't want to be penned down to something because the chinese assume if the meeting happens there is a deal. they don't want to have what happened to kim jong-un happen to them. he talk to workers at ohio about the money that china is stealing from the u.s.. the $500 billion they take from the country, is how he is it.sing i believe he refers to $500 billion in goods purchased from china. tople shorthanded referred china as the world's walmart for

reason. china had cheap labor. americans like cheap deals. these are things we like about how china changed markets will stop workers in states like ohio don't like these levels of competition. hear about china on the campaign trail in 2020 in ways that people have not figured out how they want to articulate policy changes, but they will likely have some kind of trade agreement with china to complain about or praise in a few months time. the president is committed to a deal. with the deal looks like is hard to describe. your left in hear the president talk about goods, agricultural products. that is something that politically will resonate for him. you don't hear the particulars of what the trade deal is supposed to be about. technology transfer and all of these as oteri things that may not resonate on the campaign

trail but mean a lot to people that are investing to set up businesses. that is something i am tracking. i have not figured out how to digest was notableht it that secretary of state pompeo in the past week and a half has used stronger language to talk about china' human rights abusess in a way that frankly you would expect the u.s. to talk about. pointing out close to one million people are believed to be rounded up in parts of china, muslim minorities. the language by the state department was used saying we have not seen something like this since the 1930's. that is stark language. we have not heard it from the white house yet. one thing that struck me about that is that he is talking about because the administration is accused of pulling punches on human rights. it is a little bit of pressure,

interestingly, starting to happen on that front that if the trade deal gets done we hear we willut, or maybe hear from higher levels than the secretary of state about, and perhaps scary consequence. it has had zero consequence -- and perhaps carry consequence. it has had zero consequence so far. >> they're going back to china next week to start negotiations. do you think they will get a trade deal? >> i think we will get one eventually. as margaret was saying the devil is in the details now. one of the challenges is we have gone through the process. for those who have to watch it every day, it is painful. there is a site: these negotiations, which is -- there is a cycle in these negotiations, which is largely defined by lighthizer and the administration saying we need to

have a deal that is meaningful and has to address all of the valid u.s. and u.s. business concerns about industrial policy in china, state enterprises, the regime's use of a coercive regulatory toolkit to block our companies from markets versus simply buying more stuff. planes,s, air other things on the table. for a while markets begin to become skittish that nothing is going to get done. trump starts to panic because he see's the market going down and he says let's get this across the finish line. i've seen 10 cycles of this. i think we are in another cycle. i think the most recent trip that we are seeing is interesting. my understanding is that the leaked thepartment trip to the press because

markets were going down over -- the trip was planned but they wanted to dive in. my sense is let's see what comes out of this next round. i don't think that expectations are high on either side.it is let's keep up appearances . it turns out, this is really hard to do. this negotiation is far more wto,ex than china in the and that took a decade to negotiate. for today, reading i read that someone remarked opened up theping economy has power was passed from mao, but the political system was not open. this observer said perhaps because of what had happened to gorbachev and the collapse of the soviet union.

how does that affect our dealing with china? what is your thought? >> stepping back from the day to day on the bilateral negotiations, what is happening is a reflection of fundamental differences into how we see economies being governed and how they want economies being governed. more recently, on xi jinping's descendents in particular, and consolidation of authoritarian control in that society, the elimination and moving past the collective leadership structure. they used to have to be sure that a political opening was not necessarily the thing to have, but a collective leadership structure. the most fascinating thing to me is the consolidation of greater communist party control over all things china. all things in china and chinese outside of china, as they

themselves annunciate. idea that political reform will follow, as international relations theory might suggest, economic openness assumes that economic openness and reform is itself.o be achieved i would suggest the economic and undershoot and paying is more control politically and economically. the economy is being viewed and affected and control to achieve a political end. thinking about opening politics to enable what we would think our reforms to achieve an economic end. there is the greatest challenge in this particular issue. how this plays out, i like the way victor framed this, how it plays out is not just our

bilateral relationship but how others react. how other partners also wrestling with china on the same issues, how do international trading and financial institutions respond? this will be a key moment to how this plays. is amichael is describing domestic issue for china. it is a domestic issue that has all sorts of international ramifications. china is a great power. it will be the next great power. makeup and domestic powers make great historically has ripple effects for other countries in the system. there is a reason why the united states also saw the third wave of democratization in the world. we are seeing democratic backsliding in small part because of countries like russia and china, china ascended and

russia back in the game, and the united states receding from the game. aat might be described as domestic experiment in china has international repercussions for the way that we think about regime a marker see and domestic choices around the world. >> a definitely does. the two dilemmas the chinese communist party faces is a requirement to break through the middle income trap to keep themselves in power. they are in a performance-based legitimacy system. that no choice but to succeed. secondly, the rise in power and a desire toey have obtain international legitimacy. they need to do these things but they don't want to open the political system. they know most of the successful cases who have conquered those things have done through in part through democratization. they are determined not to follow the democratization

path. industrial policy on the economy and making the world safe for china's unique governance system and capitalist economy on the international stage. >> margaret, one of the things we have not talked about in connection with the economy is security, national security. there is no question the administration clearly wants to rein in china's economical and technological ambitions, and to stop china from playing a role he the next iteration of t technological revolution, the so-called 5g that we talked about, which i had to go look that up. >> i think a lot of people even in the government are like 5g is important and do ask what they mean and they say, talk to somebody else. [laughter] technology, that

proves what john once said, all jobs in government are the same once you learn the jargon. [laughter] >> find out with the jargon is and you are set if you have common sense. there was a very interesting story in "the new york times" the day before yesterday, the headline was "allies are spurning campaign by the united huawei." block clearly, there is concern about security there. what is that about? margaret: there is and i think a lot of that was based around verbal sparring with the german government in particular. while way -- there are so many levels to this story. there is agreement that china is

a threat, but what you do about it goes victim it. marco rubio has been championing for some time this effort in the u.s. to specifically block huawei from being able to sell products here. there has been pressure to politically ban certain products with the idea that they can be used to be a national security threat. if you buy words, the technology they have a backdoor into it. margaret: essentially, yes, that is why the pentagon already implemented these bans. in terms of everyday consumers, that is what marco rubio is talking about my blocking them out of the market. i remember some twitter messages the president posted about the personal call from xi jinping a year ago about zte, that company and how important it was. all of this is, it is a long

complicated story, but it gets to the bigger question of -- are chinese companies actually capitalist entities within a communist system, or are they arms of the chinese government? that is the fundamental question that this comes down to. and most certainly republican senators, marco rubio particularly would argue that these companies and the government are the same thing and that they should not have access to our market. we i tried to tell our allies this is a risk as well. and i did not find, i would love to know what michael thinks you find a-- but difference of opinion, because i asked barbara lighthizer when he was on my program what he thought about bans like this and he said he was not in favor, but it does not seem like that is where the administration is right now. i cannot say what the policy is on this, i do not know what it is. >> is this something we ought to

be worried about? >> the challenge about this, one is -- let may say one thing up front, the irony in terms of economic engagement, i find it ironic when you step back and think in this international world that we have stood behind, no country has benefited a from the china international economic order we have maintained, the free and liberal principles that have allowed a china to achieve what they are trying to do in things like --. and no country has more threatened that order than china does. i find the irony noteworthy. the threat is, one is on a national security standpoint, not just for other countries around the world, but that vital technology and innovative expertise and give the that gives our country and others strength is at risk. by all the things the chinese go

about in acquiring them. that is one aspect. the second is how the use that capability. saying nothing specifically about 5g per say, but from a military security dimension, one of our greatest concerns about the chinese military is increasing those areas that need technology, electronic warfare where the norms of the road have not been established. and in our national security process, we adhere to certain norms when we utilize such technology into the chinese do not. , the third point is look at how china uses that technology domestically. look at what is happening. look at what is happening to repressed free and open expression, look at what is happening to freedom of liberty and all those other things, how they use technology domestically and the laws on the books requiring chinese entities with that technology to be called upon to provide support for

security services of china. not just in china, but overseas. that is why this is a risk and a challenge. >> i think before we go on, it is important to underscore the issue, because it is such a microcosm for the china challenge we started off with in terms of trying to get hardliners to work with us. the reason we are seeing the pushback that you highlighted is because the allies are saying to our government, you are asking us to rip all the stuff out of our system, and our governments are with you, but our business community may not be with you. so how about some evidence, that is one issue. and it is very difficult because nobody questions that huawei rips off technology, they even admit it, but it is the issue of how do you prove the negative in terms of the backdoors and those things. and we are doing this at your request, but where is the skin

in the game for you? your companies are making huge profits selling to huawei. you say you will do an executive order banning huawei from sales. and these are things that create strings within the alliance in an era when our credibility is a little less than it has been. >> victor, i will ask you the next question. to me, the most interesting thing i learned reading that article, it was deep in the article about our allies are rebelling against us telling them not to do business with huawei. deep in the story i found an interesting paragraph saying the president has repeatedly undercut his own justice department, which laid out a sweeping criminal indictment against huawei and its chief financial officer, and previously he had of these penalties on another chinese telecom firm, zte.

it also said in that article, iat some in the government, want ask you to comment on this michael, but some in the government are concerned he might try to put some of this into a trade deal. victor: well, it is a great point. you know, i think what this comes down to as my colleagues were describing, it is questions like huawei and zte that raised the issue of three choices we have with china in regard to this. one of them is, perhaps some of our allies would prefer we do this, which is just a muddle through and to say, as chris said, just give them to buy more stuff. reduce the merchant trade and let's just muddle through. what robert lighthizer and

michael was talking about. and the second way is to really try to negotiate meaningful agreements with china that protect technology that prevents -- or essentially regulates the behavior so that the u.s. and china can work together in the future. which is probably the hardest task. and the third is the one allies are going against, this idea that we just disconnect. let's rip out all the hardware and disconnect. and in many ways that is the most dramatic, that is the choice we are pushing onto allies, according to that article, and it is the hardest one for the allies to do for all the reasons christmas and. -- chris mentioned. >> the other challenge is we do not make that stuff here anymore. we let those technologies disappear here. so there is, there are some alternatives, huawei there is --

and without some coalition, people do not have any choices. and huawei is cheap, that is attractive to the developing world. >> i would like to ask you all, we just had the summit in hanoi with kim jong-un. margaret was there. victor knows a lot about it. what did china want to have been there? ow dodoes china want -- h they want this situation to be resolved? victor: margaret can comment on this. i was covering for nbc, not cbs, so i would say it couple things. the first thing is the absence of an agreement out of hanoi was not something that china wanted. china wanted to see some sort of agreement, because we know that their bottom line is stability on the korean peninsula and they do not want to see crises like we saw in 2017.

they would've liked to have seen some sort of agreement. and i think that all of us were surprised there was not one. i mean, i was quite surprised there was not in agreement. and i am worried about the path forward. but i think the bottom line for china is they would like to see some sort of agreement that ensures there is no more testing by north korea, that compels political crises for the united states. of course, they would like to see some practical things done with regard to the north korean nuclear test site, which sits on the chinese border. i do not feel that they are deeply vested in denuclearization of the korean peninsula, like the u.s. and its allies are. but i think that they are probably as concerned as the south koreans are about the absence of an agreement and where we go from here. >> south korea has had a tremendous impact on the government there.

victor: by far the biggest losers out of how annoyed where the south koreans -- of hanoi were the south koreans, because they are the ones at that will have to pick up the diplomatic pieces. there is clearly a gap between the u.s. and north korea on what is a potential deal, sanctions for denuclearization. and the ball is effectively in north korea's court, but anybody who has negotiated with north korea knows, that means that ball is not going anywhere. [laughter] victor: basically. and the south koreans, i think him a diplomatic halfway point. market: i do not think -- margaret: i do not think the chinese would minded the american troops leaving anytime soon. the president said it was something he never thought about, but in the future he would like to bring the troops home and it is quite costly, but we are not talking about it now,

leading into the idea that it is not so crazy to float the concept. for think china was hoping a different conclusion on that issue of a peace arrangement. i thought it was interesting we had in vietnam. i know there was talk about it as a setting like, look, this country we were at war with is a friend, but when i go to vietnam the emphasis is this is a country that has pressure on both sides and i was thinking that that was more of a fitting parallel for the summit. but i think that china muddling through is always what they kind of want, they do not want conflict. when i speak with officials now about how this played out and i think it is very clear that john bolton was happy with his position sort of winning out, in terms of taking a harder line, as i believe he said publicly in some

interviews, floating the idea that further sanctions are possible i think that presumes, china will be on board for those. i do not know that they are, but there is an idea that you could see china and the rest of the international community tighten things up on the ship to ship transfers, like cheating around the edges on the sanctions and more pressure on north korea. that is where i am not clear where china will end up on that question, if they will continue to help us play hardball. >> they probably will not. china itself has been on a huge roller coaster ride in their policies toward north korea. the scariest thing that happened was he was president who is willing to engage with north korea, and i think that their game was a stabilizing long game and initially i think probably to the detriment, that is how they describe it now, they believed when president trump said to them, work on north korea and i will get this trade stuff off your back. margaret: which he said to john dickerson, if they help us, we

will help them. >> they tried hard actually and it is more than i think most people acknowledge, but they now believe that they overdid it, in other words they worked hard, they did not get anything done on the trade front, they actually got more tariffs, so now i think the strategy is to micromanage the north koreans and forces summits with kim jong-un, where they used to have none. so the chinese feel comfortable they got him under control and the rest of it, just let it play. >> michael? michael: three points in the context of what broadly we see china trying to achieve in northeast asia, as well as what they are trying to avoid in a process. clearly trying to achieve a weakening of the u.s. security influence in east asia, in all of our alliances, particularly south korea. clearly trying to be more influential on issues that

matter in the region, maybe not specific to the u.s., but to the region itself. and clearly trying to avoid instability on their borders. in particular, right on the border with north korea. i think it is noteworthy with the comments made here in terms of what they didn't want to see happen in this process, being certainly a return to a major increase in the temperature that could get into a situation where things could unfold and they would have a crisis on the border. second is an accelerated resolution of the issue, whereby the importance of that issue, that issue is important to them strategically, but it is also important to the u.s., so it gives them leverage with us. a resolution of that issue, especially one with the united states certainly remaining a solid provider of security on

the peninsula, thereby undermining oddly the chinese strategies they are trying to achieve is almost certainly something -- china is not eager to see. -- yes, i think it is noteworthy the narrative in china on talking about the removal of troops from the peninsula. it is on their radar in terms of things they want to avoid, but i am not sure that is necessarily the case in the rest of the region. >> we have not talked about artificial islands china has been building out in the pacific. uh, what about that, are they going to -- are they no longer artificial? [laughter] >> i think they are still pretty artificial, they are getting artificial by the day, that is the challenge. you know, the u.s., in my sense,

2012d an opportunity in with a territory controlled by the philippines, the chinese were making an effort there. there was an agreement brokered diplomatically that they would use a typhoon for everybody to go home, the filipinos did and the chinese didn't. the important part is there was no consequences. forthat set the stage then the ambitious building program that we saw afterwards. china would have done most of what they have done anyway, but they would of done so over a longer time than one or two years. i think we face a situation where certainly we can do, where the administration is doing operations within the 12 mile zone, but the only way to undo it is something we might term rollback with a nuclear power. so that is a very challenging

situation and in fact those islands mean enough to us, even in the context, of our allies in right now we are not adjusting that. >> i want to get questions from the audience, but while you are thinking of a question i want to ask, what is the latest news on mike pompeo? will he run for the senate? [laughter] margaret: asking that question will get you a heck of an answer, a sharp one impaired does not like -- one. he did not like being asked about that. but we know that he spoke with mitch mcconnell about it, and he is saying for the moment he will stay in the administration. i would not rule it out in the future to see him run for office there. do you want to go from being forth in line to the presidency to junior senator from kansas? i do not know. perhaps within the next few years, if he keeps saying on the record he is staying for the moment -- i asked the president about this during our interview.

first, he told me it was fake news. [laughter] secretaryi said the actually talk to mitch mcconnell about it, he said i spoke with him about it and he said no. >> when reporter said he told him that he would that the lord decide over the weekend. i do not have any sources there. [laughter] >> are any of the rest of you hearing anything along that line? michael, you are excused. margaret: he has spent a lot of time in the american heartland for a secretary of state. he was recently doing a lot of speeches in a way that typically the secretary of states speak to local media overseas. the secretary and the state department explained that to say it is part of the china policy, talking to farmers in iowa, that is part of recruiting, he said, debate bring in more people from the heartland instead of all these elites running the government. so those are the official

explanations for why he has spent much time in iowa. >> he is waiting for the weekend. who has a question? how about right here. yes? here he comes. , identify yourself please. >> my name is angelita. so russia and china are actually after global supremacy. and they have learned their economic lessons from the past administrations. but i think that the silent problem is the partnership between russia and china, which the united states still has to a ccept to learn how to make a long-term strategy on how to deal with both. and my other question, which i want your opinion please, it is really the domestic bickering in the united states which takes time from shaping of global

foreign policies, economically, politically, militarily -- it seems that the leverage of putin and xi, they have centralized decisions and their administrations are quite long-term, unlike in the u.s. where we are dependent on who is the next in inline. is the bestou think global security or how to deal long-term with with russia and china, given your expertise? thank you. >> go ahead. >> thanks for the question. as i said, i do not do a lot of these things, the ones i have done the majority of the time we have done them on russia. for all the rifle concerns we have about russia's attempt to undermine u.s. standing around the world, continuing, for all

that they are trying to achieve, for all the reasons we talked about, china is a source of concern. but russia is more able to get away with being assertive and coercive and meddling, because it can count on, if not legally or officially, it can sort of caps on china, who has a shared mutual in just in undermining the u.s. china does right, not have to get hands dirty as much. the russians get their hands dirty by doing things around the world, meddling in the affairs of other countries, and not being as concerned about getting caught doing so. and that also undermines, you know, u.s. credibility and it also supports what the chinese are trying to acquire that is noteworthy. so solidarity, stepping back, stopping solidarity with all our of our like-minded countries

around the globe, that is the answer to a lot of these issues, the extent to which our partners stand behind us on the issues we stand for and the extent that our adversaries see that as well. the point about the south china sea, we talk about an adversary's threat to us, three things matter, intentions, give ability and resolve. that is the ability to calculate overtime what have i learned to get away with. if we are successful in moderating the behavior of not just china, but russia, what we ofto achieve a perception resolve and push back as chris said, which was not there in the case of the south china sea, i think we will be more effective. the last point, russia and china, they are not allies. i think it is noteworthy in all of this, when we talk about alliances and what we stand for, and how we have mutual interests, the russia china

relationship is more one of sort of strategic solidarity over mutual interests, but i would not say that the values that underpin what we know to underpin the alliances we stand for our necessarily there. >> i think there is an important distinction to be made between russia and china's efforts to achieve -- and their efforts to undermine the u.s. order. i think a lot of their activities are focused on undermining the u.s. order. but in terms of achieving -- , you know, usually after they achieve their power and influence they actually provide goods to the financial system, because they want to maintain their new order. the concern is russia and china, whether allies are not, are looking to undermine the u.s. you to really still take from the system without giving anything back. the united states at the end of one or two are going forward, we took from the international system, but we also give back to it.

there is only a comparison of china's one belt and one road with the marshall plan. the think about the one road and all these other activities by china, it is loans they are giving out. grants,hall plan gave that was money we gave to europe to reconstruct europe. so it is a very different thing that we are talking about when we talk about efforts to undermine america and the russian and chinese efforts. they are interested in undermining u.s. influence, but they are not interested in replacing the united states, which leaves us with a much worse order over all than we could possibly have today. >> another question. ?ow about toward the back what about taiwan? [laughter]

i didn't hear the question. >> what about taiwan? [laughter] >> yes, can you be more specific? >> i heard the argument the other day that we should become for to protect the china policy and to stop screwing around with taiwan, then i heard cory gardner and others on the hill who have been arguing for stronger ties with taiwan, to push further for their independence, where do you see the pressure that xi jinping and others are putting on taiwan now and the american response? >> ok, thank you. >> i will give it a shot. a what has been made, xi made a major speech on taiwan recently and a lot has been made of it, especially the content that seems to sit just let's have reunification sooner rather than later, which was a theme of it. there was a sense of urgency in that speech, but a lot of the

language and content was actually the old line in new bottles. similar to previous speeches. two things i want to point out. one, it is very striking that the u.s. government through the intelligence agency this year decided they wanted to -- something that said basically the chinese military now believes they can do that and win. so that is something that should give a lot of us pause. the second i think, perhaps more fundamental, is we see china using a lot of the tactics of russia to influence taiwan's democracy. i think that is the bigger threat, as opposed to a d-day style invasion. it is cheap, relatively successful. the domestic politics of taiwan can be polarized, even the ruling party is about to have a factional split between the premier and the president over running for president. and china will be deeply involved in all of that. i was in taiwan during the

run-up to the recent elections in november and a lot of this was going on and it is of deep concern. i think that that is the larger threaat. t. i think i wanted learning lessons in this process. certainly the phone call with the president-elect donald trump was a huge win for taiwan, but then they got\from the mainland, which i think they should've seen coming, but it's not clear that they did. and there is a risk for taiwan in some cases on this in being of a position of do not love us too much, from the americans, because they are always the ones caught in the middle. to go back to several comments mike made, the governance style of xi is making it easier for voices to say, we are supporting the democracy of taiwan, not the ccp ideology driven sort of socialist state. you can argue the new forces are being unleashed in that

relationship which would test those that say the one china policy was decided at the forming of these relations and it cannot be violated, it has to be managed very strictly. it is messy for all three parties, i think. >> anybody on the side? -- this sid? e? this lady right here. >> good evening. i'm a graduate student at georgetown. given the fact that china has strategy, iued a was wondering on your thoughts on china as a polar power? >> who would like to talk about that. >> i cannot, do you want to? >> i will give a quick answer. they currently have one and -- clearly have one and they want to be involved in the issue.

there is a sense that this is another area where the points that have been made by all of us today on alliances and the importance of alliances, the nordic countries are very worried about this, they are seeking assistance. we are a polar power and we was have been. and i think it will be important for us to show some leadership. i think that there is a question as to whether some of the fear of china's ambition in this area is slightly overwrought. so far, they are talking and not doing much. but we have had situations where like they now for example have the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world and the have serious economic reasons for wanting to be involved there. i think in that aspect they seem to share the russian philosophy of, look at all these minerals and economic opportunity there, as opposed to environmental protection in the nordic area, things like that. so again, this is an area where it is getting stronger and it is now important for

the u.s. to show leadership in managing the process. >> one more question. how about right there. hi, julian barnes from the new york times. i was wondering if mr. collins would engage on the question of whether, as the panel brought up, a possible ban on u.s. exports to not just huawei but other chinese companies, would that have any effect on china's control their own society? some of the things he pointed out in your comments that are concerning about china's rise, is there any way for the u.s. to hamper that sort of ability to exercise social control over their own people? and furthermore, could that slow

the rise of huawei until a western competitor can catch up? >> i think that is a great question. one of the realities out there that is not discussed widely enough is just how dependent chinese technology is on its access to the international arena. hasite the idea that huawei 5g system from start to finish, you know, there are parts of dependencies they have on access they need from others around the globe. and that is not just apply to five g technologies. xi isiorities that putting on this 2025, the division were china can be the leading provider of these major technologies around the world, as much as they aspire to

achieve that, that depends on access they still have to the technology and expertise, the data and intellectual property that they know they can get elsewhere. i would say objectively that there is a loner ability to be dominant in those technology spaces by the fact that they still need access to innovative capability, not just in the united states, but around the globe. >> i would add, because of that dependency you look at things like the relationship between china and israel. >> ok. on that, i know how to get off on time. thank you also much. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

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