framework. but what about the life and situation of actual living, breathing palestinians in gaza today who lack civil rights, who lack the basic freedoms of even arabs within israel who already don't have the same rights as , but who liverael under military occupation 50 years after the 1957 war, in rulinge of every single of an international court or organization. >> you can see the entire debate on the israeli-palestinian conflict tonight on c-span at 8:00 p.m. eastern. up next on c-span, a discussion from the center for strategic and international studies. on u.s. trade with china and chinesecerns on companies potentially spying on u.s. government and u.s. businesses. [applause]

>> well, this is a big one. i think we have one of the strongest group of experts and it put together on this. the title, as you saw, is "rise of china." in the west, as it is it every country, we have our creation story. we have what some people call it a myth. back when i was in the air force during the vietnam era i discovered that the creation myth in laos was that they believe they came out of a giant pumpkin. myth.ody has their own by the creation story of china is henry kissinger -- as henry kissinger has pointed out, is different than any other it that unlike any other creation story, basically, china was already

here when the world was created. [laughter] how china got here is still unknown. so we shouldn't be surprised when we talk about the rise of china, that the chinese to not see it exactly the way we do. that what is happening today is china's return to the center stage. up mostwe see it come of the foreign policy community, i think, would tell you, how we manage this relationship and how they manage this relationship is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the leadership of both countries. he also know that in the long history of the world, when a country rises to challenge the existing superpower, in most cases, it has resulted in war, the so-called for proclivities trap.

in 12 of the 16 junctures where a youngster has risen against the giant, 12 lost the war. is closer to war or leading us closer to a more stable world? that is what we want to talk about. may i say, as i have already said, this panel is one of the best we have ever assembled and i really encourage you to read their full biographies in your programs. limit introduce each of them briefly. michael collins is the deputy assistant director of the c.i.a.'s east asia and pacific center. he has served in the c.i.a. since 1996 as an analyst, on east asia, the middle east, africa and the arabian peninsula. he is joined by our own chris

adviser who is senior to the csi ask, holder of the chair of china studies, longtime c.i.a. and a list and china watcher. picture on the and holds a , came herer at csis after leaving the national security council in 2007, and i think he is acknowledged by most people as one of the most knowledgeable career scholars in america today. and finally, margaret brennan, who i must say has the best job in journalism, she is moderator of "face the nation" and cbs news chief foreign affairs correspondent. she was a fulbright scholar and graduated with distinction from the university of virginia where she majored in middle east studies and arabic. .nd she is a new mom let me set the stage here by getting a brief thought from each of you.

where are we right now at this juncture? how would you describe the relationship between china and the united states what is the threat being posed by china, or is it a threat? michael, you, the active, you're not a former, you are part of the government, how would you compare this juncture right now? thanks, bob for the question and for your interest in the topic, more generally. csis, we don'tto normally do this often. one thing about what concerns us and one thing that doesn't concerns us, what the threat is and what isn't, the challenge we see stemming from china's rise is i would say no longer of a traditional military, security

or intelligence nature. it is, more seriously so, it represents our most serious challenge to the liberal international order our government and our like-minded partners have stood behind for the last several decades. why do i say this? i see this in the open aspirations the communist party of china under xi jinping and nancy it, in terms of defining their aspirations as essentially as zero-sum struggle, leadership around the world, at the expense of the liberal international order as we currently know it. the increasing understanding of how the communist party of china is defining how they want their country governed, and enormous institutions around the world have enabled that.

i say this as well because china is increasingly proactively using its power in a more coercive and assertive way to establish influence around the world with governments and within countries, with academia, with media, in ways that are intended to advance that objective. when you look at the standards that the communist party of china requires in its international engagement with countries around the world, its terms in trade arrangements, withare in direct conflict the standards we have required of international institutions that have ever kitted transparency and corruption-free assistance. transparencyred and corruption-free assistance. this as and i say passionately as possible, we see a difference of view on how ,overnments should be governed

or how a country should be governed. not.the threat is the challenge is not necessarily coming from china's rise alone, china's economy, our relationship with china, the chinese people or the chinese diaspora. on the contrary, those are change. forces of the changes included coming from a state, the commonest party of china under president xi jinping, and how it desires to define and govern its own home. i think that is a challenge for what the united states and our partners around the world have to wrestle with. bob: venture, you are the korea expert and japan. how is this situation where we find ourselves now, how is it reviewed in asia? victor: thank you for the question, bob. first i would say that it is viewed as the most important

itstion when you think about future. across any metric by which we define great power status. there is only one actor out there besides the united states that equates with that great power status and that is china. anything countries in the region -- korea, japan, vietnam, australia, all understand that this is the next big challenge for the postwar liberal international order that michael was describing. i think this is the big unanswered question in goingational relations forward, how is china either going to accommodate this postwar liberal order or to what extent it will try to revitalize revise it. if they seek not to revise it is simply to destroy it, with no other model to follow, many would argue that that is an even worse situation. , think many allies in asia

they are transitioning now because in the past, many of them said, i don't want to choose. don't make me choose between the united states and china. i would like to have my cake and economico, the benefits from the united states and also from china. increasingly, as michael describes, many in the region are realizing that it will be harder and harder in the future to have your cake and eat it too. whether it is china or the united states, they are compelling choices the country don't want to make. whether it is joining the u.s. missile defense system in asia, or not joining it, there are now choices that they are being compelled to make that they are having a very difficult time with. bob: chris, what is your take? chris: i agree with most of what has been said. i would just sharpen up for in a bit by saying that in my mind,

china's resurgence on the world stage, the emerging blueprint that might refer to how they want to execute the omissions they have, and therefore the thelenge that presents to international order is the dominant strategic narrative for the 21st century. bumper sticker i would put on it. i would also emphasize as well that, the challenge is one likely have never seen before, this is why i don't like the trap model because a -- of the thucydides trap model. it is not the end of history. it turns out if you have a

market that is big enough and enough determination, you can use the internet on a very coercive course of where. i would also highlight that i think is important we understand, these policies did not start with xi jinping's arrival on the scene, my sense youalways been that if understand the communist party of china as an organization and history, much of what they are doing now should not surprise. the we are seeing is underlying strategic tensions between the u.s. and china have been building for a while and i'm really we are in a situation now where xi jinping is an accelerant for those challenges and so is donald trump, which is making things more robust. and i think the main thing to underscore is that what worked for us in the cold war with the soviet union was soviet isolation. china is not isolated. ability to engage in unrestricted competition across all domains.

that is either nonexistent with china or seriously challenged, especially given the close intertwining between the two economies. bob: margaret? margaret: i would say two sayings, big picture items. consumers,everyday is, how does that affect me?president trump was jets at arally in ohio -- just rally in ohio talking again about china in terms of this trade deal he expects to strike, he keeps talking about it as if it is going to happen. you have see date for a potential meeting with xi jinping pushed from the end of march to april. nothing is on the calendar, in part because they don't want to be pinned down to something because the chinese are assumed that if a meeting happens, that means there is actually a deal. didn't want to come in and have what happened to kim jong-un in last month in hanoi.

he speaks about the $500 billion china takes from this country, is how he was praising it. i think he was referring to the billion purchase of goods from the u.s. in china. people refer to china as the world's walmart for a reason. china has cheap labor. it has made things cheaper. americans like cheap steel. but there are a lot of things workers in places like ohio don't like about some of these levels of competition and things. so i think you are going to hear about china on the campaign trail in 2020 in ways people have an quite figured out how they want to articulate policy changes yet, but most likely they will have some trade agreement with china to either complain about or praise in a few months time, because the president seems committed to a deal. what that deal looks like is really hard to describe at this point, you know. you often hear the president talk about goods and

agricultural products. that is something that politically will resonate for him. you don't necessarily hear the particulars of what the trade dispute is supposed to be about , which is about technology transfer, and all of these kind of esoteric things that may not resonate on the campaign trail that mean a heck of a lot to people investing there in terms of trying to set up businesses. that's something that i'm constantly tracking. the other thing i would point out that i haven't quite figured out how to digest yet is i thought it was very notable that secretary of state pompeo in the past week and a half or so has used much stronger language to do about china's human rights frankly, asway that the united states, you would expect the u.s. to talk about, pointing out the closed within people are believed to be rounded up in parts of china, muslim minorities. the language used by the state

weartment twice in saying, haven't seen something like this since the 1930's. that was pretty stark language. i didn't get a lot of attention because you haven't heard it from the white house yet. secondly, one thing that stood out to me about that, but he's talking about it at all because this administration is often accused of pulling punches on human rights. so it's a little bit offen pressure, i think, interestingly starting to happen on this front that if the trade deal gets done that we hear more about or maybe we'll hear from higher levels than the secretary of state and perhaps carrying some consequence with it largely has had zero consequences thus far. bob: so i guess our people are going back to china next week, are they? margaret: steven mnuchin and bob lighthizer. start negotiations. doesn't them by have any thoughts on it? do you think they will get a trade deal? >> i will take a stab at it, i think they will. as margaret was saying the devil

is in the details and one of the levels that we've face side we've gotten into the process and for those who have to watch it, was very painful. there is a cycle that happens in these negotiations. the sort of hawkish elements which are really defined by bob lighthizer in the administration, saying that we have to have a deal that is not just transactional, it has to be meaningful and it has to address the very valid, u.s. and a u.s. community concerns about industrial policy in china subsidies of state-owned , enterprises, the regime's use of a coercive regulatory tool kit and these sort of issues, structural issues, let's call them, versus simply buying more stuff, soybeans, airplanes, the other things on the table. what we tend to see is a cycle where the hawks are ascendant for a while and markets begin to become skittish that nothing is actually going to get done. trump starts to panic because he sees the markets going down and he gets on his people to just get this across the finish line.

i have seen at least 10 cycles of this since we did this off next year. i think we in another one of those cycles. for example, the most recent trip that we're seeing emerge is very interesting and my understanding is the treasury department that leaked the upcoming trip to the press because yesterday markets were going down based on stories over the weekend that they wanted to, arrest that. the trip was already planned and they wanted to dive in. we keep seeing this over and over again. my sense is let's see what comes out of this next round. i don't think expectations are high on either side. mainly, let's keep up appearances. and as margaret was saying, we keep the date the pushed on it turns out this is hard to do.

this negotiation if it's serious is far more complex than china's obsession to the wto and that took a decade to negotiate. bob: we have seen the chinese government evolve. as i was reading to get ready for this today, i read where someone remarked that deng , stepping back from the day-to-day on the bilateral negotiations -- how does that affect our doing with china? michael? what is your thought on that? back fromtepping the day-to-day on bilateral negotiations, what is happening is a great reflection of fundamental differences of how we see economy is being governed command how they want economies being governed. , onink more recently president xi jinping's ascendancy in particular, and the consolidation of authoritarian control internet moving past the

collective leadership structure they used to have, following, , thereow being was a broader collective leadership structure. the consolidation of greater communist party control of all , all things china and all things outside chinese china. political reform will follow as international relations theory might suggest, economic engagement and economic openness, assumes that in that economic openness, economic reform is an and to be achieved. i would submission of the fundamental and of the communist party of china under xi jinping is more control of the society politically and economically. andeconomy is being viewed

controlled to achieve a political and. political -- to a political emnd. that is the challenge. how this plays out, i like the way victor framed this, how it actually plays out, in particular not just what happens in our bilateral relationship, but how others react to this, our other partners who are also wrestling with china on these same issues, how these international trading and financial institutions respond, i think will be a key moment. michael was describing is a domestic issue for china, but it is a domestic issue that has all sorts of international ramifications. essentially because china is a great power, or will be the next great power. it sort of domestic makeup

choices of the great powers make historically has all sorts of ripple effects for other countries in the system. there is a reason why the united roles it is leadership after world war ii also saw the third wave of democratization in the world. we are seeing democratic backsliding in the world in no small part because countries like china and the united states receding from the scene. what michael describes as a wouldic-esque in china i argue has international repercussions for the way we think about regime-10 democracy around the world. >> and definitely does. there are two dilemmas let's chinese communist -- and there are two dilemmas the chinese companies party faces. to keep themselves in power, they are in a performance-based legitimacy system. secondly, as their rising power and prestige, they have a desire to gain international legitimacy

and they need to do both these things, but they don't want to open the political system, yet they know the most successful cases who have conquered those various things have done so at least in part through democratization. so this is their challenge. they are determined not to follow the democratization path, so it leads them in certain tracks. industrial policy on the economy , and making the world face for system unique governance . bob: margaret, one of the things we haven't talked about is security. national security. there is no question the administration clearly wants to rein in china's economical and technological ambitions, and to stop china from playing a role of thenext iteration technological revolution, the

so-called 5gs that we talk about. which, i had to go look that up. [laughter] peoplet: think a lot of a been in the government, will say, yes 5g is important and you , ask them what they mean and then you have to talk to somebody else. [laughter] bob: it's the fifth generation of this technology. margaret: right. exactly. bob: which just proves what john connolly said which said all government are the same once you find out the jargon and then you're set. maybe you have common sense, but there was a very interesting story in the "new york times," a day before yesterday. alliesdline was are spurning campaign by the united states to block huawei, the chinese telecom giant. clearly, there is a concern .bout security there what is that all about,

margaret? margaret: there is. i think a lot of that was based the chinese government in particular. there are many parts to this story. in this country family have heard -- it is one of the few bipartisan issues an agreement about china is a threat. but how you counter it goes -- you can run the gamut. chippingio has been for the united states to specifically block huawei, zte beingher companies from here. a campaign to ban certain products with the idea that they can be used to be a national security threats to the united states. bob: that they have a backdoor through their technology. margaret: right, which is why the pentagon has already implemented some of these bands.

but i terms of everyday consumer, that is what people like marco rubio are talking about blocking them from the market. if you remember that twitter messages the president had posted about a personal call from xi jinping a year ago about zte, the company, and how important it was, all of this is a long look of the get his story. but it gets to this bigger question of, are chinese companies actually capitalist entities within the communist system, or are they arms of the chinese government? that is the fundamental question it comes down to and how they view it. republican senators, particularly marco rubio, would argue that these companies and the chinese government are the same thing, and therefore should not be having access to our market. we are trying to tell allies that this is a risk at well. but -- i would love to know what michael thinks about it -- but you find a difference of

opinion. i had asked bob lighthizer when he was on my program a while ago what he thought about bans like that, and he said he was in favor. but it doesn't seem like that is necessarily where the administration is. i cannot articulate what the administration's policy is on this. bob: michael, is that something we should be worried about. michael: and there are three aspects of a challenge. i think the irony when talking about terms of economic engagement, i think when you step back and look at this international liberal economic world, no country is actually benefited more in their economic ascendance than china from the international economic order we have maintained, framed with liberal principles that have allowed china to engage in our country and acquire the technology th they have.

and historically no country has threatened matt order more than china does. i find that irony worthy. the threat that comes from this on a national security standpoint not just us but to countries around the world, that metal technology, that innovative expertise and capability that gives our country and other countries strand is at risk. that is one aspect of the threat. the second is, how they use that capability. saying nothing specifically about 5g per se, but from a capability, itty is increasingly in areas that require chines innovative technology. in places where the norms of the road have not been established. in our security process we adhere to certain norms when we use certain technology. how chinant, look at uses that technology domestically.

look at what happens, what is happening in some of their cities. to repress free and open expression. look at what is happened to repress freedom of liberty. how they use that technology domestically, and the laws that are on the books requiring chinese entities to have that tohnology, called upon provide support to the security services of china. thatust in china overseas. that is why this is a risk. >> i think it is really important underscore the issue, because it is such a microcosm for the china challenge that we started off with, in terms of trying to get allies and partners to work with us on a challenge. the reason we're seeing some of the pushback you highlighted is because the analyzer saying to our government, you're asking us to rip all of this stuff out of our systems and our governments are with you, but our business communities may not necessarily be with you, so how about some

evidence? that is one issue. it is difficult because, no one questions that huawei rips off technology, they even admit it, there is a long-standing issue there. it's an issue of how do you prove a negative in terms of back doors and those sort of things and the allies are saying we're doing this at your request and there's the skin for you. your semiconductor companies are making a profit selling to huawei. banning huawei from sales to huawei, but you don't do it, so you create strains in the alliance in an era where our credibility is arguably a little less than what it once was. bob: victor, will ask you this next question. to me, the most interesting thing i learned reading the article,was a deep in about our allies rebelling against us, telling them not to do business with huawei.

deep in the story, i found an interesting paragraph saying, the president has repeatedly undercut his own justice apartment, which laid out sweeping criminal indictment against huawei and is chief financial officer and previously, he had eased penalties on another chinese telecom firm zte. , it also said in that article that some in the government and michael collins, i want ask you to comment on this, but some in the government are concerned that he might try to put some of this into a trade deal. lecture: yeah. yeah.tor: i think what it comes down to, as my colleagues were describing, it is questions like wally and zte that raises -- like huawei and zte that raises

the 3 choices that we have with china with regard to this. one of them is, and perhaps some of our allies would prefer we do and aso muddle through chris said, let's just get them to buy more stuff. reduce the trip merchandise trade and just buy more stuff and let's just muddle through, right? what bob lighthizer and what michael was talking about, the second way is to really try to negotiate meaningful agreements with china that protect technology, that prevent theft, that essentially regulate the behavior so that the united states and china can work together in the future, which is probably the hardest task there we had and then the third path is no on the allies are rebelling against, the idea that we should just disconnect. let's just disconnect. let's rip out all of the hardware and let's just disconnect. in many ways, that is the most , the choice we are pushing on to allies, according

to the article. in many ways, that's the hardest one for the allies to do for the reasons that chris just mentioned. >> and the other challenge is, we don't make this stuff in the u.s. anymore. we allowed an industry to disappear here. we didn't let that happen in the aerospace areas so there are a few alternatives. there's erickson and huawei and without some sort of coalition, and there are thoughts about how to do that and so on, a lot of people just on have a lot of choices. iswei is cheap, too, which attracted to the developing world. bob: i would like to ask you all, we just had the summit in hanoi with kim jong-un. margaret was there. victor knows a lot about it. what did china want to happen there? what does china want? how do they want this situation to be resolved? >> so margaret can comment. she was there, i was covering

for nbc, not cbs -- [laughter] i would say, the first thing is the absence of an agreement of hanoi was not something china wanted. china i think what i to see some sort of agreement. as we all know, their bottom line is stability on the korean peninsula. they don't want to see crises like we saw in 2017. it would have let ftse some agreement emerge from hanoi, it i think all of us were surprised there wasn't one. i was quite surprised there wasn't an agreement. i'm kind of worried about the path forward but i think the bottom line for china is they would like to see some sort of agreement to ensure there is no more testing by north korea. of course, they would like to see some practical things done with regards to the north korea nuclear test site on the chinese border.

i don't feel like they are deeply vested in denuclearization of the korean peninsula like the united states and its allies are. but i think they are probably as concerned as the south koreans are about the absence of an agreement in hanoi and where we go from here. bob: south korea has had an tremendous impact on the government there. victor: by far the biggest losers or south korea. they are the ones will have to try to pick up the diplomatic pieces. there is clearly a gap between the united states and north korea on what is a potential deal, sanctions, denuclearization, and the ball is effectively in north korea's court, but anybody who has negotiated with north korea knows, is that when we say the ball is in north korea's court, that means it is not going anywhere. [laughter]

basically. so the south koreans, think, will try to work very hard to find some sort of diplomatic half way point. margaret: and i don't think the chinese would mind if those troops left south korea anytime soon, which is what the president said. when we sat with him for an interview he said it was something he had never even thought about, but in the future, he would like to bring the troops home. i am sure china was hoping for a different conclusion on that particular issue of arrangement as well. i thought it was interesting we had it in vietnam in the first place, as the summit and there was a lot of talk about that, look, a country that america was at war with, and now a friend. when i go to vietnam with past secretaries, this is a country so stuck between china and the u.s. all of the time. that's what i was thinking that that was more of a sitting parallel for the summit. i think china muddling through is always want the kind of want

to come don't want conflict. what's interesting to me when i talk to administration officials now about how this played out is very clearit john bolton was happy with his position winning out, in terms of a harder line. said publicly it in a few interviews, floating this idea that further sanctions are possible. i think that presumes china is going to be on board for those sanctions. i don't know that they are. whether is this idea that you could see china and the rest of the international committee kind of cheating around the edges of these sanctions, and more pressure on north korea. i am not clear where china's going to end up on the question, if they are going to continue to help us, or play hardball. venture: they probably will. i think that's the interesting piece in all of this. china itself has been on a huge roller coaster ride during this process in terms of their policy

towards north korea. the scariest thing that happened to them was the u.s. president willing to engage with the north koreans and i think their game was a stabilizing long game. initially, i think probably to their detriment or that's how they describe it now they believed when president trump said to them work hard on north korea with me and i'll get this trade stuff off your back, you know? >> which he said as recently to john dickerson. if they help us here, -- >> they try pretty hard, actually did more than what was to put knowledge, but now i think they overdid it. in other words, they worked hard, and didn't get anything on the trade front, they got another $200 billion in tariffs. now i think there strategy is to micromanage north korea. so i think the chinese feel comfortable that they have him reasonably under control and the rest of it is to just kind of letter like. bob: michael, did you want to

bash the rest of it is to just kind of let it play. bob: michael, did you want to add anything. michael three points. : i think it's in the context of what broadly we see china trying to achieve in northeast asia as well as what they're trying to avoid in that process. so clearly trying to achieve a weakening of the u.s. security trying to beearly more influential in on issues in the region, on issues specific to the region itself. and clearly trying to avoid instability on their borders and in particular right on the border in the form of north korea and it's noteworthy -- comments have been made, and terms of what they did not want to see happen in the process. being certainly a return to a major increase in the temperature the can get into a situation where things could unfold markedly and they would have a crisis on the border. second is an accelerated

resolution of the issue, or by the importance of that issue, and that issue is important to them strategically, because it is important to the united states, so therefore, it gives them leverage with us. an issue in which the united states remains a solid provider of security on the peninsula, thereby undermining broadly what the chinese strategically are trying to achieve is also something china is not eager to see. presence --he true troop presence, i think it is noteworthy how the narrative in china, talking about the removal of troops from the peninsula is certainly on their radar, it is on their radar screen, in terms of things they want to avoid. that i don't know if that is necessarily the case. about theven't talked

artificial islands china has been building out there in the pacific. what about that? are they no longer artificial? are they going to be there forever? [laughter] and why? >> i think they are still artificial. they're getting more artificial by the day and that's the challenge. you know, the u.s., in my sense, missed the boat on this one. we had an opportunity in the incident in 2012 and this was a territory that was controlled by the philippines, the chinese were making an effort there. there was an agreement brokered diplomatically that they would use an approaching typhoon as an excuse for everybody to just go home, the filipinos did, the chinese dating. and the important part is there were no consequences for that decision by the chinese. that set the stage for the ambitious building for them that we saw afterwards. china would have done so over a

much longer time horizon than one to two years. so i think we face a situation, and the illustration is doing this and it deserves more credit , more aggressive operations between the 12-mile zone, but the only way to undo it is something we might term rollback with a nuclear power. a very challenging situation. in effect, do those islands need , and so far we're not seeming to suggest that it does. bob: i have some questions from the audience, but while you're thinking of a question, i want to ask margaret, what's the latest news on mike pompeo. is he going to run for the senate? [laughter] margaret: asking that question will get you a heck of an answer, a sharp one. the secretary of state does not like being asked about that, but as we know, he did talk to mitch mcconnell about it. he's saying for the moment, he's staying in the administration. i would not rule it out in the

future to see him run for office there, but do you want to go from being fourth in line to the presidency to a junior senator from kansas? i don't know. ,erhaps were given a two years but he keeps saying on the record that he is staying for the moment. i asked the president about this during our interview. first he told me it was fake news. [laughter] , theret: then, when i said secretary has actually said this but he talked to mitch mcconnell about it, then he said, well, i asked him and he said no. he's not leaving. bob: one reporter who asked him this question said he told him that he would let the lord decide over the weekend. so i don't have any sources there. i will have to check that out. [laughter] bob: are any of the rest of you hearing anything along that line? michael, you're excused from this. margaret: he has spent a heck of a lot of time in the american heartland for a secretary of state. i will say that, very recently doing a lot of speeches in ways that typically secretaries of state speak to local media

overseas? the secretary and the state department and explain that to say that this is part of the china policy, talking to farmers in iowa. this is part of recruiting, he has said, to bring in more people from the heartland instead of all the elites who are running our government, he has said. so those are the official explanations for why he has and so much time in iowa recently. bob: who has a question here? right here? here it comes. >> hi, my name is angelita. so russia and china are actually after global supremacy and they have learned their economic lessons from the past administrations. is ofthink the problem

the partnership between russia and china, which they united , toes still has to accept learn how to make a long-term strategy how to deal with that. , which iquestion is would like to hear your opinions, please, it's really the domestic bickering in the united states which takes time from shaping up global foreign policies, economically, politically and militarily. the leverage of xi jinping, and , is that they have centralized positions and other administration is quite long-term. unlike the united states where we are quite dependent on who is the political party in line, and then the lawmakers are bickering about the political situation , investigation, and all that. so what do you think is the best global security or how to deal long-term with both russia and

china giving your expertise? thank you. bob: go ahead. >> that is a great question. thanks for the question. i don't do a lot of these things a lot, but the ones i have done the majority of the time is on russia. we haven't mentioned russia yet, thank you for bringing it up. for the rightful concerns that we have about russia's attempt 's standinge u.s. around around continuing, for all the reasons we talk about china as a source of concern, we also have to talk about russia as a source of concern. russia is more able to get away with being assertive and coercive and meddling because it can sort of count on if not legally, officially count on the backing of china, who has shared mutual interests in undermining the u.s.'s standing around the world. vice versa, right? china doesn't have to get its hands dirty as much. the russians get their hands

dirty by doing things around the world meddling in the affairs of , other countries and not be as concerned about getting caught doing so. that also undermines, to the extent it undermines u.s. standing and credibility, it , thesupports any and influence the chinese are trying to acquire. that is noteworthy. solidarity with all our partners and friends and like-minded countries around the globe is the answer to a lot of these issues. extent that our partners stand behind us, and the extent that our adversaries see that as well. chris's point about the south china sea. we talk about an adversaries threats to us. three things matter -- detention, capability, and the third think i'm a

result. the ability to calculate overtime, what did i learn i can get away with? it's in the reading with the arena if we're successful of moderating the behavior of not just china, but russia. i think we're more effective and to that point, russia and china, they're not allies. i think it's noteworthy, when we talk about alliances what the united states stands for and the principles how that underpins mutual interest. the russia-china relationship is one of strategic solidarity and convenience over racial interests but it wouldn't go so far as to say that the values that underpin what we know to underpin the alliances we stand for our serving there. >> i think there is an important distinction to be made between russia and china's efforts to achieve hegemony, versus china's efforts to undermine the u.s. order. i think a lot of their activities are focused on undermining the u.s. order, but

in terms of achieving hegemony, after they achieve that power and influence, they went to provide goods to the international system. because they want to maintain their new order. russia and china, whether allies are not are seeking to undermine the u.s. hegemony and really still take from the system without giving anything back. the united states at the end of world war ii, we took from the international system, but we also give back to the international system. there's always this comparison one belt one road initiative, and the marshall plan. i mean, one belt, one road and all of these other activities by the chinese commodities are loans they are giving out. the marshall plan was grants. that was money we gave to europe to help reconstruct europe. interested ine undermining the u.s. influence but not actually interested in replacing the united states, which of these is overall with a

much worse order than we could possibly have today. bob: ok. another question? how about toward the back? >> warren cohen, wilson center. what about taiwan? [ laughter ] bob: i didn't hear the question. >> what about taiwan? bob: oh, yes, good question. that's a big topic. can you be a little more specific? i heard someone argument the other day that we should be more careful to protect the one china policy and stop screwing around with taiwan. then i heard corey gardner and others on the hill who had been arguing for stronger ties with taiwan to push further for taiwan's independence. where do you see the pressure that xi jinping and others are putting on taiwan now and the american response? >> sure. thank you. that's much clearer.

a lot has been made of xi jinping's major speech on taiwan recently and a lot has been made of it especially its content which seemed to suggest let's have reunification sooner rather than later. there was some urgency in that speech, but a lot of the language and content was actually old line and the new bottles, very similar to previous speeches. out,hings i would point one, it is very striking that the u.s. government through the defense intelligence agency this year decided i wanted to publish something in an unclassified state that said basically the chinese military believes it can do that mission and when. that is something that should give a lot of us pause. the second and i think perhaps more fundamental is we see china using a lot of the tactics of russia to influence taiwan's democracy. that is the bigger threat as opposed to a d-day-style

invasion, because it is cheap and relatively successful. taiwan's domestic politics can be quite polarized. we see the ruling party about to have a factional split between the premier and the president over running for president and so on, and china will be deeply involved in all of that. i happened to be in taiwan during the run-up municipal of their elections, and all of this was going on, and it is a deep concern. learning a lot of lessons in as far as the role this process of the u.s., i think taiwan is this process and certainly the phone call with then president-elect trump was a huge win for taiwan. but they got a lot of backlash from the mainland which i suppose they should have seen coming and it's not necessarily clear that they did. there is risk for taiwan of being in a position of, don't love us too much, to america, because they are always the ones caught on the middle -- caught

in the middle. in a way, xi jinping's style of governance is making it easier for horses to emerge and said, we ought to be supportive of democracy in taiwan, not the communist party congress ideology driven socialist state. you could argue that new forces are being unleashed in that relationship which would test of those who say, the one china policy was decided at the time of the reforming of relations , and it has to be managed. it's very messy, i think, for all three parties. bob: ok. anybody over on this side? right here. this right here. >> good evening. i am currently a graduate student at georgetown. given the fact that chinaa has recently issued a polar strategy, i was wondering your

thoughts on china's aspirations as a polar power. bob: who would like to talk about that? >> we're all looking at mike. >> ok. i'll give a quick answer and everyone else can jump in. they clearly have one and want to be involved in the issue, and i think there's a sense, this is another area, actually where the points that have been made by all of us today about alliances and the importance of and the importance of alliances, the nordic countries are very worried about this. they are seeking u.s. assistance. we are a polar power, always have been, naked there will be important for us to show some leadership. there is certainly a question as to whether some of the fear of china's ambition in this area is .lightly overwrought there are certain talking about not doing much. really we have situations where for example, they have the largest fleet of icebreakers in a world.

have serious traded economic reasons for wanting to be involved out there. they seem to share russia's philosophy of, look at all these minerals and economic as opposed to environmental protection in the nordic area, things like that. this is an area where it is kind on low boil but it's getting stronger and it's an opportunity for the u.s. to show leadership in managing the process. bob: one more question. how about right there? >> hi, julian barns from the new york times. i was wondering if mr. collins would engage on the question of whether as the panel brought up on u.s. exports to not just huawei, but rather chinese companies, would that have any effect on china's surveillance, control

their own societies? some of the things you pointed out in your original comment that are concerned about china's rise, is there any way for the united states to hamper that ability to exercise social control over their own people? furthermore, could that slow the rise of huawei until a western competitor can catch up? and think that is a great question. one of the realities out there that is not openly discussed is just how dependent chinese technology still is on its axis debates national arena, not just the united states, but elsewhere. despite the idea that huawei has, owns the 5 g system from start to finish, there's parts, there's dependencies they still have on capabilities and access they need from others around the globe.

that doesn't apply just to 5g but theires, priorities xi jinping is putting on this 2025 vision, for china to be the leading provider of these major technologies around , as much as they as player to achieve that, it depends heavily on access they to the technology, expertise, data and intellectual property that they can get elsewhere. i would say there is a vulnerability in terms of china's ability to be dominant in those spaces by the fact they still have to have access to i would add to that, because of that dependency, look at things like the relationship between china and israel. i know how to get off on time.

thank you all. [applause] [inaudible] here's a look at some of tonight's c-span schedule. next, a debate on the israeli-palestinian conflict and if the palestinian movement has a right to exist. melania trump hosted a be best event with cabinet secretaries to discuss how their departments were progressing with youth programs. a recent washington journal segment with anita mcbride, former chief of staff to laura bush. followed by interviews with fresh and men -- freshmen members of the house of representatives. on sunday, a week after announcing her presidential bid, kiersten gillibrand hold the

campaign kickoff rally in front of trump international hotel in new york city. life coverage begins at 12:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> once, tv was three giant networks and a government supported service called pbs. in 1979, a small network with an unusual name rolled out a big idea. let viewers decide all on their own what was important to them. c-span open the doors to washington policymaking for all to see. bringing you unfiltered content from congress and beyond. in the age of power to the people, this was true people power. in the 40 years since, the landscape has changed. there is no monolithic media, youtube stars are a thing. c-span's big idea is more relevant today than ever. no government money support c-span.

it's not partisan coverage of washington. it's a public service by your cable or satellite provider. on television and online. c-span is your unfiltered view of government so you can make up your own mind. next, a debate on the israeli-palestinian conflict and whether the palestinian movement has a right to exist. author is research director of the ayn rand institute. he debated u.s. army strategists at the subculture theater in new york its city -- new york city. event now.main reads, toresolution resolve the israeli-palestinian conflict, israel must first achieve defeat of the palestinian movement. i hope you have voted and ask