serious as this, you consult with the american people. and tell them what your strategy is. you need public support for these kinds of things. more. d more and as every conflict has shown over the last several decades. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] emocc or -- democratic and republican presidents on the middle east, dennis ross. now a senior fellow at the washington institute. here is the headline on the front page of today's wall street journal. iranians threat to break nuclear order. trump orders another 1000 troops to the middle east after iran's warning on uranium. your reaction? guest: i am not surprised. the iranians two weeks ago said they were going to quadruple the amount of uranium they were going to be enriching. it was only a matter of time that they would exceed the were restricted

to according to the iran nuclear deal. one thing to note. they have an argument that they will be able to make first at the u.s. is the one that withdrew from the accord. second, sanctions that the u.s. have been imposing have made it difficult for them to send their excess amount of materials out of the country. in the past they were sending out the excess materials that stayed below the limit, getting --ural uranium so it difficult -- it makes it more difficult for the administration to say they are violating the limits of the

agreement and we need to build more pressure on them. we are in a very complicated environment. host: you say pressure. explain what the maximum pressure strategy is and what the goals are. guest: i will tell you what i think the goals are because the administration in some respects has not been that clear. pressure is driven by if the iranians are under pressure and the price is too high, they will look to come back to renegotiate. there is some logic to that because if you look historically, the iranians, when they have faced pressure from the outside that becomes too high, that can affect social peace within iran, they have looked for ways to reduce the pressure. leader of the islamic republic declared during the around -- during the iran

-iraq war that it would never be open -- never be over. 1990's the iranian regime was assassinating dissidents in europe and the europeans threatened sanctions so they stopped doing that. 2003, when the u.s. defeated the iraqi military and the iranians thought they were next, suddenly they were prepared to make proposals that were very far-reaching in terms of not only their nuclear program but also in terms of cutting off military support to hamas. the bush administration tested that. administration, when the iranians said we will not negotiate on our nuclear program so long as we are under sanctions and the administration

tripled down on the sanctions and they negotiated. you can debate whether they should have or not but you cannot debate the reality that the irani and say they will never give in to pressure and historically they have. the logic of maximum pressure is to try and play on that. the a problem with that is you need to give them a way out. says they will apply their own version of maximum pressure in response. explain. the administration one --mistake, one key anning you could carry out act of sabotage which it is and the hutus are

basically a proxy of theirs, firing rockets they have --vided to deny it, to say we did not do it. this potentially could disrupt the flow of oil and raise the price of oil, which from their perspective when they can sell less and less oil, pushing the price up is good for them. interestshat american could be in jeopardy and that american friends could be under threat and the iranians do it indirectly, so the fingerprints are hard to identify. they don't create the kind of

provocation that is easier to justify a response, and because the administration does not have great relations with our allies, partly the result of if you berate our allies, don't be surprised if you call them they are not willing to answer the phone. because of that, we don't have a coalescence of support for the charges we are making against iran. i believe the administration is right. the iranians did this. didn't andying they the rest of the world is not so quick to embrace the american position. host: you can call in now. republicans, (202)-748-8001. democrats, (202)-748-8000. independents, (202)-748-8002. ambassador dennis ross with us until the bottom of the hour. do you expect more ship attacks in the coming weeks?

guest: i do think we are likely to see more but the iranians may wait to test the temperature and see what is going on. they made standpoint, the point that they could resume this at any juncture. the risk is they miscalculated. we don't have direct conversations with the iranians. it is hard to try and reduce what could be misperceptions on their part or our part. right now they believe they have us on our back foot and we don't have an easy response. that the secretary of state says we are going to continue with our diplomatic and economic approach. obviously that has not prevented this in the first place. we don't have allies rushing to us other than the british. the only country outside the region of america's traditional allies in europe or asia that has said that they agree with us was the british.

absent that, it does not create a context for the u.s. to be doing a lot more. at this point, the iranians feel we have the americans on the back foot, we can go after ships again or we can do something else and test to see what the limits of the american response is likely to be. the key for the iranians and this is where they could overplay their hand. -- even if the europeans feel a lot of this is a response to the united states, they will have a hard time not doing anything. if they do nothing in the face of breaching the limits, even if -- right nowmental

anticipating attacks that i not .e surprised [video clip] -- theook over administration has allowed iran to accrue enormous wealth and this is where the trump administration came in. we withdrew from the deal and put in place and economic pressure campaign. we have a ban on a number of petrochemical companies just this past week. president trump is that everything he can to avoid war. we have done what we can to deter this. guest: what the administration it to pressure on -- administration has done is put a

lot of pressure on iran. what the administration did not do is think about what they may do in response. i think we were caught .lat-footed by that rossr: i wanted to ask mr. about a comment his fellow at the washington institute made about using covert operations to initiate aggressive warfare towards iran. i would like to educate the c-span viewers about the context and background. this is basically the israel lobby. mr. ross was identified as israel's lawyer when he was in the state department. if people go and watch the film the israel lobby, it shows that the ministry of strategic workingin israel is

with certain institutions in the united states of america to wage information warfare against even jewish-american and other activists of palestinian solidarity. host: you made your point. ambassador ross, a chance to talk about the institute's middle east policy. guest: the policy is a nonpartisan think tank. wide variety of scholars covering every issue in the middle east. terror, arab-israel politics, turkey, iran. there are a variety of different viewpoints but if it is going to be an effective think tank, it has to have a certain dynamism. it does not have one point of view. what the caller suggests does not hit the reality. host: we mentioned you advised several different presidents.

which administrations? guest: i was a political appointee for reagan and bush and clinton and obama. i am an extinct species. host: our next caller is from massachusetts, democrat. caller: good morning. the whole thing smells like a false flag. the japanese prime minister was visiting iran. what advantage would iran have in damaging a japanese supply ship? superpower but i'm sure they have missiles. if they chose to, they could blow up or sink those ships, but a small amount of damage like the japanese ambassador was having a conference with the leader there. to what advantage -- how does this benefit iran?

this situation? thank you. wast: let's note that it the japanese prime minister meeting with the supreme leader at that time. have a system that is dual habit. you have a government and the revolutionary guard. frequently the revolutionary guard took actions that were not authorized by the leadership. i am not saying that is the case this time around but the fact is, if you want to send a signal, then you can create all sorts of problems. you want to do it in a way that is not going to be constrained and you even happened to hit a japanese tanker. of easyhis is a kind way for you to do it. it fits the style of the revolutionary guard. you don't take credit for these

kinds of things but you send a message and drive insurance rates up. you don't have to sink the ships to make your point. seeking the ships creates its own set of problems. -- sinking the ships creates its own set of problems. they acted in a way that shows they have all sorts of options and activities they could undertake. in a strange way, doing it with the prime minister there signals we will do what we want when we want it. host: first caller -- both callers suspicious of false flag operations. does that surprise you? guest: there is a lot of distrust. the british are the only american ally outside the region to come out and say the iranians did this. it suggests there is a lot of suspicion out there. part of this is there is just meant a lot of trust in the trump administration. what you are seeing on the

outside is reflected from the two callers to mystically. host: michael is in texas, republican. caller: good morning. thank you for taking my call. dealing with the iranians seems to be a little bit like dealing with isis. for a long time, the administration prior to trump seemed to be dillydallying while isis grew stronger and stronger and more threatening. then, suddenly that reversed and isis was basically eradicated. iraniansto me that the don't follow the playbook. it is this cowardice and terrorism, brutality and ignorance and i just wonder if a strategy like what was used against isis would work against them. it,: to put a fine point on

are you talking about military intervention? we lost michael but go ahead. guest: i think that is what he was talking about. aren't think the situations analogous. to bealthough they claim the islamic state, was not a country. to put this in perspective, what the trump administration did is basically follow what was the same basic approach that the obama administration has adopted. it is true the obama administration was late to pick up what were the indications that isis was emerging, but when it did adopt a strategy, it adopted a strategy where it identified a local partner on the ground, in this case democratic forces in syria and the iraqi military. we did a lot of the intelligence and bombing, but they did what was the real fighting on the ground. you don't have quite the

equivalent when it comes to iran number one. number two, when the trump administration came in, the only real changes they made from the strategy adopted by the obama administration toward isis was to give the commanders in the field much greater leeway. where us in a position the local commanders could directly use force without having it in a sense vetted in washington, d.c. that created more leeway in the fighting but it was basically the same strategy pursued with greater intensity. , you areof iran dealing with a real country and it is a rogue country. has toissinger said iran decide if it is a country or a cause and what i described before, there is a duality. it has a president and a foreign minister and the foreign minister speaks very fluent english. very well spoken.

he denies anything the revolutionary guard was doing. we had information that the iranians, even though the president was a reformist and had no interest in it, we had information that the ruble -- revolutionary guard was butiding not just the means rewards for hamas and islamic jihad to kill more israelis. at the same time we were trying to negotiate. the president of iran was saying we will support whatever the palestinians agree to. there was this duality of a government that seeks to be normal and the revolutionary guard that seeks to expand and extend the iranian influence and ideology. dealing with that requires case, whent in any

you engage in diplomacy, if you corner somebody, then don't expect that they will respond the way you want them to. the key is, how do you strike the right balance of putting enough pressure on them and especially with the revolutionary guard, the price is high but you leave them a way out. host: what should be open right now? guest: president trump keeps saying he wants to talk to them. --made it clear he is about he is not about regime change. he was about no nukes. is a very weapons vague standard to try to meet. if you ask president obama, he said the jcpoa was designed to ensure no nukes. president trump just wants to have a deal that is better than what obama has. that seemed to be the sole criteria. secretary pompeo laid out conditions which were effectively conditions for

negotiations but now he says there are no preconditions for negotiations. i don't know what would constitute a deal. if president trump could get something better than obama, they were subset provisions, limitations that would lapse in 2030. if he could get those extended, i think he would take that deal. whether or not that is a deal that should be struck is a different question but at some point there'll need to be in negotiation. the iranians now want to make a point. put maximum pressure on us, we will put maximum pressure on you. we will soften you up. at some point i think they will also turn to negotiations but they will not want to do it directly, they will want to do it through someone else. from japanter abe was they are to fit that role but he is the wrong player --

was there to fit that role but he is the wrong player. i believe there is a hypermobility that the iranians will at some point turn to the russians or the russians will approach them and you can see vladimir putin being the one who comes to president trump and says i have a deal for you. host: virginia is next, richard, a democrat. anyone i am wondering if --embers back in vietnam this man is setting us up to get into another confrontation with another country. , whong about negotiations in the world would want to negotiate with the most corrupt and scumbag that we have ever had in the white house? host: richard out of woodbridge, virginia. guest: he raised the gulf of tonkin. event bya contrived the johnson administration,

designed to create a justification for us to escalate what we were doing in vietnam. i don't see this as a parallel. the trump administration, whatever one thinks of his policies, he was applying maximum pressure. from his standpoint it was working because the iranian economy is being squeezed. devaluedncy has been by about 60%. iranians have been completely devalued. the price of normal goods have skyrocketed. life is becoming very difficult within iran. the whole idea from the trauma administration was make it difficult enough that they will come back to us and we can negotiate better terms. what i was saying before, the iranians are trying to create pressure on us that will get us to find a way to back off as well. both sides are applying maximum pressure with an eye on getting

into negotiation. the danger is miscalculation in advance. host: we showed that video of the suspected iranian mines being removed. was it a good idea to release that video? that thishink administration has a case to make. the question is whether or not it might have made more sense to quietly go and share all the intelligence with key allies privately first and work out with them, statements they might make so that by putting this out first and it is grainy and it is subject to different interpretations. but maybewere there, they were there and saw the mine and thought they should take that off the ship. i have no doubt that the iranians did this. if you listen to people like adam schiff, only intelligence

committee in the house, obviously a critic of the trump administration, he has no doubt the iranians did this. the question comes back to because the trumpet administration does not have a lot of credibility internationally, it makes -- it raises the bar for what it has to do to convince others. it requires it to be more careful in terms of when it is going to release information. he needs to do its homework in advance with others. host: baltimore, maryland. sean, independent. caller: good morning. i have two questions. first, would we really be in this mess with iran had eisenhower and dulles not help stage a good -- a coup d'etat on the the 50's democratically elected president of iran? they overthrew him in the 50's.

my second question is, did the japanese owner of the tanker that got damaged by the alleged explosion, what he is saying contradicts what pompeo and the u.s. officials are saying. he is saying that his ship got damaged by something flying over , something about a projectile hitting his ship from the air. that makes it seem suspicious. could it be iran? possibly but when you hear the owner of the tanker, that is his, he is saying it is something different. that makes this whole thing seem shady like the previous caller said about the gulf of tonkin. host: thank you for the questions. context where you have an administration whose word is not well trusted internationally lends itself to different interpretations and

when you have the owner of the ship saying the crewmembers said there was a flying projectile that caused this, if you look at the damage from the ship, it does not seem to fit that explanation either. the damage to the hall seems to fit the explanation that it was a mine. i think the first part of the question was the u.s. in the british that were responsible for bringing the back into power. most of it was the prime minister and he was ousted. would we be in the same position? 1979. in power until you have the islamic republic the cayman and went through real turmoil in the first couple of years, killing lots of iranians by the way. revolution,h of the

there was a hunt for counterrevolutionaries. they still focus heavily on the recall, the used to british are pulling the strings of the americans, they still find them somehow the archenemy but i think the fact is, you have a regime that has a view of the world that also believes it is entitled to dominate the middle east. the iranians tend to look down on the arabs and think they should dominate the middle east. they say israel should not exist. they employ terror. to say it is only because of what the u.s. did in fact eisenhower administration is a reason we still have a problem. that suggests there is too much of a deterministic approach to international relations and

foreign policy. we have in a rainy and regime that -- we have been a rainy and regime -- an iranian real politics taking place not between moderates and conservatives. those terms don't apply. you have pragmatists in the iranian leadership and what is known as the principal lists -- principalists. believe what happens outside justifies for control of the economy. -- further control of the economy. it strengthens their position of control and power. the pragmatists believe the islamic republic is more than likely to survive if it is not a confrontation with everyone else on the outside. it is not that they don't believe in having an islamic republic, but they believe if you have a more normal relationship with the rest of the world, you have more capacity to flourish and that

will build legitimacy for the regime. you have a real struggle. they have really lee politics. -- real elite politics. one has to take into account those politics. host: one more call. catherine is in ohio, a democrat. caller: good morning. my question is this. this administration does not know how to speak to people. he will openly castrate anybody, individual, even a person on his staff. if you think in your mind that this man has the ability or even the will to speak to the iranians or any other muslim country, he can't even speak to most americans because he thinks he is an emperor or king. he likes oligarchs. he likes to openly humiliate people. when you are trying to come up with logical thinking from this

administration, it is the last thing on his mind. he does not know how to speak to people. even people who are his equal. the only people he idolizes is utin from- is p russia, the man from north korea, the man from turkey when his people came into this country and beat americans up. he liked that. host: let us catherine on president trump as a negotiator and dealmaker. guest: he obviously sees himself as a dealmaker. we are still waiting to see examples of it. will -- he would like to be the one who strikes a deal but the deal has to, in his mind, he has to do better than obama did. the problem at this point is he is doing it largely alone. the fact is if you really want

to be able to move the iranians, you have to have the whole world with you. you have to have them isolated. the iranians also have to see not just what they lose but also what they get. trump clearly understands instinctively because when he was in japan and afterwards, he asserted talking about what iran could gain -- he started talking about what iran could gain. he understands he has to offer them something. the whole logic of maximum pressure as he sees it was to try and bring them around to the table. what i have tried to suggest is the iranians have adopted a mirrored posture towards us and that can lead towards a negotiation at some point but it can also lead to a conflict if one or both parties miscalculate. host: dennis ross, a