u.s. and situate these hosted this discussion on the u.s. alabama peace process -- u.s.-taliban peace and sustainable talks in the future. this was followed by a panel discussion with academics and former administration officials. this is two hours.

andrew wilder: i think we'll go ahead and get started. good morning. my name is andrew wilder. i'm the vice president here at usip at the asia center. i'm delighted to welcome today to today's are important and timely event. as many of you know, usip was founded 35 years ago by members of congress as an independent nonpartisan national institute charged with the vital important mission of protecting mitigating and resolving violence abroad. today's topic is very near and dear to usip. we've had an office in kabul since 2002 and where closely with the afghan and u.s. governments, civil side organization, and others to address underlying causes of instability and violence. support to the afghan peace process is a top priority for usip. we dedicated considerable effort over the last two years to support research, dialogue, skill building workshops, and policy analysis both here in washington and in afghanistan. throughout all our efforts with held fast to the conviction that for peace process to be sustainable, it must be inclusive. in fact, we recently held a workshop in istanbul with top women negotiators from afghanistan, most of whom had each participated in various components of the peace negotiations including many who

joined the first dialogue with the taliban in doha. a couple months ago. it is been a turbulent week in washington, to say the least. a week ago, many of us had anticipated that there be a -- there would be a u.s.-taliban agreement between the united states and the taliban, which was going to initially be the topic for today's discussion. that deal is now uncertain. while the u.s.-taliban talks have been ended, at least for the time being, the urgency of finding a way to reduce violence and achieve a legal settlement -- a political settlement of the conflict remains. the taliban and afghan government backed by the u.s. and nato allies are in a military stalemate. other groups like isis and al-qaeda retain footholds in afghanistan, and afghans continue to suffer ever greater civilian casualties. the need for peace is palpable.

whatever path lies ahead, we know the way forward must provide lasting security and for serve the people of afghanistan. we have an exceptionally well-qualified group of people today to discuss where things stand in the peace process and help illuminate a very complex situation and identifying ways forward including afghanistan ambassador to the united states, roya rahmani. welcome. a distinguished panel of experts -- including the new chairwoman of the afghanistan independent human rights commission, who is joining us video link from kabul. scott worden were moderate the discussion and take questions from the audience. i encourage you all to follow the conversation on twitter at usip in today's hashtag, #afgpeace. during the q&a period will also take some questions via twitter at this hashtag.

once again at usip, #afgpeace. check out the new ipod network which will include this event and many other compelling programs featuring leading voices and peace, violent conflict prevention and national security. before we begin today's moderated discussion, i had the distinct pleasure of inviting ambassador roya rahmani to the stage for some opening remarks. ambassador rahmani became the first woman ambassador of afghanistan to the united states in december of last year and she quickly became a friend to usip. not only has she been a fierce advocate for the women of afghanistan, her own story exemplifies the resilience and perseverance of the afghan people. like millions of other afghans, she and her family live as -- lived as refugees in neighboring pakistan during the

early 1990's. she attended attended a school for refugees, and when the classrooms overflowed with students, she studied on the roof for a year. she went on to earn a bachelors in software engineering, worked for a number of international nonprofits, focused on human rights, received a masters in public administration and international law from columbia university. she's worked in education ministry, minister of foreign affairs, served as afghanistan ambassador to indonesia. please join me in welcoming ambassador rahmani. [applause] rahmani:r excellencies, distinguished guests, mrs. lindbergh, mr. wilder, distinguished panelists, friends, and colleagues, good morning to all of you.

may peace be upon you. it's a pleasure to be here at the united states institute of peace to speak about the prospect of peace and afghanistan. -- peace in afghanistan. the afghan people have been speaking about peace for a long time. we have yearned for it, planned for it, and fought for it. with the type of commitment that comes from knowing what it is like to live without it. beginning with the rollout of the seven point agenda during 2017abul process in which was followed by historic cease-fire, the first in 40

years. the people of afghanistan and their elected representatives have been eager to engage in a meaningful peace process. since 2017, we have continued to engage the global community and our regional partners on this issue to numerous platforms. including the heart of asia and the geneva conference. importantly, we have made concerted efforts to engage with our neighbors to ensure that the region is mobilized and ready to support us in this plan that we have. despite many challenges, our progress towards peace has maintained its momentum. this past spring, i attended a grand council in kabul along with 3200 delegates from across afghanistan who came together to lend their voice, their voices, to the peace process.

one of the things that struck me the most was the practicality with which the afghans approach the idea of peace. people came from provinces not with abstract ideas, but with a clear agenda and precise demands for building a prosperous future. among the many requests put forward to the president, was to -- an institute of geology calling to support the expiration once provinces which minerals, for better roads to increase connectivity all over. my experience really confirmed something that i already knew. peace isn't an abstract concept for afghans.

it's a tangible goal. and it's grounded in three critical foundations. democracy, economic prosperity, and security. so, allow me to explain a little bit about each, what i mean. democracy, peace-building, the kind that brings about long-term peace and stability, required consensus, and widespread popular buy-in. we know that this can only be accomplished among population that is involved in seeing the terms of the agreement that they will ultimately be responsible for enforcing it. we have worked hard to create the kind of environment in afghanistan where the level of civic engagement is possible, and we've seen so much progress.

when young people today, critique administration and -- critique the administration for its shortcoming and demand, i see it as a major come as a measure of how far we have come. our citizens have come to expect democracy. they are holding us accountable and learning to trust the democratic process. with this in mind, the government has remained focused on approving government and strengthening democratic institution in afghanistan. despite the political costs. -- the steep political costs. the administration has fought against the corruption and impunity which has eaten away at our foundation. we are bringing much-needed reform to the justice sector. we are delivering critical services like education and health care. as we work to regain the trust of the people, we are laying a necessary foundation. the progress is clear.

-- foundation for peace. has been clear. the progress we have made in democracy is safeguarded by the maintenance of constitutional order. last october, despite overwhelming odds and local detractors, we had successful -- vocal detractors, we had successful and peaceful parliamentary elections. today, we have a sitting and functioning parliament, which although not perfect, is able to fulfill its functions. we must continue to build stability and support the continuity of the democratic processes to the election that are scheduled for later this month. this is a priority. if we want to succeed in creating peace in afghanistan, we must pay attention to this.

at this critical juncture, we must foster this fragile trust in afghan democracy by showing afghan citizens that their contribution matters and that their voices will not be ignored. on the economic prosperity, of course, politics do not happen in vacuum. and we know that neither peace deal nor elections are enough to guarantee long-lasting peace. with the success of one innovative type to the other, understand the relationship between economic growth and peace is crucial to the success of any peace process. what we have learned in afghanistan following generations of conflict, and now decades of hard work, is that

popular buy-in, that all important commitment that keeps people focus on building a peaceful future despite difficulties and setbacks, is sustained by a single, critical sentiment, hope. we also know that hope, or the belief that a better future will come out of all the blood and sweat and tears that must be poured into making peace a reality, is directly linked to opportunity. afghanistan is the youngest country outside of africa, 68% of afghans are under the age of 25. in the 18 years since the american intervention, this young generation has come of age with aspirations that those who came before them never were there to reach for. they want education and jobs.

they want the ability to connect to the rest of the world. the vision that they hold future -- hold of future opportunity and prosperity is the most effective insurance we have against violence and terrorism. -- against hopelessness, violence, and terrorism. sustaining this hope by ensuring that our people continue to have opportunities has been a priority for the afghan government and is a key pillar of our peace plan and reform agenda. it's a goal that i know we share with our international and regional partners who also want to see afghanistan safe and self-reliant. we have made progress on these goals in number of ways, from expanding regional trade and transit opportunities to

supporting technological advancements. as an example, just two days ago on september 7, the first train shipment caring 41 container wagon and 1100 tons of powder c powder departed afghanistan for china. the cargo will arrive at the destination after a 12 day journey. we are prioritizing the future prospects of our young citizens by ensuring that doing business in afghanistan is getting easier every day. we have undertaken reform to incentivize investment, including strengthening management of our public finances. the 2010 budget is the first fully transparent in the country's history. it meets international standards and is the primary tool for the policymaking and prioritization. finally, we have introduced many

new laws, including public-private partnership law, a new companies law, undo new insolvency law, and a new mining law. as a result of these efforts, afghanistan was named one of the top ten world banks doing business indicator approvers since 2018. -- in 2018. based on the mayor's of the many -- the merit of the many projects were implementing, the imf has agreed that afghanistan can begin applying for loans. our plans for economic self-reliance are achievable and within reach. in the past four years, we've seen a 90% increase in our cumulative revenue versus the previous four years. currently, we are able to pay for 50% of our expenses, and every year, we would like to cut

down 10% expenditure and increase 10% of our revenue. based on this plan, even allowing for unfortunate challenges, we can expect to be self-reliant within three to five years. this is a solid starting point for peace, and we are extremely grateful for our partner, who have invested so much in giving -- in getting us here. but now, we must embrace the challenge of standing on our feet. as a group of businessmen that i met during my last trip just last week in afghanistan, who told me that we are no longer putting our hands out to beg for aid money. instead, we are reaching for partnership, opportunities, and the infrastructure to support sustainable economic growth. in our quest for long-term economic prosperity, we are laying the groundwork for

sustainable peace. and last, but not least, is security. a study of over 33 peace agreements has confirmed that a cease-fire and stabilization is a critical first step in any peace process. it's not hard to see why this is particularly relevant in afghanistan.

i can just return from two weeks trip in afghanistan, during which there were 347 casualties. over 127 of them were civilians. the frustration and sadness that president trump expressed over -- in kabul last week is shared very deeply by afghan citizens. it's impossible to begin the process of rebuilding trust under these conditions. and the taliban of course is not the only threat we face. in addition to the vast terror networks that the taliban does not control, we are also engaged in a war against narcotics industry whose thinkers stress across the ocean to the individuals in america. because of this reality the people of afghanistan are well aware that needed security nor peace can be delivered by a settlement with anyone who -- [inaudible] and we are so grateful for the support we've received, particularly from our american

partners in our shared efforts to confront the -- these groups onto afghanistan, but to the entire world. thanks to the support and the bravery of our security forces, we have made steady progress. with the tripling of our air force and doubling of our commander, the afghan security forces have been defeating every wave of taliban intensified attacks since the beginning of the year. i want to conclude by saying that although progress isn't always easy to see, we have made significant strides in laying the groundwork of peace in afghanistan. for the first time in generations, we have the vision, the wealth, and human capital necessary to achieve our goals. we know peace is on the horizon. we also know that it will come from our terms. -- on our terms.

the kind of peace that afghans in patient is very much aligned with the counterterrorism efforts that the united states wants to see your the prosperity -- wants to see. thr society that we are working to build will not only bring security to afghanistan. it is the best insurance that the world could have against the global threats of terrorism. as franklin roosevelt once said, in the truest sense, freedom cannot be just slowed. -- cannot be bestowed. it must be achieved. i believe this also applies to peace. with their dedication and the support of our partners, i know we can achieve it. thank you. -- i thank you. [applause]

>> thank you, ambassador, for the wonderful remarks on scott -- for the wonderful remarks. i scott worden, the director of am afghanistan and central asia programs for united states institute of peace -- thank you. is the microphone on? i will project my voice. until the microphone gets on.

i am scott worden, the director for the afghanistan and central asia program here at usip -- thank you. >> do we have to turn ours off? >> is this working now? great. i'm scott worden, director of afghanistan and central asia programs at united states -- for the united states institute of peace. thank you, ambassador, for this -- for those wonderful opening remarks. we are very pleased to have distinguished panel to discuss further the issue of the peace process in afghanistan. i think for our afghanistan audience, these will be well know. i will give brief introductions -- joining us on the screen behind is shaharzad akbar, currently the chairperson of the afghanistan independent human rights commission. she has experience not just as

a human rights activists but, also as a civil society leader and a government official. she recently served as a deputy on the national security council for afghanistan, and she was the leader of the open society afghanistan ngo. she will be speaking first. i'm also joined by michael semple on the far right, he is a professor at the queen's university belfast at the mitchell institute and serves the mitchell institute for global peace, security and justice. he has worked in roles with the united nations and ngos in afghanistan and he served as a deputy for several years of the european union special representatives office. also to his left is doctor barnett rubin, senior fellow and associate director of the center for international cooperation at new york university and a longtime afghanistan scholar. he served as senior advisor to the state department special representative for afghanistan and pakistan and has also advise -- advised the united nations

, including on the bonn peace process. and then finally to my immediate right is laurel miller, the asia director at international crisis group. prior to that, she was the acting special representative for afghanistan-pakistan with the state department and has also worked in positions at rand and at usip. so, we will first hear from kabul, afghanistan, shaharzad akbar. thank you for joining us. it is late in the day there. of course, when we first sent out invitations for this event we were expecting to talk about the impact of u.s.-taliban agreement. now, that is suspended, but i think that agreement, if it was to occur, if it does still occur, it's really just the first act of what will be a long and difficult peace process. and that true hurdle lies in afghan to afghan negotiations

included with the taliban, with the company, and other elements of afghan society. panel, i've asked the speakers to speak from of course their different perspectives, but what lies ahead. how do we address the most fundamental issues of negotiations and notably getting to a cease-fire and lasting peace? so without further ado, shaharzad, the floor is yours. >> good morning, everyone. i'm really honored to be part of this reducing was panel. -- this distinguished panel. and speak first about the reactions of the recent investment by president trump, and then speak -- what lies ahead for the process. -- talk about what lies ahead for the process. the reaction to president trump's announcement about , there were aalks lot of positive reactions also captured by the media from afghan that the process was not moving forward in a way that it

should and frustrated about involvement and shared concerns about the implications of the process for future afghan. it was also responses that highlighted the concern. i remember right after that announcement my mom was asking me does this mean the war will go on for much longer? so there was also a set of responses coming from afghanistan about the implications of the cancellation of talks for the conflict, and particularly for maintaining violence and peacekeeping. there's also responses that have improbably been covered much by media, but there's ambivalence. many of us were watching the u.s.-taliban talks smoothly and had concerns about how the talks were going.

concerned about the way the taliban were being received by international security and by -- international community and by the u.s., positioning themselves, and this general disregard for the previous human lives. disregard for the previous -- as well as their own irony about engaging with the afghans and the arrogance about their vision for the future of afghan and her statements about the vision, and engaging.

there were concerns about how the u.s.-taliban talks are going, but there's also, due to that concern, these concerned with voice repeatedly but that doesn't mean there isn't a growing concern about the need for an end to conflict. i think one of the things, the reaction to the talks also -- the reaction, the announcement also illustrated was growing concern about the need to end the violence, and about the need for negotiations of talks to end the violence and conflict in afghanistan. i think moving forward from the reaction, i think the reactions have messages for all stakeholders involved. for the u.s. government and for international partners, the positive reaction of u.s.-taliban talks -- afghans were -- of what the talks would be for afghanistan. they were very concerned about how the taliban were treated in the sense they were having -- -- keeping leverage at the consequence of that happening

the way they were. and so i think moving forward if and when the talks will resume, there are lessons about, there are lessons to be learned about the reaction in terms of building more confidence among afghans more generally towards the use taliban talks and what this could mean for the future of afghan. we cannot really have a peaceful outcome if the majority of the population mistrusts the process that's happening between u.s. -- between the u.s. and the taliban. and i think that came out in reactions of suspension as well. in terms of the afghan government, i think this is an unfortunate thing for the for political

entities to regroup and to really think deeply about the concept of an afghan led peace process. there's a lot of emphasis from our political allegiance on the ownership of afghan, ownership comes with a lot of requiresility, confidence building and requires leadership and ownership requires preparedness. as a citizen i'm concerned about the level of preparedness and the cohesion on the non-taliban side. i think many citizens activists are concerned about this. this is the time for the afghan government and political elites to have commitment to the afghan ownership of building cohesion and preparing better for the dialogue for when it happens. i think that there are messages for the taliban from this

reaction. the sense that many afghans had from various taliban talks was that as the talks are getting more and more arrogant, they are becoming less and less interested in engaging the afghans and we need an exchange about the lies. i assume my colleagues that i went to their memorial ceremony , lost a colleague to taliban violence last week. came from an u -- from not from urban community. when i was attending the memorial yesterday, family read a declaration which asked specifically the afghan

government and international community to not engage and then using their words, it is not mine, but the group taliban. there are a lot of feelings of anger and fear, anxiety among afghans towards taliban here and and i think the process of u.s.-taliban talks, taliban feel they don't need engagement -- have an agreement that has put them in a position perhaps impose their own view. i think the message from the reaction is very -- the taliban are interested in long-term peace in afghanistan which this -- which they say they are. they really need to engage with afghans, because in the long term, they have to sit there with the afghan government, sit down with the different sectors of afghan society and they better sibling relationships now. -- better start building relationships now. in terms of the message they had

, we have to continue to make the work we do for advocating for an inclusive peace. we also have to work on broadening the alliance for the values we believe in. this would be work in afghanistan. the values that we stand for other values of all afghan. that we need to work harder to ensure the alliance for a strong and the valley is come from all corners of afghanistan and the platform is shared with the group of afghans. and, of course, one thing that is particular to the commission, very important for us, is in this process, we believe that we need to pay attention and think asking fort

differences across all afghan society including among the taliban, and are those who achieve lasting peace? without answering these questions, how and why we will not have peace for afghans come will have continued cycles of violence. i will stop there and i will be happy to answer any questions you might have. >> thank you. we'll do presentations from all the panelists before opening up for questions. michael semple, you are up next. hello, everyone. i hope i don't surprise you by saying that i am perhaps more optimistic for the prospect of peace in afghanistan than i was a week ago. i think that we shall see progress towards peace and -- in afghanistan. in large part, for the reasons

that shaharzad and the ambassador have explained to us. fundamentally, afghans and all sides of the conflict have reached the conclusion that now this war has run its course, it's time to find a way out. there is a deep desire for peace. i believe it will be fulfilled. in this crazy way things are proceeding over the past week or two, i think that there now may be even better prospects for this progress. i'm also glad that the ambassador mentioned at the start the cease-fire of june 2018. i think that's a good part to reflect. there was an event in usip in the days leading up to that. i think we should have a vision, that we saw scenes throughout afghanistan from almost every province of afghanistan where within days of announcement by

the president, when he called for a unilateral cessation of violence, the taliban were essentially balanced into following suit. -- bounced into following suit. and we saw these absolutely greasy, chaotic, in a sense, classic afghan, good spirited, not really controlled by anybody, youngsters would been -- you had -- who had been up in the mountains coming into town, the interior minister out in the streets taking salafis with taliban who -- taking selfies with taliban who basically wanted out of the country. the essence is to recapture the spirit of that and turned into reality so that it's not three days, so it's forever. however, when saying this as a -- this is a good point at which to start our thinking about peace now, there are right lessons and wrong lessons you can draw from that. one of the right lessons is the desire for peace cuts across the

sides of the conflict. it is amongst the taliban and amongst the afghans who live in government controlled areas part of the current political system. one of the wrong lessons that some people and -- some people drew was that aha, the taliban, taliban command-and-control system is supreme, and that it was the order from the taliban that was sufficient to bring about these scenes. because that i know has been used by some people in constructing subsequent other strategies. if we only go to attack the same leadership and persuade to come on board with a peace process, everything will be fine. because actually when we followed in detail what was going on there, of course the taliban fighters who came into

town and went on facebook and so on, they used as a cover for the actions order which had come through, but the process was well beyond the ability of the leadership to control and was actually, much of it was in defiance of the instructions from the commanders. in fact, by day two of the cease-fire, we had taliban commanders basically screaming "we told you to stop fire, not to go and make friends." it was a subversive cease fire. in a strange sort of way, i think the progress to peace is more likely to involve subversive elements rather than necessarily sanctions coming from the top. i was asked to sort of say how did the taliban see the current situation, the developments and the deal around the suspension or collapse of the process.

i mean, in a sense, part of the continuing good news is that many of the taliban are just as confused as people about what on earth just happened. sometimes confusion is good because out of confusion can come a new way forward. one of the reasons i say this confusion is better than what we had before was that, i know, for example, barney and i worked hard on this case for many years. i was thinking of how to explain to millennials in the audience how long we've been working on this. i'll tell you what it was. the first time that professor rubin and i sat down to do a little quite a discussion about what the way forward is, he had in his hand his first digital device, and i was looking at it enviously, what is this in your hand, professor rubin? so that is how long. exactly, it was a palm pilot.

[laughing] >> and wow, it was so cool. i was really impressed. and it was also -- funny enough -- that was also the era when they took out the first book on the taliban, because i remember on my flight back to the region, i had a copy of it and a slightly diluted young man in the pre-9/11 days came and asked me, can you tell me how i can join? i didn't. the leadership has been confused, because they thought they knew what was going on and they were trying to work out what was happening. the run-up to that was that throughout the year of this process, the leadership systematically avoided next avoiding -- explaining to the taliban movement what was

anticipated for this peace process. by a direct contrast, particularly we have followed the irish protest. months spent years and bringing their side on board. the taliban didn't take the trouble to talk to their membership. when on the 30th of august they started to talk to their leadership, their membership, about what the deal was, they pivoted from it. the only message was negotiations are continuing. trust the negotiators. everything they do serves the cause of the jihad. they pivoted to say the deal achieves everything they stood for and signing it is a guarantee of the restoration of the islamic emirates. without many details to back it up, they systematically avoided giving those details.

for those of us who spend our time trying to understand and explain, that was highly problematic. toess somebody finds a way revive this, we never know what he really intended. they certainly weren't honest with their membership. seriously the inter-afghan talks, even ideas of some kind of compromised political solution? that's something they did not share with the membership. people vaguely knew there was a movement toward talks, but there was no clear understanding inside the movement of what would happen. there certainly was no preparation for compromise and moving towards a settlement, as opposed to talks. that along with this oversold message that we are getting the islamic emirates,

across the movement, there was something starting to play to the spirits of june 2018. a majority of taliban thought that perhaps there was a move towards peace. told honestly about how that could be. perhaps their leaders the did not intend to do it. along with confusion, there's been a lot of disappointment. i have communicated bitter disappointment, people on the taliban side who thought maybe the war is about to end and they are deeply disappointed. sense ofrying to make how the taliban the it, we have to make a distinction about how the team and qatar saw it and how the rest of the movement saw it. my research over the past year, there are fundamental divergences. that's highly politicized, a

highly disciplined team that has grown up and qatar that has grown up behind this process. become good atve their job. to co-opt org , i'm sure they target you pretty hard while you are there. were a cool team, but completely separate from the people who were there in afghanistan. broadly, they justified what they were doing, saying "we're the political front of a broad is thee, the rest of the military front." i was also asked to say if there are differences in the movement over talking versus fighting. i have been approached by many , who i believe in their commitment to ending this war. when is anybody going to talk with us?

why are you people always building up the hardliners and helping reinforce the control of our hardliners over the struggle? they are sort of talking back to the spirit of the cease-fire. it was a subversive element of the cease-fire that allowed it to succeed for a wild, or at least show the road. we have never been able to get peacemaking over the past year. evidence thatte significant factions and numbers inside the taliban movement have reached the conclusion that this war has run its course and it must end. many have also reached the conclusion that it must be based on compromise rather than conquest. the challenge in going forward will be how to capture that spirit. the worst thing friends of afghanistan can do in taking this forward would be to take up from where we left off

immediately before the thing that happened last week. we are to be building on what has been achieved, rather than picking up pieces. they should declare mission successful, mission succeeded, in terms of the afghan track. huge effort has gone into it. it established the u.s. wants to move troops out of afghanistan, but wants to do so responsibly. them,y who engages with that conversation has been had. everybody knows it. the u.s. is not occupying afghanistan. any further conversations about troops if i were giving advice would be this conversation would be with the minister of defense of afghanistan and the chief of army staff. it's how the redeployment of u.s. troops is to be done in a

safeway. the agenda on piece is how to come forward to supporting the emergence of an afghan settlement so we don't need it to return to the foreigners talking with the taliban. it's been a very important conversation. now it's important to jump ahead to what is supposed to be achieved. the inter-afghan conversation. be worst thing to do would to go to qatar and carry on with conversations and empower the people who got through over the past year. let them reflect, let people think about how they overplayed their hand. open up a conversation to all possible addresses for the taliban, who are prepared to get involved with peace. the touchstone of getting itolved with peace is having pointed to ending violence and and the killing of afghans. believe there is sufficient

buy-in on all sides in the afghan war to be able to proceed on the basis. creative thinking, learning lessons, and moving forward rather than moving back. afghan is one piece, and they will achieve it. >> thank you very much. you for that reminiscence. before i go on, i want to thank the ambassador for the excellent statement. islso have a memory that somehow preparing for this talk to the extent i have prepared. the first time i gave a public talk about afghanistan in washington, d.c., which as i recall, was a meeting i organized 35 years ago at the

american university that i speakers werehe them. time, i wrote a report on human rights violations in afghanistan, which was entitled "an agent is dying." that's what one of them said to me in 1986. clearly, that was not true. afghanistan was not dying, it is not dying now, but afghans have an dying since that time. cannot overstate the urgency with which we need to end that process.

talk about what we should , my . what are you talking about? afghanistan is a landlocked country. country cano other have access to it without going through the territories or the n, apace of pakistan, ira tiny bit of china, or free central asian republic. they are also essentially landlocked, to which we have access only through china and russia primarily. that landlocked position is in many ways as the origin of these

conflicts and the dilemma that afghanistan find itself in. when afghanistan found itself in conflict with the newly formed variousf pakistan over ethnic and order issues, the u.s. allied with pakistan. if the u.s. could not aid the military and then turn to the soviet union. the decision, because of its landlocked position, to turn into a district power to protect itself against its neighbor had the results that we know. as a cautionary tale, afghanistan trying to turn to the u.s., which unlike this usually -- soviet union does not have a border, will also be a cautionary tale. it means alliance with the u.s., reliance on the u.s. for security and prosperity of afghanistan, is not the long-term strategy. this engagement is not a

short-term strategy. why is that the case? why does it need to turn to others? because afghanistan is not only the youngest country in the world outside of africa, it is also the poorest country in the world outside of africa. by far poorer than any other country in asia. all of the achievements we have been talking about and rightly celebrating are not financed by afghanistan, cannot be financed by afghanistan. when the afghan government talks about its achievements in increasing revenue in becoming more self-sufficient, it's talking but covering the cost of the operating budget of the afghans date. it is not talking about sustaining these development projects and progress. therefore, afghanistan's future, if it is to be sustainable, will

depend on developing an economy. for a landlocked country, that means connectivity to world markets. the military, the state, it is dependent on direct financial aid in the u.s., which is dependent on the logistical access to afghanistan the u.s. gets primarily through pakistan. until our relations with iran undergo a u-turn, or a lot more infrastructure, or russia goes a u-turn, that will be the only alternative. to, for conductivity actually get the afghan economy moving, the engine has to be traded investment. who are afghanistan's main trading partners? there has been changes in that. a lot of changes in the current

administration has been to diversify afghanistan's trading partners so it is no longer as dependent on pakistan. their main trading partners are still iran, pakistan, china, and india. for the more, where would the engine of economic growth in income from? there wasn't any potential engine of growth, no real economic incentive for peacemaking. people call it power of attraction. chinaowth of india and has meant that there is economic dynamism that is linked to the afghan economy, could lead to some better take up. china's mechanism for building conductivity is the belt and road initiative, including the china and pakistan economic choir, which the u.s. and india oppose.

right now, the u.s. and china are locked in a dispute at the united nations over whether the resolution renewing the mandate of the united nations will mention the belt and road initiative or not. the u.s. opposes, china is and since in. same thing happened last year, and it gutted the resolution. afghanistan,s to because it is cut off by land by irantan, depends on access , the port of chop are and another port using previously. the u.s. has iran under sanctions, which despite the attempt to waive some of them, have frozen the development and made it impossible to expand area one of the effects of these her, gdpmena is that growth in afghanistan for the past two years has been negative.

its population growth has been faster than gdp growth. that is not a path to self-sufficiency and stability. --long as the u.s. afghanistan is dependent for its security on the presence of a opposedates which is strategically to the conductivity projects that afghanistan needs to become self-sufficient, that presence can never stabilize afghanistan. what does this mean? ofst of all, the option afghanistan being stabilized through a long-term u.s. of thee is now off table, despite what people talk about. the alternative to the deal that is not ahalted

long-term u.s. presence. there is no armistice like in korea, no military that you like in germany, no unconditional sent -- surrender like in japan, no hostilities between china and taiwan. the alternative is u.s. withdrawal on other terms. one of the positive achievements of this diplomatic process has been the development of a consensus among the u.s., russia, and china, including pakistan, on this process. consensus ishat about a responsible transition to the withdrawal of u.s. troops to afghans and and a political settlement. it's not about a permanent u.s. presence conduct a forever war on terror in afghanistan. so far, russia, china, and

thestan have reiterated position that they support a political settlement that will lead to a withdrawal, dialogue, and settlement in afghanistan. the u.s. position is unclear. i think president trump's basic position that he wants to get out of afghanistan, the democratic candidate's basic position to get out, it is quite clear. the question is how? based on what i have said, let me suggest. if the u.s. is going to get out without the agreement that was reached last week, that doesn't mean it will get out without an agreement. first of all, the afghan government -- depending on how the elections go, but if there is a decisive result, which there may or may not be, the

afghan government will be in a position to regain initiative to some extent if it is willing to acknowledge its future is not based on the long-term presence of the united states. it can say we understand you are leaving, talk to us about how you want to leave. it can also say we are asking the u.s. to leave, is that your demand. in addition, the region still onts an agreement based withdrawal of the u.s. troops and a political settlement. coming up on the u.n. general meeting, which some meetings are likely to take place. the u.s., russia, china consensus position developed over the past few months was based on the work deviously done by russia through the moscow process, which the u.s.

initially saw as a threat and opposed, but eventually it participated in and was absorbed into this process so the u.s. and the russian special representatives were working together on this. the model for inter-afghan talks in that process was bringing the afghan government and taliban together through the context of a regional meeting which other stakeholders would be represented as well. they would control the access to afghan us in. it can't happen without the u.s., as well, but there's no reason that regional process, inter-afghan talks -- by the this process has

clarified is the taliban are willing to talk to the afghan government. they agreed to do it. arrangements for doing it were underway in norway. ther condition was u.s.-afghan bilateral agreement, that inhibition, that prohibition, has been broken. if,s now not a question of it's a question of how and when. talibane that u.s. talks are not enabling the right environment. -- maybeional talks u.s.-afghan bilateral -- maybe something we can't imagine, which i have found is a frequently occurring event over the past 40 years. continue to think the present war is not sustainable. no one really wants it.

somehow or other, we will find another path. >> thank you very much. we have heard perspective from afghanistan, a variety of angles, the region, now we're inng to come to the u.s. here from laura miller about some of the u.s. policy options. >> first, a word in response to michael's comments. unfortunately, if a deep desire for peace was what it took for there to bps, there would be a lot more peace in the world. i have no doubt there is a deep desire for peace. you still need political mechanisms to confer the deep desire for peace into actual. the idea that there is going to be a ferment rising up from the bottom and it will create peace is i think simply factually untrue in human existence.

that's not a policy recommendation, that's an observation. are threes., there basic options. thatht amend it to say barney has the fourth option here. the three options are first of all, the u.s. can withdraw. if the u.s. wants to withdraw, and that's a policy choice the u.s. makes, it doesn't have to make a deal to do it. it may still make a deal with the taliban to do it as a cover and a way of assuring safe passage on the way out the door. it doesn't in fact need an agreement to do it, nor does it need an agreement with the afghan government to do it. desirable.be if the u.s. decides to simply withdraw, then the counterterrorism assurances that it is already negotiated,

whatever they look like with the taliban, are essentially worthless. it is only potentially meaningful in so far as the taliban becomes part of the government structures of afghanistan and has some interest in adhering to them and there are mechanisms for holding them. otherwise, those assurances are simply papering over the exit. if this is a policy option the u.s. chose, the consequences for afghanistan would be quite devastating. i think the likelihood of a withdrawal from afghanistan within the next -- sometime before october 2020, with no peace agreement left behind, would very likely lead to

intensified and wider civil war, more chaotic civil war in afghan istan. not guaranteed, but likely. the second option for the u.s. is to continue what is doing. this is an option being promoted by some in washington. often, it is said by those promoting this option that the it. can afford -- let's call $30 billion, 35 billion. the actual numbers are disputed area the u.s. can afford that, afford to pay several million dollars a year for the afghans purity forces, can afford $8,600 if there is a drawdown of troops in afghanistan. affordse the u.s. can the monetary cost of that. however, those who promote this

line entirely ignore the cost borne by afghanistan for that scenario. and the sustainability of those costs. continue totan sustain the cost, in terms of the lives of afghan security forces and what that means for the capabilities of the security forces for an indefinite period of time? not to speak of the other human cost in afghanistan and the ways ds which the conflict impee any possibility of genuine economic growth. that scenario, the let's keep doing what we are doing, also, i think, ignores the political realities in the u.s. i don't think that just doing what we are doing for an indefinite period of time, let's say indefiniteness is not a very

long in that scenario. politically, there are many thes on the wall as to political unsustainability of this for much longer. trying tooption is leave some kind of political settlement in afghanistan that is connected to a u.s. withdrawal that means a process that is more or less like the process that ambassador cal is on has been pursuing over these months. i can't speak to the specifics of the deal that he is negotiating and whether it's the could be number she did or because we don't all know what is in that deal beyond a few specifics that don't quite tell us enough. in terms of what are the options as a process, that is basically

it. barney's idea of an option where the u.s. stopped negotiating with the taliban and negotiates the government about the terms of its withdrawal is possible. whether in fact there would be incentive on the afghan government side to negotiate a u.s. withdrawal on a timeline in terms that fit the politics of the u.s., i think it is an open question. one can contest that. what is not an option, unfortunately, is the kind of peace process that probably everyone in this room would anyone on i'm sure this panel or sitting at the table would prefer. that is the afghan government would prefer. it is the kind of peace process that for many years, the u.s. sought to launch. that is a peace process in which there is a cease-fire first, a

peace process in which the negotiations are foremost initially, or at least simultaneously involving the afghan government and not just between the u.s. and taliban. a peace process that somehow upfront guarantees that the outcome will be such that the women, minorities, many of the other kind of gains, are preserved. the u.s. has been unable to deliver that kind of peace process. i see no reason why this week the options and capabilities of the u.s. to deliver that kind of peace process are better than they were last week or will get any better in the future. if the afghan government, the aleve, thetical people want to reject the kind of peace process that the u.s. is able to launch and try and

deliver, that is perfectly within their right to do so. if that is what happens, i think that means afghanistan will be left alone to try and find peace on its own terms. i highly doubt that it will result in a peace process of the more desirable variety, where the taliban agrees to cease-fire and negotiations immediately commence with the afghan government. i'm not recommending against the preferred peace process. if it were my choice, the preferred peace process would be the one that we had. as i said, the u.s. has been unable to deliver that and will continue to the unable to. i think it is important to remember what it is that the u.s.-taliban agreement, as

distasteful as it may be in many ways to many people, was intended to do. to lead t was intended negotiations,n that will be the real chris process -- peace process. rather than criticizing the deal that can be had, my recommendation would be to keep your eye on the prize. the prize is the inter-afghan negotiations. that will be the place where afghans are able to test the possibility of getting the kind andutcome that they prefer, the kind of compromises they can live with. whether it turns out to be possible or not, i don't know. i see that as the only realistic way forward. to close, i would say how do we move on from president trump declaring that this process is dead?

first and foremost, it requires a decision by the president to declare the process undead. i think president trump has shown himself to be reframinglly agile in decisions and declarations and moving on from them when it's in of interest, if he sees it the u.s., or his political interests, or his desire and the desire in his administration to do so. i see no obstacle to president trump declaring the process undead, at least in principle. require rebuilding some of the confidence that the ambassador has succeeded in developing of the regional countries in particular in the u.s. commitment to negotiating.

that is a success to be had over the last year in winning that the u.s. was serious about peace negotiations and the disruption of this weekend does some damage to that. it is not fatal damage. it is damage that is probably easiest repaired by jolting the process back to life. ashaps some electrotherapy, quickly as possible. the longer the delay, it might be harder to do that. it is also necessary to deescalate the conflict dynamics in washington that have arisen. hink about this deal and the criticism that has arisen. that is going to require the administration to be much more forward leaning in explaining the deal, explaining what a u.s.-taliban deal is or isn't. there's a lot of perception that it is supposed to be the peace

deal, so it did not deliver enough, when that is not really the case. it will require more selling of the deal in washington, which is predominantly about explanation of what it is, what it isn't, and what is in it. close by saying that -- this is in response to some of the comments the ambassador made, which i appreciate. it is important to bear in mind that these negotiations are not peace building. they are not the same thing. many of the kinds of steps others talked about that will need to happen for there to be actual piece in afghanistan are absolutely necessary. once you have set a political foundation for that kind of peace building. that is going to take a very long time.

i think it's not helpf to criticize a piece negotiationul for not delivering what only long-term peace building can deliver. >> thank you very much for all of those comments. we will be taking questions from the audience. some of the staff will have microphones. do wait until i call on you and the microphone arrives. getting set up, i want to start with a question of my own. i'm glad to see we reconnected. said andgs you have the threat of the conversation has alluded to the divisions within the afghan political environment beyond the taliban. they obviously have an extreme and violent grievance with the political system of th

afghanistan. there's a lot of discord within the country. i think the suggestion a lot have made is this undermines the fundamental leverage that an afghan government has to negotiate. also, it's been mentioned the presidential elections are coming up on september 20. those are always a competitive and polarizing political event. 28,e look the on september not knowing who will win, what you see is the need and opportunities for the postelection environment to either consolidate or fragment. what impact do you think it will have on the peace process? let us try and get the audio. inurement -- can you hear me now? >> yes, thank you. think one of the responses to

-- aboutncement was our future.t also, it's important for the government to move beyond the situation. moving beyond that situation is trying to build consensus. it will not be easy. the impact of elections for having that

them. have it where the men and women --

was the war it is impacting, impacting our ability. it is impacting futures everywhere. sense it shares from something that happened at the local level. maybe for the leadership, they think time is on their side. for the people dying on a daily , the time was perhaps years ago. yearsct that it has been thathat it can mean -- expand.sted and should

would mean we will have it for .ll afghan access to health care, education , free media. know want to have the possibility to experience the opportunities. besides increased opportunities, that isaped by the fact a country. not only forng it to experience -- but also

learn more about how to live world us and around the and learn about different possibilities, aspirations. of mediaok at the kind the lifestyles, it will have more space for people. make decisions about their life. attentionere might be in the sense that the most hardly hit areas by the conflicts have a greater sense of urgency in wanting an exit. security is the first step.

security,more than they want a life that will allow them to have aspirations, live life similar to people in other countries and across the world who have access to the freedom and services they think they deserve. >> thank you very much. >> a quick response to the narrower question, how you get far-flung taliban to lay down their arms if there is a piece deal. two quick points, you can be confident that the taliban leadership will not sign a deal they can't deliver on, that their followers would not follow. attentive to maintaining their cookies in. if they sign a deal that is going to divide the taliban and their followers will not follow,

that would be devastating to them and they are not going to sign a deal that devastates them. that's not a point of optimism. that's a real reason why dealmaking will be hard. they want agree to a deal that they don't think they will deliver on and sell to their rank and file. the second put point is there will not be any peace enforcement mission. not an area where a deal was signed and someone other than the taliban leadership enforces it, vis-a-vis the taliban rank-and-file heard the implementation will depend on the leadership, enforcing it vis-a-vis the rank-and-file. there will not be a peacekeeping mission, you will not have the u.s. enforcing the deal, and the afghan government will be hard-pressed to enforce the deal in areas that you described. you can see the numbers. from a taliban perspective, no

deal is probably preferable to a deal. it is preferable to a deal that splits the taliban. the narrative that the government is dependent on outside assistance, therefore if the outside assistance is taken away, the taliban will win, is wrong. it's based on zero-sum thinking. it's also why the taliban are negotiating. government ofe the future that needs eight. even if it's run by the taliban. the taliban were not highly successful when in control of the capital. they want to be part of a legitimize government that receives foreign assist us. the term control is also deceptive. it gives you an idea of a border. i can't give you numbers, but there are areas of afghanistan from we -- from which we have had reporting that the security

forces, police administration is in the hands of the taliban, but they do not abolish the institutions of the afghans eight. schools, health next continue running under their directions. they are much harsher about keeps her absentees than the government. coexistencere's a already in place. what we need to do is create the political conditions for that coexistence that will enable people to expand their rights. questionske a few once the gentleman the pen in the air. with thearberry department of defense office inspector general. i want to pick up on something he just raised about the taliban not agreeing to a deal they can't sell to their people. that gets to the question of

what is the zone of possible agreements between the parties? how big or how small is it, in terms of what the taliban can sell to their people, with the afghan elite can sell on their side, with the u.s. can sell, and what constituencies can live with? no one will get the maximus decision. i want to get a sense of the areas where there is possible agreement, where are some of the things were there may not be when it may cause fragmentation to hold the support? >> let's take one other question. towards -- mike question is directed towards laurel. when u.s. administration declared operation enduring freedom in 2001, and war on terrorism in afghanistan, the then first lady called it the

process of liberation of women. process has proven to be transformative. witnessed -- do we witnessed 18 gradually progressive years in afghanistan one of the highlights of the process. now after a very long course of time, we are again at the critical juncture with the women of afghanistan. i'm concerned about women a lot and more than anything else. we the women of afghanistan are the criminal juncture of social and political existential stress and thinking the site 80 of afghanistan and taliban share over it. there is a fair that the democratic ideas of liberty and equality pertaining women's the shroudfall back

of the u.s. and disengagement of the u.s. in an. can we say that women are yet again at stake of getting back to the darkest days of the history of afghanistan? thank you. before, people are following us on twitter. i want to read another western. what are the chances of revealing up on pakistan to stop supporting the taliban, which this commentor suggested is one of the only ways to get the taliban to buy into democracy those just go to address those russians, then we can get another round in before we close. >> those are all good questions, and we don't have time to do them all good justice. the one referred to me, it was entirely understandable why women in afghanistan would be concerned about a peace process

and what might come out of it. understand that from a personal perspective and from policy perspective. the of analyzing whether the u.s. policy options and the u.s. perceives it, and what the u.s. is likely to do, it is important to remember the u.s. did not invade afghanistan to liberate afghan women. u.s. will note make a decision about its exit from afghanistan-based fundamentally on considerations regarding afghan women. saying that as a policy proposal prescription recommendation, i'm stating it as a policy reality in the rest there will be many who desire to minimize the impact on afghan

women, preserve the protections for afghan women, but at the end of the day, the decision-making will be fundamentally about other issues related to the security of the u.s., and not considerations related to women. we don't have time to address briefly,nt, but very it is a difficult election to taliban areuse the not going into this negotiation if the negotiation happens with already developed political forms, unlike other peace processes in the world. the zone of the possible is going to have to emerge as the negotiations develop and the positions confront each other. pakistan stopping are

slim. the more important point is if the u.s. withdraws from afghanistan, stars to withdraw, abandons the peace process, the chances of pakistan ramping up its relationship with the taliban and increase considerably. >> laura bush never gave such as before 9/11. if the u.s. were going to invade to liberate afghan women, it had many opportunities to do so. that speech was to legitimate something for good reason. that reality is still real today. >> on the question of what the taliban leadership would sign off on, unfortunately, nobody still knows.

we seem to be close to getting to know that, but we don't know that. we know some of their considerations. prime consideration for maintaining the movement. they also want to project themselves as being on course to establishment of an islamic emirate or something like that. whenever deal they want to do, they want to project themselves as being on course to receiving a full withdrawal. those are the things they seem to have most concern of. i'm worried about the question, which is negotiations and negotiated outcome are important, but they are not the whole thing in peacemaking. in afghanistan, setting the conditions were a negotiated , now is a good time for everybody to reflect on what

options there are to make progress on setting conditions. even what barney referred to as the existence of this zone in afghanistan, where the war has moved on, that violence levels have started to come down. there are zones of government and taliban control. they have been developing some kind of modus vivendi. that is reminiscent of the post 1989 period. clever people who are trying to plot away should be looking at what can be done to set the conditions without assuming that within one or two months you can actually jump straight to either the negotiate solution or even the negotiation to produce the solution? maybe you're not going to jump quickly to the bargain, but there are important things that can be done to alter the dynamics of the conflict in

afghanistan progress towards those conditions that are safe for the us to withdraw. >> one more round of questions. >> i'm with the inspector general. how will holding or not holding the upcoming afghan presidential election change the dynamics of political positioning, the potential inter-afghan dialogue if there is going to be one? >> thank you. the gentleman in the white shirt. >> with everything happening with the camp david cancellation, the agreement dumped on the administration, the fallout with mostly the press and the international community is focused on but a

few other crosses to bear, your reflection, one, mike pompeo said he wouldn't sign the agreement a few days before, the taliban has not agreed to meet with the government, they have done so and are about to do so. the taliban also indicates the first time in the last round and not end the violence and we have a situation where trump needs a deal to be reelected, just got rid of bolton so things are a little more conducive with that respect but my question is the elections. if the taliban, especially in light of what you are saying about the important iterations

from lower ranks, we all know these happen in afghanistan and increase in the run-up. will that not be crosscutting? how will that play? >> one more. i am director of a local ngo. question, you seem pessimistic about pakistan and the peace process. pakistan is a fundamental problem. taliban are>> -- being harbored in pakistan. the iss is the main authority for the delavan.

taliban. said the taliban leadership were there. but whenever we had an offer for them, they need to go outside, they were like we have to speak with our leaders. but they were leaders. what is your proposal? be a proposal to bring pakistan to the table to work for a peaceful outcome of assess -- of the process. >> start with michael and work our way back. >> i think the work to put together a regional consensus is important.

that is one of the points i am saying it has to be built on, rather than just scrapping. keep not just pakistan but other players at the table. most of the taliban movement is resentful asg as perhaps you might be yourself. no one has come up with a strategic level way of making use of that. i think if we do see progress towards reduction of violence over the next year or so it will be more attention. -- was like -- slapping on the wrist. i mean, i was saying the war

fatigue isn't a strategy. it's not sufficient but it's an important ingredient with the right policy from an institution is something which can be exploited. when pro-afghan sentiment inside the ranks of the taliban, when that is capitalized on in ways reminiscent of what happened in 92, perhaps9 and violent levels will come down. over the past year we have seen an attempt to capitalize on the cohesiveness of the movement, of the strategic decisions making the wise strategic decision from the taliban leadership to embrace peace on a compromise settlement and we have gambled on that. now, it hasn't happened yet and maybe they will do it and that

is a test that i hope they will be subjected to again and again, but the more they are forced to worry that our ranks, the people who have kept the fighting going, the people who give us our leverage, that there started -- they are starting to opt out, that they're going to go cool on the war. the more they worry about that, the more there is a chance that actually actually conditions are set and actually embrace a compromise solution for the negotiating table that so far has been elusive. >> the main variable about the elections will affect the process is not taliban violence. the taliban never gave any indication that they would reduce violence if the elections were postponed or canceled. that's the reasons we were having the elections. and in the past it has not been decisive. the question about the elections is there may be voting but will be an election? if the voting leads to a relatively quick choice of a

president, which is accepted by the major non-taliban political forces in the country, then it will strengthen the government as president ghani envisions. but that has not been the history of presidential elections in afghanistan thus far. if the election is contested, there are charges of corruption and it is not accepted by major political forces, then there could be a relatively long, period ofnths contestation, perhaps demands for for a second round which the government may or may not accept, in which case the divisions within the coalition opposing the taliban, the constitutional coalition, will become stronger. really a lot depends on the outcome and conduct of the elections. as far as pakistan is concerned, i think pakistan remains

pakistan, and it is not going to change into another country that does not have antagonism with india or problems with afghanistan. afghanistan remains landlocked and afghanistan cannot have a future that is based on strategic antagonism with pakistan. so somehow or other, hopefully through regional cooperation, and the involvement of third parties, notably china, because china is there probably unlike the united states. afghanistan and china, afghanistan and pakistan will find a way of living with the differences but it will not be because pakistan has transformed into a country that does not have any with afghanistan. fully agree with those comments. i'm not at all dismissive of the problem. the problems that are raised by the interests that pakistan perceives in afghanistan. i am dismissive of the idea all it takes is for the united

states to say no, or to impose some sanctions on pakistan, the at that is what it will take to fundamentally change their strategic calculation. the question of whether secretary pompeo website or not, i think the story was mischaracterized and got out of control. it was not that he wasn't going to sign off on the deal. it was there were questions as to the formalities of who would be signing on behalf of the united states, and it's more than formalities. it's also symbolism. if i were in the state department, i would recommend secretary pompeo not sign the deal. i don't think this is an agreement that should be sign at the level of secretary of state. i think that would only be another feather in the cap for the taliban, to have a podium like this where secretary pompeo is sitting next to whoever. this is an agreement that should

be signed in a more low key way by the envoy who negotiated. i don't think there is a substantive issue there. >> great, thank you. i'm glad you are back. i don't know if you heard the question. they were more about elections, but in pakistan. why don't we just give you a minute as we close for any final thoughts. >> thank you. i think there is some development. some concerns but also an opportunity. i think the main opportunity is for the afghan, especially the taliban. if they are concerned about engaging with majority of afghans they need to reevaluate their approach and they need to, especially reevaluate their

-- -- theirand with engagement -- >> thank you very much. please join me in thanking this great panel for a deep discussion on afghanistan peace process. [applause] let me close by saying that one sign of progress is that we can have nearly continuous to hour video link with somebody with high quality in afghanistan, so things are improving. thanks very much, shaharzad for staying up late talking to us. finally the conversation continues on afghanistan next thursday clock to 12:30 p.m. we will host the launch of new lessons learned report on reintegration of taliban fighters, what happened in the past. this will be hopefully useful lessons for the future because there will be fighters to integrate. with that thank you very much for joining us and see you at the next one.

[applause] >> c-span's washington journal come alive every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up saturday morning, alex discusses proposed changes to the housing finance system by the trump administration including an overhaul of fannie mae and freddie mac. then dr. marty mcgarry talks about his new book, the price we pay. watch "washington journal."

join the discussion. saturday at 11:00 p.m. neilrn, neil gorgeous -- >> those are just promises. he did not think we needed a bill of rights if we got the constitution and separation of powers right. he knew that men are not angels and the key is keeping power separated. book, then, in his latest how labsoff reports on in china manufacture the drug. he is interviewed by the new hampshire congresswoman. if you are a scientist at a

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the video went viral and all of america is hearing about cages and secret warehousing of migrant challenge -- children. >> watch book tv. team is traveling across the country, visiting key battleground states. asking what issues they want presidential candidates to address. >> a pressing issue is health care. there is a lack of health care in the country right now. affordable health care. some people are not going as far as i would like to go to the details of how they plan to handle that. will see where that goes. >> i would like for the candidates to discuss how we are going to re-normalize ourselves and what we used

to call the we world. a leader in democracy. in democratic values around the world. also, a cooperating force with the rest of the world. >> i would like to know ideas on nuclear energy. problems inment technology in every state in the country. if they believe it is a worthnable, reliable use the investment. >> i am concerned about the climate crisis. gun safety legislation. those are two essential things that have to be addressed by the election next year. i wish they would be addressed by congress before that but it does not appear the senate will move on that. toneed to try to get back .nforcing the constitution whoever becomes president should

obey the emoluments clause. minoritiesridicule or handicapped people or anyone else. integrity andtore a sense of service to all of the people. >> voices from the campaign trail, part of c-span's battleground states to her -- tour. >> thursday, the senate armed services committee held a confirmation hearing for ryan mccarthy, nominated to be the next army secretary. this hearing is about two hours 20 minutes.