speaker pelosi: the house will be in order. >> for 40 years, c-span has been providing america unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court and public policy events from washington, d.c. and around the country so you can make up your mind. created by cable in 1979, c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. c-span, your unfiltered view of government. national security officials discuss u.s. policy towards iran, including the recent u.s. airstrike. this event was hosted by new america in washington, d.c. welcome and thank you for

coming out. thank you also to c-span for covering this in our c-span viewers. i'm going to introduce the who is the advisor to the national security program and she is a longtime department of defense -- she most recently defense fory of energy security. >> apparently, you all realize it is snowing, so we are grateful that you braved the weather to come and join us for a very important conversation and fast-moving situation. i want to to start with -- peter has a new

book out that you should all read and his book just about two weeks ago, i said you are writing about a president and national security team before the story is over, so what is the next chapter? [laughter] >> you see where this is going. president has not had a genuine foreign-policy crisis yet. we don't know the capabilities, so make sure you ask his projections on the market and everything else and here we are. i would encourage you to read the detailed biographies of our panel because we would be here all afternoon going through their qualifications, but i want you to know that they are not only the top scholars in the country, they are also they know the so

information and how hard it is to actually make policy and implement options, so we are very lucky to have them with us. what i'm going to do is let each of them give an opening salvo about the situation. [inaudible] can give us unique and interesting insights about what is happening in iraq and what is going to happen in iraq and then after that, we are going to jump dr. [indiscernible] and he is next for four all kinds of reasons and again, i want to be clear that we don't need to talk to who he is, but this is a fast-moving situation

and then one of the country's top foreign-policy experts to talk about the broader that,ations, so with have unique and you .nsights about what this means >> thank you very much for being here. i want to start with the story of how we got here. modest. very a very centricly story. i'm also very modest about it and also i think things are shifting so quickly that it is very difficult to understand the things that you leaned on and

saw as solid bases upon which to do analysis are no longer true and they are starting to shift out underneath us, particularly in this region. i think this particular chapter starts on september 27 of last year when the lieutenant general is fired by the iraqi government and is moved from his position as the deputy commander of iraq's counterterrorism forces and is moved to the ministry of defense. catalyst fors a grievances that have been held .he iraqi population it they were tired of the corruption and tired of the

ethics world system. they were tired of a government that handicaps their economy .espite huge oil reserves move ofmove past this an extremely popular general was a last straw for them and they went to the streets. at first, it was exactly what you would expect. it was the entrepreneurs, the upper class iraq, probably disproportionately .nglish-speaking they just started killing them and the streets and so pretty soon you had the young man city. from sadr

and then they took a little break for their religious holiday. betterrotests look a lot before women were involved in a few days before the protests, you could see the messages going out.nd we need you to come women everywhere and they became the symbol of this. they were draped in iraqi flags. became a serious threat to the regime despite the killing the protesters . at least 450 have died in iraq, we have been

hearing this for 15 years at least, what is important is that these protests were not secretary and at all. primarily iraqi youth and the children coming up to protest what they see as the failing of their fathers and grandfathers in what it should look like. on november 30, the prime minister finally resigns on the -- under the weight of all these protests. this is why there is not an official government in iraq because the prime minister resigned on november 30. agreement, there will be new elections held and really what they are talking about is up 20 a new prime

minister to oversee the next year and how the elections are going to be set up. deal andbviously a big .ho sets the ground rules several names are floated and finally, the iranian backed nominated a man who is .losely linked to the irgc the iranian seen as candidate and on the 26th of december, they refused to nominate him, not only on the constitutional grounds, but really this is political. the americans are against this, the protesters are against this

and we can stand up against iran. been --lizes it has they can see that they are in a bad place. favor.me is not to our the americans to fit the 27,d and so on december and thew a u.s. base red line is extremely well communicated and that begins where we can all aware. point, the iranians wanted us to do this and this is politics andqi the could not stand to lose

fight for baghdad. a couple points and since then united states has largely mishandled both the events and the aftermath. things that just trigger them and that is the sovereignty and sanctions. for obvious reasons, they are deeply touchy about national sovereignty, our occupation last decade before that as a natural aboutal deeply touching their sovereignty. second, sanctions, they lived of -- under them for 14 years.

many people died as a secondary result of the sanctions. to have that floated is not terribly helpful. the united states is attempting to obtain -- maintain a u.s. president. the legality is not entirely clear. it is not clear that there is a quorum in the parliament. it is not clear if that is binding. there probably isn't a firm constitutional answer to those questions.

they can claim if they are legitimate or not. characterizeay to than a major victory. they are trying -- trying to ,alvage the american presence but i want to circle back to the protesters. that is what we need to be focused on. these protesters who are out there defending the simple things that everyone expects, a responsible government, lack of areuption, basic services still there even if the united states loses on this round.

>> this may even be a bigger deal. >> he was a singular figure because he is digger than any institution. he had an entire institution behind and they are largely outside of institutions. it became when he needed them, but my honda's was the figure who could hold together the entirety of the popular immobilization forces, so if you are a war hawks, the good news command andd the

control and if you're looking at a couple months down the road, the bad news is you removed the command and control of the hostage. i'm not sure there's another figure out there who has the status that is respected and feared that he could be a guarantor of a deal that no, we will not strike americans anymore. he could hold that deal and i'm not sure there is another figure who can guarantee that deal. i will stop there. >> how does the chessboard look to the iranians? moment,was a watershed no way in which to under emphasize how significant it is and the beginning point is when

the united states left the nuclear deal. from iran's perspective, they did so reluctantly. [inaudible] which was negotiated over. [inaudible] sometimes we forget about the people. [inaudible] the goals have nothing to do with another nuclear deal and is has to do about regime change.

you are essentially forcing it to be tougher and when the , thists happened in iran is the security forces, yes most of the protesters or unhappy. to actuallylieved push things over and there is maximum pressure strategy and a two punch process. and then comes september of this year where president macron came close to getting [inaudible] and the condition the arena present said if i'm going to meet with you, i need beforehand to live some sanctions or signed a letter in which you promise

that if the meeting is successful, then you will live those sanctions. then, the iranian president says no. after,derstood he is not it is all about regime change. that --o cap related they sat down and tried to come up with some type of solution. the year ended, president trump double down and said i will not oil sanctions in the theyans concluded that have to push back because trump thinks his policies are too easy and therefore that is when they

began hitting tankers and shot a halferican drones and to decisions. one is that we are crazier than you. then they think that worked because trump took a second look at preceding with the confrontation. the second, they wanted to showcase technological abilities. , the exact places and nowhere else was for them to say do not think this is the iranian navy of 1987. it as deterrence. , iraq wasiew

significant, under pressure the u.s. does not suffer at all. the president translating leverage to negotiations, the iranians suffer. they cannot wait until the 2020 election unless we give them something. the only way to get his attention is to do something, escalating further. you knew they would do something. there is a faction in iran that is arguing negotiations are not working, we have to do something. parliamentaryto elections in february and presidential elections in june. there is a lot riding on this, and an opportunity for hardliners.

on the u.s. reaction, and i isnk the conclusion in iran that the maximum pressure strategy is over. creates pressure alone a breakthrough with iran. by killing soleimani, the president is acknowledging it is not working, i will go to a hot war with iran. this is now a direct push to overthrow the regime. killing a member of the regime is a redline. it was a norm they understood would not be crossed. is not really going for the jugular of the regime. i do not think they have a blueprint, this came out of the blue to them. they have gauge how they would react to this.

pressures on them. thatneed to react because is what the public demands, they have to do something, but i think they believe they need to deter trump. if he gets away with this, the next they will kill the supreme ,eader and the foreign minister and he is playing this game in a way with no particular rules. i think they will have to do something, when and how they do it, how much they prepare to escalate remains to be seen. there is no back channel between the two countries. it is not at the level that will have any impact on iranian decision-making. public rhetoric is incredibly menacing. the problem with this twitter

storm is, this twitter that he does not give the other side any political maneuvering room. he is humiliating them and challenging them. piece, thegnificant funeral hast the taken everybody by shock. there is no way the regime could manufacture this in two days. if they could do that, they would have total control of the country. there is no question this was an outpouring. important to the public dialogue in america, the --ision of solo money

the way iranians see him is different. he became a household name when isis appeared. the average iranian had not by 2008.soleimani saw this as a strategic moment. their view was if damascus falls, baghdad falls. the logic is not different from who said you have to fight them there if you do not want to fight them here. to average iranians those on

, theymage to iraq remember what happened in 2006 when insurgents blew up one of the most revered shrines for this she is -- shias. soleimani is a national hero. he single-handedly prevented this from happening. that is why they revere him. protector.im as a it is not blown out of forgetion, but we often people can have more than one idea at the same time. they can dislike the revolutionary guard but like this particular general. soleimani is not a man they read about on a daily basis.

he is out there fighting a war on the frontier. soldiersd generals and known to be corrupt, he was not part of the cartel machine of corruption in iran. there was sentiment for him. had he died of natural causes, you would not have had this funeral. for iranians it is a national moment, a transformative moment. i do not know what the political implications will be down the road, but the reason is twofold, the iranian people may be tired of their own government, they are angry and that up, but they believe this particular fight was picked five united states, and it is unfair and unjust. and that he is escalating and endangering their daily livelihood, and coming over the

border threatening more and showing he is willing to do it. this was a massive act of defiance. they are saying, today, we are all together. askedody on the street i what is your name, they said, my name is soleimani. , i think iranians have always believed the only way to deter the united states from attacking iran is to show up in force in support of the government. , anybody in iran knows distance between the public and the regime, it is more likely they would attack iran. the supreme leader, the other commanders are worried what these three days mean. one conclusion they come away

with is that the people are with them to resist. it is not a demand for reconciliation. if united states hits them again, it will only solidify their support. that will make it more intransigent, the escalation, if we had that in mind. sharon: i would like both of you to think about what escalation looks like. talk about what iraq and iran look like. this picture, what does this mean for us? >> let me start by thanking peter and the international security program for making this happen quickly. particularly, sharon mentioned,

the peter's new book " if you readals, it before this crisis and were worried, read it now. one of the first things i thought of when i heard about god, ande was, oh mygod all those generals are no longer there to offer restraint, wisdom, all sorts of beneficial constraints. as an look at this international lawyer and bring it directly home. somebody who taught international law for 12 years, if summit he had said to me, the united states has just killed and iranian military leader who may or may not have been acting as a diplomat, but on iraq's soil, is that legal? the first thing i do is look at the article of the u.n. charter

which says nations cannot use force against the national sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other state. start there. they definitely used force against the national sovereignty of iraq. with nothing else, you start with that, because iraq did not want this to happen. there is a prima facie case of illegality right there, article 51 says the exception is self-defense, and that is where the administration has gone. it says, we were acting in self-defense. article 51 says self-defense against an armed attack. -- itwas no armed attack was an armed attack against our facilities, yes.

it killed an american contractor. that is not really the way the u.n. was set up. imagining a direct armed attack against the border, which we have not seen for some time. you could say, it was retaliation. thethat is not what administration is saying, the administration is saying soleimani was planning attacks against us, and this was a preemptive measure of self-defense. preemptive self-defense, there is a wonderful phrase from something called the caroline case, it is supposed to be in imminent attack. you will preempt an imminent attack, and that is instant overwhelming leaving no choice of means or moment of deliberation -- that is not this case some of is definitely not this case.

then you move to something the bush administration started pushing, which was not preemptive self-defense, it was preventive self-defense. at that point pretty much all legal constraints are off, because that means i see an attack coming down the road, i see it being planned, and i am going to attack first to stop it. you can see as a matter of law anybody who thinks we are going to attack anyone, anyone we ,hink in an age of terrorism sponsored terrorism, that opens the door. it is a matter of straight international law, you are pushing toward a definition toward self-defense that i think and pulledorrying back from preemptive to preventive. i do not think this qualifies.

even if you think it is self-defense, then the the measure of, to beefense has proportionate, and that is the other place where this debate is happening, the killing of iseimani, which i think of like killing the american head of the joint chiefs of staff, roughly comparable. for the killing of an american contractor and the destruction of american facilities -- and i do not want to minimize those attacks. out gave us iran figuring it escalated, and we did have to respond, if i was sitting in the pentagon or white house, i would have said we have to respond. but if you think of tit-for-tat escalation, this goes from level seven to level two or level one and a half a very fast. as an international legal

matter, you would not think it is proportional. then you come to domestic law, and domestic law, this has to come -- there are two different doctrines, one, is it legal under congress? the only way you can save that is if the authorization of the military act back to 2003. him as aink of terrorist leader, and you do not think of him as a state actor, you can say we killed lots of leaders of terrorist groups under that. official.tate that to me -- and i will come back to the axis of change is a big difference, alternatively though, you can say the executive has the foreign affairs power. president trump thinks article

two of the constitution is sweeping power for anything he leaveto do, but let's that aside. the foreign affairs power is broad. the debate between where the executive has power where it is not a formal armed declaration of war situation, the executive has won almost all the time since the war powers resolution of 1974. we had war powers resolution's to stop something like the tonkin gulf declaration in the vietnam war, to say if the president uses force, he has to report to congress and it has to be approved. nobody, democrat or republican has done that consistently to be a real constraint. the counterexample is barack obama going to congress before striking syria, and congress said no. that was the unusual case of the

executive actually seeking congressional constraint rather than congress approving it. under line, illegal international law, and very murky. if you take this to court domestically, the court will not resolve it. it is a question of congressional will to push back. here is where i think the bottom worrisome in terms of the expansion of the definition of armed conflict. we studied the future of warfare with asu, and when you talk about the future of war you go immediately to it is increasingly off-line -- i mean, online completely. nonphysical, but online with physical consequences. it is hybrid, a blurring of traditional physical attacks, and attacksattacks,

you could say were by an army versus attacks that are harder to trace. this pushes that in a way that i rocket strikes a facility can justify the taking out of senior military officials , and you think about the andident -- the precedent, we were talking in the green room about the indians saying why can't we do this with the pakistanis? you can take that to any conflict anywhere in the world and this will be used as a dangerous precedent. the second is that it blurs who -- who was a state actor versus a nonstate actor? al qaeda, isis, all the offshoots. you could say we are in an era

were nonstate actors can inflict the kind of damage that once only states could, and as murky as it is, you have to develop new rules, and the army has been trying to do that with our own constraints. different, he is not an al qaeda leader, he is not an isis leader, he is an iranian official. you can say he was there with iranian backed militias, but they are acting in iraq with mostly the approval of the iraqi government. this looks like a very worrying and blurring a state versus nonstate. the final thing i will say, is it legal? no, i think it is illegal under international law. it precedential? in dangerous ways.

i immediately thought of iran, russia, north korea, designate any of our senior military officials as a terrorist, or whatever designation they want, and come after them in washington. remember, the iranians try things, the chileans try things way back when. the final thing i will say, you see almost no mention of the united nations in the weeks since this has happened, almost nothing. ian bremmer talks about the g-0 world in which the traditional u.s. role, or countries who charge themselves with keeping the peace, or were charged by the security council. the security council worked until recently, it was the place you look to when something like this happened.

almost no mention, and that is very dangerous because it is us versus the iranians with russians, maybe the israelis, whoever wants to mix it in with no institutional constraints. i started with article two of the u.n. charter and you have not heard about that from anybody else. sharon: a quick follow-up question, you have had the pentagon talking in terms for a while of asymmetric war and hybrid war and grayscale war, meaning that the system of laws and norms that has made this country prosperous and stable for a long time has now become a weapon. point where there is still a chance to reform these laws so they can enable us to deal with a world where the law itself is a weapon? or are we talking about and irrevocably broken system? starting with the invasion of

the killing of qaddafi, and now this assassination, are we dealing with something that is broken, or something that can be fixed? >> let me say you are right to take it back, which is one reason i went back to preventative war. yes, i think the responsibility to protect, which i supported, but was then used as a way of overturning qaddafi. i am supposed to be writing a expansion of the liberal international order, and my conclusion is more or less the only way to strengthen it and spread it is to work as much with governors and mayors nonstate actors as with state actors, because i do not see the will among state actors for even

the minimal enforcement of these rules. we have never had maximal enforcement, but we had something you could call in order. if this president and president putin and others, though not president xi -- he does not want any rules, he wants back to the 19th century where anybody who is biggest makes bilateral deals with anybody else. hein once that as well, wants no rules. if we have a president who says andave to build -- rebuild build new international order, i think there are rules we can create. as a matter of prediction, it maybe this attack and a couple of other really horrific ones. i do not know how many, it will at levelser attack that creates mass casualties, and it may take a couple of

other -- it takes those kinds of threats to mobilize the world in the way that world war i and world war ii did. it is hard for me to see anything big enough that would pull states together right now, , i with the right leaders think it could be prepared, but i am not optimistic. a conversation about escalation, i think everyone is holding their breath, where can this go? i do not think anybody knows. what do you think, doug, where this goes? do next?t iran the ball is in their court now, and to save face they have to do something, but what could they do? what would they do? do is surprisell us.

for instance, the aramco attack was in terms of capabilities. andse missiles and jones -- drones, technology we do not know they have. sharon: this is the biggest oil facility in the world, half of saudi arabia's production, that was no small thing. >> it went to the element of surprise. it might be massive cyber attacks which will not elicit the kind of response that president trump is threatening. i think at this moment they are not keen on picking on their

ally. the reason for that, in the summer when they decided they , someo flex their muscles of what they did was not directed at the united states. when they hit the tankers, the message essentially to the gulf countries was, we are not going to fight united states in iraq. if it comes to our, we will fight them on your soil and you can kiss your skylines goodbye. they said they will come out of rumored they was allowed dollars into iran that allow the currency to depreciate.

and then iran tried to take andntage of this moment, launched their own initiatives. for the first time there were conversations without collective security, multilateral, bilateral. there is no pax americana here. i believe the iraqi prime minister more than secretary .ompeo there was a message coming and going back. there was some progress.

if the arabs maintain their distance from the u.s., i do not think they would go after them. [indiscernible] >> i am on record saying if you think you know what will happen, you are a full or liar. i think we are in uncharted territory. i cannot think of an historical analogy, we have a superpower in conflict with a regional power.

guns of august comparisons are miscast, they are not a . competitor with us. we are not in a tit-for-tat with the russians were chinese. that said, it is hard to see where this goes. i was on a panel on a middle east television network, and an iranian on the other side of the screen was quite clear, a former parliamentarian, quite clear they had to strike american assets inside iraq because that is where this offense against iranian dignity occurred. i do not know if that is the official government line or that is what will happen, if that does happen, it is hard to see how that does not trigger another american response and get us into some type of -- >> and each one has to be a little bit more. >> each a little higher than the

higher.r a lot and i think what needs to be kept in the forefront of our mind all the time is that petrochemical infrastructure is inherently vulnerable because of what goes through it. there is no way to effectively gas and that stuff primarily in eastern province of saudi arabia all the way around the golf rule thatgh iraq into iran control 20% of world supply. that is an important factor and on their minds. >> even though the united states is self-sufficient in north america for oil and gas, and we would be able to increase

production dramatically and quickly if there were a disruption, it is still a global market, so our prices would track with global prices. >> americans would pay much higher prices. >> it would be a problem for us too. >> and in an election year. it is not just the saudis thinking he cannot afford that. i asked peter bergen before we set down if the iranians were capable of striking targets in the united states, and it is a difference between could they and what they. he does not believe they have the capability. can you give peter the microphone so he is on camera? , if you areto you

on tv, take the microphone. wasr: i think the plan aspirational. the fbi is on top of hezbollah and the like. i think their capacity is limited here. american targets in lebanon or afghanistan is a different matter. sharon: then there is the question of when they? -- would they? there are still rational calculations going on, even if you have to respond to the fact you have big crowds, agendas in iraq, would they? >> i think they would have to do something. the question is what is the magnitude of it, and how do they respond to that? have irrational actors. if you look at the most important strategic objective for iran, it is that trump does

not get reelected. they know the difference between iraq, half the american population and much ofhe congress is opposed to war. it is not like the war in 2002 when we were marching towards it. if an attack is out of -- i do not think they want to help the president in the election. the leverage they have over him, if they can tiny right -- time ruin his they could election. there was the benghazi event somewhere, it might be iraq or somewhere, but i think the only way iranians can survive this crisis is if trump does not get elected.

they would have five more years , and the strategic calculation would be very different. sharon: i want to ask a provocative question. let's say hypothetically something happens in the united states, it could be cyber, what the proportionate response is is not clear for something like that. what powers does the president have? what reaction might provoke from him? ift might he do here at home he saw a paris or mumbai style attack in the united states? physical. >> i think those are two different questions, a physical attack in the united states is a course of a different color than a major cyberattack.

i just want to clarify. start by adding on about the iranian calculation. i think there is a high likelihood of kidnapping if they can. one reason we want everybody out ou iraq, if you are iran, want to do something that makes back.der to strike you want american service people who, if trump strikes back, they get murdered. you want something that is a retaliation but cools things down and makes everybody think again rather than eight to protect military strike. -- rather than a tit-for-tat military strike. the strategic value of that in the hostage crisis, and trump got us into this, what are we going to do? attack -- at

kinetic attack would have to be met by some severe physical attack on iranian infrastructure, but presumably one that you could try to limit, but i do not what else you could do particularly if you are trump . a cyber attack is different, and trump is capable of saying the iranians did not do it, they are too scared of me. if you think about misinformation, we have already seen, the nsa can say they didn't do it, and he will say they did not do it, and as far as he is concerned, he has altered reality. that is a more reassuring scenario though still extremely dent, or weor prece respond virtually. as with north korea when we responded to the sony attack, it was not public that that is what

we were doing, but we set a clear message to the north koreans. sharon: i think the iranians have authority ratchet up their campaign on social media. i want to ask you one more question before we open it to the audience. wonder, when the obama administration with the nuclear deal, and now this assassination, what is the long play? united statesaq can live with eventually? what is a credible vision for a peaceful coexistence? as a defense person, this has been a long time coming. i did not foresee we would take an action like this. sooner or later when you come out of the defense community, you thought this would happen, and the united states and iraq would come to a breaking point even with the nuclear deal. there were too many things to resolve, maybe not. is there a way to get to

coexistence, and what does that look like? how do we get there from here? >> not really now, but before this event i would have said the significance of the nuclear deal was it was the first arms-control deal. this was more like what we used to do with the soviets. it is the first arms-control deal. because itshred it does not cover all the weapons. you would say iran's regional behavior -- how do you get to a second or third or fourth arms-control deal? we signed a nuclear deal with iran. i would say they were the big winners. we gave up our strategic

, they have stronger conventional weapons. it basically has to be an arms-control deal regionally. which means you do not invest in missiles, and arms-control deals take time to put in place. is a country whose conventional military is weak. on hezbollah as a deterrent against israel. it is investing in missiles and nuclear technology. you have to have some kind of security in the region, but that means the united states

-- [indiscernible] it has to encourage them to talk to each other. the saudis need to share the region wanh the ns. now they are trying to do that. it is the ironing under president trump the saudis realize they need to do that. we can agree on some security roles, we agree to certain and not interfere in one another's domestic affairs. the idea you were going to fix this region in one sweep, it is who we areiplomats

not really relying on. it is not a short-term measure. >> the hardest thing for me in this, if we just stayed out, and i am mindful of my own recommendations over time, but fundamentally the youth in iraq and certainly the youth in iran were heading back in our direction. i always tell the story of about 20 years ago being with an iranian roughly my age, and the iranian saying the young people are passionately all american. i said, what? he said, do you have teenagers? i said yes.

he said, why do i need to say anything more than that? the parents generation was "death united states," but as that set, and we saw across the region in 2011, and just because they are of spring is over does not mean you do not have massive numbers of people including in our own country who are saying enough. enough with the sectarianism or the religious repression with the corruption, or just the lack of effective government. one of the things most frustrating here is that you had a rocky youth -- iraqi youth protesting and iranian youth protesting. i do not think this stops that long-term, but it changes the subject and makes it harder. to your point about a longer-term vision, i recommend the book coming out that talks

about the a people in the muslim world. , it saidsunni split this was a religious upheaval that starts in 1979 in iran but and the sunnida .rthodox muslim upheaval the religious revivalism, religious orthodoxy of the kind we have seen in christianity its own timeat in is burning itself out. we are doing everything we can to make that a longer and slower process than it would have otherwise been. >> it is hard to be optimistic in this moment. we will see how the next few weeks play out. help,ings that give me

-- i think we have lost this moment, and we need to look at the next cycle and how that comes about for both iraq and iran for different reasons. the thing that gives me hope is watching actually turkish-russian relations. 2013ould have thought in when turkey shoots down a russian airplane that 5, 6 years later we would not be worried about them getting too cozy. things in the middle east can turn quickly. fors not impossible relations to be reset on a is astounding to us -- we hold grudges longer. example of how the

turks and russians have reconciled gives me hope that perhaps some other model of that can happen particularly everyone realizes we are looking into the abyss, and maybe this is a good time to backup. we may hold grudges longer, but our memories -- that is what worries me. --ore you raise your hands , solort memories for us --soleimani. for the iraqis, they are the ones who stop a genocide a group from taking baghdad in june and july of 2014 when the united states was still fuzzy on whether this was a sunni revolt and we need to sit it out.

sharon: this is not the first iranian leader -- not many americans would remember that. what i worry about is the iranians know what they want in terms of the future relationship with the united states, they want us out of the region. they want to be able to protect and promote the regional interests without our interference. i do not know what we really want from them. we have some in the united states who want a war, but that is about what comes next, and i do not think we have a good vision of what comes next. that is what worries me. if you have questions, this is your moment. please identify yourself and your affiliation. i want to warn you that i may seem nice and i am not. [laughter] i will try to twist you toward the question, so please make it

a question. or a comment, but brief. eye, so you just have to wait for the microphone. [indiscernible] my question, can iranians do something to undermine us in afghanistan at a time when we are trying to talk with the taliban, who have lots of blood on their hands. >> you have a lot of experience there? >> [indiscernible] their interests are conflicted. on one level is between the government and the taliban,

something that benefits them. they do not want the united states under borders. capabilities,t of and iranians have ties to the taliban. ultimately, if you thought about the long game, it is not to focus on a single place for the u.s. can respond. >> my name is james, i am from the university of pennsylvania. i want to ask you about the 2020 election, and election security has been a big topic domestically. what are the capabilities of iran and its allies interfering

in our elections, and whether this has changed iran's calculations and its allies on how they should go about election interference. the point that the worst outcome for iran is trump reelected, one of the surest ways of helping him get reelected would be to intervene in any traceable way, because it would be devastating. at that point even the democrats would have to line up against iran, and worrying about the results. that is not something that would be high on my worry list. sharon: if you are asking if they can, absolutely. arabiat attack in saudi was a cyber attack that the iranians mounted that was successful. they are good at this, one of the few countries in the world good at this. >> we fought an undeclared cyber

war with them for a long time. sharon: not as good as we are, but they are good. >> max blumenthal, i wanted to pick up on two points. mohandas and soleimani were good it pushing back isis. does the panel see a problem with targeting governments in the middle east who have been extremely effective in deterring and,i extremist groups? second point, sanctions contributed to this escalator torry cycle, sanctions posed on iran. does the panel think it was wise for democrats to approve trump's sanctions in apparent violation of the jcpoa?

do you think that contributed to this excretory cycle, and how do measures not approved at the u.n. fit into a rules-based international order? part, iran will produce a successor to soleimani. it does remind me of the steven spielberg movie, "munich." assassinatednian was replaced by a worse person. up with someone , thevicious and nasty people to replace these guys. there might be a time where we

themaving eliminated because the people who replace them might be worse. on your question, i do not think these individuals are targeted because they are effective against isis. perhaps they were targeted despite the fact they were effective against isis. i do not think we are going after effective anti-isis figures. sharon: i think there is a perception that in the u.s. armed forces there are strong feelings about soleimani because although he did not directly pull the trigger, he provided the capability that led to a lot of american soldiers dying. is that something our uniformed professionals can get past? --it certainly is something

it is certainly something that is felt. undeniable.ing, not just in the military, you talk to older generations state department, the current senior seniorf cash senior -- lions. why we have that for the iranians and not for other figures has always been something that has baffled me. it is a true statement that areimani and the quds force responsible for about 600 deaths of american soldiers in iraq. that leaves another 3000 to be accounted for. we all know who was facilitating those deaths, and we seem to get over that quickly. i do not understand why this enmity against

iranian influence, and the guys who were fighting with al qaeda who were responsible for many deaths, well in excess of 600, they flipped sides and we for gave them literally overnight. i do not understand the disparity between these two sides. either you hold grudges against people who kill your people, or you do not. i do not understand why the iranians is for lifetime, and other extremists is something we can get over. >> i agree that sanctions are a weapon of war. >> i have a question that the arguments made by the administration about soleimani in the planning are similar to the arguments made about the targeted killing of an american citizen who headed al qaeda in

yemen. the president made this decision to authorize the killing of an american citizen, the first time an american president had done that since the civil war. he made the decision quickly. is there something to be said, clearly this decision-making , itnd terrorists came up started with george w. bush, is there something to be said about that? >> yes, and this goes to sharon's point that we are operating in a rule freezone. project knows better than anyone how many times we have done this when it was a nonstate actor who was not an american citizen. when these issues have been raised by human rights group

about cia drones, and we do have various protocols that they are there are, i think and we try to reduce civilian casualties, but not as much as we want to. none of them are shared. that is a huge problem, but we let it go unless it was an american citizen, and that did raise controversy and rightly, although i can see from obama's point of view sitting with his military, and somebody who did believe drones with a way to do it, the fact he was waging war on the united states in the same way other al qaeda leaders are. as a lawyer i could make arguments on either side. here the differences he is not a nonstate actor, he is a state actor. the fact that we noticed in those two cases, to me points

out that we are accepting it, and ultimately i do not think those rules will come until he gets used against us, which is why the iranian use of drones against the saudis was so important. we do not want to live in a world where individuals can be taken out with whoever is writing with them in a car at will -- riding. them in a car at will. >> identify yourself and affiliation. >> ima washington, d.c. resident. -- i am a washington, d.c. resident. i am curious what you think are the potential escalations in ,esponse with respect to israel and we have a leader in israel who might benefit from some sort

of response. i am curious what your feelings are on that. >> there have been persistent israeli attacks on iranian positions in syria. this was the israeli prime minister baiting them into a response that would help them domestically. as of summer estimates were the israelis have killed up to 1600 officers, which is a heavy toll. they did not brag about it on twitter, and that help. the iranians made a decision they would not play into israel's hands, they would remain focused on the persian gulf region and not get baited into a conflict in syria. putingot know what

might be telling them. i do not think this is like the 1980's, i do not think the iranians figure you hit israel and the arab world would rally to the palestinian cause and get riled up. you will not get that response. at the same time, it will expand the conflict in ways it gets out of control with the united states. who knows? i do not think that is necessarily a knee-jerk reaction. >> what about on attribute of all attacks? ttributalbout una

attacks? >> that might be sometimes a deterrent. if you did something, but i that this benefits bibi. he is in a tough place. what he would really like is for an iranian attack. the arab world is no longer a threat to israel. iran is the one enemy that might justify his claim to power. i do not think the iranians want to play into that. sharon: you do not think the hardliners could carry that? has a national security process.

the supreme leader, after soleimani wanted to make sure that the recommendations would not be out of his control. but, look at all of these and the hardliners are sort of bound by that consensus that emerges. in iran isy side bureaucrat ties to -- bureaucratized. if a decision is made to go after israel, it is a regime

decision. sharon: i want to see if any of you have last comments on the situation, what worries you. are you hopeful? >> it is hard to be anything but pessimistic in this moment. tois hard to see how we get an outcome that has the united states and its interests and the interests of its friends and allies in as good a position as we were two weeks ago. it is hard to see a path that gets us back there in the short-term. perhaps we need to do some longer-term thinking about how we structure our relationships in the middle east. >> one thing nobody has mentioned but i was thinking about when you are asking the

question about bibi -- and bibi would love to have an arabian attack.- an iranian no one is talking about impeachment. subjecthanged the dramatically. i think you have to observe that. and that does not make you happy. not-term, i guess i am optimistic. obama comes in saying -- the american -- american patience of americans dying in the middle east since 2003 is over.

i see this as a process that has been long and unguided, or guided in different directions, but it does have to come to an equilibrium. this is not a sustainable equilibrium. talkut rusa and turkey, we are nowhere in syria. maybe this completes that process in some way. >> the worst thing, i think the president is not surrounded by seasoned hands and people who have experience. that is worrisome to me. on the positive side, it is good. i don't see in this team the ability to take advantage of this in a positive way. important to is

repeat that this really is different. this president is about to be tested. thank you all for coming. be careful out there. it is snowy. usappreciate your joining for this conversation. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] ♪ >> at approximately 9:30 p.m., president trump responded to the iranian firing of mitchell's -- of missiles with a tweet saying --

we will have that statement and any updates when available. c-span's washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. wednesday morning, we will discuss escalating u.s.-iran tensions with nebraska congressman don bacon, california congresswoman barbara lee, and defense one correspondent katie bo williams. journal.hington join the discussion. british housethe of commons, prime minister boris johnson takes questions from

members in the first question time of the new year. this is also the first question time since the conservative party secured a full majority in the house of commons in the election. live wednesday at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span two. iranllowing reports that a base iniles at iraq, congressman john garamendi spoke on the house floor. rep. garamendi: i thank you, house speaker. e return to washington with an obviously, it is a new year and we returned to washington with an agenda, in many ways a tragic and dangerous agenda out ahead of us.