>> thank you so much. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] camping 2020 differs from political coverage for one reason, it is c-span. unfiltered bringing you an unfiltered view of the people seeking to steer the government this november. in other words your future. the bigger picture for yourself and make up your own mind. >> venezuelan officials and latin american scholars discuss the political and humanitarian situation in venezuela. treatyplore how the real is being used against the nicolas maduro regime. the legitimacy of his presidency

has been in dispute by juan guaido who is been serving as the acting president of venezuela. >> welcome everybody. >> we are mindful this is an all-male panel and doing whatever we can to put women in our events. we like to focus on how these affect men and women differently. how important for others

this can be beneficial to all of venezuela. we are discussing a timely topic. just for a quick background, the united states and western nations -- using the real treaty to facilitate response to the crisis in venezuela. 9/23/2019, 16 on out of the 19 member countries voted on agreeing to impose targeting sanctions on entities associated with the government of nicolas maduro. i also pledged to meet again within two months to discuss additional measures. they have potential implications for u.s. policy, it's why we are here to walk us through these and what the real treaty means

and how these affect the crisis. this is not only a timely issue because juan guaido is meeting with world leaders at davo's we speak but also because the on thesheds some light policy toolkit of venezuela. this gives us room to more options and that's where we want to get into. there are two big questions for this discussion i want to make and everyone in the room some answers to those questions. the first one, what is the treaty and what are its implications in the venezuelan crisis. the second question is what is different from the treaty compared to the sanctions and diplomatic measures that we already have imposed on the maduro regime. so how does the treaty make our international response

differently? we have a great panel to talk on those questions. thank you for joining. i want to thank two ambassadors ambassadors for joining us for this timely discussion. and we will start with you, thank you for joining. the floor is yours. >> i want to think csis and especially moise rendon, and his team, for hosting this. the real treaty -- rio treaty has become an important tool to the entire government of juan guaido and of his international campaign against maduro and his criminal regime.

under the presidency of hugo chavez claiming it was an imperialist instrument of the united states. year, the of last national assembly of venezuela approved operation -- since then we have convened a meeting of consultation of foreign ministers and implemented two resolutions aimed at involving -- eroding maduro's support base. despite these diplomatic achievements, we cannot escape reality. maduro remains in power, and his regime shows little signs of -- it's dictatorial ways. at the time the world was -- after world war ii.

economies were smaller, the world was far less connected, and the most important thing in -- the advancement in the field where veryations difficult taxes and controlled by a few countries or a few companies. without leaving an era of conflict between states and nonstate actors. and there are new technologies. the implementation of criminal enterprises like drug cartels has allowed the rise of organizations. we can say the same about terrorist organizations which have activities not limited by state borders. farcrist groups such as and hezbollah which have proven to be -- two regional and global

powers are operating in venezuela. furthermore, we live in a world where a small group of people with access to the internet technology can weaponize public opinion and influence the masses at very low cost. this is evidence of the global disinformation war that is more efficient than propaganda. the world has seen a proliferation of user accounts the target the public with devious message -- divisive messages. moises wrote in the spanish newspaper we have seen how russian hackers are learning how to sow confusion to deepen the differences and conflict

that already exist or event -- invent new ones. do and they doan but only in neighboring countries. hackers and russian bots have intervened in catalonia, brexit, germany, france ukraine, and , more countries. but that is not only the advance d use of what the russian government calls political technologies they also have the , ability to use cyber weapons to attack electrical networks, communications, transportation. a few days ago, last sunday, a new york times diplomatic correspondent wrote that watching political unrest explode across south america and

official of the state department released a pattern of antigovernment -- that otherwise have little in common. file, nearly 10% originated with splinter accounts that have a high -- of being linked with russia. in bolivia, immediately after ,resident morale is resigned spiked more than 1000 today up from fewer than five a day. over one 30 day. period, russian linked accounts had a similar message within 19 minutes of one another. and done in the first quarter of 2018, it showed that russia, in spanish, had nearly 100 million

visits in one month. these outlets not only spread misinformation, but destabilize regional governments. and in one month, russia had to weaponize the population of the region and provide them with news and entertainment. they have now moved to social media where anybody can be reached. is not, russia responsible for the social and security issues. maduro shares a lot of the blame. has put its social peace and crisis. i do hope that that will force

to focus on domestic policy and -- instead of pushing for his ouster. as worry solemnly is the means from which he has -- we've seen the regime survival. he has aligned himself with notorious drug cartels, gangs, and terrorist group granting haven in exchange for their help in the so-called revolution. this is had serious repercussions for the people of venezuela, especially those who live in border states and hard-to-reach areas. --amilitary groups have criminal gangs fight an all-out war for the resources. this year does not take into account this new form of war.

the possibility of attacking country can assume ways that did not exist in 1947. the possibility of a government co-opted by an illegitimate ruler coordinated with nonstate actors to create a domestic and foreign condition. in this context, we conceive that the maduro regime represents a credible threat to the region and that state. the tr presents as a tool to channel solution to this new kind of problems. however, as with any tool, it needs to be updated to reflect the 21st century. this means being creative about the action to take to deal with the on presented issues we face. we need to be open to new ideas, to think outside of the box, because the cost of not doing so is too great.

the resources of one of the recent regions of the world and -- funding regional gangs, terrorist groups. thank you. moises: thank you, ambassador. you covered a lot of information and i'm writing down the key points i want to go back to because there's a lot. ambassador, thank you for joining. how do you see the tr playing into the venezuelan crisis? >> i want to thank you for the invitation and it is a pleasure , with me to join. some of my colleagues are also here. thank you for being together with us. ambassador tarre has provided some context and i think it is very appropriate that he did so. i will try to address short

-- in very short remarks why we consider the tr an invaluable tool for us for the pressure and attaining some of our objectives in the region. and at the same time, these remarks are structured around what we consider to be main -- three main misperceptions about the tr. i will address those very shortly and then of course, i am open to the q&a after we finish. it is fair to say that the treaty recently has been one of the most commented international instruments for south americans. as i said, probably, i think it is unfair, but probably the treaty has a very bad reputation.

it's usually hampered by the three misperceptions. first misperception, that the instrument ofan revenge. the treaty has been applied to since it20 situations entered into force in 1948. me inleagues have helped putting together a brief summary of these 20 different situations in which of these 20 different situations in which we have invoked the treaty. and none of these situations today military intervention effectively lead to a use of force. we can make a disclaimer regarding the cuban missile crisis in 1962. we certainly have to make the disclaimer because there was a

resolution in 1962 that actually authorized the use of force. to contain the situation in cuba. this resolution however never reached the security council of the united nations, so it was never put into force. so it served as leverage, political leverage, and helped to contain the situation and finally resolve it. it was resolved through other means. not under the umbrella of the tr. the majority of situations referred to traditional threats involving two or more member states at the organization of american states, and the situation in general with the vision of territory. or interference in domestic affairs. and only and four cases has it been applied to address issues that involve an extra continental threat.

cuba in 1962, which involved the threats revolving from the association of the cuban government at the time with the soviet bloc. the question of the violence in 1982 involved the united kingdom. and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. before the situation in venezuela, 2001 was the previous case in which we invoked this. far from being in instrument for military for intervention the treaty is effective for peaceful mediation of conflicts. it is perhaps awkward to say so, but if you look at historical perspective, you will agree with me. in the case of the present venezuelan crisis, it is not on the table.

you will find the authorization for the use of force as one of the provisions of the treaty. in this specific instance, we have not considered adoption of measures involving the use of force. the second misperception is that treaty is an acronym stick. -- an anachronistic. the misperception is is it outdated, it is a tool of the cold war, that it should not exist anymore as a tool for its member states. it is true, the real treaty was designed with a collective defense mechanism in the context of the cold war. it was effective when it was used and applied to situations like cuba, when cuba acted. -- when cuba acted as a proxy to the soviet union.

i mentioned before, the vast majority of these cases where the real treaty was applied referred to traditional threats involving two or more countries with no direct relation to the cold war. if you look the situations that i mentioned, the reference to the cold war was only more clear in the situation involving cuba in 1962. the real treaty is a broad, legal basis that can be applied to a set of different situations and covers not only extra continental threats, but also open to situations as it is stated in article six with the ability or integrity of the

anitical independence of american state affected by an even by any other situation that might endanger the peace of the americas. that is a provision in the treaty. the situations are reflected in article six are the basis for the two situations that justify the application of the real treaty. the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the present in venezuela. far from being anachronistic, we consider the treaty to be a dynamic up-to-date legal instrument that survived the cold war and continues to prove to be a very useful tool as an inter-american mechanism. to conclude. thethird misperception is real treaty is a panacea for

addressing the political crisis in venezuela. designed toas not put an end to a entire regime. nor to pacify the fighters. neither is it intended as a means to restore democracy in any given country. so what is the role of the real treaty in the venezuelen crisis? in my humble opinion, the main purpose of the real treaty is to address the threats that the maduro regime poses to security and stability in the region. it aims to address security impacts in the region as a consequence of the criminal , ife involved in venezuela you look at the migration crisis, for instance. but the ambassador has referred to much more serious situations, like the free operation of criminal gangs inside the

venezuelan territory, which is obviously a source of major concern for the neighboring countries. the two resolutions we have adopted in the real treaty establish the mechanism to investigate and to punish persons associated with the maduro regime responsible for transnational, organized crime. if you look at september last year and the most recent one adopted in december, they established the operation with agents in charge of investigation, police investigations, money laundering investigations, and it is supposed to bring us with suggestions on how to deal with the situations in a collective manner. the treaty is part of measures

to address the multinational crisis in venezuela. it targets one specific and very significant component of the crisis, but the real treaty alone will not restore democracy in venezuela. this is a task for the venezuelan people. concluding remarks. first, the treaty is not a panacea for the venezuelan useful toolit is a to prevent the maduro regime to -- from continuing destabilization in the region. number two, the treaty is a legally binding agreement. it allows multiple state parties to apply measures that could not otherwise be implemented like enforcing the travel ban we have adopted last december and involves 29 figures associated

with the maduro regime. the decision to sanction the 29 persons of the maduro regime illustrates a meaningful measure that could not be implemented in systems, but can now be applied for parts of the real treaty because the real treaty establishes that other than the force, all of the decisions adopted are mandatory for all of the member states. three, all of the measures under article eight are off of the table. the redline for us has been the use of force which is not been currently an option. number four, one important side effect of the real treaty is to to continue the isolation of the regime and i think it has proved effective in that regard. part of the treaty is

combined measures by the international community as a whole to assist the venezuelan people and finding their path back to democracy. i'll be available later for your questions. moises: thank you, ambassador. thank you, again. now we are going to hear from our beloved senior advisor at csis, he was an ambassador to columbia, venezuela, and chile recently. what are your thoughts on this issue? >> i am not just an advisor to csis, i am an uncompensated senior advisor to csis. [laughter] >> ladies and gentlemen, you have had the benefit of hearing from experts on the tr treaty , its history, its applicability. now let us hear from one, who

clearly acknowledges he is not an expert. not a lawyer, not familiar with the total history of the rio an expert onven the organization of american states, but he does have a brain. he is from the state of texas, and he is capable of at least offering some suggestions as to why the rio treaty should be a helpful mechanism or tool for the western hemisphere and its governments to deal with the venezuela crisis. i will offer six reasons. after all, if ambassador simas can offer three, i should be able to offer double that number. [laughter] >> first, it is an excellent mechanism for coordination among western hemisphere governments because it is a formal, legal

mechanism. the lima group is a superb coordination mechanism but it is an informal grouping. it does not have legal status if you will. i am personally strongly in favor of the work of the lima group and equally in favor of cooperation through the rio treaty mechanism. second, it strengthens the position, the authorities, the credibility of the organization of american states. on matters in this hemisphere, particularly matters related to venezuela, that is an important positive element. the rio treaty, in essence, was promulgated and ratified through the oas mechanism. application of the rio treaty

provides greater strength and greater authority, whether moral or legal or simply perception around the world to the oas. third, the rio treaty is an effective mechanism for messaging other international organizations and ngos throughout the world, as to the seriousness with which the nations of the western hemisphere are taking the crisis and the consequences of the crises in venezuela today. those international organizations can be the united nations and its constituent elements. the humanitarian, the economic, the human rights suborganizations of the united nations. it can also be regional organizations, such as the european union, african union,

the other regional organizations spread around the world. and the ngo community would include and incorporate the humanitarian ngos, human rights ngos, economic ngos. all of them benefit and receive a message when the nations of the western hemisphere talk about their treaty for reciprocal assistance within the hemisphere. fourth, let us be frank. at some point, as i have said many times over the last two years, at some point, we know how this book ends in venezuela. we in a sense know how the final chapter ends.

what we don't know is how many chapters there will be between now and the end, and how long the final chapter will be. the rio treaty served to some extent as a useful mechanism for talking about, discussing, considering, and even preparing for some form of hemispheric, multinational role when the moment arrives that there is some form of transition in venezuela. it could be as a result of invitation from the government or the interim government in office in venezuela. or it could be by unanimous conclusion within the hemisphere that the situation has reached such a level that some form of international cooperation to address it is an important thing. and, the rio treaty would contribute to an organized and carefully coordinated process should the hemisphere reach that conclusion.

and, fifth, we have talked, every single one of us have talked about the humanitarian crisis. the fact that somewhere between five and 6 million venezuelan citizens have left their nation as refugees due to the situation at home. and how it is overwhelmingly the nations of the western hemisphere that are accepting those refugees and bearing the consequences of those movements. ladies and gentlemen, if we ever reach the point where with or without invitation, a decision is reached collectively to provide humanitarian assistance to or within venezuela, the rio treaty is perhaps a more effective, formal, legal mechanism for both considering

and eventually delivering that assistance should that be the decision. and finally, i conclude the same way i have concluded oh, so many of my presentations on venezuela over the last two years. why do i think the rio treaty is a politically effective device or mechanism today? because in my opinion, talking about the rio treaty and, in fact, applying specific provisions of the rio treaty, in my humble opinion, produce sleepless or at least disturbed sleeping evenings, perhaps, for mr. nicolas maduro or for his excellent minister of defense, mr. lopez.

i would frankly argue that anything that has them concerned about what might actually happen, what might finally be decided by the other nations of this hemisphere in terms of the rio treaty is actually a good thing, regardless of what happens. the fact that they are worried about it is good. the fact that they have to take that into account as they assess and determine how they will deal with the opposition, how they will deal with the interim constitutional government or president of the republic of venezuela is a good thing. ladies and gentlemen, the rio treaty is an extremely complicated issue through the last, what, 74, 73 years of history in the western hemisphere. i suggest to you that we should not look upon the rio treaty as

a tree, and we assess its branches, its leaves, and the veins on the branches of the leaves. that could take as years and years of discussion. the rio treaty in my metaphor is a large forest. walk into that forest and it can take you in almost any direction you wish to go. of course, we must have a clear enough sense and understanding of the treaty, the leaves, the branches, and the veins on the leaves to know what is permitted or not permitted in the forest, but the forest gives us a multitude of options. let's keep those options open. with that, dr. rendon, i relinquish the floor. >> thank you. we have a lot of material to cover. i would like to go back to the ambassadors.

connected to what the ambassador was describing about the rio treaty and how can it helpful. on one hand, we have support from russia, iran, china, cuba on the maduro regime. despite that support, nicolas maduro is more isolated than ever before. we have a regime that is sanctioned, that is not recognized as a legitimate government by more than 55 countries good it has legal and diplomatic implications moving forward. we are seeing those play out every week, every day. but despite that, maduro has had a way to adapt to sanctions and international restrictions. so, how all of these tools we were just describing that the rio treaty has on the table, they have had on the table for over 70 years, how these differentiate itself from what we have so far?

which are, again, sanctions, diplomatic pressure, a coalition of different countries, increasing pressure on maduro on a constant basis. how are these tools in the rio treaty can be different, maybe more effective to reach a safer and a more prosperous venezuela? yes. >> i agree with ambassador brownfield. in the sense all of the possibilities open by the treaty must be on the table. as the ambassador was saying, in the discussions we have in new york and bogota, the majority, all of the countries present around the table were against the use of military force. but, what i think is that the

military force as it is stated in the treaty is a conventional military force. conventional use of military force. what i tried to say first is that there are new ways of war. the war is not the same today as it was 70 years ago. in the pentagon, there is a cyber command. cyber command is acting right now. there is a war. nobody speaks about that. in this cyber command, they are fighting against hackers, against the use of misinformation, about any kind of new tools that are open by the newest technology in order to harm countries. this kind of war cannot be

excluded from the application of the treaty. we have to think about that. it is a new field, but this field in my sense is open. the second way that the use of put away is drug trafficking. venezuela right now is one of the most important transit countries of drugs in the world. a majority of drugs goes to europe and the united states goes through venezuela. there are restrictions of flights after they leave venezuela to other countries, mainly central america. that gorols about ships from venezuela to other -- to the western hemisphere.

the use of force, another blockade of drug traffickers, there is clear information about which ships are drug transporters and which are not. it should be very easy to tell our forces to intercept and to block the drugs that come from venezuela. that is very important not only because the drug is a problem of everyone and for every country. it's very important because the drugs which came from money of this trafficking is going to finance troops who act for venezuela. international terrorism that takes a lot of money out of venezuela and out of drug trafficking which comes from venezuela.

that means the problem is extremely complex. maybe it is useful in a global fight against this kind of irregular fighters that appears in the world scenario. and, that we have to confront in order to preserve freedom and democracy. thank you. >> ambassador simas, anything to add? >> yes, thank you. i think the ambassador mentioned legitimate aspects of the crisis that justifies state parties to the treaty meeting and adopting collective decisions. i fully support the approach that the treaty continues to be a valid tool to be used in this specific situation. what i would like to address is a different element.

there have been several international efforts by different groups of countries that have tried to be helpful and support president guaido and support the democratic transition in venezuela. not only the lima group, but after that, you have the international group. you have others that have tried to be helpful in venezuela. in different ways, they have tried to apply pressure in different ways. leverage. their relations with venezuela, in order to help the transition in that country. what i think, to answer your question, what i think makes the tr different -- this is

a very short answer -- as ambassador brownfield mentioned, this is a legal framework. it is mandatory to all of those parties of the treaty. now we have a very important set of two resolutions adopted in the last six months which have put in place very effective and coordinated measures to sanction people associated with the regime. i agree with ambassador. they should be extremely worried about our action in this regard. >> thank you. ambassador brownfield, you mentioned the rio treaty and 98% of this room. >> an honest 98%. >> i will briefly put into context a couple of relevant articles that i think apply to our discussion here on venezuela. i'm going to allow myself to read them out loud. just bear with me because the language is a little updated

now. article six. please correct me if i am wrong, but i believe the meeting is september 2019 was on the basis of article six. right? that is why member countries agreed to pursue sanctions on venezuela. article six in the rio treaty says if the integrity of the territory or sovereignty of political independence of any american state, not in the u.s. but any american nation in the continent should be affected by aggression or intercontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of organ ofthen the consultation shall meet and

discuss what measures should be taken to maintain peace and security in the region. i believe that article applies directly to venezuela. we have seen 5.3 million refugees out of venezuela that has affected colombia, brazil, ecuador, peru, in a way the presence of nonstate actors and others are increasing the insecurity of the region. there's a lot of narco trafficking, money laundering, illegal mining. illegal mining is creating devastation in the amazon region. i believe there are enough reasons to argue that venezuela is creating instability and affecting the peace of the region. that's article six and that is where member countries agreed to move forward. this is coming to you, ambassador brownfield, so be ready. article eight is also crucial because article eight -- bear with me -- for the purpose of this treaty, the measures of which the origin of consultation

may agree will comprise one or more of the following. one, recall diplomatic missions. two, breaking of diplomatic relations. three, breaking of consulate relations. four, partial or complete interruption of economic relations, or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic communications and all of these facts. and it says the use of armed force. as ambassador simas said, the use of armed forces not on the table from member countries, but there are a lot of other things that are on the table that are being discussed that are part of article eight. which of these tools, ambassador brownfield, do you think will be effective to keep helping

venezuela, the peace of the region? >> in my opinion, the beauty, the charm of the rio treaty is that it is both an ample, yet flexible document that allows the states party to the treaty to determine which parts of the treaty they choose to apply or enforce. when they will apply or enforce them. and even it permits them to change their mind as the situation on the ground changes over time. the importance of the rio treaty, as we have all stated you can almost say ad nauseum now, is that it is a legal document and a legal structure. that said, it is not a straitjacket.

it does not say once we have invoked the rio treaty, we all must do every single element that is in the treaty. the drafters of the treaty 75 years ago, i think, were wise enough to indicate these are possibilities or options that are permitted or could be implemented under the terms, but it is the states parties and their representatives, their leaders, their government that makes that determination. you know as well as i do, you know that i would be comfortable applying a great number of the authorities that are permitted in the rio treaty. however, since i am not an idiot, i also realize there are many, many people in this hemisphere, probably at this stage, a majority who believe that some of the potential -- some of the authorities that

could be potentially applied are not yet ripe for consideration, and certainly not ripe for application. that is fine. in my opinion, the message for mr. maduro and his government, the message for the other international organizations in the world, the message for governments that are playing as far as this hemisphere is concerned, and on the helpful role in venezuela is the following -- the rio treaty is now in play. you might want to read it if you want to see what options are available to the governments of this hemisphere should we ever reach the point where we feel we must apply those options. that would be my answer to the question. >> thank you. i want to make sure we have time for q&a. i promise you we will have about 25 minutes. just be patient.

ambassador, one of the things i like about this rio treaty is that it advocates not only a political crisis, it addresses a crisis that affects the stability and peace of the region which is the case in venezuela. that is very important to understand. some of our friends are mentioning this all the time. to get the solution of venezuela, you have to have a diagnostic first. all of the diagnostics, this is a state controlled by organized crime and criminal activity. therefore, any solution needs to address those issues first, right? that is where i like the rio treaty because it is a mechanism, a multilateral legal mechanism to address, not a political, but a security matter. ambassador brownfield said

humanitarian aid should be a priority. we have people dying and suffering just because of lack of food. how do you see applying the rio treaty and implementing some sort of humanitarian response to this crisis, and how will that affect the peace and security moving forward? >> i agree with ambassador brownfield that the treaty is open to very large choices of action. as moises read in the text of article six, the main part of the article is the hemispheric peace. peace in the west, in the americas. that is a very wide field for

application of the treaty. in article eight, the possibility, some of them are named as a consequence of the times. electric and hydroponics communication does not exist anymore. the idea is there, communication. the idea of diplomatic representation has to be seen very carefully because the existence of embassies in caracas is absolutely necessary for the people who support juan guaido. we have refugees in caracas, if the embassy were closed, should now be in jail. therefore, we have to write the treaty in a very smart way. i think it is possible.

moises in his question opens another way. it is very interesting. we have a humanitarian crisis in venezuela. people are starving. there is a problem of lack of medicines. there are a lot of possibilities of helping the venezuelan people, but the maduro regime does not allow the aid to come into venezuela. hard to push the food and medicine inside venezuela. there are ways, the possibility of no flight zones, the use of military forces, but a nonconventional use of military force. we have to think about these kinds of solutions. i think the most important for

this time is to be open of considering all of the solutions. in syria, there has been the use of force in order to give food and medicine to people, to starving people, to sick people. that has not been, in my opinion, discussed at length among the states part of the treaty. i'm personally hopeful of these kinds of solutions. there may be many more. because i am a lawyer, i may be an old lawyer, but i think the people who wrote this treaty were very smart. the tragedy of our time is that we do not have treaties like this one.

we see a lot of legal text that have a lot of holes, a lot of interpretation, a lot of misinterpretation. and the rio treaty is a marvel in this sense. it is very well written and it opens a lot of possibilities inside the legal frame that is established by the treaty. >> do we have a date for the next meeting, when it is going to happen? >> yes, around march 20 of this year. in washington. >> is that the same date, sorry, the same date for the election of the new secretary-general? >> yes, we tried -- the foreign ministers will be here. >> ok, that makes sense. that is good for all of us. ambassador, any reaction so far before we open up the floor? >> thank you.

this has been a very interesting discussion. i really enjoyed the opportunity to join with you. first, on article eight, we have state parties to the treaty. we have not precluded resort to any of the measures. we have to be really realistic also when we look at the way the treaty has operated in the last meetings. six countries or state parties to the treaty have agreed to participate if they were given some sort of assurance or reassurance that the use of force would not be on the table. any resolution the treaty to be needs a number of people. it is important to keep that in mind when we are building a

number of countries of support, adopting certain measures, we need to reach that threshold of 13 countries that support them. that is what we have done in the last two meetings. if you look at the recent meeting in december when we had agreed to the travel ban involving 29 figures associated with the maduro regime, that particular resolution had 13 votes. so, we are very carefully treading among the majority of the members of the treaty that support a certain line of action. i agree with ambassador brownfield that the beauty as other measures are available, but we also need to look at the fact that we need 13 votes in order to adopt any other measure. that is what we are doing. we are taking a step-by-step approach. proving first that the treaty is useful, that the treaty provides us with some leverage in terms of opposing nicolas maduro.

but at the same time, we have to be pragmatic and realistic in working inside the body of the state parties. secondly, when i raised initially the migration problem, it was never in my mind to imply that venezuelans are coming as a threat. that is not the case. what i was saying is we have to look at the root causes. wire people moving out of venezuela? my colleague can provide additional thoughts. brazil has not tried to securitize the migration problem.

columbia has been extremely generous. they almost 2 million venezuelans living in their country. has 200,000 as a measure of comparison. it has been a normatively important for columbia to address this issue. i think moving forward, we need to continue building the alliance around the idea we have to apply additional pressure. i think we will be able to do so , but we can never look at the ,ast measures of article eight not even the no-fly zone. we need to work on improving the treaty, which applies as a way to provide political and effective measures against the regime. thank you. >> thank you, ambassador. ambassador brownfield, any last

comments? >> i am comfortable with exactly where we have come out. the description you have heard is it is a legal document. there is some flexibility within that document, and the simple human law of logic suggests the rio treaty can be applied only party arethe state willing to apply it. that means you must have some degree of consensus in terms of which parts of the treaty and the sequencing that will occur. ambassador simas said it perfectly, it is in simple mathematical terms. 13. you cannot get to 13, you are not going to apply the terms of the rio treaty. clarify, we have 13 countries. i understand 15 approved the september resolution.

15 plus these three countries, 19 total member countries. who out of those 15 did not vote on the december resolution? what countries are dropping from the september? republic, dominican and argentina. >> trinidad and tobago. since you wanted clarity, that was one of the objectives you mentioned when we started. those countries that have decided to abstain have issues

with the legal application of the measure inside the national legal system. >> that's right. >> they were very careful to explain why they decided to abstain. nevertheless, they continue to be united with us in terms of using the treaty to apply pressure to venezuela. they have problems on how these would impact their legal systems, and you can imagine why. >> interesting. that is a good clarification, especially about sanctions. i am aware many countries have different legal barriers when it comes to applying sanctions on venezuela. it is good to be mindful of that. thank you all. i just need your name, affiliation, and remember a question ends with a question mark. i'm sure we will have time to cover many of your questions. i see a hand.

let's do two. hello. clear the u.s. has been a driving force or a leading force trying to find out the solution to the venezuelan crisis, on the other hand latin america has been more cautious. i would like to know what will be the middle point or the comfort zone for both sides, and more than that, what will be the lessons to be learned? today the venezuelan crisis -- what would happen if something similar or worse happened in the region? what would be the regional response to that? >> thank you. we have one here. much,nk you so

ambassadors. member of youth and democracy in the americas. my question is for the three ambassadors. what would be enough proof from treatyime that the rio could be enough to send military why not aon, and correct time to send the force by now? i know you already answered most of my questions, and i'm grateful, but i would like to know what would be the mistake of sending force through the united nations or the rio treaty at this time? >> thank you. thanks for the questions. we have two questions, we have three speakers, feel free to jump in.

>> with your permission. for me as a venezuelan ambassador, there is a very big problem. people in venezuela, people who are suffering a tragic situation , that is one of the , that it carries a solution and it will be simple. you are to hear trumpets and drums and maduro is going out. you need the approval of 13 countries.

about --tarted to talk in order to discuss tr we have four or five people. the majority was reluctant. as we started to talk and talk and we arrived to 16 votes. five countries are very against the use of force. you need the five countries in order to have 13 votes. that is the problem most people do not understand. a lot of people talk to me and write to me and say what are you doing, you are not doing your job. if you have a more convincing

problem should have been resolved months ago. the problem is not so simple. we are asking people to send troops to venezuela. that, but to say think of the possibility if you are the president of a country and they're asking you to send your boys to eventually die, or maybe die in venezuela. that is not an easy decision. in this way of thinking, their lives are at risk. cost isave an economic an easy way for a country. there is another thing, very important.

maduro the idea of the regime for every country, it is not the same. you hear us talk about maduro in the same way. 34we had invited all of the ambassadors, we should have it isabout people saying not an efficient government, they have problems, but it has been elected, and election some people recognize but other people do not recognize, we have problems, every country has problems. the only way is to wait for the next election. fraudection of 2018 was a . we have the possibility of waiting in order to do another election and to try to have a just election is still open.

easy towhy it is not have the support -- i spoke with membersrs, the chair are less of that, but we need the votes. the discussion is very easy. there are not 13 votes right now, we are far from that, in order to start a military intervention. reaction?er we have a question about the middle ground between the u.s. and regional positions. >> let me offer 23 point. i insist upon this. the year is 2020. it is not 1920. when one talks about military options in 2020, one must not look at the problem set as

though it is 1920. i do not believe anyone, at least anyone who is saying, -- who is sane, capable of thinking and reasoning, is suggesting an international military force should land on the beaches of venezuela and march up the highway to practice. . have heard -- to caracas i have heard no one make such a situation. suggest thatpeople if the humanitarian situation, if the breakdown of social order in venezuela reaches a state where there is risk of millions of people dying, then we should open the door to consider other options. no one is suggesting the 1920 option that i am aware of, which

gets me to the question, the suggestion of what will be the , what is the difference between the u.s. approach at the approach of governments and nations elsewhere in latin america? watch two figures. i will be brutal about this. i apologize, because the one venezuelan -- there are two of them, i apologize to both of you -- and the worst days of the united states civil war, what lincoln called the terrible arithmetic, which was to say how many people must die before finally the other side agrees that we should stop this conflict? if you apply the terrible

on thetic to venezuela part of the western hemisphere's government, it is how many people are going to be dying inside of venezuela from malnutrition and starvation, from lack of medicine, from lack of housing, at what level does that reach a point where the western hemisphere says we simply cannot tolerate this in our hemisphere any longer? at that point, what are the options available? the second number is how many refugees. it is connected to the first number. what is that number? we are now somewhere between five and 6 million. the overwhelming majority are in the western hemisphere. is 10 million a number that we finally say enough is enough? is it 15 million? half of the population. at some point that will have an impact.

it will be felt most immediately by the neighboring countries. one of them is represented on the panel with me. the other is not, but i bet there is a colombian somewhere in the audience who will have to address the issue of their own citizens saying we have reached a point where we cannot absorb ofe without some form international response. watch those numbers. that would be, in my opinion, what would bring the u.s. position, which i'm not certain is that different from that of many latin american nations. the other regional nations together at some common middle ground. that in turn would be what would get people to say, ok, we are not talking about an invasion, but is there something that can be done that has a military , that would address in

some way the humanitarian crisis of venezuela. that would be my response. i'm sorry i went off so long. i am finished. [laughter] questionaises the about how when we passed the threshold with all the numbers -- have we passed the threshold with all the numbers we are seeing of refugees? we have seen a lot of children having malnutrition issues. there is another question on the table. i want to hear from the ambassador. any reaction so far? we hear about the terrible arithmetic -- >> that is what mr. lincoln used to collect. >> of course. it is difficult and painful discussing numbers in such a cold way. what is the number of migrants? what is the number of refugees

we are able to support? lookis why i'm trying to this issue from the other perspective. how much more are we able to support inside venezuela in terms of the brutal regime attacking its people, violating human rights, and basically expanding the large numbers of people. we continue to have a local policy toward the migrants and refugees. there is nothing i have seen that would change the way we address this question. the pressure is increasing for columbia in particular, but i guess we will not change that one bit. the problem resides inside the regime. we have to attack the regime in order to get things changing. you raise the point, which is legitimate.

we need to build this coalition of support for measures other than the ones that have been adopted so far. i entirely support the view we have not precluded resorting to other measures, which are allowed under the treaty, and that is why we are convening foreign ministers every three months in order to continue -- in order to consider the situation in venezuela. we will have the next one in march. we will continue to look at this question under the premise of the urgency it raises. >> thank you, ambassador. another connection with another international treaty we have discussed before is the application -- this raises the meetson, if those numbers the urgency that requires a r2berent response, how is

applied to this respect? if you read the treaty, there are four requirements that have to be question about the role which led most toy has discuss the application. we have time for one more round. this time i will take three questions. i see one hand there. i see another hand over there on the back. >> hi. i am with kate, and facebook here in dc.

physically, i wanted to know the ways in which she would try to entice former members of the rio treaty, big economic powers like mexico who were former signatories of the treaty, but no longer are, what are some of the ways you would entice them to join, especially now in the fight against the maduro regime in venezuela? >> we have one here. thank you. . . i am the envoy for venezuela immigration and refugee crisis. thank you. as has been mentioned many times about the crisis, i have to share with you that already there are officially 5 million and is whalen refugees -- 5 million venezuelan refugees.

the declaration says that a person is a refugee when they flee a country because of general violence, human rights , and foreign intervention. all of them right now applies to any venezuelan fleeing the country, specifically when maduro recognized that there were at least 23,000 cubans in venezuela. this, it is not only refugees toenefits give them permanent protection, but it is probably the only way that we have right now in the international community to recognize there is a conflict

that has been created by a criminal state. fled,ion people that have it is only behind syria. i wanted to ask that specific question. have you been affected recently on the border or any part of brazil because of the illegal mining that has been increasing in boulevard state -- in bolivar state, not only by the armed forces but by irregular groups? thank you so much. >> thank you for the question. we have one more in the back. >> hello.

my name is daniel chang. -- i am hereturn interning in the u.s. house of representatives. you have said that the treaty is a legally binding document and is one of the main advantages. what happens when one of the signatory countries decides to have a political change of mind and not apply their solutions -- apply the resolutions that have treaty?lared in the , someone included in the travel ban, there was a change in government in was in thend he immigration. how does that alter the and what of the treaty do we do? >> thank you. we have three important

questions who addressed. invested are, i think i'm going to end with you. let's go to the legal minded question, how it is affecting brazil. if you can each of you address those questions into her three minutes each, that would be great. that david has been looking into this question. the compounding set of illegal activity at our border is a source of concern. illegal mining is one of them. it is a source of concern. address the other question in the back. thank you for the question. the fact that the treaty exceptns are mandatory for one of the provisions in the

, they, but other than that decisions that are adopted need to be enforced by legal obligation of the participant force. i do not want to delve into the reasons why rodriguez was .elcomed it is not really up to me to answer. it is up to argentina. but i think the fact we adopted a travel ban is important, and even in argentina, i am not , they have had credentials for the monger over regime,- for the maduro so argentina is not abiding by in theision we took resolution.

to complete your question, you see, in order to deal with the migrant situation in brazil, because of the scale, which is s muchss than columbia bia, ih less than colom strongly suggest you read the on migrantthe oas refugees. to put been able together an operation. we have had support from bilateral countries, often including the united states. able to put in operation a system that allows refugees of in brazil.o arrive

,e have applied the declaration so in that way, venezuelans have at least two or three options in which they can decide to stay in brazil, to work in brazil, and have access to health and education services in brazil. all of these are in the report which recommend to you. >> thank you. we have two minutes for each ambassador. >> ok. to the firstnts, and the last of the three questions we took. the first was what additional steps could be taken, but some of the larger and yet more skeptical nations on application of the rio treaty. i believe the two examples you offered up where mexico and argentina.

diplomat'syou a response to that. ways,d say that there are most of them done in private consultation, sometimes public messaging, to have dialogue among governments and nationstates. to way is to appeal humanitarian instincts. the point that, in a sense, we this isng today is that not necessarily a political, ideological, or philosophical issue. this is an issue of tens of millions of human beings who are suffering from malnutrition, bordering upon starvation in places, and complete and utter lack of public health. is this not a route to reconsideration?

as a result of those humanitarian -- that humanitarian crisis, tens of thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands more refugees will arrive in your countries themselves. to what extent do you believe this constitutes an internal political issue for you? is thend finally, this former diplomat in me speaking, one has to try to understand what are the concerns of the government that is not participating at this point in time. some of them may be fundamental, and you are simply not going to be able to address those. others may be matters of language if we say it in a different way. if we add an element to whatever the decision is, would this be --ugh to bring at least some

your government into some aspects of application of the rio treaty. this, ladies and gentlemen, is why we pay huge sums of money -- i can say that now because i'm no longer receiving any of it -- to professional diplomats in the hemisphere to try to find ways to reach a common position and finally, the last question answered, i will be very quick on this one. what do we do about governments that have, in fact, endorsed or in a sense voted for application of certain aspects of t.r. but then choose not to enforce them? this is not the first time in human history, ladies and gentlemen, in which this has occurred. when it occurs, you have both private and public dialogue. you also have to accept that governments, including my own, which i no longer work for, but i receive a miserable pension from, will at times pick and choose those obligations that it will, in fact, accept and

enforce. at the end of the day, there's a certain amount of moral persuasion, and to a certain extent naming and shaming if a government has, in fact, endorsed and accepted a certain international obligation and then not complied with it, that at least should be drawn to the attention of the world at large . and with that i stop so i would hear what i would much rather hear, and that's the ambassador offering better and more expert positions. >> not as a diplomat. [laughter] this part of the discussion reflects the complexity of the problem, not only the legal complexity, but the political complexity, and the changes that are operating in the political situation. first of all, two of the biggest, most important country of the continent, canada and mexico, are not part of the t.p. -- are not part of the treaty.

then government changes. argentina vote in favor of the last of the two resolutions but the last vote was three days before the change of government in buenos aires. and that reflects the applying a treaty that one country votes just before leaving and the new government that enters, and is legally linked by the treaty but doesn't apply in all the extent would always used to be to enter in argentina. but we have the change, there are a lot of changes. uruguay, who announced it was retiring the treaty and we are

out of this, in two months we are going to have a new president in uruguay and i am not sure what the president is there is a newt government in bolivia and that may change. ecuador, who is not member of the t.r., has not the position it had in the time of correa. that may add a new complexity, but as ambassador brownfield say, there is no way to enforce what the treaty demands. but there is a moral obligation, there is a legal obligation. and diplomacy has a lot of ways in order to deal with this kind of limitation and this kind of problem. is it absolutely not easy, but is what we have.

>> this has been a fascinating conversation. thank you so much, ambassadors. thank you for coming, and thank you to america's program for putting this together. [applause] [captions performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2020] journal,'s washington live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up this morning, we are

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