if we resort to diplomacy -- the policy is never done. there will always be further engagement, further effort to shape iranian behavior. there is a way in which we are iranians will the always perceive themselves as long as they survive to being successful and we will always on our diplomacy as being the way to being successful but not arriving there yet. how do we deal with that problem of defining success in order to encourage a continuation of the process? boy. what i generally tended to say, especially to younger diplomats as they enter and come up through the service is the job

of a diplomat is a sell them to solve a problem. you occasionally get the opportunity to negotiate an arms agreement that solves a part of the program, but even all of the arms control agreements between the u.s. and the soviet union never ended the tensions between the two systems, the two peoples, the different senses of ambition. we manage to -- we manage situations so they do not get out of hand. it is hard to define complete and total success when you are looking mostly at keeping the status quo or a slightly improved status quo. >> and it is hard to give credit for things that happen because people say they whether not happen anyway. it seemsthe jcpoa -- to me to have been a pragmatic attempt by the obama administration to deal with one of the serious problems of the

iranian threat -- a potential nuclear program. it did not deal with proxies, ballistic missiles, it did not touch on religious minorities, things that people may have wanted to see included in the deal because the obama administration decided it would not be able to lump all of these things in one agreement and have a successful conclusion. they necessarily pulled back the scope of the agreement they were working on have success where they thought success was possible and where there was international consensus. you saw what happened -- there was a broad perception that said this was a failed agreement. i do not think it was a failed agreement because it was a good application of internationally coordinated sanctions on iran. it was an incomplete agreement that only dealt with a part of the perceived problem.

that is the problem we have to deal with. anne: i think that is right. not the official obama explanation, but i always thought of the jcpoa as a bet. it would take the nuclear issue off the table and in the next 10 years the old boys would die off. obama administration towards the end of its tenure explored and talked about those things with iran, either it would be counter narcotics, whether it would be a scientific exchange, whether there were things we could do to bring them back. --re was no illusion that those were always seen way down the road. can i ask you something on the jcpoa? i think it has some past lessons.

there were mistakes made before and after the jcpoa, before in the sense that we started in oman that was critical to the success of the nuclear deal early on, but i think that already burned the gulf countries and israel to a certain extent because they thought we were trying to deal with the iranians behind their back and this was by definition going to come at their expense. so now we had to try different scenarios of trying to new -- encourage the gulf countries to negotiate with iran on their own or negotiate with iran behind our back. i think it is the case right now. lesson of the jcpoa is that these two processes should happen in parallel. you cannot have a separate arms-control negotiation and a discussion about the region in

his subsequent stops. these things have to happen in parallel -- subsequent steps. things things have to happen in parallel. second i think after the jcpoa we also committed the mistake in order to alleviate the concern of the gulf countries he sold them billions of dollars worth of arms. that exacerbated iran's a sense of conventional weapons asymmetry in the region, push them to double down on their support for proxies in the region, which for the -- which which the trump administration used as evidence that it was a bad decision. -- a bad deal. >> it is a self licking ice cream cone. if the u.s. were to engage the iranians on aspects of missile

development, regional behavior, of maximumathway out pressure, what should the regional priorities be? about to the iranian presence in iraq? should it be about yemen? should it be about afghanistan? if the u.s. were to try to take this pathway on the regional picture, or even the relationship with saudi arabia, who needs to be reassured and what kind of reassurance what they find reassuring? the questions do not get easier. have the gulf countries been schizophrenic recently. i think what they want is for the u.s. to sort of keep iran in a box and poke at them

periodically. what they did not want and this is where the escalation in the gulf scared them, they did not want a shooting war. --became worried about that they became worried about that. our response was inconsistent and incoherent. that precipitated terror ran -- an to cut their own deal. i think they are in a state of great anxiety right now about what our policy is. they do not quite know what to do about it. what thee interested other panelists have to say. week.as in abu dhabi last i was speaking to the diplomatic -- the defense college and in both places there was a lot of

interest in the topic that and earlier.entioned be made more effective and many of the questions were about, "what can we do to bring them back in because the schism in the gulf and the search for strategic depth anywhere outside of the region specifically with turkey is causing competition in public parts of the region." there was a beginning of an idea -- how can we reunite the gulf? what does abu dhabi have to do to bring the country's back in and form a unified position on iran? we do not want to do this separately. an intermediate

step of continuing what this administration has done to try to help the members of the gcc unify themselves. secretary new kuwaiti who seems energetic, but there is a mechanism that can provide a political push that may also provide us a more effective way to canvass the countries of the gulf, get them on the same page as us. as we look at these other strategic questions we half to address. >> the two diplomats did not identify any regional behaviors we should address. view was that would be yemen. i think of all of -- of lebanon and all the other places, that is still probably the easiest because iran's a strategic interest is the least. here is this country, it is sort

of like keeping the iranians off the arabian peninsula. not in government anymore, the strategic picture may have shifted in the last few years. thatu can add to beginnings of security conversations with our european allies and with israel. how could we get back into negotiations or discussions on a nuclear weapons agreement, a 2.0. to pino -- discussion, in this it is going to be pretty clear that israel and the gulf states are going to want to move quickly as part of that or on a separate track toward security issues -- support for proxies, ballistic mode -- ballistic

missile programs. there are two separate paths there. i think yemen as president macron was pushing for in the summer, may be a way into some discussions that could then be broadened where there is international -- i think the united states should be working with our traditional allies in europe, asia, and with israel to develop that consensus. we can help shape that consensus if we put an effort and to define longer-term goals. >> do you think the iranians are willing to have serious conversations about proxies? whenever i talk to iranian officials about regional activities, they tell me they support political parties. they are supporting democracy. it is not a breast merging of the iranians, it is apus merging

of us for trying to put down -- is not a deaf -- ali: it depends on what they get in return. when we are talking about proxies -- not all proxies are the same, especially the ones were very close to iran or have the alliance you have between two nato allies, it all depends on what kind of support we are willing to provide. this almost amounts to blasphemy if you say it out loud in the city, but i would argue if the iranians are able to buy fighter jets from russia, it would actually reduce their reliance llah.s below -- hesbo

the proxiesnk about system, it ison different. i ran once restore the persian empire -- iran wants to restore the persian empire in a shift shiahhis time -- in formed this time. yemen isn't a strategic priority .or iran the question is what what they get out of it? if we define this the way the saudi's have defined to this right now, which i think is problematic, the way of removing the card from iran's hand, so iran cannot use the houthis, i think the iranians will try to be the spoiler. way thatolves in a would help the iranians also get

a cease-fire with the u.s., then -- so may some economic reprieve, just enough to help them keep their head maybe that ishen something they can consider. when we think about diplomacy, if we still think about it in zero some terms, it is going to backfire. terms, it is going to backfire. think any of us -- any of this saudi, iranian rivalry can be completely resolved. i think it is an important question of how much can we expect it to be mitigated?

of a workingt relationship? of -- i do not one to say the floor -- what should our realistic aspirational goal be for the nature of saudi-iranian ties? it was that way for decades with the two pillars. was before a different iranian government, but it is not inconceivable -- to me it is not inconceivable that you could go back to some kind of live and let live scenario, but you certainly cannot go aback to it under the current scenario -- go back to it under the current scenario for all the reasons that ali has outlined.

the obama administration explored and talked about these, some kind of confidence building measures. one of the worries we haven't talked about was the saudi's and .ranian influence we could get to some iranian confidence building measures, but it is impossible under the current situation. is the waye argument to -- the u.s. is trying to send the opposite signal to reduce our presence in the region. the obama administration's strategy was to let the region come to its own equilibrium. the question is what that journey looks like and whether the equilibrium that gets struck is one we find desirable or even acceptable. weglas: one of the issues have to deal with that is

difficult is iran conducts policy on two different levels. it conducts a state to state policy, but it also conducts policy through proxies and support for nongovernmental groups in many parts of the world, including asia and across the globe. one thing that has to happen from the standpoint of the gulf, may be israel, and probably the trump administration is to draw this question into the discussion in some way. to a large extent, i think the with an to kill solemani drone strike was to show iran that there were actual consequences for iranian officials to their unofficial proxy lead policies, at least in iraq. killing ofent the solemani has rifted the band-aid off this idea that we will in our policy separate between what iran does and what to iranian

supported groups do. that will be one of the biggest problems in terms of addressing security unless iran can be brought into this discussion dry broader regional security -- through a broader regional security paradigm or it that conceives of a role for iran in regional security. for thisery difficult administration. i think that will be very difficult for the gulf state. i do not know enough about israeli policy toward iran and the gulf to know if the israelis can accepted, i think that is a big leap. step.not a first it has to come further down in the process. but maybe yemen is a first step into that much longer discussion. would make two points -- at is i think if you look

the iran-saudi relations, i do not think they are bound to be enemies forever. maybe they are bounded to be rivals, but not necessarily enemies. we have seen this in other regions of the world. you look at south germany and argentina and latin america, it is not an unusual setting. brazil, solution -- argentina, and latin america. it is not an unusual setting. the question is how we get there. i argued that it is the same way complex or impossible to resolve issues -- when we put our finger on one side of the scale. the fact that we put our finger on the sunni side of the gulf is part of the issue -- reason this

issue cannot be resolved. when we have tried to bring about some kind of balance like the obama administration's second term, it has been done in ways that have actually exacerbated the situation. at this stage i think it is very the onlyo think that de-escalation that has occurred in the past few years in the region have been as a result of the uae thinking the u.s. is unreliable. that is very telling. the only positive thing that has happened because of that -- not because of anything positive the u.s. has done. john and i were in -- they mentioned the saudi's have sent a message. i followed up later -- apparently the message was sent to through the iraqis. a b there should be a security dialogue between iran, saudi arabia -- maybe there should be

a security dialogue between iran, and saudi arabia. it was because of u.s. pressure. in the u.s. interest, without any doubt, it would be to pushing others into some kind of dialogue. you have to start somewhere. kissinger was initially not on board with the process, but let it happen. thinking that the u.s. has nothing to lose would still do its own diplomacy with the soviets, but let these other countries have their dialogue. see countries like oman and kuwait who try hard to figure a the real-escalate, but obstacle is the trump administration. >> why don't we go to the audience for a couple of questions. wait for the microphones. right here in the front.

i am wondering -- >> would you identify yourself? penn estate university. i am on the advisory board. my question -- penn state university. i am on the advisory board. you think the government in iran is getting ready to drink the poison? the reason i say that is going back to how many -- going back to "drink the poison and make a deal." the past election last friday the voters were offered the populist. it was no doubt that the conservatives will have a takeover of everything. the gives the government capability of making a deal without having to explain

anything, so like nixon going through china. do you all think that is a possibility and if it is what should the u.s. policy be to address that. ? the macron. >> ibook -- past the microphone. >> i am henry. i need have to ask -- i have to is helping out iran with the drones and it shouldn't we be talking to that nation as well? -- and shouldn't we be talking to that nation as well? on the domestic political iran, i doiron -- not think the system is becoming

more monolithic. once you get the conservatives in control of all levers of power, which is the movie we the same thinge, happened, there was political apathy by the middle class, they did not go out to vote. the system used that context to disqualify a lot of the moderates knowing the backlash would be limited. the department was taken never by the hardliners and then the presidency was taken over by an ultraconservative. lot of infighting inside the iranian government. it did not turn it into a monolith. it is happening now is the system is closing down because it feels it is under siege from all sides. maximum pressure from their perspective is not just an economic course. it is multidimensional.

jon said, survival is victory into they are trying to survive by trying to close down the circle of elites in decision-making positions. that does not mean they would not want a deal. in fact i think they wanted a deal with president trump in september. there is a misconception about drinking the poison chalice in this town. people do not understand that when they drink the poison chalice, he did not compromise on the principles of the regime, but he did guarantee the survival of the regime. president trump signal to the iranians that the only deal acceptable to them is a deal that would come at the cost of the islamic republic's survival and that is never going to happen. it does not matter who is in charge in tehran, so long as they believe they cannot get into a mutually beneficial relationship with a trump

administration -- provenht iranians have -- the iranians have proven over the years, obviously they have gotten some help from outside -- syria, north korea, some cooperation from china -- russia -- overall, this is a nation of 80 million. it has top-notch universities. they have actually been able -- it has been forced to develop some indigenous capabilities that has created some degree of deterrent. you are -- you talk to israeli officials for instance after the attack on saudi aramco. there was some rethinking about the balance of deterrence in the region because this technique of cruise missiles and swarming tactics -- these , $15,000 drones -- if

these are used against israeli critical sites like the chemical , itt or the nuclear plant is a major game changer. creates questions for israeli officials like do we address this now or wait 10 years? at the risk of a major backlash that could happen after you take action now? side, how far do push without the risk of getting yourself or your military leaders vulnerable, sub septa ball to retaliation -- susceptible to retaliation yucca we are in a pattern -- susceptible to retaliation? we should not expect the weaker party, which is iran in this

case, to unilaterally capitulate or give away cap picture late -- giveaway capabilities it sees as necessary to national security. aboutk to your question the hardliners taking over iran. i think ali is basically right. so long as there is only pressure to pull down the regime, it will not amount to much. is thing i would like to see a better articulated and more consensus u.s. foreign policy on iran itself. see issaw and still divided opinions. some people are hoping that economic pressure on iran will create a cause of the regime. the islamic republic will fall into something else will come in its place but it cannot be as bad. some are looking for changes in iranian policies. ballistic missiles and cruise

missiles, support for proxies. these strategies for these two are different, but i think we are mixing them all up together. i am not confident -- whenever i think about how easy iran will be to negotiate with, i pull up the iranian constitution and read the preamble, which is anti-american. they talk about supporting the oppressed of the world against the oppressors. there's a lot in the basis of the iranian state, which supports a radical iranian policy. my -- can a more conservative government in iran a soft pedal peddleolutionary -- soft the revolutionary ideology? at this point this is unknown. >> we are going to take a brief

break as we set up a podium for jared's talk. please join me in inking ali, anne for and -- and excellent talk. [applause] >> thank you, thank you. >> it is so nice to see you. >> i am doing very well, thank

you. how are you?

>> the center of strategic and international series waiting on the next speaker. joseph photo will be here shortly. we will continue -- we will hear

from a doctor who is the ceo of the vaccination alliance that is also hosted for the center for strategic and international studies looking at efforts to vaccinate children in some of the worlds poorest countries. coming up at 2:30 with that discussion.

>> welcome back. happy birthday. you are welcome. it is all for you. welcomelly delighted to general joseph votel for our keynote address today. he currently serves as the ceo and president of is this executives for national security. in january 2020 following 39 years of distinguished military service. he served for three years as the commander of u.s. central command. prior to serving as the commander of central command, he commanded the u.s. special operations command, the joint special operations command. in addition to his current role, he is also a distinguished senior fellow in naturals -- national security at the middle

east institute. have thered to president of the middle east institute here. he will talk about a theme that has come up throughout the discussion this morning, which we were all aware of and were not sure what to think about it -- think about -- how we should think about great power competition in the gulf. i am delighted to introduce general joseph votel. [applause] very much. it is great to be here, john. thank you for the invitation to be here. thank you for your flexibility in scheduling. i have a smile when i came up here. i gave a speech in new york as a part of my responsibilities as a business executive for natural -- national security. it was a dark and heavily paneled room. i was speaking from a podium and

i asked my staff, "make sure there is a light there. but it isks good, broke. i need a light." to myw that translated staff as "get a light from the guy."- from this thank you very much. it is great to be here. i know there are a number of that former colleagues in the audience. i see representatives from the diplomatic corps here, fellow partners. inks for being here. paul salem -- thanks for being here. variety of and a others from the department of defense and other places. -- is a john leah in the audience? i had a few words for him, but i

will hold out on that. 11th --oming up on my 11 month anniversary of my retirement from the military. i had what i would call a pretty good transition from the military. i have enjoyed that. i am engaged with business executives for national security, which has been a good opportunity to get to know the business world and meet a lot of businessmen and women from across the country. and if my objectives was to stay engaged with young people and so i am able to do that through a relationship with the combating terrorism center up in west point and the belford center at and with thechool university of pennsylvania center for ethics and the rule of law. i also wanted to give back. i have been able to get onto the boards of a couple of veteran oriented organizations to

include one, which really focuses on helping young enlisted veterans get into our best schools around the country. retirement has been a great opportunity for me to invest my time and energy into things i think matter and are important to me. if that is not enough, i would say to my wife that marriage is for love and not for lunch. i was invited after several months retirement to get izzy and so i have. so i have. it is appropriate that we recalled that it was about 75 years ago this month when president franklin delano egyptelt met aboard -- in and initiated what would become what would become a long relationship between the united states, saudi arabia, and other nations in the region. as the story goes, they talked about many things during this

meeting. they talked about their common responsibilities as heads of state. they talked about their shared view that at the heart of things they longed to be farmers. they also talked about the fact that their own personal infirmities were both obstacles that they had to overcome in their lives. -- fdrn delano roosevelt even left one of his wheelchairs for the king, which became an object of pride for the saudi's. they came to a solution that centered around military training for saudi arabia, then a fledgling country surrounded bypolitical sport in the region. all in all, a mixture of personal relationships and national interests that for better or worse has endured for over seven decades. i think it is a fair assessment -- i think a fair assessment can be made that fdr understood he needed to engage and compete in this area to ensure our access

to the critical resources of the region and to support our interest. today's topic is great power competition in the gulf. my specific job is to talk a bit about the military aspects of this great power competition. while i think people understand the general notion of great power competition, it, like many other conceptual military or security concepts for ideas, think of things like the war on terror, things like body, with, and through how we train partners, think of irregular warfare. the soft doctrinal approach to competition. defineften difficult to and understand. i think it is fair to say the great power competition has replaced the war on terror as the preeminent descriptive term of our principal strategic security focus. it certainly has within the department of defense.

it clearly is becoming the driving force in identification and characterization of national interest, deployment of forces, budget considerations, capability development, and international relations. great power competition is more about, and my view, about prevailing than directly confronting. it is militarily more indirect than direct. an argument is often made in my profession on whether great power competition is actually warfare or not. my personal belief is it does belong in the taxonomy of activities leading to open conflict. topetition is often about verging interest and objectives. exhibit a is a serious. wheres country, an area four different countries -- russia, iran, turkey and the united states -- came together

to defeat isis but as that was accomplished, began to divert in terms of all in our interest and objectives. in turn much more into competitive environment over that then our original purpose for being there. ultimately, great power competition is about a balance of power in the relationships that support maintaining influence. in today's environment, great power competition is also about domination of emerging technologies and domains in the rules that guide ethical, moral, and legal employment activities of these emerging areas. contrary to what we may be sing in our policy and public communications, great power competition does not mean that alliances and partnerships are not important. they are more important in my opinion and successfully prevailing in a geostrategic setting dominated by great power competitors. winning in this environment also has different connotations.

it is certainly about beating our adversaries or enemies, and we always try to do that. more importantly, in today's strategic context, it is a much more subtle approach. things.imply several it implies maintaining a competitive advantage, outperforming our competitors. and business parlance, being seen as a greater balance in higher quality, more desired, and more reliable by our partners. winning is about protecting our interests. those that are essential and those that are important. winning requires we maintain our access and relationships and a level of influence and balance of power that is more favorable to us and to our competitors and adversaries. example is our preferential access to passage to the suez canal. despite overall long period of time, we remain the only country that has had privileges there, and that is a distinct advantage.

something that persisted even during the most difficult days of our relationship with the egyptians. finally, winning means providing decisions based for leaders through strategic advantage. relationships, options, planning, available capabilities, and the capacity to go along with all that. my main take away for each of you today is we must compete militarily in this region to support our overall national security objective of maintaining competitive advantage against great power competitors. it does not necessarily mean that we do this at the same troop levels or operations or locations that we have for the last several decades. but it does mean a level of policy and planning, presence, relationships, capabilities, activities, and reliance that demonstrates our ability to maintain that balance of power that is more favorable to our objectives than others. hasdiscussion of the gulf

to start with a discussion about interests. i think there are five that are currently present and will be well into the future. first, we have to ensure the region cannot be used as a platform for terrorist or terrorist organizations to attack our homeland citizens, or those of our friends or allies. secondly, ensuring -- we have to ensure instability in this region does not impact our interests and other regions. one only has to look at the impact of refugees flooding from a place like syria and the impact it has on europe and immigration policies and ultimately on our country. third, we have an interest to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. fourth, we want to preserve access to the critical lines of communication and resources of the region. for us and our allies and partners. finally, we want to maintain an overall favorable balance of power. it is fair to question these interests, but i think the more important aspect is the

discussion of where they fall on this tale of criticality from important to existential. i would argue addressing terrorism, perhaps access are perhaps -- probably important but may not rise to the level of being existential to our third survival to the nation. pluripotent and maintaining a favorable balance of power, if left unchecked, could be existential to our security or those of our close partners. i think the efficacy of an iranian nuclear weapons program would manifest itself as an existential threat to the country of israel and would largely be seen the same in our country. my point here is this. there must be a robust discussion of interest in this region and the criticality as part of our national process. we have to communicate this better to not only the region and to our great power competitors, but also to the citizens of our country. secondly, we have to recognize

the -- that interests in areas other than eastern europe and the indo pacific are critical components of our overall national security strategy. this is an area where great power competition has and will continue to take place whether we wanted to or not. some would argue an equally critical contribution to winning the cold war played out in the mountains of afghanistan with our support against the soviets, just as it did on the central plains of europe with our large long-standing military alliance. today, the waters of the middle east see a constant presence of chinese naval vessels. to not recognize the geostrategic implications and opportunities of this region to the overall ivf competitive advantage it great power competitions, great power competitors, is a mistake in my view. it is important to look at current and emerging threats and influences affecting our approaches to the region.

most of these will be familiar to you but there may be a different twist. i would briefly highlight six areas for you. the topic of the day is great power competition. we have to start there. russia, while not economically strong, still poses a significant military threat to the united states. they now possess long-term access in the mediterranean through intervention in syria and continue to look for opportunities to supplant our influence and play a role as a dealmaker and peace broker in the region. when we step back from partner, we should expect russia to step into that void. china is the more significant challenge. their long-term centrally driven plan to dominate emerging technology, expand markets, create military parity and possible superiority poses a direct challenge to the u.s. that must dominate our security strategy. across the region, across this region, they are increasing military presence, influence,

and activity principally as an extension of their initiative. you only have to look at the china-pakistan economic corridor, the linkages in the port, and the routes to the port in djibouti to see an example of this. a second threat influencing our approach to the region is iran. animaliran as an injured protecting itself, but capable of lashing out. given the recent loss of qassem soleimani and the shootdown of an iranian airliner, we should expect the iranian leadership looking inward and consolidating their partner. -- their power. this may limit their regional venture is him. still reeling from losing its prominent latour commander and their own incompetence in shooting down ukrainian airliner in the response. force is not the same

force is under the leadership of qassem soleimani. the new leader, despite being soleimani's debbie for many years, will not immediately and may never carry the same throw rate -- throw rate as his predecessor. i think it can also be argued the quds force may exercise more interest -- introspection on their part as well. this may be an opportunity for us. we should expect iranian proxies will not likely de-escalate and make for the most part test their independence from iran. we can expect to see this and lebanon, yemen, and iraq. their maritime environment will continue to be an area where iran will excess considerable layered capabilities, coastal defense systems, bass boats, mines, and other capabilities. it appears by all accounts that iran is moving forward steadily

with its nuclear weapons program that may have been delayed under the jcpoa. we should expect missile capability will continue as long term trend of allocative and quantitative improvement in iran . finally, i think it is important out the arab gulf states have conflictnow in a between the u.s. and iran, they stand to lose the most and are not eager to see this escalate. and would likely prefer to stand -- see an overall trend of de-escalation. a third threat is terrorism. back to the future is a phrase that comes to mind. jihad is going local. exploiting -- using local fighters, impacting local populations and creating local successes. isis will continue to exploit teams where it can in an out of the region. continue --l attempt to tease instability of the region to reconstitute its

external plotting capability. a fourth threat is a festering instability. long-standing underlying tensions of the region, corrections, poor governance, disenfranchisement, economic toxic sectarian narratives among others are ever present. a difficult in position. while there is not yet a national push for u.s. departure, the protest continue under a new prime minister and a weak government. some have surmised, you difficult for the kurds and sunnis to block concerted she push for u.s. departure. -- shia push for u.s. departure. iraq will likely remain -- iran will likely remain. syria is at a difficult juncture and this should be significant concern about whether the regime could control and isis resurgence while the conflict and tension in the northeast

part of the country seems to have subsided and perhaps even stabilized to some degree, the outlook and other areas is not good. idlib is a significant disaster. somewhere between 400000 and 800,000 persons were displaced. more than 1200 have been killed and only a relatively small percentage of the de-escalation were -- de-escalation recaptured. there is now an open conflict between turkey and syria in this area with russia playing the supposed referee. al qaeda linked continues to gain power and influence and appears to be growing into a searing version of the taliban. al qaeda grows more dangerous by the day. attacks against regime forces in southern syria have returned to 2011 levels. in this vacuum, hezbollah is increasing. membership and influence to increase.

significant concern. we are all aware the situation on lebanon is not good, either, and will likely continue to get worse before it gets better. in this turmoil, we should expect hezbollah will take advantage of the situation and consolidate their situation. while currently unaffected, the lebanese armed forces stands to lose as instability continues. a fifth aspect impacting our approach to the region are other unresolved regional conflicts. the kingdom of saudi arabia is attempting to resolve the self-created situation in yemen and now is focused on rebuilding regional cooperation impacted by the nearly three-year-old fallout with qatar. neither of these will be resolved quickly but they must be resolved. we are on the precipice of an initial agreement in afghanistan that could lead to further agreements on you was presence, and more important, enter afghan discussions aimed at ending the

conflict. finally, we have to consider the view here at home. it matters. we are less dependent on the resources of the region. the u.s. is now one of the larger exporters of the resources upon which we dependent on from this region. there is fatigue on the home front brought about by lengthy engagements across region that have expended significant american treasure and highlighted the problems of the region that often times seemed unsolvable. it would be a mistake for our friends in the region to underestimate how powerful this fatigue is coming not only in our policymakers, but on the broader american public. earlier, there is now a strategic imperative to maintain our competitive advantage against russia and a rising china. as many of you are aware, the u.s. national defense strategy makes it very clear that maintaining our competitive advantage against these states in particular is our overriding objective.

recent guidance from the makes thisf defense clear with a definite push toward a reversible momentum -- your reversible momentum. where does this leave us strategically? in my view, all of the interests i highlighted earlier remain relevant to one degree or another. maintain a favorable balance of power however means highly relevant to our national defense strategy and maintaining competitive advantage against great power competitors. said more simply, we need to compete in this region. if we don't, our great power competitors undoubtedly will do so, filling in the voids and replacing our influence and using that influence to support their broader strategic objectives. from a military standpoint, we will need several categories of force to pursue our objectives. we will need a security cooperation component that works with our partners to develop their capabilities and assure

integration among themselves and with us. this should ultimately be our military main effort. we will need rotational ground, air, maritime, and special operations forces to demonstrate resolve, exercise with our partners, protect vital u.s. assets, and ensure sufficient access and basing to meet contingency requirements. we will need a level of sustained ct presence to carefully watch and understand the evolving threat, train partner forces and were necessary, address threats beyond the capabilities of our partners. and we will require response forces based outside the region that can deploy and respond to emergency operations. the mixture of these forces must be determined through careful staff work, but i do believe there is a test estate -- sustainable military presence that we can achieve in the presence to protect their interest and directly contribute to maintaining our competitive advantage. more importantly is not just what we do, but how we do it.

building and sustaining relationships is critical to this approach. looking at iraq, are critical military task is to return our relationship to where he western the height of the isis campaign. that of a strong, largely behind-the-scenes partner focused on specific and mutually agreed military tasks. this can best be done by returning to what has worked for us in the last several years, a laser focus on the defeat of isis activities, clear and direct communications to our iraqi interlocutors iraq protects the u.s. and coalition forces, pursuing these agreed-upon missions, and continued respect for iraqi sovereignty. secondly, we need to normalize our operating methodologies in the region. in other words, we need to ensure we have measures in place to reduce miscalculation. let me use syria as an example. despite a highly complex and

crowded operating environment during the campaign against isis, we were able to achieve our military objectives largely because we normalized how and where we were conducting operations and backed it up with albeit an imperfect but adequate mechanism to communicate with the russians. i am absolutely 100% convinced this not only save the lives, but prevented further escalation. the news the media has recently carried stories of tensions between u.s. forces and syria and russian forces in the northeast part of the country. making sure expectations are clear and having the ability to communicate directly are incredibly important mechanisms to maintaining influence and preserve ring interest. -- preserving interest. i was suggest in the future this must include iran. finally, we should understand the significance and the advantage of small but highly focused and impactful programs to directly help our partners. a good friend of mine once told

me that one of the best ways for us to help israel was to double down on our relationship with the lebanese armed forces. i still believe this to be the case. over the last 12 years of engagement, they, the lebanese armed forces, have increased the capability to become more and -- more independent and respected institution in lebanon. this was accomplished through a very small presence on the ground and in many cases less than 50 troops. very modest and targeted foreign military sales programs and strong support from our country concerns about hezbollah influence. there is a long way to go the lebanese armed forces, but this is a clear area where we should continue to compete. small focus programs work. they keep our footprint small, our mission well-defined, and they are sustainable and affordable. they are overwhelmingly popular with our partners in the region. let me close are returning

briefly to my main point. we have to compete in this region. this is how we maintain a competitive advantage are security and defense strategies call for. i think it is a strategic imperative for us to do so. i think franklin roosevelt saw this 75 years ago. iss we have enduring interests in the region and well into the future. i acknowledge these interest for the most part will not likely eclipsed the interest we have expressed in other areas, maintaining our competitive advantage against china is an existential requirement for the united states and for many of our partners around the world. i do believe maintaining a balance of power that is favorable to the united states is a good approach to this region and it supports our overall approach a prevailing against great power competitors. it does not mean we need to be endlessly and substantially engaged militarily. it means the following -- we need to have a sustainable presence over time that is

predictable for our forces and our partners in the region. it demonstrates our intent to protect our important interest and understandable by our citizens. secondly, we need to exercise patience. none of this will be accomplished quickly. we have to wind down ongoing conflicts, just our posture, communicate our approach to our partners in and out of the region. in italy, my time today is probably too short to do justice to this topic. one that grows more complex by the day. i hope i have offered you some food for thought from a former u.s. military commander who spent a lot of time operating and thinking about this region. i don't expect that everyone here will agree with my assessment or my specific suggestions, but i do strongly believe we have to compete in this region to continue to preserve our national interest and support our vital national strategy of competitive advantage. thank you for your attention.

i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> thank you very much. that is a lie to chi one. -- that is a lot to chew on. one of the interesting problems the president has been very vocal that in his view we have wasted $8 trillion in the middle east, even the obama administration wanted to rebalance its efforts away from the middle east and toward asia. aboutu are talking competing effectively when we are essentially, their view of two administrations, going to reduce our presence while the chinese and russians -- even if they do small things, are increasing their presence. are there ways that we can while thatectively

balances going on in absolute terms we will go down in absolute terms, they will go up? even in relative terms, we remain the preponderant power. the senses we and subways are on the way out and there on the way in. how should we think about that? >> great question. it is real challenge for our people operating in the region. i think we have to stop talking about what we're going to do in this region and what we are going to do in that region. we have to express our strategy in a much more wholesome manner, much more fulsome manner, should say. the strategy is about maintaining our competitive advantage against great power competitors. thatve to recognize that means we have to compete in the regions where our great power competitors are located, but it also means we have to look at the other regions where we also

-- they also can compete. theoint here today is that middle east, the gulf is an area where great powers are going to compete. that has always been the case and will probably always be the case going forward. we have to figure out a level of -- a way to compete. i offered a couple of thoughts on how we might do that militarily. likenk when we say things we are pivoting here or we articulate our strategy only and terms -- in terms of one particular geographic area, i think we sell short the role that competition and other areas play. i think what we have to do is paint a picture that competing has to take place on a global aale and not just in particular region. i think a lot of our strategic

communications works against us. >> one of the challenges is, in some ways we are trying to cover the waterfront. we compete while our competitors are very selective. the chinese are very assiduously not try to replicate what we do. they are trying to pick targets both in terms of countries and in terms of activities and countries. as was talked about earlier today, they are careful not to be drawn in to the middle east militarily. trying ways, if we are to meet the chinese and then some, for example, in the middle east and in africa and in latin america, and we see the chinese making inroads into europe -- which keeps the eu for making consensus decisions the way we might want them to -- i wonder if it all sort of becomes a little bit sisyphean to do everything we think is important

and combat everything we see them doing in order to compete. what can we afford not to do? >> first of all, i think what of the key things we have to do is unwind ourselves from ongoing conflicts. i think the efforts toward china creates some kind of political agreement in afghanistan is a good way to begin to draw down our presence. i recognize that is, like many things in this region, is an imperfect approach to what we're doing. it is not going to satisfy everybody. but he doesn't get better if we don't try to move forward on this. -- but it doesn't get better if we don't try to move forward. we have to extricate ourselves from these ongoing conflicts. syria,uation in iraq and there was an opportunity i think for us to begin to draw down forces there and get them to a more sustainable level. i still think we should. the numbers are not

comparatively as high, frankly, but probably could be lowered there and that maybe something to do as well. i think our focus needs to be -- we can't be everywhere, but i do think our focus needs to be much more heavily into the security operation area with a lot of our partners. and through. >> also having capable of says around the region that work with our leading partners to develop their capabilities and make sure they're integrated with each other. i think one of the big challenges we have in the gulf states is the integration of our missile defense capabilities. we have -- there is a lot there, a lot the united states burns, a lot of our partners bring, but it is not effectively integrated. with us or among themselves. that is a difficult thing and we

have begun the process of trying to do that. i suspect my successor is continuing to move in that direction, but i think that is how you begin to reduce the physical reliance of our forces and take on more of the burden themselves. i think we have to look for opportunities to do that. the special operations capability i think is a good example. as you look across the region, there are a number of special operations forces that are capable of handling the situations in their own country. and doing it in a manner that reflects adherence to the law of armed conflict and other things. not universally yet, but for the most part, there are a number. that is an example where a longer-term investment in these things i think can yield capabilities where people can take care of their own problems ush a level of support from that is sustainable and does not

require -- tasks weere security should try to get from other countries inside or outside of the region to take on? ?re there red lines one of them is combating terrorism and terrorist organizations. i think we have made a significant investment. looking at the maritime environment, particularly in the gulf, it is an area where we should be putting more focus on our partners and developing their capabilities and this is an area where we don't have to be the lead in the combined task force. others can do this. other western powers can do this. eventually, other people in the region can do this. >> should we encourage the russians and chinese to get involved or? >> we have seen instances where

the chinese have stepped up. several years ago, they stepped up in a particular area. a way toan figure out try to cooperate on common things, i think we probably should. we never really achieved that in a place like syria. we were riveted by our own loss, from collaborating, cooperating or coordinating with them. we could do was deconfliction. that was the lowest of things we could do. we should certainly try to do that. >> the wall street journal had a story this morning about the mercenaries for foreign policy. fighting, actors use asymmetrical tools.

you have come out of the special operations community and have done some pretty great of things. are we too hidebound as we look at this series of challenges? do we need to be even more creative and outside the box? what is some direction that we need to think about that we are not to deal with the complex environment? >> i think that the idea of contracted security organizations is out there. that is something we have looked at in the past. my personal view is that i don't think that we have come to a conclusion on how we actually manage control over those types of activities and where they start and where they end and where policy and our objectives fit into that. i am not yet completely comfortable with taking the approach. i think that contractors can

physicalet the pertinence of military forces in doing some of the training, supervising and establishment, some of the more institutional aspects of helping our partners developed their own capabilities. i think that those are things that we ought to look at. i also think we have to look at leveraging the capabilities of our best partners. that weember coalition assembled to defeat isis contained a lot of small contingents. small but capable contingents. i think we have to look for ways --t we leverage that leverage them better. the other thing i think we have to look at is leaders in the region and how they can bring others along. at special operations cave abilities and they are well developed. they function as a leader and can bring others along with

them. i think we have to look at how our strategy operates to the end. >> we have about 10 more minutes. and then i want to open this up to the audience. barbara has a question. the microphone is coming. there it is. thank you. >> thanks so much. barbara from the atlantic council general. it is a pleasure to see you. you used the verb compete, not contain. i want to push on that, in terms of how the u.s. should deal with iran's influence. it seemed when we try to contain iran, it became more influential. what advice would you give to u.s. policy makers how to compete, rather than contained in around -- iran? >> i am not sure i am excluding the idea of containing iran's

activities. when i talk about competing, i am talking about our interaction with great powers. i recognize that iran is certainly a regional power and has a historical and cultural role in the region. we must respond to it. i think that -- i don't think that necessarily means we don't try to contain them. one of the things we have to do is we have to be very clear in terms of what our objectives are. what our expectations are in the region. i think that my personal view, as i look back over the last 18 months of activities in the region, certainly during my time , it seems to me that there has been a constant struggle, back the unitedetween states and iran to understand what each player once out of this and where we are going with

this. i think it is extraordinarily important that we try to clarify this in practical terms, as soon as we can. that wecases, i think are talking past each other on this. hardenedg the positions on this, while i recognize that, in some cases, we have to do that. the lack of flexibility in some impacting us. one of the things i was almost always concerned about was an interaction in the gulf, a miss calculation -- miss keck elation in the maritime environment. miscalculation in the maritime environment. i was certain it would not be caught by our forces. i was not certain on the other. i wasn't sure if it would be the actions of a rogue commander or the actions of an orchestrated iranian strategy. look very keen to try to

at ways that we could establish a communications channel with them. i am heavily influenced by my experience in syria. i cannot over emphasize how important that channel was. it was not anything i orchestrated. it was done above and below me. i had the ability to be a big player. i am using that as an example of why this is so important that we have a communication channel to do this. this is a point i try to make. that way to reduce presence is to establish a norm of activities in the region, a very clear articulation of things that we are after and clear mechanisms that are in place that communicate about this. >> [indiscernible] >> i don't know.

maybe. i don't know. maybe there is. sure, i thinkor the iranians are not very clear on where our red lines are. and what we are willing to tolerate and what we are not going to tolerate. i am an observer to this. i am not in the process and in the discussions right now. i do not necessarily exclude that that situation makes it prohibitive for us to try to figure out a channel to communicate to the iranians. i believe it is absolutely imperative that we have some reliable mechanism that we our adversaries over. i think it is critical for following the situation, preventing miscalculations and, perhaps, creating a platform for which other things can ultimately be established. >> on the issue of redlines,

there is a school of thought that says we shall be clear with redlines so that there are no misunderstandings. in disproportionate ways in response to clear violations but acting unpredictably and disproportionately is a way to deter your adversaries. do you come down one way or the other on that? >> i am more for clarifying expectations and being clear, in terms -- particularly at an operational level, being clear on things that we will and will not tolerate in the region and where things will trigger a reaction from us. view, and i am heavily influenced by my own experience, i think this was a better approach to us. it allows us to have more control over a situation that

was ultimately not all that controllable. being clear with things is very important. thee have tried to be with iranians, with the russians and and down the southern part of the country, very clearly articulating where our presence went and the extent of important of the very measures for us to protect ourselves and to communicate what wouldothers trigger a reaction from us. >> right there. , i know from your own tok how hard you worked

bring together teams and work within. your predecessor did that and your successor is doing it now. you talked about a competitive advantage, which is a buzzy concept. how do you see the role of diplomacy in keeping our competitive edge? >> i think it is absolutely essential. i think it is always important. i did not necessarily do it in these were marks today, i remind thatnces that i speak with there is almost always a supporting element to the diplomatic aspect. i think we have to recognize that. dippel medic front, the idea of public information that supports this, of being very clear and demonstrating unity of u.s.ll instruments power is critical.

i think it starts with our diplomatic partners. whether it is ambassadors or the department of state, i think it is absolutely essential. and weonfronted isis look at our competition, i think we are missing a great component from the information aspect of this. if not from the information aspect, it is an information aspect that the department of state can be effective in. i think we ought to have the united states information agency like capability that is orchestrating our ideas and information out there in the environment. i have done a fair amount of reading on this. i recognize that at the height of the cold war, we have that capability and we could respond to put truthful information out

there and put to rest misinformation that was coming out. i think this is an extraordinarily important aspect. i think that ensuring that in countries around this region and perhaps much more broadly, having confirmed ambassadors sends a clear message to our partners. march, 20t last countries diplomatic relations and some of of them had confirmed -- seven of them had confirmed ambassadors. all of them were excellent, dedicated americans doing the best for their country. it does not carry the same way as an investor. it puts an unfair burden on them and an unfair burden on the military, frankly. we need to make sure that that is in place. we need to make sure that our offices are manned with

professionals, diplomatic professionals to provide that. i wish i could come up with a catchy slogan like jim mattis like give me more money for bullets. the sentiment is exactly the same. we are swinging with one arm tied behind our back if we do not engage our full diplomatic capabilities in this. in many ways, this is a competition for ideas, frankly. you that i amell not sure if they should be playing the leading role. someone else has to be. i think it comes back to our dippel medic side, rather than others. >> some of us should take solace that our secretary of state is like you. we have some of it with a military background.

they talk about swagger but i agree with you that there seems to be disproportionate in terms of -- it seems to be disproportionate in terms of who is supporting who. >> the military carries an outsized impact with our partners. i recognize that. as i have traveled around the region, we always tried to use influence and access that we got, despite being military anders, to help diplomats help others as well. i think we have to recognize that. he used to have a private jet. he used to take the diplomats along with him because he had so much more ability to show up with fanfare than the diplomats did. there is a lot that comes with resources.

i don't want to be all mom and apple pie but it is about the team approach in terms of this and getting behind our diplomats and using our resources. >> thank you very much for joining us. thank you all for joining us. [applause]

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[indiscernible] >> we will have more live coverage this afternoon at 2:30 eastern time. whoill hear from a doctor

is looking at efforts to vaccinate children in some of the world's poorest countries. that is live at 2:30 on c-span. you can also watch online at c-span.org or listen free on our c-span radio app. tonight, on the communicators. from the state of the net conference, justice department associate attorney general, sue. encryptionaker, on technology and privacy. the company itself will lose visibility into what is happening on its platforms and 75% of thaton is will go dark. think about all of the children were being abused, as we speak, who we will not be able to track down. >> my view is that law enforcement needs to rethink its approach to encryption in light

of the fact that there are significant cyber threats and embrace encryption, instead of ways instead of to break it. it needs to embrace encryption as a way to enhance cybersecurity for all americans. >> watch the communicators tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span two. >> during this election season, the candidates beyond the talking points are only revealed over time. everywhere,nnot be our campaign 2020 programming differs from other coverage from one -- for one simple reason. we brought you your unfiltered view of government every day since 1979. this year, we are bringing you and unfiltered view of the

election, this november. in other words, your future. this upcoming election season, be direct and unfiltered. see the biggest picture for yourself and make up your own mind. with c-span campaign 2020. brought to you by your television provider. the next contest on the political calendar is the south carolina primary on saturday, known as the first in the south with 54 pledged delegates. the following week, it is super tuesday with more than 1300 delegates at stake with 15 states and one territory participating. colorado is one of the 15 with 80 delegates rewarded on a proportional basis. pete buttigieg was in colorado over the weekend. he spoke to supporters at a town hall in denver. ♪

>> colorado, please welcome to the stage, congressman anthony brown. >> alrighty, alrighty, how is everybody doing? colorado, wow! look at you, look at you. how is anybody doing today? wow!