can have an effect later on, other party should know that. andge you to consider that i am 13 seconds out, so i will leave it with that. please think about these things. there is something not right about the way this is happening and i urge you and anyone from the court who is listening to try to sincerely clean this mess up because break for lunch. >> i would like to submit a letter. i want to talk about religious freedom for a moment. as i mentioned the other day, i think you and i share something in common on this, and enthusiasm for religious freedom a member ofed i am the church for jesus christ of latter day saints and we have been no strangers to persecution even in this country. thectober 27, 1838 government of missouri ordered us exterminated, it was not nice but i assume he had reasons.

heretics,d we were but we try to be nice heretics, and it was not until the late 70's that the governor of missouri lifted that ban. would haveosh hawley lifted it for us had it not been lifted by then. religious liberty has always been interesting to me for that reason, and also just as a lawyer. ,y late father, also a lawyer worked on and advised congress regarding the religious freedom restoration act. my longtime professional mentor was someone that i worked with in establishing a first of its kind religious institutions practice group a couple of decades ago. catholics, like members of my faith have also been subjected to religious persecution from time to time.

cases, we are directly targeted through blame amendments. provisions worked into state constitutions, really four, in many cases, latently anti-catholic purposes. they had as their purpose the restricting of public funds going to certain religious institutions including schools. yearfully, earlier this the supreme court in espinoza versus montoya -- montana department of revenue struck down another blow against blaine amendments by reinforcing their earlier decision in the trinity lutheran case. would you discuss briefly with us the supreme court's jurisprudence regarding these amendments and how they intersect with religious freedom? judge barrett: sure. recent supreme court's

decisions get at the principle that while we have to be careful about the establishment because, there is a line of cases saying that a state or federal government cannot establish a church, so we have a line of cases about what that means. at the same time, espinoza being an example, the court has been clear that religious institutions cannot be discriminated against or excluded from public programs simply because they are religious. during your time on the second circuit you have been able to handle cases involving religious freedom issues. for example, you joined a majority opinion in the gross case upholding a freedom of a jewish religious own discretion to hire teachers at school.

now, that ruling was challenged before the u.s. supreme court but the supreme court denied it in that case. majorityheless, a 7-2 of the supreme court in the our upy of guadalupe case ended adopting a position similar to that which you can you talk to us a little bit and seventhpinion opinion and its application of the ministerial objection? --the ministerial exemption exception gives religious institutions discretion to hire teachers who are ministers.

what this requires the courts to do is to decide who is a minister. on the one hand, there may be -- there might be more obvious questions like someone who teaches religion, religious teachers. the court said those would follow more in the heartland. it gets more difficult if you have a religious school like the jewish school or the catholic school who has a teacher who is teaching math. the court cap to come up with a test to decide whether a person is a minister or not. the decision said is it is a multifactor test where no one factor is determinative. it could not be determined that a teacher teaches math instead of religion. in this case, the teacher taught

jewish prayers and said jewish prayers with the class. the school considered it part of the teachers duty to form the them about to teach jewish prayers and to form them in that tradition. even though she spent other time in the curriculum teaching other matters, it viewed that as part of her job. our lady of guadalupe gives deference to the school's characterization of whether the teacher is a minister or not. not to encourage discrimination but to encourage religious freedom. at a catholic school, the teacher might teach math, but also pray with them and attend mass with them. it could be someone who is also forming children in the faith. it is really about what the scope of the ministerial

exception is and how you identify if someone is a minister. >> thank you, that is helpful. when you came in front of this committee in 2017, we are talking about just over three years ago for your confirmation for the seventh circuit, you said if there is ever a conflict between the judge's personal conviction and the judges duty under the rule of law, it is never permissible for that judge to follow their personal convictions in the decision of the case rather than what the law requires. do you still stand by that statement? do.e barrett: i >> i have colleagues on the others of the aisle who want to focus on statements made in your personal capacity and in your capacity as a private citizen and a member of your faith. addressing actual cases dealing with abortion. i have a hunch that it is

because of your record on the seventh circuit shows that you're able to set aside your personal convictions. that is what you have done when conflicted with your duty under the rule of law. chicago, -- price versus chicago, you joined a seventh circuit panel opinion affirming the legality of chicago buffer zone law which places limits on what activists as-- on pro-life activists they are demonstrating in front of abortion clinics. i assumed that was the case because there was minding supreme court precedent on the abortion buffer zone issue. is that correct? panel heldtt: the

that there was binding precedent. >> you follow that precedent, and you did so as a jurist rather than following whatever personal predilection might have guided you or any other member of the panel. parenthood of indiana dissentucky, you joined in the seventh circuit. the supreme court later agreed with you in a 7-2 decision with respect to the indiana law requiring fetal remains to be following anmated abortion. the decision that garners a days on of 7-2 these the supreme court, a decision

that includes justice breyer and justice kagan does not seem radical to me. do you disagree? courtbarrett: the supreme summarily reversed which means without argument and briefing the panels holding in that case. and the fetal remains disposition of fetal remains portion of the statute was not rational. >> i will note for the record that i don't think i have ever aard anyone characterize as radical act of conservative activism 7-2 decision joined by justice kagan and justice breyer. judge barrett, in addition to being able to set aside your personal convictions when deciding a case, you have toonstrated the ability expertly determine what the law requires.

i believe this stems from a fundamental and correct view that a judge needs to start from the premise that the law provides an answer. the legal disputes can be difficult and reasonable minds excuseisagree does not the judge in believing there is a right answer. you seem to follow with that and it shows up in your work in a way that reflects well of you. the congressional research service conducted a review of your cases from the u.s. court of appeals of the seventh circuit and determined that your -- case-by-case consideration of the relevant law without any overarching trend toward either expanding or narrowing fourth amendment protections. this is exactly what i would expect from a textualist originalist. on an issue like the fourth

amendment, it can be politically charged. this is exactly what you would expect to see with you, someone who does not appear to be up partisan one where the other. and who comes down on both sides. on the government and nongovernment side. this would also account for a variety of outcomes in your cases. an are not aiming for overarching trend in outcomes. analysis seems to come out sometimes in favor of a defendant and sometimes in favor of the government. i find your opinions and dissents and panel opinions to demonstrate this commitment to following the law as it is written rather than on the basis external objectives. can you tell us why you felt the need to dissent in the case of schmidt versus foster? judge barrett: yes.

that case involved a state court case that came up through the wisconsin courts. a the case, there was question of whether the defendant could raise a defense under wisconsin law called adequate provocation having murdered his wife. the case came to the wisconsin arguedand the defendant that an x partake examination of the judge at which his counsel was present but not permitted to speak did not violate the sixth amendment because in that case, they did not want to preview his case for the prosecutor and so he didn't want the prosecutor in the room so the judge said i will allow that but only if your attorney doesn't speak because if we aren't going to preview your case for the prosecution and not allow the prosecutor to be here.

the judge proceeded to ask the defendant questions to decide whether he could make an adequate provocation defense and concluded he could not. in that case, the wisconsin courts held that this proceeding did not violate the defendant's right to counsel. telling his counsel that he could not speak. under 2254my court which is the state habeas statute permitting collateral review of state conviction. it requires heavy deference to state courts. you can only disturb a state court holding on a matter of law if no reasonable jurist could reach that conclusion or it has to be in conflict with clearly established supreme court law. in that case, i made clear that it wasn't up to us to decide whether we saw it as an original matter whether it violated the

sixth amendment because as the panel majority which then became a dissent said it was an unprecedented hearing. if it was unprecedented, that meant that there was no clearly established supreme court law on point. the decision was driven by federalism and by the statutory instruction that federal courts give deference to state courts. >> thank you. case, united states versus wilson, i believe that one was in which you agreed with the majority in concluding that the officers acted with reasonable suspicion raced on the circumstances of the case and the detention there involving a flight by the individual from the scene. us wrote separately, tell why you wrote separately in that

case. judge barrett: that case if i have it correctly, i have been almost 600 cases, but i think another when you were talking about. about somea tip crude -- criminal activity and there was a group of men in a park. the police approached the park then they went up to talk to one of the men at the park because they noticed a bulge in his pocket. he was wearing athletic shorts. , theylice approached them approached the man and he fled. under supreme court law, the determinative question for a seizure is whether the person fled then was detained and seized by the police. the other way that that could the been justified is if police had reasonable suspicion

to approach him because they saw the bulge in his pocket. i wrote separately because i thought that the placement -- policeman's basis for stopping him if it had been on reasonable suspicion was questionable because they had an anonymous tip. the people in the park did not match the description given in the anonymous tip, all they saw was the bulge in his pocket. he had not fled, i thought the case it talked about the fled -- the flight because if he had not fled, i was dubious that it would have been a justified stop. toi admire your decision write separately in that case. i think it shows real courage and judicial leadership to speak out and write separately when the occasion requires that and you did so with nothing to gain from it. you did so because it was important to point it out under

the law and i respect that. and the couple of minutes we have left, i wanted to ask you more broadly about something i have noticed in reviewing letters and other materials we have received in response to her nomination. i have noticed that there is a common theme among your law and students that they feel like you see them as individuals and they feel meant toward and taught -- they feel meant toward and taught by you. deciding who to hire as pure law clerks -- as how you clerks and mentor them? judge barrett: over a teaching career, i have taught roughly 2000 students. four law clerks per year and i also continue to teach at least seminar in which i have 15 students or so.

what i am work -- looking for in law clerk is excellent legal ability because i need to help to do the legal research. i want someone who has excellent legal ability. i want someone who has integrity. i want someone who isn't afraid to push back and express his or her own opinions at the same time realizes that i am the boss and if i disagree, they're going ultimately.o along i also want law clerks who are character. our chambers is small. in ameone had sharp elbows chamber that only has six people or that showed disrespect or arrogance, that would make for a miserable year for everyone. i have not been disappointed. every one of my law clerks has

fit that bill and i view it as my duty my law clerks just as with my students to encourage them to enter the profession as full people who have gained knowledge in the law with their time with me and have seen that they can live a life where people c look forward to supporr nomination. >> we are going through the hearing as though it is a normal hearing. americans dead. no pandemic relief bill insight for the american people. the fate of the aca at risk. democrats of the committee continue to ask you questions to let the american being putw that you on the screen court would dramatically flip the balance of power to the court. further to the right.