hey! ♪ ♪ >> cspanshop.org is c-span's online store with the collection of products and every purchase help support our nonprofit efforts. with contact members for members of congress and the biden cabinet. browse our newest products at cspanshop.org. announcer: a look at the ongoing violence between israel and hamas and what the u.s. can do to de-escalate the situation. what scholars -- with scholars from the washington institute on u.s. policy. this is one hour and 15 minutes. youtube or the washington institute website. i know we have gathered at a time of tension in the middle east, of crisis, people have been glued to their tv's or

online capacities to follow what has been a very tragic situation, whether in jerusalem, whether in gaza, whether it is an oscar lawn or tel aviv, and in the streets of israel, where we have seen this a russian of intercommunal violence we have not seen in a long time. there is so much to discuss today. before we go to the panel, it is a very changing situation, and we will may be look very briefly at one slide about kind of the state of play. these are the numbers we have from official sources. there will be differences, the gaza health ministry have their take on how money palestinians

have been killed, others have other takes. i think a spokesman claims over 100 hamas militants have been killed. we don't know if we are at the end of the operation at all, or -- we will need to see. i do know we have three excellent panelists to discuss this and interpret what we are seeing and suggest possible trajectories. it is a delight for me to moderate this session. we will be having each speaker speak roughly seven minutes and then we will open it up for discussion. i will introduce all three right now. our first speaker will be the director for the israel conflict program and focuses on the interplay of each side's civil

society. our next speaker is a fellow with the washington institute and a former associate editor of the jerusalem report. he has worked as a commentator for israel television. he is probably israel's leading analyst on middle east and palestinian affairs for decades and is no stranger to the washington institute. also, someone known to us, a fellow at the washington institute, a former executive director of the american task force for palestine. served as an advisor to the palestinian negotiating team at camp david. he was on the palestinian authority advisory role for many years before camp david and the years after that. we are delighted to have three

great experts. lucy, i'm going to turn it over to you. lucy: thank you, david. as you alluded to, it is a gut wrenching week. i think any of the critical analysis we give needs to be with the context of the suffering of israelis and palestinians alight. -- alike. this is a tragic deja vu. i think precisely because it is a repeat offense, that's what makes it so frustrating from an analysis perspective. it's urgent to dissect. i'm going to focus on three things. first, the difference, the second, the implications for

dynamics in israeli and palestinian society. and one of the specific decisions for the u.s. administration. what are the differences? you have hamas in full -- mode. and you have bad faith that don't miss an opportunity like this to seize a rallying cry. in trying to seize the mantle, the articulation of demands, and also activity which would seem -- which we saw in weeks prior.

hamas are not merely trying to extract concessions at this point. but to appropriate the leadership of the palestinian cause. palestinian politics have been in disarray and provided the atmosphere of pressure. you have a weakened netanyahu who still cannot form a coalition. this might another one of these characteristic netanyahu -- there could be a tide turning. we have that context behind us. we have the extreme right wing into politics. hamas also in terms of what is different, shown further

progression in technological capability. what david referred to in the opening, you have israel -- a civil war. whether this is intentional or not, it is perhaps a victory from hamas's perspective. the political leader spoke with great triumph. one of the fronts is what is happening inside israel. it strikes me when you combine these things, that gaza itself is becoming almost a sideshow. also the diplomatic discourse and trajectory centered on 1967.

i think what we are seeing today with these dynamics and the disc were surrounded, things are looking -- and the discourse surrounding it, things are looking much more changed. when you think about what is different, to look at the regional contract. the haber have accord -- abraham accords. i think it's going to be focusing perhaps more on that. many questions were raised by our moderator. around a resolution to the conflicts. if you were to wake up, if you

had been in a coma and looked at the headlines, there's not any indication to me that anything like this has happened. they are taking unusual postures at this point could -- this point. it's not clear what difference these things will make. i have noted the violence between citizens in israel. there seems to be a stark interracial divide in attitudes driving this kind of violence. -- intergenerational divide in attitudes driving this kind of violence. we are seeing harder line attitudes.

we see this in the west bank, in gaza. we have been taking a look at the new attitudes. what we are seeing so far is these trends are disturbingly continuing. we also believe on both sides they believe there's no solution possible. i mention this because it is in context to the elections. by the deadline, i think 93% of palestinians had registered to vote, there was great enthusiasm. this was a blow and gave hamas the perfect opening. hamas cannot help be pleased at

this point. i think it has given a boost to hamas. the concern is that hamas might be able to get a foothold on the west bank. what does this mean for the current administration? the conflict has shown up on the administration's doorstep. i think many people have learned that little political policy benefit can be gained by investing in this. it is a calculated risk. priority number one, a cease

fire. but will it return to business as usual after that? going back, will any of these factors force the administration to think again? can it go back to business as usual? can it keep focusing on distracted on its prior foreign policy priorities, the jcpoa, when some of the republican party have been supporting hamas? has anything changed in its calculation of israeli and palestinian leadership, allowing the u.s. to do anything meaningful? there are not many possibilities

the administration can move forward constructively. the current crisis has come about -- and represented the challenges the u.s. faced. to wrap up quickly, i think it underscores the challenges we face and what the administration needs to do is rethink what it needs to de-prioritize. we have to note that -- there is no special envoy on this issue. this underscores the urgency of channels of engagement.

the underlying drivers are not addressed. the fire is lit by the parties. the u.s. could be in the role of ignoring, but sometimes ignoring is fuel, or fighting. if we don't want to find ourselves in the constant pendulum swing, we need to be in the business of active fireproofing, and that will be the question for the administration as it moves forward. david: great, thank you, lucy. these are helpful questions. american policy questions will be put. do both sides of this, looking at the internal hamas dynamic, and you are in touch with israeli decision-makers, look at the nexus between those two -- how do you see things? >> i have to be restrained, i

will try to behave myself. i would say this is a very different round of fighting between israel and hamas than anything we have seen before. because both parties were really ready, prepared, almost expecting the confrontation take place the israelis had three weeks ago, long before anything happened in jerusalem, the israelis had a warning from the intelligence that hamas was -- regarding tech.

the advice of the chief of staff and the head of the internal security service was to mount a preemptive attack, it was refused by netanyahu. but everybody was ready. long before anything happened in jerusalem. the second thing, which differentiates this round from previous rounds, is now we see -- deadly entered by israelis years ago, by giving him a booby-trapped cellular phone and blowing it up, taking over.

really taking over as the guy who is guiding the hamas military forces without really consulting anybody else. the situation was that when you had whatever happened in jerusalem, which is partly the fault of the conduct of the israeli police early on, because they had prevented palestinian jews from gathering at a place

in which for years they used to gather for the star of ramadan . that was a mistake of an experienced, new police commissioner. having palestinian youth throwing projectiles into where you had thousands of jews praying was not something new. having the police stopping it is nothing new, it is almost routine. what was not routine was the fact that both sides were ready for a confrontation. which nobody needed, of course. now, the situation as i see it

now, we have two major different changes from the routine clashes we had with hamas. one is that it is spent to the israeli arms. 20% of the population, most of them urging their leadership to get more integrated into jewish society, antigovernment, etc. -- into government, etc. they were almost tempted, ejected into this cycle of violence by a combination of criminal gangs in big cities

because the police never had the time to mount the effort to take the weapons out. joined by activists of the islamic movement. and you always have hundreds of young people in the sector who are unemployed, not really integrated into society, without proper employment, who are happy to have whatever is possible. an acre they burned in the old city, or the jewish restaurant

or the jewish hotel. do they expect that our businesses, thriving in the old city, will get jewish visitors for your two -- for a year or two? the same everywhere. not going into it. but from hamas's point of view, they have managed to do something we did not see before. i don't know in my long years covering this field, that they have joined in, participated in any clash between israel and hamas, this is a first. the second thing is that by

instigating this confrontation, hamas has toppled and it's really -- an israeli government that has yet to be formed. we were about to have a government of let's call it anti-netanyahu, change camp, whatever you want to call it. it is over. so hamas in a way, if i put this very bluntly, hamas handed netanyahu another term, whether in rotation with somebody, whether on his own, but there

will not be an alternative government as i can see now. let me go, david, with your permission, to the situation, because i don't think -- and i apologize for what i am going to say. but i read the new york times, washington post. i must admit i read the wall street journal. i don't think the picture is being given there is accurate. the situation is like this -- hamas has suffered a huge spanking, big-time. i don't know at this moment i am talking to you how many hamas armed personnel are buried,

struggling to come out in the tunnels and in the bunkers that were attacked by the israeli air force. they don't know, they don't publish it. we don't know, we don't publish it. we are thinking about major, major punishment. at night, the israeli army, the bible says in hebrew, you make war with -- then have a drink. they announced they were going to have a ground operation in gaza and they moved tanks and artillery and infantry units

along the boundaries of the gaza strip, making sure the lighting would allow hamas to see the decks. then many hundreds of hamas operatives came out of the tunnels of the bunkers to take their offensive visions -- positions, and they were hit by 150 israeli planes. i don't know to tell you, nobody can, whether we are talking dozens or hundreds. most of the workshops producing missiles are out of action for a

few months or a euro more -- year or more. most of the underground bunker headquarters of hamas's military operation are done with. their naval commando done with. i could go on and on, i am not sure everybody is interested in the details, but i can provide that during the q&a. i go to where we are at the moment as i see. hamas is bleeding for 12 hours. they want a cease-fire. from their point of view, they have made a point, they dominate the palestinian scene.

we had seven palestinians killed in the west bank. very serious. but the point now is that we need to get to a sort of a de-escalation which is very clear in that the terms are obvious for both sides and are exposed to the international media, etc.. i will conclude by saying i

think this confrontation is going to go on for a few more days until maybe monday or tuesday. i think many of us will follow this, and appreciate biden administration's attitude. basically they are giving us time. basically they understand what we understand, if you punish hamas, you have the alternative. let's hope that between now and monday, tuesday, hamas doesn't manage to get what they are trying to do. what they are trying to do, and i am finishing with this, what they are trying to do is score

some spectacular hate. stop the flights not just for 20 or 30 minutes, stop the flights at the alternative airport. hit the gas for the platform, which they are trying. hit the tankers, the oil pipeline, etc. they are trying to do this. so far, they didn't manage. the explosives don't work. you know, if i put myself in the shoes of the leader, i wouldn't want to, and what he is seeing

is something very simple. they are firing barrages and we have eight people killed. but the arrow down -- aerodome is capable of intercepting almost all of it. secondly, hamas spent millions, hundreds of millions, on tunnels leading into israel. the attack tunnels were neutralized by the israeli obstacle. their options now are extremely limited. david: thank you.

that last point is something people loses sight of, and lucy was very helpful in setting things up about how this is different from 2014. one of the ways is the tunnel smuggling is not what was, it was a big deal. i was in the u.s. government and we were very focused on that issue. that's one of the reasons why israel had ground operations. now with the underground sensors, it is a different situation. the tunnels they hit last night, it is an internal tunnel where commanders can go from place to place. that is different from the smuggling tunnels and attack tunnels of 2014. the underground sensors is another piece of how this conflict is different. you also mentioned monday, tuesday happens to coincide with sunday night, that is a jewish holiday that traditionally has brought tens of thousands

streaming to the western wall study, prayer. it is a big moment in jerusalem, jewish jerusalem during the year. you do wonder if there is an xm point therefore prime minister netanyahu -- is in point -- exit point for prime minister netanyahu. sometimes developments on the ground mean yes, but they could hit some of these infrastructure points, and will that prolong it? i turn it over to my friend and colleague, ray. ray: thank you very much, it's always a challenge to come after two such top-notch colleagues and friends. apologies in advance if i repeat some of what they said.

i would like to echo a point that all of my colleagues have pointed to. i'm going to talk about policy and political issues that are going to be critical. it is essential and important to remember that at the top of all of this, there is a human factor. this is, by the way, an area i firmly believe that both side sism is appropriate. palestinians are dying and suffering, that is a fact. israelis are dying suffering, and that is a fact. as we talk about policy, we need to keep that in mind. i would focus on trying to paint a picture of the dynamics i see happening on the ground, and maybe widen the lens a little

bit and talk about the diplomatic implications. apologies in advance for being very telegraphic. we really are talking about three distinctive, obviously interrelated distinctive sets of dynamics. one, the connective tissue of all of this, is jerusalem. this is where it started, whether it is the big context or the way that things develop as was mentioned, the old city, etc.. jerusalem continues to be the core of -- the core mobilizing issue and hamas understood this and used it. the second arena, the most obvious one we are focused on right now is the gaza arena. my mind, it is very clear that

hamas initiated this fighting and did so for a very obvious reason as well put i think my colleagues -- as well. i think my colleagues mentioned it, it is part of their domestic power gain. hamas wanted to build on that momentum and already emerged after the cancellation of the ill-fated, ill-conceived election gambit. hamas views itself as the center of democracy and it wants to present itself as the center of jerusalem. by and large, they are succeeding so far. the third dynamic that we have really not talked about, referenced briefly, is that until today, -- has not happened on the west bank. it has been quiet. for a number of reasons, a

number of factors, not least of which is that the palestinian and israeli coordination and security forces -- we are critical and i believe his mistake in canceling the elections and beyond have set the stage for this. remember that palestinians in many ways, west bank, gaza, east jerusalem, frustrated with leadership, the inability to govern internally and provide "liberation agenda" and engage in a positive way with israelis. this is kind of the backdrop we are working within what does -- within. what does that mean in terms of diplomatic steps? let's start with gaza, the most pressing and immediate issue.

as was just mentioned, ultimately it will end in a cease-fire. the timing will be dependent on things on the ground and diplomatic objectives, the need that kaman's -- that hamas does not come out of this declaring victory. when it comes to how to a cease-fire in gaza, both process matter. the substance and ensuring that hamas does not exit this being able to claim a political victory beyond what it has already been able to claim, but also the process matters. by this, i mean who gets delivered the cease-fire. it is essential that this is given to egypt, not to anyone else, and i would like to remind everyone, the last round of hostilities, when then secretary of state john kerry tried to

bypass the egyptians and reach a deal with qatar and turkey expeditious to hamas, it extended the war for two more weeks. it is key that egypt is the main partner. even once gaza calms down and this episode is over, something has to be done about jerusalem. jerusalem continues to be a powder keg. there are many potential trigger points. if you just look at the calendar. it needs to be dealt with. and just like i said about gaza and jerusalem, any collection and any resolution from these issues, jordan has to be important. jordan because it has equities in the matter, because it will

be impacted, and frankly if you don't give it to jordan, someone else will get the credit and usually that is not someone who is particularly positive. i would like to remind everyone, 2017, metal detectors, jordan was key in de-escalation, but it was mismanaged in a way where ultimately bad actors took credit. three, we go to the west bank. as was mentioned, today, seven people were killed. is this the beginning of something? is it simply a spike we saw because of friday and everything? i don't know, i don't believe anyone knows. but it is worth remembering that what we have seen so far is a result of many things, not the least of which is the work of the palestinian security forces, and a special note should be said about the amazing work done by the u.s. security coordinator, restart general mark schwartz and his team --

three-star general mark schwartz and his team. i think it is key that any future moves look at how we can support them. moving out a little bit, you know, when it comes to the abraham accords, i think many of those that are against it, and i've seen a lot of social media, they are being dismissive, etc. -- that is disingenuous. the abraham accords were never meant to solve the palestinian conflict. what this reminds us is yes, we have a new, flashy, positive thing with these things, but don't forget the old. jordan, egypt. what happens in the west bank gaza, israel, it has an impact. we are seeing in jordan daily demonstrations almost tore the israeli border.

the egyptians have their own equities. we have to continue with the abraham accords and it is key to not forget those actors and how we can merge those universes and see if we can find ways in which partners get some dividend from the new dynamic. finally, a word on the u.s. the u.s. wished none of this had happened, they had a policy predicated on continuing things. it happened. the u.s. is in a difficult position. the u.s. has to lead any cease-fire and de-escalation efforts. the u.s. has to remind the partners of its own equities in terms of the conflict itself also how it impacts u.s. allies in egypt and the others, but the u.s. should not do it in a way where it gets too dragged into this. at the end of the day i think

the administration was correct, we cannot get engaged in high diplomacy, so we have to continue with this. one operational point, i think as was said, the staff dealing with this are extremely qualified, knowledgeable, etc., but they need support from the public level could -- political level. the trick is how do you manage this that political intervention from washington helps our full -- folks on the ground without dragging us in more than we want to get involved in? with that, i conclude and look forward to the conversation. david: thank you very much. there is so much to discuss and so little time. maybe we could start by where do you think we end up? we realize the limitations. the crystal ball is cloudy.

let's assume the following -- each side wants a political victory. but each side is also very focused on the others's internal -- other side's internal narrative. i've been watching israeli tv and some coverage on palestinian tv, but what i was struck by is how each side wants to shape -- they don't want to participate in their own narrative, they want to know what the other side's narrative will be. in israel, you keep hearing the words deterrence, and that hamas should not be allowed to tell people we are the defenders of jerusalem or that he struck these spectacular targets. sometimes you feel the reality is almost irrelevant.

they are worrying how the other side portrays them. i think the defense minister could give you paragraphs from the spiderweb speech and which he said israel is like a spiderweb, it looks menacing, but you flick it and it falls away. a lot of israeli decision-makers didn't care, they were like, what is the narrative of the other side? how do i change that narrative? to what extent can each side really impact the other side's narrative? can the fighting shape the narrative of the other side? there is the reality on the ground, how it ends and each side wants a political victory, but how can they ship the other side and does it at her? -- it matter? or is it a relevant? -- irrevelant?

and if you could say something about is the old paradigm dead, basically you bought quiet with money in a certain way. or is there going to be a big international investment? can you have international investment? who will invest if hamas is still there? no one wants to go in and disarm hamas, that is the real story. israel does not want to go in on the ground, egypt is not want to go in on the ground, the palestinian authority for sure does not want to go in on the ground. the net effect is are we doomed to these kind of band-aid solutions? who to start with on this one? lucy? lucy: thank you. there are a couple of questions, i will start with your first question.

there was a question i saw in chat, asking me about israel countering the perception of hamas. forget hamas and israel's calculations here. what people are seeing on the ground is hamas has not been that embolden and receive support by the action taken, i was struck by the fact that -- when elections were still thought to be happening. hamas is not getting majority support in the sense of what palestinians perceive are the best outcome of what they are looking for. unification and all of those things.

i think hamas has successfully capitalize on the moment. i would like to respectfully disagree when it was said that if you punish hamas, you help the alternative. my solution is the opposite of what we have seen. i think it may be too late to resuscitate -- for all of his faults and failings, he was an alternative. in israel and the u.s., there is this multiple opportunities. i think where we find ourselves, there's going to have to be -- sooner rather than later. israel is going to have to address the dynamics.

one of the things on israel's part is addressing -- we have seen this emboldening of the extreme right wing that the government is going to have to address in one way, shape or form. to get the impression of what happens after a cease-fire is achieved, there are underlying drivers of the conflict, particularly with the consistent flashpoint of sites will move to address, and that will change the narratives. david: very good. ehud: thank you. i have more liberty now. what we need to seek now is when

we have a sort of cease-fire, whatever you want to call it, egyptian intelligence generals will take credit for it. i don't think the u.s. should get involved with it. humble opinion about the guy to do that. we will have a cease-fire, a lull. then israel has to tell whoever is mediating, like the u.n. envoy, we are not going back to the arrangements we had between you and qatar getting suitcases with millions of dollars. we are going to take a fresh look at everything paid that is what israel -- everything. that is what israel will do, i

believe. now what do we do with the pa? i disagree with you, lucy. i have spent all my life on this , they are not interested in a deal. they are not. whatever you offer them, the answer will be no. because they are not willing to make any compromises about the right of return, the history of the jews's exile in jerusalem -- it is not going to go anywhere if you try it this way. many people before did and it is not going to work.

the one thing we should do is while telling hamas, we have senior colors now again -- seen your colors now again, and you have had your spanking, yes, we absorbed maybe 1500 missiles. the other thing we will do is tell the u.s. and europeans, if we cannot get an arrangement with the palestinian authority, whatever remains of the remnants of the plo, let's see how we can upgrade and at her and improve the situation on the ground -- upgrade and that are -- better and improve the situation on the ground. because we all have to get ready for the day after hamas.

he is telling people and i am telling it before that his father died at 103 or something, and he is only 55, he is a midcareer politician. i hope he is correct in his diagnosis but i am not sure. we all have to get ready now to lay the groundwork for the morning-after. david: by the way, i think his mother was 103, and has said he has strong genes, but he did not live as long as his mother. genes are never a foolproof reason. ehud: my mother is 101. david: also, to discuss the endpoint narrative, apart from

wanting to be the defender of jerusalem, apart from seeing the status quo under attack, they had a cease-fire with israel for three years, but to what extent is palestinian succession rate also a factor driving hamas? i want to get that but also a sense of what in game -- end game, and less it is something really dramatic from what we know now, what is likely? ghaith: honestly, i don't know. we are in the middle of a dynamic that can take summary different directions. it is hard to predict. as i mentioned before, especially when you consider the west bank, i don't know, it is impossible to know whether today's development is the beginning of something or the end of something. it is very hard to tell. there is only so much you can do to change a narrative. violence, conflict treats its

own narrative, and ultimately -- creates its own narrative and ultimately it is hard to counter what hamas right now. as a defender of jerusalem. no matter what many palestinians think of violence, when you think about hamas, it is hard for them to reap any political dividend. that's why i mentioned, give them -- don't have them and unalloyed victory, give some credit to egypt and jerusalem -- and jordan. i do want to go to the point of the west bank and the pa. first of all, i fully agree, there is no chance of any peace deal. look at the palestinians, look

at the israeli. can we see netanyahu or his collision -- coalition able to get to that point where we can have a deal? i just don't see this as even a topic for conversation. i agree with lucy in we needed to get the pa some, even partial political narrative to give the pa the ability to go to the public and say my security cooperation given me something. this is collaboration, not cooperation. you need to give an ability to construct a narrative for the palestinians that there is a reason why we are doing this. that's why a said earlier i am a supporter of the approach of the united states. this is what the biden administration is focusing on right now. to show that maybe we are not getting independence but at

least some progress because of dramatic engagement. when it comes to succession, i don't believe hamas did this as part of the mechanical idea of succession, who will be the next pa president. i think this is part of a larger hamas strategy, not necessarily motivating in a cause away the escalation, but to basically take over the palestinian national. what they are trying to do defective is become the adverse -- de facto become the adverse for the palestinians. we see some things playing into this. of course turkey and qatar would push this, there was a conversation with the moroccan prime minister. hamas wants to present itself as the adverse. it's not about succession, per

se. in some ways you could say the elections are about succession. this is about dominating the past -- palestinian national movement. what i would want from the international community is reaffirmation that hamas is not the adverse. david: that last point was really interesting. in terms of arab governments, what it seems to me is, whatever the issue is jerusalem, you're able to galvanize not only the public but the governments. even the abraham accords, we know the deep enmity, and once the issue becomes jerusalem, the reframing, it forces people to choose bad sides. who knows, we are still in the middle of this, maybe it will --

in jerusalem. but the story has not been jerusalem for five days, it's been rocket fire between gaza and the coastal town, the violence. i wonder if this is some way, is there a way for israel to do something to counter this perception of hamas as this legitimate palestinian defenders of jerusalem? lucy made an interesting point about these gangs that have emerged we did not see before. i also wonder if we can shift a little to the is really domestic context for jerusalem and the elections, and namely to what extent. it was mentioned, the inexperience of the police. you have a new commander of the police who comes from the border police, who sometimes are viewed

as very quick on the trigger. i have seen already stories, and you are going to get people wondering, the police minister, who is very close with netanyahu -- at a key moment, everyone knows hamas wanted this fight. they don't deny it. but does he play into hamas's hands by using tactics that were not used before? could this be tied to netanyahu's political i do not want to sound like a guy. i never like conspiracy theories but usually between ineptitude, but to what extent do you think

is really political calculation at a key moment. even if he is the culprit of all of this? did that helped light the fuse in a certain way and also doing, destroying the chances of a coalition of netanyahu at this time? >> david, we have known each other many many years, and i did not expect him to be asked something. my answer is i think throughout this crisis, was quite responsible. the risk moderating, taking responsible decision, running the confrontation in gaza.

now i put a. , -- the conduct of the minister of interior security is despicable to say the least. i think they have nominated a commissioner general for the police. a very good man. experienced in situations like this at some of the decisions that they've taken early on in jerusalem before they have lessened to people like from the internal security services. they were wrong. i will give you an example. they've approved for the jerusalem day which is the

tradition around here. it is never a problem. you have guys marching with the is basically flagged celebrating their unification of jerusalem through the muslim quarter. almost never a problem. this time, you understand the situation, there are other ways for the march of flex to get into the quarter. through mount zion, through different other places. they were too late in doing this. please believe me. many of my closest and smartest friends are asking me whether i think this was some sort of looking for a trigger. no i do not.

but once it was ignited, that was the guy they exploited. >> do think it was a operational decision and coordination with police minister and netanyahu did not have a role in formulating the approach? ehud: there are two things here. when they get overexcited, as have many times before they start throwing molotov cocktails and stones onto the crowd of jewish prayers. the police esther come in.

that is happened many times. that was a decision taken at the local level, not even at the commissioner general level. what happens now is that they've approved the march of flex to march through the old city. personally, i think nothing would have happened but it was -- who said no. let us change and then you have also jewish provocateurs, the right-wingers, who are coming in. they provoke the palestinians to react and you have a chain

reaction. a, i know it is information. i'm not guessing. three weeks ago, hamas was getting ready -- number two, the head of police committed a mistake of presenting them together. things would have gone in different directions. it is too late now. david: my last question is about the biden administration. my understanding from the administration is that they have had very good communication with

the prime minister's office during this crisis. that they are not prepping israel but i'm trying to understand what art israel methods for success and they want updates. where are you at now? even though that is a subtle form of pressure, they want to be in close contact. he points out that direction of the march and it was reported that jake sullivan is communication with the president was not the best idea right now, supreme court issues ruling on jerusalem, prime minister netanyahu will agree and when i pointed to this one thing of how did they mishandle the temple mount, of course everyone agrees about no one wants any single rock thrown at the western wall.

to what extent was there a heavy hand on the temple mount itself? would that have made a difference, we will have to see. i see the president with standing 13 out of 15 -- we have got discussed. -- we have not discussed. i do not think it was hamas rockets, we do not want to give a victory to hamas so this is a case of the u.s. wanting very closely. the obama administration of no daylight at a certain way with israel but we have also seen in these crises there is a certain rhythm where there is unity in the beginning and then tragically some civilians are killed and that unity starts to

fright between the u.s. and israel. -- that unity starts to fright between the u.s. and israel. what extent, this being the first real crisis of the biden administration and dealing with the israel -- with the israelis and palestinians, do you think there's a way of standing with israel? you think it is going to fray? we do not know how this thing will and but i just want to know how you think the ministration is doing so far? >> the thing as you noted, this coded more directions depending on how involved -- with the civilian -- calculations.

i think it has done so much analysis of the last few days. lost the ability -- being effective. i think in order to be a effective broker, they're going to be need to be engaging. in this situation, the challenges that we have at the immediacy is the u.s. cannot be dealing effectively with hamas. the problem typically engagement -- you are seeing have no impact. it does not have any influence on hamas and that relationship

[indiscernible] with the biden administration was trying to do. i once the cease-fire will be achieved, that is where emphasis is going to have to be -- fireproofing and dealing with these festering dynamics. the to be balancing engagement with both sides [indiscernible] palestinian side, if they do not go to the p performance what we are seeing today. >> part of the problems with jerusalem -- is almost like every other crisis, a well it

was given to experian's low level -- official. if it happens over and over again, that we have a problem. what i heard from the israeli foreign ministry. no this is jerusalem. in that sense, i think for israel, i do you ensure that the decision-making in jerusalem is done in the context of heine political awareness of decision-making to prevent a repeat. first of all, i do not by what people are saying that the u.s. was missing in action. that is not true. i do think that the u.s. was in many ways taken off guard do

shift the policy we had was engagement at certain level focusing on the specific shift from there. it is not something -- especially in a new administration. one has to ask himself, showed that conversation have happened? to shift some of these dynamics in terms of quarters but i think in a sense the u.s. is engaged. engagement particularly to give support your operational elements. i think that is a key point and i would also say that irrespective, the u.s. has been -- i can tell you, the egyptians, the israelis, the

palestinians, and others are watching to see is the u.s. capable of managing this, is the u.s. capable of taking leadership? it means the ability to mobilize other actors. i think the way the u.s. comes out of it will take the u.s. at a later stage. one last point, this is not the biden template. this is a return to establish u.s. policy that preceded trump. this is exactly what happened in 2009 and the issue of giving space and giving israel space is exactly what happened in 2014. there's only so much space that the u.s. can do, whether it is a

response to development, civilian deaths and distractions so this about a bite of thing. this is a return to a well-established mode of u.s. policymaking that was dropped for four years under trump. david: you guys all contributed wonderful perspectives from really different insights. we saw some differences and convergences also to demonstrate that the alternative to hamas. >> i think the best thing for everybody is if the u.s. does not try to broker anything between israel and hamas and concentrate on building a different type of relationship

between israel and the -- cease-fire with hamas. thank you. david: i was just about to say that point. the three of us where our point of convergence is is to demonstrate that israel -- that those relationships can improve and even if we cannot solve this entire conflict, i do not think the biden administration is about to do after the u.s. tried , i do not see the belief that the event diagram overlap between israel and palestinians for conflict resolutions but even conflict management and i think conflict shrinkage is something that should be thought about and so i think, i and on that note, there are things that can be done to show that the other side, that approach pays

with israel, even if it is modest, it is something, it is gradual. so we will see how this ends up and i want to thank you all for reaching us with your insight. we listeners who are out in the middle east, i hope you all stay safe and everyone else, i wish you good health and good spirits and a good