>> today the house is considering legislation to end sentencing disparities for possession of crack cocaine and powdered cocaine. lawmakers will debate the $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill the senate passed last month. house speaker nancy pelosi says they'll vote on the bill thursday. when the house is back in session, you can find live coverage here on c-span. joinini vaez, with the international crisis group. he is a senior advisor and director of the iran project, here with us to talk about the talks ahead on the u.s.-iran nuclear deal. welcome to "washington journal." tell us about your group, the international crisis group. what is your mission and how are you funded? guest: the crisis group is a conflict prevention organization. there are a lot of organizations, ngos and

governmental organizations that deal with the aftermath of conflict, from refugees to health issues, reconciliation, reconstruction. like human diseases, wars are often better to prevent than to deal with. that is the mission of this organization, which is based in brussels and it was created 25 years ago. it is funded by philanthropists, foundations and also governments and it covers around 50 conflict around the world, including the iran nuclear issue. host: what role does your organization have in the discussions on the iran nuclear deal during the obama administration? guest: the organization has been involved for almost 18 years now , but during the obama administration, we were one of the outside groups in the u.s. or europe who were helping the

negotiators bridge the gap, with coming up with ideas, providing creative solutions for both sides to be able to reach the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. host: tell us where we stand right now after the trump administration entering into the biden administration. the trump administration withdrew from the iran nuclear deal. what happens next? guest: as you know, the trump administration withdrew from the agreement in may of 2018 with no good reason. iran was fully complying with the agreement at the time. it's nuclear program was in a box and was one of the most rigorously monitored programs in the world. iran was about one year away from having the ability to break out which means having enough material for a single nuclear weapon. the idea was that rim position of sanctions would pressure iran to come back to the table and agree to a deal that was more

advantageous to the united states. in practice what iran did was ramp up its nuclear program and right now it is only a month away from the ability to break out. in addition to that, iran has become more aggressive in the region and more repressive at home. the trump administration's maximum pressure strategy turned out to be an absolute failure. the biden administration came in with the objective of returning to the agreement and restoring the restrictions and monitoring on iran's nuclear program, but it appeared that the talks works really difficult. there were six rounds of negotiations in vienna but the parties were not able to reach an agreement by june 20, when the negotiations stopped, when iran was going through a presidential transition and three months later, they have not resumed yet. host: we want to point out to our viewers and listeners, first of all, our phone line for ali vaez, if you support the iran

nuclear deal, the number is (202)-748-8000. if you oppose, it is (202)-748-8001. if you are unsure, that line for all others, (202)-748-8002. if you would like some information or you would like to know some highlights of what is in the jcpoa, the joint comprehensive plan of action, it is online on the national archives. when the biden administration came then, was the regime in tehran mistrustful of the biden administration? did they show any sign other than opening up for talks that they would be willing to engage in these discussions? guest: obviously because the u.s. reneged on the agreement,

the iranians were extremely mistrustful of the u.s. as a reliable negotiating partner and the president had promised during the campaign that he would return to the jcpoa. the iranians expected the biden administration would do what it did in the case of the paris climate deal or return to the world health organization, the idea was that the u.s. unilaterally went out of the jcpoa nuclear deal and would unilaterally return to it. that didn't happen and also when the biden administration didn't really do much in its first few weeks in office in terms of any goodwill gestures towards the iranians on him in a terry relief from sanctions given that iran was dealing with a deadly situation given the covid pandemic, all of that really disappointed the iranians and push them to harden their position. from the time talks started in vienna in early april, the iranians already had hardened

their posture and that is one of the reasons that the parties were unable to reach an agreement by june. the expect tatian is that talks will resume next month, but there are also -- the expectation is that talks will resume next month but there were also expectations that talks will be much harder. host: -- is he involved in that talk, in those talks? guest: yes, he leads the u.s. negotiating team along with other experts and his team who are very familiar with this issue. most of them were involved in the obama administration negotiations with the iranians that led to the nuclear deal but on the iranian side we have a situation that all the architects of the nuclear deal are out of power and they have given their place to the jcpoa's critics in iran. that is one more reason it is

hard to be optimistic abut the prospects of the deal's revival in the next few months. host: it is a reversal of the trump administration. critics of the jcpoa, withdrawing from the deal in 2018. guest: that is absolutely correct. this is the story of iran-u.s. relations in the past four decades. they have rarely been on the same wavelength with the exception of the second term of president obama when there was a relatively moderate president in iran and all the stars aligned allowing both sides to finally have an agreement on the nuclear issue and that is why it is a pity that president trump reneged on the agreement because the one deal that iran and the u.s. have had since they broke up to the medic relations in 1979 had a sorry fate and that is obviously not encouraging future negotiations within the two countries. host: you had a piece published

that was headlined, how to save the iran nuclear deal, both sides must revise the redlines and in that you write at the heart of the standoff are misperceptions on both sides. the biden administration treats iran as it would any adversarial the goshen party -- adversarial negotiating party, whereas iran sees itself as the aggrieved party. for its part, iranian leadership believes time is on its side. the economy has survived and is now expanding. given its nuclear program's x financial growth, officials in tehran believe they are well positioned to extract more concessions from the west. what sort of concessions do you think iran wants to extract from the u.s. and other partners? guest: there are three buckets of issues that iranians really care about. they are absolute redlines. one is the question of some of the sanctions that the biden

administration wants to keep, some trump era sanctions. for instance, last year the trump administration tried to prevent the u.n. arms embargo and -- unconventional weapons from being lifted as part of the jcpoa. they failed miserably at the security council, one of the most million defeats the u.s. has had on the international stage. the trump administration imposed a set of unilateral embargoes on iran jacky ability to purchase or sell conventional weapons. iranians want the sanctions lifted but you can imagine the biden administration, given the fact that iran is involved in attacks against u.s. forces in iraq and mimetic facilities in iraq and is engaged with israel, it is supplying to houthi rebels in yemen that are attacking

saudi arabia. it is very difficult to imagine the biden administration will be able to do this without paying a huge political price in washington. there are other sanctions as well, out of the 1500 sanctions the trump administration imposed or reimposed, the biden administration is seeking to keep around one third of the. -- one third of them. second is the biden administration wants iran to commit to follow on negotiations and they are obviously mistrustful of the u.s., extremely reluctant to accept that. finally, there are some conditionality's that the u.s. has attached to some of the sanctions that are not related to the jcpoa. for instance, sanctions on the supreme leader's office or designation of the royal guard as a terrorist organization. in return for iran making that commitment, that is also complete and except about to the iranians.

the u.s. also has redlines we can discuss later but at the end of the day, the point i am trying to make is that if we get back to the negotiating table and resume from where we left off, we are still going to be in deadlock. it requires both sides, if they want to restore the jcpoa, to show flexibility, especially given the fact that the alternative is not that much more attractive. host: in your view, did the trump administration sanctions cage iranian behavior? guest: it only made it worse. there nuclear program is now closer to the ability to develop nuclear weapons than it was in 2013 when the obama administration started negotiating with iranians, or when the jcpoa was finalized. we saw the kind of attacks that the iranians had not been involved in, at least since the

1980's like the attack on saudia ron: oil company which took half of saudi oil exports off the market for a while. attacks on tankers and shipping in the persian gulf, those of the kinds of behaviors we have not seen before the trump administration imposed its maximum pressure policy. at home, the iranian system has become much more oppressive and we have seen protests that have been brutally crushed. all in all, i would say none of the objectives were materialized despite the fact that sanctions really devastated the iranian economy and inflicted a lot of harm on the iranian people in the middle of a pandemic. host: we are talking with ali vaez, senior advisor and iran project director at the international crisis group, talking about the u.s.-iran nuclear deal. (202)-748-8000 is the line if you support the deal. (202)-748-8001 if you oppose the

deal. for all others, (202)-748-8002. we will hear from carl in hawaii. good morning, go ahead. caller: hello there. i appreciate you taking my call. i have a few questions if you can tolerate me. i wanted to bring up a couple issues i'm sure you are familiar with. first is the israeli archive. could you please elaborate and answer this after i finish my series of questions. the israeli archive which disclosed information with some extroverts archer -- which some experts were trying to claim were nonrelevant or highly relevant. two, is the huuti's.

the biden administration took them off of the terrorist organizations, then their behavior show they really were a terrorist organization. three, the time frames from the original jcpoa show that the time frames that were elaborated in the negotiations obviously are about to come to pass now, and even if we are able to get to the original deal, the iaea inspectors have said that it is completely dead. things have to be completely reengineered, and unless we can go back to the original nuclear negotiations and remove all of these sanctions, that we will never be able to make headway

with the iranians. host: three issues and ali vaez, if you would like to respond to any or all of them. guest: on the nuclear archives, the fact that in early 2018, israel managed to steal a lot of physical evidence of iran's past nuclear activities from storage in the middle of tehran's spectacular intelligence operations and a major victory for israel. that archive put meat on the bone but what we already knew was the case, was that iran had pursued a military nuclear program, preacher thousand three. -- pre-2003. it did not include much new intelligence.

it had some elements and iaea had concluded they had some elements in their research. that makes the value of jcpoa much more because it proved with concrete evidence that there was a military dimension to this program and so it is much more important to be able to put the program in a box and under serious monitoring. let me answer the other nuclear question and then i will talk about the houthi's. on the possibility of going back to the deal, given the advancements that the nuclear program has made in the past, reducing its compliance with the nuclear obligations, the reality is while that is true, it is not entirely restorable, but it is much better compared to the alternatives because it took two

and half years to negotiate the jcpoa. if we want to start from scratch and negotiate an entirely new deal, given the amount of mistrust that exists, the iranian nuclear program will continue to go and they are only one month away from having enough material for a nuclear weapon and that is not a sustainable situation. it is much better to restore the deal and get a longer and stronger nuclear deal. with regards to the houthis, the decision to take them off of the terrorist organization list was a purely human to terry and just year because they control huge chunks of yemen and if they are a terrorist organization, basically a lot of human agencies would not be able to deliver food and medicine and humanitarian goods to the yemenis and it was not done as a key that would open the door of resolving the conflict in yemen. host: does iran support the

houthis with arms? guest: there is evidence iran provides material support to the houthis in yemen but the reality is that one of the positive things that have happened in the past few weeks is that iran and saudi arabia have had several rounds of negotiations in baghdad, mediated and facilitated by the iraqis and there is a possibility that iran could eventually end up reducing its support for the houthis as part of a deal with saudi arabia. that makes for a much more sustainable agreement and it could potentially be the beginning of de-escalation in the persian gulf region. host: this is sam in new jersey, who says he opposes the deal. caller: good morning. i don't oppose the deal per se. there were faults in the original deal and also with the idea of pulling out.

i hesitate to cast pulling out of the deal under the light as trump did it so it is automatically bad. i think there were problems on both sides. as a massive fan of c-span, i have spent enough time in the middle east that when i hear rhetoric like this gentleman is using, it is pretty clear to know which side he falls on. out appreciate somebody in a case like this or somebody is so clearly pro-iran, if you could consider next time having somebody with a perspective from the other side. i represent what i think is the majority of americans would say iran is all well and good but it is not our job and friendly when it comes to iran, a heavy hand is necessary.

i would like for the government account -- clarify two things. he has said twice now that iran is a month away from their material. are you saying they will have a nuclear weapon in one month because it sounds a lot like the bellicose rhetoric at the end of your foreign affairs article or when you say the u.s. suffered a humiliating defeat. when you say these things, you make a position clear so if you could comment on that, are you telling us they will have a nuclear weapon in a month because that is significant news. second, is -- would you please go back and clarify, let's say we had stayed in this nuclear deal. is it your contention that iran had just hung up their nuclear ambitions forever? that was their agreement. everybody at the top, everybody said we are never going to go for a nuclear weapon again. i spent time in gaza and i spoke with people who were receiving

money and everybody knows how they spread the money around and you said there is evidence to support the houthis and then follow that with, if we get a deal, they will stop. host: we will get the response. guest: the reality is, when i say one month from breakout, it doesn't mean one month from nuclear weapons. breakout means basically that you have enough material for a single nuclear weapon, but then you have to put that material into -- basically weaponize it which in and of itself is a process that could take about a year. you have to fit it on the cone of the missile and then you have to test it before you can actually say that you have an operating nuclear weapon. if you look at the history of proliferation in recent decades, there is a process and usually countries don't break out with

just enough material for a single weapon because you need an arsenal. the jcpoa was designed on expanding that window, the breakout time to 12 months so the international community would have enough time to detect any breakout attempt and try to deal with it with sanctions or military action against iran. that is the first point. second point, again, the reality is, this was only a nuclear deal. it was not a nuclear missile original deal. -- nuclear missile regional deal. if we wanted to put all of those issues on the table, it would have become impossible to resolve them. the obama administration's -- approach was the most urgent issue, the nuclear issue, on the back burner or basically put it on ice to try and then address other issues, but they ran out

of time because the deal was implement in 2016 and then in 2016 we had a change of administration, and critics of the jcpoa came to power. the deal has been in limbo longer than it's been fully implemented. host: let's hear from crystal, who supports the deal in florida. caller: good morning. i just want to say that -- host: make sure you mute your television and then go ahead with your comment or question. caller: i have. i support iran's right to choose. i believe in america pulled out of the deal, they did it for political expediency and gain. it is really unfair because we are so unreliable, whether or not we are good partners can change every four years, so why should anybody trust us?

i just want to say -- i want to ask a question, how is or is israel dealt with as a party that is monitored by this gentleman and the work he does? how does -- is that one of the groups for deals or parties that are mentioned because it seems like they are not allowed to be criticized. guest: i think trust is a really important dynamic -- dimension in international diplomacy all the leverage is necessary if you want to get a deal that serves your interests and by definition, diplomacy is about compromise so any deal you get, it is win-lose. unfair deals begat unfaithful dealmakers and the jcpoa was a case of win-win and mutual

compromise. but is why it has opponents both in tehran and washington. the reality is that we can compare the situation with regards to iran's nuclear program or even other regional policies, or even domestic policies, human rights, before and after the nuclear deal. it becomes pretty clear that the jcpoa, despite all of its shortcomings, was serving the interests of both sides and that is a formula for win-win diplomacy. israel is not a member of the nonproliferation treaty so it has not committed as iran has committed, not to develop nuclear weapons. neither international community monitors israel's activities nor our group which basically is focused on preventing conflicts. my colleagues work on israel-palestine and we work on

iran-israel tensions, especially in the maritime realm. israel's nuclear program is not something we work on. host: one more call, valery is in new york and unsure about the deal. caller: good morning. i do have mixed feelings about it. part of me says some deal is better than no deal, and another part of me says we have real genuine problems with iran, and if they violate a deal, what do we do? . i am critical of all religions so this is in particular to islam. the accra fleet -- theocracies as i'm concerned are the worst sorts of autocracies and i blame the governments, not the people of the nations, but we have real problems there. islam has not had a reformation the way the west has, and

everything has gotten more extreme in iran. it is not the iran that elected a democratic government and that if we had left them alone might have gone on a better path. host: we will get a response. . guest: valerie is right, there is plenty of blame to go around from the u.s. pummeling iran's democratic government to iran taking hostage of u.s. diplomats and so on and so forth. the reality again, that we have much broader problems with iran is should we have to tackle everything at the same time? the trump administration imposed 12 conditions onas i said, the . it did not really managed to achieve all of its -- any of its strategic objectives. that is why i think tackling the most urgent issue with iran is

important. although this will be an imperfect agreement, you usually start with the first deal and start building on it. if you destroy it completely, it is more difficult to bring a stronger deal forward and built on the ruins of the original agreement. i think that is the mistake that was committed. host: ali vaez today the house is considering legislation to address sentencing dispairs for crack cocaine and powder cocaine. house speaker nancy pelosi said they'll vote on the bill thursday. when the house is back in session find live coverage here on c-span.