where he looks at the digital divide in america and offers suggestions to close the gap. watch book tv every sunday on c-span2 and find a full schedule on your program guide or watch online anytime at booktv.org. ♪ >> exploring the people and events that tell the american story on american history tv. on "the presidency" the 60th anniversary gala with caroline kennedy and jill biden reflecting on the work of jacqueline kennedy for founding the association. on lectures incited -- on lectures in history, joseph riley and carrie taylor talk about why a new african-american history museum is being built in the city joined by the former

south carolina congressman and the author of "my vanishing country." exploring the american story every weekend and find a full schedule and watch online anytime at c-span.org. >> "washington journal" continues. host: we are back with jacob stokes who is a fellow in the indo's post -- indo pacific security program at the center for a new american security to discuss national security threats to the united states. in morning. guest: good morning and thank you for having me. host: let us set the stage for the conversation. how would you describe the biden administration's china policy right now? guest: i think the best shorthand for the bided -- the biden administration's china policy can be described as

competitive coexistence in that order. let me go through with what is entailed with each of those. starting with competition, competitive, it is a recognition that china is less of a partner and more of a geopolitical and strategic competitor on the world stage, and that the challenge from china is multifaceted, it spans diplomacy, military affairs, technology, economics, and also values. it is a recognition that china's rise has reached a certain point where it is really starting to challenge american values and interests and the rules-based global order, not just in east asia or in the indo pacific or increasingly around the world. then there is the second word, coexistence which is a recognition of two things, one that china is large and powerful, and that conflict with china would be a negative, not

only for the united states, but also china and the world, and avoiding such a conflict is an important goal, but also that finding ways and we need to find ways to work with china in the context of cooperation with a number of different countries to advance common issues like preventing climate change, global economic stability and security with a pandemic. it is an attempt to balance those two things but it starts with the recognition that china is a major competitor for the united states, and that we need to strengthen not only our domestic bases of power, but also our alliances and partnerships around the world to be able to compete with china over time. host: you said that china is one of our major competitors, would you say that china is our greatest competitor on the world stage? guest: absolutely.

we have seen that from the biden administration officials as well. the term that is used often by the defense department is the pacing threat, which means it is the threat that is in front of all the others when we are thinking about challenges to u.s. national security, also global stability and democratic values around the world. we learned this week that president biden is going to make several stops in asia this spring. which will be his first visit as president to the region. from your perspective, what does he need to do, and what does he need to say to assure our allies and keep us in this competition with china while he is in the region? guest: sure. this is set out to be an important trip for president biden going to asia. he has set to go to japan for a

meeting of democratic partners, big and powerful countries in asia including united states, india, japan, and australia. and they have served as a leading group for supporting the rules-based international order and regional order in asia, and the biden administration has done a good job of sustaining and improving that group. they held the verge for -- the first virtual leaders summits of that grouping and the first in person leaders summit hosted last year. this is a continuation and deepening of that relationship over time. in addition, what is important about them is that it is not a grouping designed to be against china, but to answer what we are hearing from allies, partners, and other countries is that they want an affirmative vision which

they mean -- they mean they want to know what we are working for. they want maritime security, vaccine distribution, supply chain security, things like that that show that the u.s. and close partners can be for and how to provide alternatives to chinese options. in addition we do not know the full list of countries where president biden will stop on his trip. it is likely that we will see some stops in south korea as we think about the threat from north korea, but also that is one of our most important alliances in the region, and it is possible that they will either stop potentially in china or in a country in southeast asia, it ultimately it is about offering an affirmative version for the reason -- version -- vision for the region and that the united states president is committed. host: let me remind our viewers

that they can take part in the conversation. we will open up regular lines meaning that republicans, your number will be 202-748-8001. democrats, you can call 202-748-8000. independents, your line is 202-748-8002. keep in mind that you can always text 202-748-8002 -- 202-748-8003 and we are always reading on social media at twitter at c-spanwj and facebook.com/c-span. you said we do not know which countries exactly that president biden will visit while in asia, is there any chance that he would visit taiwan, because we know that the tensions between taiwan and mainland china, we can also see a similar pattern but between the tensions going on between ukraine and russia right now. guest: yes. i think there have been parallels drawn on the issue on

whether president biden will visit taiwan. i think it is unlikely. we have not seen u.s. officials visit taiwan at the presidential level or really above the ministerial level or cabinet minister level. cabinet member level. and that has been a long-standing practice that goes back to the normalization of ties with china and de recognition of taiwan. ultimately our taiwan policy is about maintaining a status quo. for president biden to visit taiwan would be a major shift in the status quo, and not really consistent with the policy. as for the impact of potential with ukraine situation on taiwan, i think there are several angles to consider when thinking about how china might view the situation in ukraine.

you know, president she -- xi will be watching the response of the united states and other allies like japan. president xi can draw two opposing conclusions and we will have to be analytically cautious about assuming we know which one he will pick. on the one hand he could conclude that the u.s. and allies' inability to prevent a russian invasion if that comes to pass means the same would hold true for taiwan. on the other hand, he could conclude that a major u.s. and allied response to russia over ukraine might pin down the united states and europe and reduce the attention and resources that washington can devote to east asia and make taiwan more vulnerable. we do not really know how xi jinping will interpret the

situation. ultimately the situation in ukraine is one of many factors that he would have to weigh about using force against taiwan and local factors in east asia including the military balance and political situation in taipei and beijing are more likely to be much more can -- much more important considerations than in europe. host: earlier we were talking about china and the olympic games. from a diplomatic standpoint, what is president xi's goal? guest: president xi's goal is really to show that china is a major advance power in the world, and that it is really an attractive -- china has an attractive and sex -- successful governance model. i think that has ultimately been undermined in part by the united states led diplomatic boycott

where athletes go, but senior u.s. officials do not, which really deprives beijing of the political pageantry that they would get of having the u.s. and other allied leaders flocking to beijing to watch the olympics. and i think what is important about the strategy is that it has been calibrated enough that it has gotten the support of a number of other countries from the united kingdom to more tacitly japan and india, and having more countries on board makes it more meaningful if -- then if the united states was alone in sending the message that the abuses must be condemned. as it relates, china hosted the olympics in 2000 eight and it was at a time when china was still emerging in the world stage and it got a lot of kind of image benefits from hosting the olympics in 2008. my sense is the picture in 2022

is not as positive. it really has been an opportunity for anywhere there is free media in the world that is not authoritarian to really focused on -- focus on china's human rights abuses. i do not think what president xi is seeking is what he is guessing -- getting. host: we are starting with cornelia from cottonwood, idaho on the republican line. good morning. caller: hello and good morning. hello? host: go ahead. caller: i was just going to ask two questions. one has to do with our withdrawal from afghanistan and leaving our base, that is close to the chinese country and what effect that would have on our

military security down the road. and also, what effect with the biden family being tied economically and gaining all kinds of wealth from the chinese government, what effect does that have on our president's trip to china, those are my two questions and i will thank you very much. host: go ahead and respond. caller: -- guest: thank you. the question about how the withdrawal from afghanistan might affect the u.s. military position in the indo pacific overtime is an important one, so i am glad that the caller raised the issue. as it relates to the particular base in afghanistan that she is referring to, most military leaders would say that the operational imperatives, the ability to fly planes out of

that base for operations are pretty minimal and we would need to be able to control or have access to that base, but also to have permission from the government in afghanistan to be able to do those operations and to protect our forces over time. it is much more likely or operational beneficial operationally unofficial to operate from other races. we have bases in japan and south korea with more access in australia and other places. the notion that we would stay in afghanistan simply to retain access to one base, i do not think the resources required really would justify the military benefit thereof. it took many billions of dollars a year, upwards of 10 plus billion dollars a year to fight even at the very low level

forces in afghanistan in the final years, and so, diverging those resources from the 20 year war in afghanistan to rebalance the u.s. military forces and an investment to each -- to east asia and the indo pacific will get us more value against china. host: her first question was about a connection between -- a financial connection between the biden family and china, do we know anything about that? guest: i think we see financial connections between china and a number of american political leaders, you know, there have been some stories about it related to biden that is much more well documented for the trump family and other families. more is -- how can we implement measures to ensure transparency about not just our president but any of our political leaders' financial

ties and assets to foreign government. it is about creating a system that has transparency over time. host: let's go to dominic calling from virginia on the republican line. dominic, good morning. caller: good morning. how are you? host: just fine. go ahead. caller: i have two comments, by joe biden and going to asia and not going to taiwan sends a message to china that our current president in my opinion is both -- and incompetent. the chinese will view that as weakness if he does not go to taiwan. it is one of our oldest allies in the region. i did live in hong kong prior to china taking over and just look at what they have done to that country. you lead them into taiwan after putin decides to march into ukraine and we do not have anything to do with it, we just

send a strong message that we are going to sit back in a laissez-faire attitude and let china do what they want. i am done. host: go ahead and respond there, jacob. guest: i think the color raises an important question. particularly as a relates to hong kong, that is a good example of what we would be likely to see if china were to use military force and be able to invade taiwan. the traditional model for hong kong has been known as one country, two systems. but china throughout that agreement that have been made with the united kingdom but was really an agreement with the world and crushed the opposition with an iron fist in hong kong. i think china offered that model to taiwan and the people in taiwan are unequivocally rejecting it because they do not want to have what happened to them -- happen to them what

happened to the people in hong kong. it is a cautionary tale for taiwan but also for those of us it's in the rest it -- us in the rest of the expansion of chinese influence on taiwan would be. technically speaking, taiwan is not an ally of the united states. we have a special relationship with taiwan, a close partnership. the united states is committed by law under the taiwan relations act, to provide taiwan the ability to defend itself. whether we would come of the united states would, come to taiwan's aid and fight on its behalf with a conflict on the mainland and china, that is operated under a policy known as strategic ambiguity. we will not say whether that we will or we won't. there is debate on whether we should change that. ultimately, the most important thing is have steady deterrence

with china and upholding the status quo. on the one hand, we need to spend additional -- send additional messages to deter china but we also need to provide reassurance that we are not going to unilaterally change our political viewpoint toward taiwan, which could precipitate china to start a conflict. if the president flew to taiwan, that has the potential of being interpreted in beijing as the change in the u.s. political position to support taiwan's independence, and that is not consistent with our policy. we can't deter china and support taiwan without taking moves that create instability and end up itself. host: has any u.s. president ever visited taiwan? guest: yes but not since 1979 when the u.s. changed its recognition from -- of china from taipei to beijing. host: ok. a comment from reuters --

i want to read a little bit of that to you and have you respond to it. guest: please do. host: with china knocking russia earlier this week in a united nations security council debate on ukraine called by the united states, both nations appear to see the gains of the opportunity to signal their increasing cooperation in the face of western states and other adversaries. many of whose diplomats are boycotting the games. with china making its ambition to bring taiwan back under beijing's control under 2020 increasingly clear and fears on the rise, china could benefit from close cooperation with russia, making it harder for it to be starved of energy. what is the relationship between russia and china now? guest: this is a very important

question. i am glad you raised it. this week's marks -- week marks a new high in china russian relations. she thinking and vladimir putin just held a sum as the winter olympics were beginning in beijing. this was notable because it was the first in-person meeting with the foreign leader that president xi has had since the president began more than two years ago. after this summit, the two countries released a comprehensive joint statement that proclaimed their relationship is at its best point in history and has "no limits," which is far beyond what many observers thought was possible just a few years ago. this moment has been decades in the making and goes back -- going back to the cold war, china and russia were ideological in geopolitical enemies of the time with the soviet union but the two powers had relations as the cold war ended and is improving ties over periods of decade.

-- of decades. putin stepped up that intensely. the two leaders cling to have a strong personal support and xi called putin his best friend. they have met each other more than any other pair of world leaders during xi's 10 year and power. they both sit at the top of authoritarian political systems where they have accumulated power to themselves. so both xi and putin have been able to personally mandate and oversee a cooperative agenda between their countries that is both broader and deeper than ever before. it stretches across diplomatic, military, technological, energy, economic, and other realms. what is driving their cooperation i think as peter wrote in that column to some extent is a shared worldview. it is one that stands in opposition to the u.s.-led rules-based order in which these political and military threats from america its democratic allies in east asia and other.

that is not to say they are at 100% aligned on every issue. there are major faultlines in the relationship over trade imbalance, intellectual property theft, and over russia's fear of china becoming a vastly more powerful country. though both beijing and moscow have taken great pains to avoid inflaming those sensitive areas. it is a time of close cooperation between china and russia. one thing to go on a little further is that column suggests this question about whether the u.s. and -- u.s. is pushing china and russia could together -- russia together. that is often a question we hear in this field. framing this issue as united states as pushing china and russia together does not accurately capture what is going on. a better way to understand the situation, beijing and moscow are taking aggressive action that they themselves isolated from the rest of the world and

violate the rules-based international border that has underpinned the global security and stability since world war ii. they are creating a situation where they have only each other to turn to along with a few arteries like pakistan and north area. if we worry too much about pushing them together, policymakers run the risk of being two accommodating with china or russia's misbehavior and in doing so conceding important interests and values. we have to be realistic about what we are giving up and let we might get in return. of course diplomacy with beijing and moscow remains essential to avoiding conflict and we see the biden administration making that diplomacy a priority with both countries. at the same time, giving up on bedrock interests and values in the hopes of enticing china or russia to abandon the other is unlikely to work. the old notion that comes from the kissinger era and nixon of a strategic triangle with

china, russia, and the united states is outdated and ignores the other power centers in europe, india, japan, and elsewhere. washington needs to lead a coalition to balance chinese and russian power. if we do that, the threat from them working together is ultimately less worrisome. i think we see the biden administration focusing on revitalizing alliances and partnerships, and that is in part a recognition of the need to build that counterbalancing coalition. host: let's talk to james calling for michigan on the democrats line. good morning. caller: hi, good morning. i will make the question quick. i would like to tightknit -- tired back to the taiwan issue. to ask your guest, in his opinion -- and i'm not looking at official policy -- in his opinion, does he think the united states would go to war, call it war, on behalf of taiwan if or when china decides

to when they want to bring taiwan into their orbit? thank you. guest: i think the united states would see it as crucial to regional and global stability, and ultimately to the u.s. interests. i think we would see, as the u.s. is required to do under law, united states providing supplies and assistance to taiwan to help taiwan to bend itself, so that is a question of what the level of military support would be, and i think it would likely be very high. there is a broad skill recognition that needing to deter chinese aggression against taiwan but also against disputed territories in the east china sea with japan or south china sea, potentially on the border with india, is essential. it is not just about the

territory, small pieces of territory. it gets to larger questions of regional and global security. i think the united states would not stand aside and let china take over taiwan without any massive response. host: let's talk to ethan calling from honolulu, hawaii on the independent line. good morning. caller: a ha, c-span. -- aloha, c-span. in addition to two questions -- i have two questions. in addition to what you have mentioned, what is china afraid of in regards to the united states? my second question is, are there conflicts between china and russia, regular con -- conflicts between them? guest: thank you for your question. what is china afraid of is an essential question and i'm glad

you raised it. ultimately, the most important political and strategic goal for china in its current incarnation is to protect the rule of the chinese communist party over the state and china. one of the things that the chinese communist party sees as a threat from the united states is two things, one they worry that the u.s. and allies are trying to contain china by encircling it with alliances and partnerships to contain china's rise in a replication of what we did with the soviet union during the cold war. they are also worried the united states and other democratic countries are trying to sew the seeds of democratic revolution in china and pursue a policy of regime change. ultimately, that is what they

really worry about. china's leaders are not just worried about threats from the united states, they are also worried about challenges coming from within china. they are worried about being seen as losing legitimacy in the eyes of their own people and being subject to what they call a color revolution, which would be a political uprising. that is why they use force to put down the protests in tiananmen square and that is why you see such ironfisted response in hong kong. there is that worry that there is a kind of -- that there would be a political uprising against party leadership. i think a lot of behavior from the prc government comes back to this question of regime security. the second question on whether there were conflicts between china and russia, they fought a

brief war in the 1960's during the height of what was known as the sino-soviet split. they were estranged for many decades and had much of the military forces lined up on their long shared border against one another. at the end of the cold war, they worked hard to build trust and to work slowly took the the relationship, and it took them a long time. they still have disagreements or potential disagreements over economic issues, linton electoral -- issues, intellectual property theft, potential for dispute over certain pieces of territory, so there are those fault lies in the china/rush holt relationship that we should we -- china/russia relationship that we should be watching. united states is not in a position to create or drive wedges between russia and china

but we should be on guard to see if those fault lines are splitting and wedges are arising naturally and whether we can exacerbate or make them worse. host: let's talk to john calling from johnstown, pennsylvania on the democrats line. good morning. caller: good morning, gentlemen. one reason i think china is eating our lunch is because china does not have enough structure party like the republican party like the republican party in our country. the reason why we got out of afghanistan, it was costing us $1 billion per week and i think it was a great thing that biden did. no matter how you would get out of that country, it would never be pleasing to everybody. i'm thinking that really showed a great deal of strength rather than weakness. thank you. guest: i think the caller raises two important issues. one is that ultimately for

democracy to work and for democracy to continue, for us to be able to show the world democracy is a better political system than authoritarian governance in china is that we have to show our system can deliver benefits to people regular people, average citizens in the united states, but to some extent around the world, better outcomes than authoritarian political systems can like in china. that is a key part of the u.s. last china competition. is this question over governance and over values? china would argue that they do deliver a better outcome than democracy. that is quite incorrect in my view. wholely wrong but it is not a self -- we have to prove that that is the case by delivering results over time. it is really incumbent on both

parties to work together, to deliver, solve problems and deliver those benefits for citizens, to demonstrate democracy works. so that is a really key issue going forward. i think the caller notes he was probably right about the level of money being spent at the height of the u.s. involvement in afghanistan where we had many more forces on the ground. i think it was substantially less money per week by the end because the size of the u.s. force in afghanistan had gone down dramatically. but it was a still -- a very meaningful amount of money. that is one of the strategic rationales we had for ending the war in afghanistan, to be able to rebalance u.s. diplomatic and security priorities, to focus on china and russia as what is called major power competition but also transnational threats

like climate change and health security and other things that have come to the fore in the two decades since we have been fighting in afghanistan. host: let's talk to andrew calling from connecticut on the republican line. good morning. caller: good morning. my question is more of a logistics question. how do you see china invading taiwan? is it going to be a d-day type invasion, a sea type invasion, a long-range bombing type to -- type invasion? do you think some type of destabilization political attack? how do you see the attack going? i know you are not a general but how do you see the attack coming from china? guest: it is important -- there could be several scenarios as you pointed out, and part of the

challenge in deterring china but preparing for an attack is making sure that's we are ready for all different types of scenarios. you can certainly see, as you put it, which is smart, a crimea-like situation where there are special forces but also an attempt to sew political chaos in taiwan. i don't think it would be as effective for the russians and crimea but that is one scenario we look at. another is more like a d-day scenario where there is a full all-out fast and big invasion against the strait. we would likely see turn out amassing forces before it happened, similar to what we see russians doing across from ukraine right now. it would be a major task for them because getting the number of forces china would need to

fight taiwan's military and any country's or japan providing assistance, they would need a lot of assistance. they need the ships to get them across the strait. we look at things in the defense analysis community does not only does china have the amphibious ships to get across the strait but can they pull in commercial vessels to ship troops across? and how can taiwan make itself difficult to be invaded? we talked about the porcupine strategy, hard to swallow. that has been the focus of taiwan's defense policy and u.s. cooperation to try to improve taiwan's ability to defend itself, but as we said, you have to be ready for a range of different scenarios. there is also the question of

kind of how much of chinese actions against taiwan would be pre-planned or pre-meditated. certainly in general they want to take back taiwan but in terms of planning a war, it could be premeditated over a longer period of time or it could come as a result of china using aggressive military maneuvers that results in an accident and then there is political and military escalation that becomes uncontrolled, so china has to -- but also taiwan -- has to decide to fight a full-scale war on pretty short notice. being prepared to respond any time is another critical element to this challenge. host: let's talk to lettie calling from texas on the democrat line. good morning. caller: hi. good morning. thank you, and thank you, mr. stokes, for your welcomed knowledge. i want to make a, and have a question. since the corporations have all

-- a comment and have a question. since the corporations have sent all of their companies have been making items in china for so many years including our computer technology because everything is about huge profits, it has made china a major power. and because of that, i think that is why we are in the mess we are in. over the last four years, putin has had an open door to do what he wants and now he and xi stan to be standing -- seem to be standing together against us. the gop has never been on the side of the working class or seniors of this country. i am fearful for the united states. i feel like we are heading towards an authoritarian or dictatorship style of government , a one-party system ruled by

the gop. i would like you to comment on those things as far as corporations making just about everything in china anymore and what our u.s. is looking like for the future. thank you. guest: thank you. i think those are all really important issues you raise. thank you for the call. this question of how u.s. investments have facilitated the rise of china's economy and whether that was a smart, strategic decision over a period of decades is admittedly a bed of a complicated one, but there is a growing i think bipartisan consensus that we need to -- that it is starting to pose a more direct challenge to u.s. economic interest but also our strategic interests and values.

there is an attempt now to rebalance the trade relationship. we see u.s. trade representative ambassador kathryn tie talking about workcenter trade policies as we negotiate the next round after the so-called phase one trade agreement with china, we negotiate what comes after that in the trade relationship to make it more fair, to level the playing field, to respond to where china is not adhering to the rules of the global trading system. so that is a really key area going forward. at the same time, there is a broader discussion about what types of economic interactions are helping to advance china's technological and military capabilities. over the period of recent years,

we have seen u.s. policymakers focus on looking more closely at chinese and other foreign investment in the united states, including reforming the process that is for what is known as the committee on foreign investment in the united states so it covers more sectors, so we do not have chinese companies buying up strategic assets in the united states. increasingly, it is cut it is also looking at what is known as outbound investment. so where's wall street and other u.s. companies and private equity? are they investing in chinese companies that are doing things like a lot parading with the chinese military or cooperating with chinese companies that are involved in surveillance and human rights abuses and thinking about ways that we should impose restrictions on those types of investments where u.s. capitol is helping facilitate -- u.s.

capital is trying to advance china in those areas. that will be a critical shoe going forward. host: we would like to thank jacob stokes, a fellow in the end of pacific program for the center for a new american security for being on with us this morning and sharing his knowledge about the chinese national security threat to the united states. thank you so much for your time this morning. guest: it was a pleasure. thank you for having me. host: up next, minky worder of human rights watch will join us to discuss the issue of chinese human rights abuses hanging over the olympic games. on monday, nba star and activist miss cantor freedom spoke about the u.s. diplomatic we can't and his message to fellow athletes when it came to the olympics and china. >> for me, diplomatic boycott is good because it shows

[indiscernible] i feel like all the athletes out there are saying enough is enough, this is bigger than sports. i think one called it really well, i call it the below shame and [indiscernible] it is not more important than your morals or principles. i feel like all the athletes need to stand up for something because in basketball, i'm not going to participate where in a country where there is a genocide happening. i feel are people need to understand the problems are with the national committee. they are in the same bed as china. i think athens has a huge choice and they need to use it. whenever i have a conversation with one of the athletes, i

bring in the missing tennis player and i said look what they do to their own tennis player, are we going to trust ccp with our own players? also, there was an article where the chinese comers party said while the athletes are in china, they are not allow to make any kind of statement about political stuff. that is pre-much killing freedom of speech. when i have a calm -- pretty much killing freedom of speech. whenever i have a conversation with athletes, i say whenever your daughter, sister, wife, was on a trip, would you still go? i understand -- i get this question a lot, but the athletes are working so hard for how many years to get to that level? but i'm saying there are bigger things than sports right now.

all the gold medals in the world are not more important than peoples' lives. i think we need to understand where -- understand what we are sending our athletes too. it is just bad. >> do you feel you are making any headway with your fellow nba members? do you think you speaking out as having an impact and opening people's eyes? guest: whenever we have a conversation -- >> whenever we have a conversation in private, we talk about what people are going through. when i started to talk about all the issues, and not just this puts what tobias, taiwan, and others are going through, not just people around the lake, not just athletes, but people who work for nba, even the rafts,

and i wanted to learn what is going on. whenever we sit down and have a conversation, they understand and acknowledge that genocide and they know what is going on. but unfortunately, they are too scared to say anything because of obviously again business and money and silence. that's what breaks my heart. they know what is going on, and they know about the abuses but because they have the endorsement deals or jersey sales or shoe sales in china, they tell me they have two remain silent while they are supporting me in praying for me. my one side, it breaks my heart for them to remain silent, but i'm like i will do everything i can to educate them. i cannot stop because of all of