our broken election, how the left to. change the way you vote. . on 10 p.m. eastern and afterwards, ro haskell on his -- where he talks about his path to becoming a state senator at age 22. he is interviewed by a millennial action project and president. watch book tv every sunday on c-span2 and find a full schedule on your program guide or watch online anytime at book tv.org. host: joining us is michael kofman with the sensor for naval center for naval analysis to talk about russia-ukraine tensions. thank you for your time. guest: thank you. host: can you elaborate more about the center, the work you do, the position it take, and how it is funded? guest: we are a federally funded

research center that is nonpartisan to provide research and analysis for the government and other organizations. the center is also housing a larger corporation called the cna corporation, similar to the ram corporation. host: when it comes to actions involving russia and ukraine, a lot of ways of looking at it, particular, what do you see playing out, not only between those two countries in united states and europe for that matter, but also the leadership involved in decision-making? guest: it is rather dangerous. there is a higher chance of conflict today than there ever has been since the military operations in 2014 and 2015. it is a fairly intense standoff. it does look like russia is

putting the pieces in place to conduct a large-scale military operation. whether they intend to do that has been the subject of extensive debate. both here and across the atlantic in europe. russia denies that they have any offensive intentions towards ukraine. -- intents toward ukraine despite launching a number of offenses. you can take that for what it's worth. there's a great deal of concern of if there is a renewed or reignited much larger war, the wars continue between these states since 2014 and will fundamentally change the european security order. a rather defining moment for european security. host: you write in a recent op-ed, a large war in europe is likely coming in the current weeks. the architecture of the continent, future of nato, and america's role in shaping security outcomes are all at stake going on saying ukraine ,whose fate hangs in the

balance, maybe at the center of the crisis. but -- a revision of the security order. can you elaborate? guest: in the months up to this, i thought a conflict was more likely than not and most of the evidence unfortunately points to that conclusion. the russian demands issued in december are not specific to ukraine. they are about relitigating the post-cold war settlement and security architecture. namely how security arrangements , in europe are decided, by whom, how security options are decided, russia wants to be the determining power with a voice in europe and with a deed over secure -- a veto over security arrangements. it wants to veto who other countries can ally with. it wants privileged influence in the geopolitical space and sees its interest in security concerns as having supremacy over the ability of other countries, particularly neighboring countries, being able to choose their own alliances or strategic orientations.

this is a defining moment because it fundamentally conflicts with the order in europe that european countries have saw to build and the united , states as well, and the united states has been clear it will not compromise on russia's principal demands. in those demands i can briefly list. first, no more nato enlargement. the top of the list, no ukraine and georgia. no further defense cooperation second, when it comes to key conventional or strategic systems amongst non-nato members, military basing selling key , weapons technologies or deploying u.s. weapons in these countries. third, russia demands that nato and the united states pulls back military deployment that have taken place in europe since 1990, it calls for a return to pre-1997 military posture which tells the united states and european states to go back to germany and the posture at the end of the cold war.

none of those are acceptable to the united states or europe. host: we saw the german canceler -- the german chancellor come to the united states and the french president speaking to president putin himself. as far as those two players on the europe scene, allies in this effort, what do they face and the risk they face in how far they engage with ukraine? guest: they are challenged because the united states and european allies have to coordinate and align calls. looking at the situation today not all countries agree about , their interpretation of vladimir putin's intentions. the united states and u.k. are on one page and germany and france might be on a different page and less concerned that a war is likely and seeing the case of diplomacy where russia is just trying to see what it can get. ukraine is in a difficult position because if they acknowledge an invasion is

likely, they will create panic. the economy is under pressure, investment is basically running away, and there is concern that invasion or not, russia could collapse the economy simply by the threat sustained over time. he is both trying to paint the tone that russian aggression is a serious danger right now, but the same time trying to downplay it while saying the threat of invasion is unlikely and the estates is exaggerating it for local and economic reasons. host: michael kofman joining us. if you want to ask questions about news you've heard about russia and ukraine and the role of europe, call us at (202) 748-8001 republicans, (202) 748-8000 democrats. independents (202) 748-8002. if you want to text us your thoughts this morning you can do

so at (202) 748-8003. the lead editorial in "the washington post" talks about the minsk arrangement and they highlight in part -- the doctrine signed by russia and ukraine calls for resuming control over the borders between russia and donbass which has been wiped out. ukraine insists its borders to be restored for the election and russia manipulating the vote through its separatist proxies say no. it goes on from there, but can you talk about the minsk arrangement, what it is and it's importance as far as you see when it comes to this discussion? guest: as a result of the fighting in the winter of 2015, the two sides signed the minsk agreement, a cease-fire agreement was basically signed at gunpoint. ukraine was not successful so it was imposed on ukraine and deeply unfavorable.

it was essentially what you would call a actors piece -- victoire's peace. in that agreement, russia stipulated essentially that ukraine would have to change its constitution, grant a greek -- a degree of autonomy to separatist regions and eventually there would be elections and ukraine would can gain -- regain control. the agreement was very different, which is actually it is russia that should surrender control and give ukraine control of the borders. and then ukraine would conduct elections. russia said, no, were not going to do that. if russia withdraws from the territory it is occupying, ukraine will do whatever they want with it and reneged on the agreement. the foreign minister basically trying to find a way to get the sequencing right of the agreement but the long story short, this deal has largely been dead and has not progressed forward.

the last hope for it was when zelensky got elected, moscow hoped he would make major compromises. it became clear zelensky will not go forward and make the compromise russia seeks because they might -- big parts of ukraine society don't agree with it and it is political suicide. long story short, there's been no progress on the deal. from the russian point of view, there isn't the likelihood of global compromise which is one of the driving factors behind why they began their military deployments a year ago, to pressure ukraine and if they don't get something significant along their list of demands, they won't actually conduct a further, much larger invasion. host: mr. kofman, the german chancellor was in the united states visiting with the president and what came up was the support for nato and the

nord stream 2. i want to play a question to the president and get your response. [video clip] >> mr. president, once again a question with regards to arms exports, do you think it is ok that nato partners have different -- with others on the nord stream 2? do you think the current positioning of germany with regard to the russian threat is ok? president biden: look, there is no doubt in america's mind that germany is an incredibly reliable ally and one of the leading physical powers in nato. number one. number two, the notion that nord stream 2, would go forward with an invasion by the russians is just not going to happen. host: mr. kofman, the first part

of the statement, germany as a reliable ally, what would you make of that? guest: germany is one of america's most reliable allies and has been. host: as far as the nord stream 2, what is its importance? guest: russia and germany long had an agreement that russia would build a pipeline to germany called nord stream 2. russia currently supplies a considerable amount of gas and oil to europe. much of the transit pipelines that transverse ukraine and the ukrainian territory, it would allow russia to directly supply gas to germany along with another pipeline and this will essentially -- the need for ukraine pipelines and ukraine would lose much of the leveraging it relationship. the pipeline is completed but not active.

gas is not going to the pipelines yet. there is a clear threat to russia in the event of a large , military operation against ukraine, germany will scuttle the deal and russia will spend a tremendous amount of money to build the pipeline and essentially lose out. it is not going to somehow end gas to europe. it is not operational. it is a threat. i personally have often found nord stream 2 be a political issue, significant political issue in europe because it was controversial in the sense that germany was more interested in having a secure line access to russian energy to the detriment of the foreign policy of certain other european states. that's where the controversy came from. the impact on the russian economy, or this is a threat, it's not very significant. this is one of the most minor things that we or anyone else could do in response to renewed

russian invasion. we talk about it kind of like small potatoes in terms of potential u.s. sanctions or moves to economically punish russia. host: this is michael kofman with the center for naval analyses. joining us on this discussion. (202) 748-8001 republicans. democrats, (202) 748-8000. independents (202) 748-8002. you can text the comments at (202) 748-8003. james, newington, connecticut, republican line. james, good morning. caller: michael, i would like to say that the american news media often does very little actual news reporting to explain the background of any situation and i would like you to comment on explaining to people about the pipeline itself in ukraine and how that pipeline actually is the reason for the initial russian incursion into ukraine

when the ukrainian prime minister who took over tried to raise the price of moving gasoline, natural gas from russia through the pipeline to europe. that precipitated the very first ukrainian-russian international issue where the russians decided to try to take it over because they wanted to get that pipeline under their control. i would like you to comment on the second part, how the weakness or perceived weakness of our president joe biden, under trump, not one inch of ukrainian territory was lost but we have to remember the invasion of ukraine in crimea and northern ukraine started in the biden administration with obama. i wonder if your perception of european leaders regarding our old president is that he is too weak to stop the russians. thank you for your help, sir. host: that was james. guest: the first part of that on

background, the answer that there is a pipeline that runs to ukraine, the pipeline origin is quite old. the soviet union began to supply energy to europe starting in the early 1970's. both soviet addiction and russian addiction to gas and oil exports dates back to the history of russia inherited an addiction to natural resources going back to this time period. the history of the price war. there is a severe history of gas price disputes and transit disputes between russia and ukraine in the mid-2000s. i remember winter 2000 and nine

and there about this long predates the crisis. the crisis and the war itself was not caused by an energy dispute and is not directly related to the gas pipeline, nor was the flow of energy disrupted during the course of the conflict. it is fortunate that the revolution in 2013, yanakovich fleeing ukraine in 2014, and following that there was a russian seizure of crimea, and operation in late february 2014. russia answered but at the same time countered with a separatist movement in eastern ukraine which led to fighting that escalated and led to a russian military operation in august 2014 where real conventional fighting in the country. long story short is that there is a history of gas pricing disputes between russia and ukraine. those are primarily economic disputes but at some point they

reached crisis levels where gas was briefly cut off to europe. that is not the cause of this conflict. the conflict that are looking into now is essentially interstate war that dates back to 2014, very different. the origins of the current dispute and the current standoff have to do with russian policy. it has occupied a piece of ukrainian territory and use that as a grappling hook for ukraine's strategic orientation. that policy is not proven very successful for moscow since 2015. it looks like russia has basically come back with a much greater threat and series of old demands of the united states and european countries. obviously, ukraine is very much at the center of this crisis. host: david in florida, independent line. caller: do you think there's any

chance that the u.s. navy is going to be patrolling in the black sea? if any of these conflicts erupt? and what do you think the chances are of a naval skirmish? if you do see a naval skirmish, what do you predict the outcome will be? guest: thanks. the u.s. is currently deployed in the mediterranean and there is substantial russian naval presence gathering in the eastern mediterranean as part of a naval standoff taking place. actually, not being well observed or covered. the focus is on the russian ground posture and what's going on around ukraine but both sides are bringing in forces. both sides are bringing up forces. there is nato ships as well. with regards to the black sea, while the united states does regularly have a naval presence in the black sea for exercises,

presence, maintaining relations, and the like, i don't expect a strong u.s. presence in the black sea. i expect much of the naval standoff will be in the mediterranean but it is hard to predict how a conflict will evolve. keep in mind, the u.s. navy as an outside actor, the black sea is heavily restrained by presence. naval presence to the black sea and access from the old treaty , 100 years old, and it stipulates a real restriction to the types of ships and the placement of the ships, the fleet you can deploy and the amount of time, the duration of your stay in the black sea, it is constraining and it is governed by turkey. that placed pretty large restrictions on the united states. last but not least a conflict is , very unlikely but

if there is a renewed russia invasion, i think there's going to be some very tense periods some significant military activity and proximity between u.s. forces and -- and interactions between forces. it will get tense. host: nbc and others today about russia beginning military drills with belarus, what is the importance of that? guest: this to be frank seems largely a cover being used by russia to have a good story as to why to deploy such an immense amount of military power in the past month. russia said it will withdraw forces currently in belarus, however it is very clear that a large number of units deployed are not there for exercises and are not in the training areas. instead they are concentrating

, in the southern part of belarus on ukraine's border so they are positioning for a northern front in the potential military operation, and they are not far from the craney and capital of kyiv. they are actually probably the units closest the ploy to it. the answer is that we will see. we will see what happens. russia is gathering more forces and moving them to the border. these are manned formations. it is behaving in a way that suggests they are seriously considering a large scale military operation. if this is a fluff, it is an incredibly convincing one and coordinated one because they are engaging in all the actions and behaviors of a state about to invade another state. host: when it comes to timing, do you see this happening in weeks or does president putin play a longer game? when it comes to these kinds of ideas.

guest: that has been a function -- subject of some debate. i think russian political leadership is entering a go or no go posture where they will make a decision in the coming weeks and this will play out within the month. i do believe that they have the ability to -- if they draw down forces and leave equipment pre-positioned in the area and take some of the units back, but this is deeply unlikely. if they do that, it will be clear to many they are in many ways, loving. the cost of invasion is high for them so i don't think they would be successful knowing that. host: bill in scottsville, arizona, independent line. you are on with our guest. caller: thanks for taking my call. i like the portrait of the card. my screen is a little fuzzy. my question is, when you characterized putin as trying to revive the post-cold war

settlement in europe, which makes sense in a way considering that russia's power position in europe is different today than it was in the immediate aftermath of the soviet collapse. i guess bigger picture, i'm wondering if you see a possibility for a renegotiation of the terms of the post-cold war settlement that is agreeable to the west and russia, that does include limitations whether explicit or kind of behind the scenes, on nato inspection. -- expansion. others were cautioning against nato expansion in the 1990's so it is strange in my opinion, but it has become kind of a given to me. in u.s. foreign policy circles,

that nato expansion needs to be held as a possibility. thanks. host: thank you. arizona. guest: i think from the russian point of view, they see nato as the united states building and the order of exclusion. it excludes russia and european six -- european securities determined by the united states and europe. the point of view that russia has been historically one of the key powers to determine the security architecture in europe, they believe this was created at a time of russian absence and weakness and they do not accept it. you have a pretty big problem then. russia is militarily the most powerful country in europe. putting aside the naval alliance -- nato alliance from an

, individual state perspective, it is the most powerful and if it is not a stakeholder in a security architecture, it is not long term sustainable situation. it means you are one major crisis a way that could turn into a regional conflict and could potentially undermine the system. we take a lot of things for granted about european security, and how stable it is and maybe we shouldn't. can the united states and europeans renegotiate? that's what russians are trying to see. when this quarter was created, there was a belief that russia would come to see the benefits and could be included that russia would join the west and the global community and become a democracy, and russian community -- security concerns could be allayed. the process overlaid the process of soviet disillusionment.

the dissolution of the soviet -- soviet union is not an event, it is a process. russia is not equal to the military state. they are still a leadership that sees a historical russia where they want influence, and geopolitical states outside of russia's border they are trying to claim, and they have the power to fight for it. >> the big challenge is accepting this position from moscow. open-door policy is part of nato. obviously, there is a call for a prudent approach. countries want to join nato. it is upon members of nato to agree. it is very clear that ukraine and georgia are not getting into nato. if not now, perhaps not ever. this conflict is not

precipitated by some looming ukrainian -- tomato. united states and european countries have painted themselves into a corner where they are not willing to say that ukraine or georgia will not be members of nato. especially because moscow demands it. because moscow demands it, it is essentially coercing other states to change their policy and that makes it even less likely that they will get what they want. it is a gordian knot. it is not an easy 1-1. it is seen as sort of a principal position and one that dates back to the origins. at the heart of it is the belief that states in europe should have the ability to choose their alliances freely and not have it determined by other rate powers who claim that these countries

are in the sphere of influence and they have to do what moscow or someone else told them. >> from bill in massachusetts, independent line. hello. caller: what is the difference between us putting people -- lining up troops on the nato countries when russia is in nato? they will not attack any nato countries. that is ridiculous. nobody really talked about how that was for the democratic party but then they talked about the republicans censoring cheney for going against their party. host: we will leave it at that because it is not relevant to our conversation directly. go ahead. guest: the question about nato versus something in arizona -- i might have missed the second part of it. host: let's go to roger in

michigan. independent line. caller: yes. hello. i'm kind of off-base here a little bit, but as far as i am concerned, the whole russia and ukraine thing, i mean, that is insanity. the guy is power-hungry just like donald trump was. my question really is where did you get that painting over your right shoulder of jean-luc's petard -- jean-luc picard? host: we will leave it there. guest: as far as a follow-up to that, when it comes to prudent -- perceptions of putin, do we look at him as power-hungry? do we look at him as a post-power? what is the perception of putin and russia at least in the united states and why is that important to factor into how we act or at least the united states and nato acts? guest: russia is an

authoritarian regime. at the end of the day, he's going to decide what happens by talking with himself in the mirror. there are very few influences in russian foreign policy. it is important to remember that countries are run by people but they are not people. don't forget that there's 145 million russians and what they think is important, too. that said, i think that he is a calculating leader. he is rev and chest. historical russia matters to him. he has a strong belief that countries like ukraine belong to russia's geo global space. does not want to be the russian leader who lost, in his mind, and ukraine. he does not see these as independent countries. people like him are from a generation of leaders whose formative years were in the

soviet union so they remember when all of this was one country. to them, states like ukraine are not independent, not sovereign, and he sees ukrainian government as a puppet state of the united states. he does not really see ukraine as being an independent country making its own decisions in that sense. leaders can be rational but not necessarily reasonable and there is a difference between those two. they have a calculus, means and ways and the like, of how they are going to get where they are going. he is very emotional about the subject. he is rather emotional and angry about it and i think it's very clear from his writing on the subject that he feels that russian policy, namely his -- he is not willing to let ukraine become -- integrate with the west, join the west. he's not willing to see russian

influence in ukraine. there is a strong sense on his part that russia was betrayed, that russia was promised something at the end of the cold war about no further nato enlargement which is the russian narrative and most people in the united states and western europe don't subscribe to this interpretation of history. it is a sense of betrayal. and the revanche-ist attitude when it comes to these parts of historical russia. host: the significance at least to you of president putin and president she of china -- xi of china meeting before the olympics and the implications of what is going on at play? guest: russia and china have had an enduring alliance had one of the most consistent vectors of russian foreign policy has been a rapprochement with china. china is very supportive of russia. the issues resulting from that summit showed a very strong

chinese support for the russian position and the russian demands on security from the united states and nato. in practical policy terms, there are significant disagreements between a few countries and china not willing to do a great deal. if we take a look at whether it's recognition of the fact that russia annexed crimea or -- secondary sanctions. china enforces u.s. sanctions of china even better than a number of european states because it is so afraid of the consequences from noncompliance. long story short is that the two states are aligned in a lot of visible ways. they are pursuing competition with the united states. russian analysts like to say together but separately. from a standpoint of practical policy, there are major differences.

historically, it is not shown to be willing to take on significant costs on behalf of moscow. host: one more call on our independent line. caller: thank you for taking my call. a couple things. when biden first approached the whole subject, he kind of slipped out that it was a limited division. could this be a charlie -- where the media feeds it? and secondly, with china, is a dangerous partnership with russia that is very concerning. is that perhaps showing them together at the olympics a sign of things to come? rep. himes: ok, so i don't interpret president biden's comments -- guest: ok, so i don't interpret president biden's comments that way. it can be a limited military operation p and i suspect there is strong alignment on policy and sanctions in the event that

there is a large-scale russian invasion. russia has a range of options and it's very hard to predict what they will do. i have been on the more pessimistic side, believing it does not make sense for russia to conduct a limited military operation of any kind at this point. now it is 2015 and there is an acknowledgment that they could not achieve their political aims with this kind of military operation compelling ukraine to sign one agreement and then compelling them to sign another agreement and here we are many years later and russian influence in ukraine is waning. ukrainian -- defense cooperation with key nato members increasing as well. what would be the point? from the standpoint of what russian military posture, there's only one input in how you analyze these things. it looks like the pursuing of a

maximum solution. then looking to encircle the ukrainian capital to impose a pro-russian regime in ukraine and perhaps seizing ukraine's easternmost regions. even worse case scenario is from that. i don't think it will be a limited incursion or operation. i don't think it will be a repeat of the kind of fighting we saw earlier on in 2014 and 2015. host: the russia studies research program director, thank you for your time. really appreciate it. guest: thank you for having me on your program. >> c-span's washington journal. every day, we take your calls on the air on the news of the day and we discussed policy issues that impact you. coming up this morning, we will look at the biden administration's pandemic and mental health policies with joe rogan, former director of the

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recordings. find it on the c-span now mobile app or wherever you get your podcasts. ♪ >> jose andres and nutrition experts talked about the need to update child nutrition legislation. the discussion addressed child hunger and food insecurity which this panelist -- the panelists say worsened in the u.s. due to covid-19. this is an hour and 15 minutes. >> good day and thank you for joining this a discussion of the task force report we issued just last week that was entitled " strengthening the child -- program." i am the senior vice president with the center and i have the pleasure of working with our economic and health team on various public policy issues confronting policymakers today. you cain