>> coming up wednesday on c-span, the center for strategic and international studies looks at the relationship between china and russia and what it means for the united states. that is live at 10 a.m. eastern. later, new jersey democratic representative tom malinowski joins the jewish democratic council of america for an update on the crisis in ukraine in light of russia's latest actions. that is also live on c-span starting at 2 p.m. eastern. you can watch online at c-span.org or on the go with our free video app, c-span now.

now, a discussion about russian president vladimir putin and the current crisis between russia and ukraine, hosted by the carnegie endowment for international peace. this is 45 minutes. host: good morning, good afternoon, good evening, wherever you are in this world, i hope you and healthy. i'm aaron david miller. senior fellow at the carnegie endowment center for peace. welcome back to carnegie connects. a discussion on important issues . i'm delighted to host one of my carnegie collects, currently the head of carnegie's moscow center. welcome to carnegie connects. >> thank you very much. it's a pleasure to be on the show with you. host: it's great to have you. of the 40 and so carnegie

connects we have done since march of 2020, this one has got to be the most timely and perhaps the most challenging. because reading and analyzing the calculations and motivations of a single human is extremely difficult. last week i was using out loud -- musing that it would be hard-pressed in divine to figure out what mr. putin is up to. the situation has clarified so much in the last week. let me start by asking you a question. you are sitting in moscow. give us a sense if you could and can of what the atmosphere is like. i think you said a week ago that you said mr. putin had not

really conditioned or prepared his public for anything remotely resembling a major conflict. i wondered, what is the mood? >> the mood has changed dramatically last night when mr. putin spoke in the evening on television. he gave a 17-minute long address that started with a narrative the history of the ukraine-russia and history of the ukraine and then it passed to discuss the issues at hand with european security around russia's attitude toward european security and then he

talked toward the end, maybe 15 minutes after he had started he talked about the need to recognize the republic of donetsk. somewhere in the middle of the speech the impression some had was that mr. putin was going to announce an imminent invasion of ukraine, i had never considered so much possible as likely, and i never thought that was the actual objective of mr. putin's amassing of forces around the ukrainian border. but then he he rose to a very high pitch and then he descended very, very low to announce a measure, the recognition or of

donetsk and luhansk as different estates that could have been done by russia any time in the last seven or eight years, something a lot of people have been pressing for, something that was not bound to meet any resistance from ukraine. at the end of the day, i think i was very much

was going on and what would follow. i think this would've uncertainty has engulfed a lot of people. there is a lot of uncertainty about what comes next. aaron: if mr. putin were planning a massive military move , would he have had to condition the republic talking about sacrifices for mother russia. have you detected any of that art is that a reliable indicator of what he might do -- have you detected that is that a reliable indicator of what he might do? dmitri: the previous actions under mr. putin were all local conflicts and limited. a conflict, a war with a country next-door, a big nation, 40 million people, so closely tied to russia, along border with russia, that was bound to have major repercussions within

russia. i thought that had he planned anything of that scale, he would have had to start conditioning the russian people for what was to follow. instead, the russian state on television was making fun of the predictions made by the u.s. officials about various dates of russia's opposing invasion of ukraine. it was like carnival in many ways but this carnival stopped past night, and people have become much more somber than they ever were in the last few months. aaron: let's take it step-by-step, since we can. you also mentioned a week ago we were at the end of the beginning, which i thought was a curious but fascinating sort of formula.

in your assessment, where are we now and where do you think mr. putin is going? dmitri: we still think we are at the end of the beginning. i thought that the end, and i was wrong, i thought the end would be russia saying we will continue to press for the most important demands, no nato-ukraine, out of nato's military infrastructure in europe. at the same time sit down with the united states to talk about arms-control issues and confidence building issues based on the exchanges that the foreign ministry of the state department has had over the past few weeks. that, to me, looked like a

pretty credible scenario. instead, mr. putin has opted for a recognition of the donetsk republics is that mr. putin was -- ukraine was not fulfilling its obligations. this is on the back of the renewed shelling in donetsk board by the republics. the origins of all of that again are uncertain for a lot of people. but clearly this was how mr. putin decided to end this phase in my theory at this point, this

is nothing more than a theory, mr. putin for three months starting in november and all the way to where we are now has been trying a concentration of military forces around ukraine and the demonstration of his own resolve to use those forces in ukraine was trying to get the west to get him what he demanded , and also to get the united states in particular to lean hard on ukraine and president zelensky and kyiv to start implementing minsk. i think he took a decision that there was nothing to be extracted from the united states on the most important issues and in particular in the issue of minsk. minsk was not going to be implemented and i think this is the way, and this is only my conjecture at this point, this

is the way he decided to end the first phase, the beginning of his operation, to end on a high note, de-escalate by escalating. aaron: let's try to enter mr. putin's head. there is a line of argument, and you have seen it as well as i, who has been increasingly isolated, not just by covid, surrounded by hardliners and to some degree he is out of touch with the implications and consecration's -- consequences. yesterday at one wondered on cnn of putin's rationality. as yesterday, one official wondered on cnn of putin's

rationality. do you by this? dmitri: i buy the isolation argument because we all find ourselves more isolated than we have ever been probably in our lives. this certainly has a bearing on people who bear a lot of responsibility, in particular for their nations. i do not buy the argument of irrationality. i do not buy the argument of restlessness. i think mr. putin has been using this image that the western media has created of him with the image of reckless, incalculable irrational person. and using it quite definitely -- deaftly.

aaron: doesn't this depart somewhat from his previous pattern of limited moves on georgia, crimea , actors that are favorable? you have geographic advantage in george and crimea and long-standing allies in syria. the worst case on this would suggest this is a rather fundamental break from his previous cover relatively risk-averse strategies? is that a fair reading or not? dmitri: i would argue otherwise. i would say this is the most risk shy step that mr. putin could have taken to bring at least the beginning of the crisis to an end. a lot of people were seriously

and still are seriously expecting him to lunch a full-scale offensive to go to kiev to bound that city of 2.8 million innocent lives, innocent people and go to certainly across the river. what he has done was a no-brainer, if you like. here you have a region which is very close to russia. it has a long border with russia . it has been supported for eight years by russia. russia has its people inside, maybe not in the form of units of regular forces but certainly the instructors, volunteers, other people who are helping the

local militants to hold out against the ukrainian army. so clearly, and of course in donetsk , pressure -- russia has been seen as a savior and other have a prospect of stability in their life. because the next step at some point could be incorporation into the russian federation. on the three to 4 million people believed to be living in donetsk , 800,000 are already russian passport holders. there is another 1.2 million waiting for that. it is the least risky step that mr. putin could have taken. the alternative was for him to

call it in and send forces back to their barracks and come to moscow empty-handed because he has failed to get the most important prizes he had set for himself. that is how i see the situation today. aaron: but if this is risk aversion, and it makes perfect sense, is it a hiatus? will we see risk readiness in the days to come? is that contingent on anything or has mr. putin made a decision in his own mind that this is the first step to a far more ambitious aspirational set of objectives, which involves a major military move into ukraine? dmitri: a bit of both. i call this a risk shy measure

or almost risk free but it is not exactly risk-free. should russian forces arrive to the front line or what they call the front line donetsk line of donetsk , then you have a direct conflict between russia and ukraine and russia will not just stand there, they will start moving. there is another thing, the republic that russia has just recognized was born out of the territories of two regions in ukraine. part of those territories is controlled by ukraine and the constitutions of those two republics actually claimed the

territory of the oblisks and that a conflict would push russian forces to the limits or maybe beyond those limits. so we don't know. this is why i say there is a lot of uncertainty. on the one hand, it could be a de-escalation step if everything keeps quiet on the line of contact and nobody shoots up the other side or it could be the last step before a full-scale invasion. this is the last thing i will say in this portion. mr. putin did not exactly need

to deploy forces to donetsk for a major invasion of ukraine. aaron: i appreciate your implied humility and that you actually admitted that you were wrong, which is to me in the analytical community and in washington is probably unprecedented to admit you are actually wrong in your analysis, but i am pressing because the intelligence community the united states of america has made a judgment that mr. putin has plans for a massive military action into ukraine. the former defense deputy minister said sunday that mr. putin is not interested in securing guarantees in ukraine, he wants ukraine.

an hour colleagues in a very interesting piece deposited the notion of unfinished business that this is what mr. putin wants. what he wants, i don't know. a fractured state, but i know it is impossible to read but isn't it possible to argue this is step one? dmitri: it could be, but in my head, again, there. one is the objective that mr. putin was following in the last three months was to get the united states and provide them

with certain guarantees, call them what you want. ukraine was implemented in that but ukraine, although central in strategic terms was not central to his objective at this time. i clearly appreciate what the president has said in his article on ukraine that was published in june. he was very passionate about ukraine and he really believed that ukraine and russia are naturally inseparable and whoever tries to separate the two is a traitor to both. that is how i could summarize the just -- the gist he said

basically ukraine as a country isn't artificial creation of the bolsheviks and should be, in all honesty, called lennon's ukraine because it was lenin, stalin, khrushchev that added territories to soviet ukraine under soviet communist control, but still ukraine. then he said something else. it was sometime time ago that afford minister, mr. lavrov, stopped talking about the ukrainian government and instead started talking about the kyiv regime. and this is something mr. putin mentioned recently and a couple times before, that we take that regime as illegitimate, born of

a coup d'etat and guilty of crimes. moreover, he said that we will chase those who are responsible for perpetrating some of those acts in 2014 and we will punish them. this is very strong language. it was at this point that a lot of people, including myself, started thinking that he was going to essentially declare war on ukraine. we were surprised and relieved that at the end he said we are going to recognize the republics . the point he reached in the middle of the speech was truly, truly -- how shall i put it -- too difficult to simply accept.

so basically what i am trying to say is there are two things here. one thing is security guarantees. mr. prudent has failed to get the most important -- mr. putin has failed to get the most important ones for him and he is trying to counter the things he sees as problematic, dangerous for russia. the issue of ukraine, i believe mr. putin has taken a major step toward what one might call a final solution to the ukrainian issue. it is one thing to publish an article and although you are a sitting president, it is not simply an historian's work or

writer's musings, but different when you say these things and more and using much stronger language when you are addressing the nation as president, on a most important, even vitally important issue. i think that for mr. putin, ukraine has moved i think on his agenda. it is no longer something that he thinks about, feels strongly about, but something that is now on his agenda. aaron: on his agenda for action? dmitri: yes. aaron: again, we come back to the issue of what is the end state? you could ask yourself the question why move now? mr. putin has moved as a brilliant tactician and some

would say strategist, opportunist. why move now, a divided europe without strong leadership, weakened u.s. president, disarrayed domestically, politically, a strengthening of the russian-chinese relationship? all of those factors apparently are creating a basis for the timing of this. again, and i am pressing you, i know, however you may be as an analyst to predict the future, but again, where do you think this is headed? dmitri: let me add another thing, which i believe is more important. 2024 is coming. this is a presidential election year in russia.

i do not believe, although mr. putin may surprise us all, i do not believe that mr. putin is about to leave the presidency in two years' time. however, every election, the presidential election in russia, is a test for the system. you have to come up with something for the election. you have to get the people out, you know, and vote. it is not taken lightly by the kremlin, this challenge. what domestically is some sort of let's say reconstruction of the russian federation. geopolitically, politically, economically, culturally, ideologically, part of this wider transformation of the russian state, russian system,

economy, society, by shedding the last remaining vestiges of call them for short western rooted globalization friendly elements. russia is being remodeled on a set of values that are considered to be russian, genuinely russian, not imported for the united states -- from the united states or germany or the western world, but genuinely russian. the changes in the constitution adopted in 2020 or a major step in that direction. what may follow by 2024 could be a much tighter union with

belarus and maybe with the new republics of donetsk , including them into the union state, you could have belarus and part of what used to be ukraine, 4 million or 3 million people in that state. that would be presented as a major exercise in strengthening the russian state. aaron: you wrote a great book in which you argued that we need to get over the notion that russia is an empire and can be re-created as one. does any of mr. putin's moves -- how do you reconcile that conclusion with mr. putin's objectives in light of what you just said with respect to

belarus and the new russian republics in the donetsk? dmitri: we are an analyst's vision of the future, something that particular analyst believes should fit for russia and the specific actions of the head of state. i will stop musing and begin analyzing. mr. putin lives under the trauma of a collapse of the russian state, twice in the last 100-something years, and actually his statement last night was one of his most vitriolic comics -- comments,

credits of lenin. he blamed lennon for the breakup of the soviet union and he blamed lenin for pandering to ukrainian and other nationalists in order to save himself and the bolshevik party and keep them in power. he was very, very critical of lenin or is why he called this, if you like what some other russians would call -- ukraine, he called it leninist ukraine. of course he meant the geographic expanse of ukraine, the geographic composition of the country, but that is very important. i think that is to putin, who actually in this long speech, he

engaged in some memories from distant past. he said that in 2000, during bill clinton's visit to moscow, he asked the united states president the question of what the u.s. attitude would be to russia within nato. he said he never told that to anyone publicly. it is a well-known fact that in the early to thousands, vladimir putin -- in the early 2000s that bled repute wanted to rush into nato and europe. before the famous munich speech in 2007, in 2001 he spoke in german and proclaimed russia's european vocation. he was bitterly disappointed in his attempts to fit russia into

the wider west and his conclusion was that the west will never ever accept a strong russia. he bases his actions on that insight, if you like. so he is building a strong russia, to him also means a russia that has more russians under its roof than it had russian speaking regions integrated with or within the russian federation. aaron: you mentioned 2024 and i want to use that to get to the issue of the united states. how critical is joe biden in vladimir putin's calculations now? i mentioned 2024, because either

putin will face mr. biden, with whom perhaps he still wants to cut some sort of deal. we haven't talked about diplomacy, but this is a form of diplomacy, or face another u.s. president. when he looks at the biden administration, does he look at it as a fundamental adversary or as a potential partner to validate whatever new form of security arrangement vladimir putin is trying to achieve, not just in ukraine, but in europe beyond ukraine. how does he look at joe biden? dmitri: i think he looks at joe

biden as the only partner that he has on all of these issues. he has given up on the europeans. i think a particular the visit by chancellor scholz i wouldn't necessarily say was a disaster but a big disappointment. his comment later that putin's claims of a genocide of russians in ukraine was ridiculous, this was repeated 1000 times on russian television, which means to me that it deeply offended president putin personally. you do not joke -- it is not a trifle -- you do not use the word ridiculous next to

genocide, especially when you are talking about genocide of russians. i think he sees president biden as a partner who is well-equipped to deal with the issues. mr. biden is someone who remembers very well the cold war , who sat down with officials and someone who recognizes russia -- someone who sees the soviet union as an historical name for russia and deals with russia just as they dealt in some way with the soviet union. someone who genuinely does not want war in europe. so i think -- and for the time being, the beauty, if i may say

so, in dealing with joe biden was that joe biden was unlike donald trump. joe biden is supported by the majority on capitol hill, even as people have some questions about this or that potential deal with putin, they are not as ready to call it high treason as they did during the presidency of donald trump. who knows what comes next. if it is a person from the new generation who may never have heard about the cold war or the soviet union, it could be much more difficult to do deals with that person. so i think that biden in many ways is someone with whom mr. putin can do business. the problem is that the things that mr. putin has identified as

his major goals and major diplomatic demands of the united states cannot be met exactly in form that mr. putin has formulated. that's the problem. aaron: i think that is probably an understatement given the politics here and mr. putin's own actions. if you were to speculate -- and that's all we can do -- to try to separate out what is vital for mr. putin as opposed to what is discretionary, what are the must haves, if in fact were to have a diplomatic process, as opposed to what would be the nice to haves, what would they be? and this is all premised on the notion that putin is interested in using coercion to somehow secure diplomatic gains. that is still a highly arguable

proposition based on where we are now. dmitri: well, that he has no other means to take the united states to the negotiating table with him. and he believes that he tried many other means in the past but it led nowhere. that they united states only understands and becomes interested when it is threatened by an adversary and then it becomes interested in the adversary. that is something that to him was born out of a pretty bitter experience. with regard, i think mr. putin -- what i think mr. putin needs is an ukraine that is friendly to russia, friendly in the sense that it doesn't have to be

economically integrated -- that would be too costly, not militarily integrated. i don't think russia would count ukraine alliances as particularly loyal, but a country that is de facto demilitarized. it has eight military but that is not a problem for russia -- it has a military, but that is not a problem for russia. that it does not host foreign bases and forces and essentially deals with moscow as its principal partner. it may also deal, of course, with the western countries, but moscow would be the principal partner. but even that, i think, maybe dated. after what mr. putin said last night, and again i rate this

speech so much higher than the june article for obvious reasons. mr. putin may have decided that ukraine will not stand, even in its geographic location that ukraine needs to become similar to donetsk and luhansk . it is a total reformatting of the geopolitical map of that part of europe. i think that is where we are today. that is not necessarily where i thought we were even two or three days ago. aaron: i understand that and appreciate it.

china -- vista putin and president xi initiated clearly the key advantages that include russia as a consequence of this relationship -- is mr. putin worried at all about becoming president xi's little brother or a junior partner in this relationship? will this provide president putin with everything he needs? dmitri: clearly not, it will provide russia with things that china will not be able to abide because china does not have it, some of the more advanced technologies for example. on the other hand, the west is closing its technology exchanges with russia anyway. and there is a clear danger in

accepting too much from china and becoming overly dependent on china. mr. putin certainly does not want to make russia china's little brother. people may see it that way, but this is certainly not mr. putin's objective in this is something the bulk of the russian people will not support. so there are limits to how much russia would want to be exposed to china and there are also limits to how much china would run the risk of becoming too close with russia. both sides understand that. the beauty of the relationship is that it is a no-nonsense, totally unsentimental relationship.

the leaders understand the language of power and understand about balances and understand about the asymmetries between them. again, it is an adult relationship. aaron: one final question -- if you had your two or three minutes with president biden today, based on your understanding and analysis of vladimir putin, what would you tell him? dmitri: well, i think that my colleagues with president biden and others in the administration, they have a lot to tell them. i don't know. i am not a supply-side guy.

i try to answer the questions that people pose to me. i don't want to impose on people. i don't think any foreigner should have the illusion of being able to influence the united states and leaders. but helping american leaders understand things better is something foreigners can do. i will be waiting for a question if i open my mouth. aaron: i think if joe biden were listening to this podcast he would have walked away learning something. so let me thank you for very thoughtful analysis, for your honesty and your humility in the face of all of this uncertainty. perhaps too many people are too certain and we get ourselves into big trouble. i'm always testing and reconsidering our own analysis and i think we have done that.

thank you for participating and thank everyone for listening. a, -- a podcast event has been rescheduled and you do not want to miss it it will be very interesting conversation on the state of the republican, ken burns and his documentary. with that, i wish everyone a happy day. dmitri, we will talk soon, and thanks again. dmitri: thank you very much. goodbye. >> coming up wednesday on c-span, center for strategic and international studies looks at the relationship between china and russia and what it means for the united states. that's live at 10:00 a.m. eastern. laser, a new jersey democratic presented a joins the jewish democratic council of america

for an update on the crisis in ukraine in light of russia's latest actions. that's live on c-span starting at 2:00 p.m. eastern. watch online at c-span.org or on the go with our app, c-span now. ♪ >> c-span offers a variety of podcasts that have something for every listener. weekdays, washington today gives you the latest from the capital, and book tv plus has information from writers. the weekly uses audio from our archives to look at how issues of the day developed over the years and our series with historians about their lives and work. many of our television shows are also available as podcasts. find them on the c-span now mobile app or wherever you get your podcasts. ♪ >> i can report to the nation,

america is on the move again. >> live, tuesday, march 1, the state of the union. president biden addresses the joint session of congress and the nation addressing his first year in office and laying out his plans for the year ahead, he speaks at 9:00 followed by a republican response and we will take your phone calls and reaction. live, tuesday, march 1 at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span, c-span.org or on the c-span now io act. -- video app. >> next, attorney general merrick garland briefed the press on the conviction of three men for hate crimes in the killing of ahmaud arbery who was chased down while shot -- and shot by the defendants in georgia. they were previously convicted of his murder.