leader reset. host: a couple minutes as we wait for the event to start at the center for strategic and international studies, and event on china and russia and what it means for the u.s., starting in less than five minutes. it might be getting underway right now. we will end the program here, but we will be back here tomorrow at 7:00 a.m. eastern, 4:00 a.m. pacific. we take that -- take you now to the center for strategic and international studies. >> i am delighted to be coasting this event with the director and csis. our discussion does not need much set up. events that have transpired over

the last couple of days and months have given a clear enough indication of why today's discussion is critical. ukraine has declared a state of emergency. yesterday, the biden administration unveiled a new sanctions package targeting moscow. we want to join that conversation, i bite looking at the role of china. what will is china playing in this growing crisis, which we want to address in the first part of our discussion? then we will discuss possible trajectories for the china-russian relationship in the years ahead. we have a lot to get through in a short amount of time. we have a fantastic panel of experts joining us today to give us 360 coverage of events in

ukraine and the broader china-russia relationship. we have got andrea kendall taylor, director of the transatlantic security program at the center for new american security. previously, she served at the national intelligence council. cairo bonnie is the chair of the indo pacific research program. we have a professor of international studies at stanford university. mike was ambassador to the russian federation from 2012 to 2014. during the obama administration, evan served on the staff of the national security council and as senior director for asia. angela extent is the director

your merit up for european studies and professor emerita. she served as national intelligence officer for russia and eurasia at the national intelligence council. before that, at the state department. this could not be a better group of experts. before we start, a few logistics. i will moderate the first half of the discussion, where we will focus on events as they transpire and china's evolving role. i will then turn it over to my colleague, bonnie lind. we will look at the russia-china relationship and where it goes from here. we also want to invite audience members to ask questions.

you can go to csis.org. click on "events." you will notice a button that says "ask live question." we will hold 15 minutes at the end of the discussion where we can address those. i am going to go down the line and ask for your thoughts on the china's role in this emerging crisis. aging seems to have put itself into a difficult position by both supporting moscow's position on nato expansion while also trying to maintain its traditional view on territorial sovereignty, saying it respects all nations' territorial sovereignty, which seems to be in tension with its support for russia.

beijing continues to insist that a diplomatic solution be found as it continues to hold discussions with russia on ways it can mitigate sanctions. this is a have your cake and eat it too strategy by beijing. i am curious if this is tenable. i want to put it to the group on how you assess this and also anyone who is willing to give possible speculation on how you think beijing is willing to move forward. how much support will and throw behind moscow, helping to evade sanctions? is this 2014 all over again? or has the russia-china relationship round to such an extent or has the relationship with the west deteriorated to such an extent that beijing may be willing to take on more risks. i would love to get reaction on those or any other questions you

think salient. you are watching this as close as anyone. what is beijing's strategy? what do you find important to notice? what is your expectation moving forward? >> thanks so much. i am thrilled to be part of this panel and looking forward to hearing everybody's thoughts on one of the defining situations for the next decade. i thought i would keep my comments to talking about two specific things. i think it matters because it is critical to what we are saying in eastern europe. secondly, my thoughts about the current position the chinese government has taken. on the joint statement, while it

was not the last piece of the puzzle for peyton -- putin, it did provide a sense of certainty about the political support he would be receiving from beijing. when he traveled to china, we do know that the current situation is not mentioned in the statement, but we know that he meant -- met sergey lavrov. to me, the february 4 statement matters at least in so far as --. it established congruence between the two sides. both sides have a somewhat shared vision of a future world order.

essentially, major powers have a greater say in shaping world order. apparently, we are in a state of world disorder. from their actions, it is clear that both sides believe that force and coercion to varying degrees are necessary to shape this new order. it is not necessary there is some sort of shyness about the use of force. in the statement, china formally backed the russian position on nato eastward expansion. this says -- this is china stepping forward, more so than in 2014. on security, the idea of the principle of individual security is reflected in the joint

statement. it is not suddenly coming out. it is part of it for a long time. also, beijing was somewhat caught unaware with how things have escalated. i wanted to put a sentence from the joint statement to say i do not think that is the case. there is a part of the joint statement which says that russia and china undermine security and stability i think it is quite clear. that is my take on what the joint statement means. on the chinese leadership's public reaction, i do not think it is surprising, but it is an example of why when two sides have a strategic congruence,

that does not necessarily mean they will not have differences on specific policies and actions. the commonality of security purpose is not necessarily apply agreements and approaches. china and russia have different interests. therefore, their actions will differ. how they go about doing that is something we will have to watch. to me, what russia has done in ukraine impinges on several chinese goals. china does not necessarily want a cold war style confrontation. it wants to preserve its economic interests in europe and wants to keep the developing world on its side. the reaction to the kenyon representative at the u.n. was

an indicator of tensions. the messaging ukraine has been supportive of russia. it is a difficult act to perform. the recent statement from the security conference tell us it is going to be difficult. this balancing act will depend on the scale going forward that is an uncomfortable position, but for the moment, it is still manageable. to me, all of this also allows china watch with the west is doing. what tools does it deploy? what costs is it willing to bear ? given the nature of domestic politics and populism in large parts of the world. it is also a good test case to test the belief that the west is falling and the east rising.

i want to speculate whether -- how they will react. i would like to hear what others have to say. >> excellent remarks. the second half of the discussion will turn to this issue of what larger lessons beijing may be learning looking at the european command u.s., and nato response. evan, at set of questions and any additional thoughts after hearing the opening remarks? >> thank you. great panel. four points from me. first, i agree that the convergence between russia and china is substantial. it represents a common vision. that common vision of global

affairs is about constraining u.s. power, but more than that. there is clearly a set of shared ideas for organizing global governance. while we often focus on the constraining balance of u.s. power, there is another part. it is important when we talk about common interest to focus on common material interests. high degree of economic complementarity, energy connectivity, and substantial sharing of military technology. the carnegie endowment has done great work on this. it is important to recognize that the convergence of material interests is substantial and appears enduring. in terms of common values, that is important as well. noninterference in internal affairs, single party systems,

of course opposing democracy and color revolutions putting forward their own version of democracy. this is a substantial conversion of vision, interest, values and it looks to be enduring even when we are past the ukraine issue. point number 2 -- this convergence is not a recent development. it is a culmination of years of this, which accelerated in 2014. i saw the convergence between putin and xi jinping institutionally and personally in the wake of his annexing of crimea. this timing of food being in control and -- putin being in control and xi being in power

had an important result. this language about no limits, some scholars say that language goes back to 2017. juang he highlighted it in january of 2021. last year, putin publicly stated that russia was helping china to build an early warning system or their nuclear and missile capabilities. if you look at their exercises, they are trending toward combined, if not eventually joint, military operations. it has been growing for a while. while the february joint statement brought this to the forefront, even absent ukraine, a think -- i think we would have

been experiencing a substantial cooperation. .3 on ukraine -- i see china's top position as characterized by a strategic try lament, trying to balance three baskets of interest. the first is to stay aligned with russia, to express sympathy for russia, and concerns about u.s. actions, nato expansion. second, a desire to maintain adherence to core p.r.c. principles, in particular, the inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity. the third basket is to avoid incurring too much damage with nature economic partners, minimize collateral damage from sanctions, and to maintain

strong ties with the developing world. i thought the statement from the kenyon representative yesterday was notable in that regard. it raises the question whether or not voices in the developing world will create a new complication for china. how are they going to manage this strategic trilemma? they are going to engage in strategic cake-ism -- they are going to have their cake and eat it too. they are going to the into the russian side. i interpreted the commons is essentially that, standing on

principle but blaming the united states, nato, european countries for provoking russia. at this stage, the robert will hit the road for china in managing this trilemma will be in terms of sanctions. how much sanctions is china willing to offer russia? it is going to be hard for them to balance this sympathy on the one hand versus avoiding in the in aiding the u.s., europe. if they provide substantial relations -- substantial sanctions relief, that will create problems with the u.s. and the eu. fourth and final point, what should the u.s. do about it?

our options are limited. the u.s. can try pulling them apart, but that looks maybe futile given the degree of convergence. for russia, the argument would be, look, you have an inherently unequal relationship with china. let us cooperate together. for a variety of reasons that andrea, mike, angela will articulate, that does not seem remotely possible. for china, the argument would be russia is a depreciating asset. you are going to compromise your interests with the developing world and maybe drag you into a cold war. given the substantial converging interests, maybe you should just give up and find a new modus operandi for stable relations with the west.

that is going to be difficult, giving a variety of anxieties and perceptions of xi jinping about the u.s. you could try to isolate, criticize, penalize russia or china -- china for its embedding of russia, including trying to use this moment to galvanize europe, to criticize china and perhaps penalize china, especially if they provide sanctions relief, far more than was done in 2014. in essence, create a coalition that forces china to rethink its relationship with russia as too costly. or the risk of that strategy, all you do is push russia and china closer together and ring about a more pronounced -- bring

about a more pronounced split globally. the third option is you could focus on isolating, penalizing russia and with china adopt a more narrow approach focused on trying to minimize the degree of comfort and relief china provides to russia but not really target china in any significant way. give china a pass or or less, but focus on minimizing relief. one thing that deserves a double tap is this idea put forward by the journalist and commentator on friday is the u.s., if it was smart and strategic, would run the kissinger -- nixon 1972 play, pull china from russia.

i want to remind the audience that there were two factors in 1972 that do not exist today. one, china and russia had a high degree of antagonism. there was an acute chinese fear of russian attacks on china, most notably captured in the 1969 conflict. two, china was economically and militarily weak in 1972. there was a group of leaders, not now per se -- not mao per se, who was interested in modernizing and new aligning with the west was going to be key. the two proximate factors that were probably most influential in facilitating the success of

that rep. sherrill: -- that rapprochement could not be more different today. >> let me turn to andrea, angela, then mike and shifting our lands to looking at this from the vantage point of moscow . let me throw a couple of questions out. it would be helpful to get access wins on to what extent china's support february 4 have played into moscow's calculations. what might moscow be expecting from beijing moving forward? andrea, those questions and others that you would like to respond to as it pertains to unfolding events? >> great to be on this panel. i agree with both evan and manoj

that russia-china relationships have deepened. there cooperation amplifies the threat that both countries pose to the u.s.. from russia's perspective, china's support helps mitigate western pressure. that has been important for pressure. the deepening partnership helps explain the timing of putin's aggression in ukraine. it is not a primary factor, but i think it contributes to quickness a sense of confidence and helps explain why putin thinks this is the time to push his demand. he knows he has a partner in crime. he has got xi in his corner. they are trying to change the order that they view does not advantage either of them. that relationship has emboldened putin.

it is true also, though, that russian actions hold a key fissure in the russia-china relationship. we think about what are the fissures that we could exploit to limit the extent to which the countries are doing together? one natural fissure that has nothing to do with the u.s. is the differing pensions for instability. russia does have a penchant for destabilizing action, while china has this desire to rise to great power status. this is pulling it at that seem. when i think about how this relationship has evolved, their partnership has deepened without either country having to incur any costs for the other. they have had the strong, natural alignment of interests.

they have the shared interest to undermine u.s. influence and power, but they have been re-to pursue those objectives -- been free to pursue those objectives through their own needs. neither country has had to incur costs. china is going to have to define whether it is willing to incur costs to support russia. i have appreciated the comments about this idea of china standing on principle than supporting russia. i have been wondering how to interpret china's comments saying that ukraine enjoys the right to territorial sovereignty or that they rhetorically do not endorse the invasion. i have not understood exactly how to think about those comments, but the thought that has toomey is that -- to me is that these countries lie.

putin lies all the time. i have wondered whether we may see china working from the same playbook in the sense that beijing can say all the right things and continue to work with russia to undermine influence -- u.s. influence. even if china does not support russia on the sanctions, there is still a lot that they can do together again the defense domain my particularly in the democracy and human rights domain, which i think are most consequential for the united states. ukraine does not have any effect on that. in my mind, even if there are limits to what china is willing to do, it is not take away from the significance of this partnership. we should expect to their

alignment to continue as it has. if anything, this may be peyton plowing the ground -- puti plowing then ground, doing from work for china, trying to challenge the order more aggressively moving forward. it is early to tell how this will unfold, but i am happy to try to make sense of it. >> excellent comments. angela, a lot on the table. anything that you want to pick up from what has been said or the framing questions that i laid out at the outset? >> thank you for having me on this panel. i agree with everything the previous speakers have said. putin would not have embarked against ukraine at this time if he did not know that he would have china's support. it is not the reason, but it is

the timing and the fact that he knew that whatever happened, the chinese would be there. in 2014, the west tried to isolate russia. china stepped in. now that relationship is stronger. we have a different chinese leader. this is the central backdrop for understanding what putin is doing. the united states finds itself in a similar situation to the soviet union in the early 1970's. an antagonistic relationship with the united states, then -- decided it would embark on a detente with the united states because it did not want to face these two major antagonist.

today, these two powers coming together, i think it is impossible to try and persuade russia that it should weaken its ties with china. it is important for two authoritarian leaders to support each other domestically. they have interests in common. in theory, maybe the u.s. should think about in fact doing a similar 2022 version of kissinger and reaching out to the chinese, but we are in the opposite position. from the chinese point of view, the chinese are pushing negotiations. we have to implement them.

the fact that the russians have an out recognized those two entities as independent states has -- that is one thing where the chinese will have to adjust at least their rhetoric. i do believe that the chinese not approve of the violation of another country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. but there are still blaming nato and the u.s. for this crisis. however, china does have not and is substantial relationship -- not an insubstantial relationship with ukraine. if the ukrainian economy continues to tank, that affects

chinese interest. think will have to balance that with the kind of support we see them giving russia now. we will have to watch the reaction to the sanctions. in 2014, major chinese banks that complied. china's economic interests are much greater with the u.s. and europe and with russia. china will have to very carefully balance it support for russia while not trying to jeopardize its own economic interest with the west. it will help russia to get relief, but if the russians go further and the military conflict extends in ukraine and there are massive sanctions threatened by the u.s. and the european union. i think the if every fourth

meeting -- february 4th meeting underscore the strength of this relationship. putin has made the choice that russia will remain china's junior partner going forward. he understands russia's role in this. as long as he is in power, he will see china as a partner in pushing back against the west, in reordering the global order that both russia and china criticize. whereas russia talks about the possibility of a tripartite, dividing the world into russian, chinese, american influence, if you go back to the cold war, there were rules. the soviet union observed those rules.

his interests are more in a disordered world system where there are no rules and where disruption is key. i am not sure that that is the view. but that is far down the road. for now, china will remain a major supporter of russia and enable it to do whatever it is going to do in ukraine. >> excellent remarks. maybe in the second part of the discussion, we can probe your final point. beneath the february 4 joint statement, there is some deep nonalignment's and how they think about international order. mike, i would ask you to back cleanup.

-- bat cleanup. worryingly, there is a lot of alignment amongst all our speakers. i might ask you for any thoughts or comments on the above, any areas of two alignment, just so we can make it interesting? -- reas -- areas of disalignment >> thanks for having me. i wanted to go at last, because i wanted to find things to disagree with. i do not have prepared remarks. i did not find a lot to disagree with. i am going to go through telegraphic lead the way i see putin's view of china and get to the fundamental one that angela

just ended with, which is the way that he sees the world in terms of revisionism and destruction of the liberal world order. one, i am saying this partly because i know we have a lot of china experts sinning. i am not a china expert, but i am a huge consumer of china and have talked to their russia experts. putin's worldview, some of it i share as it relates to china. putin thanks russia is a great power. he is partially right. sometimes, we look at gdp and say it is burkina faso. that is wrong. they are the third-biggest power in the world.

he understands that they are the third, but he has deliberately aligned himself with china to balance against the u.s. putin's russia is an autocracy. that is obvious, but it is way more autocratic than it was a year ago. there seemed to be some parallels there with china as well. as you turn as autocratic as putin has, that means the u.s. as a democracy is a threat. it does not matter how much happy talk you are going to have. the very existence of the u.s. as a democracy is a threat to his legitimacy as an autocrat. parallels to xi jinping there as well. i think that putin is an ideologue. he is a nationalist, orthodox, populist autocrat.

i have known putin since 1991. i followed his career for a couple of decades. he was not always this way, but i think there is a body of thought, call it liberalism. i do not -- call it i ll-liberalism. i do not want to get caught up on ideology. he has a set of use that animates what he does. that is why sometimes these cost-benefit analyses that we assign to him do not work. it is different from xi jinping's thought. the ideological mission that they have domestically and internationally are quite different. he does not just have an ideology for home. he seeks to propagate it abroad.

he sees a nice division of labor between china and russia. he focuses on the developing world, china is focused on the developing world. he invests in propagating these ideas. he has had a lot more success than people in the western world relays. think of lepen and donald trump. they are more ideologically aligned with putin then joe biden. there is also a lot of alignment with xi jinping. that creates commonality. fifth and finally, putin seeks to undermine the liberal order. he is comfortable to be in a 19th century world, redrawing borders. he already has three times.

he has already gone to war four times. he is very comfortable with the use of power that does not have the u.n. giving it legitimacy. he is risky. he is on the brink of another major war. he thinks he has won all those wars. there is a triple data to suggest he has. that makes him a risky actor willing to take risky action to demise the international order in a way that makes xi jinping uncomfortable. i am a big football fan. it reminds me of you want to win the super bowl, so you take a chance on antonio brown. he is a troubled actor, but maybe he will make our team at her.

look at what this troubled actor is doing for xi jinping there is a fundamental divided between a china that wants to reform the liberal international order and create pockets of order independent of that versus putin who just wants to break it down. i am not sure that this cannot last. we are all in the preinvasion way of thinking about the world right now. i hope i am wrong. i do not know what putin is going to do, but let us think about some of the worst-case scenarios. if there are tens of thousands of people being shelled in the heart of europe, is it going to be so easy for xi jinping? i love evan's phrase cake-ism.

it will be harder to do that then in 2014. president bynum is going to call on the world -- are you with this war or against it? that will be hard, especially if the war has consequences beyond ukraine, which i do not think is a zero probability. >> thank you, mike. excellent comments and good provocations that set us up nicely for the next phase of the discussion. there is a lot of speculation right now about what china may be learning for its own at territorial ambitions in ukraine by watching russia -- territorial ambitions in taiwan by watching russia in ukraine. if there is a long, protracted work with houses of moneybags --

body bags headed home to russia, xi jinping would do well to think of what a similar operation would do in taiwan. because we are trying to mobilize support in the u.s., we always play the upside, but if we want to outcompete russia and china, we need to start finding fault lines in the relationship and exploiting that. let me to it over to bonnie. we have got a good half-hour left. behind schedule, but still sufficient time to delve deeper. >> thank you to all of the panelists for your excellent remarks. we are focusing on the broader china-russia relationship, but i am cognizant of the fact that much of this was discussed in your opening comments. i will focus on specific topics. angela, i was struck by your

mentioning that russia understands its role as a junior partner. what happens after putin --? is that he worst-case scenario in terms of the russia-china relationship? >> great question. first of all, the question is also how important are the personalities driving this relationship. i think they are very important, especially in an authoritarian regime. particularly because russia and china are not natural allies. it has taken these two leaders to drive the relationship forward. a few years ago, i was at the st. petersburg economics firm. jason peng and -- xi jinping and

putin were on stage together, saying it were best friends, but that relationship between the two of them is important. if putin were no longer around, that is your question, any russian government pivoting to asia, this is something putin has been working at, that would still be there. russia under a new leader might have a less antagonistic relationship with the rest -- west, but that does not mean it would not still have strong ties to china. i have to believe that a future russian leader might want to balance this relationship more than putin himself is doing. nevertheless, russia has had

military ties with china, economic ties which are growing. i do not think that is going to fade away. but i think also a future russian leader might have a different view of world order, but putin can stay in power until 2036 and beyond that, xi jinping can stay as long as he likes. >> if we have to wait until 2036, that is a long time to shape the russia-china relationship. andrea, you had mentioned some of the cost to china that it would incur in the event of a further escalated conflict in ukraine.

i want to look at more hypothetically in the future. would russia be willing to incur potential cost in the future in the event of a potential chinese buildup on its borders? you talked about how authoritarian powers have a willingness to bluff. they might not be as credible. do you think that if china was to find itself in a similar situation that russia would be willing to incur costs for china? >> probably not significant costs. they have an understanding that on their core security interests , ukraine for russia and taiwan for china -- that those are their primary domains. i do not think either country would expect the other to come to their aid directly on issues that are critically important to

their core security. but i do think that one area where the relationship between russia and china has been the most consequential is in the defense domain. we already see the ties between them growing. we know that russia is providing increasingly sophisticated weapon systems to the chinese. there was the mention of the early warning missile systems. it is not just air defense. russia is basically making it easy for china to keep the u.s. out of its backyard. they are bringing the chinese military along, doing joint exercises. russian -- they are not battle tested. russian forces are. they are also sharing some of their know how that helps

mitigate some of the vulnerabilities of the chinese military. they are doing these joint exercises, the defense ties are deepening. russia is helping china in the indo pacific. i also would say i do not think it would be entirely beyond the realm of possible, but if there was a military confrontation between china and the u.s. in the indo pacific that russia could -- [dog barking]. >>. as they are waiting for andrea to come back -- maybe as they are waiting for andrea to come back, let me turn to evan and mike. we had mentioned quite a bit of areas of convergence and

divergence between china and russia. one question is how much does u.s. ally strategy factor into their growing relationship? what can the u.s. do to prevent what we would view as a worst-case scenario? in what ways do our actions -- could we push the two countries to become even closer? >> happy to jump in. or evan? >> andrea, let me turn it back to you. then maybe mike and then evan. >> it is not beyond the realm of possible that if there was a military confrontation between the u.s. and china in the indo pacific that russia could look to raise the cost to the u.s. they could disrupt satellites,

submarine warfare to raise the cost of the confrontation. it comes back to my point. i have thought about this relationship that they amplify the threat that they pose to each other. they are the distinct challenges, but the way they cooperate makes them more threatening to the u.s. it is this idea of a synergy between them, but the one thing i wanted to pick up on was the point that mike made. the degree of violence associated with the ukraine situation is going to be one of the key factors that shapes how beijing factors what they are willing to do for russia. in that bloody situation, it would be evermore costly for china to throw its weight behind russia, but if militarily it is quicker or a last violent

scenario, i want to go back to the sports analogy and bring up the extent to which in a football analogy, putin is the blocker and xi is running with the football behind him. if we are getting our minds around a post ukraine world, if it is not incredibly violent in persian into ukraine, to me, it seems possible you could see these two authoritarian leaders leaned in to undermine and challenge the u.s. in that sense, putin may be laying the groundwork for xi to assume a more aggressive posture. >> mike, then evan. >> i have 55 things i want to say. one, at what to get to this

thing about what is in and what is not in. i want to underscore if we are talking about the long-term, it is hard to think about change. it is easy to think in status quo kind of ways. it was not that long ago -- when i was in the government, i will tell this by an anecdote. i remember vividly. it was a meeting at the white house with the vice president. it was with a senior russian official who i do not want to name. one of the top people in the government at the time, 2011, pete of cooperation with the u.s. he said, we know we are the junior partner with this trilateral relationship. we want to be on your site. then putin invaded ukraine and

we are in this moment now. but i want to get us away from the idea that russia is fixed this way and will be this way forever. it will be this way as long as utin -- putin's around, but remember how much volatility we have had. one breast now if -- when bresnef had a lot of victories, he was running the table. then he decided correlation of forces was on his side and that is when he invaded afghanistan. thing about what happened after that. it turned out to be a horrific mistake. new leaders in 1985 change things radically. i want us to be cautious.

i think we spent way too much time, especially in washington, inking about how we need to divide russia from china. why? what is the big deal? it is good that xi jinping has two defend this rogue actor. we need to ask more concretely why is it so important for us to bring fisher's -- fissures to that relationship? let mayor is not going to send russian forces to taiwan -- vladimir putin is not going to send russian forces to taiwan. military corporation is a thing,

but we should be thinking about how to unite the democratic world. in the long run, some say, it ukraine is a distraction. we have to focus on china. that is where the real action is. what is wrong about that argument is that the number one instrument of power that the u.s. has for decades is not our aircraft carriers or chips or soldiers. it is our ideas. that is where we are strongest against xi jinping. that is where the world is on our side. if we do not think about how to reinvigorate -- [no audio]

>> week seem to have lost our signal from this event. we will work to resolve the issue and hope to resume live coverage shortly. >> i welcome you to comment on anything that was discussed or if you want to comment on how the u.s. factors into the china-russia relationship. >> the obvious question is are you then prepared for a new cold war? do you believe that america's allies are going to be prepared to make the kind of choices based on values? i ask not to suggest that i disagree, but as somebody who spends my time thinking about

that you have experience negotiating with partners in asia and europe. -- the world that it is not clear to me that the world is prepared to make those kinds of choices. i would love to get your reaction. your characterization of u.s.-russia relations versus putin is him -- putinism has in some degree of applicability to xi jinping. we are focused on xi-ism and putinism. there clearly is a set of ideas that xi jinping has adopted about governance at home and abroad. they align with putin not perfectly, but a substantial degree of discomfort with the

international political order, some aspects of international security. it is an open question about whether or not a different relationship with the west. as you have seen a commentator did. i do not know if there are similar voices in china about that right now. what i do know, is somebody that has spent quite a bit of time, met him with vice president biden in 2001, he has a different set of ideas about economical future. about america's power about his tolerance. he is clearly much more risky than any other chinese leaders.

i think we are seeing that play out. there is a big question about whether or not you sort of portrayed him as you know, he just wants to reform liberal international. putin wants to break it. what i would say, the chinese have a diversity of views when it comes to political order, especially our ideas about the rights. the chinese do not want to reform it, they want to revise it and eliminate it the chinese have a different and negated set about views on international order. they do not tolerate. but the key point i think here, is that the chinese do not want to bring down a global order. i do not think they are fundamentally -- china's rise has been facilitated by

globalization. they want it more on their terms , increasingly in terms that disadvantaged the united states and other western economies. your point, our ability to sort of manufacture between them, especially when you have two leaders with strong views and relationships, i think it is going to be difficult to do that. unless, the external situation changes in a way that increases the cost for china. so, you know, for us to talk about, you know massive violence in europe leading to a conundrum for china, i actually agree. that is a very high-end scenario. the question is, if you do not have that kind of scenario, and have a situation in ukraine that is more permissive to a continuation of strategic take in's, what we do in that regard? final point is, kicking back up on this playing the china card

analogy. you know, what i see is that putin placed the china card on as. right? he basically took the play from kissinger. he ran kissinger's play on us in 2014 because of the growing frustration, anxiety, discretion sizing from the west. it accelerated by a lot of trump policies. that has been very successful. so to your point, the challenges press to try to divide them are substantial. the benefits are somewhat unclear at this point. i do think that it is important to keep my mind the chinese, perhaps more than putin, based in their calculations on a pretty practical benefit calculus. i think he continues to be very

focused on national rejuvenation. of course the chinese economy is facing structural headwind. now is not a good time for him to take the security crisis appeared it is important to keep in mind. there are some sources of leverage there, but there are limits given the ideas that he himself holds about global governments and domestic governments. i just think has deep skepticism of the west marker cr relative -- west democracy. >> thank you. >> i do want to give up mike, also andrea time to wait in --weigh in. let me turn for your perspective.

basically, whatever you want, however you want to weigh in from the perspective of india. >> i also disagree. i want to get to the valid points that i do not agree with. do not think that there is a fundamental difference between china and russia. when you look at china's force, it seems like there is a significant risk. i think that is something we need to be mindful of. in terms of force and how that is used, yes, there is a difference between how china and russia operates.

it is very different. china does not want that to happen. the use of force is a really good objectives there. i think that is what we need to keep in mind. in terms of how india views the russian, china relationship. i want to echo something that was said. i think if you look at it from a point of view and explain a large point of view, values of democracy, to me, that is something that is not going to get you far. india specifically, there is a much more pragmatic approach. if you look at foreign policy, one of the biggest things in foreign policy domestically and internationally has been that it used to be motivated but -- by a sense of idealism.

many would disagree with that. there is much more pragmatism in foreign policy. how does india view the world? interviews of some stands -- interviews and substantial disorder taking place. it looks at it and it says look, we have tremendous economic challenges. we have a unstable environment. we have a extremely off cited security geographically. you have got china, you have got afghanistan on one side which is in term all. you have potentially tomorrow in central asia. you got a tremendously volatile environment. there is a big change that is being taken place in that environment. what you're looking at is either you look for partners that you can ally with.

so therefore, what india implement are doing is saying in this world where options are shrinking, how do we expand our options and expand our maneuver. in terms of the china russia relationship, i think that there is --. if you look at india's reaction so far, it speaks to that. in terms of balancing the deepening relationship between china and russia. i think there are multiple things that they are doing which i talked about. it is not a immediate response to what is happening.

it has been happening for the past 20 plus years now. the recent events that is engaging in issues of coalition and other sort of partnerships in the framework, expanding ties to certain countries. india wants to sort of --. we have the same -- the same as the philippines. finally, wanted to do that because you have to have the option.

so, that is how india looks at the dynamic between china and russia. there are two points that i would want to highlight. some of us see it is really important for -- to stop thinking about reducing by diversifying the ammunitions and extremely dependent on russian supplies. i think that there's a realization set in that also. this is particular when you're facing tensions on both borders . how russia views the relationship, my sense is that,

when you are in a partnership you do want others to act as balances. i think that is what somewhat russia views. that is all. >> thank you. so, judah is reminding me we have five minutes left. we wanted to make sure we went around the room and gave everyone time a final comment. let me go to mike first. then andrea and angela. mike, any last thoughts from your end? >> you're not going to get -- give me a chance to talk about them all. and test a conversation. we should do it again. let me just say two things. number one, i want to be eclipsed or clear when i was talking about -- i want to be cluster -- crystal clear. that was a analytical statement.

you might want china to be pragmatic, russia to be dogmatic. as i look at it, they are not. they have ideological agendas and to pretend that they do not, i think that is a analytical mistake. number two, i actually think to say that it is a pragmatic to think about ideas, you and i can have a long commerce i should about that. i think it served our security and economic interest were 100 of years. let's be careful of using pragmatic to describe those things. it is not pragmatic in my view thinking about what he is about to do to invade the country. for what? i listen to his speech. that was not a pragmatic speech. that was late ideological speech. -- that was a ideological speech .

i take your point. immobilizing cold war. i use different language is when i write about this. whether we can shape that our weather that is happening, as it in terms of policy. i would say two things. i am not sure we can. we are not the country that we were before. there are big part of the republican and democratic party that do not want anything to do with that. they do not care about ukraine, that is not our problem. that is the first one. secondly, i would just say, remember the cold war. we also had allies. we played a game that was, sometimes we were talking about our balance -- values. i think it will be a apartheid regime. i think what we need to do is learn the lessons from the cold war for when that was necessary.

sometimes i think it was necessary. what i think intellect to underlying strategy for how to be effective in this great power ideological world that we have entered. >> thank you. evan? >> wonderful discussion. >> great point. number one, ukraine crisis is a critical think. it is hard for me to think of another foreign policy challenge that china has faced. the power in 2012 that has so many different, stresses so many different chinese issues simultaneously. there is all sorts of different ways to frame it. this is going to be seminal. the choices that the chinese leadership make it will tell us a lot about them. point number two, what it will tell us about them, is that it agreed to which pragmatism, cold

cost benefit calculations, versus ideologically. ideology, but a commitment to domestic governments and global governments informed on how he makes decisions about foreign policy. the chinese foreign policy community have been raised and tutored on the chinese, even now is a cold part pragmatist when you carry away all of the windowdressing. i think with him, there are actually a series of ideas that he is committed to. underneath those ideas are a series of assessments about the relative value over democracy. then more coldhearted calculations about acceleration in relative decline. i do not think not only this

moment is instructive, it is not to be instructed in a very seminal way about understanding ideas versus power in chinese foreign policy, but also specifically in the u.s. china relationship. final point, third final point, is what should the u.s. do about it? mike and i might this agree about this. i do think we want to think about relative alignment and manoj right that the degree of violence is -- has occurred over ukraine and in europe. it will be very important. the higher degree of violence makes it difficult for the chinese. easier for us to time -- to manipulate the chinese. the result may be the approach of the u.s. may have to think about taking is, push them

closer together in order to eventually bring them apart. you know, all of the commentators were absolutely right. there are points up convergence and divergence. some of the points of convergence while very important, like pollutants affinity for -- putin's affinity for desire for economic growth and rejuvenation, those are fundamental. they are also pretty far down the road. it is unclear how quickly we are going to be able to operate them. the reality is, the united states may have to be willing to tolerate a degree of friction and background money in the u.s. china relationship. not wanting it or desiring it, but tolerate it in order to be in the effect chinese cancellations about relative alignment with russia. because if they said, putin ran kissinger 72 on us. i do not think we should be trying to run kissinger 72 on

the chinese right now. we will stop there. >> thank you. >> angela, we are two minutes over. i so want to give one or two minutes and andrea to close out. >> i'm going to be short here. i was happy to hear mike. what i wanted to say primarily was that when you look at it from a point of view, what is going to attract a deeper partnership, not whether democracy or whether the idea and actions are going to be met. you know, ideas are critical, i agree. look at it from an indian point

of view. secondly, i want to make a point about we have not spoke about the roles of european states. the response that your past and the level of pain that europeans are willing to bear is going to be critical in terms of how kind in response to the situation. specifically, we do not seek massive escalations appear even with massive escalations -- seek massive escalations. the final point, i sort of say that this balancing act that we have seen today, to me, and is

different from china and russia. quality is different between the united states and china. china is talking about how the united states is fundamentally looking to contain it. you're not going to see a split. and none of that is going to happen immediately. final point. we do think about how much of what is happening in europe with the american energy and resources. i think that is a genuine concern that i have to mention and talk about. andrea, final words? >> i will be quick. the russia china partnership is consequences -- consequential. i think ukraine is going to continue to be consequential in areas that matter quite a lot to the united states feared we talked about in the defense domain particularly very important. as well as the democracy, human

rights. that is the area that there are the fewest limits on what they are willing to do together. they are proper allies in -- popularizing government models. i mean the list goes on and on. i think even if china is not out front and blatantly backing up russia, there is areas of their partnership that they can still continue to work together and deepen and that are consequences -- consequent or to the united states. it might eventually push them apart. all of the other panels have said, that is a long way away. in the meantime, they have the ability to complicate and push back against u.s. interest. we have to think about what to do. i agree with mike, that willing allies coherence and unity is important. building resilience is important. i think we can't just stop there. i think we have to think about how we do stop the partnership.

we were talking about how to -- the relationship. i think the goal is to limit the expense of what they are willing to do together. i really liked evan's idea about showing china the costs for backing russia. i think one interesting approach to that is through europe. we know that china cares a lot about europe. if we can get the europeans in particular to articulate to china that there will be, i think there is one way that you can put on what china is willing to do for russia and like this case. i think that is the go. we're not going to pull them apart, we just want to limit what they are willing to do for each other. >> thank you. thank you very much for the other panelists for joining us. we had a rich discussion today.

i think we could have continued this conversation for another hour. we will have to wrap it up he or. i think everyone for joining us. we look forward to future discussions. >> house speaker nancy pelosi sends a weekly briefing with reporters and the u.s. response to russian tensions in the ukraine. that will be coming up in capitol hill in about seven or eight minutes. we will show you that briefing when it gets underway. in the meantime, a conversation from this morning washington journal. -- "washington journal".

>> economic roundtable this morning. running as with the discussion, we are joined by zoom with the president of policy institute and rachel with heritage foundation. good morning to you both. thanks for joining as.